In Moscow's Shadows 266: Diesel and Delusion

Donald Trump's diesel deal is, of course, in effect a birthday present for Putin, explained by The Donald’s transactional self-interest and hunger for a headline before the midterms, not baroque theories about hidden loyalties. Even if not a single barrel of diesel ever ships, though, this is undoubtedly good for Moscow. Maybe some revenue (if need be, Putin can starve domestic markets to export), but above all a political gain. Washington is again at odds with an angry Kyiv, while Europe is again left looking clueless and weak.

In part, Europe may have been wrong-footed by its failure to consider brutal questions of national interest. Why does it depend so much on comfort-blanket mantras about the Russia-Ukraine war? To a degree, it is the power of groupthink, and this brings me to the Leonid Ragozin case in Latvia and my wider worry about democracies sliding towards silencing dissent instead of winning arguments.

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Matrix Hook And Headlines

MG 0:00

Mm are we all stuck in the matrix maintaining one virtual fantasy take on the world or another? From Trump's diesel deal to the expulsion of an emigre Russian journalist from Latvia, it's really sometimes hunting. Hello, I'm Mark Galliotti, and welcome to my view of Russia in Moscow Shadows. This podcast, of varying length, frequency and format, yet always reassuringly low production values, is supported by generous and perspicacious patrons like you, and also by the Crisis Exercise Software Company Conductor. So here we are on Sunday the 11th of October, and maybe we should all be joining in a rousing chorus of Happy

Putin’s Birthday And The Diesel Deal

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Birthday, Gasparine President. After all, on Wednesday it was Putin's birthday, he turned 74, and then, admittedly, two days late, on Friday, he gets this astonishing birthday present of a diesel deal with the Americans. And of course, this inevitably raises the hoary old question of, oh, is Trump a Russian asset? And no, I really don't think we need to go through these kind of baroque explanations each time. Nor is this specifically appeasement. I mean, appeasement, unfortunately, appeasement has a very, I don't know, distorted notion. I mean, in part appeasement in the pre-World War II context, was actually a depressingly rational approach, in that certainly the UK realized it wasn't in a position to challenge Hitler's war machine at that point. So there was an attempt to, on the one hand, yes, see if it was possible to buy him off, but at the same time, a massive programme of armament. I mean, by by the late stages, I mean the the Brits were arming much more quickly than the Germans were. It was rational in its own terms, but it's now become this overall term for just simply you're be you're being too nice, too aggressors. So there's always danger with the pre-war metaphor, because Putin is not Hitler, this is not the late 1930s, etc. etc. It's more it can be explained away quite simply as the fact that Putin not Putin Trump is a creature of transactional self-interest. There he was in a situation in which it looks like the Republicans are going to get a hammering in next month's midterms, and in part that's precisely because fuel prices were so high, largely, of course, because of his war in the Gulf. I think diesel actually prices have gone up at peak 70%. And so, as ever, being a showman rather than a sort of technocratic operator of the machine, he wanted a splashy initiative ahead of those midterms that would allow him to at least claim that he was doing something. Now, in practice, even if all the diesel that has been promised uh arrives, and that's open to question. People who know these kind of things say at most it'll get ten, perhaps even twenty cents off the diesel price. Enough for people to notice, but not enough to make a serious difference probably to quality of life and all those sorts of things. But again, look, you know, Trump is is is desperately looking for things to be able to try and influence the elections, and Putin could

