On this Back Story with Dana Lewis, we talk to Yossi Beilin, the architect of the OSLO Peace accords on where does Israel go from here?
Beilin predicts either peace or a unilateral Israeli withdrawl from the West Bank.
And, Jerusalem Post Military Affairs reporter Anna Ahronheim who talks about military goals in Gaza and was it a victory over Hamas?
On this Back Story with Dana Lewis, we talk to Yossi Beilin, the architect of the OSLO Peace accords on where does Israel go from here?
Beilin predicts either peace or a unilateral Israeli withdrawl from the West Bank.
And, Jerusalem Post Military Affairs reporter Anna Ahronheim who talks about military goals in Gaza and was it a victory over Hamas?
If you ask me today on the Israeli side, if we don't change the government of Netanyahu, I don't think that we can really have negotiations on peace with the Palestinian
Speaker 2:Side. So it goes on the longer it goes on Mr. Bale and the more frustration, uh, on the Palestinian side and on, and the less trust on the Israel side, all you seem to do is to strengthen the, the far right, the extremists, and it makes peace even more difficult to even discuss.
Speaker 1:And this is why you need ideas, maybe new ideas, and you need the world to be involved.
Speaker 3:[inaudible]
Speaker 4:Hey everyone. And welcome to another edition of backstory. I'm Dana Lewis. I was based as a correspondent in Jerusalem for more than a decade. And during that time, the Israelis and Palestinians began a meaningful peace process. What a world away from where they are now, the Oslo Accords in 1993 meant that Israel would leave areas in the west bank and Gaza. And eventually this process would lead to a Palestinian state Israeli leader. Yitzhak Rabin said that living in peace with a Palestinian state was the only way to secure Israel's future because what's the alternative, the Israeli opposition leader, a guy named Benjamin that then Yahoo, the same Netanyahu who became prime minister led a huge campaign against the Oslo Accords. He fed into some degree, rode a wave of far right-wing hatred towards ravine and the peace process. Benjamin Netanyahu was the star speaker, by the way, it to now infamous demonstrations where the crowd slogans included death to ravine in July in 1995, Netanyahu walked at the head of a mock funeral procession featuring a fake black coffin
Speaker 2:Because the right
Speaker 4:Wing settler movement and ultra religious Jews somehow see a religious territory of Israel, as bigger than the modern state of Israel. They think that denying Palestinians, a Homeland and expanding the geographic boundaries of Israel is somehow messianic and repeating. They said was Dean rude death, a threat to Jewish lives. And that's how ravines assassin justified shooting Rabine in the back at a peace rally in Tel Aviv in 1995 in since then, what do we have? Netanyahu has killed the peace process and strengthened extremist Palestinians, chiefly Hamas, which controls Gaza and Israelis and Palestinians moderates. And by the way, they're the majority have very little voice. Is there a peace camp left? Well, no one knows better than the architect and chief negotiator of the Oslo Accords. You'll see baling. And on this backstory, you can believe what you want, but I actually think eventually Israel and the Palestinians have to settle this and push the extremists on both sides out of the discussion rejecting hate and violence.
Speaker 2:All right, joining me now from Tel-Aviv is you'll see bail and a former government minister, a member of the Israeli Knesset or parliament. Uh, he was one of the principle architects of the Oslo peace Accords, uh, and he joins me now. Hi, Mr. Balen.
Speaker 1:Hi, thank you for having
Speaker 2:Me. It's great to see you again because I interviewed you many time. And then in the 1990s, uh, when I was a correspondent based in Jerusalem with Canadian television, um, and you, you always had a very eloquent and I thought clear view of the road ahead in terms of being able to, uh, have a two-state solution with Palestinians. But first of all, let me ask you, um, we have had this horrendous couple of weeks, uh, with rocket attacks from Gaza and Israel's response and also violence on the temple Mount. What is your assessment of what is happening now? Are, are we on a, uh, a circle of violence that just continues to repeat itself? Or is this a very different chapter?
Speaker 1:Well, it's hard to know. I hope that this is not the case, that it was an eruption of violence as a result of the tensions, which are the, which have been there for years. From time to time, there is such an interruption and then the world intervenes and say, Hey, kids in the kindergarten, stop it. Why should you hate each other? And then they say, no, we have to eat a little bit more in order to achieve our targets. God knows what are the targets. And then they stop for a while. If there is no peace process, then things like that may continue. And it doesn't have to be a, a catastrophic, a development after which there is no way to get back to the, to any process. Uh, but it is a, it is a kind of a setback for sure. It is a kind of, uh, of a setback.
