Papering Judges After J.O.: Update your 170.6 software

Does your office have a blank 170.6 form ready to go for a certain judge? Stop doing that. A 170.6 peremptory challenge is no longer automatic: the California Supreme Court now authorizes courts to look behind your 170.6. The touchstone is whether your 170.6 is based on a genuine belief of prejudice—or mere grievance.

But first, a $3 million sanctions order against Quinn Emanuel in a big‑pharma advertising case, where an expert obtained key clinical data before it was disclosed and the firm failed to correct the record. The Northern District of California called out firm culture, and ordering the attorneys to prepare and lead an eight‑hour ethics MCLE.

• How a three‑million‑dollar sanctions order against Quinn Emanuel grew out of failures to correct prior statements about expert discovery.
• The court’s criticism of a “culture of bad ethics decisions” and the requirement for a bespoke eight‑hour ethics course.
• The facts in J.O. v. Superior Court, including 325 peremptory challenges aimed at removing a single judge from conservatorship matters.
• The new three‑step framework for challenging bad‑faith, blanket 170.6 practices and what counts as a prima facie showing.
• Strategic implications for lawyers who rely on peremptory challenges in small counties and specialized calendars.

What is your firm’s 170.6 practice like? Expect any changes after J.O.?

Transcript

Introduction to Legal News and Perspectives

Jeff Lewis 0:05

There's no disincentive for those people not to send just a million public records act requests, so give your local city council a break.

Announcer 0:15

Welcome to the California Appellate Podcast, a discussion of timely trial tips and the latest cases and news coming from the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. And now your hosts, Tim Kowal and Jeff Lewis.

Jeff Lewis 0:30

Welcome everyone. I am Jeff Lewis.

Tim Kowal 0:32

And I'm Tim kowal. Both Jeff and I are certified appellate specialists, and as uncertified podcast hosts, we try to bring our audience of trial and appellate attorneys some legal news and perspectives they can use in their practice. If you find this podcast helpful, please recommend it to a colleague.

Jeff Lewis 0:46

And please give us a pause the rating on Apple Podcasts wherever you listen to us.

Tim Kowal 0:49

Well, Jeff, it's been a while since we had some cases and tidbits, and we have a couple today to report. One on a giant sanction, a $3 million sanction against Quinn Emanuel. And very interesting case out of the California Supreme Court limiting what used to be an absolute right or seemingly absolute right to file peremptory challenges against judicial officers under 170.6. We'll talk about the JO versus Superior Court case. But Jeff, let's tackle this Quinn Emanuel $3 million sanction award first. You've got that one.

Jeff Lewis 1:20

Yeah, and this I read about this in Above the Law and it has a link to the order. We'll put in our show notes a link to the order. But this uh sanctions order is super unusual for the following reasons. One, it doesn't involve AI. This is not an AI uh case. And second, yeah, the amount is three million dollars, huge amount. I guess maybe for a big firm that's not big, but it makes my eyes pop. And then third, in addition to money, the federal judge here who imposed these sanctions ordered the law firm to

Quinn Emanuel's $3 Million Sanction Case

Jeff Lewis 1:47

design an MCLE course about the ethical issues raised by the sanctions order. And then uh to have the the lawyer, the litigation team involved in this in this issue take that course that they designed. So you don't see that every day.

Tim Kowal 2:01

Yeah, an eight-hour legal ethics course.

Jeff Lewis 2:03

Yeah.

Tim Kowal 2:04

It's not just a one-hour lunch and learn program. This is a full-day program.

Jeff Lewis 2:08

Fun fact you know, when you design an MCLE presentation, you get credit, like extra credit for the designing part as opposed to attending it. So I imagine these lawyers would probably fulfill their MCLE requirement for the year by performing. Exactly. Gotta always see the upside, lemonade out of lemons.

Tim Kowal 2:23

Yeah. So what what was the abuse here that uh that triggered this $3 million? And it was $3 million in attorney's fees payable to the other side. And then on top of that, an additional punitive fine of $100,000. I assume that was pay payable to the court itself.

Jeff Lewis 2:40

Yeah, and most of that was imposed on the law firm, although some of the lawyers that the court deemed most culpable had a portion liability for uh for that.

Tim Kowal 2:49

Yeah, it looks like two of them got hit with $58,000 each, and a third, an associate. The partners got hit with $58,000, and then an associate got hit with $28,000 in sanctions, individual sanctions.

