33 - The End of the End of History feat. Philip Cunliffe and George Hoare

I talk to Phillip Cunliffe and George Hoare about their new book The End of the End of History.  

In 1989, Francis Fukuyama predicted a boring eternity of liberal capitalism and for nearly 30 years, it looked like he might be right. We had Clinton and Blair. Globalization and apathy. Kurt Cobain. According to my guests, the end of History wasn’t just about politics, it was a whole vibe. 

But since 2016, things have started happening that don't quite  fit the pattern and the pundits are losing their minds. Do Brexit, Trump, and the new politicization signify the end of the end of History? 

We chat about how the political zeitgeist has changed in recent years and what that may hold for the future. 

Phillip Cunliffe and George Hoare are, along with Alex Hochuli, co-hosts of the Aufhebunga bunga podcast and co-authors of The End of the End of History: Politics in theTwenty-First Century.

Transcript

Clif Mark: 0:00

Before we start, I just wanted to say that this interview, especially the first 20 minutes of it is going to make a lot more sense. If you have listened to the last episode on Fukuyama, his End of History first. So if you haven't heard it, go back and listen to it. It's only 30 minutes long. And when we dive right into the grand sweep of galeon history, it's gonna make a lot more sense. Today 90s vibes, cultural exhaustion, and the end of the end of history. I'm Clif Mark, and this is good in theory. Welcome to the good in theory podcast today we have George Hor and Philip Cunliffe from the alpha bonga bonga podcast, which is the global politics podcast at the end of the End of History is that guys, yeah, that's a that's right. That's a tagline. Well, welcome to the show. I wanted to have you on. I love the podcast, everyone should listen to it, I support it on Patreon. And so should you if you're listening, and you guys just came out with a book called The end of the end of history. And I got through it. And I like it a lot. It's short, which is one of my favorite qualities in the book. And it gives a really interesting perspective on politics in the 21st century, a lot of people have noticed, things are getting weird things are getting really political. And you guys have written a short, interesting book trying to articulate what's going on. And so I would like today, for you to take us through that to explain what the end of the End of History is. But to get with that, we'll have to figure out what the End of History is. So my first question even before that, to whoever wants to take it is, what was history? Because you don't just mean the events that happened in the past?

Philip Cunliffe: 2:14

Yeah. Do you wanna do this? No, don't don't tackle history. So the End of History is the US political scientists, Francis Fukuyama was his tagline at the end, and he used it to describe the end of the Cold War. And what he meant by history, he took from the French philosopher, Kojo, who in turn took was a particular interpretation of entering the German philosopher agle, who never actually said the end of history, but I suppose implied it in terms of his political philosophy, and the how he described the constitutional States of Europe that emerged from the Napoleonic Wars. And by implication, and I suppose by a process of reverse engineering, what counts as history is a process of humanity searching for higher forms of political and social order. So that it's a process of subjecting society to a degree of conscious human control and trying to re engineer and shape I suppose, the historical process in such a way as to realize particular kinds of visions of what an improved social and political order should look like. And so that is the, I suppose, the crude and rough version of what history was in, or the kind of history that was supposed to have come to an end. So

George Hoare: 3:45

it says history history with a capital H, that kind of events, particularly after the French Revolution, that realized human human freedom through through various events in space and time, you might put it that way. So pretty, you know, pretty big deal stuff.

Clif Mark: 4:03

So history is realizing of human freedom. But just to be clear, it also happens before the French Revolution, too, right?

Philip Cunliffe: 4:11

Yeah, so at least in the kind of the old in the Hegelian sense of history, various kind of there are various key staging posts, such as the reformation, with the Assad, the overthrow of the Catholic Church and the establishment of individual conscience. And famously, Hegel describing the Middle Ages as long, dark night. So lots of things happened in the sense that there are lots of you know, there's lots of kind of aristocratic intrigue, and dynastic struggles, but none of it is particularly meaningful, a long, dark and terrible night, as he calls it. So it's eventful, but without anything meaningful, because it doesn't actually none of those kinds of struggles actually helped you realize an embed deeper and more meaningful understanding of human freedom, the rise of Christianity, the ancient Greek city states and the Roman Empire in a kind of qualified sense. So there is history before the French Revolution, different forms. And all of these in the Hegelian version of the story, all of these different historical episodes play their own role in laying particular kinds of foundations, which subsequent societies build upon in a process by which the meaning of human freedom is given greater depth, intensity and breadth as well.

Clif Mark: 5:35

Okay, great, then, why is the French Revolution in particular such an important inflection point in the story?

George Hoare: 5:43

Yeah, I guess. So. Hegel's idea would be that the French Revolution is essentially the end of traditional authority, you know, the earthly authority, loses its divine support, and its ability to kind of dictate the terms of our existence. So you do have a kind of a really important inflection point because the, from that point on, it's then the we kind of have to make our own authority, we have to take responsibility for our own our own freedom. Yeah,

Philip Cunliffe: 6:12

kind of just picking up on what George said with the French Revolution, there is no because it enshrines popular sovereignty, as the basis of political authority and social organization means that there is no authority that is external to humanity itself. As the and human Well, there is nothing outside of human will, as the principle of political and social organization. So the end of history in a galleon terms is the beginning of modern politics. So political processes in constitutional states substitute for what previously had been these kind of grand historical struggles of the world historic figures, great men like Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Napoleon, and so on. And in their place, because we have constitutional order, you have the beginning of modern politics and the pluralistic vision of popular sovereignty within these constitutional states.

Clif Mark: 7:09

Great. So the end of history for Hegel is when you get the constitutional state that comes out of the French Revolution, because there's popular sovereignty and it realizes human freedom properly. But the end of history that you're talking about in your book and that Fukuyama talks about, doesn't start at the French Revolution. So tell me about that End of History.