Speaker 2:It seems to me that look, there's been violence on temple mountain before there hasn't been violence in Gaza. Um, but every time it seems to progress and it seems to, in my view, the violence seems to get worse. I mean, look at 3000 rockets and more this time, uh, can this just continue on because long-term, is it not a long-term threat to Israel security? That's just not going to go away and it's going to increase.
Speaker 1:Yeah. If you asked me whether it can go on regretfully, the answer is not negative. It can go on by why, but why should it, I mean, this round is less lethal than the previous one. If you count the, eh, eh, killed the death toll on both sides, but this is, this is not the case. I mean, what is happening is that we are having to two Palestinian entities. One is in the west bank and another is in Gaza. And the problem is that the, the entity of Hamas in Gaza is not demanding. Anything politically, you don't need. They don't say no. We want to have a government. Or we want to have, eh, eh, eh, embassies in the world or whatever. They don't want anything. They said you Jews get out, which was by the way, the view of the Palestinians hundreds of years ago. And they changed their mind during the years, Hamas didn't change its mind, and you don't know what to do with him. I mean, I don't know what to do with that. If I personally want to talk with, with them, with some of them to know better, what do they really want? What are the aims Donald ready to talk to me? I'm, I'm the nemesis because I want peace. I want petition of the land. And then they, of course are not ready for any petition because the, the land, the holy land is a works and they're not ready to petition the land with another people. So they believe that with violence, with terrorism, whatever, they will be able to push us out of the land. Of course it is childish, but this,
Speaker 2:But at the same time, Israel has its very far right as, as the Palestinians do. And they want to push Palestinians out of the land. They want to take more settlements,
Speaker 1:Sorry. I'm not sure about that. What it is true that you don't have now a partner in Israel, it is true that the leadership in Israel in the last years was not ready to petition the land. And this is the litmus test all the time. This is the question, are you ready to share the land or not? And once Israel was not against then a false Israel was not a once the Palestinians were against it until 88. Actually there were not the real power in 88. The Palestinian changed their mind about it. And the 93 years were change its mind. That was that what happened. But the Hamas came up and say to the other moderate Palestinians, what are you doing? You are desecrating our land, our holy land. And we will do whatever in all the, to prevent it from happening and on the Israeli side, the far right or the not necessarily only the far right, was totally against the Oslo agreement was totally against partition and did whatever it could in order to prevent the, this brought to a very, very tough, eh, confrontation. And if you ask me today on the Israeli side, if we don't change the government of Netanyahu, I don't think that we can really have negotiations on peace with the Palestinian side.
Speaker 2:So the longer it goes on the longer it goes on Mr. Bale, and the more, the, the, the more frustration, uh, on the Palestinian side and on, and the less trust on the Israeli side, all you seem to do is to strengthen the, the far right, the extremists. And it makes peace even more difficult to even discuss.
Speaker 1:And this is why you need ideas, maybe new ideas, and you need the world to be involved. And that happened in the past. I mean, if, if you asked me whether there was a, a bigger supporting Israel for a Palestinian state, uh, 30 years ago, 27 years ago, the answer is no. And you remember it, that Israel was totally against the Palestinian state. That's changed in 93. And so I'm not giving up on the idea that things will change. And Netanyahu is USI is not very strong. I mean, his victory so-called is his ability to prevent another government and to drag a caretaker government for almost three years. This is what he's doing all the time.
Speaker 2:Do you still believe in a peace process? Do you still believe in a two-state solution?
Speaker 1:I, I don't have a better solution than a two-state solution, but if it is impossible and if there is a government in Israel, which is ready for petition while the Palestinian side, whatever it is, whichever it is is against it, then the only solution would be a unilateral withdraw. Like what we did in, in Gaza, it's bad. It's king it's, it's very expensive in blood and treasure, but we will not have another, another solution. If we want Israel to be a democratic and Jewish state.
Speaker 2:Why can you not go back to the peace table to begin negotiations with the PLO, which is more, more secular, more moderate strengthen, Abu muslins side and the west bank. And, and again, go back to the deal that maybe yes, sir, Arafat wouldn't sign before, which is access to the holy site of Jerusalem, the some discussion of right of return, a real Palestinian state in terms of geography. Why won't it work this time?
Speaker 1:Dana, we have the solution, you know, that we have the solution. It is the Clinton parameters. It is the Geneva initiative. I mean, it is in detail. It is not all the talks between Olmert and Abbas. I mean, all the talks with secretary Kerry in, in, in 2013, 14, the solution is there. We are not going to do now invent the wheel. We know what will happen in Jerusalem about the Arab enables in the Jewish neighborhoods. We know what will happen on the temple Mount that the temperament would be under the Palestinian state and, and the wailing wall will be under Israel. I mean, we know what will be with water with the, with the, the, eh, with the environment, with the other resources we did with the, I mean, we have the map in such details that we can just implement it tomorrow. The point is not that we need the solution is necessarily, although I believe personally that the best way to get to such a solution is through any Israeli Palestinian Confederation. And, and this is the new so-called new component that I'm adding to the formula, but generally, I mean, they need it and we need it and we will have it. We will have it eventually we will have it.
