In Moscow's Shadows 246: Is Russia A Great Power?

A battlefield setback in Mali sparks a much bigger question: what kind of power is Russia now, and what kind of power can it afford to be? Is it a superpower? No. Is it a great power? It depends what you mean. It certainly is not just the "gas station with nukes" of the cliche. 

Putin’s language of “sovereign civilisation” recasts greatness as resistance rather than dominance, especially as Victory Day messaging leans on endurance. I argue Russia is a middle power that can pivot, triangulate and sometimes punch above its weight without shaping the world order. 

That's no bad thing. Russia (and Putin) are not "failures" as some would suggest, even if they have by no means hit their grand, aspirational goals. Russia would be a lot happier if it accepted this status but for Putin and his Homo Sovieticus peers, alas, this is not enough - and that is what has lead us all to the present unhappy place.

The article I mentioned from The i Paper is here, and the Deutsche Welle video is here.

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You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials including the (almost-) weekly Govorit Moskva news briefing right here. 

Transcript

Defining A “Great Power”

MG 0:00

Simple question. Is Russian a great helm? The trouble is to that you really have to decide what you mean by great palm. Hello, I'm Mark Galliotti, and welcome to my view of Russia in Moscow Shadows. This podcast of varying length, frequency and format, yet always reassuringly low production values, is supported by generous and perspicacious patrons like you, and also by the Crisis Exercise software company Conductor. So the trigger for today's ruminations was what happened last weekend in Mali in Africa. There Russian mercenaries from the Africa Corps, or African Corps, maybe we should really be calling it, which is the state-controlled mercenary organization that sort of subsumed Wagner's operations on the continent. Closely controlled now by the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of Defence, uh the Military Intelligence, more on that in a moment. But anyway, it's there supporting the government in its struggle against both an Al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist movement, but also a separate separatist group made up largely of Tuaregs from the north of the country. Anyway, these two distinctly different forces came together and launched a series of surprise attacks last weekend, which saw the defence minister killed with a suicide truck bombing, and in particular, Russian and Malian forces pushed out of the town of Kidal, which had previously been something of a sort of great triumph for the Russian forces in particular. And I wrote something for it in the I newspaper, and then also did an interview for a package on Deutsche Vela's English language service. I'll leave links in the programme notes if people are interested. Talking about the degree to which this represented, or this was a part of an unfolding story, of Russia's withdrawal from an attempt at being a real global player, in just as they essentially sort of sat back and let their ally Maduro be extracted, kidnapped, called it what you will, from Venezuela, with nothing more than just simply verbal protests, and even with Iran. Until I think it's fair to say Iran really started showing that it had teeth and the will and capacity to fight long term, frankly, the Russians were confining their support to the least they could really get away with, and something that ensured they didn't have too much skin in the game. But of course, nothing succeeds like success, and so once it looked like the Iranians were, if not the winning side, but certainly not a hopeless side, then the Russians became a little bit more supportive. Now, I received some pushback on my basic thesis of this kind of withdrawal from globalism as Putin focuses everything on Ukraine. Ironically but predictably, this came from both sides. You know, the Russia is a superpower, what are you talking about? And Russia is nothing, it's an insignificant little whatever hole. And that got me thinking more broadly about this whole question of Russia as a great power. And the fact that people are still uncertain. Again, there is still this strange dichotomy that the very same people who regard Russia as being some hapless regional power in decline also consider it to be a global threat, one whose legions are all ready to spill over into Europe and so forth. So, okay, let's let's dig into this. And it's worth noting that way back when, in August 1999, when he was being confirmed as Prime Minister under President Yeltsin, Putin, at his confirmation hearings, said Russia has been a great power for centuries and remains so. It has always had and still has legitimate zones of interest. We should not drop our guard in this respect, neither should we allow our opinion to be ignored. Well that's in many ways a very bold statement to be making in 1999 when Russia really was still very much in a state of chaos, state of decline. Yes, that state of decline was anyway being reversed. We shouldn't assume that Putin had anything to do with its recovery, or rather he had much to do with it, in fairness to him. But on the other hand, it also speaks to Putin's sense that Russia is a great power, not because of what we could consider objective metrics, but because it is its birthright by blood. By, as he sees it, defending Europe time and time again from enemies foreign and domestic, from the Mongols to Napoleon to Hitler, from its cultural position or whatever. Basically, Russia deserves to be considered a great power. For him, this is in some ways a moral historical argument more than anything else. But we don't