Ukraine’s Refinery Strikes And US Pressure

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provide. At the same time, there's no way of getting around the fact that Ukraine seems to have dramatically mishandled the diplomacy around it. Apparently, six times the Americans asked the Ukrainians to stop hitting Russian oil refineries, because that was leading to increases in global prices, which clearly were having their knock-on effects for the American consumer and American industry. Six times the Ukrainians refused. Despite the fact that clearly this is not an American government that appreciates being denied. Instead, what they were demanding was a mutual energy ceasefire. So they would stop hitting Russian refineries if the Russians would stop hitting Ukrainian energy network, power stations, petrol stations, you name it. Now look, of course Putin wasn't going to go for this. He doesn't desperately need a deal over diesel or exports. He clearly is in a position where he feels that he can readily enough weather the Ukrainian deep strikes, more of the, you know, in the sense that he is causing more pain to the Ukrainians than the Ukrainians can for him. And in any case, energy attacks are going to be absolutely central to his winter air war strategy. So in those circumstances, this was something that he wasn't going to do. And by the way, on the point of actually the impact, I mean we we have a lot of figures being banded around 45-50% of Russian oil refineries capacity destroyed. Well, first of all, hit damaged does not necessarily mean destroyed. Refineries have proven to be relatively hard to destroy, and they can and indeed are being fixed. So you might say it it's it's a rolling issue of how quickly can the Russians fix things compared to how quickly how much can the Ukrainians damage them. And on that, the independent observer Clemen Molin notes that there was a peak in attacks in July, which since then has come down dramatically. And it's for a variety of reasons, including above all, as I've mentioned, the fact that the Russians do adapt. They're not good at spotting coming threats, but once those threats have materialized, they are actually quite good, one has to recognize at doing something about it, whether it's in terms of protecting refineries, whether it's in terms of shooting down Ukrainian drones and missiles. I mean, take the Flamingo cruise missile, for example, much fated. And yes, at first it had some successes, particularly because there was the Ukrainians were sending them down river valleys where it was less able to be picked up by radar, but the Russians have worked this out, and flamingos have had vastly less of a successful strike rate since. All sorts of different ways of adaptation. But nonetheless, as Molin has pointed out, as a result, fewer impacts. And by the way, just a little sidebar, if you'll excuse me, on the the what we can think of as the war mappers. For those of us who try to keep on top of what's going on in the war, but don't have the time, the focus, or frankly the inclination obsessively to monitor it, whether we're looking at you know satellite photography or social media posts or whatever else. Anyway, those of us, we owe a huge debt of gratitude to relatively few people who actually are doing this and doing this properly. And we have to recognise, as I said, there are relatively few of these people, perhaps for understandable reasons, although there are a hell of a lot more who kind of present themselves as such on social media, even though they are really piggybacking on the work of the real Pathfinders and frankly appropriating their work. And it's worth in that context saying, by the way, the Institute for the Study of War that does tend to sort of monopolize the media coverage. I'm still not convinced that it can count as one of these original creators, but hey, what do I know about that? But anyway, going back to my main theme. So the Ukrainians were essentially obdurate. They were saying that they would only stop their strikes on Russian oil refineries if the Russians would stop their strikes on Ukrainian energy. Well, that wasn't going to happen. They had the opportunity to try and instead pivot to making some other deal with the Americans. And this is something that I've heard from sources within the American government system, let's say, that it's not that the Americans were absolutely refusing to seek to see any kind of room for some kind of negotiation. This is a very, very, after all, again, negotiation-oriented transactional administration. It was just that that particular demand was not on the table. Who knows what they could theoretically have turned this into a discussion about maybe chance to get more patriot interceptor missiles or whatever else. I don't know. But anyway, Kiev stood firm. And so what happens? Well, surprise, surprise, in those contexts, Trump therefore decided to ignore them. And he went away, went along with this deal, which ironically enough could arguably have been facilitated by all this furore about the quote unquote mnemonic plague outburst in Irkutsk, because that led to a lengthy, hour and a half long Trump-Putin phone conversation. Ostensibly it was Trump wanting to get the latest lowdown on this from Putin. But of course, Putin is going to use this as an opportunity to, as ever, dangle all sorts of economic opportunities in front of this most economically oriented of presidents, and lo and behold, he's able to do his usual bit of Trump whispering in that context. So almost one one could say that that uh poor

