On this Back Story understanding the Russia conflict with Ukraine, as Russian troops appear ready to mount a large scale attack on Ukraine, again.
Host Dana Lewis talks to International Crisis Group’s Program Director for Europe and Central Asia, Olga Oliker who says if the fighting starts NATO be drawn into a conflict with Russia as one or more of its members support Ukraine.
Duncan Allan is director of Octant Research & Analysis an independent consultancy, and has been based in the British Embassy in Kiev and Moscow. Duncan explains the "Minsk Conundrum" as Russia and Ukrainians have very different views of the Minsk agreements to stop the shooting.
And we hear from Konrad Muzyka who is the director of Rochan Consulting, which provides open-source assessments of the Belarusian and Russian Armed Forces.
On this Back Story understanding the Russia conflict with Ukraine, as Russian troops appear ready to mount a large scale attack on Ukraine, again.
Host Dana Lewis talks to International Crisis Group’s Program Director for Europe and Central Asia, Olga Oliker who says if the fighting starts NATO be drawn into a conflict with Russia as one or more of its members support Ukraine.
Duncan Allan is director of Octant Research & Analysis an independent consultancy, and has been based in the British Embassy in Kiev and Moscow. Duncan explains the "Minsk Conundrum" as Russia and Ukrainians have very different views of the Minsk agreements to stop the shooting.
And we hear from Konrad Muzyka who is the director of Rochan Consulting, which provides open-source assessments of the Belarusian and Russian Armed Forces.
For now, let me just reiterate that any escalatory actions by Russia would be of great concern to the United States as they went to Lafayette and any renewed aggression would trigger serious consequences.
Speaker 2:Hi everyone. And welcome to another edition of backstory. I'm Dana Lewis. That was us secretary of state Anthony Blinken on a trip to Lafayette, a NATO member, which is calling on the U S to station American forces there on a permanent basis. The Baltics are nervous. What's up. Well, if you didn't know, Russia has been building up its forces in the Crimea, which had seized from Ukraine in 2014 and also along the Ukrainian border and even positioning forces in the north. And Bellaruse crane is threatened from all sides. Why Ukrainians over through a Russian back president Yana Covich in 2014, then it sought, it seeks to join NATO in the European market. Russia doesn't want any of that. It sees NATO as a threat or so it says, and it has used rebels in Eastern Ukraine to keep a low-level war going now for seven, almost eight years. So on this backstory, what if, what if Russia invaded? What would the west do blink and really didn't say anything other than there would be consequences. Why is Russia insisting on implementation of the Minsk Accords, a 2014 ceasefire agreement? Because as you're about to hear they'll cease fire agreements would allow rebel held areas to feed any move towards Europe and keep Ukraine from acting as a sovereign country. Russia seeks to dominate its neighbors, and now, you know, why Latvia and Lithuania and Estonia and Poland and others are worried about Putin's troop buildup on Ukraine's border. I want to introduce you to Olga Ola Kerr, who is the international crisis groups program director for Europe and central Asia. And as I look back on to, you've been doing this for quite some time, uh, you know, these issues very, very well. So let's just jump right to some 90,000 troops, Russian troops on the border with Ukraine. What is president Putin doing? Is he bluffing?
Speaker 3:So there are always a lot of troops near the border with Ukraine. Um, and especially since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, it really built up the black sea fleet, but had already been Russia's black sea fleet had already been based in Crimea even before the annexation. So there's been a buildup. So there's usually a lot of Russian troops near the border with there are more now and they've been moving around in ways that make everybody a little bit nervous or a, so the, you know, the question on everyone's minds is are they preparing to attack? Are they bluffing or are they trying to make everybody nervous? If they do attack is going to be the big attack that Ukrainian military military intelligence has talked about or something smaller what's going on. And the answer might just be that the Russians haven't decided to get themselves and they're keeping their options open
Speaker 2:Ambassador to the UK, just warned over the weekend of a serious risk of war. Um, as Britain deployed its some of its arm or back to Germany, uh, fearing that there may be an escalation of violence there. The state department, um, the white house are all, you know, warning their European allies. That war may be, uh, in January or February. So it's, it's certainly seems like people in the intelligence community believe that Putin is about to make a move
Speaker 3:Or that he might be right. I mean look, and there's also this mutual deterrence coercion activity going on, right? If look, the Russians hope is surely that they can get what they want without a war. What do they want? They want Ukraine to be a more amenable Ukraine. They launched a promise from the west of no NATO or EU membership for Ukraine. They want to renegotiate the whole European security order. All at the end of this is a big ask in the near term. They just want the Ukrainians to, you know, be a little, well, a lot more amenable to the, um, there's been a real standstill in progress on implementing the Minsk agreements that ended the really high end fighting in 2014 and 2015. The Russians are trying to push something. Um, I think the challenge, the problem here is that they are probably willing to go to war to get that they've proven that they're willing to go to war in the past. They'd probably prefer not to Western states would prefer that the Russians back off and not get what they want. So you've got this kind of jockeying for position. The Western states are also probably not that interested in fighting Russia. The question is would they, if push came to shove,
Speaker 2:Let's, let's come back to that because that's really critical, but the Russians want to get what they want. So right now there is no pending EU membership on anybody's doorstep. There is no pending NATO membership on anyone's doorstep. So it seems so what do they want right now? Putin says they want Ukraine to implement the Minsk agreements.