necessarily need to accept that. We shouldn't accept that. So let's interrogate Russia's status. And let's start with the geopolitics, and particularly, well, let's dig into quite what happened in Africa with Mali. Now, the African Corps replaced, as I say, Wagner after the 2023 mutiny. And what we had is now a new structure, which is, well, the faceman, the guy who's notionally in charge, is Deputy Minister of Defence Yunusbek Ievkurov, who is very much a soldier of the old school, I think it's fair to say. Highly decorated, quite an astonishing sort of not just military record, but he's also been governor in the North Caucasus. And not really what one would think of as a wily wheeler-dealer type. And real operational command is much more in the hands of Lieutenant General Andrei Averyanov of GU, Military Intelligence. Now, Averyanov was formerly commander of Unit 29155, that is the GU's sort of assassination and sabotage squad, and he's now a deputy head. So deputy head of the GU. So, you know, he probably has quite a lot on his plate. And what is clear is that in the interests of ensuring greater control, because clearly they realise after the mutiny, probably a bad idea to find a ruthless political entrepreneur and give him a private army. Instead, African Corps is now much more under control, and let's be perfectly honest, it demonstrates certainly the lack of Prigojin's ruthless entrepreneurial flair, his ability to make deals, his willingness to bribe the right person if that's what it takes to get a deal across the line, that kind of thing. But nonetheless, it's still active there. We have a force in Mali. Different accounts put it anything from just over a thousand to two thousand soldiers. Largely involved, frankly, as is generally the case now, in training and support operations rather than frontline fighting, when it can get away with that, though it is also operating combat helicopters and the like. We have the particularly large deployment in the Central African Republic, again, about 2,000 soldiers. We have a smaller force in Libya, backing the forces of Field Marshal, I think he's there is a rank he's got at the moment, Haftar and his unit, which is kind of part of the civil war that is being fought there, and smaller deployments in Niger, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea. So, you know, it's it's a not inconsiderable force, and it is still able to get reinforcements in terms of men and materiel, even though that clearly becomes much more complex if Russia does lose its capacity to stage flights through Syria. But on the other hand, I can't help but feel that the tide of this particular experiment in outsource geopolitical influence is very much on the wane. It's not necessarily absolutely doomed. I mean, in part it depends on what opportunities arise. Again, remember the Russians are essentially opportunistic. It's a point I'm going to be probably coming back to time and again in this podcast. They can't really create opportunities, but they can exploit them. They can in many ways be more nimble than, for example, the West. It also depends on whether it has successes rather than failures. I mean, no one's going to hire the Russians if they think they're not going to do a decent job. They had actually been doing a relatively decent job in not just in the Central African Republic, but in Mali as well. So, you know, if it's a question of whether or not they can actually demonstrate their continued utility to clients as well as to Moscow. And indeed, it does depend on that mood in Moscow. There is a debate going on behind the scenes. There are those who say, look, the resources we're spending on this little adventure in Africa are just not worth it. The men, the vehicles, they could be much more usefully put to work in Ukraine. So let's not get distracted by this. In many ways, the whole point about the whole Wagner adventure had been to distract the West. Well now it's distracting us. So you know we'll have to wait and see. It is still, I think, a debate in process. But so far it's worth noting that Russia's role in Africa does not depend just on the African core, or indeed mainly on it. Yes, a lot of focus on that because it's it's kinetic, it's visible, it lends itself to packages of photos and such like. But in fact, obviously I would say the key thing is trade. There is a huge amount of trade, and in particular, a lot of sanctions busting trade. A lot of the the so-called shadow fleet and such like, they are taking oil and indeed other other natural resources to Africa. And now with the Straits of Hormuz close, we're seeing an increased appetite also for, well, Russian wheat in the future, but in the shorter term, fertilizer. Remember, Russia is one of the key global producers of that, and anything between a quarter and a third of the global supplies of fertilizer, and indeed the raw materials to make it, pass through the Strait of Hormuz in happier times. So the point is that people want to deal with Russia. And this is one of the reasons why there's so much pushback against sanctions, the sense that why are we being forced to give up on what we regard as both a reliable and also a cheap trading partner, just simply so that the West can fight its proxy war in Ukraine? I'm not saying that is the actual situation, but that is the widespread perspective. So there's a lot of trade. There's also a considerable degree of cultural links. In part a legacy of Soviet times, and obviously the Soviet Union was at different times quite an active and assertive influence there, training specialists, providing aid, providing military support, security support generally directly, or through proxies like the East Germans or the Cubans and the like. But it is more than that. I mean, approximately 