In Moscow's Shadows 252: All the Pieces of Peace in Ukraine

Peace gets talked about as if it is a destination we can spot from the front line, but the closer we look, the more it feels like a mirage. Ukraine’s mid-range strikes and tactical gains tempt commentators into declaring a decisive shift, and then into assuming peace is near. Real progress matters, but overconfident stories can set the public up for disappointment and push policymakers towards shortcuts. 

I take an article by British ex-diplomat Ian Proud on what he thinks a peace would require - I agree with many of his diagnoses, but not with a lot of his prescriptions - as a starting point to explore the different moving parts within any peace process. I don't end up feeling especially optimistic, although Russia could still just stop fighting at any time.

The Proud article, by the way, is here: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ukraine-russia-europe-talks/

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Transcript

Welcome And A Quick Favour

MG 0:00

Is it groundhog delay? Because once again, on the one hand, we are having to talk about what it would take to get peace in Ukraine, and on the other hand, we are doing so with a clear sense, and at present it doesn't seem unfortunately at all imminent. Hello, I'm Mark Galliotti, and welcome to my view of Russia in Moscow Shadows. This podcast of varying length, frequency and format, yet always reassuringly low production values, is supported by generous and perspicacious patrons like you, and also by the Crisis Exercise Software Company Conductor. So I'm recording this on Sunday the 14th of June, and if you are a paying patron and listening today, last call tonight for the next uh sort of quarterly or so patrons only questions and answer episode. And speaking of patrons, I have just been taken to task in the nicest possible way. Apparently I should be begging you not just to subscribe, but also to review this podcast and generally lord it to the heavens. So I am pretty pleased. Seriously, if you find this at all interesting or useful, it would be great if you could beat the drum, not least because then the uh, as I say, highly supportive patron who said, Oi, why are you not doing this? Every other podcast does, essentially will be off my back. Anyway, let's go on to the meat of this podcast.

Ukraine’s Gains And The Hype Trap

MG 1:55

With metronomic regularity, slightly overblown talk about how the tide has turned in Ukraine's favour. And on that point, look, let's recognise real progress, particularly thanks to their new strategy of mid-range strikes. But I'm always worried about the sudden sort of everything has changed kind of narratives. Because they're also a little bit like, do you remember back in 22, 23, 24, when there was always going to be some new Western wonder weapon, you know, Patriot missiles, F-16, HIMARS, whatever, that was suddenly going to completely change the whole narrative of the war? You know, we can't just simply take a f a month or a few months and then just draw a straight line based on those dots on the graph. You know, it may well be that in fact this current combination of what they're doing on the battlefield, what they're doing in the mid-range, and what they're doing strategically in f further Russia will actually genuinely make make a difference. At present, certainly the the pendulum has swung in Ukraine's direction, but let's beware undue and premature triumphalism on that point. But anyway, the shift of the narrative to it's it's Ukraine that is now putting Russia on the back foot, etc., has turned into talk of peace, this time on Kyiv's terms. And I really want to address whether we're anywhere really near there, but also, again, that whole question about what does peace look

Zelensky’s Letter As Political Gambit

MG 3:32

like. Now look, there was no surprise that Putin didn't respond to Zelensky's open letter calling for talks, but honestly, it was pretty clear from the first that this letter, stacked as it was with personal snipes against Putin, his age, his relationship with the Russian people, etc., wasn't actually meant to be a genuine overture to talks so much as a trap, a bid to trigger a rejection, which would allow Zelensky to paint Putin as the baddie. And I'm not c this is not a criticism. It's funny, when when people, so or some people, hear me sometimes try and dig into what Zelensky is doing and what might be behind it rather than taking it at face value. I sometimes get accused of unfairly cynical snipes. But look, in many ways I regard one of the greatest accolades I can give Zelensky is that he's actually doing his job well when he essentially takes the political fight to Putin, just as his soldiers are taking the military fight to it. So bear that in mind. But anyway, as I said, this was essentially a gambit. And of course the Russians duly obliged in their own clumsy and thuggish way. And so it worked, and frankly, Zelensky himself admitted so at a meeting with leaders of the Baltic states. He said, When I sent that letter to Putin, I knew exactly what I wanted. I think I got the result I was looking for. So, you know, again, this is this is about the the political struggle, particularly for hearts and minds in Europe, which remember is absolutely crucial to Ukraine's continued military and political and economic survival, rather than anything else. But nonetheless, we do have to keep thinking and talking about peace, not least because on both sides of the line there are those who actually are trying to discuss what that might look like.

