Israel Policy Pod
A weekly podcast that goes beyond the headlines to bring you analysis from Israel Policy Forum experts and distinguished guests.
Israel Policy Pod
Qatar, Gaza, New York
On this week’s episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts Chief Policy Officer Michael Koplow and Distinguished RAND Israel Policy Chair Shira Efron. The trio discuss last week's Israeli strike on the Hamas headquarters in Doha, whether Donald Trump knew of the attack ahead of time, the start of the Israeli offensive into Gaza City, the fate of the Israeli hostages, next week's meetings at the U.N. on Palestinian statehood, reasons for optimism heading into a new Jewish year, and more.
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Israel Policy Forum nearly upon us, so I thought it'd be a perfect moment to do a big overview and catch up with our regulars, israel Policy Forum's very own Chief Policy Officer, michael Koplow, and our dear friend and former colleague Shira Efron, a senior fellow at the RAND Corporation and their distinguished Israel Policy Chair. We discussed last week's strikes in Qatar, the ongoing IDF offensive in Gaza City, next week's very important meetings in New York at the UN and some, dare we say, positive and optimistic news heading into the new Jewish year and much more beyond all those. Trust me, it was a terrific conversation, as always with those two. But just some housekeeping notes before we start. First, just a reminder we're now a video podcast available on YouTube, so check us out over there if you want to watch us and not just hear us, and do subscribe and leave a nice comment if the mood strikes you, both on the podcast platforms and YouTube. These things are important. I've been told both on the podcast platforms and YouTube. These things are important, I've been told Also.
Neri:Second note since the holidays are nearly upon us and things do shut down, definitely here in Israel, our schedule for the next few weeks could be a bit erratic. We'll do our best to get a few episodes in, hopefully, but especially if something dramatic does happen. But fair warning for the coming few weeks. And with that let's get to Shira and Michael. Hi, michael, hi, shira.
Shira:Thank you, shana.
Neri:Tova and welcome back to the pod.
Neri:Thanks, neri Shana Tova. So, as promised, I wanted you both back on before the Jewish High Holidays were upon us to discuss a host of issues and stories, although when we last chatted a month ago I don't think we quite appreciated what would be in store. So there is a lot to talk about today on this episode. But I wanted to start our conversation by looking back at the big news from last week, obviously, the Israeli strike in Doha, qatar, targeting Hamas's headquarters there. Just by way of context for our listeners and viewers, the strike was meant, obviously, to take out the entire top Hamas political leadership. That likely did not happen, which even Israeli officials are now conceding and admitting.
Neri:Five lower level Hamas officials and one Qatari security officer were killed in the strike. That's confirmed. But, interestingly, a few of the very top Hamas guys have not yet been seen in public. So no confirmed proof of life for either Khalil al-Khayy or Zahra Jabarin, people like that. So it could mean that they were injured, but again, nobody quite knows, but unlikely that they were killed outright. And finally, well, qatar and the entire Gulf and the entire Middle East are not too happy with Israel. So, with that being said, well, qatar and the entire Gulf and the entire Middle East are not too happy with Israel. So, with that being said, michael, let's start with you. What did you think of this unprecedented brazen choose your adjective operation by Israel and Qatar? And do you really buy the line coming out of the White House, the Trump administration, that they didn't know anything about it beforehand?
Michael:My initial reaction when it first happened was that of course the administration must have known about it and it must have been coordinated to some extent, because Israel, even this government, would not have the brazenness to go after Hamas mediators just a couple of days after a new US offer was passed to those mediators and when Steve Woodcoff and company were supposedly working very hard on it, and, furthermore, that even this Israeli government wouldn't have the brazenness to attack on Qatari territory, given that Qatar is a major non-NATO US ally, officially designated as such, and given the fact that there are obviously very close ties between the president and his family and members of his team with the Qataris. So my initial reaction was there's no way that Israel just did this without notifying, and it seems to me now, just based on the reactions and we do have Barak Rabid's most recent reporting that actually it seems that that's precisely what Israel did. Now I'm sure the US knew about it before the missiles actually struck, and there's this question as to whether they only found out about it once the planes were in the air or if the president found out about it theoretically, with enough time to tell them to turn the planes around, and he didn't actually do it, but it doesn't seem like this was something where the US was given a huge amount of advance notice, or that it was even negotiated between Israel and the US as to whether this was something they should do or could do. And, assuming that that is actually what happened and that the reporting is correct, it suggests two things to me. One is that Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Israeli government seem extraordinarily confident that there's nothing they can do that will run afoul of this administration. Whether it be launching missiles on Qatari territory in the middle of US brokered negotiations, whether it be something like West Bank annexation, whether it be not really taking the negotiation seriously, which I don't think this Israeli government has ever really done they seem to think that they can pretty much do anything, and even if the president doesn't like it, he'll give Bibi a slap on the wrist behind closed doors and that will be the end.
Michael:The second thing it suggests to me is that, as reckless and risk-taking as I already thought this Israeli government was, it's well beyond that, and this isn't like a little move. I mean, it's not the same as attacking Iran. We can talk all we want about the rhetoric from Israelis and from much of the American Jewish community about Qatar and the fact that Qatar is seen not as Iran but almost as a foe. That's just one notch below In the real world. Attacking a Sunni Gulf state like this is just a different thing. This is a GCC member. The other Gulf states, even if they don't like the Qataris and I don't think they really like the Qataris they do not want this happening in another Gulf capital. So this is just. It's a much bigger move and as much as I always say the Israeli government is off the rails, this seems to me they're even more off the rails and even had it worked, I think it would have been risky. The fact that it didn't is just a huge misstep in all sorts of ways.
Neri:So it's interesting, I'll get you in. I'm very curious to hear what Shiri has to say, but I actually disagree with you, michael. I know that I like it.
Michael:I like it when we have disagreement on this.
