In Moscow's Shadows 251: The Near Abroad Recedes: Armenia and Belarus

Russia still talks about the “Near Abroad” as if the map never changed, but the region is changing anyway. After a quick touch on Zelensky's open letter to Putin and the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, I dive into the relative trajectories of Armenia, currently at the polls, and Belarus, emphatically not. Despite its continued use of this problematic, imperialist term the "Near Abroad," in different ways, Moscow’ is finding its influence  fraying across the former Soviet space, and why the Kremlin is leaning harder on pressure, deniability, and narrative spin to compensate for a shrinking sphere of influence. 

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Transcript

Aluminium Bearings And A Quick Reset

MG 0:00

Time to head to the near abroad. And yes, I am aware of just how problematic that term is. Specifically aluminium bearings. Hello, I'm Mark Galliotti, and welcome to my view of Russia in Moscow Shadows. This podcast of varying length, frequency, and format, yet always reassuringly low production values, is supported by generous and perspicacious patrons like you, and also by the Crisis Exercise Software Company Conductor. Yes, I'm not really going to be talking about the current news of the moment. I'm not really going to be talking about Zelensky's open letter to Putin. Look, let's be clear, this is not actually a peace initiative on his part. Really, it's a bit of trolling. And also it's an overture to Europeans to ensure that if they do engage with Russia, as is being discussed, they do so as Ukrainian partners, not as neutral parties. Which, after all, let's be clear, they're not. You can't arm

Zelensky’s Letter And Europe’s Role

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and bankroll one side in a war and then pretend you're not involved. And I'm not making a criticism of Zelensky when I say this. He's doing his job, and his job at the moment is indeed to make sure that the Europeans remain, as he would say it, in their lane. But let's be clear what's going on, and I'm not surprised that Putin responded rather titchily, given the degree to which, not least, the open letter essentially did have a go at his age.

SPIF Denial And Russia’s Economy

MG 1:49

Likewise, there's not really all that much that I really want to say about the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum and Putin's address. I had been contemplating making this a podcast about that until I actually looked at what was being said. It was definitely a don't mention the war moment. Or more to the point, don't be candid about its effects. No real talk about the rising tax burden or corporate debt. Central bank chair Nabulina wasn't even there. Apparently she's on sick leave, but uh quite frankly she probably wouldn't want to be there. Putin himself combined the familiar criticism of the West with the equally familiar spin on the economy. I thought particularly priceless was the line Russia's economy is slowing down deliberately. There are no threats to the economy, nor will there be in the foreseeable future. Of course. Look, the Russian economy is not, contrary to what some claim, on the verge of some kind of crisis or collapse, but it is in trouble. Now, whether it's a worse crisis than much of Europe is facing, I don't know. I mean the budget deficit is at 2.6% of GDP, which is essentially quite comparable to the average across the European space. But on the other hand, it's actually much a better position than Europe's most strained economies. I mean, Britain and France, I think it's over 5% in both cases, I think. That's from memory. Total public debt is something like 20% of GDP, while the European average, I think, is over 80%. And both Europe and France are over 100%. I think of France is actually up to 110%. That said, European economies can borrow freely on global capital markets at competitive international rates, which the Russians can't because of sanctions. So instead, Moscow is having to borrow entirely from domestic banks, and that's that's causing a real problem. Debt servicing is swallowing up, I think, 10%. No, I think it's about nearly 9% of all Russian federal expenditure, which is only a little bit more than Britain and okay, definitely less than France's 5%. So look, I I don't know. Swings and roundabouts here. But let's just recognise that Russia is not facing some kind of economic death spiral or whatever else is being claimed by some. The key thing for me was the level of denial. Now, the big question is whether this was just St. Petersburg International Economic Forum spin. What happens at SPIF stays at SPIF, and how far Putin just simply stuck his head even deeper into the sand. We're going to have to wait and see. But anyway, as I say, this isn't really about that. It's actually instead I wanted to look at a couple of countries in the quote unquote near abroad. And I