Peace As Four Interlocking Deals

MG 5:23

And well, one approach, look, I'm again I'm I'm gonna have another little editorial sidebar, my apologies, but you know, particularly in these polarized times, I'm always disappointed by a tendency to play the man, not the ball. In other words, to draw conclusions about what someone has said, not based on what they've said, but on who they are. And yes, sure, there are people who in many ways support, in some cases, disreputable views, who can nonetheless say useful things. There can be articles and statements which are anything from gullible to actively, let's be polite, mischievous, but which nonetheless have certain seeds of interest within them. And well, you'll soon realise why I'm having that little editorial, because there was a particular article by someone by the name of Ian Proud, a British diplomat for over 20 years, whose career in fact included a stint as economic counsellor in Moscow, um, I think it was 2014 to 19. But now he's a pretty consistent thorn in the side of his Majesty's government in general, the Foreign and Commonwealth and Development Office in particular, and he definitely polarizes opinion between the fact that he's oh he's a refreshing truth-telling expert who speaks out against institutional group think, or on the other hand, that he's a marginalized Russia excusing contrarian. Well, be that as it may, in another polarizing outfit, frankly, the Quincy Institute's responsible statecraft blog, Proud writes what I thought was actually quite an interesting piece. Not that, as you'll soon realise, I agree with every point of it, in which he argues a durable peace for Ukraine will require several interlocking agreements, each of which will be incredibly difficult to negotiate, but all of which will be vital if we are to avoid a general war in Europe. And by the way, I'll include a link to the article in the programme notes. Now, look, I'm not so convinced by this whole line about if Ukraine is not sorted and sorted soon, then there will be this general war in Europe. Because the irony is this is something that is mobilized both by those people who are saying, oh, we need to make a deal now before things spiral out of control, which is something Putin himself has been trying to encourage, not least with his occasional flicks of nuclear rhetoric. But also actually by the hawks who say Putin wants war with the West, and I'm trying to think, it could be by, and always be wary when people say it could be, you know, because it could be is not the same as the intention is. But anyway, we've we've got uh Sakir Starmer in Britain saying it could be by 2030. We have a German general saying it could be by 2029. I mean, you know, frankly, it almost feels like like a bidding war. Who's gonna say it's gonna be next Tuesday? But anyway, the idea that actually what is at stake is a general war in Europe, I think is a problematic one because, as I said, it inclines us more towards concessions towards Moscow that frankly need not be made. And to be perfectly honest, isn't peace in Ukraine and Ukraine's chance to build a sovereign, democratic, liberal nation not high enough a prize in and of itself? Anyway. Putting that aside, in general I thought this this way of thinking of it as in multiple interlocking issues and agreements, I did think is actually quite a useful one of thinking about the peace, even if I don't necessarily buy Proud's own prescriptions. At least he's he's right on the the ailment, just not the cure. Anyway, he says for any peace would need, first of all, a bilateral peace deal between Russia and Ukraine brokered by the United States and others. What he says is the existing US broker draft, which I'm not sure if it's a real draft, but anyway, never mind, is the right place to start, as that includes the most contentious issue of territory, and in particular the future status of the remaining territory in Donetsk, which Russia has not conquered, it would also need to cover sensitive topics such as the size of Ukraine's army, Ukrainian children who were removed to Russia, and minority languages in Ukraine. Well, okay, let's unpick some of that. First of all, US brokered peace. Um I mean, let's be honest, what has has emerged from those points when the Trump administration was seriously involved was not exactly an agreed, let alone indeed public document. I get the sense that it's more of a what was originally a Russia-leaning document that then had a bunch of Ukrainian editions and emendations made it made, but I think probably as a result satisfies nobody. But nonetheless, yes, these are some of the key contested issues. The issue of the remaining territory in Donetsk that hasn't been conquered, I mean I can't help feel that that is surely by now off the table. Um that yes, the Russians might well militarily retake it, but they might well not. But the point is that I think it's clear that Zelensky neither can nor would actually just simply hand it over in the name of a sort of a nebulous or even specific peace deal. So, you know, again, I think the more focus there is on that, and this is a problem, I think, with Putin's obsession with it, it makes no sense, but then again, my notion of sense is clearly not Putin's. We learnt that in February 2022. It makes no sense for Putin to be sort of digging his heels in so much given the remaining costs. I'll come to this later. But nonetheless, there we here we are. Although people in his own camp are trying to persuade him otherwise. Nope, at the moment he still seems committed to that. But the issues of size of Ukraine's army as well. Now, look, again, I think it's a non-starter to try and cap the Ukrainian military. Because, again, they're they they they're just not going to do it, and and why why should they for that matter? And frankly, it's gonna be the economy that in some ways provides its own cap to the size of the Ukrainian armed forces. And if Russia has, as would likely be the part of any peace deal, a commitment from Kyiv that it would not try to retake the occupied territories by force, then in some ways surely the size of Ukraine's army be begins to become irrelevant. Or rather, it becomes relevant only in terms of if you want to reserve the option of having another bite of the cherry, and Russia is thinking in terms of another invasion. So, look, I think we we need to be very much more careful about