Neri:Yeah, it's rare, both on this pod and in real life, but I think there's zero chance Bibi Netanyahu greenlit the strike on Doha without the Trump administration and the president at least giving a yellow light for it to go ahead. I think our friend and colleague, Barack Rafi the latest reporting backs that up that they did notify at least the president an hour beforehand and we've seen this president turn around Israeli planes in mid-flight on the last day of the Iran war, which I'm not going to repeat this is a family podcast, but I'm not going to repeat what he said and those planes did turn around right quick. We've seen this president and this administration admonish Ukrainian President Zelensky for not wearing a suit, so you can only imagine what this president would have thought and actually said and done if, out of the blue, Bibi Netanyahu bombed his Qatari allies. I think it's just not credible.
Neri:I'm happy that the spin that initially came out of both Jerusalem and Washington was kind of pushed back on eventually. But yeah, I didn't buy it then. I don't buy it now, especially since Bibi Netanyahu was so beholden to Donald Trump politically, for domestic reasons and internationally. It's the only thing he has going for him. Donald Trump, Shira, what did you think of this? Well, it was still brazen, regardless of whether Donald Trump greenlit it, but especially as we know from reporting here in Israel that a lot of the security chiefs were against bombing Qatar for various reasons.
Shira:I don't know what the US administration knew or didn't know, and it serves everyone to keep a plausible deniability, but really I don't think that's the issue that while I understand that when Israel vowed to hunt the last Hamas leader, this is not the way to do it, definitely not at this timing and not at this location.
Shira:We have precedence right when Israel wanted to kill Ismail Haniyeh, who was in Qatar all the time, they waited until he went to Tehran to do just that about a year ago and maybe served another message vis-a-vis the Iranians, but still the point is that there was a clear decision to avoid hurting them in Doha and we know that this plan for this specific strike or for alternative ways of getting them through ground operations and others these plans have existed for a long time. So the timing and the decision has to do with a horrifying right terror attack in Jerusalem the day before. That created a lot of anger here and desired dissent. There are also obviously the cutter gate and political issues here back home.
Shira:You think of the motivations to do it then I disagree with you a little bit, neri, because I had meetings in Washington. So it happened when I was in Washington, I was shocked and then met with several Israeli officials who happened to be in Washington at the same time, and also former officials, and I have made some phone calls to people working in this defense establishment and initially, when they thought this was successful, a lot of those people were cheering for this. I think. When you say that there is opposition among the security establishment, I think Mossad went out of its way to explain that they really were against it because of their ties with Doha. We know there was an objection from military of doing it at this time and they said let's wait another week. But the merit of actually doing this thing in this way, I don't know if it was pushed back in the same way that some people have changed their mind post failure, and I know some people have not changed their minds.
Speaker 4:Post failure.
Shira:They say this was still the right thing to do it. We messed up for a variety of reasons. Some say that there was advance notice by the US. Again, I have no visibility into that information. Why, actually, it wasn't successful from an operational point of view? But I think there's the mindset in asking, analyzing the full implications of Gulf countries, seeing this as an attack on them, right, on GCC, on behavior in the region. What does it do to US posture in the region? Right, we know the biggest US military base is in Qatar. What does it mean for them? And I think it's bad either way, right, if the US approved it, then if it didn't approve it? So I think, in either way, like to me, just like a failure or not a failure, maybe a deliberate. I'm sure there was a discussion on what this could mean and where it can deteriorate. I just don't think. Uh, it may have reached the right conclusions and these voices were not here. Now, of course, there's the hostages and other things. Right, negotiating on the hostages, and? And what does he do? And if? If the war aim one of the two war aims is still, even though we're not hearing so much about it is to bring the hostages back home. We don't know how this serves us now.
Shira:What are the implications of this? Obviously, it's being it's. It's unsuccessful. But even if it were successful, I mean clearly it only strengthened Qatar rather than undermined it. It brought the Arabs together, not just the Gulf Right.
Shira:What we saw with Egypt and Iran was there. So, instead of you know, israel has the fantasy of like a Middle East NATO against Iran. It almost sounds like a Middle East NATO against Israel. Also, in Washington, their views and they were furious and I got to tell you I was in a city in Europe, coming from Washington, and there was a former Qatari senior official. This is a group that discusses Gaza and I mean they were shocked so to think that they knew about it or didn't know about it or had expected this. They were shocked so to think that they knew about it or didn't know about it or had expected this. They were shocked. So, anyway, we're still grappling with this, with the implications of this, but I really, even though I have no sympathy for these guys in Doha or obviously in anything that has anyone that has to do with Hamas, I wish they would think of the strategic implications of this earlier.
Michael:They would think of the strategic implications of this earlier. And I think it bears adding on top of that that the summit in Doha took place literally on the fifth anniversary of the Abraham Accords and instead of having the region celebrate that and celebrate Israel's integration and think about how it can be expanded, instead you literally had the Abraham Accords countries and Israel's peace treaty allies meeting in Doha with Iran. There, as Shira notes, to blast Israel. I mean, when we think about the Abraham Accords and the legacy and what goes forward, I would argue that at the moment, Israel's posture in the region is worse than it was the day before the Abraham Accords were signed, and we're now in a post-Abraham Accords world. So I'm with Shira Not shedding any tears for Hamas leaders who may have been killed or ones who survived. I'd rather that they're all six feet underground. But when you look at the overall implications, this doesn't strike me as being very smart.
Neri:Yes, for the record, and we'll be clear, all those Hamas quote unquote political leaders, the head of this vicious terrorist organization, yes, they all deserve to die, especially for their role in October 7th. But it's a question of when, where and how. And, like Shira and you, michael, we're talking about the larger implications for Israel of doing it in this way in Qatar and Doha. It's not like it was a secret that Hamas was headquartered in Doha. They've been headquartered there for years. This building I know for a fact because someone told me who has been there. Yes, that's their primary headquarters. So it didn't exactly take the top-notch Mossad capabilities to figure out where their headquarters were. And it's been like that too. And, by the way, both Israel and the US have found it very useful in the past to have Qatar host Hamas even before October 7th.
Shira:First of all, I have to say something.
Shira:I mean the fact that people are deserved to die. I don't know something. I mean the fact that people deserve to die. I don't know if it means Israel has to go and kill everyone. This is a question, right. I mean I think you argue that there are a lot of people that the US is upset with. I mean there's an issue and we can talk about Hamas and what does Hamas mean? And these people specifically yeah, sure, did they know about the October 7 attacks? I don't know, they seemed pretty surprised. Were they extremely happy about that?