What The Near Abroad Really Means

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should add, I am recording this on Saturday, the 6th of June, even though it'll drop as usual on Sunday. So if something dramatic happens in the next 24, 18 hours or whatever, that's why I'm not mentioning it. Anyway, near abroad. And look, this is a, as I said, deeply problematic term. It's the one that the Russians use for the countries of the rest of the post-Soviet space, with I think it's fair to say the exception of the Baltic states, that they have kind of internalized, is not, is not Nash, not ours. And their sense is essentially that this area is their sphere of influence, their area of privileged sovereignty. And obviously it is a deeply, implicitly imperial notion. The idea that there is the near abroad, which isn't truly properly abroad, and then there's the far abroad that is the real abroad. Increasingly, this term, insofar as it ever had any kind of validity, not in objective terms, but just simply in understanding how the Russians think about the area, but even so, I think it's becoming less and less meaningful. And I want to start from a slightly indirect direction.

A Travelogue Lens On Post USSR

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Look, I'm a bit of a sucker for the travelogue, the well-written travelogue, especially when it's written with the kind of the right mix of humour, insight, and empathy. And I still think the gold standard is Eric Newby's The Big Red Train Ride, which is his account of taking the Transsiberian Express all across 1970s USSR, right the way to the Pacific, accompanied by his wife Wanda, Otto, the increasingly frustrated German photographer, and Misha, their their handler, their interist guide, whose main job seems to have been to get them to meet mares and visit factories. And the phrase Wanda, Wanda, save me from the Buriats still tickles me, if anyone actually has read it. But do yourself a favour and give it a try. So something of a potential successor is Joe Luke Barnes's Farewell to Russia, a journey through the former USSR, which is published this year by Elliot and Thompson. Barnes, a journalist, travelled across all 15 post-Soviet countries, starting in 2022, so it was a particularly interesting time to be doing so, and who kind of frames this as in some ways fifteen coming of age stories of fifteen new nations. I've definitely I enjoyed this book, although in conscience squeezing fifteen republics into one book means that really you've just got a series of vignettes, and often what I actually wanted to do was to read something in which he he could dig a little bit more deeply. The Russia bit, despite obviously having the particular virtue of his having been there when the 2022 invasion started, which was undoubtedly an eye-opening opportunity to talk to people, is nonetheless, I felt a little bit on the obvious side. And I I suspect that this is the thing. I was most interested and engaged by the chapters relating to the countries that I know least. Presumably precisely because I was more likely to be surprised. Still, look, Barnes is an engaging companion as he wanders, sightsees, boozes, and chats his way across Eurasia. And it it's a very human book. And yes, sometimes that does mean the usual tropes of the chatty taxi driver and the ludicrously hospitable local. I must admit, I mean, maybe I'm just doing something wrong, maybe I'm just a miserable sod, but I haven't had as half as many people sort of invite me to dinner and meet the family and whatever else. But anyway, despite that, it's a very nice counterpoint to a lot of the sort of top-level political analyses around.

