In Moscow's Shadows 250: Moscow's Comms Playbook (And Why It's So Bad)

A Russian drone hits a Romanian apartment block, two civilians are injured, and suddenly a stray weapon becomes a case study in how Putin’s Kremlin handles bad news. Why does the Kremlin’s crisis management default to a belligerent, self-sabotaging sequence that turns a manageable incident into a wider political problem?

It comes down to the priorities of an insecure, personalistic authoritarian system that equates any admission of failure with weakness, that regards information as a battlefield, and which lacks institutional filters between personality and policy.

Details of the 23 June event in Potsdam I mentioned are:

https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/marc-galeotti-autocracy-vs-technocracy-explaining-ukraine-war-6107930

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Transcript

Milestone Introduction And The Incident

MG 0:00

A stray Russian drone slams into an apartment block in Romania, and in the process offers us a case study in what we could consider the Kremlin's belligerent crisis management. And why Putin's Kremlin is so often its own worst enemy. And welcome to my view of Russia in Moscow Shadows. This podcast, of varying length, frequency, and format, yet always reassuringly low production values, is supported by generous and perspicacious patrons like you, and also by the Crisis Exercise software company Conductor. Before I start, now, in some ways it's actually a little bit misleading because there were some sort of out-of-sequence specials and so forth, but technically speaking, this is the 250th episode of In Moscow Shadows. I literally only realized that when I was actually saving this file. And so I want to use this opportunity to thank you who all of you who have been listening for whatever length of time it has been. And yeah, well, I just hope that it continues to be of value to people to listen.

Drone Hits Romania And Injures Civilians

MG 1:33

Anyway, last week a Russian Gerantwo drone hit a ten story residential apartment block in the southeastern Romanian city of Galatsi, causing a fire and injuring two civilians. And this is the first time that a stray drone from the war in Ukraine has hit a densely populated area inside a NATO member state and caused injuries. And I want to look at this episode not so much because it is that pivotal in its own right. I'm not minimising it, especially as it could have been a lot worse, but rather I want to use it as a case study in how the Kremlin tends to respond to these kind of crises and incidents, and why it seems inevitably to default into such a belligerent mode that actually seems so counterproductive. Now, it's worth noting, I mean some people have claimed that this actually was a deliberate attack and a pro a probe with the usual claim that it was because Moscow wanted to test NATO. I find this, I have to say, pretty questionable. This was never going to be something that anyone really wanted to elevate. It wasn't going to be the subject of Article V discussions, though it might be talked about under Article 4. And in any case, this whole testing NATO line seems frankly to be a Western rather than a Russian obsession. Indeed, it's much more likely that, as the Romanian government says, this was a strike aimed at the Ukrainian port of Reni, which is just on the other side of the Danube, that malfunctioned or had its sense of direction scrambled. Apparently it was hit by anti-aircraft fire. And well, just like it's worth noting, the Ukrainian drones that had come down in Baltic states were were clearly just sort of diverted off track. According to Romanian President Nikutsor Dan, there was a swarm of 43 Russian drones targeting Ukrainian port, you know, Reni, and one of them was hit by exactly anti-aircraft fire, and this sent it spinning off into a different direction. Now as I say, I'm not minimising this. This is what's going to happen if you insist on launching drone strikes on border targets, and the West is absolutely right to call it reckless and irresponsible. Even though obviously some people pushed it rather further, there was a bit of predictable breast beating from the hawks. But the point is that both Romania and NATO have officially categorized the strike as an accidental spillover from attacks on Ukraine rather than a deliberate act of aggression. But what I'd like to dwell on, as I said, is how this is a case study and just how lead footed and often, I would say, downright stupid the Kremlin seems to be in a crisis, because we seem to find the same depressing pattern repeating in terms of its responses every time.