Neri:Of course, no, but Khalil Khaya. He was Yahya Sinwar's number two. Sinwar sent him out of Gaza, right, right, I'm with you on that, khalil.
Shira:Khaya and those people and I'm afraid. No, I'm with you on that and Khalil Khayyam and those people, and really I mean from the standpoint of Israeli mentality and where Israel is and October 7th, they have to pay a price. But this Qatar thing, first of all, we also need to know that, as a sort of unintended consequence, as a Qatari security guy was killed and this person by the way, I don't know if, if you know, but apparently he's from a very important Qatari family, so that doesn't add anything to it.
Shira:This is also something that is complicated because you're not supposed to hurt Qataris and what you said now about Qatar and it was convenient for Israel and the US. I mean we spoke about it so many times and we were critical of this policy even before. Israel can blame Qatar all along as much as they want for propelling Hamas, for helping Hamas, but I mean we have friends in the IDF that counted the Qatari dollars, the suitcases, the money, the requests to pay. This was all conceived here in Jerusalem.
Neri:That were physically brought in before October 7th, obviously by a Qatari envoy. Physically, you had heads of Mossad, heads of whatever military intelligence, flying to Qatar to negotiate with the Qataris to calm Gaza down again before October 7th.
Neri:So sorry, I was going to say. When Bibi Desniahu, yesterday he gave a press conference which we'll get to in just a bit, another press conference he was asked about Qatar and he said you know, qatar hosts funds, supports Hamas, etc. Etc. It's like, of course, you knew this, you promoted this policy. Obviously, he was asked about the strike that he grinlit no, no, no, sorry, shira, I cut you off.
Shira:But that's part of the, I think, the issue in Israel, I think the mentality in Israel and also now the people, all the people that support this, that it's. Yeah, we can talk about the Qatari position, which many countries in the region and the world have issues with, and Israel should also, but in the context of Hamas, the one who enabled, encouraged, facilitated, led this, liked this, loved this, went to the World Cup in soccer in Qatar, like we're the Israelis and this is pre-October 7, but we pay for mistakes. What can we do so?
Neri:on Qatar, yeah, yeah, all right. Enough about Qatar. So ongoing Gaza issues, gaza proper. As I'm sure our listeners know, israel late Monday, early Tuesday, launched its long-threatened ground offensive into Gaza City. Again, shouldn't come as a surprise to listeners and viewers of this podcast, because we took those plans and those threats very seriously over the past month. But, michael, well, I think both of all of us have spoken about this, but, michael, you were very negative, to say the least, about this looming IDF operation. Has your opinion changed at all now that it's underway, and are you still pessimistic that it will lead to Hamas's either full elimination or full capitulation, as some people here in Israel are still saying it will actually succeed in doing so?
Michael:It has not changed even one iota. I do not think that this is going to lead to Hamas's full capitulation or defeat, any more than the previous operations, and we've discussed this ad nauseum in the past, so no need to be repetitive. And as it is unfolding, we're seeing the fallout. I mean, the Europeans are contemplating all sorts of new measures to I don't know if the correct word is retaliate or deter, but whatever it is all sorts of new measures against Israel, effectively in response to this very operation. And even if you don't care about any of that, even if you take the Netanyahu view that Israel is now an island unto itself and, as he said the other day, it has to become a super Sparta. In super Sparta, the IDF chief of staff, yael Zamir who in a super Sparta maybe should be the most important person he is warning about this operation and he wants to know why Ron Dermer and David Barnea are sitting in cabinet meetings rather than going out and negotiating a deal to get the hostages back. So I fail to see why anybody still thinks this is a good idea.
Michael:Lovely aspiration to go into Gaza City, the alleged last Hamas stronghold, even though we all know it's not really the last Hamas stronghold and clear them all out. Lovely ambition. I support that in theory wholeheartedly. In the real world, the one that we're actually living in, this is not going to defeat Hamas. It's going to cause an enormous amount of destruction and suffering for non-Hamas Palestinians. It's going to put Israel in an even more precarious position and if it goes forward, then chances are six months from now we'll be sitting here discussing the next operation in the refugee camps in central Gaza. That is going to be the one that finally defeats Hamas and gets the hostages back and brings total victory. It's a farce and, like I said, I fail to understand how people can talk about it as if it's going to be decisive or successful with a straight face.
Neri:Just by way of both anecdote and data point. So we're recording this on Wednesday afternoon, tel Aviv time. The grand offensive started early Tuesday. So we were briefed by the IDF and, according to the IDF's own estimate, there are probably 2,500 Hamas fighters in Gaza City and there are still probably 600,000 people in Gaza City right, and there's a lot more than 2,000 to 3,000 Hamas fighters in the Gaza Strip still, and there's a lot more than 2,000 to 3,000 Hamas fighters in the Gaza Strip still. So it's definitely not the last stronghold, just on a literal basis. It's not the last stronghold because that's not where the majority of Hamas is Shira. What do you think about the new ground offensive? And I mean, is the charade over?
Shira:I mean, this government isn't even kind of pretending like it cares about the fate of the hostages on vacations and stuff, and he was truly trying to to prevent this from happening. And we hear constant leaks from cabinet meetings where he says why are you telling the heads of the Mossad and the negotiation team, why are you even here? Why are you not flying around the world trying to get a deal?
Neri:To Doha, to Doha. Why are you not? Why are you not in Doha negotiating a deal? Yes, not anymore.
Shira:So this is really an issue with the fact that this is probably I mean, no one wants this in Israel. We have to acknowledge the fact. The IDF does not want this. The vast majority of the Israeli public doesn't want this and still the government decided against it and the Israelis don't want this because I think, like Michael said and we've been in this for almost two years and we've been in this when we talk about Rafah and we talk about other things, it's right, like by military might alone, you're not gonna make I don't know that you can make Hamas capitulate. We can talk about this. What does it mean? Capitulation by an organization like Hamas? But you know, military might alone is not going to solve our problem in Gaza. In this case, I would argue is going to make it worse. It's also the fact that, right, the IDF is the fighters, the combatants. They need arrest.