Jeff Lewis 3:02

Yeah. So look, this was a big pharma advertising case. Uh expert witness testimony was paramount in this case. There's a battle of the experts, it looks like. And the Quinn Emanuel lawyers had an expert who got early access to some game-changing clinical data from a study that would have changed the outcome of expert reports in the case. And there were several junctures where it became important to know when Quinn's expert got this data and when Quinn disclosed it to the court. And essentially, there were several junctures where the Quinn firm made the decision internally. Yeah, even though we know now that we got this much earlier than we're that our expert got this much earlier than we thought, we are not going to um correct the record and tell the court that what we previously said in court or represented about the timing of when our expert got this game-changing data, that prior representation was not true. And so the sanctions order lays out the timing of this and it raises the issue about not just the duty of Candor, which I think we all know about, but updating past statements to the judge when there's material game-changing information that would have changed the outcome of the uh case. So yeah, big order.

Tim Kowal 4:14

That is something that uh I think often goes overlooked is the is that the duty to inform uh what opposing counsel and the court of material past statements that prove to be untrue. So what is the duty? Is it the same is it the same duty just as soon as you learn it, you're supposed to disclose it? Are there any uh the uh guidelines offered in this order about how the what the attorneys should have done? I guess that's going to be covered in the eight-hour ethics course.

Jeff Lewis 4:40

Yeah, maybe Queen Emmanuel and make that public. I will say one other interesting thing. I don't know who opposing counsel was in this case, who Quinn's opponent was, but uh the opposing counsel is like a dog with a bone, would not let this issue go when they had a suspicion that some data had been obtained by this expert earlier than than they thought, and they sent a subpoena to a third party who might have had correspondence relating to this data, and they found this letter that implicated that the expert had obtained the data much earlier. And uh kind of a sideshow issue that this lawyer pursued that became the main show, and uh good for him for not letting this issue go, him or her.

Tim Kowal 5:15

Yeah. Yeah. I mean it's uh kind of of a piece with with our discussion that we had last week with Morgan Peets about pulling the string. The opposing counsel did not let go and kept pushing on this issue, suspecting that there was something missing here. There's something that had gone on, and through that determination, uh got to the bottom of it.

Jeff Lewis 5:33

Yeah, and and I guess the last thing I'll add to the order was the judge didn't really come down so much on this conduct or these omissions, so much as what the judge described as a culture bad ethics decisions. And uh that was not limited to just one lawyer, and that's what the judge seemed most concerned about, and I think that drove the uh the uh sanctions.

Tim Kowal 5:54

Yeah, and that's uh that's got a sting to a law firm to have this appear in a court order that there is uh not only just a couple of bad actors, this is not only limited to this case, but there is a bad culture in the firm. That's that's hard to shake. And uh even just an eight-hour ethics exam internally or ethics course internally is not necessarily it is certainly not going to uh shed the stigma being called having a bad culture of ethics in a federal court opinion.

Jeff Lewis 6:20

Let's talk about peremptory challenges, Tim.

Tim Kowal 6:22

All right, this c uh the case is JO versus Superior Court of San Joaquin County. The decision makes a significant shift in California's approach to blanket judicial disqualification challenges under Section 170.6. The Supreme Court stops short of holding that 170.6 is unconstitutional, but it does cabinet. So we'll we'll cover what happened here and what the new rule is going forward. So uh the court partially overruled uh a

Changes in Peremptory Challenges in California

Tim Kowal 6:51

long-standing uh 1977 decision from Solberg. And uh the court holds that while 170.6 remains facially constitutional, blanket challenges or blanket abuses of the statute can now be challenged on separation of powers grounds. So when a party timely objects and makes a prima facie showing uh that the objector, that the 170.6 motion constitutes bad faith, then the court may now look beyond the 170.6 affidavit or the oral statement and inquire into the legitimacy of the assertion of prejudice in that affidavit supporting the 170.6. And uh if the if the circumstances rise to an inference of bad faith, the court may reject the improperly motivated disqualification motion. So this case arose from a conservatorship case. J.O. is the conservatee, the person who is under the conservatorship. Uh so J.O. is someone that the county had had found to be gravely disabled, and he was represented by the public defender. J.O., as I said, is a petitioner. He's the one who objected to the blanket challenges. And the challenges were to a judge Aaron Guy Castillo. The San Joaquin County Public Conservator is the conservator. And what happened is two years ago in May 2024, Judge Guy Castillo had admonished uh one of the deputy county counsel for improper conduct. And shortly thereafter, county council uh began filing 170.6 challenges against uh Judge Guy Castillo across all her conservatorship cases. Now, this is a fairly small county, Jeff. So there is probably only one or or maybe two uh judges on this conservatorship panel. So in the

Jeff Lewis 8:36

Yeah, 300 peremptory challenges filed in a in a in a couple month period, that's a huge impact on a little county.