Accident Or NATO Test Narrative

MG 4:24

First, temporise and hope the issue goes away or is eclipsed by some new news, which, let's be honest, is a lot more plausible in the Trump era, where we do have a rather ridiculous spin cycle of news. So for example, speaking at a press conference in Kazakhstan, Putin stated that it was too early to determine whose drone it had been, no one can say what had really happened until there's been a proper, formal, forensic investigation of the wreckage and so forth. So basically, step one, just try and put it off and hope it goes away. Second, of course, in the current environment, blame the Ukrainians. Putin actually suggested that the drone was likely a Ukrainian one that had strayed off course because of, again, malfunction or electronic warfare. And he compared the situation to previous incidents in Poland and the Baltic states, where the initial sort of panicky reactions have been, oh, the Russians are coming, and it proved to involve Ukrainian hardware, which is perfectly true that that is the case in the Baltic states. But the point is just because there were some cases of Ukrainian drones going off track doesn't mean it's not Russians. But the point is it's good to blame the Ukrainians if you're Putin. Once you've done that, well then you claim that it was essentially an incident that's being manipulated by hawks and blown up simply out of sheer russophobic ambition. Putin openly mocked, for example, the fact that Ursula von der Leyen of the European Commission had blamed the Russians, saying, well, if she hasn't looked at the wreckage herself, has she? And likewise, you know, other Russian coverage has presented the news as, if not an outright fabrication or a false flag, nonetheless, you know, being hyped up well ahead of any hard data. So stage three is just simply saying, oh, hawks are using this for russophobic purposes. And that allows you to move on to stage four, which is essentially to demand that the anti-Russian case is proven. Maria Zakharova, the ever-toxic spokeswoman of the Foreign Ministry, flatly labelled all European accusations against Russia as baseless and unsubstantiated, claiming that no material facts had been presented. And above all, twinned with this is a sense that, well, if you're going to prove it, you have to involve us in the in any investigation. This is, for example, what we saw with the whole Screpal case, saying, oh well, send us your your evidence and and we will examine it, as if actually the suspects need to be part of the investigation. Of course not. But the point is, this is intended to try and, well, in theory, if if this was accepted, give Russia access to any investigation and a chance to spin or delay it. But more to the point, because they know full well that it won't be accepted. It's a chance to say, oh well, just think of what cover-up is going on. Just think of how if we were involved we would see that in fact the real story was something very different. And then finally, stage five is if it has been proven, just tell the other side anyway to shut up or else. And we saw this kind of aggressive approach very, very clearly in one of the usual outlets for such belligerents, because he is at once high enough profile that his words are newsworthy, but on the other hand has no real meaningful position and therefore can be ignored or denied if inconvenient. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chair of the Security Council, because he took to social media and wrote, Shut up! This is just the tip of the iceberg. This will continue to happen. There's a war going on, and citizens of EU countries, like the populations of warring countries, won't be able to sleep peacefully, especially in those places where drone production facilities are located for the Banderite forces. In other words, the Ukrainians. So Medvedev is actually almost leaning into this idea that this was a deliberate strike, which again I don't think it was, to more or less say just don't talk about this too much, because who knows where we could hit next.

Kremlin Crisis Response In Five Steps

MG 8:47

We have seen all this sequence play out so many times before. And when has it actually ever really worked? I mean, as is, if we look at this particular incident, in response to what it called a grave and irresponsible escalation, the Romanian government is closing the Russian consulate in the Black Sea port of Constantia. Meanwhile, Romania has formally requested that NATO speed up the transfer of advanced counter-drone and air defence capabilities so that it can protect its border. Russian drone debris has apparently fallen on Romanian soil 47 times since the 2022 invasion. And of course, though, this is the most serious case. But at the moment, Romania is spending about 2.8% of its GDP on defence, which is up from 2.3% in recent years. And the plan is to hit 5% by 2032. I mean they've already ordered, for example, 32 eye-wateringly expensive F-35A jets. But there were concerns about whether or not there was the political will for future expenditure. And I imagine that it's now going to be a lot easier to push through the order, for example, of a third 16-plane F-35 squadron, which is what they were planning. So,