Shira:I just heard the statistics that one million Israelis suffer from PTSD, from post trauma stress disorder. 1 million. Now, it's more than 10% of the population, because if you talk about PTSD, it's the grown up, right, it's mostly the adults about the age of 18. So it's probably even more than 10% of the population, not to mention what Michael, you know, spoke about in terms of the growing isolation of Israel, and the prime minister even is aware of that, as we talked about his speech yesterday, so that, in regard, I think what we're seeing now is an operation that the IDF is reluctantly going into. We're seeing displacement of Palestinians again. The images from Gaza are horrible and sad and they're going to hunt us for years. People have nowhere to go. I have reasons to believe that the numbers reported on how many have left are not accurate. It's actually more people have stayed in Gaza, so it's probably more than 600,000 that stayed.
Neri:Do you think the numbers that we have heard that have left are inflated? I think so, it's almost are inflated.
Shira:I think it's almost 400,000.
Neri:I think so, I don't know for sure.
Shira:I think there are no accurate counts of these and you know, still we're talking about, there were over, according to estimates, over 1 million people in Gaza City before. So even if it's 370,000, whatever they said yesterday, it's still over 700,000. And it's very and really where there's nowhere to go. And, at the end of the day, you're going to do all that and what? What do you think is going to happen to? Is it didn't Haddad, who is now sort of the military leader? Uh, gaza and the various people that even us, as people who follow this, don't even remember their names because they are, you know, majors turned generals, right? And what's going to happen? They're going to be like oh well, you know what You're right, this was really a bad idea. Bye, we're leaving, we give up, we raise the white flag.
Shira:No, what you're seeing here is two actors that are both doubling down. It's like gamblers and the casino. Both of them are doubling down and Hamas is not. There is definitely a military achievement, right, because Israel, a year ago, already broke down Hamas as a governing and as an organized military force. Right, but it still has. It went back to its roots. Right, there's a guerrilla movement and with more agency and independence for the different cells that are working and operating, at least in the last few months, we know that they recruited higher numbers than Israel kills. Right, they're doing expedited training for 14-year-olds and what you need is someone to learn how to put an IED somewhere or fire an RPG or fire a car. I mean, you don't need this advanced to be the training and, according to all estimates they are preparing you know, what they're preparing for the IDF in Gaza is very dangerous dangerous for the soldiers and dangerous for the hostages also, of course.
Shira:And in terms of the hostages, yes, we're not even hearing about the hostages. In the last, there've been a lot of press releases and statements, but we don't hear anything about the hostages. So it does seem that this goal, this war aim, which was really important, is pushed back into the back burner. I think it would be nice if we get them, but less. And you know it's important, because Netanyahu said in a speech that he tried to mend the damage. But speaking about what's coming, probably he had inside information on what's coming. Probably he had a uh inside information what's coming from europe, but it's not just gonna be from europe, right, he spoke about israel needing to be super sparta, and if you look at sparta today, it's a dusty little town, right, yeah. And athens?
Shira:is a thriving metropolis with, I don't think, 5 million people. People don't remember. Sparta lost.
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Neri:This is why I have PhDs on this podcast to remind us. Yes, Sparta did lose.
Shira:They're like the Greek islands.
Neri:Yes, yes, 100%. And just touching on what you said, shira, I don't even think the hostages are put on the back burner. I think they've been taking off the grill and this government pretends like they don't exist, like almost. I mean, I hate to say it, I hate to put it in these terms, but they're fighting a war as if the hostages don't exist. And I know that probably many ministers and their political supporters are happy about that, because total victory is more important than the lives of 20 living Israelis. But I think the majority of Israelis would disagree with that, especially two years into a war. And the second point you said, shira yeah, it's like two gamblers doubling down, but Hamas has a lot less to lose than Israel. So Hamas is betting its last $50, and Israel is betting all of its $50 million. I mean, that's the poker analogy, michael.
Neri:I was struck this week by the fact that Marco Rubio was here and in his press conference with Netanyahu on Monday in Jerusalem it could have been, I don't want to say Betel Osmotri standing next to Netanyahu, but Netanyahu standing next to Netanyahu and on the issue of the Gaza war specifically, there was zero daylight.
Neri:Zero daylight. Marco Rubio said basically well, it would be nice to get a deal that got all the 48 remaining hostages, including the deceased ones, out, and that Ham would be nice to get a deal that got all the 48 remaining hostages, including the deceased ones, out and that Hamas basically ceased to exist, as he said, and lay down its weapons and get that through a negotiation. But even Rubio said, oh, that's likely not going to happen, so we'll probably need a what he said, a concise military operation to achieve these goals. So obviously you don't think those goals are achievable through this military operation to achieve these goals. So obviously you don't think those goals are achievable through this military operation, concise as it may or likely won't be, and even the IDF admits it'll take months. But were you surprised that Trump and his people are so on board with this Israeli policy?
Michael:No, I'm not surprised and I agree with you policy. No, I'm not surprised and I agree with you. Somebody should have let Rubio know ahead of time that the IDF thinks it's going to take months, and possibly an entire year, to actually accomplish what it wants to accomplish in this operation militarily. I'm not surprised. I think that Rubio is echoing what we tend to hear publicly from President Trump too, you know, which is warnings to Hamas that they have to release all the hostages now, or you know the gates of hell will open Right, or else you know, israel Katz and Donald Trump tend to post on social media about this. And, in similar fashion, you know, this week it was President Trump warning Hamas not to use hostages as human shields, which you know. I would hope that we all hope that. But do we think that Hamas isn't going to do that? I think that they almost certainly are going to do that.
Michael:So I'm not surprised, and we've seen sometimes kind of ambivalence from administration officials on certain things, right. So you know, you hear administration officials both publicly and privately. When the question of annexation comes up, they'll say they won't, say do it or don't do it. They'll say, oh, we don't have a policy, right, whatever, whatever is wrong, and rubio, effectively, he effectively communicated that this week and I think Mike Huckabee reportedly said it, you know, said it publicly that it's up to up to Israel right when it comes to annexation, up to Israel when it comes to the war and whether to go ahead, up to Israel. So it's green lights or, you know, sometimes maybe a kind of flashing, flashing yellow light, maybe not even yellow, somewhere between yellow and green, that's kind of the most you get.