The Bare-Bones Deal That Might Hold

MG 12:10

the terms. I think the terms are going to be much more bare bones, they're gonna be more about look, we stop now, we we draw a line where the current front line is, we're gonna have to obviously delineate it because that's often a very, very hazy line. But nonetheless, broadly speaking, this is the situation. Russia may well withdraw from a few little little bits and pieces it's got, like in the Sumi region, because what does it need them and what would it do with them? But essentially it's just simply gonna be a cessation of hostilities, with the Russians accepting that the Ukrainians are gonna go their own way, not into NATO, but go their own way, and the Ukrainians saying that they won't take that territories by force, which of course does not close the door to some kind of political or economic process in the future. So much more simple, but yes, it has to be between Russia and Ukraine directly. And that is one of the key issues. And I think a lot of these sort of talk about negotiations and so forth sometimes lose track of that. Secondly, a clear plan and timeline for Ukraine to join the European Union, which is something that, as he as Proud notes, can only be negotiated bilaterally by the EU and Ukraine. This is not an area in which the United States or indeed the United Kingdom can have any kind of role. Now, yes, of course, this is also going to be difficult. But on the other hand, look, although Ukraine has been a technical candidate for membership since 2022, on Friday, now that Hungary is not vetoing it, European members, European Union members agreed to allow Ukraine, and let's not forget Moldova formally to open the sort of what's called the first cluster of accession negotiations, which are called the fundamentals. Now look, this is just the start. Zelensky is talking about membership in 2027. I don't see how that's going to happen. Not just because of the war, but because Ukraine is not there yet. It is not ready for membership in terms of its economic structures, its political ones, the laws and so forth. There are fundamental issues. Poland will demand some kind of progress on terms of agriculture so that essentially Ukraine is not benefiting from the common agricultural policy to a disproportionate extent. There are questions of rule of law and indeed minority rights. Zelensky's also just signed a law removing Russian from the list of languages covered by the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which is, on the one hand, entirely within Ukraine's rights, but on the other hand, may well bode ill for how the EU ultimately assesses the protection of minority rights within Ukraine. So there's a lot of technical stuff to be done, and although the Ukrainians are clearly strongly committed to this and highly motivated, I don't think that progress of laws through the Radar and such like demonstrate that this is necessarily going to happen that quickly. But in many ways, look, I think that doesn't necessarily matter as much. Look, a roadmap, a roadmap that is much more clear and explicit rather than, well, these are the rules, it just up to you how quickly you actually manage to, if I can mix my metaphors, jump through all these hoops. Well, I think something that is more clear than that would be obviously not as welcome to Ukrainians as actual immediate fast-track membership, but would on the one hand avoid serious divisions in the European Union, which could still lead to more vetoes, but on the other hand, also provide not just practical security and economic guarantees for Ukraine, but also that sense for Ukrainians that they are indeed making progress, that they are coming home as they see it, that this has not been in vain. A psychological and kind of morale factor which really shouldn't be underestimated. So, yes, I still do think that European Union membership and a clearer sense of how quickly that could be achieved, and what security guarantees and what economic assistance Europe is going to provide in the interim period, which I think is absolutely crucial, well, that needs to be part of the process. Thirdly, Proud says there needs to be an agreement between Russia and Europe, including the United Kingdom, on the future shape of their relationship. Now this is a tricky one. I mean, is it really necessary? I mean, certainly it probably would help the process go forward if Russia feels it can now talk about also wider issues, but the risk is then that everything gets held up on this final biggest picture issue. I mean Proud says