Armenia’s Pivot And Russia’s Levers

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And he recounts an interesting conversation with an Armenian student who got into trouble with a prospective PhD supervisor because he was deemed too pro-Russian. I mean, he denied that he was actually pro-Russian, but rather bitterly said, Look, at least the Russians helped defend Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, this enclave within Azerbaijan. Now, this was before 2023 when Moscow effectively abandoned Yerevan. Azeri forces smashed into and across Nagorno-Karabakh and began carrying out what looks suspiciously to me very much like ethnic cleansing. And the student continues, perhaps also because we're a Russian-speaking generation and grew up listening to Russian music, watching the films, so we're more positively inclined towards the Russians. But that's mainly because we have no one else to turn to. Now that may well be in Ebb, but we shouldn't ignore it. But secondly, that rather tragic and pathetic because we have no one else to turn to. And the elections in Armenia that are being held, well, as you're listening to it today, in other words, on Sunday, very much also a referendum on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian's efforts to steer closer to Europe. Moscow would almost certainly prefer to see Paschinian and his civil contract party lose to more pro-Russian opposition figures in the elections, like Narek Karpetyan, who's nephew of the Armenian Russian billionaire Samvil Karpetyan, or indeed former president, actually, I think it was, Robert Kacharyan. But as I discussed for patrons in this week's Gavarit Moskvar press review, Moscow's absolutely turning the screws on Armenia at the moment, particularly with economic sanctions. But nonetheless, it does seem clear that one result of Moscow's abdication of responsibility for supporting Armenia in 2023 is the ruination of this connection. But at the same time, although Pashinian is looking closer to the European Union and European Union membership, Armenia isn't anywhere near even the point of being invited to start the accession process, which can take, well, in some cases, a couple of decades and counting. And frankly, I don't think Europe, as it abases itself to the Azere dictatorship because of all of its lovely oil and gas, is going to be putting itself too far for democratic Armenia, especially if it has to choose between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And I do still wonder if, however conditional, abusive, and transactional it undoubtedly was and is, the Armenians may well still end up re-establishing their relationship with Russia. Perhaps I'm being too pessimistic here. So on Thursday, before his set piece speech at the International Economic Forum, Putin sat down with the heads of a bunch of international news agencies. And in response to a question from Andrei Mokor of the Belarusian news agency Belta, who raised issues of a crisis of trust with our partners in the post-Soviet space, specifically the events unfolding with Armenia, Putin actually sounded on the in the main quite measured, saying in relation to Armenia's desire to get closer to Europe, there's nothing wrong with that really. They're looking to Western standards as European standards, and I believe it's the right of every sovereign country, which Armenia certainly is, to choose standards and partners that they consider priorities and valuable for the country's development, for strengthening its independence, sovereignty, and most importantly, its economy. But then he said, We'd ask our Armenian colleagues to decide as quickly as possible which direction they'll take. As in practice, and he talks about particularly in terms of standards and regulations and so forth, harmonisation with the European Union is pretty much incompatible with continued membership of the Eurasian Economic Union, which is his bloc, economic bloc in the region. And he says, we will maintain normal relations with Armenia no matter what path it decides to take. But definitely he is basically saying it's best that it does so quickly. But at the same time, look, he's clearly just not sitting back to hear what the Armenians decide, especially as he was clearly also very irked by the fact that in April Pashinian hosted a European political community summit, which also included Zelensky, and the fact that Pashinian has also made overtures to the United States, and indeed Trump has endorsed him. Marco Rubio recently visited Yerevan. And this week, as mentioned in Gavarit Moskva, we had this piece in Moscowski Kamsomolets with the headline Putin kicks the chair out from under Pashinian. The inner workings of the Kremlin Yerevan conflict. Why Russia and Armenia have reached a breaking point. And this article, which is clearly, I think, channeling Kremlin thinking, very much warned that Armenia couldn't have it both ways. It couldn't have the perks of being a member of the European Economic Union while, quote, politically aligning itself with Moscow's arch enemies in the European Union. And the claim that is made in the article is that Paschinyan frankly misread the situation. What Pashnyan, I believe, underestimated is the degree of emotional and political tension palpably felt in Moscow. In the truly important offices of the Russian capital, they don't believe this is a time for half measures, for exercising strategic patience towards allies who engage in double dealing and even betrayal, and indeed we're seeing measures to match. First of all, economic pressure. Russia has restricted its imports of Armenian flowers, cognac, fish, mineral water, all sorts of produce, and indeed threatened to terminate a 2013 natural gas deal, and this is a big deal, which guarantees Armenia's duty-free deliveries of Russian gas and petroleum. Now, the European Union accounts for something like 5-8% of Armenia's total export market. Russia, well over 35%, so this matters. We're also seeing political pressure. There's a whole campaign of political destabilization, disinformation and the like. And indeed threats. Because despite his statesmanlike comment at Spief, Putin recently drew a rather worrying parallel with Ukraine, saying, We all see what's happening with Ukraine now. But where did it all start? With Ukraine's effort to join the European Union. It's not quite true, but the point is that that what matters is the point that Putin is trying to make. The intent, which is essentially you start going that way, and before you know it, you might have tanks rolling across your border. And there was a incidentally thoroughly charming, and I I trust the irony is there, is clear, headline in the nationalist Zagrad news site, which said Putin is preventing Pashinan from turning Armenians into Jews. Now I had to read this out of horrified curiosity. And the headline only really paid off in the very last line. Without Russia's support, Armenia will collapse, and its population, to the delight of its hated Turkic neighbors, will be forced to disperse. Although not all of them will be able to become something like the new Jews. Ah, okay, okay. I'm not even going to try and parse quite what Zargrad really meant by that. But the point is, we have this idea that essentially if Armenia turns away from Russia, then at best Russia will just let it dangle, withdraw the economic lifelines, and Armenia can expect to be crushed by Azerbaijan and its Turkish allies. And at worst, Russia might actually step in and do the job itself. Now, I can't help but feel, and look, what do I know? I'm not an Armenia specialist, but that for Armenia the safest approach is probably a slow, careful extrication from under Russia's thumb, not some attempt at sort of dramatic reversal. Because it's it's hard to know quite how Moscow is going to play this after Pachinyan wins, which everyone expects. And also, whether the European Union, in wanting to support Armenia, pushes to essentially make it go too far too fast. On Thursday again, very keen to support Armenia's drift away from Moscow, the European Union announced that there'll be an initial 50 million euro economic support package to help the country weather these Russian sanctions. You know, while while saying how unfair it was to use economic pressure. And I'm thinking, come on. I mean, look, let's just be honest. What are you doing to Russia over Ukraine? Sanctions, what do you do? Use so often as your only real instrument of choice, Europe. It is economic pressure. So let's just be let's just be grown-ups and appreciate that that is how things work. But anyway, fine. So they they provided 50 million euros and talked up further European cooperation. But the point is they can't replace Russian markets, no matter how, you know, how I think Latvia is now importing Armenian roses. Well, that's very nice and fine, and I'm sure they're lovely roses, but you know, you you can't actually step in to the same degree. Armenia has suspended its membership of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in 2024, which I can't really call Moscow's new sort of Warsaw Pact, but nonetheless certainly sort of is Moscow's preferred security corporation structure of the region. And that was in 2024. And Pachinian recently said, in effect, we already consider ourselves outside the CSTO, even though they're still technically members. And in a debate with opposition leader Narek Karapetyan, he went even further. Fine, we'll leave the CSTO. Well, you're trying to scare us. You don't get to decide that. You or whoever's got your back, again, basically playing the idea that Karapetan is just a Russian proxy. We'll decide and will leave. Armenia is its own guarantor, the country, the military. Well, I mean not the chorus of the hymn of the Armenian army is I look this up. Our hearts are always strong, fiery, our swords are always strong, sharp, and let everyone know our name is the Armenian Army. Well that's all very stirring stuff, but I do hope that Pashnyan won't make the same mistake of Georgia's Mikhail Sakashvili, who, despite what he was repeatedly being warned by the West, assumed that in a crisis the West would come and protect Georgia back in 2008. Now I don't think Pashinyan would be this stupid. And frankly, I certainly don't think that Moscow actively wants basically to push things to that level, especially while its forces are all tied up. But I do think that Putin is feeling that the ebb of empire maybe has gone too far. And Paschinyan may feel that he has to escalate, and Putin may then feel that one way or the other he has to escalate too. We all know how well that could work. So conditionally, Armenia, I think, is in a position which can s as I say, slowly pull itself out from Russia's orbit, but there are some real dangers up ahead. They'll need to be navigated more carefully. Let's take a break, and then let's move on to Belarus, which I think could fairly be described as a rather different kind of country. Just