Romania Arms Up And NATO Rethinks

MG 10:04

you know, all of a sudden Romania is arming itself rather more assiduously. Meanwhile, it was very hard for the Romanians to actually do anything about this case because they only had apparently four minutes between radar detection of the drone and it actually impacting. And so as a result, NATO is actually beginning to debate or changing its rules of engagement to allow its forces to bring down low-flying drones even before they actually cross into Alliance airspace, if they look as if they're posing a direct trajectory risk to civilian cities. So if they're on a dangerous track, then maybe you'd actually shoot them down even while they're over Ukrainian airspace or looking at other areas, international waters. And again, that's a step forward, it's inconvenient for the Russians to say the least, and it's being pushed forward by not just the drone strike, but how the Russians have chosen to respond. And more broadly, look, Estonia has apparently just installed its first kind of permanent drone detection systems along a little stretch of its border with Russia and plans to extend it to the whole length. Well, I do wonder how long before the Romanians and others want the same. So as ever, this has been something of a PR disaster for the Russians. I mean just think, as a purely as a counterfactual, what would have been different if Moscow had promptly admitted responsibility, saying yes, yes, it was one of their drones, but it was a terrible accident. Obviously, in the process they could indirectly blame Ukrainian air defences and electronic warfare, but nonetheless they say, but you know, ultimately it's our drone, we will take responsibility. Offered not just apologies, maybe even compensation, which actually, if nothing else, would have raised some interesting questions about forcing some flexibility over the sanctions. Because if you're going to pay compensation, you have to be able to pay it, which means unlocking some banking stuff. And the point is that every small and temporary hole in the sanctions machinery structure is still a hole. And then maybe even gone further and said, look, they were perfectly happy to observe a moratorium on further strikes on border settlements along the Danube. So long as the Ukrainians observe similar restraint on, say, oil refineries, whose damage has terrible environmental effects. Let's think of the children. Now, look, of course this would have been seen for what it was, damage control. But nonetheless, this kind of an approach might have mitigated the worst of the reputational effects for Moscow, and maybe even put some pressure on Kyiv to limit its strikes. For minimal real consequences to Moscow's campaign, because every drone that is not aimed at a damn new port can be aimed somewhere else of equally significant military effectiveness. Now look, I'm not making a pitch for a crisis management consultancy gig with the Kremlin. I'm just highlighting that it did have options, and I would suggest arguably rather better ones. So why this thuggish, cack-handed, predictable and counterproductive playbook? I don't like this term playbook that is actually quite widely used when it comes to the Russians, because I think it of too often it is used to claim or impose a pattern where none exists. But I don't see how that can be avoided this time, because that sequence I've talked about, that that range, that limited but nonetheless predictable range of responses and options, is one that we've seen so many times in so many different contexts. Whether we're talking about the MH 17 shoot down back in 2014, whether we're talking about, as I mentioned, uh the Scripal attempted poisoning or whatever else. Time and time again we've seen this. So why does Moscow react with such implausible belligerence every damn time? As I say, this particular incident, frankly, is not a really important one. It's likely to be just a footnote in a month's time, unless it's repeated. But the reason I'm actually digging in is I do think this is a case study in the psychology, in the political culture of Putin's Kremlin. So having kind of laid out the situation, after the break, let me go into quite why I think this kind of pattern emerges and why, for the Kremlin, what may to us seem ludicrously counterproductive actually performs a function. Just

Sponsor Break And Listener Support

MG 14:50

the usual mid-episode reminder that you're listening to the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Its corporate partner and sponsor is Conductor, which provides software for crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counter-terrorism, and civil affairs. But you can also support the podcast yourself by going to patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows. And remember that patrons, as well as knowing that they're supporting this peerless source on all things Russian, get a variety of additional perks depending on their tier, including articles I've written, the most weekly Gavarik Moskvar press briefing, and other bonus content like the Chronicles of a Different Russia alternative histories. And you can also follow me on Twitter at Mark Galliotti or on Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. Now back to the episode. Before I get down to the nitty-gritty, just to mention that on the 23rd of June I'll be in Potsdam, speaking at the Centre for Military History and Social Sciences of the German Armed Forces on the topic autocracy versus technocracy, explaining the Ukraine war through politics and history. There may be some other gig in Berlin after that, that week. Watch this space for that. Anyway, back to the topic at hand.