40,000 African students are currently studying in Russian universities. That's more than, for example, the Chinese student population there. And this is a significant increase uh over previous years, and over the past 13 years that number has tripled. So you're seeing more and more cases of Africans who will go to Russia, may well learn Russian, in some cases acquire Russian spouses or whatever, and go back, and look, in some cases they'll go back saying, God, I hated those bloody Russians, of course, that's inevitably the case. But others will actually retain links and a certain degree of fondness. I mean, this is the irony we see in Afghanistan. There is still that sense of Russia as a place of both specialist training, engineers, medics, and the like, but also a place where things get done properly because of a lot of actually rather good Russian infrastructure projects, or Soviet infrastructure projects rather, carried out during that period of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. So even while they were fighting this ghastly war there, nonetheless they were also acquiring and retaining a certain kind of reputation. Well, we can see that too. There is a obviously an increasingly active Russian cultural outreach. There's more than a dozen so-called Russia houses, these centres which do training of languages, screening of films, that kind of thing, and act very much as soft power hubs. And there's plans for I think more than 22 others to be built across the continent. There's media, I mean there's RT French, which isn't just trying to broadcast to France, but also to francophone parts of the world, like a lot of Africa. There's Sputnik Afrique, which is the African arm of the Sputnik News Agency. There's Afrique Media, which is very much, I think, sort of at the forefront of attempts at penetrating and influencing domestic media in Africa, obviously, often providing packages that they can then run. And this is a common pattern, it's worth noting. I mean, I'm focusing on Africa at the moment, but you know, there's also RT Arabic, for example, RT Brazil for Portuguese broadcasts, and the most recent one, the opening up of RT India. You know, this is an area in which the Russians, just because they are increasingly excluded from the Western information space, they're not standing still. And of course, there are rather less wholesome forms of cultural influence and penetration, you know, quite a lot of disinformation, a lot of it playing, after all, on anti-Westernism, that one could argue is one of Russia's main trump cards. We are not the West. Remember, for a lot of countries there is considerable suspicion of the West. And if your particular experience of colonialism was at the hands of the French or the British or the Belgians or the Germans, whoever, or the Italians indeed, or if today you feel that the whole sanctions regime is, as I've heard it described, essentially financial imperialism, you know, basically telling African and other global South countries, and it's worth noting the Russians flatter them by calling them the global majority countries. But anyway, if you're being told by the Americans or the Europeans or whoever, that there will be negative implications if you continue to trade with people you might want to trade with, well that seems like an affront to your sovereignty. And particularly in the context of what's meant to be a war for the sovereignty of Ukraine, you know, there there is considerable anti-Westernism still that the Russians can stoke and exploit. So, you know, where do I see things going in the future? Look, again, let's not pretend that the Russians are in a position to make massive inroads into Africa or indeed into any other parts of the global south. If they can't use their sort of hard power assets through African core, then increasingly they will have to focus on more positive things, building bridges, making trade links and the like. And yes, it will continue to be opportunistic, because one thing Russia can't afford to do and won't be able to afford to do for the foreseeable future is spend money on this project. They're not going to be coming in and offering to build dams or solar farms or whatever else. You know, they need to have these projects to be, as far as possible, self-funding, indeed, ideally, as in African core, actually making a small profit. And the other one is I can't help but wonder if in some ways the parallel for Russia in the future in the global south is going to be with as China was before its real takeoff and its emergence as essentially one of the two poles of the current global order, in that China had to position itself as the the scrappy insurgent power, yes, but more to the point it was the third country, it was the third power. It was, well, look, there are the big players, which once upon a time was the Soviet Union and the United States. And if you don't want to end up becoming a vassal of one of those two, hey, you can come to us and you can make deals with us, and we're going to be much less demanding and much less arrogant, because we know that we are not in the same league as them. But on the other hand, we still have something to offer. I think that is very much going to be where Russia is in the future when it comes to the global south. And again, I think that that gives us a sense of the limitations of any claims of Russia as a great power or a superpower, but also that sense that there are still opportunities for Russia to play what would seem to be an outsized role in the world yet. And okay, speaking of China and speaking of the world, let's think more broadly about Russia's capacity to be that. Remember, back in 2014, Barack Obama really seriously honked off Vladimir Putin when he called Russia a regional