Russia Adapts To Deep Strikes

MG 10:18

lab technician who died in the Irkutsk, she died for the motherland. And no, I'm not suggesting it was anything other, you know, it was anyway set up or there. So we have this deal that is an absolute gift for Putin and frankly is a gift for Putin even if a single barrel of diesel is not exported. Let me explain why. First of all, clearly it drives another and increasingly thick wedge between Trump and Zelensky. I mean, Zelensky was obviously ununderstandably furious at this decision, and in particular he lambasted it and by extension Trump as weak. Many other things as well, but weak, I don't know, that strikes me as precisely one of those particularly neuralgic terms for Trump. He is so desperate, just as he's so desperate to seem smart, he's so desperate to seem strong. So perhaps no wonder that he responds very, very badly to this. And it will mean, after all, that further refinery strikes carried out by the Ukrainians will look like they are deliberately giving the thin skinned orangiocrat the finger. And it's interesting that just hours after Trump announced this unsanctioning of Russian diesel, Ukraine hits the Novoshaktinsk oil terminal. Admittedly, it's close enough that they can claim that this was already in train or whatever. It's very much a question of watch this space. However, it is striking how far the certainly sort of American rhetoric on Zelensky has suddenly sharpened, not least, with Trump actually saying that he thinks Ukraine needs a new president, and that essentially it's Zelensky who is the obstacle to any kind of a peace deal, which is precisely where we've been in the past, and precisely where the Russians would like Trump to be. So that's big benefit number one for Putin. Secondly, Europe looks wrong fitted and humiliated once again. After all, it had just agreed to release huge amounts from its own strategic reserves at the Americans' urging, in part, explicitly, so that Russia's stranglehold, alleged stranglehold, on global diesel prices cannot be allowed to continue. So this very much is going to feel like a bait and switch from the point of view of European leaders. And even if it wasn't, even if it is just an example of a fairly undisciplined and chaotic White House policy making process, nonetheless it makes Europe look as if it was subject to a bait and switch. And it also raises all sorts of interesting questions about Europe's desire to increase the scale of its campaign against the so-called shadow fleet of tankers carrying Russian or oil around the world. Are they going to risk going after a tanker which is heading to a US port? Who knows? But again, as ever, Europe clearly, if nothing else, is just left in a position where it's obviously just regarded as a vassal region that has to accept whatever policy comes from the White House. It will not be consulted. It will be lucky if it is briefed after the event. Now, can Russia actually deliver this promised diesel? It's very, very hard to say, frankly. There has been, after all, this diesel export ban since July, precisely because of the temporary dislocations within the Russian market, you know, those long lines and such like. The situation has to a degree stabilized since then. There are still localized shortages, long lines at times, but on the other hand, it's worth noting that the price has not spiked. So there is clearly still a degree of control. Putin claimed at Valdi that Russia now had diesel to spare, but I think it's fair to say and be prepared for a particularly dramatic revelation here, Putin is not always entirely honest. On the other hand, there are industry sources that are suggesting that diesel production has probably, at least in the recent weeks, actually exceeded demand. So in other words, they're rebuilding up stockpiles. And if anything, this is actually going to get more the more so now that harvest season is essentially over. Harvest season is a period of particularly high demand for diesel fuel. So, you know, he may. So he could have stocks. It could well be,