Michael:Right, an orange light. Well, well done with the primary colors there. That's kind of the best that you really get. And listeners to this podcast know I really believed between the time that President Trump won the election and took office and even early on in this Trump term, that there was a chance things would be different because of the influence of the Gulf, and all the more so when President Trump came to the region and went to the Gulf and skipped right over Israel.
Michael:But it's hard to see the influence of the Gulf in this stuff. So either the administration is ignoring what they're hearing, and I think there's evidence for that. There's no way that the Gulfies wanted strikes on Iran before they happened. I think they're probably fine with the results, given that it was short and successful to some extent without much blowback, but I don't think they wanted that ahead of time and it happened anyway. I'm certain that they wouldn't have wanted a strike on Qatar, but that happened anyway. We all know they want the war to end, but there isn't a lot of administration pressure on Israel at least to do that. So maybe Trump just doesn't care about what he's hearing from them.
Michael:And maybe they're not actually speaking up. Maybe at this point they're kind of content to wall this off as much as possible. But I'm now beyond the point where I'm going to be surprised by green lights from the president and top administration officials. I just don't think we're going to see any effective pressure or even a sign of genuine anger or frustration or loss of patience with this Israeli government.
Neri:And I think all of us who would like to see a bit more US pressure on this Israeli government, maybe we need to give up that ghost and I made this joke with Shira, I think, the other night. We have a very good friend who, in almost every column for probably the past six months, definitely the past six months either starts the column or ends the column with well, you know, it's really up to Donald Trump to stop this war in every column, and he's right, because there's very little levers other than maybe, you know, the Israeli public, which we also haven't seen, to get this government to change course. It's that, or Donald Trump and neither have kind of risen to the moment.
Neri:Moving ahead and looking ahead to next week, which will likely be a big one, as if the previous weeks have not been big ones, but it will be, I think, a landmark week, especially in New York. We have the UN General Assembly, meetings and speeches, including by Netanyahu and Trump, but, by the way, not Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who was not given a visa to attend the UN meetings in New York Unprecedented. But leaving that aside, rosh Hashanah Eve, monday evening, we're going to have the big meeting on Palestinian statehood recognition hosted by Saudi Arabia and France, where we expect movement by a host of states, including, well, france, the UK, canada, australia and others, to recognize the state of Palestine, shira. What do you think of this diplomatic gambit next week? Good idea, bad idea, shrug.
Shira:Let's put it in context. First of all, after assuming recognition is going to play out like we think it will, by next week there'll be over 150 countries that recognize the state of Palestine. 164 countries recognize the state of Israel. So we're at near parity and practically I think this does not mean much. Michael and I wrote an article in Foreign Affairs, I think a year ago when the previous wave of recognition it was like I think it's thinking nine countries and it started. Actually, what was interesting last time it was that broke the taboo on European countries. Right, all these other countries that have recognized the state of Palestine previously were from Latin America and Africa. This is Spain and Sweden, and don't remember which one. The others were the first ones to be the European countries or major European countries to have recognized Western Palestine. What we have here is we're talking about permanent members of the Security Council, right, we're talking about France. We're talking about the UK, england, which I'm hearing Again.
Shira:It's not like scoops of what I just heard today, they could be even recognizing before UNGA, which is, you know, it's a big issue. And then there's Canada and Belgium and other countries. So we're talking about a different group and even though we know that this in practice is not going to move the Palestinian state ahead, and we know that the Palestinians, you know, in the making, right, the PA sort of the government, is closer than collapse to actual, than being in a government that has effective control over territory and it is probably going to revoke an Israeli retaliation that is going to penalize the Palestinians, setting them back even more. Right, I think it reflects something that we are seeing with an international community in these countries that are frustrated, they don't know what else they can do, and sort of like the fear, right, there was always a deterrent from doing such things, and now they're like if Israel is going against, as I it's, it's like if israel is gonna foreclose any political horizon for the palestinians, we are going to foreclose, you know, the horizon on israel being part of the western country, part of the western world, and I mean we can play with it also because the horizon, uh, research program, which israel is losing access to also. But I mean this is. This is the idea. It's like they lost the deterrence. We're seeing active sanctions.
Shira:It's true that the critics are in Israel and other places are saying that it's motivated by political considerations back at home, but of course they have politics too and that is true and where it can have implications that I think Israelis are serious about or concerned about, beyond this sort of like hyperbolic and reward for Hamas and all these things that most Israelis do see it like that right, and the question is if this is the timing. There's an issue right Until now, we're under this concept that the Palestinian territories are disputed and they're disputed, which means that Israeli operations in areas controlled by the PA right are considered legitimate, given Israel's security concerns. We can talk about the raids into Area A, but just if Wait, I'll get?
Neri:What about the settlements? The?
Shira:settlements and incursions into Area A and Air Trabi can be considered as aggression against a fellow UN member states. So this is much more like Russia-Ukraine than a different status. It will also accelerate legal processes against Israel in the Hague right, icc, icj. This is something that is more dangerous and, of course, in terms of the sanctions, this is something that is more dangerous and, of course, in terms of the sanctions. So I think we're seeing Israel.
Shira:Was this diplomatic tsunami, an economic tsunami against Israel? A lot of the things you saw, the quiet embargo and the sort of reluctance to do stuff with Israel without the formal sanctions. But this can bring actually the formal sanctions. So it's going to have real implications. And how do we we don't have much time if this is not something that we, I think all support, thinking it's the wisest uh, step forward. I told this to european officials, but I think at this point, at this point, it's fait accompli. What needs to happen is some sort of like how do we mitigate against the damages?
Shira:And this can be done if this was uh framed in terms of like, I think, the new york declaration of the saudis and the french right, or saying some sort of like we, you know if the uk and the belgium approach that says we are recognized the state of palestine, but this recognition is going to come to effect only when the hostages return and there's the end of the war and hamas is gone, so when it meets the conditions that israel requests and if it's framed in explaining that this is a recognition of or re-recognition of the Palestinian rights for self-determination, rather than pretending this is a state in the making.