power. That very much seemed to be a sort of disparaging comment. And let's be brutally honest, it was politically stupid and also not particularly meaningful in a globalized age, in which actually it's just as easy to trade in some ways, particularly when it's in non-tangible assets like financial services and so forth, with a country on the other side of the world as with your immediate neighbour. But because I don't think Putin listens to me that often, I have to say, sad though that thought may be, nonetheless, I'm willing to take the risk and suggest that Russia, okay, it's not just a regional power, but it is, to use a phrase that particularly Canada's Mark Carney popularized, a middle power. So in other words, not a superpower, not a great power, but but by no means inconsiderable either. What generally defines a middle power? Well, first of all, they're usually described as being bridge builders. They often act as kind of mediators in conflicts, promoting cooperation between major powers. Well, to present it Russia as that would seem rather odd, despite the fact that, of course, Putin is trying to inject himself into negotiations over Iran between Tehran and Washington. But in slightly less idealistic terms, instead of bridge builder, let's say that what it is is middle powers precisely have the capacity to triangulate, to exert leverage precisely by, as I said, not being one of the primary antagonists, the primary great powers, and so forth. And in that Russia already is playing a role. And also, let's not forget structures like BRICS, which brings together, you know, Brazil, Russia, India, China, Saudi Arabia, and so forth, and indeed, which is a growing bloc, the Shanghai Corporation Organization, and others of these structures, actually, the Russians are very keen to build these kinds of connections with other countries that they can use in order to assert some kind of role. So it's not that they're in a dominant position, but precisely that they are that kind of pivot power. Second usual definition of that, if we're talking about pivoting, I mean that they are swing states, that precisely they are crucial players, not because they actually sort of are dominant within the global economy, but probably because they actually control some specific aspects of it. It may be a key trade route, it may be particular natural resources, which obviously in the case of Russia is not just oil and gas, but there are all sorts of other resources in which Russia does play, again, not dominant but highly significant role. Thirdly, that middle powers tend to have regional influence, oh dear, we're back into Obama territory. But you know, it's certainly within their strategic neighborhoods, they hold substantial sway, and they can in those areas influence rather than just be influenced by global events. And I think that that's also hard to disagree with. Although Russia at present is very much kind of, as I say, focusing on Ukraine, nonetheless, you know, Russia still has, and will continue to have to some degree, a role within Central Asia, within the South Caucasus, and more broadly also, I would argue, within the Middle East. It's not likely to be a major player in Latin America or indeed in Africa. But within its strategic neighbourhood, that's another matter. And look, the third element, and again, I think this is very much because it's it's a Western kind of definition of middle state, is their pro multilateralism. In other words, that they are very keen on there being a stable international order, and they're very supportive of the institutions and treaties that underpin it. Now, again, that seems a little perverse to be saying about Russia, considering, you know, it's again to use that uh Rather tedious cliche of a formulation about its unprovoked and illegal war in Ukraine. But nonetheless, it is true that although, yes, Russia is at the moment breaking and perverting a whole variety of treaties and obligations, nonetheless, it's worth remembering, first of all, how Russia sees the world. You know, to the Russians, they are pushing back against American hyperpower. America and the West more generally, will and capacity to use its muscle, military and otherwise, to try and impose global hegemony is actually quite central and predates the Ukraine war. Now, a lot of this is frankly just for handy propaganda, but if one looks at how Russia projects this war in the global south, well, there it is as an anti-colonial war. I mean, a toxic and rather obscene concept. But anyway, the idea is that Ukraine was being used as a proxy by the West to make Russia accept Western dominance and Russia is just pushing back. Now, as I say, to a large extent that is propaganda, but it carries within it, I think, genuine seeds of how Putin and his ilk do actually see both the war and the world. That they are in defence. So, in other words, their support of multilateralism is to be found encoded within their notion of precisely a multipolar world, one in which all countries have a certain degree of sovereignty, greater or lesser, but on the other hand, there is no single or indeed pair of global hegemons. So, in its own terms, I think that one can see this element within Russia. And also that Russia has in the past often been a very active player, yes, in terms of wanting to influence it, but if one looks at the United Nations, if one looks at the sort of great global treaties shaping the world, Russia is often there. So, yes, it wants multilateralism for its own interests as a way of preventing American dominance, as a way of influencing the shape of the world order, but that doesn't mean it's not there. So, you know, I do think that actually in reality, if one takes away the distorting factors of this current imperial war in