War Mappers And Information Shortcuts

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after all, that part of the motivation for instituting or at least retaining the ban on diesel exports was precisely to monkey with the global markets to keep the price up. Because remember, the higher the cost of energy, the more economic problems this means for a whole variety of countries, but including the West, the people who are, after all, bankrolling Ukraine. So it could well be that he was precise, or he, I don't make it sound as if Putin is the mastermind, the Russians were precisely trying to actually sort of stress the global market in the hope that it would lead to something, though they probably wouldn't have expected quite such a bonanza as happened. So it could be that they actually, again, they do have the stocks. It could be that they will be able to provide at least some of what they promised simply by basically starving the Russian market of diesel for a bit. Putin is willing to make ordinary Russians suffer after all. And it's interesting, there's an interesting parallel here with the whole debate we were having about a mobilization wave. The idea was Putin is not going to risk the political turmoil that a mobilization, a mass mobilization, would have before the recent State Duma elections, but after, well, all bets are off. And that's perfectly true, though still at the moment I think the signs are not suggesting that he's about to launch such a mobilization. But on the other hand, in some ways, this is the peril, the equivalent of that, you know, something that is politically unpopular, but perhaps considered to be useful in grand statecraft terms, is precisely diverting certain amounts of diesel production from satisfying the domestic market to satisfying exports and particularly satisfying Donald Trump. He may well just simply do the least he can possibly get away with, and assuming the Ukrainians keep up, as they are promising, their attacks on refineries, blame them for any shortfall. Probably, to be honest, it's going to be a mix of somewhere else all three. I don't imagine there's going to be huge amounts of diesel heading out. And quite frankly, even that is apparently a mix metaphors, a drop in the ocean compared with actually overall demand. But nonetheless, there will be something there, and that will obviously mean

How Putin Profits Politically

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also more revenue for the stressed Russian state treasury. And beyond that, Putin does come off as that 3D chess player, which again, as regular listeners will know, I have always pushed against. I don't see him as a long-term strategist. But certainly in this, it looks very much like Putin is the one who has been leading the White House and, by extension, the whole Western Alliance around by the nose. And why does that matter? Well, obviously it matters at home. People want to see their president as being successful, and it's certainly already getting quite a lot of coverage, not just in the Russian media, but in social media as well. But also in the global south. I think it is important to realise the degree to which actually not only is Putin still well regarded, and indeed Russia is well regarded, in much of the world, but the signs of Putin being able to pull one over the West make it easier for people to accept the kind of narrative that the Kremlin is putting out, which is exactly that Russia is still one of the great global players and therefore worth adjusting to, allying with, dealing with, and so forth. It is not just simply a gas station with nukes. It is not simply, to use Obama's phrase, a regional power, it is still a global player. One could argue the objective reality of that. But since when has politics relied on objective reality? It's all about subjective. And subjectively this looks like Putin has as again coming off as a winner. But when it comes to the American dimension of this, look, I I'm not obviously an American voter, an American expert, or anything like that. It seems to me, just as a pure observer, that there's quite no real way, frankly, that the Republicans can avoid getting quite a hammering. Not even the promise of, what was it, five thousand dollars to everyone? Uh looks likely to quite literally buy that election back. But from the Russians' point of view, they don't really care. Again, for those who regard Trump as being just some kind of bought and paid for Russian asset, it is worth noting the degree to which both the public debate, the expert debate, and from what I can hear, the behind the scenes discussion, is the Russians have basically written off the Republican Party for the midterms. They are anticipating that that they'll be getting that that drubbing. And to a degree they have writ off too, in the sense that they are not convinced that he, as they had originally hoped, is going to be willing or able to actually impose some kind of deal that they find congenial on Kyiv. Yes, of course, they they will manipulate him as far as possible, they will neutralize him to the gr as a potential threat to their interests to the greatest extent at their disposal, but they are certainly not really that bothered if Trump finds himself in a weaker position after the midterms. Why not? Well, from their point of view, I mean above all, they don't want America to become a potential sort of powerful adversary, a powerful supporter of Ukraine's. And if what happens after the midterms is just over a year of chaos in America, as Republicans and Democrats more or less block each other, and as a vindictive Trump goes after the people he feels have let him down, his enemies and such like, this is likely to be a period of inward perspective and chaos within the United States, and that's a perfectly decent outcome for them. The Russians have learnt, after all, that their capacity to influence elections is very, very limited and in some cases can be counterproductive. But on the other hand, that elections can be not just great opportunities for their subversion, for their attempts to precisely widen and amplify existing divisions within society, because elections are always when these divisions are very much at the forefront, but also that they can create the kind of chaotic situations which do paralyze countries. And that's in their national interest. And this does raise a wider issue, and the whole question of how far Western politics. Is genuinely driven by national interest. Now look, I find Trump