George Hoare: 7:35

So yeah, I mean, the this phrase is, as Phil said, was popular popularized by Francis Fukuyama, who was in American state functionary later, a political scientist. And I think we, you know, it's in the tagline of the podcast, but I think the, this idea of the end of history, we would probably take exception with some of the ways that Fukuyama talks about this, because, you know, to, to be a little bit crude about it, his essential idea is with the, with the collapse of the Soviet Union with the kind of the ebb and the implosion of socialism, that's it, that, you know, we now have a final form of human government, which is basically like liberal capitalism. And that's, you know, that's it job done, essentially. And now, it's more a case of of like, and he is quite wistful, in this, there's now a case of, you know, things hat things will happen, but it won't be it won't be history. So it's it is a, I think one of the reasons that we sort of found this this term to be particularly useful is because it captures more than anything, a feeling or, quote, unquote, vibe, that you have this, you have politics is kind of this dull, boring enterprise, you know, Blair versus brown in the British context, you know, who's, who's going to get fired up by that. So it's really this kind of, you know, sense of cultural exhaustion, this sense of kind of a lack of, of big, potential, different alternatives. So, I think that feeling which we was all that kind of vibe of politics, which we were all socialized into on the podcast, which started, you know, beginning of the 90s and went until 2016. And we can we all 2020 we can kind of talk about that in a bit. But I think that that's really what it captured that feeling of, of the of this systemic alternative, being no longer present. And so having this, this kind of feeling of politics at that point in time,

Clif Mark: 9:35

okay, I would love to just dig into a few of the things that you just mentioned. So, first thing, the beginning of the end of history is the end of the Cold War, right, the fall of communism, why is eliminating that alternative, so important? And so, why was it history before why was why was it history in 1988, but not history in 1991

Philip Cunliffe: 10:01

Yes, I was I suppose it just building on what George has already said. It's some it's a good question. And it's the according Fukuyama, his terms so that history didn't end after the Napoleonic Wars, because there were still, there were still competition over what the best form of human society was. And concretely those two options were essentially capitalism and communism during the Cold War. And so you have this ideological polarization about what the best form of human society is. And as we talk about in the book, you know, it's not the Cold War isn't just a kind of a politics of alliances and diplomacy and who has the most tanks and rockets, but also, you know, who is who is the most efficient economic system in terms of delivering all round material prosperity, who has the best vision for urban planning and architecture,

Clif Mark: 10:54

which way of life most thoroughly realizes human freedom

Philip Cunliffe: 10:57

exactly which way of life is most is most effective that unlocking human freedom human potential, that's what the competition is actually about. It's not just a kind of, it's not just a game of strategic kind of Alliance shuffling and you know, moving chess pieces around on on the strategic chessboard of global politics. So, when the with the implosion of the USSR, by the end of 1991, that alternative is gone. And so there is no there are no real meaningful choices anymore in politics is the implication of Fergie armas. Fukuyama his analysis. And it's worth saying, I mean, you know, so many people have taken issue with it and misunderstood it and mangled it, and so on. But to draw the implication that there is no that with the collapse of the USSR and all the kind of chaos and Dylan and hope, I suppose that came around that moment, as well as foreboding and fear, and what have you to draw the implications of it in Grand world historic terms, was something that was quite prescient and insightful. And I think it's worth crediting him with that, to see the way in which politics would be affected by the absence of meaningful ideological alternatives.

Clif Mark: 12:14

So with the end of the big contest over different political alternatives, ways of life, we enter the end of history. And can you tell me a little bit like concretely, what was it like? What are the political markers of the End of History period?

Philip Cunliffe: 12:31

I think the I mean, so it's a really good question. Actually, I was gonna answer it very swiftly. And then it occurred to me that there are so many kinds of things that one could choose from one's own kind of life experience, but also things that were also kind of world well, historic events, I suppose. The two, speaking from the vantage point of domestic politics in Anglo America, it's Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. And they're both important because they both embody what they call third way politics. And they were very self consciously styled a new form of postmodern social democracy, so left of center, but increasingly, in fact, center. So the lopping off of communist alternative, a socialist alternative further to the left, man that by default, old social democratic parties or left of center parties, or if you want to describe them shifted to the center. And so that ideological, kind of the compression of the ideological spectrum was the most important part of it domestically, I think. And part of that came with, you know, the kind of the shrinking of political options and the increasing boredom with politics. And people, you know, all politicians are the same. Doesn't matter who you vote for the erosion of participation in politics, both measured in terms of party membership, and also in terms of voting, and elections, people watching the nightly news, reading and subscribing to newspapers, all of these figures declined over the post Cold War period. And this was an index of the, of the end of history. On the international level. I think one the one thing and this comes from this speaks to my academic area of expertise, so I'll just be brief, but it's the the rise of humanitarian and cosmopolitan versions of politics. So politics that were suspended above the national interest, politics that was cast at the level of humanity itself, independently of the you know, the male ego testicle, ambitions and jealousies of, of nation states. And so a Supra political, supranational form of politics became increasingly prominent in the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the European Union, and humanitarian ideals, human rights.

Clif Mark: 14:51

Great. So just to summarize a couple of things you said, in the end of history, there's a kind of ideological compression That happens. I love that term from the disappearance of the left alternative because communism fell. And the result is a lot of disengagement on the popular level people read less newspapers, they vote less, they're joining political parties less. And insofar as people are interested in politics, it's a kind of global humanitarian politics, the UN the WTO, NGOs, stuff like that. People are concerned less with the glory of their own nation, and more with getting mosquito nets for kids in Africa to prevent malaria. Is that is that more or less it?

George Hoare: 15:35

Yeah. So I think I think you can kind of have I don't know, if listeners prefer a kind of a list, or, or an, I don't know, an example. But I can give you I can give you both. So one of the, the sides, I think things on the list, and this, you know, might not be exhaustive, and it repeats some things that Phil said, but definitely globalization. So these are the determinant features at the end of history, globalization, globalism, as you said, moving away from transcending, if you will, the nation state neoliberalism, post politics, in terms of, you know, a particular method of managing dissent and a moral panic around apathy. So people disengaged, and like elites like, oh, why is everyone so apathetic? capitalist realism is a book by Mark Fisher, which I think captures quite a lot of this and humanitarian intervention. But I think the the example, or weeds in the book, we talk a bit about the culture, or the cultural effect or feel of at the end of history, and it was quite a, an exhaustive opposition or quote, unquote, resistance, and then pre packaging them and, and selling, selling them back. So it's overall quite, you know, that you can see this this is this kind of lays the feel for the rise of technocratic approaches to politics. And without those big alternatives that we talked about previously, then there's a lot about competence and, and presentation and marketing approaches to what politics is, and that is hardly surprising. People are not particularly interested in that. Because, you know, it appeals to a certain cast of mind, who might might not be listening to podcast and offensive if that's your if that's your bag. But I don't think many people that we know what particularly kind of inspired by, by that kind of technocratic, third way, sort of politics, Clinton and Blair era that felt mentioned.