Ukraine, Russia does fit in many ways, again, once it's been kind of reframed to be a bit a little bit less fluffy and western-centric, the notions of a middle power. So, yes, it's not a superpower, but it's not an inconsiderable power. And not just because it's got enough nuclear weapons to be able to blow up the world. It's because it is a genuinely globalized state. It has links economic, cultural, soft power as well as hard power, and so forth are all around the world. But of course, for the future, I mean this really assumes and depends on Russia's capacity to break out of the orbit of China, which is where at the moment it's inevitably spiralling because of the extent to which it depends on China while it's fighting its Ukraine war, and it assumes that Russia will not be sucked into Chinese vassalage. But in fairness, as I've mentioned in the past, I do think there is a strong elite consensus to try and avoid this. And even if Putin isn't that exercised by the risk, or even aware of it, one would think, there are certainly many within the system, powerful figures within the system just below him, who are aware of that and are trying to mobilize to that end. So geopolitically, Russia, you know, it's not a great power defined as like a superpower, but nonetheless, it is certainly a player. It is a middle power in my opinion, it is a regional power, in Obama's opinion, but able to exert its influence outside that region. But what about at home? Well, let's turn to that after the break. Just the usual mid-episode reminder that you're listening to the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Its corporate partner and sponsor is Conductor, which provides software for crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counterterrorism, civil affairs and the like. But you can also support the podcast yourself by going to patreon.com slash inMoscow Shadows. And remember that patrons get a variety of additional perks depending on their tier, as well as knowing that they're supporting this peerless source on all things Russian. And you can also follow me on Twitter at Mark Galliotti or on Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. Now back to the episode. Now when we come to looking at Russia at home, there is clearly a constant and I would argue escalating degree of rhetoric. Putin's not just Putin and his generation, saying that they believe that Russia is special, but is special always great. Now it's not new for Russians to be asserting this grand place in the world. On becoming foreign minister back in 1996, after all, even before Putin, we had Yevgeny Primakov, who many regard as being in some ways the kind of the architect of modern Russian geopolitical thinking. Anyway, he declared his motto to be Russia was and remains a great power. Her foreign policy should correspond to that status. So one can see the echoes of that in what Putin himself said in 1999 about Russia has been a great power for centuries and remains so. But then in 2013, so you know, this is obviously in the period in which he had already lost his initial rather naive notions about how Russia could find a modus vivendi with the West, become increasingly unhappy, and now has returned to power after the Balotny protests that remember he considered to be essentially Western hybrid war against him. Anyway, in 2013 he said, We do not aspire to be called some kind of superpower, understanding that as a claim to world or regional hegemony. So, at least rhetorically, he's saying that, you know, we are not, like implicitly the Americans, aspiring for this kind of imperial rule over others. Instead, increasingly what he was talking about was the idea that Russia had the right and the power to be a sovereign civilization, civilization state. Because he was also going to say either a country is sovereign or it is a colony. So in other words, either you actually have control over your destiny or else accept it, you are dominated by others. And in 2020, he said Russia is not just a country, it's really a separate civilization. So look, although we always have to be careful dealing with rhetoric, because I'm sorry to have to break this to you, but it is known for politicians to lie. But nonetheless, although clearly in terms of practice we have seen Russia seeking to impose some kind of semi-imperial sphere of influence on its immediate strategic neighbourhood. In particular, we're talking obviously once upon a time, there's things like the invasion of Georgia, but now it's focused on Belarus and Ukraine, this sort of the holy trinity of the Slav Russian, sort of some Russic homeland states. But despite that, in philosophical terms, what has emerged has been this notion that Russia's great power status is not so much about power projection as resistance, as being able to stand against the tide of whether it's incorporation within Western dominated financial systems, whether it's accepting what they regard as a rather degenerate set of wokist ideologies emanating from Europe, or whether it's just simply the capacity to resist being told what to do by a hegemonic United States. So, you know, in this respect, great power status is about independence rather than dominance. And it's going to be interesting to see, for example, how Putin spins Victory Day this coming week. It's clear that the parade is going to be, although we'll wait and see the details, a much shrunken affair compared with previous ones in terms of both the foreign guests, but also there's not going to be all that the heavy armour rolling through Red Square. There's probably not going to be anything like the same numbers of troops that once upon a time we saw. But Putin has to give a speech. And Putin has to give a speech that is in some ways about more than just simply