Tim Kowal 8:43

Yeah. So these were uh these established a blanket practice aimed at forcing her off the bench because they are being held accountable for their actions. That was JO's challenge. And so as you as you said, this is a short period over less than four months. Uh the county council's office filed an estimated 325 challenges against Judge Guy Castillo, uh, such that she was reassigned out of the conservatorship mental health department into misdemeanors, traffic, small claims, unlawful detainers, restraining orders, and expungements. Judge Eagle took over her calendar and in September 2024 denied JO's opposition, citing Solberg, to the effect that 170.6 is quasi-absolute, there's no challenge to it, as long as it's timely filed. The Court of Appeals summarily denied a writ, and the Supreme Court granted review and has now remanded. So if anyone's just gotten one of those postcard uh writ denials and you're on the ropes and you're wondering if there's ever any hope in filing a petition for review, well, here's the exception that proves the rule that they they do get taken up sometimes. And just by way of background, here's the the evolution of the 170.6 statute, the peremptory challenge statute. Almost 100 years ago, the the operative statute was 170.5, which the Supreme Court struck down in Austin versus Lambert. It was struck down as an unconstitutional, concealed weapon against the judicial branch. So it was just it was it was too absolute. It didn't even require the affidavit showing a subjective belief of prejudice. In 1958, in Johnson versus Superior Court, the court upheld the new 170.6 statute against facial constitutional challenge, noting that its safeguards prevented it from being struck down as unconstitutional. Those safeguards were the affidavit requiring statement of grounds. There was one challenge per side, and there were tightly constrained time limits. And then in 1977, 170.6 was challenged again, and it was upheld in Solberg versus Superior Court. Uh, it reaffirmed, quote, strong disapproval of blanket challenges. But the court said that they were merely a, quote, relatively inconsequential price for Section 170.6 efficiency and did not substantially impair judicial functions under then existing conditions. The majority noted that blanket challengers could force judges from assignments, but found that did not violate separation of powers yet. But now that's changed over now almost 50 years later in JO versus Superior Court. And the court has noted that there has been much change to the operation of the Superior Court since the 1977 Solberg case, noting that there's a sharp increase in caseloads and case complexity. They're sweeping new laws that require specialized judicial expertise, rise of specialty courts and proceedings, and dedicated judge assignments to specialized calendars. And the implication of all that is that in this new 21st century environment of the California Superior Courts, blanket challenges are much more pernicious than they were in 1977 when they were upheld, despite being strongly disapproved, but being held not to substantially impair judicial operations. Now, in 2026, they do substantially impair judicial operations because they force judges from specialized assignments. They effectively control which judges hear certain types of cases, they create pressures on judges to rule favorably to avoid removal, and they undermine public confidence in judicial impartiality. The court also noted that after 1977, there have been some other states where blanket judicial challenges have been struck down, such as in Minnesota, Arizona, and Illinois. They have all prohibited blanket abuses of similar judicial disqualification statutes as threats to judicial independence. So, Jeff, the the new procedure, which uh trial counsel will want to note carefully for when they because everyone has got at least one judge that they that they carry around to 170.6 for. Some judges just you just have your suspicions about. They either, I don't know what it is, they they just don't like me, or I don't know, we'd whatever it is, you just don't want to take your chances with that judge. And one of the things in reading the statute again, as I read this case, it does the the court takes issue with litigants filing just uh because they think that a judge takes a certain view on the law, or is uh of a certain ideology or uh has a certain doctrinal position on the law or came from a certain background, they were a plaintiff's lawyer, or they were a uh a defense lawyer or an employer's lawyer. Those are not supposed to be necessarily grounds for disqualification, but where is the line? And and here we get to how the statute is going to work now. So the new procedure

The New Rules for Judicial Disqualification

Tim Kowal 13:34

is step one, after you make your timely objection, the opponent of the 170.6 must do two things together. They have to timely object and demonstrate a prima facie case that the proponent, the one who filed the 170.6, is lodging a bad faith challenge. Normally it's going to be a blanket challenge. It's going to be part of a pattern of successive challenges against a particular judge. And the objection is necessary, but it's not sufficient because if the objector makes no prima facie showing, then the 170.6 must be granted without further inquiry. So there is still kind of a quasi-absolute right to make the challenge because there has to be an objection that is both timely and includes a prima facie showing that this is some kind of successive or otherwise bad faith challenge to this judicial officer.