Speaker 2:What is the Israeli Palestinian Confederation?
Speaker 1:No. Um, I thought one of the most important thing, things for the, for the, for the Palestinians is the access to Israel, the Israeli market, to the Israeli universities, to the Israeli high tech. And of course, if it is a Confederation, it, it is not a one state solution, but there is accessibility, which is big and they can benefit. And they say, so, I mean, not necessarily openly, but they say so that they can benefit a lot from, eh, from Israel. And the, and I think that for Israel, it is very, very important among other things to keep those settlers who would prefer to remain in the Palestinian state as Israeli citizens in Palestinian residents, where they are in a, in a, in a Confederation, it is easy. And the same goes also for the issue of the refugees of the Palestinian refugees when they, the right of return is to the greater Confederation rather than necessarily to their homes, which have been already destroyed in the last 70 or 80 years. So I believe that that another government will eventually do that. Although the problem of Hamas is a problem. I mean, I, I'm not, eh, eh, dismissing the, the issue of Hamas. It was easier for me to say these things before Hamas took over, because I need a partner who want something for me, it might be even offensive, or at least very difficult for me to compromise on, but at least you say to me, okay, this is the price that I need in order to make peace with you. Let's argue about if somebody comes to me and say and says, what do you want? I'm not going to sell my car. Now let's negotiate. I mean, about one. So Hamas is something I eat meat. I don't have a simple answer to this. And I hope that the Arab world will help us, especially against the background of the normalization and whatever to deal with the issue of, of, of hummus.
Speaker 2:Could you go forward with the peace process on the west bank with the PLO and leave guys? Uh, not the popularity of Hamas rather than being bolstered, which had just, was probably in the last two weeks with this fighting, maybe wouldn't, it would be diminished. And eventually there would be a more moderate faction in Gaza. I mean, I, I don't know
Speaker 1:What I'm saying is that I don't want Hamas to have the, the veto power over peace with the Palestinians. So my idea is to sign a peace agreement with the Palestinians, according to the lines that we talked about before, and say to the guardians, you are welcomed to join. When you join them, there will be a safe passage between the west bank and Gaza, as you will promise them, things like that. But as long as you don't recognize the Oslo process and you don't, of course you don't recognize Israel, eh, it will be only peace, eh, implement the peace will be implemented only on the waistband, and we will be ready to wait for you. But I admit that it is not the ideal answer.
Speaker 2:Can you tell me when you think back to after the Israelis, um, redeployed out of Jericho and Ramallah and Hebron, to an extent in Hebron, um, Arafat came under pressure because of the attacks in Israel that were launched by Hamas and Islamic jihad and some of the suicide bombings to take Hamas under control in Gaza. And he started to jail them, some of them, um, and he, he had to show his partner, which was Israel, that he was able to control the violence he, he started to. And then,
Speaker 1:Well, that was, that happened in 96 before their Israeli elections. And then when Netanyahu came to power after promising the whole world, that they will not, he will not implement the Oslo agreement, but, and then saying, I will implement it in my way. And his way was to actually fault it. Then, then things changed. I mean, if you ask me who actually prevented the implementation of us law, namely getting to a permanent agreement by may the fourth, 1999, my answer will be that it is both the Palestinians and Israelis, but if you push me to the corner and say, say one name, it will be Natanya. Isn't
Speaker 2:It tragic that he is, had this tremendous footprint on the conflict. Um, and when he said that, you know, we will not be able to turn the clock back on the peace process. It's exactly what he did do.
Speaker 1:Yeah. Did. And, and it is a tragedy, but you know, I, maybe it is also a metal of age. I'm not ready to, to accept it, that it is irreversible because not because of a belief in, in a destiny, but because this is the real interest of both people, nobody is doing a favor to the other. And I mean, since ever since ever petition was the only source, whether it, it will be a two-state solution under an umbrella of the Confederation, whether it will be an Jordanian, Palestinian, eh, Confederation or Federation is, as you remember, that was one of the main, main ideas in the eighties, at least, eh, or something else. This is another question I cannot say that it is only the two-state solution again. I mean, I, I think that if, if there is no partner for Israel to the minimum demands of any Israeli, moderate government, then it will be willing step, which is, which is very bad, but better than the current situation,
Speaker 2:What would prevent the west bank from being used as gas? It was just used where it slowly is taken over by extreme elements. And then they just, it has just become another launch pad, uh, for attacks on, on Israel. What would stop that and how do you convince Israelis, uh, that they could give up or withdraw unilaterally from that land or with a deal from that land and that they would be safe?