suffering. I mean a lot of it will be about remember what our ancestors went through in the Great Patriotic War. In order to fight the Nazis and save their motherland, they put up with terrible privations. So you should too, in effect. But it's got to be more than just simply doom and gloom and suffering. You actually have to give that sense of a victory. And it's impossible for Russia at the moment to present itself as being victorious in Ukraine, even though it you know it has it has liberated Lukansk again, except for the bits that it hasn't. But nonetheless, he has to give some sense of victory. And I think in that respect, again, victory will be in the resistance. The very fact that Russia can and continues to stand against the West is going to be presented as a victory. And that isn't just simply the best his speech writers can salvage from the current situation. It does speak to this notion of great power defined by sovereignty, sovereignty defined by resistance. But of course, it's it's more than that. It's also, again, from Putin's point of view, that a great power also has great ambitions. And Russia clearly does under Putin. It's not just simply abroad, it's not just simply this notion of we impose hegemony over Ukraine and generally other post-Soviet states and the like. No, it's more than that. It is, first of all, in certain sort of great projects. It's quite interesting. The encoding of status through signature projects is quite a big Soviet and now Russian thing. I mean, for example, just this week we had in Moskovsky Comes the Molyets the headline Putin will do what Stalin did not. It's strategically important for the country. Now what was it talking about? It was talking about the decision to again we'll see if it actually happens, but nonetheless, to build a bridge from the mainland to Sakalin Island, way off in the Russian Far East. Now this will be a bridge some five to seven kilometers long. Sure, it's not the 19 kilometer long Crimea Bridge, which was, it has to be said, a pretty astonishing feat of logistics and engineering. But still, it's it's a very impressive project. Now, this had been proposed back in 2008 by Medvedev, and then the cost estimate was four billion dollars. Nothing really happened. Then in 2017, Erjader, the national railway company, also said that it was going to build a bridge, and at that point the budget had to be 17 billion. Again, didn't happen. So we'll see, first of all, how much it'll cost, secondly, if it actually happens, but nonetheless, you know, it does give us a sense of this way of creating some kind of national benchmarks for success. In military technology, this idea that Russia can, should, and is going to be able to go toe-to-toe with the latest American and indeed Chinese technology like warplanes. You know, you've got, for example, the new Sukhoi 57 stealth plane that is meant to be the answer to the American F-35 fighter. Now, I strongly doubt that in terms of the capabilities of this plane and also the Russians' ability to actually produce it in adequate numbers. But again, the very fact that Russia is not accepting, as for example, most European countries are, that they either have to buy American or they have to operate within production alliances. If you look at Europe, for example, as the Eurofighter Typhoon begins to begin to look dated, you have the Future Combat Air System Project, which is a multinational venture between France, Germany, and Spain. And you also have the Global Combat Air Programme, which is Anglo-Italian Japanese, to produce this new multi-role fighter. But there isn't this acceptance that in effect they cannot go it alone. They need to operate with both the sort of the capacity of an alliance of nations to combine their expertise, but more importantly, combine their resources. No, Russia's not trying to do that. Arguably that's a foolish decision. Arguably, though, it's not really anything that they can avoid. But still, it says something about the ambitions. The fact that Russia is still serious about being a space power. I mean, they are planning their Venera D mission, scheduled for 2036, to send a sort of multi-vehicle probe to Venus with a balloon, a lander, and an orbiter. So very much trying to kind of reclaim this sort of Soviet-era space prominence, if not preeminence. But more generally, there is clearly this ambition to build a modern, connected, healthy, thriving nation. Evident particularly in the sort of great national projects, which are these huge state funded development programs aimed at upgrading the national infrastructure, social services, technology, addressing demographic issues, all these kinds of things to improve the national quality of life by 2030. It's getting closer and closer, guys, by the way, with 9 trillion rubles in federal funding plan, for example, for the period 2025 to 2030. Again, we'll wait and see if that happens. Now look, there is a touch of Soviet gigantism here, as indeed is also of Soviet Gosplan, the state planning agency. But I have to say, and again, this is in some ways the the I hesitate to call it virtues, but let's say the attributes of authoritarianisms over democracies, that they can and do think in longer term, because they don't have to think just of the next election cycle. But nonetheless, you know, it it speaks to a colossal ambition about Russia, an ambition which, in many ways, is not going to be achieved, but that's not necessarily the point. Although, look, the Russians are already looking for excuses as to how why they're not going to actually hit their targets. I mean, on Thursday, for example, Medvedev was speaking at the Znanya Pirve um education first, educational marathon, anyway. And he gave a speech in which he said that victory in the special military