Why The Kremlin Cannot Admit Fault

MG 16:04

Why that particular kind of response that we get time and time again from the Kremlin? Well, first of all, I think the purpose is to maintain the illusion of infallibility at home. This is an issue of autocratic strength. A regime's legitimacy, a regime like this, relies very heavily on projecting not just competence, which, let's be perfectly honest, is often a real problem for this Kremlin, but also absolute power and admitting a mistake, admitting a crime. These are things that the Kremlin tends to regard as a sign of weakness that could embolden both pressure from without, but also domestic political opposition. So there is a natural default towards saying we do not screw up. And more to the point, this feeds into a certain cult of invulnerability that the government presents itself to Russian citizens as this unassailable and reliable protector against external threats of any kind, whether we're talking military threats or just simply harsh words. So making admission of guilt in this respect is again impossible. I mean, for example, Tsagrad, the ultranationalist news outlet, spanned this as some kind of a story of Russian success. The way they have framed it, Romania and NATO made a fuss about some drone strike, who knows quite what it was. And they are in fact talking about making some kind of harsh response against Russia. And then that's the point when Dmitry Medvedev, the mighty globe bestriding colossus that he is, made his intervention on social media, and quote, it was at this moment that the diplomatic magic occurred. For some unknown reason, the NATO Council didn't convene. And in Bucharest, they apparently spent the entire night pondering Medvedev's unpleasant words. And in the morning they came up with the following. The drone was Russian, but it wasn't treacherous and hadn't attacked at all. It turned out it had been shot down in Ukraine by the same infamous air defence system that sends chills down the spines of Ukrainians. It was shot down and it nosedives straight into Romania. So Russia didn't attack. Well, there is of course no evidence at all that Medvedev gave the Romanian government sli a sleepless night. But the point is this has been spun now as actually a tale of successful deterrence of NATO that wanted to use this as an excuse for some kind of hostile act. And of course it also plays in in the same under the same sort of category into a certain victimhood mentality. You know, the Russian government consistently frames any exposure of its wrongdoing as some kind of evil coordinated russophobic plot orchestrated by the West. Izvestia, for example, which is often, frankly, a relatively sane Russian newspaper by the standards of the Russian media, nonetheless claims that the Galatsi incident was actually just simply the pretext for a new diplomatic escalation that had been prepared in advance, this closure of this Russian consulate. So the Romanians have been waiting to do it and thought, no doubt, heaved a sigh of relief when they had a suitable pretext. And this leads away to what we could consider to be preemptive aggression. And this is crucial because it's worth noting, you know, we shouldn't forget that, and I'll come to the information warfare side of things in a moment, but nonetheless, you know, there is an element within Russian strategic culture that says if you're going to get involved in a conflict, best throw the first punch. And I think this is this kind of preemptive aggression, almost defensive aggression that we see here. By treating every accusation against them as an act of Western Gibrna Voyna, hybrid warfare, against Russia, of course, the regime justifies its own aggressive, hostile responses as a legitimate act of national self-defense. And in the process, again, not only does it puff itself up as the defender of Russia and Russians, but it also is a massive deterrent to open discussions about failings at home. When you frame yourself as being in an existential political struggle, then, as Putin has made it absolutely clear since 2022, there is no more middle ground between being a patriot and being a traitor. And if you start talking about issues in which the government seems to have done badly, if you start echoing the talking points of the Western media, then you have crossed that line from patriot into traitor. And so you don't. And this is something that we see very sort of generally as a way of sort of trying to close down any internal discussion. It it fails in terms of the kitchen table conversations, but it can certainly affect the open discussion. But