Speaker 3:So then yeah, so the mens could agreements are two sets of agreements that were signed, um, in 2014 and 2015 to effectively end the really, really bloody fighting that was going on at both of those points in time, they are like many peace deals. They favor the country, the, the forces that were winning at the time. And those were the separatists, Russia backed and Russian forces that were actually helping them out. Ukraine sign these deals because it really couldn't afford to keep losing, which means that
Speaker 2:I wouldn't want them implement it so quickly. I mean the, the, the Ukrainians have not implemented the sections of the Minsk agreements, which allow for free elections and you know, more promised autonomy in the Donetsk region because they say that Russia hasn't stopped supplying arms, Russia hasn't stopped the fighting Russia needs to get out of there, which Russia denies three even there, but Russia needs to get out of there before you hold any democratic elections in, in the domestic region,
Speaker 3:Right? I mean, how frequent elections speed if they're held under the control of these people who've been running these regions, uh, since 2014, um, the self-proclaimed, uh, heads of the Luan skin, then that's people's Republic. Um, the thing is, you know, there's these interpretations of what special status means for the Russians. The vision is that special status is going to give these regions led by the people that they're supporting a veto over major Ukrainian policy decisions, including foreign policy. Now, whether that Look, interestingly, Ukraine had a neutrality clause in its constitution before 2014. Uh, so it's, you know, people change their minds. People, you know, you can get all sorts of promises out of a country and then that shifts. So it's, you know, I, I have some questions about how effective this would be in the long-term even if Russia got exactly what it wanted, but nonetheless, what the Russians want is some progress on all of this. The conventional wisdom before spring of this year was that everybody was okay with the status quo, that Russia was kept Ukraine sort of on edge that the Ukrainians, you know, weren't happy with this war in the east, but they also had no plan to integrate these regions. And this kept the west on their side. So it was okay with everybody. So the Russian buildup back in the spring, uh, suggested native the Russians weren't so happy with the status quo. So they had another buildup in the spring that time they said it was all about their exercises, which, you know, nobody could figure out what exactly they meant. Everybody was sort of, you know, why are they building up? What are they saying? Pretty sure at that point on like this point that they weren't planning a war. And if in fact the Russians pulled back, most of their forces though, not all of the infrastructure, you know, and said, we're done with the exercises. Now they've moved back in, but talking to Russians, um, about this, the sense you get is they really expected[inaudible] who came to office, the president of Ukraine in 2019 to cut some deals, to make some progress on men's, to start giving them what they wanted. Um, but they really do want progress on this because in the meantime, what they're seeing as a Ukraine, that's getting closer and closer to NATO and the EU, even if membership isn't in the cards. And one of the things that reports him said in Sochi recently is that, you know, it doesn't have to be natal membership. It's this infrastructure, you know, needles, the NATO Alliance has no NATO infrastructure in Ukraine, right? It's member states doing a training mission here or there it's things like that. But what puts in saying is I don't care. It does all of this. My, my red line isn't NATO membership by red line is this relationship that's developing between Ukraine and NATO Ukraine in the EU.
Speaker 2:Let's spin the wheels back to what you said a few minutes ago, would the west defend Ukraine, would NATO countries defend Ukraine?
Speaker 3:So Russia is probably counting on that answer to that question, being know, uh, and that is why Russia is probably prepared to escalate. I think some NATO countries might be inclined. It really depends on how, how it all plays out and what the circumstances are and what kind of conflict it is and how quickly things move. And I think this is the real challenge for Western countries. So they want to deter Russia, but it's hard to deter Russia. If there are such clear limits to what you will do. And one of the problem is here is that you make all of these statements about our implied commitments and promises. You can box yourself into a corner where it's the worst of all possible worlds. You've sent Russia, the signal that you wouldn't fight, but then you feel that you might actually have to do more than you've said you would when push comes to shove. And that's where you get the escalation nobody wanted without having deterred, which you might have, if you'd actually signaled, he would do it.
Speaker 2:It seems to me, you're saying if there was a slow roll, if that, if that fighting started and Ukraine could hold out for some time that the Westwood through NATO, through other organizations, support Ukraine and support that support them, defending themselves.
Speaker 3:We're not through NATO, through individual countries through, you know, what we saw in 2014 was each different countries doing kind of their own thing at varying degrees of, um, just how much help they were going to get most of that. You know, all of it was some supplies and some training, you know, it's, there is no, there's really no amount of supplies and training. You're going to give the Ukrainians right now. It's going to enable them to withstand Russia on their own. Russia, just, it has more, it has better capable forces. Ukraine has good forces actually has good equipment. They, you know, they're a major arms exporter. They've been building weapons for a long time. There's some thing a little bit strange about saying we're going to send an EU military training mission to Ukraine. I mean, these guys have been fighting the Russians for seven years. They use going to send a military training mission. I mean, you has not been fighting the Russians for seven years. So a lot of this is very symbolic. What actually happens if push comes to shove, you know, some countries, particularly countries that are closer to Ukraine that are more fearful of Russia might be inclined to help more. And then, you know, what does the rest of NATO do? Well, I don't think the rest of NATO centers them for it, right? Maybe you don't need all of NATO to do something, but then you do effectively have a conflict between NATO and Russia. Once natal member states are involved and a freshman moves against those NATO member states in any way, you start getting into article five territory. I mean, this is how the escalation story can work about, you know, if I want to spin out that story, it's a pretty scary story. I would say. It's a pretty scary story. If you're a Moscow to
Speaker 2:What do you make of the president? Zelensky his comments in the last week that there's an assassination plot involving the Russians, uh, against him a coup d'etat, which he is uncovered.