Shira:This would be hopeful. Also, and I think it would be useful also if there's a reminder to Israelis that you know, Israel itself was recognized by the UN and in that decision there was a recognition also of an Arab state. So it's difficult, you know, it's very convenient for us to take just our part and ignore the other state that was also supposed to be established through this framework. After October 7, trauma, zero tolerance, you know this really very risk averse mentality. It's all justified, but at this point I just don't think Israel can fight it in a viable way and therefore it's better to think how you manage it and leverage it and maybe even use it to say okay, you acknowledge Palestine, how about you acknowledge us as a Jewish state?
Neri:right, it's something that was very important for Israel, so maybe you use it to extract leverage and put pressure on what Israel cares about it doesn't seem like this Israeli government is heading down the more constructive path, heading down the well more destructive path, which we'll get into in a second. You said fait accompli. I think these governments are fed up completely.
Shira:I will avoid speaking about political stuff.
Neri:I got a smile from Michael Koplow.
Shira:He smiles a lot.
Neri:My day is done.
Michael:I mean, it's a smile of disgust.
Neri:Yeah, my day is over. It was a productive day, Michael. What do you think of what we're going to see next week and what do you imagine, like we said, the reaction from Israel will be?
Michael:I agree with you. We're going to see this wave of recognitions. I think it's a very bad idea on the part of these countries. You know we talk about magical thinking on the Israeli side with regard to the operation in Gaza City and what military pressure can actually accomplish. This is just complete magical thinking from the Europeans and others about what declaring Palestine into being is going to actually accomplish on the ground is going to accomplish nothing.
Michael:And our our friend, samar Sinjolawi, who has been on this podcast and who Shira and I were both supposed to see in person last week in the US but couldn't because he was denied a visa to come to the United States, he has a very effective yes, incredibly unbelievable. It's not just Mahmoud Abbas who's being kept out. It's literally any Palestinian, including Samer, who is one of the most quote unquote responsible Palestinians that exists in terms of his rhetoric and his willingness to talk to Israelis and engage with them. It's criminal that he's kept out of the United States simply because he's Palestinian, but he has a very effective line on this, which is that you can have 190 countries recognize Palestine, but only one matters and that's Israel. And until Israel recognizes Palestine, then this is all feeder, and that's exactly what it is. It's all feeder and there's going to be some sort of Israeli response. No question Now what that will look like. I'm not sure. It seems to me that the discussions with Rubio and Huckabee over annexation are clearly related to this in some way. Not to suggest that Israeli ministers didn't want annexation anyway, but they're very seriously, I think, discussing whether the US will back them annexing something as a purported response to countries recognizing Palestine. There will almost certainly be some sort of sanctions against the Palestinian authority that will be designed to weaken, if not collapse it entirely. I think that whatever funds Batala Smotrich has been transferring, that's probably going to end, and maybe there will be some sort of stepped up IDF campaign in the West Bank in symbolic places, right. More IDF activity, let's say, in like Ramallah. I think that's certainly a possibility. There will probably be some form of Israeli diplomatic response against European countries. There's been talk of shuttering the French consulate in Jerusalem. Maybe Israel will pull ambassadors or downgrade relations in some way. We'll probably see some combination of this.
Michael:The other thing that really worries me is that the Europeans talk about this as if it's going to change something for Palestinians, as if this is something that should be celebrated by Palestinians, and it's going to change nothing. Not only is it going to change nothing for the better. If it does change something, it'll probably be for the worse, as we're contemplating what Israel might do in response, and you elevate the hopes of Palestinians and then you dash them, and that's going to have a long tail because it's going to impact Palestinian attitudes about a peaceful, diplomatic process. I mean, like I said, I think this is a silly move and I'm opposed to it and I don't think it's smart. But whatever it is, it's certainly not armed conflict and intifada. So I think you discredit the approach. That is not armed conflict and intifada.
Michael:I think that you even go so far as to perhaps let's drop Palestinian statehood, just push for Israeli citizenship, turn this into a straight civil rights campaign to become Israelis, which is. I don't know if that happens, especially given the world we live in. I don't know how Israel overcomes that. So I think that there's a real potential downside to this and I wish that if Europeans were serious about Palestinian statehood. So keep on holding Israel's feet to the fire in different ways that may be appropriate, but also restore some Palestinian agency. Tell them that you support statehood, but it's not going to be contingent on the Gaza war ending and Hamas being out of the picture. It should be contingent on genuine PA reforms, institutional reforms and security sector reforms and democratic reforms, as opposed to acting as if the Palestinians will get this thing that they're not actually going to get and that somehow they're just bystanders to all of it. It's a deeply mistaken and misguided move that.
Shira:I agree with Shira that at this point there's no way to stop it. You know that's what and the way that I think Israel could backfire. Right, one of my fears is in terms of like downgrading ties or maybe kicking out diplomats here. What does it mean about the US security coordinator? Right, if you look at the officers working there, there are many Canadians and Brits. Actually, the largest part of the mission is Canadian. I mean, are they going to go out?
Michael:If we're talking about the number two officials are Canadian, you know.
Shira:If we're talking about, by the way, you know, aboumazen. He didn't get a visa to New York, to the United States, but will Israel let him return? He's away now. This is also a question, right? Can he return here? We don't know where it's going to go and I think, after this circus next week and admittedly it's going to be a circus we're going to all stumble into the same issues.
Shira:Oh, by the way, on annexation, I just want to make a point there. Annexation, you know there's the US allowing this or not allowing this, or approving this, but I think where you see most leverage actually on Israel is coming from the United Arab Emirates, who have and this is where you see that one statement from them. But continued pressure now on basically threatening almost to cancel the Abraham Accords or using very harsh language that they've never used before, is, I think, affecting calculations here and this, and together with the failed Doha strike, I actually think this is more of a might be the thing that could prevent annexation and there might be a statement on annexation and there's de facto annexation, but an actual change measure we'll see. Right, you had E1 already, which is the settlement part between Maladumim and Jerusalem, which is perfectly the West Bank, right. So there have been some measures already expressed as a response, as a sort of like an early response to the recognition, and maybe these all will be framed on this. But you know, on the bigger picture right, we're all going to come to the same issues how to end the war in Gaza.