Europe needs cheap energy to stem the tide of self-imposed deindustrialization. Hard to disagree on that point. Russia would like European investment again, and a more open people to people relationship. There will need to be a settlement on how sanctions against Russia are eased during a postwar period. Ignoring an EU Russia deal risks pressing the pause button on a future general war at a time when Europe is rapidly rearming. Well look, again, let's go through these elements. Does Europe need cheap energy? Sure, it of course it does. And frankly, at the moment, the the need to therefore import particularly American LNG pushes up prices. And it also is worth noting that it wasn't, you know, Russia didn't really use the so-called energy weapon against Europe, not least because it's a sword that cuts both ways. You know, Russia also wants to export its energy. So, yes, of course, I can see the economic advantage. However, of course, from Europe's point of view, it is going to want to ensure diversification of sources. But again, in the current environment, maybe diversifying further away from American reliance might be no bad thing. But when we come to investment, Russia would like European investment again. Yeah, of course it would. I don't think it's going to happen, not for some time. There's a big difference between trade. You know, you want something from us, we give it to you and you pay us. Nice, straightforward, encapsulated transaction, and investment, which basically means you are putting your money into Russia and making it vulnerable to future political vicissitudes, Russian attempts to grab it, you know, we have continued nationalizations and so forth. I mean, and of course, there will have to be certain controls on investment to ensure it's not going into directly defense and sort of indirectly defence-related enterprises. So, you know, there's going to be some kind of controls even as and when sanctions begin to be lifted. So I it's interesting that I think there is a lot more interest now in going back into the Russian market. I mean, even if I just think of the commercial consultancy side of my own business, Mayak Intelligence. When the invasion happened, then we were quite busy with corporate work helping companies extract themselves from the Russian market as painlessly as possible. Then for quite some time, the only real commercial work we were doing was actually involving disputes over assets which were in the West. So it's more like litigation support type stuff. People can go disagreed over ownership of yachts or whatever else. In the past, I'd say nine months probably, um, there's been more interest in companies beginning, just beginning to scope out options for a return to the Russian market. I'm not saying that they're planning on it happening imminently and that they're going to jump in with both feet, but certainly just that sense that it's worth being prepared for an end to the war. Well, I mean, in terms of obviously sort of companies have their own particular sets of assumptions and so forth, I mean let's hope they're right. But anyway, that's certainly something that I've noted. But again, not yet investment, much more trade. Mentioning of people-to-people relationships. I mean, that basically means things like visas and opening, reopening borders and such like. And there's going to be a considerable concern, particularly on the part of those bordering countries that have faced what is clearly attempts to use migration as a weapon, you know, taking people from the global south, encouraging them to come and then trying to flood border checkpoints, whether it's in Poland or the Baltic states or Finland, that's definitely happened. And although Belarus is probably the most serious uh actor in that case, you know, the Russians are involved as well, particularly when you look at the Finnish border. So again, you know, yes, it's important, but nonetheless we've got to appreciate that it's not going to be a quick and easy process. And generally speaking, sanctions, look, what's probably going to happen, in my opinion, is actually the Americans are going to lift sanctions in due course when there's some kind of a peace process, much more quickly. And the Europeans may well be reluctant, but the point is that to be honest, there'll be such a hole blown in the global sanctions system with the Americans pull back that I think the writing will be on the wall. So things may well happen, but the point is maybe I think that Proud is providing a Russian favouring wish list rather than anything

