The Israel-Lebanon Deal Explained

On this week’s episode, Israel Policy Forum Policy Advisor and Tel Aviv-based journalist Neri Zilber hosts David Daoud, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. They discuss the recent U.S.-brokered agreement between Israel and Lebanon, the chances of the deal actually leading to Hezbollah's disarmament and Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon, the ability of the Lebanese army to fulfill its obligations, the reaction inside Lebanon to the agreement, why Netanyahu touted it as a "historic achievement," whether peace can be achieved between the two countries, and more. 

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Introduction

Neri 0:05

Shalom and welcome to the Israel Policy Pod. I'm Neri Zilber, a journalist based in Tel Aviv and a policy advisor to Israel Policy Forum. Major developments in Lebanon this past weekend with the new agreement signed on Friday between the US, Lebanon, and Israel in Washington, that could have the emphasis on could and the conflict on the Northern Front. To help us make sense of what it all means, I'm delighted to be joined this week by David Daoud, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an expert on Lebanon, Hezbollah, and the conflict with Israel. I wanted to break down with David what this new trilateral deal says and what it doesn't say, the reactions to it inside Lebanon and Israel, and what the prospects really are that the Lebanese army, to say nothing of the Lebanese state, can actually disarm Hezbollah and facilitate the IDF withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, which is the basic wager behind this Freimerk deal brokered by the Trump administration. This was a great and timely conversation with David. But first, before that, a few thoughts from me. So we're recording this episode Tuesday afternoon Tel Aviv time in case something dramatic happens between uh when we record and this episode goes up, always a possibility, trust me. But I wanted to do a quick state of play on the various issues and fronts happening right now. So obviously the Lebanon deal was a big development in the trajectory of the Israel-Hizbolah conflict. How big of a development, how big of a deal this deal is, well, we'll get into that with David in just a moment. But this agreement obviously came in the larger context of the Iran-U.S. negotiations, still ongoing, and the MOU, the memorandum of understanding that they signed earlier this month. This deal, to say the least, uh is not going great, the Iran deal. You've had extensions of fire between the U.S. and Iran in the Gulf uh in recent days. Uh the Iranians have also hit a few Gulf Arab countries. And in general, a Iran is demanding to maintain some level of control over the Strait of Hormuz. This is obviously a big no-no and a big no-go for Donald J. Trump and runs counter to the terms of the MOU. So we'll have to see how this issue is resolved, if at all, or if we'll just keep kind of muddling through with these sporadic and spasmodic uh flashes of violence between Iran and the US. But it is interesting to me how the Trump administration has now concluded three different ceasefires across three different fronts in the Middle East Gaza, Iran, and now Lebanon, uh, that are all for the most part broad framework deals or MOUs or preliminary agreements or call them what you will, that still, for the most part, have to be fleshed out uh and actually implemented on the ground. So is this a smart strategy to lower the flames before an eventual final deal? Is it a dumb strategy that just kicks multiple cans down multiple roads indefinitely? Uh, or is it just the best idea anyone could come up with at a given time when these agreements were concluded? Um, I don't know. I don't know the answer to that question, but the bottom line is that nothing has been resolved yet on any of the fronts. Uh finally, in Israel, we're gearing up for the official start of election season, uh likely in about two weeks once the Knesset summer session uh finally and mercifully ends. Uh election day at this point will almost certainly be end of October, which is uh just remarkable. Uh this is our current Netanyahu government will have actually fulfilled its full term in office, a full four years, uh rare enough for any Israeli government, but for this one specifically, it's um well, madness uh after it presided over October 7th, and the controversial judicial overhaul uh bid and the mass uh nationwide protests uh that lasted nine straight months in 2023, um, and their constant attacks even ongoing now on a daily basis on Israel's judiciary, on the security establishment, on the media, on pretty much anyone that happens to disagree with with the government line. Uh so it's going to be a bumpy, bumpy summer, but we'll be across all of it, rest assured, uh, in the coming weeks and months on this podcast. Suffice it to say, uh finally, that as of right now, Nanyao and his uh right-wing bloc uh in the Knesset are behind in the polls. There's no real clear path uh for him and them to win an outright majority just yet. Again, just based on current polling. Um but the opposition, depending on the poll you're looking at, also doesn't have a very clear-cut majority of 61 seats uh without the support of the Arab-Israeli political parties, which um a lot of them in the opposition don't want to accept, uh, I'd argue foolishly, but that's the reality of the situation at the moment. So uh for Bibi, it looks like the best he can hope for is a tie. Uh a tie after election day. But things could obviously still change. Uh four months is a lifetime in Israeli politics. But I think the main thing we can say as of right now, speaking late June, is that by all rights, by all rights, it shouldn't even be this close. So with that thought, let's get to David Out. Hi, David. Welcome to the Israel Policy Pod.

David 5:52

Hi, Neri. It's been a while, but it's good to be back on.

Neri 5:55

It has been a while, David, but uh you were the first person I thought of when uh the big news on the Lebanon front came down last Friday uh with this trilateral framework agreement brokered by the Trump administration between Israel and Lebanon, because I really wanted someone who has insight into Lebanon and what's happening there and Hezbollah, uh, but also someone who um, shall we say, understands, appreciates the Israeli point of view. Uh, and you're you're a rare breed uh because you have a lot of uh Lebanon experts, obviously, maybe Hezbollah experts and um you know experts in Israeli military affairs having to do with Lebanon, but few people can kind of combine everything uh and um give us an understanding of especially Lebanese politics and society in the context of this deal. So um welcome. It's great to see you. Uh we were just chatting before we started recording. And they were like, yeah, we should actually hit hit record because we could go for another hour. Yeah, we could go for an hour and uh and have nothing until we hit record. So I wanted to start here,

The 14 Points of the Israel-Lebanon Deal

Neri 6:55

David. Uh the first and most basic question for our audience: what is in this deal uh that was signed last Friday? Um and Jeremiah, really, what's the most important or intriguing of the 14 points uh that came out of uh the deal brokered by Marco Rubio uh last Friday?