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Belarus Beyond The Headlines

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So, Belarus. And before I start, just a little behind the microphone sort of comment. What I find interesting is that when I focus on issues other than whatever is the primary news story of the day, that at the moment almost invariably seems to be something to do with the Ukraine war, I tend to get good, positive, supportive comments on the podcasts, but rather indifferent listenership. And okay, fair enough. I mean, obviously everyone gets to decide what they listen to. That's entirely their sovereign right. But my view is that I think it's important to look beyond that the story of the day. I mean, look, there are, I don't know, 50 podcasts on the Ukraine war, some of which are excellent, some of which, quite frankly, are terrible. But if we think that that's all that matters, that's all that we need to know, let alone that that's all that's interesting, I think we are definitely missing the point. So I shall continue. So Belarus. Now if you read what's in Bielta, which is the official government news agency, everything there is absolutely fine. But then again you'll quickly get a sense of what kind of a news agency news quote unquote agency Bielta is by looking at the top headlines. And frankly these would make Tass blush. Lukashenko. Belarus is the only country where healthcare has been preserved at the state level. Lukashenko praises Festival of National Cultures in Grodno as major cultural event. Ghana's president praises Belarusian agricultural machinery at Belagro 2026. Somehow I found it in me not to read that particular story. Lukashenko dresses down officials after stepping off helicopter. Lukashenko sends National Day greetings to people of Sweden. I'm sure they're tremendously grateful. Lukashenko comments on rainy weather in Grodna. Yeah. Okay, look, maybe that's not really the best guide to what's really important in Belarus. But then there was another headline that was perhaps more significant.