operation in Ukraine would unlock the way for the country to develop. He said, this is what Russian citizens themselves are waiting for, including income growth, solutions to housing and demographic issues, health care and the education system. Yeah, in other words, so everything that actually Russians really care about. But the point is, again, it's just over the horizon. All we need to do is win this war, and then everything will be lovely. So yes, just over the horizon as always. But just because you don't meet your targets, does that make you a failure? So this reminds me of the book Failure, Russia under Putin, which is an edited collection brought together for the Brookings Press by Harvey Balzer and Stephen Fisher. And it brings together a slew of heavy hitters, it has to be said, from Sergei Guriev on the failure of Putinomics, that plausibly argues that Putin's successes were largely down to luck and his failures down to policy, to Balzer himself on Russian human capital, that it has to be said concludes in very damning terms. Let me just read that point. Putin has failed to favour sorry. Putin has failed to foster a sustainable increase in the Russian population's size, health, life expectancy, educational quality, or economic and environmental security. And then he goes on later. I mean, seriously, tell us what you really think. Overall, this is this whole book is a damning indictment of Putin's reign. Although I have to confess that the chapter How Putin's sexism and LGBTQ phobia endanger Russia's and the world's future did, I have to say, for me, win something of a prize for title overreach. But look, as you'd expect, lots of excellent analyses of aspects of Putin's reign. But the fundamental concept stuck with me. How do we define failure? Now, the editors do it in these terms. Success or failure is invariably assessed against a benchmark. One such criterion is Putin's stated ambition for Russia to attain a status akin to that of major powers such as the United States, China, and the EU. EU, I'm not sure if he regards EU as a major power, but anyway, never mind. In recent years, Russia has made no headway toward achieving this objective. Another gauge of Putin's effectiveness lies in his track record of implementing the priorities he sets during each presidential inauguration. The frequent recurrence of these proposals implies failure. Putin himself acknowledged that many of his decrees were not implemented. Well, fair enough. But first of all, very few twenty-five plus year political careers truly end in success. I mean, in some ways, failure is the inevitability of life. We all ultimately fail when we die, arguably. That's a cheery thought to consider. But those leaders who do succeed in their own terms are not necessarily the best models. And clearly here I'm thinking particularly about Uncle Joe. I mean, Stalin was an extraordinary success if one looks in known terms. He maintained power until his death. He fought off Nazi invasion, destroyed, killed, sent to labour camps all of his rivals. He industrialized a backward country, blah, blah, blah. So the longer the span of reign, arguably the harder to succeed in totality. And for success, well, that depends very much on what kind of rule you have. In many ways, and this is arguably the ultra-nationalist critique of Putin in his conduct of the war in Ukraine. I mean, Putin has, I wouldn't I don't want to say not been not been dictatorial enough, because that's that would sound very, very controversial. But let's say that in order to guarantee the kind of successes, he would have had to, A, obviously, limit his ambitions rather more, but arguably also not allow himself to be so constrained by a desire to actually bring the Russian people as far as possible along with him. Let's not forget that until relatively recently, this was a kind of hybrid authoritarianism that did try genuinely to cultivate widespread legitimacy within its own population. Secondly, how many leaders achieve what they claim to be their goals? I mean fully. Often these goals are precisely aspirational. You know, sure, if we compare Russia today with Russia in 2008, let's say, just before the economic crisis, or 2013, just before the invasion of Crimea, in many ways kind of fixes Russia's more antagonistic relationship with the West. Or indeed 2021, just before the invasion, one can make all kinds of negative comparisons and observations. But compare Russia in 2000, when Putin was first elected, with Russia today, and there's a world of difference. I mean, obviously there would be any way, but let's just appreciate how far things have changed. In 1999, for example, when Putin became acting president, Russia's GDP was$196 billion. Germany's was$2.6 trillion. What about 2025? Russia's is now$2.6 trillion, Germany's$5 trillion. So obviously Germany's has gone up too. And there's ups and downs and all sorts of vicissitudes in this period. But in that period, 1999 to 2025, Russia's GDP has increased by 13 times, while Germany's went up by 2.3 times. Different situations, different circumstances, but is this a failure? Depends how you look at it. Finally, failure also needs to be defined in comparative terms. You know, how else might Russia have developed? You know, can we say that Russia under a different ruler would be in a better place now? Well, I mean, in many ways, my honest answer was probably yes. But the point is Russia wasn't going to be a superpower, whoever was in charge. Charge. So, yes, one could argue that it was a failure for Putin to, for example, want to achieve parity with the United States and China, but that was unachievable anyway. But again, it's how far is the goal, the struggle, the road the important thing, rather than actually achieving that implausible