Clif Mark: 17:22

So here's a question about this vibe of the end of history. It seems that and I want to get back into your idea of post politics. But it seems that you're both saying there's this exhaustion people are less interested in politics, you have Nirvana is kind of a political sad mood in the 90s. But and the reason for that is the fall of this alternative Soviet communism. But is it really the case that all the sort of left progressive parties in the 80s were really trying to bring the revolution to Britain or Canada or the United States? Is? In what way? Was the alternative animating the progressive side of politics and say, the counterculture?

George Hoare: 18:07

Yeah, that's a good, I think it is a good question. And I don't think you want to exaggerate the the the moment of collapse, because clearly it's it, it's been undermined and exhausted for a while. But I think there is a key, there is a there is a change over the course of the 80s with with successive defeats political defeats of the working class. And that does that does have an impact. I think one of the things we talk about a bit in the book is the legacy of 1968. Those those might be revolutions if that's the way you sort of frame it. And they did have an impact on eventually on the I guess the the turn towards the counterculture for legitimacy on on the left, and eventually came to it to influence people, possibly belatedly some of the forms of politics that we did see in the, during the end of history, Take, for example, occupy, and that kind of frivolous, more frivolous and carnivalesque approach. So it had been a long time coming, I think, essentially, would be my my sort of short answer to your to your question that there's there's obviously an increasing disenchantment with the with the USSR as a as a plausible alternative, but it takes it's kind of, and that's why I think that the, the more or less spectacular or anticlimactic end of the USSR is an important kind of point, because then it shows that this thing has collapsed essentially under the weight of its own contradictions.

Clif Mark: 19:37

Right. Okay. So that's the end of history. vibes of exhaustion, no alternative capitalist realism. We're all just who is going to manage capitalism best. Right, and that's, that's what's going on politically. protest is frivolous and carnivalesque, or involved at the supranational level. Now anyone who remembers the end of history, we'll have noticed that things have started to change, things seem to be shaking up a little. So what are the markers that we've come into the title of your book, the end of the end of history.

Philip Cunliffe: 20:13

So I suppose I mean, you could take it by reference to some of those, I leave leave the, the kind of the favorite teenage bands to George, I guess is a better place to talk about to talk about, you know, who's who embodies the end of the End of History best and but

Clif Mark: 20:31

I should say that as a boy, I went to Nirvana's last concert in Toronto, it was really important for me, you know, they're, they're really a big band for a tween at that time, sorry, sorry about my earlier

Philip Cunliffe: 20:44

buttons conceal, apologize. It's a point of division within our pod, because Alex, who's not here is, is the biggest Nirvana fan on the pod, I tend to share your ga skepticism. But you could mark so the end of the End of History could be marked by the end of those some of those typical characteristics. So you get the exhaustion, and the increasing the increasing challenges placed at the humanitarian form of politics. So in the in the international realm, and there's no way of avoiding the fact that it is Donald Trump, who most successfully places this kind of political challenge on the agenda in terms of foreign policy in the US. But it's, you know, the increasing exhaustion with the endless war that comes with the humanitarian form of supranational conflict forever. These endless war becomes the token of the end of history that comes increasingly under challenge. At the domestic level, you get the, again, the exhaustion of those social democratic parties, and in some cases, their eventual almost elimination in some kind of national contexts, such as France, and who knows, maybe even in Germany, as well, as you know, in increasingly marginalization in Britain itself with the struggles of the Labour Party. So all of those do you get the decline of those, those kinds of politics that characterize the end of history, they seem to be undermined or overturned or called into question. And you see this with the rise of left populism challenging those parties, those left wing parties, you see the increasing irrelevance of the conservative conservative parties and right of center parties. And you also see the fracture points within globalization. And obviously, the most important moment there is the 2008 financial crash. So the great kind of economic engine of prosperity that would drown all political conflicts in growing wealth at the international level, that no longer seems plausible or effective as a means of delivering prosperity to all after 2008. So any of the any of the characteristics you could use to describe the end of history, they all seem to begin, either be begin kind of crumbling and shuttering and crumbling or called into question, at the end of the end of history. Yeah,

George Hoare: 23:16

just Can I just can I add a couple of couple of things out sorry. It's the it's the tagline of the podcast, I've got to have my, my two cents. So I think I think just one thing to say is that the end of the End of History is kind of deliberately a double negative, because it is the collapse of on the exhaustion of of that model of politics at the end of history without really a coherent alternative. And so the just to kind of set up the distinction a little bit, I think, if the End of History is is about post politics, so a form of government that tries to foreclose political contestation by emphasizing consensus, competence, you know, like ideology is a bad thing, then. And that's if that's characteristic of the end of history, then the end of the end of history, you see the rise of anti politics. So basically, rejection of the political establishment, and that managerial approach to governing society, which is often you know, characteristic of populism. And then at the same time, you have the response to this, like we talked previously about this moral panic almost amongst elites in in terms of apathy, and at the end of history, now, it's about ignorance or gullibility. So the fact that the people are starting to re enter politics, potentially, the elite respond to that I think has been extremely revealing. And a lot of people have have really shown their, their true colors if you will, with for example, let's take the the election of Donald Trump or the Brexit referendum. The responses to that really showed deplorable. Yeah, or you know, repentance one poetic moment, the basket of deplorable is that captures so well, like, these people are ignorant. They don't do the right thing. Like previously, it was all about how can we drag them back into politics, we need to legitimize ourselves. And now it's like, actually, you know, we've got, you know, back off, we don't really, we don't really need the citizenry there. Actually, kind of they're doing the wrong thing. And they're voting against their interests or they're otherwise stupid and ignorant. So I think there is, you know, I think that division between post politics and an anti politics, if you take 2016 as a kind of, I think is symbolic. But as that dividing line, you can see you can see a real, obviously prefigured earlier, but you can't see a real distinction there.