David 7:13

So I think the most uh important, first of all, thank you for thinking of me. I'm I'm really flattered. Uh it is, like I said, it's it's an honor to be on this podcast and have the conversation with you every time. Uh I think the most important is the 14th point, obviously, President Trump's role and uh in shepherding this deal to to fruition, right? Um I actually was surprised to even find something like that in a deal like this. Look. Were you actually surprised? I I was gonna make a joke that it should have been point number one, not point number two. I mean given given the administration and that brokered it, perhaps. But look, I've never seen something like that in a deal like this. Um uh but you know, both sides need to give credit, I suppose, where they believe credit is deserved. I don't think it's any secret that I'm a s I'm a skeptic on on the entire Israel-Lebanon um, if you want to call it a peace track, I wouldn't uh negotiation track. Uh looking at this framework, um look, at once it's a good deal, and I'll explain why that doesn't necessarily make me kind of jump for joy. And at once it does also have certain things that are unique, and we'll get into that. Largely, though, it's why I say it's a good deal. Um it replicates other good deals. It replicates Resolution 1559 in part, it replicates um resolution 1701, which ended the Israel-Hezbolla War in part, and it replicates the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement brokered by the Biden administration, uh, that also was a good deal on paper. All these were good deals on paper, and what they all required, what this deal required, uh this deal requires, in perhaps more explicit terms, and perhaps that's its benefit, relatively more explicit terms, because it doesn't name Hezbollah by name, but neither do those previous agreements, is uh Lebanon assumes total control over all of its territory. Lebanon dismantles all non-state actors uh uh throughout all of its territory. Uh Lebanon uh ensures that uh none of these non-state actors have any uh security or military role in the country. This is basically uh normalizing in that sense uh relations between Israel and Lebanon, in that at least the if we're if we're not gonna have diplomatic ties, which I don't see in the in the near future, which isn't in this deal, if we're not gonna have diplomatic ties, then at least let's have normal relations in that uh the decision of war and peace is governed by Jerusalem and Beirut rather than by an actor, a rogue actor, Hezbollah, uh that despite it claiming to act in Lebanese interests, is really, I mean, acting in the interest of the resistance axis, in Iran's interests, uh, and using Lebanon as cannon fodder. Um so that that that much is is good, but that much is also not new. Uh now, where I see the distinction, where I see a silver lining, even this skeptic, this cynical, pessimistic skeptic, sees a silver lining in this deal, um, is in the so-called pilot zones. In the past, what made all those good deals, 1559, resolution 1701, the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement? Well, if those are good deals, how come we're even having this conversation today, Neri? Uh, because ultimately uh these deals placed enforcement in the hands of the Lebanese state, in the hands of Lebanon. Now that's understandable because Lebanon is the sovereign over its territory, who has the responsibility, uh let alone the capability to control territory more than a sovereign. Uh the problem is that uh Lebanon uh has been uh unwilling. I won't even say unable. I think they they try to say they're unable. Really, it's an unwillingness to deal with Hezbollah over the course of the 18 years since 2006 and 1701, the you know, uh almost two years uh since the November 27, 2024 ceasefire agreement. And that's because uh, right, and this is where we get into framing. Uh and the Israeli framing on this is wrong, the American framing on this is wrong. Hezbollah is not alien to Lebanon. Hezbollah is not an Iranian occupation of Lebanon. Hezbollah is at once an organization that is absolutely ideologically loyal to Iran, to the person of the supreme leader uh in Iran, but at the same time, it is 100% Lebanese in the sense that all of its cadres, all the way from Naein Qasim, formerly Hassan Masrallah, but now Naïm Khasim, down to the lowliest grunt, uh lowliest fighter are Lebanese citizens. And they derive their strength in Lebanon, uh their social strength, their political strength, their military strength, their recruitment, their money, not just uh, you know, they derive from Lebanese citizens, right? Not just from hardened ideologues, but from other from primarily Shia. And what we've seen over the course of all these decades and the past years is that Shia have not largely broken with Hezbollah, at least not in the numbers necessary or in the visibility necessary to undermine this organization. So the Lebanese state can't act against them because uh this makes it an issue of civil war, right? Um so this leaves Lebanon unwilling to act. But the here's where the saving grace is here. The pilot zones, to some degree, take the enforcement out of Lebanon's hands. They say, okay, Israel, we're not going to ask you, like 1701, uh like November 27 to do a total withdrawal from Lebanon, uh, and then Lebanon gets to talk about disarming Hezbollah, like withdraw from small patches of land that you find negligible to your security. And let's see how Lebanon does in those areas. If Lebanon fulfills those deals or fulfills the terms of the deal in those areas, then let's do another small patch of land and then another small patch of land, and let's keep this process going accordingly until we secure a total Israeli withdrawal and a simultaneous total assertion of Lebanese control over areas south of the Letani River. Now, how you deal with the no how you replicate that north of the Litani River is a challenge. There's another challenge. Uh, right, let's not kid ourselves. This very understanding, this very framework, the very talks that we're having between Israel and Lebanon, the very constant, very American investment in a ceasefire in Lebanon arose in the shadow of Iranian coercion. At a certain point, the United States wants out of the war with Iran. Iran sees uh an opportunity here to say, you want out of the war with us? Out of the war with Lebanon, too. No war in Lebanon. So the question now is: does the United States want quiet with Iran? And I won't say peace with Iran because we know what the Iranian regime's intentions are. Do we want quiet with Iran more, or do we want Hezbollah's disarmament more? Because if we want quiet with Iran more, uh, then we could, I could see a scenario where the enforcement of the pilot zones becomes kind of superficial, uh, kind of ticking the boxes, a way to increase pressure on Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, to kind of remove the sticking point in US-Iranian negotiations rather than a method to hold Lebanon's feet to the fire. So slightly optimistic, but a little bit pessimistic. Or a little bit skeptical, still skeptical. I need to see the results.