National Interest And Western Contradictions

MG 22:06

often short-sighted, always self-interested, and frankly frequently quite grotesque in his policies. But nonetheless, it very much has brought to the fore this whole question of how far nations ought to be driven by national interests, how far they are driven by national interests. Now, the interesting thing is that obviously a lot of what Trump does, one could argue is certainly not in the US national interest, but rather in the DT national interest. They're what he wants to see. But nonetheless, at least certainly the framing of US policy is very much that sense of, you know, our interests have now come to the fore. Whether it's in terms of global energy markets, whether it's in terms of Greenland, whether it's in terms of Venezuela or Iran or whatever else, you know, we ultimately will do what is best for the USA. And those actions, you know, again, whether or not they actually are in US national interest, do highlight the degree to which, firstly, we are, I think, increasingly in an age of national self-interest, and we ought to recognise that. And yet at the same time, when it comes to Russia policy, or Russia slash Ukraine policy, I do think there is often a very odd disconnect. You know, how far is it in the national interest of many European countries after all, to be waging what is really an increasingly expensive proxy war with Russia, which is not only allowing Russia or forcing Russia, driving Russia to militarize, and indeed to centralize all the more. And look, I don't want to make the Russians out. Again, there is always the danger of then making the Russians out to be poor little victims here. It's the same way as that whole NATO expansion lied. Oh, well, what else could the Russians do when NATO was expanding? The Russians have agency, they have options. Well, likewise in this case, Putin has options, and he's clearly not against militarizing and centralizing. But nonetheless, it certainly clearly has helped, has been a driver to that process. And how far it is interest is in our interest to allow China essentially to be able to consolidate its position as the kind of mature power in global politics, and indeed to have increasing leverage over Russia, how far it's in our interests to, in effect, become increasingly energy dependent upon a United States that is clearly sort of, again, willing to think of its own self-interest. There's a whole variety of other issues about national interest that may well, it may well be, absolutely, it isn't that it is in European national interest to continue this this um struggle. It's just how it's debated, how far it is properly, seriously, openly debated that is the problem. And to that I think I will turn after the break.

Patron Support And Show Notes

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Europe’s Mantras Put Under Scrutiny