Clif Mark: 25:23

Right? Yeah, I think so. Definitely, that's when people everywhere started recognizing things are getting weird. So let me just review that little distinction that distinction a bit. So in the end of history period, in the 90s, in the early aughts, we have post politics, which is basically the people are apathy, the people who are in government, the elites, they're not giving anyone any real choices. It's just technocratic management, fiddling with the knobs of policy, etc. It's very, very complex, none of you people would understand, but you know, you should really care about it. Then, as we move into the end of the end of history, the people are not so apathetic anymore. They're angry. They're sick of these elites and managers. It's just like, anti elitism that we hear a lot about in this revolt against elites. And now whereas before the elites were saying, why, you know, the people should participate more, why don't you guys vote Rock the Vote, guys. Now they're like, Well, look, these, these Yahoo's are a bunch of ignorant racists and they don't know, they don't know what they want, they just can't vote in their interests. They don't know what's good for them. Yeah. And so

George Hoare: 26:32

I think that's it and hearing you present it sort of back to us. I don't know if, you know, it sounds very, sort of simple and straightforward. And I don't know, if that's a mark of the genius of the, of the of the heartache that we've constructed, or just the fact that it, you know, is it is a fairly, you know, fairly stylized and simple distinction, but I think one that has, it does have a way of, of capturing a change in the environment of politics and changing some of the, you mentioned, the kind of anger that cultural effect is, you know, it's it may be it's easy to over overdo it, but that move from depression to, to anger in the in kind of culture is is that, you know, it seems to me clearly related to the rise of, of this kind of popular this kind of angry populist, anti managerialism, which, you know, is, I think, a hallmark of a recent politics. And I think it's, you know, something which we've, we've, which we explore a bit in the book in its various manifestations as, as well.

Clif Mark: 27:34

Did you want to jump on that anti politics point?

Philip Cunliffe: 27:37

Philip? No, I mean, I think you You did a great job of, of describing the kind of summarizing the characters of the two of those two regimes and how they relate to each other.

George Hoare: 27:50

Or one point, sorry, I'm taking liberties here, but I'm going to I'm going to do it anyways. And I'll be I'll be quick, though. One point I think about anti politics is often expresses itself through anti corruption. Politics, I think you see some good examples in, for example, in Brazil, one of our co hosts is from and resides, that it's a good way to, to pretend not to do politics, but but really do politics often in quite an effective way. Because you can sort of say, Well, if the whole political class is corrupt, let's replace them with it with a new political class, obviously, but I think there is a swamp as it were, yeah, yeah. Yeah. Then, you know, another good example,

Philip Cunliffe: 28:28

it feeds into the disenchantment and the anger because you portray the kind of incumbent leaders and representatives as all being incorrigibly corrupt. And also suggests that material interest in representation itself is somehow by its nature, kind of dirty, polluted, and, and that there is some kind of pure reform of politics that doesn't involve material interest or representation. And so the, you know, it played the anti corruption coming into words appears to kind of rejuvenate, in fact, to re simply ends up

Clif Mark: 29:05

recapitulating the same problems of post politics. Interesting, interesting point about the anti corruption politics. Now, I'd like to say a little bit more about the idea of anti politics because, you know, since 2016, it seems to me like things are getting a lot more politicized. Right, and maybe it's a particular kind of politicization, but I'm seeing more people in the streets for protests, and I would have seen before both for the women's protests after Trump and for the Black Lives Matters, marches. There are people out there I haven't seen before there are people talking about politics, it seems like more than ever. So what do you make of that? Because you're still saying it's an anti political period, but this kind of looks like politics, right? So what's going on here?

Philip Cunliffe: 29:55

So I, I take you know, I wouldn't want wish to discuss the significance of, of Black Lives Matter. Or the, or the enormous I mean, women's protest after after Trump came, was elected. I suppose though I'm also struck by the continuities in many of those political protests, and particularly the carnivalesque aspect of it, the fact that people can't have dressed in costumes, their take their kids, I mean, not not Babs, the BLM protest so much, but certainly the the woman's thing, the, the kind of the lewdness and the playfulness, so everyone wearing pussy hats at the, at the anti Trump rally. All of those things seem to me that well, so you defeat fascism. Well, indeed, right, except with irony and playfulness. And all of that is really continuous with the the carnivalesque kind of character of the anti globalization protests of the 1990s and 2000s. And also has, you know, shares characteristics with occupy. So, where it seems to me there is where there's kind of more, which I think, and I suppose, the way I mark the difference more, or it seems to me more striking at least, is the fact that I hear people talking politics more. Now, it's not a it's obviously not a you know, it's not a scientific guide, it's kind of an intuition and a personal observation. And I can't discount my own kind of subjective awareness and all the rest of it. But I was struck me very much in 2016, that all sorts of conversations, this was in the middle of the Brexit referendum in the UK. You know, usually if I said if somebody asked me what I wanted was doing if you know, any kind of banal ordinary interaction in a supermarket or a taxi or getting my haircut or you know, with with strangers or on on trains or whatever. If I said what I did I teach politics at university, that would be the either the end of the conversation or quickly diverted in 2016, was the first time that people actually began to ask me about politics as a result of hearing what I did.

George Hoare: 32:08

So you, are you saying that it was the time that you were no longer ashamed to be a politics academic It was.