Jeff Lewis 14:24

Yeah, well, uh, the doubles on the details in terms of how the courts are going to apply this in terms of the what is a blanket objection and what is a case-specific basis or particularized basis for using a peremptory in any case. Back in the day in Orange County, there was that snitch scandal, the jailhouse snitch scandal, where just uh then Judge Gothels made some rulings that the DA's office didn't like, and they issued a bunch of peremptory challenges to every case he was handling. And shortly thereafter, I think he got elevated to the appellate court. But that kind of situation was clearly a blanket assertion. And the one in this case with the county counsel doing like 300 assertions in a two or three month period, that's a blanket use of the process. But what I wonder is what if you have a s a less clearer case? Like, let's say the consumer attorneys of the Association of Los Angeles think one particular judge is too pro-defendant and not pro-plaintiff enough. And they decide that, yeah, we're just going to paper that judge in all our cases. That is not a party to the case, but it is a group of people. I mean, it's not the same party every time papering a judge, but it's a group of people trying to influence how the Superior Court staffs its departments. And I wonder if this new decision has opened the door a little bit to something less than blanket uses of uh peremptory challenges can be challenged on on an individual basis.

Tim Kowal 15:46

Yeah, these are these are good questions. Some of this might be uh might be encompassed in the step two move here, that after the objector makes the time of prima facie challenge to the 170.6 as being not based in true good faith, then a hearing will be will be held as soon as possible before a judge other than the judge named in the motion. And at that point, the burden shifts to the proponent, the one who filed the 170.6 affidavit. And that burden is to give a genuine case-specific basis for believing that the challenged judge is personally prejudiced against this party in this case. Now, I'm a little dubious about this, or I'm a little confused about uh about this because you've got to file this 170.6 early in the case when the judge is first assigned for all purposes. And how are you supposed to have a case-specific basis when you're just days into the case? You would have to have some kind of background about the uh about the judge that is specific to the facts of this case uh rather than just based on your past bad experiences with this judge in your other cases. Is that not a is that no longer a grounds for a good faith 170.6 challenge? I'm a little confused by that. Right. But you have to make that uh genuine case-specific basis of personal prejudice against the party or the attorney in this case. And that's the moment that the court may now look behind the section 170.6 affidavit. The proponent need not prove actual prejudice. It's just a good faith belief or good faith basis for prejudice. But the proponent still must offer a clear and reasonably specific explanation of legitimate reasons. And the inquiry is whether those reasons are subjectively genuine. So again, it's not an objective standard. It just has to be subjective good faith basis. But still you have to make some kind of noises about specif things specific to this case and not just generalize, well, I've gotten a bum deal every time I've appeared in front of this judge in the past, so I'm not taking my chances again. That presumably would not cut it under this new standard. Do you think, Jeff?

Jeff Lewis 17:50

No. And by the way, how many lawyers would be willing to put it out there after a per there's pushback on a peremptory to put something out there in terms of justifying why you did it, knowing that there's a good chance you're gonna be stuck with this judge who has just read what you put in that peremptory. Boy, I'm not excited about that process.

Tim Kowal 18:09

Yeah, yeah. There is a huge there are gonna be a huge chilling effect now. Now, presumably, because the the pattern out of which this uh this uh new rule arises, the facts out of which it arises, is is a huge pattern, a huge, almost inarguable pattern. 325 peremptory challenges within four months by a single office. These are...

Jeff Lewis 18:29

And every every case this judge was assigned to by county council, but what if it's let's say just the conservatorship cases or just the real estate cases? Is that a blanket use of peremptories? I don't know.