Shira:This can be through an agreement and I think that the state of Israel there are people here I'm not talking about Mitzal Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Fir, but there are people here reportedly close to the prime minister itself that understand that a transitional authority that has to do with some Palestinians and international players and the regional government. I mean, this is sort of the only possible viable way. And because the regional actors want an invite from the Palestinian Authority and want some Palestinian Authority stake in this, and because Israel understands that and because they can say it's not PA but it's Fatah and have a dotted line to the PA or whatever, we need to ask ourselves how these policies and this includes all the actors right how do they serve us? And can we force the PA or make sure that the PA does what it needs to do through engagement and not through sanctioning them? You know, this is where I think we hope to come to come to senses, because I agree with you.
Shira:I think that this idea of like, oh, the Palestinians said that they will engage in reforms and they appointed the deputy Abbas, appointed deputy, done deal. That's not true. And, on the other hand, can they really engage in reforms given the policy of the Israeli government at the moment? Right, that does everything to undermine them. So we are really in an issue that you know. Yeah, we'll have Anga next week and Rosh Hashanah, but then we're going to come to the same issues and the same issues that are actually there is a way out, right? It's the same way I've we've been talking about for almost two years, but what you have here is what you need is the leadership to agree to go on this path, and clearly the reality is going in a very different way at the moment.
Neri:That's what I was going to say, that, yes, you could sketch out a very reasonable path forward that resolves both Gaza and stabilizes the West Bank. I see no indication of this Israeli government and this Israeli prime minister that this is the direction they're heading in. They're heading in the opposite direction. Now, maybe that'll change at some point, maybe on the other side. But israel, but israel voluntarily.
Shira:It will be hard, hard pressed to do this. You think about international players with leverage, right, and you know we've been pounding on israel it's. We don't have expectations of hamas, but maybe, maybe this is Hamas has not been helpful. Maybe there is a way of wisely thinking of what this capitulation looks like. When you talk about terrorist organization, right that they're saying, okay, we're willing to retreat for the Palestinian people. It requires a tolerance with this idea that it would have to have inter-Palestinian understandings. I mean, this is like very complicated stuff that someone in the international community needs to help.
Neri:Yeah, but I think there are multiple actors in the international community that have thought about it. We know that for a fact. I think, again, not to pick on the Israeli government, but I'll pick on the Israeli government. Yes, you could create a formula to have both sides kind of save face and bring this to a close. But, like you said, you need input or equity from the PA, from the Palestinian Authority. But this Israeli government doesn't want to hear the words Palestinian Authority, right, it would cause a coalition crisis.
Neri:So how do you square that circle? And then you know the Palestinian Authority should be supported in the West Bank because it is actually cooperating with Israel on security, as we all know, and has kept it remarkably quiet and stable over the past two years of war. And yet, sorry again, this Israeli government is actively undermining that entity and that stability and that cooperation. So again, I hate to pick on my own side, but I will, and I will pick on my other own side as well. Rubio as well, early this week, standing next to Bibi Netanyahu, said if these Western governments take unilateral steps against Israel quote, unquote by recognizing a Palestinian state, then don't be surprised if Israel takes unilateral actions in turn on the West Bank, which is complete gaslighting because Israel is already taking many unilateral actions against the PA, and on the West Bank.
Michael:And it's also not doing Israel any favors to push it or encourage that decision. But you know, mary, that wasn't my favorite US official comment this week. The best one was Mike Huckabee saying that European countries can't recognize the Palestinian state because to do so would violate Oslo.
Neri:Yeah, nimrod and Ibrahim and I last week got into that. Ask Mike Huckabee if he supports the Oslo Accords. Yeah, well, apparently he does. Well, that's news, I think, to Mike Huckabee. Final question and topic to you both I gave you a bit of homework before we started recording. Obviously, you know difficult times here in Israel and across the region, and also in Gaza, we have to mention. We touched on a few of the issues, especially for here in Israel, for our kinds of people the growing international isolation of Israel, politically, diplomatically, economically and the like. Not great times. But this podcast is known for many things, but above all for being the purveyor of good news and positive vibes, as the kids say. So your homework was to find one piece of positive, feel-good, optimistic issues, points, news that you can share with us coming into this new year, this new Jewish year. Michael, should we start with you?
Michael:Sure, but let's also note that Dr Scheer-Effron did not think I'd be able to do this.
Michael:She referred to me, I believe, as Dr Doom right. So I'm going to show you, scheer, that I so I'm going to demonstrate that I can be not so doomy and not so gloomy. This actually wasn't difficult for me, because I do think that we're seeing something that for me, is super optimistic, which is that, setting aside the push to unilaterally recognize a Palestinian state, we're also seeing this effort on the part of states in the entire Arab League in the guise of the New York Declaration that says we want two states, but that also is including this laundry list of things that Israel has wanted for a very long time. The New York Declaration isn't only about two states. It also condemns October 7th without reservations. It calls for the return of all the hostages. It demands that Hamas disarm completely. It calls for the demilitarization of Gaza. It calls for the return of all the hostages. It demands that Hamas disarm completely. It calls for the demilitarization of Gaza. It calls for a future Palestinian state to be demilitarized. It calls for the Palestinian Authority to take reforms on their education system, to end incitement as conditions for statehood.
Michael:These are things that Israelis have wanted forever, and the idea that two years ago, if I'd said to you hey, the entire Arab League is going to sign on to these things that Israel is asking for. We would say, wow, what a fantastic position Israel must be in in the world for the Arab League and the European Union to be endorsing these core and extremely legitimate and understandable and justifiable Israeli demands. And that's what's happening. So you know, the conversation right now around recognition of Palestine is as we had on this podcast. It's not a great one, but alongside that, we do see these trends that I think are actually very favorable for Israel and demonstrate that things that Israelis want the rest of the world is coming around to and saying, yeah, you know what those things make sense to us. We can't argue with those things.