Philip Cunliffe: 32:15

It was coming coming out moment. And so that's the

Clif Mark: 32:21

it was around that same time, I guess. Do you guys know, Jacob Levy, he's a political theorist at McGill. Yeah. So he was I think, tweeting about how psychologists have a lot to answer for as being the big public intellectuals, Jordan Peterson, Steven Pinker, and how they've kind of, you know, monopolize the public intellectual space. And I said, Well, I think we're next. I think political theorists are next. And so it seems like your experience is bearing bearing that out a little bit. You mean, that we should be we should be criticised for occupying public space? know that people will start to care what

Philip Cunliffe: 32:59

you have to Oh, okay. Gotcha. Yeah. You might, you know, you may well be right. And I mean, and perhaps it's already, you know, perhaps it's already happened and on the way and, yeah, I mean, who knows? But that was what's what stuck with me. And even now, kind of, you know, I hear kind of people talking politics, you hear the names of politicians mentioned kind of income snip, you know, snippets of conversations overheard. And so, it's, you know, that seems to me, it's much more I've marketed much more than I did the the size of the scale of some of the protest movements that we've seen in recent years. And I would also qualified, you know, so I think for instance, unlike the say, the pussy had marchers. If you compare that to the Zulu, john marches, for instance, the yellow vest movement in France against Macron, that's a very different kind of political protest, without any of the, the kind of the self mocking irony, the the costume aspect of it, the having a good fun day out, you know, quite the opposite, because it was all tear gas and the thuggish pneus of the French Riot cops. So Nina don't want to say that all political protest is kind of less great Far from it. And there's also been obviously a lot of violence associated with the BLM protests and even riots in some cases in the US. But notwithstanding that, the way I mark this change is, in fact, politics and political interest seeming to creep into day to day life in a way that I don't think I've ever experienced before.

George Hoare: 34:35

Yeah, and one one kind of consequences of this which might or might not resonate with with listeners is the number of like, serious falling fallings out, or it's kind of quite quite rancorous dinner table arguments about politics since 2016. Because I mean, this is my you know, my personal experience in my, my whole take on this is that prior to that, though, there were Political disagreements but none that were particularly important. But then you have something like Brexit or Trump come along, and suddenly you have you know, you have real issues at stake real arguments develop and, you know, people we weren't really practiced at doing that. Having these kind of relate really quite fundamental disagreements often and, you know, names were names were called, things were said that, to me, and probably by me as well, that, you know, maybe weren't weren't the greatest, greatest moments. But yeah, I think that's that's part of it, that this replay stylization was, was quite deep in the sense of really starting in probably in a quite an incorrect way to put these really important questions and politics back on, on the on the dinner table, as it were. And that's, you know, and that's, that is something which I think is related to what to what Phil's talking about. And that's obviously one of the reasons that kind of energy and that politicization was one of the reasons we thought, you know, it would be worth worthwhile to do a politics podcast, because, you know, there was just more interesting things to talk about. So

Clif Mark: 36:08

are you saying that before Brexit, it was easier to keep friends? Yeah. Yeah. I mean,

George Hoare: 36:15

there's, but it's, it separates the wheat from the chaff. You know, you got, you know, I, I wouldn't wouldn't want to claim that, but no, I certainly did have some, some pretty, you know, robust discussions, let's put it that way, with people who I might have, you know, been previously like, Oh, you know, I'm a Marxist. You're conservative. Oh, that's, that's fine. Let's Let's we can have, we can have a reason reasonable people disagree. But then it's like,

Clif Mark: 36:43

well, there was no stakes, it didn't matter.

George Hoare: 36:44

Maybe that's it. And then it's like, okay, now there's a binary dividing line. And if you're on the other side, then your fair game, you're challenging yourself on the side of the conservatives really make things complicated. make some new friends as well, they said, right.

Clif Mark: 37:02

One interesting fact, at least to me, maybe you guys will be interested is I also had a sideline in like lifestyle writing. So I was interviewing people from dating apps. And one of my articles I never published, never finished writing was about politics and dating. And so I was talking to people at OK Cupid, and whatever these apps, and what a woman Okay, Cupid told me was that it's been say, a 10 to 15 year shift. But there was huge step shifts in the increase in politicization on the apps, people using political filters, people like showing their primary t shirt, election, you know, t shirts in their photos. And it coincided really, just when us, you know, call the, the end of the end of history was 2016. Trump election, Women's March Brexit that really saw a big increase in this stuff. And it hasn't, you know, this was right before pandemic, I spoke to her. And,

Philip Cunliffe: 38:03

yeah, I mean, it's, that's really, it's really interesting to hear. And I mean, I suppose in another way, it's also different from the politicization of the past in that that kind of fragmentation. And also the feeling of politics as being kind of a tribal identity, rather than having some kind of common reference points around which there's the possibility for establishing common positions or this kind of thing. That also seems to be part of it. And maybe the dating gaps, are really telling on that score, in terms of fragmentation. I mean, they've done all these studies, you know, where, in the past, Democrats and Republicans in the US would be more likely to marry and to be, you know, to be friends with the other side, whereas now it's far less likely people selfs self sword than sortition, both in terms of who you marry and to date, as well as your friends are particularly on the side of left wing people and Democrats, apparently. And so, you know, that I think that that it is a kind of it is an indication of that politicization, but also the different kinds of politicization to the past.

Unknown: 39:10

Yeah,

Clif Mark: 39:11

absolutely. You know, and hearing you speak about these same issues. In Britain, I was just hoping that a lot of this fighting over the dinner table and stuff was an American thing that we see it on the American internet, but it was not as real in other places. So it's a pity to find out that it is,

Philip Cunliffe: 39:31

I think it might have even started in Britain in terms of the shift from the kind of the shift from the end of history period to the end of End of History period, because it started I think, with a Scottish referendum. So and this is what people said in Scotland, so is 2015, the Scottish referendum and Scottish independence. And it was so bitter and divisive. You know, so families were split. fathers and their kids were split. I mean, I'm talking this on the basis of friends in Scotland people I know colleagues and Scott And, and they were around these awesome people who study politics, you know, academically and they were appalled. Many of them were simply appalled by the fact that this thing that they study actually had significant implications that they could never have countenance before. And they also said this was a warning of what was to come in terms of Brexit and the politics that would come after Brexit. And they were right.

George Hoare: 40:24

Yeah, sorry to have a go at politics, academics, but they have not covered in the last few years, particularly around that inflection point, and maybe around 2016. Like, why is everyone talking about politics, why they're arguing? Carney just vote and have party preferences, and all this sort of thing that we can do logistic regressions on and just stop? Like actually thinking about this stuff? It's our domain. So yeah, I think they, if they do, as you suggested, become the public intellectuals of this next period, then, you know, where, you know, public intellectuals need to be criticized.