Speaker 3:I have no idea. I have not seen any of the evidence. Nobody has, well, let's see emergency cases that he has. So presumably somebody showed it to him. Um, look, the Russians are sick of the landscape. I mean, that's certainly the messaging that we've heard from them. Um, they, and I've heard, you know, I've read, you see this Russian narrative that they would like somebody else empowering Ukraine. It is hard to imagine them getting somebody who is actually more favorable than Sudan skate. Um, but that's, you know, uh, countries aren't always realistic
Speaker 2:Is Olenski a strong leader. Do you think? I mean, Poroshenko, I, I, I think that, you know, his, his, his predecessor would probably command the troops to defend against the Russian attack and do so in the most vigorous way he could. So Lenski,
Speaker 3:So look, I think the Ukrainian forces will fight. Um, and I don't think that has very much to do with who is at the helm of the government and how they feel about that person. If they feel, you know, they are under attack, they will fight. They've proved. They've proven this before and the people of Ukraine will fight. Um, I don't have any question of that. The positions on Russia have hardened, not softened over the last seven years. It's, uh, you know, I think there there's a myth in Russia that there is a silent majority in Ukraine that actually loves Russia. This is not true. I mean, I think that myth exists in part because the only Ukrainians one interacts with in Russia are people who like Russia, um, traveled to Russia because Russian men can't even travel to prime right now.
Speaker 2:There's a softer, more pro Russian or possibly a little more neutral population segment. As you look kind of around the Crimea down that black sea coast,
Speaker 3:Crimea is in Russia. And I don't have evidence to suggest that we involved the population is probably divided on the subject. Um, most of them are probably okay with being in Russia. You know, I have not done the public opinion polling, but you know, I
Speaker 2:I've been there and I know they were very pro-Russian and you know,
Speaker 3:But one thing I've seen traveling to Eastern Ukraine since, since 2014 is you've seen any certain crane where the attitudes were much more friendly towards Russia. You've seen a shift you've seen far more people speaking Ukrainian. You've seen, you've seen this patriotic nationalism grow is that. And even people who speak Russian continue to speak Russian, you know, they don't want to live in Russia. They don't want to be Russian. And I, you know, I I've had this conversation with Russian colleagues and they say, well, it's the Ukrainians you speak to, which my answer is, look, I don't speak Ukrainian. When waiters at restaurants, when cab drivers so forth are speaking Ukrainian to me, I don't understand them. They're not doing it to impress me. So there is something going on here.
Speaker 2:Well, I guess we, we see how it plays out. Um, th the question is, is the west making a mistake right now by wagging its finger and saying, don't, you dare Vladimir Putin. You will pay a severe price. And that's coming from the white house is coming from NATO, you know, Stoltenberg everybody. But, you know, should there be another approach to this? And a lot of people think that the only approach that you could, you could take to dissuade Putin would to be, make promises of no native NATO membership. Um, and nobody's going to do that,
Speaker 3:Right? So, you know, what the Russians are asking for from both Ukraine and the United States is both impossible and probably going to be insufficient for them, right. Because we've seen promises made before, or that get walked back, like the neutrality clause that used to be in Ukraine's constitution. So I don't see how that's going to solve the problem. It's not going to be sufficient. Um, I think the real problem with the finger wagging is in so far as they're not sending clear enough signals, a signal they end up sending is we will go so far in that further. And so far in that further is not going to deter, uh, when, and if you're trying to rely on strategic ambiguity, if you're trying to rely on this idea that, well, maybe it will be much worse. Well, the Russians are willing to escalate. The Russians are pretty sure they're more willing to escalate than Western countries are. And they think the Ukrainians are weaker and the taking and occupying parts of Ukraine will be easier than they probably will be. So put these things together and, you know, you have, you have a problem. Uh, I think the Western states would do well to spend some time consulting amongst themselves to really get some clarity on who's willing to do what under what circumstances, and then communicate that to both Moscow and Kiev. Uh, so
Speaker 2:Yesterday,
Speaker 3:Yesterday, but you know, all settle today or tomorrow, we actually probably have some time, but the idea is, you know, figure out what you're willing to do. And then Russia is either going to be deterred by that or not. So you also need a plan for what happens if Russia is not the church, what's your next step. Uh, and I think that's, I think that's missing. Um,
Speaker 2:And I, and I guess some people are scared to have that conversation because they think it may be interpreted by Moscow to be provocative.
Speaker 3:Well, again, decide what you're going to do, and be honest about it. A strategic, strategic ambiguity works when it's credible. Um, they have to actually think that you might do what you're going to do, and they have to actually be scared of it. We will send more weapons to Ukraine is not scary enough to Russia. So, you know, we will sanction more is really not that scary to Russia. They've faced a lot of sanctions already. So are you willing to threaten something that they might actually be scared of? And if not, then what kind of conversation are we going to have with the Ukrainians about this
Speaker 2:Olga all occur from the international crisis group? It's really great to talk to you and thank you so much.
Speaker 3:I enjoyed the conversation.
Speaker 2:I want to introduce you now to Duncan Allen, who is the director of[inaudible] research and analysis and independent consultancy. And he is also a consultant with Chatham house, which is a think tank in London and a hi welcome Dunkin.
Speaker 4:Hello, Diana.