Tim Kowal 18:40

Yeah, that's right. If you are a probate specialist firm and uh you're doing all your work in the probate department or a family law firm doing all your work in the family department and you're and your whole firm is making challenges as to a certain family law judge or a certain probate judge, this pattern type of analysis can apply to you. You don't have to be a government office, it can just be any uh any firm. Even individuals can, I guess, fall fall under this rule of of a blanket objection. But certainly if you are in a firm and you come back and report back to all the other attorneys at your firm, we need to always ding Judge Smith because you won't believe what Judge Smith just did in one of our cases. We can never trust Judge Smith again. So always have your punch card ready if you ever get Judge Smith assigned to your case. Beware that you can you can get objected to if you start establishing a pattern that you're always just reflexively dinging Judge Smith. And then step three, the inquiry judge determines the genuineness of the challenge. If there's bad faith found, then the then 170.6 is denied and the case stays with the challenge judge. So as you pointed out, Jeff, uh that is the the worst of all scenarios where you have a judge you already thought didn't like you, and now uh you can just uh remove all doubt. And and then if there's good faith found, then the motion will be granted as as per usual before the JO case, and then it's resigned. The case is reassigned to a new judge. The ultimate burden of persuasion rests on the objector, the same allocation as Batson. So the objector both triggers the objection process with the prima facie and ultimately must persuade the judge, a different judge than you're challenging, of the bad faith of the challenge. The proponent's job in the middle is only uh to come forward with some genuine explanation. So it's uh conceivably a minimal burden. I don't know. Do you have any predictions, Jeff, uh what the what the showing is going to be by the county council's office in this case? Because it is sent back down, uh, not to just reject the 170.6, but to conduct this this inquiry. It found that there's a timely objection, a prima facie showing because uh because of the pattern. Now it's on to the county council to make a genuine showing of subjective good faith.

Jeff Lewis 20:52

Yeah. And the court, by the way, said it's not moved because you can always basically unwind it uh in terms of the rejection of the initial peremptory. So this is still a live controversy in terms of this particular conservatorship case. I don't have any predictions on this particular case, but I predict rampant abuse by uh people looking to uh keep a judge they like, and in the face of a timely peremptory raising uh some sort of suggestion that the judge in this particular case should raise this blanket peremptory issue. That's my prediction.

Tim Kowal 21:22

I would be very interested to know more of the backstory about why Judge uh Guy Castillo here was dinged 325 times based on the only thing that the opinion reveals to my reading is that he had admonished one of the jud one of the attorneys at County Council's office originally for some for some of the litigation practices. But it that couldn't have been the only thing that set off

Implications of the JO vs. Superior Court Case

Tim Kowal 21:47

the entire county council's office to uh to go on this 325 peremptory challenge blanket tirade. So I'd be I'd be curious to what the background is there, because it and it certainly had the effect in a small court. court of removing probably the only judge that they would deal with in that department. And I I wonder just if things how will things go the other way now? Because in these in small counties where there is only one judge on on your particular panel, there are some very small counties right where I think there's only one judge in the whole court. And if you ding that judge, then you get what happens? You get uh moved over to another county. But what happens now that things are might tilt back the other way and litigants are faced with a single judge who maybe they do have a disposition against your general point of view. Maybe you're a you're a a plaintiff's attorney and and the single judge was a defense attorney before they were elevated to the bench and now you have to face that judge every single time unless you can marshal a a case specific grounds for the challenge in your case. That can be tough for for small town attorneys.

Jeff Lewis 22:52

Yeah, absolutely. No question about it.

Tim Kowal 22:54

See we can follow up on this case a little bit. There there have been some law review articles cited in the in the decision that I didn't put my uh my arms around yet, but I thought it was interesting that the point there have been some there's been a lot of study about abuse or alleged abuse of these categorical peremptory challenges. And as we mentioned in some of the some of these other states they've already found that they do violate separation of powers.

Jeff Lewis 23:17

Now that you've thoroughly researched and resolved and subbed your reporters, the court reporters crisis and the history of that legislation, it's a new project for you to research