Clif Mark: 41:00

One other point that I want to talk about is, in this end of End of History, period, there's a chapter in your book where you talk about neoliberal order Break Down syndrome. So I guess this is the reaction, mostly of the elites to these changes, it's growing politicization of the populace. Can you? You tell me a bit about that? And how, how that Yeah, how the elites are reacting to these these changes? Yeah,

George Hoare: 41:28

so I think the so neoliberal order Break Down syndrome, or knobs, what is our kind of obviously slightly tongue in cheek acronym for the inability of the liberal establishment to understand, explain or respond to these 2016 events of Brexit and Trump? So you really do see some really, I think Twitter is kind of good for this, or at least at that point, it was good, because you just see people's like instinctive reactions to these things. And it is, it is kind of a really, quite, quite nasty, in some cases, quite hysterical. In other cases, like an effect of basically like, What What on earth are people done, you know, that you can, with with Brexit, you can lay out so many examples of like this real turn against, like, against people for voting this way. It's an it's an example of economic or national self harm, some quite like the triumph of the parochial lizard brain as one as one, quote unquote, journalist, but it so it really is that that moment of there's something new is is is there and the kind of the commentary out reveal themselves to be essentially defenders of the status quo by their horrified reaction at this, this change? And there's some hopefully quite amusing examples in the book of of, of India, I think it's not just in the Anglo American context. But you sort of you see it there in 2016. Quite, quite clearly. So yeah, I think that's the that's the the core of this,

Philip Cunliffe: 43:00

I think George is being a bit is perhaps being a bit restrained in terms of characterizing get I mean, it was, in some cases, it was genuine derangement. And there's very little, you know, I don't think, you know, there's little other words to find to say, to account for just the sheer extent and mania, say, conspiracies about Russian meddling in western politics and the extent of the, you know, what was attributed to Russian influence. And that was derived, you know, there is no word for a derangement, the inability to

Clif Mark: 43:34

give me some, your favorite total meltdown examples.

Philip Cunliffe: 43:39

Well, so one, the mean, one favorite would be, say, Paul Mason, who's left wing journalist in the UK, and has, you know, has some international prominence as well. And, you know, I even go as far as to say he was somebody I had some kind of respect for, you know, he's always kind of grudging respect, but I had some respect for him prior to 2016. And I never anticipated that he would come become more or less, I mean, deranged in the last few years. You know, he Oh, he openly talks in the kind of the cut and the thrust of the polit political, political process that came after Brexit and all the constitutional shenanigans had one with it of the Tory government. He talked in terms of Weimar moment, Reichstag moment in terms of, you know, an imminent fascist threat. This would be like he would be on marches of, you know, enormous numbers of people, or hundreds of 1000s of people talking as if, you know, storm troopers were going to be kind of coming around the corner and, and that there was going to be a dictatorship established. And despite the fact that Tory government is, you know, kind of the most multi ethnic cabinet Britain has ever had in its history talks in terms of white supremacy, in terms of Putin's influence in terms of dark money, and there is no other way to you know, the it is raining.

Clif Mark: 44:52

Putin's controlling Britain as well as the US

Philip Cunliffe: 44:56

controls Britain, the US controls everything essentially that right you know, To the point where you think, well, surely if Putin's don't powerful, he must control you too. How did you manage to escape? So,

George Hoare: 45:06

good point, you defeat him with his own logic, but he's still on this bullshit. This particular guy is sort of, I think his most recent thing is imagine if the Nazis invented a time machine towards the end of the war, and a crack team of SS men are sent into the future to restart the Reich. What gear Do you think they go for? 2016 is like this is their F. Maybe Phil is right, that unhinged is the only the only word for Odin, you know, that?

Clif Mark: 45:31

Just would you guys pick a different year than that? was not given the question.

Philip Cunliffe: 45:39

I think they would probably have that I probably have a good shot in. They probably have a good shot in some time when the European the pre some of the precursors of the European Union were most kind of packed to the gills with Nazis and fascists,

George Hoare: 45:54

maybe CJ. But no, I mean, why don't they go back in time? Like,

Philip Cunliffe: 45:59

I would make more sense to make a lot more Nazis had a time machine, you'd go back in time and not shoot Hitler. It was Yeah,

George Hoare: 46:08

I mean, so I mean, again, to not shoot himself. But anyway, I think in the in the in the US there was there was some kind of other

Philip Cunliffe: 46:16

intellectual malady to msnbc was was another example of this. I mean, so do you remember there was a malady nostalgia?

George Hoare: 46:24

That was another point, wasn't it? Like everybody was like, Oh, can we just get back to, you know, to President Bartlett and, and that's, that's the, the thing that we could, you can know, we can kind of wish away all these political changes. By just going back to this, this TV series,

Philip Cunliffe: 46:38

we felt it appropriate to talk in terms of syndrome because it was a you know, it was it had the it had done, it had the aspect of a malady that was psychological, you know, so a derangement that gripped a particular kind of social strata, a large, influential strata, academics, media, professional classes, lawyers, politicians, journalists, and so on. And that they were so unwilling to accept and get to grips with the nature of change in their own societies, they prefer to come up with the most outlandish and deranged accounts of what was happening to account for political change that they simply could not accept.

Clif Mark: 47:22

Right, because like, no one could actually vote for Trump. It must have been Cambridge Analytica, absolutely Russian meddling, etc, etc. Absolutely. Yeah. Putin's bought armies. I love it. It's it's completely insane. At least it sounds that way. And who is this? Can you say again? who it is that is so deranged by this? And like, Why? Why can't they deal with it? What is Yeah, like, what's their problem?

George Hoare: 47:49

What's their what's their major malfunction? Well, I mean, I would, I would say that it's it's essentially the kind of liberal comment area. And I think the, you know, you can think of your favorite or least favorite journalists in the American context. But basically, anybody who writes for The Guardian would would be pretty good, pretty, pretty susceptible to this to this particular syndrome. And what explains it? Well, I think, you know, I think in the book, we talk about this, you know, this culture at the end of history, this has something to say you have this kind of retro mania. So this kind of constant repetition of the recent past, you have no real change. You know, we talked about some of the aspects of politics. And so essentially, I would say there are two things go towards explaining it. One is like they just didn't see it coming. They didn't predict it. They didn't, it didn't fit their mental models. So you explain this either through, you know, Russian interference, or just people being racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic, you name it, as Edward Vinson, put it? And the second thing is that it does, you know, it does, they do perceive that it threatens their their position, if they perceive correctly, that it represents some aspect of a, of a breakdown of this consensus, which they have been, you know, have been very well rewarded in articulating and defending. So what

Clif Mark: 49:12

was what was the consensus if you could briefly characterize it?