Sanctions, Energy, NATO, And Guarantees

MG 21:20

else. And then fourth, he says, an agreement within NATO. He says a peace settlement for Ukraine will only land when its future nature, NATO aspiration, is taken decisively off the table. Anyone who still believes that Russia will give up on this clearest of red lines is dangerously misguided. I mean I think that's probably true, though the Russians may well be realistic and just simply think, well, look, we know that Ukraine isn't going to be part of NATO. To be honest, though, I think Putin does need some kind of formal commitment that Ukraine will not join NATO, both for his own psychological reasons. Remember, he this is a man who was Convinced, not totally wrongly, but largely wrongly, that he has been lied to and screwed over, quite frankly, by the West in the past. So he's not going to just simply assume that some kind of nod and a wink is enough. Frankly, that was one of the problems with NATO expansion. And also NATO, I think well, you know, NATO not being on the table, I think is something that Putin will need for his public facing optics. He needs to feel that he needs to be able to present himself as having been able to force that on NATO and on the Ukrainians. But nonetheless, as Proud notes, in fairness, Ukraine needs cast iron security guarantees that should involve a hard commitment to boots on the ground should Russia renege on its commitments. That will require, sorry, this will require Russia to have confidence that NATO isn't stoking the fire in the background to reignite tensions as a pretext for intervention. These are incredibly complex issues and will require US leadership to shift the Europeans into line. The NATO Russia Council could have provided a forum for discussion and deconfliction, but was formally disbanded in December 2025. Perhaps a NATO Ukraine Russia Council might emerge to take its place, reopening a vital avenue for military dialogue and deconfliction. Oof, there is a lot to unpack there. And frankly, there's also a lot to challenge. So I'll tell you what, let's have the break and then let's get back to it. Just the usual mid-episode reminder that you're listening to the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Its corporate partner and sponsor is Conductor, which provides software for crisis exercises in hybrid warfare, counterterrorism, and civil affairs. But you can also support the podcast yourself by going to patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows. And remember that patrons, as well as knowing that they're supporting this peerless source on all things Russian, get a variety of additional perks depending on their tier, including articles I've written, the most weekly Gavarit Moscovar press briefing, and other bonus content like the Chronicles of a Different Russia alternative histories. And you can also follow me on Twitter at Mark Galliotti or on Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. Now back to the episode. So a quick reminder of Proud's prescription. I mean he does say that Ukraine needs cast iron security guarantees. Absolutely true. But he says this should involve, first of all, boots on the ground should Russia renege on its commitments. Yeah, I mean certainly it's it's only really in time of war rather than peace. I mean the the E3 Germany, Britain, France, continued talk of a multinational force Ukraine in peacetime, is in my opinion, an obstacle rather than an aid to peace, because it absolutely is something that Putin would find problematic, because as far as he's concerned, it would just simply be a NATO battle group in Ukraine, which is something that, you know, before the invasion he raised as one of the sort of nightmare reasons slash excuses for for invading. And to be perfectly honest, I'm not entirely convinced that Kyiv is really calling for this. I mean, look, first of all, should would they actually believe that uh Westerners who up to now have not been willing to fight for Ukraine would in the future, or certainly would they be willing to put their faith in that? That's that's a whole separate issue. But also, I was reading the Coalition of the Willing statement from July 2025, and it just simply talked of Ukraine's readiness to issue an invitation to the force and enter into formal agreements with participating countries where necessary. Now, I mean this does not sound like an enthusiastic welcome and a desperation on the part of Kyiv for this or