Speaker 2:And I want to mention the fact that you have a lot of diplomatic experience you were posted in Kiev. You've been posted in Moscow. Um, and you've, you've, uh, you've been sort of analyzing Russia and the Kremlin for almost 30 years. Yes, that's correct. Tell me, what are your thoughts? Because when I talked to a lot of people, I know who are Russia files and asked them, what do they think about Putin's moves on the border with Ukraine, 90,000 troops there? Is he bluffing? Is he planning? Is he plotting? Is he serious? Is his finger on the trigger? A lot of people kind of scratch their heads and they're not sure.
Speaker 4:I think Dana, we need to go back to the mince agreements of 2014 and 2015 in particular, the circled mince, two agreement, which was signed in February, 2015, because on paper, these agreements provide a framework for ending and ultimately resolving the war in Eastern Ukraine. Now, the problem with these agreements in, in particular, the second agreement, the minutes, two agreement, the problem with these agreements is that they are in my judgment inherently contradictory, and that's because they embody two irreconcilable views of Ukrainian sovereignty. So on the one hand, we have Ukraine's view Ukraine's interpretation of the mince agreement, which essentially views the agreement as the means, which you, crane will eventually restore itself as a sovereign country. In other words, Russia will withdraw its military forces from occupied Donbass. There will be free and fair elections monitored by international observers. The occupied regions will be given a limited form of autonomy. And on that basis, they will then be reincorporated into Ukraine and Ukraine will then reestablish control over its border. Thus, at the end of the day, Ukraine again becomes a sovereign country. Now Russia's view of the Minsk agreements is very different Russia views the Minsk agreements first and foremost, as a means to break Ukraine sovereignty, to destroy Ukrainian sovereignty, I would argue and Russia, therefore in visitors, a very different sequence of events, Russia demands that elections be held in occupied Donbass before military forces have been withdrawn from the region, Russia then demands or simultaneously demands that are very far reaching form of autonomy, which it calls special status be written into Ukraine's constitution. And only then does it become possible for Ukraine to reclaim control of the border? The point about the extreme form of special status that Russia demands for the occupied Donbass? Is it, this would any fact prevent Ukraine from running the country as an integrated whole and would establish essentially crazy independent states controlled by Moscow at the heart of Ukraine's political system? So Russia would therefore not just be able to influence the direction of Ukrainian foreign policy. Russia would have lost political influence inside Ukraine itself. So that is what I call in my paper. The mince conundrum,
Speaker 2:You call it a conundrum and rightly so, but is it, why did Ukrainian leaders agree to sign an agreement that seems to push them into a corner and threatened their sovereignty or, or are you arguing that as far as they were concerned, it didn't do that. It is not clear in the agreement.
Speaker 4:It's important to understand the context in which these two agreements were signed. The mince one agreement was signed in September, 2014. As I mentioned, mince two was signed in February, 2015. The immediate background to the signing of both agreements was heavy. Military defeats suffered by the Ukrainian armed forces at the hands of, of the Russian armed forces. So in effect, Ukraine was the Ukrainian administration at the time, headed by president Polish and was really on the back of a military defeat. There was also, I think, particularly as regards the mince to agreements, considerable concern as well among Western capitals about the importance of stopping the fighting as soon as possible. And on this basis, it was agreed that this extreme form of special status would be written into both agreements, but particularly in, into the second degree, the point is however that large majority is of Ukrainians are opposed to this idea of special status, particularly in the extreme form, demanded by Russia opinion, polls show this consistently. So it's important as I say to bear in mind, the extraordinary circumstances in which these agreements were saying,
Speaker 2:I mean, your, your paper is, uh, is a very good read in terms of being able to understand not only the background, but the implications for Ukraine, if you take the extreme interpretation of the Minsk agreements, because as you point out, then Russia will sorry, the Netscape area and Lugansk, they would claim that they could veto NATO membership. They could veto membership to the European union. They could even have foreign bases on their, their land, like a Russian army base.
Speaker 4:Yes, indeed. Um, these would be essentially Queensland, independent, crazy autonomous statements formerly reincorporated into the Ukrainian constitutional system. But in reality, the authorities in care would have minimal if any political influence over what happened in those regions.
Speaker 2:So Western powers that, that brought the two sides, the two groups together there weren't really two sides because Russia didn't claim to be a side at the time. They, they have claimed all along, um, to be some kind of referee, which, you know, nobody thinks that they are, but, um, w why did people go along with the Minsk agreements? I mean, you say that Ukraine was a bit desperate. They had suffered some military defeat, but did they not think that by signing this, it would inevitably lead to the fracture of Ukraine sovereign.
Speaker 4:So it's a, it's a really good question, Dana. Um, two, two points I would make, first of all, just to re reiterate what I said earlier, um, back in February, 2015, there was genuine and I think completely understandable alarm in Western capitals about the prospect of further bloodshed, um, further full-scale fighting in Eastern Ukraine. And that is perfectly understandable because the, the events of the time were, were absolutely horrific. Um, so at one level, the, the Minsk agreements, the mince process, which was established is a genuine attempt to prevent the reoccurance of full-scale fighting. It's a, it's a genuine attempt at conflict management. Um, and, and, and also an attempt to address the array of humanitarian crisis issues that have been created by this terrible war in Eastern Ukraine. At the same time, I would argue that there is a mistaken view that however, some sorts of midpoints can be found between the Ukrainian position and the Russian positions such that a compromise political settlement broadly agreeable to everybody could be broken. That is, that I think is, is an unspoken assumption of some, at least some of the diplomatic efforts that have been underway since 2015. Now my argument in my paper is that such a mid point actually doesn't exist. What we're talking about,
Speaker 2:The sides are very different.