destination. So in that respect, Putin was a failure, is a failure, but Russia is not, I would say. Look, I'm I'm not knocking the book. Again, um failure, Russia under Putin, edited by Harvey Bowser and Stephen Fisher, Brookings Press. But, you know, like and like all edited collections, it's uneven in quality and not always laser sharp in focus, but it's lots of exceedingly thoughtful and well-informed studies. And a few on the neh side. But rather I'm trying to challenge the question of some of the implied metrics that both Putin himself and some of his critics might try to apply, and instead to understand, well, where is Russia today? Now, as soon as you're talking about this, there's going to be a certain kind of commentary present that, oh, it's just a gas station with nukes, Nigeria with nukes. Well, take a look at what's happening in Nigeria. But we need to be very cautious about a lot of this very crass characterization. I mean, first of all, we can set aside pseudo facts like this kind of moronic claim that a quarter of Russians have no inside toilets that we keep still seeing thrown up, certainly on social media. The fact of the matter is that that was a misreading of the real data, because it includes things like people's dachas. You know, often they're yes, their little summer cottage doesn't necessarily have an indoor toilet. Or in some of the coldest locations of Russia, actually indoor plumbing or you know, plumbing is a is a problem, and therefore there are alternative sort of forms of waste management, shall we say, which aren't going to freeze. But the point is that no, the overwhelming majority of Russians do have plumbed inside toilets. That's just a little sideline, but that's quite a hobby horse of mine. But more broadly, let's, for example, knock the crass comparisons of GDP gross domestic product on the head. I mean, Russia's GDP globally is I think about 11th, just under the United Kingdoms, comparable, say, to Canada. But if you look at GDP purchasing power parity that factors in actually sort of what that really buys, Russia is fourth in the world. Now, neither of these is a proper measure. One of them understates Russia's position, the other one flatters it. But even so, they show that actually Russia is not some kind of impoverished basket case. It is a country which in purely arithmetic, if not moral and political terms, deserves to be within the G8, let alone the G twenty. But for all that, yes, it you know, it does have a certain large economy, it does have nuclear weapons, it does have considerable military force still, but it's not really a great power, as I said, particularly because of its incapacity to really shape the world order. It is, as I say, opportunistic. I've used the parallel in the past that it's a jackal, not a lion. It can happily feast on whatever carcasses it finds, but it's not bringing the elephants or the antelopes down. And at home, the realities are very much lagging behind the aspirations, precisely in terms of healthcare, education, and so forth, to a considerable extent, but certainly not solely because of the war in Ukraine. So, yes, it's a middle power, it's a regional power with global influence. But that's no bad thing. If only Russia, or indeed Putin, could bring themselves to accept this. Back in 2003, Putin said our principal task should be the return of Russia to the ranks of rich, developed, strong, and respected countries. But this return will only be possible when Russia becomes strong economically, when it is no longer dependent on crumbs from international financial organizations. Now, first of all, what he's describing is not necessarily a great power but a strong middle power. Secondly, return Russia to the ranks of rich, developed, strong, and respected countries. To greater or lesser extents, Russia had all of those things certainly in 2013, and arguably still in 2021. One could question the respected one. In some ways we have to consider the distorting effects of this war, not to ignore it, I mean it is a fundamental point that it is changing Russia's position in the world. But nonetheless, it is striking how, to a degree, Russia had what Putin was presenting as the goals. But that's the thing, that was not enough for Putin. If only he could have accepted what he had, rather than, like so many of his generation, this are the dying Homo Sovieticus generation, dwelling on what was lost, and in particular also drawing comparisons with a mythologized notion of what they had at the peak of Soviet power, which was already passed by the time they had come in to their political positions and the like. Ultimately we fail or we succeed in our and others' estimations. Arguably, after all, the best recipe for happiness and success is realistic, I mean even low expectations. Maybe what Putin should have really aspired to, in which case he would have succeeded, Russia and indeed Ukraine would be much happier places, if he had gone for let's call it the reassuringly low production values school of geopolitics. But alas, he didn't. He couldn't, and Russia and Ukraine and the rest of the world are paying the price. Well, that's the end of another episode of the In Moscow Shadow Podcast. Just as a reminder, beyond this, you can follow my blog, also called In Moscow Shadows. Follow me on Twitter at MarkGaleotti or Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. This podcast is made possible by generous and enlightened patrons, and you too can be one. Just go along to my Patreon page, that's patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows, and decide which tier you want to join, getting access to exclusive materials and other perks. However, whether or not you contribute, thank you very much indeed for listening. Until next time, keep well.