George Hoare: 49:15

Yeah. So I think it's just that essentially that, that third way, sort of consensus that you don't want, you know, nothing to like, like with food, nothing too strongly flavored, you need it in the, you know, in the middle, you need to kind of, let's kind of all all agree on the basic precepts. And then we can just get the person who's the best manager who has the best kind of haircut and tie combo, and they and they can, you know, we all agree what we need to do, and they can, you know, they can, they can do that and anything too extreme, is not is not really politics, it's not really sensible. And so this kind of that the ideas of decorum, maybe even or sensible ness that had been dominant in the end of history, if you will, respond. So if you reject those, as you know, people have done and did in 2016, then you that's where you see that nostalgia for the recent past when those things again pertained. And when they had that cultural influence along with the kind of catastrophism like you've broken these rules, like we're gonna have food shortages, or Trump's gonna going to start the Fourth Reich or whatever it is. So I think there's, you know, there is a kind of logic within that, that group who are politically culturally very significant that is really strongly threatened by this by this inflection point between the end and the end of the end of history.

Clif Mark: 50:36

Right. these are these are the same people who believe that there was actually a coup happening when when those protesters stormed the Capitol.

George Hoare: 50:43

Yeah, all of the the most kind of, like the worst liberal fantasies and our fantasies, but they kind of do want that to happen. You might say, well, we can we need another episode on the liberal side,

Clif Mark: 50:54

it would give it would give them a purpose, you know? Well, okay. So it's mostly these liberal elites and media figures, commentators who are finding it difficult to deal with the new end of End of History order. How has the right dealt with it? Have they done any better? Or are what are we just like, more worried about the left? Because we feel like we're on the left?

Philip Cunliffe: 51:23

Yeah, it's a good question. And so I suppose it depends where you're where you're looking from. So it's interesting that the, in the UK, at least, the Tory party has benefited from it in as much as I mean, mainly through the logic of, you know, electoral opportunism, and an instinct for power that they realize that they've needed to, they've been able to appeal to some of the sentiment that is broken through around Brexit and sense as well as tapping into popular disenchantment with the way politics had been hitherto conducted. And the sense of trying to seek national renewal at some level to be benefited. I mean, Trump obviously benefited both in 2016. And also the fact you know, that he had such an XC extra grew his vote share by a significant margin, I'm including among ethnic among minority voters in the US elsewhere. You know, it's not so clear. So the, you know, in if you think of Germany, for instance, the Chancellor Angela Merkel, is coming towards the end of her interminable reign. And there seems to be no, you know, capacity for the German right to really consolidate in her awake. So they've I think they've, you know, the right wing, politics has also struggled, and in particular, populist right wing politics, and this indicates the limitations of populism. And in particular, I mean, Trump is another good example of this, the sheer kind of incompetence in power, the lack of any kind of developed carder, who know how to manipulate the political leaders of the political process, who actually had kind of detailed policy proposals, who know how to concretize and flesh out particular political visions, and also are available simply to kind of man the state and to oversee various kinds of institutions within the state. And so, I think I mean, it's not, despite the that the left has suffered the most from the end of the end of history, the right has not been able to steer it either. And the fact that the right has not been able to really meaningfully stamp its mark, on the end of the End of History is why we characterize it in such terms, that there isn't there is no positive order, which has replaced the previous one, which has replaced the End of History order, the post Cold War order. And so all we can really talk about is the end of the old one, rather than the beginning of something which is meaningfully new. Right. So

Clif Mark: 53:53

the I mean, that incapacity to govern is not like, specifically a conservative problem, right? It sounds like it's more an anti politics problem. If you if you run on the idea that government is bad, and we hate government, and I'm an outsider, and you are an outsider, then you turn up, you're not going to, you're not going to get anything done.

George Hoare: 54:12

When we talked about political authority a bit earlier. And I think that that rejection of political authority is one of the you know, one of the limitations of, you know, contemporary populist projects. I think the just to kind of go We'll just make some points and they might might not be necessary around this this like who's benefited more the left or the right almost, but I think we'd we would definitely reject this idea that this is a period of the rise of the far right or of fascism I think the I think that is a that is coming unfortunate kind of blackmail that you might see on the part of some some

Clif Mark: 54:49

humming You mean you see it all the time. Yeah, yeah. From business it's Yeah,

George Hoare: 54:53

yeah. I mean it and it basically is like it's a bit like environmentalism is like if you do want this to extremist Do you want this? You know, do you want the world to end? If not do what do what I say, you know, do you want do you want fascist? If not, you have to do this. And I think that the, what has really been exposed or has become clearer and clearer in this kind of end of End of History period is how the left has, like, you might or might not think the terms left and right are useful. But the, like, one kind of characterization was that the left was was kind of a collection of movements trying to put trying to promote popular sovereignty. And that clearly isn't the case anymore. I mean, if you look at the look of Brexit, for example, the turning of the left against, you know, the British left against them against the people was was quite, quite striking, and obviously putting in quite crude summarize way, but that that like that historical kind of association of the left, or the concept with the concept of popular sovereignty is, is has been, you know, I don't think is really tenable at this point in time. So I think that, that, that kind of being exposed in that way, has led to an opportunity which has been seized by the center right, to a greater or lesser extent. But yeah, as Phil said, they don't have they don't have a project with, you know, with with mass support and political authority and state capacity that can that can transform that period at the end of the end of history and something and a positive rather than double negative. So we're left in this in this current situation where you see that both both sides with with very severe contradictions.

Clif Mark: 56:31

Did you want to jump in on that Phil about the question of say, what is next there is this sort of unstable period? No one has a real project. How do you see things reorienting themselves? Because I think like it's clear that they are, but do you see a resurgent left a some kind of right that will get itself together? or neither? Just this kind of confused, shapeless, fumbling through until I don't know, environmental catastrophe or whatever?