Speaker 4:The intentions of the sides are very different. So if you look at the Ukrainian side, as I mentioned earlier, opposition to this extreme form of special status demanded by Russia is very strong in Ukraine and any Ukrainian leader who even attempted to go down the path of negotiating, such an outcome would quite possibly trigger far-reaching political instability and Ukraine fear. Meanwhile, Quite, quite possibly, quite possibly. I don't, I don't, it's difficult to speculate, but that would be certainly the prospect would be for potentially serious political instability in Ukraine. Meanwhile, on the Russian side, since 2015, I've seen no evidence whatsoever that Russia's position has fundamentally changed on this. Now that in turn, I think speaks to a deep seated view in Russia, certainly among the current political leaders in Moscow. And this is a view that president Putin repeatedly voices, this idea that somehow Russians and Ukrainians are one people with a common destiny. Now, the implication here is that the idea of are you crying that is independent and sovereign and distinct and separate from Russia is something of an aberration. It's a natural, and it's such a Ukraine. Moreover, it is inviolable. Now, if you take that view of Ukraine, then your position is not going to change because at some point you expect it's going to be possible to reconcile your cravings to this extreme version of special status that Russia has in mind. So there's been, there's been no movement between the two positions between these two positions. Fundamentally,
Speaker 2:A lot of people would say that this is a successful strategy by the Kremlin. They have delayed native membership. There's no way NATO is going to take in a, uh, Ukraine that is fighting, uh, and engaged in armed conflict that the, the membership of the EU is stalled. Although there has been some informal progress, um, but you write that it's a stunning failure of Russian foreign policy. Why
Speaker 4:'cause back in spring 2014, um, shortly after Russia had illegally and next Crimea, my judgment is that the expectation in the, in, in, in Moscow was that the Ukrainian state would collapse. And that the, the, uh, campaign of destabilization of Eastern Ukraine, which Russians understood is the so-called Nava Rossiya project would lead to millions of Ukrainians, flocking, rallying to the cause. And essentially MBR re-embracing a close relationship with Russia and essentially overthrowing the authorities in Kiev. And that quite clearly did not happen. So this is another important element to understand about the context in which the Minsk agreements were signed. Yes, they immediate the proximate background was what of military reversal for you crane, but it was also the failure of Russia's attempts to, um, undermine the Ukrainian state through the use of pressure and coercion.
Speaker 2:And would they continue? Why, why would they take another step into that mud?
Speaker 4:Well, it seems to me that from Russia's from the perspective of the current leaders and decision-makers in Moscow, as I indicated already, the fundamental view of Ukraine has not changed. This is an viable, uh, natural state. Um, it is, it didn't collapse in 2014 and 2015, they think solely because of Western support, if Russia can break the Western Ukrainian link, at some point, Ukrainians will come to the realization they think, but they have nowhere else to go and they will. Re-embrace Russia. And that, what is his agenda Russia's agenda in respect of Ukraine will therefore be accepted by Ukrainians.
Speaker 2:What does Duncan Allen think
Speaker 4:That's simply not going to happen? Um, because that, that entire calculation founders on one reality, which is Ukrainian national consciousness, and the fact that Ukrainians want an independent sovereign country of their own,
Speaker 2:They may have increased their desire. Uh, for that end, their resentment of Russia may have increased as well,
Speaker 4:Unquestionably as a result of Russian activities over the last seven years in particular, more than seven years now, unquestionably, it seems to me, it seems to me that Russia, Russia is further than ever from achieving the objectives it's sought in 2014. Now the immediate objective back in 2014 was to prevent Ukraine from signing an association agreement with the European union. Well, that agreement was signed in 2014 and came into force in 2017. Russia's second and more ambitious objective in 2014 was to begin the process whereby Ukraine would be gradually absorbed into Russia's own regional economic block, the so-called Eurasian economic union. Now that I think that was highly unlikely anyway, in 2014, that is virtually unimaginable now. So on both those scores, it seems to me, Russia has suffered strategic reversals.
Speaker 2:So Putin says implement the Minsk Accords, implement the agreements. He's demanding that from Ukraine, should the west be saying the Minsk agreements are dead because they are on, sorry.
Speaker 4:Well, I think we need to go back again to the nature of the Minsk agreements. And my argument is that there are two interpretations. I would argue that Ukraine's interpretation is every bit as credible as Russia's, in some ways it's even more credible. So for example, if we look at article 10 of the mince to agreement, article 10 talks clearly about the withdrawal of all military forces from Ukraine without preconditions, um, Ukraine can credibly argue that that must happen before there can be any talk of elections in occupied Donbass before there's any talk of some sort of political settlement in the east. Um, so it seems to me that if you, if Western governments are serious in what they say about standing behind Ukraine as a sovereign country, by definition, that means standing by Ukraine's interpretation of the Minsk agreements in the knowledge that that will entail a prolonged protracted standoff with Russia over this issue.
Speaker 2:Where do we go Duncan from here? Do you think, I mean, let me go back to the very first question, which was 90,000 troops there, maybe more, maybe more coming Putin has a, a finger on a, on a trigger. Do you think he's prepared to pull it and, and push further into Ukraine?