Infowar: Infoshum And Competing Stories

MG 21:04

this is also about information warfare abroad. So we've got the illusion of infallibility at home and information warfare abroad. Much is made at times in certain quarters, this idea that Kremlin the Kremlin employs a Soviet-era tactic called reflexive control. Now, reflexive control is about conveying information, specially prepared information, to an opponent in such a way as to force them to make a decision to do something which will actually be to their disadvantage. And honestly, I do have a sense that it's another example of a fairly common tactic that everybody uses. I mean, frankly, every parent trying to use reverse psychology to get a kid to eat their greens is in a way employing reflexive control. But the point is this is something. That is made to seem exotic and Russian-specific by giving it a particular term. We've seen this with Maskirovka for strategic deception and such like. That said, it is certainly true that Russia absolutely does seek to manage narratives in a very purposeful manner in order to undermine its enemies, essentially these days it means the West, and also push them in certain directions. And one of the approaches it does so is not by kind of presenting a single coherent line, but quite the opposite, by employing what is called infoshum, information noise, in which you basically try to deploy multiple often contradictory lines. Not so much in order to try and convince others of your particular point of view, so much as to muddy the waters, to try and give that sense that, oh well, we'll never know the truth of it, so let's move on. Again, classic example was precisely what happened in 2014, when Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17 was shot down over the Donbass by rebel forces using a Russian-supplied BUC surface-to-air missile. When you had claims that, oh, it was actually a Ukrainian missile, it was actually a Ukrainian plane. I mean, they actually claimed the ground attack aircraft, which couldn't possibly get a sufficient altitude, was responsible. Or even more outre ones, like the one I thought was extraordinary, was that it was already full of corpses, and this was a CIA plot to basically bring it down over the Donbass and then claim that the Russians and their local rebel clients were responsible. All kinds of nonsense. But the idea is you just blast out as many different conspiracy theories as possible, not because you think any one of them is going to gain much traction, but just simply by the sheer volume and in some ways the eye-catching lunacy of these lines that you obscure the truth. And for example, we had in Komsomolskaya Pravda, one Sergei Stankievich claiming, in connection with the recent Romanian attack, the goal is to provoke a major European war. First by drawing in at least one or two more countries, Romania, Moldova, Estonia, Belarus. Everywhere we see a pattern of non-random quote unquote drone incidents. So you make this out to be sort of part of some grand provocation to generate a whole new global war or something like that. And, you know, in in so many other areas the Russians try this. They escalate the situation and they throw out as many different lines as possible in the hope of obscuring the reality, but also maybe one or two of them happen to land. Take for example Zelensky. I mean, the Russians have portrayed Zelensky as a drug addict, patron of neo-Nazis, porn of the United States, porn of the United Kingdom, or in recently we had this viral AI-driven campaign circulating an entirely fabricated news report claiming that he had just bought a $3.2 million Armani designed, that's a nice little touch, apartment in the Burj Khalifa huge building in Dubai for his mum. I don't know, actually, in some ways I think some oh he looks after his mum. Maybe that sounds almost positive, but clearly this is attempt this is an attempt to to basically paint him as corrupt as well. So in all the other things. So this is this is the approach. It's information warfare because you want to. I mean, obviously, ideally you establish yourself as an arbiter, not the suspect. I mean indeed Putin had said in relation to the drone strike, if they provide us with some objective data, we will conduct an objective investigation. And only then will we make an assessment. So it's trying to elevate Russia out of the mess. So again, it's not a suspect, it's another investigator. But failing that, you want to make any investigation impossible, or at least implausible, so that when you actually get the real truth, it is buried, hidden under this cloud of falsehoods. And that leads to, I think, the third point I would want to make, is that this is not just simply about trying to respond to a particular piece of bad news.