Speaker 1:Well, I don't want, I'm not there. And I don't, I don't want to convince them to, uh, to withdraw unilaterally because as I said, it is not a good solution, but we are much stronger than the other side. And they, if there are times like that, they, they will be a match. And our main issue is not the security visit with the Palestinians. It is a big problem, but this is not the bank. The biggest problem, our main issue is Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. And if this, this doesn't prevail, what phobia then what are we doing? It is not a security. If, if we speak about the Palestinians, if it is with Iran or something like that, then it is another story. But with, with the Palestinians, I mean, people on the right side, what happens if they should miss sides on the airport. So they determined we can handle, we're going to handle things.
Speaker 2:Talk about the being challenged, the big challenge, being Israel, being a democratic state. Are you talking about the Arab Israelis? The Arab Israelis are part of Israel.
Speaker 1:Yeah.
Speaker 2:But people are fighting right now, as you know, there was fighting in the streets between Jews and Arab Israelis. Well,
Speaker 1:I hope that it is over. I'm not sure, but I hope that it is over, there were two nights like that, and that was frightening for sure. But eh, you know, we, we understand that it is not, Israel is not a melting pot, even if we are deceiving ourselves from time to time, we are not. Eh, and, and we, we are different groups here and there are animosities with alternately, just people with the arrives, with the, the Safara, the Jews and the Eskenazi Jews. And usually it is okay and quiet. And, and it is a very interesting country and people are optimistic and whatever, and suddenly because of what ever you have an explosion, and then you say, how come my enables, we will in good relations and suddenly they are shooting or, or beating or shouting against me or, or whatever. It's not the first time in human history. And the wisdom of, of the leadership is to say, okay, okay, we know that there is a problem. We know that actually you can live together, let us somehow teach the patches and, and, and live together as we did in the past, it happened, you know, in 2000 with the second Intifada, which was really awful. And for no reason, there was no reason for the Palestinians to launch an Intifada. In 2000, we were in the midst of negotiations with them on the most difficult issues for both sides. And it did happen without a trigger and created an immersive among the Israeli Arabs and, and the Israeli Jews and between us and the Palestinians and with the Arab world and our neighbors, eh, called back their ambassadors, Egypt and Jordan and whatever. And then it came back to, to, uh, something, eh, much more normal. And we even had the day now the relations with the Gulf states. So it is, I cannot say that what hap, what happened between us as Jewish Israelis and Arab Israelis is a something that cannot be, we cannot mend fences. We can mend fences, and we know how to do that. The big thing is whether, and when we can really solve the problem and our problem is not unique, and we know the solution and what we need is strong leaderships on both sides. I believe that[inaudible] president[inaudible] is committed to peace, but I also know that he is very weak and that, I mean, if you are with then your wishes are not enough. And I know that on our side, Netanyahu is not ready anymore for the petition of the land, meaning that he's not ready for, to stay solution. So as we speak, it is very difficult, but I, I'm not going to give up. And I'm not sure whether it will not change it in, in two weeks from now.
Speaker 2:Can I ask you how, when you look back on your secret negotiations that took place in Oslo, it was a crime then in Israel to go and talk to the PLO, if you were, I think if you were a reporter as a journalist, Steven, um, you could be charged if you've talked to the PLO, you, you went and you had this vision, I'm not alone, but with many people about a way forward, what do you think your legacy is now, when you, when you look back, do you think that eventually that plan Oslo will be seen to have been the future regardless of how long it took to get there? Um, or is it just a bruising chapter?
Speaker 1:First of all, I never broke the law. We began our talks on January the 20th 93, while I was just setting the people that I sent to Norway. They began it on the 20th of January a day after we changed the law. And the one who brought the bill to the Knesset was me, so that we, it was not breaching the lo eh, to talk to the PLO and had it not pass because it was a very small, my job majority, we wouldn't have a began the, eh, so, so since it was my idea, I can tell you, it was very, very important for me not to be accused of breaching the law. And the, if you ask me, I mean, also was, was a small step. It was actually, we, we were trying to, or slow to implement the, the Kim David idea of begging and Sadat about a autonomy autonomy of for five years, which was a bad idea. I mean, in my view, but we were committed to it. That was the Madrid conference, eh, eh, basis. And the, when I suggested to ravine to go immediately for covenant agreement, he refused to it because he thought that going in the footsteps of begging will help which didn't, but this was his, his, his idea. And he said also that if, if we try and a permanent agreement and fail, the Palestinians will not be ready later on to have with us, even in interim agreement, since they will say, now that we know your permanent ideas, why should we go with you to a corridor corridor, which would lead to a solution that we cannot accept, right?