War Rumours And Nuclear Signalling

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Lukashenko, we are not going to wage war on anyone. And the reason why that's significant is precisely because there's a lot of alarmist talk during the rounds, not for the first time, that Belarus is about to join Russia's war in Ukraine. The anti-government emigre next news agency, for example, runs the headline Belarus preparing for war with NATO. At least it throws in a question mark there. Defence Minister signals readiness to fight alongside Russia. Well, look, Belarusian Defence Minister Viktor Krenin did indeed argue that NATO's military build-up in Poland and the Baltic states looks worryingly like preparations for direct military confrontation. And he did indeed say that in those circumstances, obviously the Belarusians and the Russians would be fighting together against this hostile attack. But he wasn't in any way expressing some kind of enthusiasm for war, just that intent to resist if attacked. So, you know, I think we have to be cautious about that. Because I have to say that I think this line about Belarus wanting and being ready to join the war seems pretty implausible. We've seen, yes, recent Russian-Bielarussian military exercises, which included the launch of nuclear-capable missiles and the reported deployment of, but I think simulated tactical nuclear weapons to some units. But that's something that happens all the time. That's nothing really that new. Then last month we had claims coming from Ukraine and its closer allies in Europe that Moscow was pressurizing Belarus to join a new northern offensive into Czernyhiv in northern Ukraine. Now, I don't see where the Russians have got that much spare military capacity in order to launch yet new offensives. And then in fact the reports went even further, said that the other possibility is that they're getting ready for a direct attack on NATO. And Zelensky said that Lukashenko, quote, must understand that there will be consequences if there is aggression against Ukraine, against our people. And Robert Madyabrovdi, who's head of the Ukrainian drone forces, warned that there's already a list of 500 Belarusian targets ready to be struck if Belarus joins the war. Now, again, I really see no suggestion that Moscow, let alone Minsk, is thinking of starting a war with NATO while the Russian forces are already bogged down in Ukraine. But again, this is nothing new. We've heard this kind of rhetoric periodically in the past. And frankly, again, Zelensky seems quite happy to stir things up. Back in February, he rather unhelpfully said that NATO should treat any sightings of Areshnik missiles in Belarus as a legitimate target, regardless of whether they were actually being used against Ukraine or anyone else. Last month he met with Belarussian opposition leader Svetlana Tsikonovskaya and saying, We all support the aspirations of the Belarusian people to free themselves from Russian interference. Well look, I mean it's not actually Russian interference, I think, so much that the Belarusian opposition is really trying to fight against, but rather Lukashenko's fuggish authoritarianism. I've got a great deal of respect for Tsikonovskaya, but Zelensky knew that he was tugging at Lukashenko's moustache there. Then we had one of his advisers, Mikhail Padayak, apparently even threatening Lukashenko directly, when he said As a cautious person who wants to live to retirement, I know, ensuring the transition of power, building a dynasty, I say all this sarcastically, but nevertheless it would be preferable for him simply to remain silent today. In other words, shut up or face risks. Again, I don't think for a moment that the Ukrainians are going to be striking Zelensky Lukashenko or anything like that, but just simply using such language is deliberately provocative, and I'm not quite sure, to be honest, what Ukraine's game plan is here.