whatever. So I think yes, there needs to be a commitment, but it's a commitment to actually be able to support Ukraine if things go bad, rather than the idea that somehow, don't worry, Ukraine will have a relative handful of British, French, German, and other troops somewhere near the border. You know, there's there's going to be training assistance, there's going to be all kinds of logistics assistance in peacetime, but not, I would suggest, any kind of semi-permanent military combat troop deployments. And it's worth noting in Moscow Shadows 231, real guarantees for Ukraine back in the 11th of January 2026 are actually provide what I see of as an alternative suite of ways in which Ukrainian security can be supported and guaranteed without this chimera of a multinational force on the ground in peacetime. So that's episode 231, the 11th of January. If you haven't, go and listen to it, it's full of wisdom. Then Proud talks about the need for Russia to have confidence that NATO isn't stoking the fire in the background to reignite tensions as a pretext for intervention. Now look, I fully accept that Putin and his immediate cohorts do have some rather surreal notions of NATO's goal, but we have to be clear that I don't think there is any question that NATO would at all be interested in planning any kind of active military intervention. There's an interesting parallel here with some of the European threat perceptions of Russia, that you sort of take the most paranoid notion and then you spin that into some kind of clear enemy intent. So, look, yes, of course, Russia needs to have some kind of reassurance that NATO doesn't have sinister plans, but I don't think we should take this as anything more than just simply a way of coddling Putin's sensitivities rather than anything else. This is not a real issue. He talks about the process would require US leadership to shift the Europeans into line. Well, again, I think that's actually deeply problematic. Putting aside the question of the current US leadership and how successful it has been in actually sort of driving Europe, I mean yes, it has driven Europe to a formal commitment to a 3.5 plus 1.5% spend on defence, but other than that, actually, in many ways it has been strikingly unsuccessful. More to the point, even if we put the current administration to one side, remember, you know, this is something that has to be considered over years, the idea that this will require US leadership, I think, is also problematic, because that will essentially mean that US interests will be privileged over European ones, and therefore there will be the inevitable ten tendency from the Europeans to push back. I think the whole point is the Europeans need to appreciate and accept that this is in their interests, that peace is in their interests. It is not something that just simply they should do because the Americans are calling for it. So in some ways I think America actually I mean yes, ideally it will be playing a much more active and positive role, but in many ways, if it can't do that, then the most positive thing it can do is to step take a step back. And then Proud also talks about the NATO Russia Council as a potential forum for discussion, though it's been disbanded. Well, yeah, but look, I mean actually since 2014, I think really it it hasn't been doing anything. In fairness, the NATO Russia Council did seem to do some good, but only frankly in the 2000s. And that was at a time when both sides were happy to cooperate anyway. So it's it's very hard to say it's because of the council, it's just that, well, if they're gonna be cooperating, then the council provided a suitable venue for that. And also, quite frankly, one of the reasons of its success was because the council avoided tackling the difficult geopolitical conversations, you know, not just in terms of NATO expansion, though that's clearly it. Instead, it looked for the low-hanging fruit of technical issues where agreement was easy. I don't think there's any harm in this, but I don't think a forum is going to create amity. In some ways, you have to reach the agreements on a nation-by-nation basis, and then maybe you can create some kind of structures. So, you know, broadly speaking, I think yes, this issue of the relationship with NATO is an important one. It yes does have to be addressed, but the danger is that then everything becomes hostage to the trickiest issues. You know, you have a convoy of agreements moving at the pace of