Philip Cunliffe: 57:02

Yeah, I think it would be confused, shapeless fumbling through is is most likely the most likely call. Yeah, it's I think it is the most likely call. I mean, I think the the left is going to suffer more, because it's the way in which it's unable to build on the basis of popular sovereignty, the idea of the you know, just the basic idea of the people being capable of self government and self rule and of mass democracy, being the natural kind of home and terrain of the left the fact that it has shown itself repeatedly unable to base its politics, when it's come to the when it's come under challenge to base its politics, in in those domains means that it will inevitably suffering in an age of growing popular frustration, anger, disillusionment and populist insurrection. So I think, you know, I mean, there might be kind of left wing populist breakthroughs, but I don't think that the left will measurably gain. But the ride will, I think, also very, this will also struggle to make headway and that was evident, I think, in the kind of the farcical the farcical Riot outside the Capitol. So they've adopted all the kind of the carnival as scam accoutrements of left wing protest. And unlike the left, which is, you know, kind of spent all the time toppling statues and cultural monuments,

Clif Mark: 58:23

they do look like they're having fun,

Philip Cunliffe: 58:25

while they look like they're having fun, but also they, you know, they, they attacked, political kind of pulled the halls of power, and the symbols of political institutions, but then didn't know what to do when they broke into the chamber. And, you know, they kind of sat in Nancy Pelosi is office and chair and in the speaker's, the speaker's chair, and they're, you know, in behind the podium and all that and there was it was all kind of bizarrely, anticlimactic and empty and vacuous. There was no, you know, there's no program there. That's also evident in the UK, very evident with the completely shambolic way in which the government has managed the COVID crisis with a very, you know, with the dire kind of death toll. The only thing which has been successful is the vaccine program in Britain, but otherwise, it's been completely shambolic. And that speaks to the general malaise and ineffectiveness. Great.

George Hoare: 59:21

Yeah, I think if you wanted to just just quickly if you wanted to characterize it in really broad brush terms, like what what will the structure of the conflict in the next kind of decade maybe be? I think you see, on the center, right, perhaps you have this this state capitalism, or this essentially high, high investment, high expenditure turning towards the state for to solve problems is good. Some people call it Neo statism. And I think, you know, that that reflects something something true that that the least outer ideological layers of neoliberalism are quite easily discarded. And but I think the real question Boom with that is that the COVID crisis has shown that states do not have the capacity to not have the apparatuses to solve citizens problems very effectively. So that's a project which has very real limitations. And if that's what the you know, say the right or center is going to do, what's the left's response? I mean, personally, I think it seems to me quite likely that you'll have this kind of moral minoritarian ism or or this kind of turning towards the turning away from a majority Aryan political project to moral ways of justifying certain courses of action. We talked about fascism, blackmail, environmental blackmail, look at kind of these, these these ideas, that, that there's a there's a correct way to do things, and we don't necessarily need popular support for doing this. You can see this maybe in the green New Deal. You know, then if listeners are fans have any of any of these things, and you know, if so, you know, maybe apologies, but I think this this sort of seems what's coming down the line that you have a, you know, a defeat of left populism in electoral terms. So a kind of rethinking how can we do this without a kind of majority or a national project is this municipalism? Is this kind of turning towards cities is a turning back towards supranational organisations defending the EU or extending that or whatever? So I think, you know, you've got two, two projects at the moment with very real limitations. And and no, you know, and they, probably the former is, it seems, at this point to be more likely to be to be dominant, but it's, you know, it's not, it's not a very secure Foundation, because we've seen how the state is not across the world is very, has been extremely bad in many cases in its Coronavirus response, particularly in, you know, Western Europe and America.

Clif Mark: 1:01:53

I mean, that just might be the excuse, they needed to start building the state capacity. But so on the one side we have, we have a left that is. So before, in the end of history, we had a third way left that was just managers in elites, and they didn't want to have anything to do with the people, although they just want them to vote, then. Now we they there was a left populism. And so I guess you're thinking like Bernie Sanders, Jeremy Corbyn. And that was okay, we're gonna do a left movement, social democracy, get people involved. But that didn't work out. So now you think there's going to be a retreat back to like, whoa, hold on, forget the populism. We are going to defend neoliberalism against the right, which wants to have a more interventionist state, which seems just like a reversal, and in a weird arrangement,

Philip Cunliffe: 1:02:45

I think, I don't think I don't think they'll defend neoliberalism in economic terms. I think it'll be defended in political terms. So in the end, that I think is evident in identity politics. So identity politics, I think, is the political expression of neoliberalism in the sense that it's, you know, kind of fragmented identities essentially built around consumption. And that is sad, the logic of kind of market competition, and that always require the state intervention in various ways to oversee it. So I think they will be they will remain attached to the political forms of neoliberalism. But they will shift I think, to more kind of coercive views of how to deal say, with climate change. So you know, Ram through kind of declines in standard of living, enhanced taxes of various kinds, restrict for, you know, various aspects of consumption and transportation, I think that will be the area of retreat, given the fact that they've recoiled away from popular democracy. So a weakened left that wants to defend political Neo liberalism through identity politics, and just get less democratic when they're reading through reductions in standards of living to help the environment

Clif Mark: 1:04:03

that, I think is a good place to leave it. So I would like to thank you guys for coming on. And is there anything else you want to add? At the end of our episode, on the end of the end of history?

Philip Cunliffe: 1:04:16

word say thanks Clif, for having us on. It's, it's been it's been great. And, and I think you've in some ways, you've even done a better job in characterizing similar the some of the contrasts between the end of history and the end of the end of the end of history, then we did ourselves so thank you.

George Hoare: 1:04:36

Yeah, just just a second that No, thanks so much for a great set of questions and some challenging ones in there as well. So, you know, making making us think, which is always good.

Clif Mark: 1:04:47

Very, very welcome. It was a really My pleasure. Thanks, guys. Special thanks today go out, of course to George and Phil the Bongo boys, as well as Christine hasty who reached out and decided to support the show on Patreon. Thank you, Christine. We really appreciate your help. And if you would like to support us as well, head over to patreon.com slash good in theory, and we'd appreciate any help you could send our way. Thanks for listening. keep spreading the word. I'll catch you next time.