Neri 14:02

Skepticism, I think, is in order. Um, and we'll get to the the Iran uh shadow, as you called it. I like that, the Iran shadow, uh, in just a moment. Um, just for our audience, uh Naem Qasim is the new head, the new secretary general of Hezbollah. He took over after Hassan Asrala was um removed from this earth by the IDF in what, late September 2024? September 27th. Yeah, September 27th, 2024. You remember the date? Uh yeah. It's an important date. It's a good day. It is it is a really important date. But um, I mean, basically the broad strokes, right? And we're gonna get into the pilot uh programs in just a second, too, because that's that's crucial in terms of how we move forward. But to my mind, the basic wager is that the IDF may redeploy or pull back. They don't use the word withdrawal in the agreement, but redeploy out of the security zone uh it now holds in southern Lebanon, about 10 kilometers north of the Israel-Lebanon border. So Israel is holding this kind of broad security zone again uh in southern Lebanon. So the idea is to find a mechanism to get the IDF to pull back, redeploy, withdraw southward um in its place, again, according to the kind of broad idea of the deal, the Lebanese armed forces, the LAF, as they're called, will move in and reassert control, sovereignty, make sure the area is clean of Hezbollah, essentially disarm Hezbollah, what do they call um non-state actors or substate actors in those areas? Um, and then you know, you said there's there's uh no no diplomatic agree agreements, but it is surprising that in as part of the 14 points, they do talk more ambitiously about a future pathway to ending the conflict between Israel and Lebanon, ending the state of war. I think that's also uh interesting. Uh you know, not unique.

David 15:54

But there's no diplomatic relations rather than uh Right.

Neri 15:57

Yeah, right. Which I which also is an interesting di distinction, right? Um you can be in you can end a state of war or end a conflict. Doesn't mean you necessarily actually have diplomatic relations. But again, this is kind of in the future more ambitiously, some would say um overly ambitious, uh, to have this kind of be a pathway to peace. But broad strokes, that's the that's the basic wager of of this agreement that they just signed in Washington on Friday. Um, but it all starts, as you said correctly, with these two pilot zones, um basically at the far end of the security zone that the IDF currently holds in southern Lebanon, which are supposed to be taken over by by the LAF, by the Lebanese army. Um I mean, to your to the best of your understanding, that's not supposed to happen tomorrow. It's supposed to happen in a few weeks, right? These two pilot air areas, these two pilot zones uh to be taken over by the LAF, right?

David 16:51

Uh yeah, I mean, I think there hasn't, I saw even something. There's this mechanism that's supposed to oversee this entire process. It's not expected to, I think I saw a headline in Lebanese news yesterday,

The Ability of the Lebanese Army to Fulfill These Obligations

David 17:00

Nahar, saying it's not expected to meet anytime soon. So unclear when this practically happens. Um, there are a lot of challenges for this on the Lebanese side. What does it look like for LAF to go in um and start to dismantle Hezbollah's infrastructure? I think we have, again, this goes back to the lack of understanding we have here on the American side uh of how Lebanon operates or how Hezbollah operates within Lebanon, right? If you go to the June 3rd agreement, it talked about uh Hezbollah's evacuation of its forces from the southern Litanis sector as a prerequisite to the maintenance maintenance of the seas or maintaining the ceasefire between the two sides. What um these guys are locals, right? These guys are from the villages. I mean, to for like to to create, you know, to to kind of draw a parallel to an Israeli parallel, these are basically uh Kitotkoninut, right? Uh these are locals. Uh first response teams? Yeah, first response is essentially, yeah. Yeah, local defense local defense teams for lack of lack of a better uh but they're locals. Uh some of them are married, some of them have properties, right? These are it's not, I mean you're asking people basically thousands of people to move northward. I'm not saying these are you know good people or decent people, they're terrorists, but they are local residents, so it's impractical. So the mechanism that's going to be required to disarm them is going to be something more like uh you know a ta'if style agreement of uh forced demobilization uh and basically perpetual monitoring, kind of putting these guys on probation to make sure they don't relapse for the foreseeable future. I don't know how, you know, we've seen how Hezbol has reacted to this deal. They're not fans, obviously. I don't know how LAF handles that uh and deals with that image in Lebanon, right? I think there's this is probably why there's we've gotten the deal. Let's see how far we can kick it down the road before we start the implementation, because the implementation has to look like uh if if the disarmament and clearing process is placed in the LAF's hands, it's going to look like forcible disarmament. Um and, you know, on the one hand, look, March 2nd of 2026, the Lebanese government takes an unprecedented decision, says Hezbollah's military activities are proscribed. Hasn't done anything about it since, right? Nice words on paper. The LAF, uh, about five or six days later basically puts out a statement effectively saying we're not carrying out this order, right? Domestic, the priority remains domestic peace and tranquility. And that remains the LAF's consistent line. And then you have, you know, everyone wants to talk up President Aon and Prime Minister Nawaf Sarah. They have both said in the period since March 2nd, 2026, uh, that uh the only way to resolve the issue of arms uh is uh through dialogue and consensus. This was their line, by the way, throughout most of the ceasefire period preceding March 2nd, 2026. Basically, for all the reasons we talked about, Hezbollah's support among Shia, and the Shia being a major demographic component in Lebanon, if not the largest single block, we need to talk to Hezbollah. We need to ask them nicely, will you disarm? And this creates kind of a stalemate in Lebanon that Hezbollah has in the past exported to regenerate, but this remains the line, and Hezbollah has is saying, we are not disarming, we're not giving up our arms. So I don't know what this looks like practically then, right? This is where we get to the rubber uh you know, rubber meeting the road. What does it look like for the IDF to redeploy from an area, withdrawal from an area, the LAF to move in, and the images of them going house to house, telling people, give up your arms, right? Do you have a tunnel in here? Are you, you know, you know, are you do you have a weapons production facility in your in your basement? And like these aren't, you know, we talk about the drones or the FPVs that have been a big problem for Israel uh over the past uh you know couple of months with the renewal of the war in Lebanon. If you go back to the 15 months during the ceasefire, the IDF talked about targeting uh drone production facilities, not necessarily FPVs, but drone production facilities in Lebanon. Well, these aren't like IAI, right? We're not talking about Raytheon here. We're talking about a guy who probably in his bathtub makes a component, a single component for these drones, or maybe assembles a single component, right? That doesn't make it any less dangerous. Uh, but that's what we're talking about. So the LAF has to go figure out who's producing uh you know weapons, weapons components, who has weapons caches under their house. I don't know what that looks like practically. I don't know how the LAF deals with that practically when the images of them confronting other Lebanese who are members of Hezbollah start to emerge.