Narrative Escalation As Asymmetric Deterrence

MG 26:40

It's also about what we could consider to be asymmetric information deterrence. I know I'm putting my own little pompous phrase on this. There is a claim often made again that Russia has in its military doctrine an escalate to de-escalate strategy. So in other words, if it gets involved in an unpleasant conflict, it will actually step up, and often the implication is by using nuclear weapons, in order to de-escalate the situation. So basically it does something really dramatically bad and then says, we don't want this to get out of hand, so let's agree to settle things down. Well, I think it's very questionable that that's actually part of its military thinking. But on the other hand, it certainly does seem to be how it approaches information warfare. Again, by upping the ante in the hope that everyone will want to just calm things down and make this problem go away. So we always have these very, very aggressive efforts to blame everyone else. I mean Zacharova, for example, says that this case is actually just a means of trying to distract attention from the Ukrainian drone strike that hit the university premises in Starobielsk. Carried out, she adds, with EU money and EU support. This Starobielsk case, after all, is a very live issue for the Russians at the moment. You know, a series of Ukrainian drones hit a couple of educational establishments in Starobelsk in occupied Luhansk. And it seems to have killed uh 21, I think it is, youngsters or well, mainly youngsters. And they're claiming that it was an unprovoked attack on a civilian target. The Ukrainians, well, I mean, at first there was a sort of claim that, oh no, this there were no civilians killed. Now I think they're accepting that there were, but actually they were saying that in fact this this building was a headquarters of the Rubicon drone unit. Now the fact of the matter is are look hard to ascertain from outside. I think it's fairly clear that civilian kids were killed. On the other hand, two particular separate but adjacent educational institutions were hit. The second one, it's much harder to be sure quite what was going on there. It may well be that that was some kind of military installation, and that the kids were, to use that ghastly expression, collateral damage. They were sort of caught by accident as a result. But the point is clearly the death of twenty or so youngsters is not just a genuine tragedy from the Russians' perspective, but also a very, very handy information tool. So that's being brought up time and time again to say, oh well, it's because Ukraine did this terrible thing that Ukraine and its allies are trying to distract from that. Putin himself, when he was in Kazakhstan, was very actually quite angry and said that within the media, the Western media, there's been, and this is untrue, but nonetheless his view, not a word at all, simply not a single word about the tragedy in Starobylsk, about the fact that children died, that our children were deliberately killed. Not a word of it, as if it doesn't exist. So, you know, again, we we tend to have this thing of just, well, you did something bad. Now, for example, we have Russia still making much of its claim that a Ukrainian drone hit a turbine at the Zaporizhia nuclear plant that they seize, and this is another terrible again to use those phrases, you know, reckless and irresponsible act. So if in doubt, if feeling on the defence, move immediately to the offense and respond to accusations with immediate belligerence. With overkill, quite frankly. The idea is to force critics, essentially, in this context, Western leaders, to weigh the cost of pushing for accountability against the risk of a dangerous confrontation. I mean, this is the purpose of things like Medvedev's broadside. It's just basically to try and say, shut up and do not push this too far, because otherwise you're gonna make us do something that you won't like. It's noteworthy, for example, that after the announcement from Bucharest about the closure of the consulate, the Russian Foreign Ministry, I mean, didn't just simply condemn it as an attempt again to divert international focus from Ukraine's actions in Sarobielsk, but warned that there would be a prompt Russian response. I mean, I think Romania still has a consulate in St. Petersburg, so maybe it's time for the staff there to start packing. But again, it's always this point of if you are going to try and make us accountable, appreciate that we are going to hurt you back. It shifts the conversation away from the original wrongdoing into just simply the tit for tat, and it forces your adversaries into a defensive position because they have to try and manage this new escalation. So there is a logic to it, it's just not necessarily the logic that we would expect, or indeed that we'd like to see. So