Tim Kowal 23:26

I also thought Jeff just what one uh one other thing that I I haven't resolved in my mind but when whenever the court mentions starts talking about separation of powers, now it makes me uh think about this issue that we uh started talking about some months ago about how in California there is no judicial standing doctrine. It's just purely a creature of statute. Whereas in federal court it is a judicial threshold doctrine. And it got me thinking that if the California court system does not recognize that its judicial power has any threshold doctrine, that it doesn't have the judicial power in California doctrine doesn't does not include who gets access to the courts, does not look into standing beyond just what the legislature has said. Why doesn't the the California judicial power doctrine also yield to whatever the legislature says about judicial management or judicial housekeeping because in this JO case the California Supreme Court is being very bullish on no the the the judicial power absolutely includes the ability to to do housekeeping and and who is assigned to what departments and when and we are not going to let the legislature dictate to us in absolute terms what which one of our officers can be removed from a from a certain case. I just found that a just a little bit of incongruity there that the the California concept of judicial power seeds the threshold question about who gets access via the standing doctrine. That becomes a legislative determination but judicial housekeeping and staffing is very jealously guarded under our California judicial power doctrine. So again I have no upshot of that it was just an observation. All right well just by way of bringing me down from that uh soapbox one uh one unpublished case just for hygiene because we used to enjoy covering so many unpublished cases Jeff Voice of San Diego versus San Diego Unified School District this is a public records act request case where the Voice of San Diego had made numerous public record act requests to the San Diego School District over a certain span of time and it was its grievance was that the district was not timely responding to its Public Records Act requests. And it averaged over a five year period when it had submitted a a large number of requests the average time that the district took to respond was 399 days where the what is it the statute requires something like that they must be made promptly available, I think unless there are unusual circumstances. But what possible unusual circumstances could justify an average of 399 days over this five year period. But the court rejects the challenge the trial court rejected the challenge and so did the Court of appeal. And I was just curious to to read on to figure out why because that seemed to me pretty uh pretty grating. 399 days is uh pretty outlandish but it looks like maybe the uh the voice had cherry picked some of the data to get up to that 399 day average there were 31 of the district's 75 requests and rolling productions it only counted the last production date while ignoring the first tranche of requests and the court gave two devastating examples first a request that uh the voice billed as over 1900 days was actually 78 days from the party's agreement on search terms and then another 1,267 day request was in reality completed in 24 days, with the long tail coming from a date three and a half years later when the district voluntarily turned over 26 pages an employee found in an unoccupied desk drawer. So some of these numbers were were stretched maybe beyond credulity.

Jeff Lewis 27:09

And let me let me let me take the county or city's side here for a second. The Federal Public Records act law when you submit a request and it requires federal agents to scurry around looking for documents you have to pay the federal government for their time to do that. The state law is different all you have to pay for is basically the cost of reproduction copies or CD ROM but not the time it takes to have people run around. And because of that these local agencies cities, counties, school boards are buried in public records act requests looking for minutiae. And I have seen over time the length of time these jurisdictions take to respond has increased. They give themselves unlimited extensions which they can by statute because they're just buried and there's no disincentive to members of the public those people who come and speak for the three minutes at city council meetings on any topic they want there's no disincentive for those people not to send just a million public records act requests. So give your local city council a break Tim

Tim Kowal 28:09

The other the the the court also noted that under the Public Record Act statute, section 7922.530, it says the records must be promptly available, but there is no real definition of what promptly available means. And the court reasoned that the legislature knows how to write a deadline if it wanted to but it chose not to do so here. So we're just left to the substantial evidence standard of review on factual questions and abuse of discretion. So I think if the if the voice were was was using this as a case to try to find an outer limit, someplace where the Court of appeal could step in as a matter of law and say, well it's generally a matter of discretion and up to the circumstances, but over a year is just far too long. Maybe this just wasn't the right record on which to do that. I think maybe in a certain case, in in the appropriate case, if these numbers perhaps did bear out that the average truly was over a year long, I think maybe we could find some common ground that yeah enough is enough. It's probably an abuse of discretion to find that this was not that this was still a prompt delivery of those documents. But this was not the record for that.

Jeff Lewis 29:20

No if you want to find a case to challenge a local jurisdiction on that it's not the averages that matter you find one case where you send a a public records act request asking for one page of one document that you know it exists and you wait for the the county to take six months, nine months a year to respond to that. That's the case you take to court on a challenge, not relying on lies, damn lies and statistics.

Tim Kowal 29:40

Yeah

Public Records Act Case Review

Tim Kowal 29:41

this was uh I think there was a little bit of a a creative strategy here. It was under a uh it was under a taxpayer an illegal expenditure of public funds theory and uh and the voice was seeking to enjoin the district's illegal expenditure of public funds to maintain an allegedly unlawful public records practice. But again the court did not find an an unlawful public records act practice or a or a policy of of withholding it. But that's that's why I think they were not taking your advice Jeff and just finding one single improper denial or refusal to promptly turn over the documents. They were going for a whole practice so they can get a a big preliminary injunction or permanent injunction. Okay well that's all I got Jeff

Jeff Lewis 30:24

I think that wraps it up.

Tim Kowal 30:25

All right if you have suggestions for future episodes please email us at info@calpodcast.com in upcoming episodes look for tips on how to lay the groundwork for an appeal when preparing for trial

Jeff Lewis 30:36

see you next time

Announcer 30:59

You have just listened to the California Appellate Podcast a discussion of timely trial tips and the latest cases and news coming from the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. For more information about the cases discussed in today's episode, our hosts and other episodes visit the California Appellate Law Podcast website at calpodcast. com. That's C A L Podcast dot com Thanks to Jonathan Caro for our intro music. Thank you for listening and please join us again