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Bear with me, because I know it's a particular hobby horse issue of mine, the degree to which public debate, or sorry say, official political debate, within Europe in particular, about the Ukraine conflict and precisely what should be done about this, does tend to default down to some empty mantras with a sometimes very odd disconnect with reality. And again, look, I I really would want to un underscore this point. It's not that I'm saying that all the policies are wrong. Some of them I do think are, but nonetheless, it's more that just simply we should actually have, I think, a better debate about where we are now, where we're going to be, and how we want this war to end. And particular mantras. First of all, that this is a war for European security, that essentially Putin has to be stopped in Ukraine, or else his legions will spill westwards all the way to and maybe beyond the Channel. Now, look, I mean clearly at the moment Putin is mired in Ukraine and then will have to reconstitute his armed forces. But look, we have to go back to this point that there has been no evidence of any kind of territorial ambitions in what we might think of as Europe east of, sorry, west of the post-Soviet sphere, and certainly not even the Baltic states, actually. Yes, Putin does believe wrongly that Russia is entitled to a sphere of privilege interests, a sphere of influence, which includes Ukraine, the country that he wrongly thinks is is not a real country at all, but that's something very different. And even then it's not like he actually wants to or has shown signs that he wants to totally annex all of Ukraine. He just wanted to ensure that there was a compliant vassal leader there. Now, yes, he's probably going to be wanting to hold on to that 20% that he has already occupied, but that's a very, very specific case. And indeed, arguably, actually support for Ukraine, or the means of support for Ukraine, arguably has made European security more problematic. Because hence we have the hybrid war that is entirely likely to continue to escalate, at least as long as the war in Ukraine continues. So we do face a whole variety of threats that we didn't face before. And we face a Russia that is now more and more convinced, or at least when I say a Russia, a Kremlin, that is more and more convinced that Europe is implacably hostile to it, and that Europe is potentially the real aggressor. So, you know, one can argue, is this a war for European security? Yes, again, let me stress, this the Ukraine war is unprovoked and entirely imperial. I'm not in any way suggesting that it was fine for Putin to do what he did. Absolutely not. But the point is we have to be very clear about whether or not this is really a threat that then rolls further westwards. Combined with that, there is the second view that Ukraine is fighting for Europe's defence. Well, no, it's not. It would be fighting regardless. It's fighting because a vicious imperial war has just been unleashed upon it. So of course it's going to resist. And in fact, arguably, actually what we have done to support Ukraine, as I say, has has diminished our own. I mean, there there is a strange disconnect sometimes in that, yes, we're talking about spending a lot more money on defence in the longer term. But in the meantime, we have been stripping our own military to support Ukraine. In 2023, for example, Britain sent its last two, 32, rather, um, AS-90 self-propelled guns. So it had no more self-propelled guns in its arsenal. And the AS-90, it was getting a little bit daty, it was a 1990s vintage, as you'd imagine from the name, but it was by no means was a terrible self-propelled gun. So, well, money was spent to buy 14 Swedish archer self-propelled guns as an interim fix. So they got rid of 32, but they replaced them at considerable expense with 14. And now the plan is to spend what could well be over a billion pounds in due course buying German RCH 155 self-propelled guns that should be delivered between 2028 and 2031. If all goes well, and we know how there are never ever hitches or delays in military procurement, don't we? So, and again, is is the British military stronger or weaker? Yes, there are terrible Russian losses, which will also lead to, again, delays in in due course building rebuilding the Russian military, but there's also a huge amount of experience that they're learning. They are been pushed into further militarizing their economy. I can't help but wonder quite how formidable the Russian military will be five years after the war, compared with how it would have been in 2022, for example. And if we're talking about defence, I mean defense is just simply a wider, you know, a subset of a wider issue of security. One of the things that has happened as a result of this conflict and our policies towards it is that Europe is now increasingly dependent on energy from the United States. Yes, there's all this drive, no, no, no, we we can't be dependent on Russian gas, for example, so we are buying more expensive American LNG instead from a country that does prioritize its own interests. A third point, well, Russia will be defeated and must be defeated. What does defeated mean? I mean, this is the point. We talk about victory and defeat without really knowing what it is. And perhaps more importantly, what's more important, defeating Putin, whatever that means, or saving as much as of Ukraine as possible. The whole point about Russia will be defeated, which somehow implies something that is militarily for the moment at least impossible, which is that Russia will be pushed out of all the occupied territories, that in some ways locks down debate about how this war can and should end. Let's throw in another one of these mantras. Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine. Now, on one level, that's absolutely admirable. The idea that there shouldn't be some kind of a deal stitched up behind Ukraine's back with the intent that that's then imposed upon it. But on the other hand, again, it is both naive and deceptive, in that, look, of course, every country has its own interests, and it will prioritize those those interests. I mean, otherwise, you know, why else are we we know we're not putting as much money into Ukraine as we could, theoretically? We are not going and sending our soldiers to fight and die on the front line, we have our own interests. And it is frankly a lie to pretend there are no discussions that are relevant to Ukraine without a Ukrainian presence. So, yes, there are things about Ukraine without Ukraine. Why don't we just be honest about it? Because otherwise it implies that Kyiv gets an absolute veto on policy. Now that is clearly not Donald Trump's approach, but how far is it still European, implicit approach? So look, these are all you know broad issues. Again, not because I think I have you know the answer or the my response would be better than everyone else's, but just simply because I feel there is insufficient public debate about what they are. And to a large extent, it does, I think, reflect the power of groupthink. You have a standard line, which is yes, painful in the sense of m a lot of money is being spent on supporting Ukraine and and the impact of the war, but not so painful that most politicians absolutely have to deal with it. And in that context, no politician wants to look weak. No politician wants to, again, be called an appeaser or a sort of Putin sympathizer or whatever else, unless you happen to be already on the sort of counter-mainstream populist wings of the right or the or the left. But also commentators don't want to raise these too much because they face being pilloried publicly and maybe marginalized and maybe losing out on opportunities for grants and so forth if they question orthodoxy. There is a degree to which actually, of course, I don't want to get into the whole cancel culture thing, but you know, of course there is self-censorship. And people are pretty open about it when they're talking quietly off the record, just in conversations, about the degree to which there are things they know they say they will face all kinds of flack for, so they decide not to. And how far therefore as a result is Western media coverage, but also official briefings and the like, really driven not by hard nose analysis, but by political posturing, virtue signalling, attempts to win a political argument. And certainly I, like others in my position, often feel very much stranded in the sort of barbed wire of no man's land between rival front lines in the crossfire of their informational barrages.