Why Grand Bargains Favour Moscow

MG 30:30

the slowest ship. Proud concludes with the suggestion that as the US is rather disengaged and everything's all terribly complex, this quote, may require a grand summit, similar in scale to the Helsinki Conference of 1975. And here for me is another big concern. Yeah, of course it is very complex. But if you expand the negotiations, and frankly, expanding negotiations is a time-honored way of trying to break deadlocks, by actually saying, well, you know, if we can't make any kind of concessions here, well, if we actually broaden the talks to also include this parallel issue, we might be able to make concessions there, which will allow you to make concessions here, if you see what I mean. The trouble is that this is something that Moscow would exploit to its advantage. We have to appreciate just how brutally hard-nosed they tend to be in negotiations. And they would absolutely use this to push for extra advantages. You know, look, they are not going to withdraw from the overwhelming majority of the territories they have occupied, for example. And just saying we're also going to talk about, I don't know, cooperation in the high north or whatever else, is not going to make them budge on that. Let's just accept that. So, yes, there are all sorts of things that we could fruitfully be talking to the Russians about, but that if we actually begin to harness it to Ukraine, we actually give the Russians more leverage. Because they can sort of essentially say, well, if you want peace in Ukraine, you've also got to give us something here and something there. So I think that we we have to appreciate the problems in that. But that said, in any case, we've always got to remember that Russia has the option of declaring peace at any time. There is this kind of banal line that, well, if Russia wants peace, it can just pull out. As if Russia is so desperate for peace that it would pull out of the occupied territories, hand back Crimea, etc. etc. Well, here's the news. It's not unless Putin absolutely feels that this is a genuinely existential crisis, and possibly not even then. But what Russia can do is essentially just stop fighting. It can declare a ceasefire, say that they're you know, we we are fixing our forces in place, we will resist if we are attacked, but we will not launch any offensive operations, we will stop firing drones and missiles at Ukraine so long as Ukraine does the same. And after Ukraine has done the same, well then we're perfectly willing to talk, without any preconditions about how we how we go from here. Now, if they did that, I think it's very hard to imagine Ukraine not feeling it has to accept, not least because it will face, I would think, massive pressure from both the United States and all or some European countries to say basically, look, this this is necessary, this has to be done. Of course, it creates a situation in which Russia can then either engage with a negotiation process in good faith, or in good faith as in as any negotiation process ever is, or just use it to just string out the process in all kinds of nitpicking and stonewalling ways, as only Russian diplomats know how to do, to again keep its options open, because it then has always a a sort of Damocles hanging over the head of Ukraine and by extension the West is this war can start anytime, can restart any time. So you need to make a deal or else you risk a rerun. And I think this is one of the problems with some of the kind of framings we get from Ian Proud and indeed the Quincy Institute as a whole, about the the terrible dangers. If you create a certain sense of apocalyptic iminence that can only be averted by a peace in Ukraine, then you begin to ratchet up the pressure to basically give Russia more than you might otherwise have given just simply in the name of avoiding this self-generated nightmare. Now, yes, of course, the Russians would love early and quick sanctions relief. They would like to be able to trade once again with the West, they would like to sell some of their oil and gas to Europe, they would like to do all kinds of things. But the point is that they can cope without it. If they're not fighting the war, if they're not having to desperately recruit, whatever it is, thirty thousand or so more warm bodies every month, if they are not having to continue to reconstruct oil refineries that keep going up in flames, frankly that in itself will be a a major a major benefit. Now look, do I think that