Speaker 4:I'm not going to speculate about, about the intentions of the current Russian leadership, uh, that, that, that that's, that would be highly speculative. Going back to what I said earlier, we need to understand, first of all, the nature of, of, of, of what has driven this conflict and what is reflected in the Minsk agreements, the drivers of this conflict are irreconcilable views of Ukraine sovereignty. Russia's determination to break Ukraine sovereignty, Ukraine's determination to defend itself. And that's the first point. The second question is where does the Western interest lie in all of this seems to me, Western interest lies in helping you crane to defend its sovereignty in the face of Russian aggression. Now, what that means is, as I've already indicated, supporting Ukraine's interpretation of the Minsk agreements, and really trying to shift the focus of the Minsk agreements towards conflict management, which after all is the immediate reason why these agreements were signed in 2014 and 2015 dampening down the prospects for the further, further upsurge in fighting, addressing, um, confidence building measures along the line of contact, addressing the acute humanitarian crisis in the conflict zone. Side-by-side with that, uh, support for Ukraine sovereignty means concerted, um, Western support for first and foremost, implementation of the EU Ukraine association agreement, which over time it seems to me would help to build up Ukraine's, um, state institutions and provide the basis for long-term resilience and stability in Ukraine itself. Um, but also side-by-side going side by side with that, I think there has to be a recognition that any prospect of a reintegration of the occupied Donbass in the foreseeable future is highly unlikely because of the, um, very different, um, political systems, the very different, the growing gap between the occupied Donbass and the rest of Ukraine. In other words, just to reiterate a point I made earlier, what we are looking at, I fear is a protracted standoff, a protracted conflict in Eastern Ukraine that will probably not, um, uh, is almost certainly I suspect not going to subside while the current leadership in Moscow is in office.
Speaker 2:I can imagine it's going to subside. I can imagine that if president Putin decides to push forces into Ukraine, whether you want to, whether you want to engage with that or not. I mean, that's the possibility of it, which we all know, right. If he takes more territory, he will destabilize Ukraine even further, um, Western powers, despite all of their finger wagging, uh, may not come to the aid of Ukraine aside from supplying some arms, um, and conflict could erupt that could be determined with, with more geography on the Russian side very quickly within a matter of weeks or months.
Speaker 4:Well, I think one of the big lessons from 2014 and 2015 is that that would be a catastrophic miscalculation by any Russian leadership that took that decision because the historical record is very clear on this, which is that Ukraine Ukrainians in 2014 and 2014 fought back and resisted in defense of their country's sovereignty. So the idea that there is somehow a military solution to this crisis is simply untrue. That would be a, that would be an horrendously, dangerous miscalculation
Speaker 2:Duncan, Allen of octet research. And also with the Chatham house think tank Duncan, your paper is for anybody really worth the time to sit and read all the way through. Um, the conundrum, uh, is, is, is well-written piece. And it gives you all the background. You want to know about men skin, and you can't just go and view this conflict without understanding the Minsk agreements and how the two sides view them differently. So I really interpret, I really appreciate your time interpreting that and spelling that out. Thank you so much.
Speaker 4:Thank you, Donna.
Speaker 2:All right. Joining me now from Gdansk. Poland is Conrad Musica, who is the director of RO Han consulting. And what they do is they provide so-called source assessments of Bella Russian and Russian armed forces. And he's written extensively on Russian and Belorussian for structures and capabilities and modernizations. Hi, how are you? Uh, Conrad
Speaker 5:I'm okay, thank you. Look, this
Speaker 2:Is important because you don't have to be a military expert, um, to understand what's going on in the Ukraine Russian border, but I think you do have to be independent somewhat. And the problem is that we're hearing assessments from the Ukrainians and assessments from the Americans. And I'd like to hear your view as to what you see taking shape on the Ukraine border, just in general terms right now, how many Russian forces do you see massing there and, and, uh, and in how many different places,
Speaker 5:Uh, the situation currently, uh, you know, what, what we are witnessing now is the situation is very dynamic actually. So, um, essentially you cannot really take a look on the last month and the events that have occurred over the last 30 days, because you essentially have to go back to the events that occurred in Ukraine in the March. And what happened then was Russia started a very big possibly the largest military mobile mobility exercise that was not linked to an ongoing military operations. Um, and they shifted quite a lot of equipment from, uh, units in Southern military district. They shifted them to the border, uh, to near the border with Ukraine and to Crimea. The problem was that, uh, you know, this mobility exercise finished, uh, after a month or so, uh, but some of this equipment was left behind, uh,
Speaker 2:Of the equipment behind not all of it and not all of it was withdrawn.
Speaker 5:Yes, yes. So, uh, we saw that there was some of the equipment about, let's say five battalion tactical groups too, which is about, let's say four, four and a half a thousand personnel let's say, um, was left at Portanova near varnish. That's about 200 kilometers from the border with Ukraine. But, uh, I think from my perspective, at least, uh, more important was that in Crimea, uh, Russia established a, I think it, it can be said that a forward deployed, uh, artillery, deep depo, that, that hosts quite a lot of artillery assets belonging to one of the combined arms armies for the Southern military districts. And this equipment is still sitting there. Okay. So, so, you know,
Speaker 2:And you have, for people who don't quite understand the geography there, you have along the border of Ukraine along the Eastern border, you have troops massing, and then separately in the south, in the Crimea, uh, which Russia, annexed, um, illegally say Western countries, nevertheless, they occupy it. And there you have this, um, Lily pad, if you will, a very dangerous one of artillery now that can hit all the way up Eastern Ukraine.
Speaker 5:Uh, it's not that it's not, uh, it doesn't have this range because th the, the artillery operating from Crimea, they, they are, they would only have a ranch out of about 40 kilometers, but they, the key is that they don't, the readiness of this Depot is, is obviously high because Russia does not need to drag all the equipment back from say, the Eastern parts of the Southern military district. They can simply, uh, sent, uh, its troops to this Depot, take the theory out and then go straight to the bottle.