Lukashenko’s Agency And Red Lines

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Now there was a quite a funny snarky paragraph in Joe Luke Barnes's Farewell to Russia when he's talking about Belarus, in which he's drawing a parallel with Brexit. Belarus is often dismissed by Western commentators as being somewhat of a Russian client state, still lumbered with Soviet street names, speaking Russian and reliant on Moscow for oil and foreign policy direction. Personally, I think this is a little harsh, and there is nuance beneath the surface. Indeed, I've come here seeking to test my hypothesis that Belarus is essentially like modern Britain. A country that chose to become independent, but with a population that didn't know what independence meant, and a political class who lacked the vision to carry it out. Well, okay, fair enough. Barnes wants to have his little jab at Brexit and those who voted for it. But the point is, when he then moves on from the sort of fascinating fact, by the way, that Belarusians are apparently the world's greatest per capita potato eaters, I didn't know that. But anyway, then Barnes concludes that Belarus actually come to think of it is a client state, and really does so on cultural grounds. Now I disagree on both cultural and indeed political grounds. I mean, Lukashenko is a survivor. He knows that military involvement, for example, would be disastrous, and also exceedingly unpopular with the military. Remember, you know, Belarusian ground forces are just 18,000 troops. That's what, at the current official sort of casualty rate, that's just over half a month's worth of casualties in the war. Furthermore, yeah, he does depend on Putin, especially since the big protests in 2020. But that doesn't mean he has no agency. I mean, I draw up a parallel with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte's rather foolish comments that if she wanted to invade Taiwan and needed a distraction, he'd just ring up Putin and tell him to invade NATO and NATO would do it. Well, no, actually, even if you are dependent, there is always a degree of agency within that relationship. And indeed, last month Lukashenko very, very specifically denied any plans to involve his country in the war, unless aggression is committed against his territory. And actually instead proposed a face-to-face meeting with Zelensky, saying if he wants to discuss something, seek advice or anything else, please do, we are open to it. I am ready to meet with him anywhere, in Ukraine, in Belarus, and discuss the problems of Belarusian-Ukrainian relations. Now, part of me wonders if he's actually also pitching himself as an intermediary between Ukraine and Russia. But the point is, you know, actually Zelensky has an open door if he wants to go through it there. And frankly, not even the Russians would would be particularly keen on this. As I say, the Belarusian army is not really going to change the balance of power that much. And more to the point, if Belarus got directly involved, that would give Ukraine free reign to hit at military infrastructure and indeed defense industry infrastructures being used by the Russians inside Belarus, as well as energy infrastructure. There's two big oil refineries that actually have become an important fuel reserve for European Russia when its own refineries find themselves offline as a result of Ukrainian strikes. So I think for these reasons, actually the status quo suits Moscow a lot better.

Annexation Talk And Public Opinion

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Now there's a lot of talk also on the part of the anti-Lukashenko emigre opposition of a Russian plan for creeping annexation, with notionally the idea that this is meant to be accomplished by 2030. I think probably the Kremlin would be perfectly happy to see Belarus as part of the Russian Federation, absolutely. But first of all, Russia is not in the best position these days. It has rather less leverage, and membership of the Russian Federation is less of what we could call a value proposition these days. And as a result, the overwhelming majority of Belarusians don't want to become part of Russia. They feel positive towards Russia, but that's different. Public opinion polls don't consistently show that very much there is a strong opposition to this. They want to be an independent, sovereign state. They're happy to be within the so-called union state of Belarus and Russia as two countries with a considerable degree of harmonization, visa-free travel, all that kind of thing, but that doesn't mean to say run from Moscow. Great diplomatic and economic ties, open borders, blah blah blah, but independent. How many want to be incorporated into Russia or for a true sort of Union state that is essentially Russian dominated? Well, again, depending on the poll, only between five and fifteen percent. So it's clear that this is not a point in which there is a groundswell. And after all, and here I do take issue with Barnes, although there are very great cultural similarities, and indeed the Russian language is widespread, this is a country with a distinct and indeed growing sense of its own national identity. And in fact, even when we come to language, I mean Bielorussian is closest, closer to Ukrainian than it is to Russian. And all of this has been exacerbated by the war. Even those who are broadly and probably often sentimentally supportive of Russia still favour neutrality. They oppose the idea of Bielorussian boys going and dying in a conflict that they don't really understand, or indeed the country being sort of hit by Ukrainian drones and missiles. And finally, look, Lukashenko himself is happy to be monarch of a little kingdom rather than governor of the Belarusian oblast within the Russian Federation. So look, for all of these reasons, although, yes, I absolutely accept that plans have been drawn up, especially within the presidential administration, but these are more contingency plans than anything