Speaker 2:It, for people that don't know this was a five-year implementation process with Oslo, where a lot of the details of where the border was and what the territory would be, was not set out in concrete, but it, it was the beginning of that discussion and an agreement to have a piece and then go forward and negotiate that.
Speaker 1:So, so what was the, the important things? What, what made us loyal kind of a milestone? There were two things. One was the mutual recognition of the two national movements. After so many years, we recognized each other, the PLO and the Zionist movement, or Israel as a state. And the second one that physically, we, we enabled the Palestinians to come to the west bank into Gaza and to establish a kind of a, a Prato state or whatever you call it, eh, to prepare for, for the, uh, for the entity, because we did not agree on a Palestinian state yet. Eh, and these were the two things, but the most important thing was the permanent agreement then that we never achieved.
Speaker 2:But you believe last word to you. You believe we will get there at some point that Israel and the Palestinians will get there. Or do you think, first
Speaker 1:Of all, I believe that we should, we will get there, but I'm not sure about it. What I'm saying is that we have to petition the land. And if we don't have a permanent agreement, we should do it ourselves. That's it? Because, I mean, if I I'm telling you, we will have an agreement, eventually it's a wishful thinking, I don't know what will happen in, in Israel, in the next elections. And I don't know what will happen in, in, in Palestine. So what I can say is that whoever is leading Israel and is a Zionist, we're not be able to continue the status quo because if it is not a Jewish state, but a state with a Palestinian majority, majority, then the Zan, his dream collapses.
Speaker 2:So partition the state, give them some land, either through negotiation or unilaterally.
Speaker 1:Exactly, exactly. And even if I agree with you that a union led to a politician may be very costly, dangerous. Yep. Dr.
Speaker 2:Berlin, thank you so much. Good to see you again. Thank you. All right. Ana Aaron Haim, uh, is a military reporter for the Jerusalem post. She received an ma in counter terrorism and Homeland security. I mentioned that because I think it's incredibly impressive. And Anna joins us from Jerusalem. Hi, Anna. Hi. How are you? You're in Jerusalem, right?
Speaker 5:I'm in Reshaun a little bit between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, but, uh, right now actually fitting in my bomb shelter, working in my bombs out there.
Speaker 2:Is that a normal thing for you to do?
Speaker 5:I mean, usually I'm out in, in coffee shops working it's, uh, but right now with the situation it's just easier to be at home.
Speaker 2:Has this campaign been as successful as the, the Israeli military, uh, claims that it has been? I mean, there's been a lot of civilians killed. There's been international fury. It Israel right now is off the charts. So I don't know. What do you see that inside Israel, the way people see it outside of Israel. So there's a price to be paid for this military campaign and this conflict, but have they succeeded, uh, where they claim that they did in dismantling a lot of Hamas and the tunnels, et cetera?
Speaker 5:Well, I think if you want to compare it to previous conflicts, for example, in 2014 operation protective edge, which lasted 50 days and saw thousands of Palestinians killed and hundreds of Israelis, um, civilians and soldiers being injured and killed as well. Um, if you look now within the 10 days, um, Israel has been able to target and take out a lot of Hamas infrastructure damage, a good amount of their tunnels, if not destroy their tunnel system. Um, Israel dubbed it, the Metro, the Metro network, um, and they say there are hundreds of kilometers of tunnels, um, that were taken out by air by airstrikes. Um, and if, I mean, looking at the casualty count, unfortunately in every war, there will be casualties and there will be, um, non competence, including women and children and the elderly, um, being killed that that's the nature of war, no matter how you look at it and how precise you want to be with your munitions. But if you look at the damage that was caused by Israel, with their munitions, you have to say, well, the casualty count is relatively low. Um, there's over 200 Palestinians that were killed the majority of them being men. Um, yes, there are unfortunately 63, uh, children that have been killed over 37 women. And there was a number of which, you know, you can't hide and you can say, well, that's nothing. No, that that's something that's a disaster. That's unfortunately unacceptable. But like I said before, it's war. Um, but I do think that Israel has, uh,
Speaker 2:You're saying it's unacceptable. I'm not going to take you to task on it one way or the other, but the military would say it's acceptable because they feel that those are acceptable people that got caught in the crossfire and what was a unnecessary military campaign. But I guess when you talk about accessibility, you have to say, okay, short-term goal is to dismantle tunnels and kill Hamas leaders,
Speaker 5:Right? That's not their short-term goal. This joining their tunnel network is actually a long-term goal of theirs for in a future conflict. They won't have to go in and maneuver to destroy their titles. That's what military is saying that this is not a short term goal.