Speaker 2:So we talking about, I mean, some of the estimates from Western countries are 90 to a hundred thousand.
Speaker 5:Okay. So, so now let's, let's fast forward to what is happening now. Uh, we've, you know, over the last, over the last, um, uh, over the last month or so Russia has been again deploying troops to, um, to the border with Ukraine. And we've noticed that the composition of this, um, of this force structure has changed because they've started, they've started deploying, you know, tanks in very modern infantry fighting vehicles, the numbers of nutrients coming in. Aren't that big, because we should be looking at about, say 10,000 troops. I think that will be max. Uh, I'll be I'm, I'm talking from open source assessments, right. Um, but, uh, look, Russia now has about 90,000 personnel near the border with Ukraine, right.
Speaker 2:Well, why did you say 10,000? You're saying 10,000 additional.
Speaker 5:Yes. So 90,000 are the number of tubes that are there permanently about. Okay. Uh, and that includes, uh, you know, the entire Southern with our district for sustained Crimea and parts of the units that are subordinated to Western military districts.
Speaker 2:Where are they? Where are they from? Are they all over Russia?
Speaker 5:No, they they've actually deployed on the units from Southern military or district. Uh, some salt, some units are from Western military district, the first darts dunk army, which is the most modern, the most capable and very highly destructive force. Uh, we've noticed that at least two battalion tactical groups, so about 1,500 to 2000 men out deployed south a varnish, uh, possibly. Um, so, you know, we are, I think we are on the early stages of a buildup. You know, Russia is not particularly, I think, in a hurry. However, however, you know, every day we see videos or posts on social media showing trends, moving towards Ukraine. So I suppose that, you know, we see only a small, a small percentage of actually the movements, uh, that is really occurring. Um,
Speaker 2:And interestingly enough, even the Russian, um, military sites are posting a lot of videos now. Um, and they're putting them on Twitter and all over the place of, of, uh, you know, air to ground aircraft training and hitting targets and returning. So it's quite interesting what's going on in social media. I mean, they are not trying to make a secret of that buildup.
Speaker 5:I think it will be very difficult in, in contemporary words to hide a movement of tens of tens of thousands, which I think ultimately will be the strength of the Russian contingent to, you know, moving hundreds of kilometers from, from Moscow, all the way to the border with Ukraine. So I think they, they knew that they would, the day that the day would be thin. However, they have also taken steps to actually mask the, the, the movements because in March and April, it was clearly a demo, a demonstration because I think all of the, you know, train moving across Russia happened during the day. Now they've tightened up operational security and there is a lot of traffic actually occurring at night, which obviously makes it difficult to recognize what unit is actually being moved in.
Speaker 2:It's interesting because if you take a look at it, they're not doing that because they don't want anybody to know they're there. We all know they're there now. So what they're trying to mask is what is their capability that's there is that right?
Speaker 5:That's, that's interesting point because I don't think they are actually trying to Musk even units that are deployed near Ridge the portal, let's say, because, you know, the equipment is stored there. It's, it's not hidden, uh, it's, it's planned for everyone who has access to satellite imagery to see, and, you know, in contemporary world, you don't have to be rich to, uh, to be able to acquire a high quality image of, of any place on earth, really. Uh, so, so, you know, I don't think that's a political decision to invade Ukraine has, has been made, but what has Russia, what Russia has shown recently is that they are making a lot of efforts to actually amass troops, uh, near the border. And this in itself is, is, is concerning. And, you know, if, if we spoke on Thursday, Friday, last week, I would say, okay, you know, these events are concerning, but I'm not really sure, but it's built up. But during the weekend, uh, I noticed that Russia started withdrawing equipment from storage sites in central, uh, Russia. Uh, we've noticed that, you know, some logistics assets we're on the move, and this is, I mean, this is warning that I think this was a warning, you know,
Speaker 2:From central storage sites in central Russia, they are traveling presumably thousands of miles to get.
Speaker 5:Yes, yes. Plus, you know, if, if you want to increase the size of your forces, uh, the capabilities of them, uh, it's preponderance of power, you are actually going to obviously rely on, on, um, on storage sites, which, which, which house, you know, thousands of artillery pieces, uh, infantry fighting vittles tanks and, and, and, and stuff like that.
Speaker 2:Um, are you gaming? Are you war gaming it,
Speaker 5:But
Speaker 2:Based on the look, this is all you do, you study this stuff, right. So if you were to take a look at, uh, the, the, you know, the teeth in the, in the bear's mouth right now, um, what's what would it, what would an assault look like?
Speaker 5:We do not get know where they are going to position themselves, right? So we've, we've noticed that, uh, they've been, uh, amassing, let's say near, let's say near the Northern border and create a belt, actually all the way south, um, you know, near Rostov and down to, to Crimea. So the worry is that, you know, they can launch an attack on a car cave in the north. Uh, you know, they, they can take the entire and then push, uh, push west to join with these forces, uh, from, from car cave. Uh, you know, there is also a lot of equipment in the Crimea, so they may strike from the south. Uh, they will spread Ukrainian forces thin, and, and unless the Ukrainians do not conduct a full mobilization of its armed forces and, you know, start populating unions, reservists, uh, it could be, it could be quick fights.
Speaker 2:It could be a quick fight. Yeah. And, uh, it's, it's hard to read through that haze because the Ukrainian say they have an army of a hundred thousand they're much better equipped than they were before.