Michael:So to me it's optimistic. It's optimistic in the guise of two states, because I think that once the two-state conversation turns serious again which certainly won't happen while the war is going on and certainly won't happen without the benefit of some time for Israelis to heal, both physically and emotionally when the conversation picks up again, if this is any indication it's going to pick up again from a much better place and from a place that does take Israeli concerns seriously. And even if we set aside the two-state conversation, the fact that we do have every single Arab League state condemning Hamas and calling for their exclusion from Palestinian politics and their disarmament in such unambiguous terms. That's a really good thing, and I think we should celebrate it and lift it up and use it as a cause to be hopeful, going forward Very well said, so there may be well good news Michael good vibes.
Shira:Michael good vibes.
Neri:This coming year.
Shira:Exactly.
Neri:Sunshine and butterflies With sprinkles.
Michael:Exactly, that's my new nickname Sunshine and Butterfly With sprinkles. Exactly.
Shira:That's my new nickname. First of all, I agree 100% with Michael and just to say I wrote something about it in an article supposed to be at Foreign Affairs the other day, because I do say, as I said before, I think it's fait accompli, like the recognition is a done deal. But if you look at the larger context, there are positive elements and the problem is that even Israelis that know the positive elements, they don't understand that you can't just get the good without getting the stuff. That gives you a pause and with, I think, a blind spot when it comes to Palestinian nationalism, because it's fine to say a Palestinian state is not going to be like now, but this idea of never, ever right and in word and in deed, and it's not just by the Israeli government, right, it's opposition, and we know there's a motion in the Knesset that passed with a large majority. So anyway, but I'm in positive. Let's pause. Yeah, no, no, I'm going back to like my rainbow mood. Actually, I'm not. That was way too negative. I'm not, I am positive. Why am I positive?
Shira:I think that, despite where the current trajectory is going, there was a sense of revenge and everyone's coming to terms. There's a clear society here that, despite the trauma, despite the difficulties, does not want to be Sparta, wants to be Athens that understand and see with very. It's not eyes wide shut, right, it's like eyes wide open. Where are we heading? And protesting the government's policies? And I think you know, I think that's really important because at the end of the day I mean in a few months, whatever this Gaza city incursion going to end and before it rolls into, oh, now we need to Moassi and the central camps, and I agree with Michael, they're like it's hard to see this ending, but hopefully one day I'm going to come to a place where, like, we have to make a decision and I think the israeli public now will push to the right decision and that is is important.
Shira:We often talk about the palestinians of having no agency and sort of the leadership and stuff. But you see a new political activism by different party parts of the israeli society. But you see new political activism by different parts of the Israeli society, right, you see the parties themselves. You see young generation thinking about going into politics. And you know there's this song here, maybe really cliché, but there's this. You know, for our Hebrew-speaking listeners, it's it's always darkest before sunrises, and so I think we will see next year will be better, see Sort of optimistic.
Neri:Very well done, shira, you did it.
Shira:Meanwhile we came with the Giants.
Neri:I'm going to pick up on your optimistic yeah. I mean, it sounds like a good, that would be very positive trip to Greece. But all kidding aside, I'll pick up on your point, shira, and then I'll make my optimistic point. I thought one of you was going to be more explicit, but I think this coming year, even the Jewish year, will be an election year and with elections, hope springs eternal even in Israel. And I think there will be obviously it'll be a momentous and fateful and historic and I've used this word before, but existential election for the state of Israel.
Neri:But I think, well, if the opposition gets its act together, it could be actually a very positive and optimistic election that could actually usher in a new Israeli government. So, politically, I think that is my optimistic note that this coming year we'll see an election. Think that is my optimistic note that this coming year we'll see an election, if not triggered, then actually held, which I think will be momentous and will give us a lot of content for this podcast. So that's also an optimistic and positive note. And then my other optimistic and positive note for this coming year. So we're recording this on Wednesday, september 17th, for this coming year.
Shira:So we're recording this on Wednesday, september 17th. Do you both know what today is? Oh, yeah, yeah, I knew that. Yeah, it is, I saw Naim Kassem Happy Beeper Day.
Neri:To you both. So a year ago, yeah well, he I'm sure he was spitting it as a great victory for Hezbollah, but in reality it marked the beginning of Israel's real kind of full-out offensive against Hezbollah. And this happened a year ago. And when those beepers went off, and before I foolishly kept packing for my foolish trip back to the States, we didn't know how the coming weeks and months, and indeed the coming year, would play out. And it actually turned out better than anyone had any hope to expect, because Hezbollah was always even more than Iran was always kind of this real dangerous threat to Israel. But it was very, very well done by the Israeli intelligence services and the IDF.
Neri:On September 17th 2024, a year ago, the ground invasion hadn't begun yet. Yes, hassan Nasrallah was still alive, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And extrapolating from that, a year ago Yahya Sanwar was still alive. He is no longer, thankfully, with us. Iran had yet to be struck rather successfully, the 12-day war this past summer.
Neri:So again, my point is that, especially looking back but also looking forward, israel's kind of security and military position in the region has improved tremendously over the past year. Now the negative side, obviously, is that this Gaza war is continuing for no apparent reason and it could have very easily ended, probably end of last year, definitely by earlier this year, but it has not. But really, I think, in terms of the actual security of the state of Israel and the Israeli people, night and day different from a year ago. So that is something, I think, an optimistic point to take into the new year and not something well, not something A that we should take for granted and, b we should acknowledge that right, that, in all the doom and gloom, politically, diplomatically, internationally, et cetera, et cetera, in real terms, in military and security terms, israel is safer. Remains to be seen whether this prime minister and this government can actually leverage it for enduring stability and enduring positivity.
Neri:Okay, thanks again to michael coppola and sharaf ron, as always, for their generous time and insights. Also, a special thanks to our producer, jacob gilman, and to all of you who support israel policy forums work. Do consider making a donation to israel policy forum, so keeping a credible source of analysis and ideas on issues such as these that we all care deeply about, including this podcast and, most importantly, shana Tova and Chag Sameach to all those celebrating and, of course, thank you. Thank you for listening, thank you.