Neri 21:29

FPVs are these are the fiber optic cable drones, uh first-person view they're called, uh use to deadly effect, not just in Ukraine, Russia, but uh in recent months, especially in southern Lebanon, causing many, many IDF casualties uh tragically, and uh still not a good not a good uh response to it um just yet from the IDF. Um I mean you pose you pose a good point, David. Uh okay, the the LAF has to go in and according to the terms of the deal, kind of uh clear. out these areas, make sure it's disarmed and clean of whatever his belongings.

David 22:06

Let's call it pacified.

Neri 22:08

Right. But then you have this coordination mechanism that the US is going to oversee. So they have to actually show the US and then by extension Israel that they're delivering. Otherwise the IDF will just remain in place and Lebanon potentially gets nothing from this deal.

David 22:24

Well yes, but again this is where the you know uh there's nothing new under the sun. Uh right um this was supposed to be the deal there was a there was a coordination mechanism that existed between November 27 2024 and March 2nd of 2026 that was overseen by the United States um and the LAF managed to fool everyone. I mean let's go back to January 8th of 2026 where Rodolf Heikel uh uh the head of the commander the commander of the LAF certified that uh uh the LAF had taken uh effect effective operational control effective control of the of the southern Litani sector of the area south of the Litani River. Now why is this significant? For several reasons. First of all Lebanon committed to do it right so September 5th of 2025 the government approves a plan um to you know the the LAF's disarmament plan. Initially it was supposed to be disarmament of Hezbollah throughout Lebanon by the end of 2025 then they diminished it to the southern Litani sector uh by the end of 2025. Hezbollah had played an interesting game. Naim Qasim uh going back to the outset of the deal um said Hezbollah's demobilization applies only south of the Leitani River. So effectively Hezbollah was saying we accept demobilization south of the Leitani River. Then you start to see Lebanese officials talk about these 500 positions. And actually in a tweet thread uh a few months back I kind of showed how these 500 Hezbollah positions that they'd allegedly dismantled, they started to shift geographically in terms of you know uh what they were and what and so on and so forth. But the consensus, kind of the narrative that eventually emerged was the LAF had already uh prior to the the uh approval of the the the LAF plan dismantled 500 uh Hezbollah positions south of the Litani River. So this is you know uh prior to September 5th. Let me take you to July 8th of 2025 where Naeem Qasim is asked point blank by Al Mayadin. What's the deal? Literally their answer to Al Jazeera. And uh you know the interviewer asks him well did they actually dismantle 500 positions south of the Litani River? And Naeem Qasim responds in the I don't know most clever way possible uh they've dismantled what they've seen. Thank God the country is vast. So that's point one. September 27th of 2025 so this is after the LAF adopts its plan Naim Qasim comes out this is Nasrella the anniversary of Nasrella's assassination says uh and I'm I'm paraphrasing here but effectively Hezbollah's regeneration is now outpacing even Israeli operations. And remember this is the time where Israel was conducting daily strikes on Hezbollah personnel assets what have you and two weeks later you start to see reporting uh from you know on on Israeli uh security cabinet discussions basically admitting that Hezbollah's regeneration is outpacing uh uh uh is even Israeli operations. I actually did a tracker for Longword Journal throughout this time for anyone who's interested in the nitty-gritty breakdown of what was said and what the Israelis did in response and the intensification of Israeli operations uh after that point. And then you go again to January 8th of 2026 LEF says we've we've done our job right we've we've hit the metric that we agreed to in September right disarmament south of Litani. And uh you know Naim Qasim comes out a couple weeks later uh in a speech and refuses to confirm that. And right reality then he should you know reality then shows that Hezbollah had not in fact been dismantled south of the Litani River. I mean just yesterday uh the IDF destroyed a 200 uh meter uh tunnel in Majdazun Majdazun was an area where the LAF was operating where if you recall I think it was last April or something uh I think several LAF soldiers were even killed and wounded uh taking over an abandoned uh Hezbollah installation I think it was abandoned like you know I think Hezbollah uh had abandoned this area expecting the IDF to take it over and booby trapped the remaining uh ordinance and the LAF walked into this I don't think this is intentional there were some people who tried to spin this on the Lebanese anti-Hezbolla side as intentionally charging the LAF that would be stupid by Hezbollah right now uh they want to appear as Lebanese as possible anyway the LAF was operating in this area the LAF had seized Hezbollah assets in this area and yet they somehow missed a 200 meter Hezbollah installation right under their noses. So there has been, this is again where my skepticism comes in that we've had the mechanism. We've had US oversight we've had Lebanese certification and it's all turned out to be false in the in the most egregious way that Hezbollah maintained enough of a fighting force and and and military assets in South Lebanon to be able to put up a quite a tough fight against the IDF for several months. Now Iran had to come in and pull their you know pull them out of the fire uh but still there they had enough assets in the area. So um the certification and this is kind of the deal right does say that the certification has to happen by a third party but I wonder I wonder about the mechanism through which that happens right I would not have a situation where the LAF can conduct unilateral patrols, unilateral disarmament without someone looking over their shoulder right it's not only the Hezbollah fighters that have to be demobilized and put on probation but Lebanon also has to be put on probation because it's demonstrated over the course of so many intervals that it is willing to play a game, to put on a theater of you know acting against Hezbollah while in fact kind of trying to split the difference, trying to get the benefit of looking like you're acting against Hezbollah, the benefit of ending Israel's military operations in Lebanon, ending Israel's presence in Lebanon, ending the pain, right? That is not just hurting Hezbollah, by the way, it's obviously affecting the Lebanese economy. It's affecting sectarian tensions in Lebanon. And don't forget Lebanon's already in a state of economic collapse. So you need that to end. But then not actually doing the thing that you know not actually going through the the tough work of dismantling Hezbollah so having your cake and eat it too. So there has to be someone credible third parties not just certifying something that the LAF shows but I would like to see joint patrols not U.S. forces not where there's no appetite for that in the United States. I was going to say yeah I don't see the the US Marines patrolling southern Lebanon nor should it be but look there are trusted you know there are there are actors that are trusted by both sides and I know the French are a little bit anathema uh in Israel right now but they're trusted by by the Lebanese um I think you know if we have French uh German uh and British patrols right you the Germans I mean the Israelis trust and trust you know close security ally of Israel uh they've done uh you know they can't no one can hermetically seal a border we've seen that with Israel vis-a-vis Gaza uh even the maritime border but they've you know the the German contingent of UNIFOL has done an excellent job when it comes to uh patrolling the maritime border uh with Lebanon and the UK has done an excellent job with the land border regimen right and these are these are security partners that Israel trusts uh the UK and Germany and Lebanon trusts France if we can have some kind of mixed ground force mixed ground patrol uh whereby these forces are in tandem with the LAF conducting patrols, verifying what the LAF is seeing, not letting the LAF off the hook. I mean I remember one incident again I I tracked this in my tracker but the the exact specifics are are are are escaping me and this is what we want to avoid where you know IDF tips off the mechanism uh that there's a specific Hezbollah installation right mechanism tells LAF go do it LAF has to coordinate with the local Hezbollah coordinator and obviously that guy is going to not want the LAF to seize the weapons and this is what happened in practice the coordinator is tipped off right uh when the LAF shows up he organizes a demonstration by the local women right the local villages women this distracts the LAF uh allows the Hezbollah operatives to remove the their weapons from the local installation and then you know the LAF and the local Hezbollah commander say look we're gonna we we've taken the weapons out you take pictures of the empty installation everyone goes home. LAF looks like it's doing its job LAF gets what it wants done without paying the price Hezbollah gets what it wants done without paying the price and then if you if you rely exclusively on Lebanon you could take this to the mechanism and say look empty installation right we took care of the problem and there's no shortage of you know spent munitions that you can detonate and claim you destroyed. So there need to be joint patrols that hold the LAF's feet to the fire real-time verification of what the LAF is doing that can then be submitted to the mechanism as demonstrable proof. Otherwise we're gonna fall for you know as as as US Ambassador Tom Barrick once called bullshit and I think we should be tired of the bullshit Israel Policy Forum is a policy organization rooted in the Jewish community.