Core Takeaways On Kremlin Psychology

MG 32:02

here are my in conclusion, my kind of takeaways. For the Kremlin, information and narrative is just simply war. It's not about what is right and wrong, true or false. It's about how can this advance your position. And this strategic culture that says if you're going to get involved in a conflict, it may well be time to strike first, so that you can at least determine the timing and the context of the conflict, also applies in the information space, where everything can be reframed, everything, every truth can be hidden in this cloud of falsehoods. And it was quite telling that there was a piece in Moskowsky Komsomolets on the attack on Starobylsk by one Andrei Klinsevich, head of the Centre for the Study of Military and Political Conflicts, who said that look, that that drone attack on the university was no accident. He said Artificial intelligence controls the battlefield, but moral algorithms have been completely disabled. Any means necessary are being used to exert pressure on the enemy. The algorithm calculated that children's institutions are sacred sites for Russians. Yeah, tell that to all the Ukrainian ones that have been hit. So we're targeting them. It's an old British intimidation tactic. Well look, let's set aside the characteristic snipe the Brits. But again, it's this point that in fact they're trying to say whatever happens, it happens because of enemy action. Or at least that's how we're going to frame it. The narrative is a battlefield, plain and simple. Secondly, that this is a Kremlin that feels it cannot admit to failure or weakness. And this, we've got to realise, is a product of insecurity. This is a very, very insecure Kremlin, particularly driven by Putin's own sense. Remember, this is a man who's seen both East Germany and the Soviet Union collapse around him, and who felt that these regimes failed because their leaders were not tough enough, and that small concessions create the first cracks in the dam of authoritarian power. So you can't make any concessions because God knows quite where that will lead. And in many ways it's also informed by what we could think of as the sort of culture of the prison camp, which again is if you back down once, you'll be backing down forever. I mean, it it's quite funny, for example, a slight tangent here, but that Russians seem to understand Prigozin's mutiny, the Wagner mercenary mutiny, rather better than most Westerners did. They get a sense of quite why Prigozin did what he did. That he felt that he was in this desperate struggle with Defence Minister of the Time, Shoigu, and that he felt he could not back down. That although common sense would see, would be accept that Shoigu has outmaneuvered you, and that you are going to basically lose the Wagner mercenary army to the Ministry of Defence, but you'll still be rich and powerful, even if you accept that. But he just could not let that go. And therefore he had to gamble everything on a desperate and ultimately rather stupid throw of the dice to try and just finally get one over on Shoigu, finally get Putin to back him. Better that than make any kind of concession. As I say, I'm I'm struck by how often Russians get that, whereas it's still regarded as bizarre in the West. So that's this kind of culture. Insecurity means that you just can't accept that you screw up. Thirdly, that everything is about the domestic. I mean, yes, of course, Russia is engaged in all kinds of operations abroad, but when it comes down to it, it's all about the domestic side of things. And Putin is perfectly willing to burn foreign relationships and foreign relations and foreign credibility in the name of domestic security. And that means that there is very little room for nuance. You know, it is not a situation in which one can say, well, we are involved in legitimate military operations military special operations, and sometimes that means that things go badly, and we have to recognise that and take accountability. No, you have to hold the line at every point. And no, we never do anything wrong. So the reason why this seems such a bizarre strategy, frankly, for the West, is because it has different goals from what we'd assume. It's rooted psychologically in these notions of victimhood and paranoia. It presumes that Russia can't ever is never going to get a break. So why bother even trying to do that right thing as we would see it? It's not about defusing tensions, it's about exploiting them. And above all, it's about the domestic rather than the foreign effects. So this isn't just about tactics. This reflects the very real feelings of Putin and his cohorts. And look, let me stress, because at some point someone, invariably, when I try and talk about how they see the world, interprets this as me somehow saying that we should empathize with them and give them a break. I'm not saying that at the moment. I'm just saying that we need to actually understand how they see the world in order properly to interpret and analyze Russian policy and Russian actions. So, okay, necessary defensive caveat inserted. So Putin and his cohorts in particular, and this also applies more generally, but it's especially, I think, relevant to these 70-year-old men who have seen the Soviet Union collapse. They feel constantly threatened. They constantly feel that they are being unfairly treated. They're wrong, but there you go. And as a result, they are both angry, vindictive, frankly, and insecure. And the trouble is this is what happens in personalistic authoritarianisms. Policy is personality. Personality is policy. There are no institutional filters between those two things. Nothing that actually moderates the impact of the fields of the particular guys in charge. It just simply gets transmitted directly and immediately into policy. So the good news is that Putin's Russia continues to undermine itself through mishandling of crises, largely through misinterpreting the environment in which it's operating. The bad news, alas, is and I hate ending on a pessimistic note, especially for the 250th episode, but anyway, the bad news is I see no real chance that this will change, at least so long as Putin is in the Kremlin, whether in terms of the way they look at the world through this embittered and paranoid prism, or actually how they respond to what happens. So yeah, unfortunately, that particular playbook, that belligerent response to crises, that attempt to essentially say life will get worse for you if you insist on highlighting our flaws, our failures, and trying to make us responsible for it, all that is something that we're going to have to accept for some time to come. Oh dear. Yes, that is far too downbeat. I will try and think of something more optimistic to talk about next week. But

Closing Thoughts And Where To Follow

MG 39:42

in the meantime, thank you as ever for listening. Well, that's the end of another episode of the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Just as a reminder, beyond this, you can follow my blog, also called In Moscow Shadows. You can follow me on Twitter at Mark Galliotti or Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. This podcast is made possible by generous and enlightened patrons, and you too can be one. Just go along to my Patreon page, that's patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows, and decide which tier you want to join, getting access to exclusive materials and other perks. However, whether or not you contribute, thank you very much indeed for listening. Until next time, keep well.