Kremlin Political Warfare Gets Subtler

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else. And certainly I don't think they're going to be brought to fruition. I mean, within the presidential administration, there was the Directorate for Interregional Relations, which was essentially the whole kind of political war arm of the presidential administration, and that was demonstrated by the fact that it was run by a succession of spooks. Most notoriously the SVR's Major General Vladimir Tsernov. And he's the guy who came up with this plan for the creeping annexation of Belarus by 2030. The point is in 2021 Chernov retired, and he was replaced by another SVR officer, his deputy Igor Maslov. But by all accounts, Maslov is a much, much less aggressive, active individual. I mean, he was much more keen to sort of basically rest on his laurels rather than try the sort of very ambitious projects that Chernoff was in mind. But that directorate was abolished last year, and it was replaced by a new directorate for strategic partnership and cooperation. Now again, we shouldn't r rest on these, the names too much. In some ways, almost the more benign the name, often the more malign the actual agency. But still, it also rolled into itself the old directorate for cross-border cooperation. And yes, it's still about not sort of so much foreign but near abroad policy, shall we say. And yes, it still is about pushing Russian interests on a level of aggressiveness that is not exactly kind of British council or whatever level. But the point is it's it's now under a former journalist and PR Flack by the name of Vadim Titov, who, not coincidentally, used to work for Rosatom, which, again, not coincidentally, used to be run by the figure in whose bureaucratic empire this new directorate sits, Sergei Kiryenko. Now, I'm not going to present this as a dramatic turn. I mean the directorate is still packed with all sorts of spooks and it's still committed to political warfare. But I think the focus is shifting to much more subtle means, and also towards, frankly, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan. Belarus is a much lower priority. And Kiryenko himself, I think, has undergone something of a change in approach. Remember, in 2022-2023, he was actually really quite keen on the war in Ukraine for a variety of reasons, including the fact that he thought it was create this new momentum to creating an ideological basis for the Russian state, but also because he actually thought that the process of consolidating the occupied territories, and remember there were going to be a hell of a lot more of them under the original thinking, expectation, was also going to give him, firstly, scope for a lot more bureaucratic empire building, but also, again, a boost overall to Russia politically and economically. Now he's much, much less keen on this. He does seem to be suggesting, or signalling rather, that he supports the idea of an end to the war, just basically declaring victory, freezing the front line, and focusing on a kind of reconsolidation of what's there rather than risking the kind of economic and thus political crises that could follow if this war rolled on and on and on. So, you know, I think generally Kiryenka is going to be making sure that his his guy, Titov, while active, is not quite so aggressive and probably not quite so ambitious.

US Belarus Backchannels And The Wrap

MG 36:58

Besides, I mean, the irony is that one of the reasons why Kyiv is getting so vociferous about Belarus and trying to present Belarus as this terrible threat to the West is because it is unhappy to see Minsk and Washington DC talking. The Americans have eased their own sanctions on Belarus. There was a recent release of political prisoners, and Washington is also quietly urging Poland, Lithuania, and indeed Ukraine to allow Bielarussian potash to be exported to the United States through their ports. So in some ways, this is actually, and again, perfectly logical from Ukraine's point of view, an attempt to try and stymie this kind of back channel dialogue which could lead to some kind of reconciliation with Belarus. So generally speaking, I think we all need to calm down. Obviously to different degrees, Belarus is no more unaffected by the the ebb tide of Russian hegemonic authority in the near abroad as Armenia. And indeed, in some ways, actually Belarus now has that much more agency than it had before 2022. Another one of the ironies of the degree to which Putin is burning through Russia's positions economically, politically, geopolitically, socially, you name it, in the name of this ridiculous war. So if we want to come down to it, even if one accepts the notion that there is a near abroad of Russian special interest, that near abroad is shrinking, or, put it another way, becoming increasingly a distant abroad. Well, that's the end of another episode of the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Just as a reminder, beyond this, you can follow my blog, also called In Moscow Shadows. You can follow me on Twitter at Mark Galliotti or Facebook, Mark Galliotti on Russia. This podcast is made possible by generous and enlightened patrons, and you too can be one. Just go along to my Patreon page. That's patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows and decide which tier you want to join, getting access to exclusive materials and other perks. However, whether or not you contribute, thank you very much indeed for listening. Until next time, keep well.