Speaker 31:15

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David 31:57

If you rely on Israel Policy Forum for credible and nuanced analysis please make a tax deductible gift today at IPf.li slash support the pod or at the support the show link in the show notes so uh I'm very curious to get your sense of what the mood inside Lebanon at the moment obviously the the Lebanese government led by President uh Joseph Aoun um went and went ahead and signed this deal uh and it's fair to say that well Hezbollah obviously rejected it Hezbollah is not happy but what has been the reaction uh publicly and across the political spectrum um according to my information it hasn't been hasn't been warmly received in Lebanon this deal quite not and well let's also look at the framing that uh President Prime Minister Noah Salam and Ambassador Nadahmede have made of this deal it's not a peace agreement right they've talked about restoring Lebanese sovereignty securing Israeli withdrawal uh you know the return of the uh southern uh residents to their to their locales to their villages to their their hometowns and a million a million

The Mood Inside Lebanon

David 33:03

Lebanese have been displaced from southern Lebanon over the course of this exactly so that's the framing right it's not Yachil Leiter's framing of you know uh Hezbollah is out Iran is out you know bikinis or or sorry bathing suits and business suits going across the border I I I don't know where he's getting that from right I feel like he sometimes is is is is that the Israeli ambassador to the United States who negotiated this deal.

Neri 33:27

I I feel like he's often talking um for Israeli public consumption obviously and also to a certain kind of American public consumption.

David 33:37

Which we'll which I hope we'll talk about in in a second like why explaining the the rhetoric on the Israeli side but yeah I just want to say his book on uh the uh the the Hebrew Bible's influence on jock John Locke's political philosophy recommended reading uh brilliant uh but yeah when it comes to these negotiations I am often flabbergasted by his statements uh so that's the political echelon right this is going to secure our our desires as Lebanon through sovereign you know through Lebanese sovereignty and so on and so forth. Now yes obviously Hezbollah rejects this Hezbollah rejects this for for obvious reasons they want they they don't want to normalize two things. The very concept of an Israeli flag and a Lebanese flag standing next to each other um at a at a at a negotiation is anathema, ideologically anathema to Hezbollah right they don't want this to be something that becomes normalized because that threatens their underlying premise. It's not that the negotiations themselves and the contents are necessarily posing a direct threat to Hezbollah but the idea of Lebanese breathing the same air as Israelis in an amicable fashion or at least a non-hostile fashion is problematic for Hezbollah even though you saw the Lebanese ambassador went out of her way to pretend Ambassador Leiter and his country don't exist. And if you go back to the first meeting between the sides right the ambassadors I've I think there was some kind of mess up in the protocol they end up getting photographed next to each other and Lebanese media right there are reports not just in the you know the pro-Hezla outlets but I think even MTV Lebanon reported on this was there a handshake between the Lebanese ambassador and the Israeli ambassador God forbid guys don't worry there wasn't uh her hands remained pure uh right but this this should kind of give you an understanding of the mentality going on in Lebanon but the very image is problematic the very image is problematic for Hezbollah so they object to that on principle. The second part is this they want to make sure that the Lebanese state knows ahead of time if you touch our weapons you're in trouble. This goes back to Nasralla's uh May 2008 uh threats the hand that touches the weapons of the resistance will be cut off this is basically the modern permutation of it softer because Hezbollah is in a little bit more trouble right now um so you know obviously they have to you know go out into the streets and demonstrate and then Amel and Hezbollah it's not just Hezbollah supporters it's Amel supporters also going out and demonstrating against this deal Amel is the is the other major Shia party uh which you know we in the West and even in Israel I've seen commentators talk about Amel as the moderates meanwhile Amel uses its moderate image to provide cover for Hezbollah and we can talk about that at length if you're if you're interested for your for your listeners they're out in the streets and then Hezbollah and Amal frame this response as spontaneous I don't buy it but you know uh they they need to show look we we're we are willing to confront you. As for the average Lebanese from the commentariat to the politicians to the average person, I think it's a mixed bag. You know, I've seen a lot of the commentary uh you know approve of the deal writ large not so much of uh you know the specific terms right I think Michael Young for example was talking about state sovereignty being unconditional uh which is a ridiculous notion because we have concept state sovereignty is an international law concept uh you know territorial integrity uh and so on and so forth and international law creates exceptions right conditions upon state sovereignty namely if you uh engage in a war of aggression or if you if a non-state actor engages in a war of aggression from your territory that opens you up to self-defense uh and potentially belligerent occupation both of which are entirely legal under international law if they're done correctly obviously uh and uh those are conditions upon state sovereignty they diminish state sovereignty so um I've seen a lot of that commentary kind of this idea the Lebanese have that uh their state sovereignty should be unconditional and unconditioned while somehow at the same time tolerating a non-state actor that continues to you know take that state sovereignty and run with it and being okay with a situation where nothing is done to confront them because at the same time Michael Young and those like him will tell you we don't want forcible disarmament. This will lead to civil war. Okay so what's the solution? And then you have, you know, I think most Lebanese though just want quiet, right? I think they want a restoration of quiet. So I think there's some kind of hesitation about Israel's intentions is Israel really taking this and running with it are they going to occupy Lebanon in perpetuity right there is a distrust of Israeli intentions but I think the average Lebanese if I had to summarize it and this includes many of Hezbollah's supporters by the way who aren't hardened ideologues they view Hezbollah as their vehicle for quiet wrongly but they want quiet. This is this is the Lebanese goal now how do we get quiet will this bring us just an end to this war, end to this mess? We have enough problems, the economy's still in shambles, the country has a lot of corruption, this is a borderline failed state, if not a failed state already can we just end this pointless war and go back to our lives and and and not have this so I think they'll take anything that that gives them that out.