Speaker 5:But so, so, uh, the Russian armed forces, you know, they're much
Speaker 2:Bigger,
Speaker 5:Much bigger. Yeah. Yeah. So, yeah. So as I said, 90,000 Russian troops are near Ukraine permanently, and Russia has, let's say other additional 10,000 now. And these trains with new unions are keep moving in. So it's too early to say what the Russian force structure is going to be and the size, but it's clear that it's still being augmented and it's still being strengthened.
Speaker 2:One of the scenarios is that they would seal off a large part of the, the coastal side of Ukraine, the seal Ukraine off from the sea in the south.
Speaker 5:Yeah. So I've had that cross this assessment, but again, let's wait and see how they will pre-position and then we will, and then I will see, you know, what the force structure is, how much, how much equipment they've actually, uh, deployed and which access, uh, in particular have been strengthened. And then, you know, we will be able to see, uh, what the scenario could be, because as I said, they can go through, they can go to Kharkiv. Obviously they can cut off Ukraine from the other C D Ukraine. A map that was released a few days ago, also showed at pawn shops and elements of the second motor rifle division being deployed to borrowers, uh, which would be, you know, from European perspective, it will be a, it's a disaster, you know, a, a motor rifle division, a Russian motor rifle division stationed in, in Belarus, because it's a such a preponderance of, of, of power. But, you know, they, Russia can deploy its trips to Belarus, not, not to fight, but to keep Ukrainians, uh, split, then, you know, to engage Ukrainian, armed forces, potential to secure the Northern flank, then it will not be able to deploy as many trips to the east, as it would wish.
Speaker 2:Do you take a look at the Ukrainian side and, um, what they have in terms of their, you know, we've seen the trench warfare, we now know that they have some drawings from Turkey. Um, they have some anti-tank tank capability. They have, there's a big discussion on any aircraft ability that that may be given to them by the U S um, w how would you assess the Ukrainian military and their ability to fight and their ability to hold on?
Speaker 5:I think, you know, if, if Russia will deploy everything that it has, uh, then, uh, you know, the Ukrainian armed forces would be very hard pressed to stop the Russian advance and better. Um, I'm very interested in how the javelin ATGM, the[inaudible], uh, guided missiles are going to do against the Russian times. Uh, I'm not quite sure how many TGMs the javelins are, the Ukrainian side has. Um, but, you know, they will need hundreds of them if they are really thinking about rebelling, Russian advance, plus, you know, the, you know, your grind has TB two drones from Turkey, which, which I think is a great tactical kit, but at the same time, you know, Russians have been practicing anti-drug on warfare for years now, they have, they're very, they're very capable, electronic warfare force. Um, and I'm not sure to what extent they will actually be effective, but, but what I am sure is that from NATO's perspective, now they a, such a conflict will be looked at very, very, very close.
Speaker 2:Do you think, first of all, nobody's going to deploy to Ukrainian territory and fight with the Ukrainians? Are they,
Speaker 5:I don't think so.
Speaker 2:So the Ukrainians will be given support and ammunition, but they'll largely are left on their own there.
Speaker 5:If, if we, I mean, I, I still think it's it's contingent and that, that they will be given a, they will be given, say additional job then, uh, know it's still not, not, not quite sure. I, well, th the way I read your statement is, is that yes, the us will, uh, will, uh, defense kind of Ukraine, and it supports its territorial integrity. Well,
Speaker 2:And he had never said defend, I think they said support or independent Ukraine, and they won't waiver from that. But I mean, there's a lot of, there's a lot of, uh, smoke and mirrors in there right. As to what the us would be prepared to do.
Speaker 5:Yes. Because essentially, you know, if, if the United States, uh, say sense on new shipments of any weapon, rarely that will be a proximal. Right. So I don't think that would go particularly lightly in the Mo in Moscow, especially if, you know, javelins turned out to be highly effective against the Russian arm.
Speaker 2:Last question to you do, does some of this become self pro self fulfilling prophecy of some sort in that, you know, unless there's a deescalation, um, the, the, the two sides are war gaming, this, they will continue to build up and call up, um, and increased capability. Um, and, and, uh, eventually that becomes very likely that they'll engage.
Speaker 5:Yes. I think, I think, you know, from Russia's point of view, if they are building up, they are not building up just to skirt, you know, they're building up, uh, to deploy and employ and attain their political objectives or whatever they, they can be. So yes, it can spiral out of control. Uh, but I think no, as I mentioned, I don't think the political decision has yet been made. And a lot of will depend on how the political relationship between Russia, the EU and Ukraine and the United States will develop in the next coming. Perhaps not a couple, maybe two, three weeks. You know, if, if nothing changes, if, if, if the
Speaker 2:Russians are critical two to three weeks.
Speaker 5:Yeah, yeah. I think by, by Christmas or by the end of this year, Russia should have enough equipment to do something with it. Um, that's, that's, that's the way I see it.
Speaker 2:Conrad, Musica consulting. Thank you so much,
Speaker 5:Conrad. Thank you very much.
Speaker 2:And that's our backstory on Ukraine and Russia, December 25th, 2021, March the 30th anniversary, since the breakup of the Soviet union Russia, president Putin called the collapse of the Soviet empire, the greatest political catastrophe of the century, his neighbors, which gained their independence, including Ukraine baked to different and bow to fight. If Putin tries to turn the clock back, I'm Dana Lewis. Thanks for listening to backstory. And I'll talk to you against
Speaker 6:[inaudible].