Latvia Expels A Russian Journalist

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And that leads me to the case of Leonid Ragosin. It's interesting. First, there was the Ian Proud case that I covered previously, the British diplomat who was stopped and questioned after he came back from attending the Valdai conference. Now we have Leonid Ragosin, a Russian journalist who left Russia, has been living in Latvia, very critical of Putin and indeed of the war, but also very critical of a lot of Western policy towards it, as I would suggest is his right. But it seems to be that he has been persona non-grated, expelled from the country. According to Latvian authorities, after all, he he propagated Kremlin narratives and served Russian interests. And for example, they they mentioned a recent column where he suggested that Ukraine would have to make painful compromises at the negotiation table. Well look, the idea that Ukraine's going to have to make painful compromises is frankly generally accepted. So quite what was so terrible about that. As I say, the the key thing is this, although he has been very critical of a lot of Western policy, in particular that sense that he's conveyed, that in effect, and I think he goes too far on this, I'll I'll come on to the sort of issues that are that are actually I disagree with him in a moment. Um his view is very much that the West pushes Ukraine into continuing the war, and therefore all the terrible human and other costs for Ukraine. Now I don't think that's actually the case. I think that at best one could see the West as the enabler of the continuation of the war. But you know, that there's no sign that Ukrainian the Ukrainian state is being pushed, kicking and screaming into continuing to fight. But nonetheless, look, that's that's his kind of perspective. He is, it has to be said, I think, something of a contrarian. And in that context, he does say things that are uncomfortable. But I would stress, first of all, his position is plausible. It's a certainly sort of an entirely legitimate line of argument. There's things that he says that I would disagree with, things with which I would agree, but which is on one level pretty much irrelevant. But the whole point is exactly he's not just some kind of barking mad lunatic or some you know ardent propagator of the Kremlin line. And what he says, a lot of people are saying, but not necessarily as openly, as vigorously as Ragozin, and not in the position of precarity of being a Russian citizen that has been granted the right to be in a foreign country. The point is there, there is, as near as I can see, no evidence, none at all, that he is a some kind of Kremlin agent, despite uh vicious and overheated nonsense that is being propagated by some in social media who are exulting at the fact that he's being expelled. And let's be honest, if there were such evidence, I presume that the Latvian authorities wouldn't have just simply expelled him, but that they would have arrested and tried him, as the law would would require. So instead we are left with a claim that he is unwittingly doing the Kremlin's work, because of some of what he says mirrors Kremlin talking points, or sort of you know, in some ways speaks to them. Look, if the Kremlin says the sky is blue, are we required to say it's pink? Or can we accept that sometimes, inevitably, there are going to be areas of of of congruence? Now I I don't know Leonid Ragosin. I have met him I'm pretty sure I've only met him once, I think in Moscow back in 2019. Anyway, yes. And I as I say, I certainly don't agree with everything he says, but I I do worry about this notion that you can expel someone just because they say things you don't like. Now, one of the counterarguments is, well, he has no right to be in Latvia, and and that's perfectly true. I'm not questioning the legality of the Latvian government's actions, because frankly, every government has those kind of get out of jail free clauses in their laws that allows them, should they choose, to to kick someone out for often the most uh vague of grounds. But the idea that to dissent is to become a target is one that I find profoundly worrying, especially in in democracies. If you think that something that someone says is wrong, then argue it. Win the debate. Don't just try and silence it. That, after all, is Putin's game. And in particular, what Ragozin himself presented himself as as doing is that he was challenging groupthink. He was questioning orthodoxies. And look, is that sorry, I'm using look a lot today. Anyway, is that sometimes an excuse for just being a contrarian pain in the arse? Not saying Ragozin was doing that, but we have to recognise that sometimes, oh, I'm just challenging groupthink can be an excuse just for being that kind of tedious individual who feels that they have to question everything. But at the same time, I think that challenging groupthink is a very valuable service, and arguably we could do a lot more of it. The thing about challenging groupthink is it does force the mainstream to actually have to defend its position rather than just simply rely on the all-right thinking people agree defense. And in that context, arguably those who challenge groupthink, I say, are doing us a favor by making our own information space more resilient, by forcing us to grapple with the realities of the situation, by forcing us to articulate our points of view and then argue them in some depth, rather than just trying to close off discussion straight away before anyone looks at the unfortunate realities of the Emperor's new clothes. So, in that respect, Leonidra goes in, I mean, he's now apparently somewhere else in Europe, he's not saying where, and I I I wish him well, I'm genuinely saddened by this case. But the crucial point that comes out here is I think that in light of what's happening in Ukraine, in which, yes, the Ukrainians look as if they're going to have a very, very hard winter, and although they've