Neri 38:46

And the idea that this is we're gonna get to the real Israeli reaction in just a second so it'll tie into what I'm about to say but is the I mean it's it's a fact. Which has not been made public but um a credible version of it yeah there have been leaks. For the average Lebanese right to say nothing of the people displaced from southern Lebanon it does not look like the IDF is going to withdraw anytime soon. And Israeli leaders I get we'll get to that in a second are making that very clear. So the fact that this is going to be a drawn out and correctly a conditions based um withdrawal or redeployment by the IDF is that not feeding into greater Lebanese public discontent that why did you sign this deal with Israel? I mean I guess I understand maybe American American pressure but why did uh this Lebanese government actually go ahead and and accept this agreement to your mind.

David 39:49

Look I mean they don't really have an option uh I think this Lebanese government is trying to show that negotiations like what what's what's what's the uh the core of Hezbollah's legitimacy right it's not that you know all these Shiites that support it and some non-Shiites right have suddenly become Khomeinists or believers in the Khomeinist ideology. If you go to the average Hezbollah supporter they're probably I like to say like indistinguishable in terms of their mentality outlook and lifestyle from you or I. So why are you following an Islamist organization that specifically has an Islamist theocratic model? It's because you believe that there's this entity south of the border in part, right? There's a large part this resistance narrative yeah this entity south of the border called Israel that wants to as a matter of ideology as a matter of culture as a matter of just you know ideological imperative this is Zionism, right? Wakes up in the morning and wants to kill you, uh murder you in the most horrific ways and take your land and steal your resources. And you know just because uh and they'll use all these types of justifications but really it's the ideological imperative driving Israel. The irony by the way to frame the Israelis is this way by Hezbollah. But you know and the only thing deterring this rapacious murderous greedy entity is the strength of the resistance right but for Hezbollah strength this would be your fate Lebanon.

Neri 41:08

To be clear that this is exactly backwards right if there was no Hezbollah or even before no P no PLO Palestine Liberation Organization, um Israeli tanks would not have crossed the border north ever.

David 41:22

There's no interest. I mean there was in 1948 but that's because Lebanon attacked first right and the Israelis withdrew as part of the armistice agreement in 1948 uh sorry 1949 armistice agreement uh that required also both states to have no no you know no belligerent intentions towards each other by state or non-state actors so this could have been solved in 1949 guys um so uh what the Lebanese state is trying to demonstrate is oh oh oh and the other corollary is that once the Israeli acts on their you know their uh bloodlust and and territorial greed the only way to eject them is through resistance perpetual resistance right and what the Lebanese state is trying to do is to say well no we don't need resistance we can get this done through negotiations um and there is an element there where you know look this puts Israel in a in almost a catch-22 right uh this goes back to Ahud Barak back in 2000. He tried to undermine the narrative of Hezbollah without undermining Hezbollah's ability to regenerate and maintain power. And Hezbollah just spun the whole thing the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 not as Israel's lack of desire to maintain occupation of Lebanon obviously there were a million and one domestic Israeli reasons for the Israeli withdrawal at the time that's a complicated story right it would take us an hour just to talk about what were the domestic Israeli reasons for the withdrawal that had very little to do with with the success of Hezbollah's military campaign. It's easier to sell this idea that we pushed them out. So you have to deal with both if you're Israel. You have to shatter the narrative you have to demonstrate conclusively we have no territorial ambitions in Lebanon if you're Israel. We have no greed that this narrative is nonsense while at the same time defeating Hezbollah conclusively to show it was not resistance that pushed us out guys we left willingly we left willingly to show you we don't have territorial it's only security it's only security of our our citizens so the Lebanese government is trying to show that look this can be achieved through diplomacy you don't need resistance. The problem is you're dealing with an actor that is uh like Hezbollah that is uh very adaptable very smart very pragmatic so this necessity right trying to shatter the myth of resistance drove Lebanon to this I think there is US pressure I think there is a reality on the ground how else do you get Israel to stop? How else do you get Israel to stop the war? Now that does not mean entering these negotiations that Lebanon either wants conclusive peace with Israel or has any intention to confront Hezbollah they want they're doing whatever it takes to get the Israeli war effort to stop and Israel to withdraw. What happens after that? They'd ideally like it to be left Exclusively in Lebanese hands. And I think we'll end up if that's if that happens, we end up in a situation like we did between 2006 and 2023.