Speaker 2:My question, my question is how was this a mess of failure in Israeli intelligence? I doubt it. So they must have known that they were there. They must have known that they were building them. They must have known that Hamas was slowly gaining capability. Why did they let it go so long?
Speaker 5:I mean, that, that's definitely a question to be asked. Um, it wasn't a failure per se of, um, military intelligence to let us go on. Um, what I think is a failure with them saying, well, we knew Hamas was going to attack Jerusalem and we let the tensions grow and the flames grow even higher. And then they fired the rockets, which led us into this conflict. I think what Israel has, and this is what they've said in, in, in many, uh, briefings, is that we took the calculated risk for them to build these tunnel systems, knowing that we had the plans and the intelligence to pretty much x-ray the Gazan underground and know where exactly to hit, how to hit. We had the munitions, uh, prepared and ready where to hit. So I think, you know, it doesn't take two seconds to, to gather this intelligence and to really map out, uh, the plans of the targets. It also doesn't take two seconds to strike the target. It takes, you know, hours. Um, but I do think that there are many issues in terms of the Israeli military and their targets. Did
Speaker 2:They knew Hamas had the ability to fire those volleys of, of rockets as quickly as they could. And in the numbers they did over 3000 rockets,
Speaker 5:Over 4,000 rockets now. Um, and probably by the end of the day, four and a half, who knows, um, military officials have said they were surprised at the intensity of barrages Ford's Ashkelon and Ashlan sits right on the border and a good amount of people. I think 25% of people don't have access to bomb shelters. Um, so they were very surprised at that. Were they surprised that they were launching towards Tel-Aviv? No, they know that they have over a thousand rockets, which can hit Televiv. They know they have the ability to send them in, you know, large barrages of a hundred rockets or more, um, dis they know, and that's why they had the iron dome system set up, uh, in the Houston area. That's the center of Israel. They had them set up before, um, this last round even broke out,
Speaker 2:Did nothing yet who do this fuel fuel settlement expansion, uh, back to court case for the sediment seizure in Jerusalem, jumped at the chance to go after Hamas. It seems for political rescue.
Speaker 5:That's a question that many people are asking. Um, I don't think that he, uh, took this opportunity to save his, his seat and to continue to be prime minister of Israel. Um, the timing is timing is suspicious. Um, but I mean, what he, he worked with Hamas to rockets on, on Jerusalem, or that, that to me is a little bit far-fetched. Um, I do think that he is, uh, taking this opportunity though, um, because let's be, let's be fair. Okay. You fire rockets on the capital of a country, that country is going to respond, it's going to respond heavily. Um, no matter which country that happens, happens to. Um, I do think overall though, that it is a great coincidence, um, that this is happening when yet you ended up, period has only two weeks left in order to form a mandate. Hopefully this will be over soon. Um, and people will forget about it. Like Israel, like people have forgotten about the mountain Morone tragedy that happened to ago.
Speaker 2:Yeah. Who harvests political support from this? Does he, do you think it will save him?
Speaker 5:I don't think it's only this, uh, where he's harvesting political support. I mean, the, the riots on the street in Israel, it's more worrisome to the everyday Israeli than what's happening with Gaza. And I think that's really, uh, what could save him, um, what could lead this country to another election, not what's happening with Gaza, because what happens with Gaza unfortunately happened every year. People vote for Netanyahu in the south, no matter the fact that they have hundreds of rockets ran down on them for the past 20 years, they vote for him. But what we're seeing on the streets is a completely different type of war that if not taken under control and really stopped. And that is what could save him.
Speaker 2:You're talking about fighting between Arab Israelis and Jewish Israelis that had been quite shocking in some centers. Yeah.
Speaker 5:Yeah. And we saw just the other day, the first fatality of a man who actually spent his whole life trying to bring communities together. And he worked with at-risk youth and he was lynched in load and he died and he was a first fatality.
Speaker 2:So why doesn't it, Tanya, Yahoo continued to court the extreme. And you can, you can say, Dana, that's not fair if you want to, but he, in some ways has had a very comfortable relationship with maybe uncomfortable relationship at times, with Hamas, rather than strengthening Fatah and PLL and mainstream elements in the west bank, some would argue, um, he has brought in to his coalition or attempted to marry some pretty extreme elements. I mean, there are members of Kahana that I understand they're in government now. I mean, I, that shocked me.