Who Wants Peace And When

MG 35:40

Putin's gonna do that? No. I mean I think the thing is, is anyone though really thinking about peace? It always seems to be just over the horizon. And for both sides it also seems to be conditional on themselves being in a position of strength. Now in Russia, look, I've discussed before that there is clearly a campaign within certain elements within the elite, particularly the business and technocratic elites, to try and persuade Putin that he can afford to just simply declare a triumph and end the war. Now Putin, who is such a fence sitter, clearly has allowed this to happen. I mean, these things were happening to a degree behind the scenes in previous years, but really it's this year that we've actually seen it come out into the open. And particularly given that Kiryenka, first deputy head of the presidential administration, is one of the figures behind it, there's no way he'd be doing this as a maverick venture if he thought that Putin was going to punish him for it. So Putin is willing to see a debate, but there is no evidence so far that this debate is changing his mind. At present, he is either still supportive of the Hawke's contention that if they keep pressing by the end of this year, by autumn of this year, they'll have taken those remaining bits of the Donbass. But then again, they've been saying that for quite some time. Or at the very least, he's not yet been convinced by the alternative argument, and in absence of any kind of clear decision from Putin, essentially the status quo prevails, so the war continues. As for Ukraine, now, according to a report in Ukrainska Pravda, Kiev's timetable is autumnal, that they think that October and November is quote when everything comes together, all the military, diplomatic, and international factors, and a window of opportunity for talks might open somewhere before the American elections and after the Russian Duma elections. The trouble is, I feel or I worry, that by that time, October-November, Putin might well be thinking, well, look, how about one more winter hammering Ukrainian energy infrastructure? Just to see if that makes them a little bit more open to negotiations on our terms. Because I don't think the Russians are considering the Americans a factor one way or the other. Sure, I would believe that Trump would love to be able to claim some kind of great international triumph before the midterms. Quite how far he will be willing to go to secure it, I don't know, particularly because certainly at the moment he's a he's a tad busy in Iran, and God knows how long that will last, even though we're being told that some kind of a deal is is imminent. And in any case, I could imagine the Russians actually thinking that an embittered post-midterm Trump intent on punishing what he regards as a treacherous US legislature and public, again, is going to be too busy for him to be mobilising any kind of peace talks. But of course, this idea that there will be some kind of window of opportunity for talks is is a politically useful one for the Ukrainians to push Europe, the West for extra funds. Now apparently they're asking for an extra twenty billion dollars to seize the moment before Russia adapts. An official, a Ukrainian official, told Politico, the window of opportunity tends to close. Russia is fast and innovative, and if we give them time to adapt again, we might lose the only real chance to end this war with real negotiations. And if Russia invents its own mid-strike drones, it will be a catastrophe for us. But if by October-November the Russians have adapted, and that they're ready to hammer Ukrainian energy infrastructure, then frankly neither Ukraine nor Russia would seem to be on track. Sometimes it does look as if there's a wind over peace, but at present it's hard to be that optimistic.

Final Thoughts And A Dark Joke

MG 39:46

I still feel that this is a war which may end up not really being resolved, but just subsiding. That's a rather depressing thought. But nonetheless, look, the very fact that we continue to talk about peace, about the modalities, about how negotiations could happen, even if most of these discussions are premature, are based on false premises, or unduly privilege one side or another, the very act of talking is an important one. Because the point at which we give up hope that this war can end, is the point at which we're dooming the Ukrainians and the Russians and everyone else to some kind of permanent conflict. Now that's a rather depressing thought, so let's end with a joke. So it's after the September Dumor elections, and Ella Pamphilova, chair of the Central Election Commission, goes to Putin. And she says, I've got good news and I've got bad news. What do you want to hear first? The bad news. The Communists got seventy five per cent of the vote. Borgemoy cries Putin. Then what's the good news? United Russia got seventy six per cent. Thanks very much. Bye. Well, that's the end of another episode of the In Moscow Shadows Podcast. Just as a reminder, beyond this, you can follow my blog also called In Moscow Shadows. You can follow me on Twitter at Mark Galliotti or Facebook, Mark Galliotti on Russia. This podcast is made possible by generous and enlightened patrons, and you too can be one. Just go along to my Patreon page, that's patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows, and decide which tier you want to join, getting access to exclusive materials and other perks. However, whether or not you contribute, thank you very much indeed for listening. Until next time, keep well.