Neri 44:07

Okay. Um, and by the way, 2000, uhud Barak, then Israeli Prime Minister, withdrew Israel from the former, the previous security zone it had held uh for nearly 20 years. We're not gonna relitigate the security zone. That that would actually be a a uh wholly separate episode, actually a really interesting one, I think, given that uh there's a new security zone. Yeah. I was gonna get to it in in just a minute, but uh we may as well talk about it now. The reasons for not only Israel agreeing to this deal, but also the Lebanese government agreeing to this deal and also the US kind of now promoting this deal comes, as you said at the top, in the shadow of the overall Iran war and the US-Iran negotiations. Um it's a major talking point in Washington at the moment. This idea that Marco Rubio is uh leading the Israel-Lebanon track and kind of had a big win over the weekend versus the JD Vance led uh US-Iran negotiation track, which did not have a very good weekend. Um I I differ with that analysis. Uh my point of view, uh, and I've said this to people, I don't think, on the podcast, but basically you wouldn't have had this uh US Israel-Lebanon agreement without the shadow of the overall Iran war and the larger negotiations with Iran. That the fear of Iran actually dictating the terms of everything that was happening in Lebanon, and it has had uh a major impact and influence on events in Lebanon uh since April, right? Kind of forcing Trump to force the Israelis to actually stop firing. Um, and that's kind of spurred Israel to actually agree finally to enter into real negotiations

The Reasons Why Both Sides Agreed to This Deal

Neri 45:50

with Lebanon and agree to this deal, which um had been mooted since March and April, right? And Israel wasn't in any hurry because it thought it would have all the time in the world to go and hammer Hezbollah. Uh and also I think for the government in Beirut that uh it didn't want Iran to be dictating to Lebanon what it can and cannot do, and it didn't want um Iran and by extension Hezbollah to be the ones uh to get credit for well, Israel stopping the war and the idea of withdrawing. Um, and it wanted actually to preempt that. Am I right or am I wrong with this thesis?

David 46:29

Look, you're you're you're absolutely right. I actually wrote a 2400-word monstrosity on Longword Journal called The Road to the Second Lebanon War, or the Road to the Second Lebanon ceasefire that shows the sequencing of um uh how the you know the April 16th agreement came about, and it was, yes, specifically. I mean, you look at the uh the the pattern then, and we've seen that pattern replicate itself. Uh US and Iran come to a deal to cease hostilities, it wasn't a full ceasefire agreement. Iran says Lebanon's included. Initially, the US says no, right? President Privice Vice President J. Z. Vance initially said no, Lebanon's not part of the agreement. Why should it have been? The Israeli campaign in Lebanon never implicated us. This is where the Iranians kind of caught us. Um Israel could uh prosecute the war in Lebanon, the campaign in Lebanon, either high-intensity, low-intensity conflict, and there's never any risk of the United States getting directly involved. All the Israelis need from us at that point is some diplomatic cover um and and uh renewing, uh sorry, replenishing uh weapons stockpiles. Otherwise, we have an ally taking care of an enemy of ours. I mean, Hezbollah not just has historical, historically American blood on their hands, they define the United States as their primary enemy. Israel is a mere, sorry, Israelis, uh uh you're the you're only a tool and a forward military base in Hezbollah's uh in Hezbollah's conception, advancing a nefarious American interest. I mean, the the Hezbollah narrative says that the 2006 war, America pushed a hesitant Israel to prosecute that war, right? Israel didn't really want to fight 2006. So that's that's kind of the conception. So Hezbollah is focusing on, you know, through the region ending American influence in concert with Iran. So Israel's taking care of an ally for us, or sorry, an enemy for us, and uh no cost to us. No, no, no possibility that we will ever have to be, uh that the Marines will ever have to deploy on the ground to get rid of Hezbollah. The Iran war changed things, right? Because then you have direct American intervention in the Middle East, uh, which ran uh against uh President Trump's uh electoral promises, no new wars, no new forever wars. And it was hurting the economy. And Iran realized they had us at that point where they said, okay, you want quiet with us, you want this quiet so badly? Fine, we want quiet in Lebanon. And we're not gonna let you off the hook until we get quiet in Lebanon. And for Iran, the calculus is obvious. It's not because of Lebanon, it's because they want to save their most valuable asset, which is Hezbollah. And you start to see this pressure campaign build on Israel to stop its campaign in Lebanon. Uh, all these reports of President, which President Trump has confirmed, of American pressure, direct American pressure. Don't ruin this for us, guys. We don't care. Yeah.

Neri 49:14

Stop bombing Beirut.

David 49:17

Stop bombing Beirut. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Uh Ahmed Shadow could do it better, right? Um, so uh we start to see this pressure campaign on Israel. Don't ruin this deal for us with your little sideshow over here, right? This doesn't matter. This is what matters. We're out, you're fault, you're falling in line. Look, the Israelis really, at the end of the day, uh, you know, you don't have an option, right? Israel depends on us for weapons. Israel depends on us, more importantly, I think, for diplomatic and moral support. But also you don't cross President Trump, right? This whole narrative that's grown in the conspiratorial swamp on the right, Tucker Carlson and so on and so forth, that Bibi was dictating to Trump. Like, come back to reality, guys. Um, and I think President Trump wanted to prove that with this to some degree. Uh, so the war in Lebanon started to uh kind of adapt to an Iranian set tempo. Now, there is some element of truth that the Lebanese wanted to kind of take this out of Iranian hands at the same time. Uh, Prime Minister Nof Salam, and if I'm not mistaken, also President Owen, has said these two tracks can't be separated. They are more than happy to benefit from the leverage that the Iran track gives them uh while pretending, you know, this this whole state sovereignty stuff, you know, while while playing at that, but they are more than happy to benefit from the leverage they're getting over Israel that they otherwise would not have had through Iran pressuring the United States to pressure the Israelis. And they've explicitly acknowledged it. I think it was May 13th, uh if I'm not mistaken, or May 6th. It was sometime in May that Nawath Salam said the Islamabad track and the Lebanon track are not entirely separate. And more recently, uh President Awan said something very similar. Uh so again, Lebanese are happy to have their cake and eat it too. Uh, but yes, this did, this very framework, this very concept of US-Lebanese, or sorry, Israeli-Lebanese negotiations reaching this point, uh, is being driven forward by Iranian pressure. Now, are there attempts? Uh I don't know if there's a clash between Vice President Vance and uh and Secretary of State Rubio. I don't want to be part of this pile on Vice President Vance. I think he's he's in a very tough position, um, trying to salvage what he can uh out of a war he never believed in and a war that ultimately stalled. Um so don't envy the man. I think he's trying to do what's in the best interest of the United States, even if I disagree with some framing. I think Secretary Rubio is trying to backstop the vice president by at least snatching victory from the jaws of defeat in Lebanon, right? Where, okay, Iran's trying to do an end run around us through Lebanon. How can we do an end run around them by having the best, you know, you want a ceasefire in Lebanon, Iran? Great. Let's give you the worst possible ceasefire that you can that you could want. Now, I'm hoping that's the case, right? And that again depends. That will whether that ends up being the case, whether this ceasefire deal that Secretary of State Rubio is uh pushing through through in in Lebanon that you know culminated in the in the in the June 26th framework ends up uh outflanking Iran uh will depend on American commitment to disarming Hezbollah outweighing uh our commitment to or our desire to have this uh quiet with with the Iranians. I will not say peace.