Speaker 5:Yeah. But does it shock you that he was also trying to bring in an arm and Islamist party and his government as well? I mean, he's gonna, you know, take whatever he can in order to stay in power. Uh, yes, he has been, um, he's always used very inflammatory sentences, uh, to, you know, grab the, the far right in Israel. Um, be it the connoisseur or be it just the everyday people, um, that consider themselves Likud and in far. Right. Um, but at the same time, I do think there was a good amount of, uh, support, um, for the change party, the change coalition, or where people were saying enough is enough. You know, how many years has he been in power and why are we not seeing any change in this country and anything coming out of, of, uh, of what, of his government. So
Speaker 2:Does that lead us now in the week of, you know, when the dust settles from this latest conflict, this latest round, and honestly, and I'm not there. And I feel like I've covered it. I've covered the spark on temple Mount before I've covered the, the conflict in Gaza. I understand each time there are elements that are different, but there is so much that's the same. And every time it seems just to move radically further to the right, it doesn't seem to have a solution to it. And everybody says, okay, this should provide impetus for a new discussion about a peace process that everybody says doesn't exist, but needs to, do you think coming out of this, there is re-emergence if not in Israel, certainly on the international side, what American backing of this to state discussion again, um, and that the sides need to come to some kind of political discussion at the table to end the cycle of violence.
Speaker 5:Well, I think that it's not only the two sides, you have to bring into three sides. Uh, like you said before, the PLO fought and, and the west bank, because that is completely separate from, from Gaza. And the, the elections that were canceled very likely would have seen Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah lose their rule over the west bank had come off, would have very much a very, probably gained and, and gone into power.
Speaker 2:The people, I mean, you and I know cause we've covered the story, but a lot of people don't understand outside of Israel and the west bank. And that factor is generally pretty secular and fairly liberal depends
Speaker 5:On when you look at Fatah, but compared to us. Yes. Um, but at the same time
Speaker 2:We're going to have, if you, if you're going to choose to have a discussion in Western terms with a party to sit down and say, what do you want and be able to maybe come to terms with them, does your best bet compared to Hamas, which you probably, who knows what they want except the destruction of Israel. Definitely.
Speaker 5:Um, I mean, Hamas through, off members, off roofs, when, when they, you know, took power in 2007 in Gaza, I mean, I, you have pictures of awful pictures that of guys at that time and the Hamas, unfortunately, hasn't really changed. Um, since then, but I do think that you can't only look at Israel as being, um, the main problem. You also have to look at a, to come ask, you know, what it, two to tango or, and, you know, right now pushing a hammer, a flattop to the side right now, it takes two to tango. And right now Israel is not ready to come to the table. Just like Hamas is not really ready to come to the table. I may
Speaker 2:Be able to maybe willing to come to the table and Netanyahu's not willing to come to the table.
Speaker 5:Right, right now he's not ready to come to the table, but I'm talking overall, the two sides don't want to talk to each other. Right. They have mediation with the U S in Egypt and, you know, in different rooms. And, but they're not going to sit at the same table together, neither party. And in order for a real change to happen in order for really this cycle of violence, which we see on a, you know, every single year they have to sit down, they have to open the doors and say, okay, we're going to look you face to face. And maybe it doesn't have to be Haneda and baby, but just, you know, representatives sitting down and looking at each other, because if you can't look at each other, how are you going to make an agreement and, and stop this violence?
Speaker 2:So almost 30 years after the Oslo Accords, um, when one of the prime architects of that you'll see Baylin, um, who was in the labor government, under Yitzhak were being brought home, those Accords. And then there was a peace process, which didn't spell it out. A lot of things in terms of what the territory would look like and how you would resolve all these different issues from Jerusalem to borders, to whether they be armed, right. Of return. All of that stuff. Balan said to me in our interview, and I was really surprised. He said, no doubt. There will be a Palestinian state that, that doesn't shock me so much. But he said, we will either come to it through peace negotiations or withdrawal, just simple Israel at some point is going to withdraw, which will be a mess. And it will be very hard, but he said, inevitably, you know, you can delay it another decade, but that's where this will end up. What do you think of that? What do you think most Israelis would say about that?
Speaker 5:Most Israelis would say, look at Gaza, we unilaterally withdrew of Gaza. And what happened? I think that's what the majority of Israelis would say. Um, there was a lot of talk earlier this year, or maybe it wasn't last year. I can't even keep anything straight anymore about, you know, adaptation.