How The War Ends And Closing

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been making some gains or counterattack successes on the battlefield, the overall aggregate flow of territory is still into Russia's hands. Slow, painful, bloody, but nonetheless, that that is what's happening. Arguably it is time for a discussion as to where things go from here. And I appreciate that that is often code for saying basically we should abandon Ukraine or Ukraine should just put up and shut up and accept a sort of a deal on Russia's terms. I'm not arguing that. I'm just simply saying that we need to say how we think this war really ends. What is the best outcome, the best credible, plausible outcome? Because otherwise, if we just keep relying on mantras and keep relying on as is clearly the case, the hope that somehow some kind of black swan event, some kind of Russian economic collapse or Putin dying or whatever else, suddenly resolves this whole issue magically. If we just simply rely on methods and rhetoric, which frankly hasn't well, it has worked. I I don't say for a moment the sanctions haven't worked, for example, just because they haven't actually stopped Russia's war effort, but they clearly are not doing the job. Well, as long as we keep doing that, we are frankly can continue to relegate ourselves to just simply not spectators to history because we are participating actively and suffering as a result, but victims of history. And I don't think that's in anyone's interests. But anyway, time for me to climb back down from my soapbox, and thank you all for listening. Well, that's the end of another episode of the In Moscow Shadows podcast. Just as a reminder, beyond this, you can follow my blog, also called In Moscow Shadows. You can follow me on Twitter at MarkGaleotti, all as one, or Facebook, MarkGaleotti on Russia. This podcast is made possible by generous and enlightened patrons, and you too can be one. Just go along to my Patreon page, that's patreon.com slash in Moscow Shadows, and decide which tier you want to join, getting access to exclusive materials and other perks. However, whether or not you contribute, thank you very much indeed for listening. Until next time, keep well.