Speaker 2:We've got so many layers of the story changes so much, but we, we seem to go around to the same starting points again, but
Speaker 5:Go ahead. Exactly. You know, the talk about annexation when, when president Trump was in office and that was a big issue and people are really worried that that would bring about another Intifada. Um, we didn't see that happen, but I do think that the talk of, uh, withdrawing from the west bank is something that is very, very, very, um, what's the proper word. It's a tipping point for many Israelis and for many government officials that I don't think are ready to, they're not ready to take that step. I don't think that even[inaudible] will be ready to take that step. Um, I do think that right now, the what's what's happening in Gaza. So fresh in everyone's mind. Um, they're just going to say, why are we going to allow that to happen in, in the west bank as well? And we're getting at it from two sides. I do think that if we're able to, to bring Gaza and Israel to an understanding, and we don't see a rebuild of Hamas and Palestinian Assamese Shihad because that, again is a group that not many people are talking about, but it's just as big of a player as come us, especially now in this round. Yeah. Person is on. And Shihad, if we don't bring those two groups to the understanding that they can't be firing their, their rockets and mortars to civilian cities, if that's not taken care of first, we can't even talk about a withdrawn from the west bank.
Speaker 2:You may, you may discuss the west bank and leave Gaza because it's just a more complicated problem and requires maybe a different solution.
Speaker 5:But, um, but I'm saying is Raley's, won't be ready to talk about the west bank if they don't see Gaza being fixed first because they, they, they, yeah. They, they see really that the, that the withdrawal and in 2005 just made the situation worse.
Speaker 2:Yep. Yep. Well, some people would say it's better because how simply that Israeli soldiers were not being ambushed nightly as they did their patrols through the Gaza strip and settlements were not being attacked. And at least now you have a berm and you attack Geza from the outside. And I'm not, I'm not saying it's a good situation, but it's a controllable situation. Um,
Speaker 5:I mean, if controllable means you have hundreds of rockets and mortars being fired towards Israeli settlements and, and, you know, I'd have to, was being attacked on the border or being kidnapped through a tunnel. And, you know, we can go on and on and on about what's happened since 2005. I mean, yes, Israeli soldiers aren't being attacked and killed and Israeli civilians aren't being attacked and killed inside.
Speaker 2:I agree with you, but I don't think Israel ever left. Geza thinking that there was going to be some kind of utopian, a peaceful dream on the other side of the fence the next day, they simply wanted to get the hell out that they, they didn't feel that they could secure it anymore and better to be dealing with it from the outside then on the inside. And then of course, you know, you had Hamas overtake the PLO there.
Speaker 5:So that was, yeah. Yeah. Whereas in the west bank, Israel does feel like it can control the situation. It can control. And, um, uh, w working again with the, with the Palestinian security forces stop a lot of attacks. So I think the west bank again is completely different, just as complicated, but completely different, uh, situation.
Speaker 2:So it sounds like just to wrap up with you, it doesn't, it sounds like in the minds of a lot of Israelis, the way you read them is that you don't see any impetus for a new piece of process out of this. That really it's just another stalemate and we'll be, we'll be doing this in another three years or five years. W we holding the same conversation about the same conflict that begins maybe on the next round of the temple Mount at the end of Eve. And here we go again and gas in the west bank and that's pretty dark.
Speaker 5:It is. And I think that if you know, the diplomatic angle, doesn't come up and say, okay, well, this is a ceasefire that both sides have to adhere to a ceasefire, which calls for Hamas to not rearm itself, but to really focus, um, all the aid that was going into the Gaza strip onto the civilian population and for Israel to say, okay, well, we're not going to, you know, strike just because we feel like it, or both sides have to agree that what happened before is not going to happen again, is that going to happen? And
Speaker 2:Then I'm shaking my head because I'm nodding. That sounds good. And I'm not going to have it because fat chance, Hamas is not going to do that. And you know, at night,
Speaker 5:Yeah, yeah, it's unfortunate. But I mean, I was talking to, um, a retired military, uh, officer just shortly before we were having this conversation, it was like, Sue's fires, aren't worth the paper that they're signed on for Hamas. They're going to break it. There has to be something new, what that's going to be. It's not up to the military. It's up to the political echelon to, to deal
Speaker 2:With. I have a stale political echelon that probably doesn't have much of a vision right now. Sorry.
Speaker 5:It can't even make its own government.
Speaker 2:It's great to finally talk to you. I can say I was chasing Hannah for about five days now, but she's been all over the country covering the conflict. And, uh, but at least we caught her in a bomb shelter. So that's comfortable bomb shelter. Thank you, Anna. Thank you. Take care. That's how we're
Speaker 4:Backstory on the Israeli Palestinian conflict. The only way you can understand this is not to see one side or the other as the big understand, they both torque the facts to the extreme, to suit their demonization of the other. I think you'll see bail-in is right. The international community needs to help and push both Jews and Arabs to soul. They will never get there by themselves, but probably only after Netanyahu leaves, the prime minister's office. He is blocked peace at every term. I'm Dana Lewis. Thanks for listening to backstory and subscribe. So you get all our podcasts and I'll talk to you against them.