Neri 52:34

Yeah, it's a really interesting question how uh both Hezbollah and Iran play this, um, especially if the LAF actually go into these pilot zones and maybe beyond and start maybe causing Hezbollah some discomfort. Um so what happens on the ground in Lebanon and also how Iran reacts to all of it will be uh will be interesting. Um it's fair to say that Iran uh feels very emboldened. Uh and we see that just in in recent days, um trying to demand certain things with regard to the Strait of Hormuz. Um we have to talk about the Israeli reaction to all of this. Uh needless to say, uh the deal uh is viewed a lot more favorably in Israel. I think the deal is uh planted uh more favorably to Israeli equities than it is um arguably to Lebanese equities, at least in the uh immediate term. Uh but not a surprise to see Prime Minister uh Bibi Netanyahu uh frame this as a quote historic agreement uh with Lebanon uh that allows Israel to uh keep slash retain uh its security zone indefinitely. And this is this is the way he's framing it, right? Uh that Israel will remain in southern Lebanon for as long as necessary, for as long as uh there is a threat to northern Israel, um, until Hezbollah is disarmed. So that may mean forever. I mean, depending on how how uh optimistic or pessimistic you are with regard to the LAF actually being able to disarm Hezbollah. Uh and interestingly, he he frames this also uh that this security zone and the idea of staying in South Lebanon has been done via this agreement with the acquiescence, with the approval of both the Lebanese and American governments, which uh which is interesting and also uh arguably very damaging for the Lebanese government. Um so that's how Netanyahu is framing it. There are some voices on the hard right, you know, Betzel Smartrichitamar Benvir that are at least kind of play acting like they're not in favor of this agreement. They wanted to continue bombing Hezbollah, um, they wanted

The Israeli Reaction to the Deal

Neri 54:39

to kind of disregard uh, I don't know, Donald Trump. I don't know. That's just their play acting. Uh their other actual criticisms of the deal, not so much I think, on its merits, but arguing, I'd say correctly, that Netanyahu waited too long to actually um embrace and move forward with the diplomatic track vis-a-vis Lebanon, that like I mentioned earlier, this could have this could have been gotten um maybe March or April before Iran started kind of impacting the negotiations, and now you're doing kind of this rear guard action um at the last minute via Marco Rubio to get this deal, um, which like I said tilts very favorably to to Israel if you want to stay uh and maintain the security zone in southern Lebanon. So uh as a close watcher, David, uh as well of Israeli politics, uh, what did you think of how the Israeli side is framing this?

David 55:32

So I think look, there, I mean, there's there's break, like we got to break it down, right? So and we'll get to the prime minister and and the government last, but uh look, I think the Israeli public has been split on Lebanon ceasefires uh since November 27, 2024, especially the residents of the north, right? They're the they're the people with the least margin of error uh, you know, to to trust in Lebanon, to see a Lebanese flag across the border, on on, you know, or on the blue line rather, on the frontier line, it's not an international border yet, but see, you know, see a Lebanese flag across the frontier line and feel security, right? Because these are the people that have lived in the shadow of Hezbollah's harassment and threats of various forms uh uh for years, uh, seeing Hezbolla literally across the border, uh, you know, laser pointers, sounds of digging, and then October 7th happens, which, you know, the concept of the October 7th attack was created by Hezbollah. This is their invasion of the Galilee. I always like to point out, like, Sarit Sahavi, for example. She's a resident of the north. Uh, and whatever you know, divergences of opinion we may have, she heads the Alma Research Center. Um, this is a this is a person whose daughters live in the shadow of Hezbollah. And what I appreciate about it about Sarit is she has no margin of error. This is this is her, these are her daughters' lives that are there. And so this is the situation for many residents of the North. I think they're expressing some skepticism. Then when we go to the Israeli opposition, I think we've seen Avikdur Lieberman, uh, I think Eri Lapid, uh uh Gadi Eisen quote. I haven't seen Naftali Bennett uh say anything yet uh on this. Uh I'm sure he will. Um, but we've seen skepticism. We've seen skepticism. I think Lieberman was skeptical of Lebanon's ability to fulfill its end of the bargain, not wrongly.

Neri 57:15

So, I think Lieberman loves nothing more than to outflank Netanyahu from the right. Um, I don't know if Lieberman would be making different decisions if he was Prime Minister, but you know, that that's what the opposition does.

David 57:27

Sure. And this is where we'll get to Netanyahu in a second. Uh but look, even yet you're Lapid, I think there's some element like there's an element of truth in what they're saying, but there's also, I mean, look, Lapide was taken to task for the 2022 maritime uh border agreement between Israel and Lebanon by Prime Minister Netanyahu, by then opposition leader uh uh Benjamin Netanyahu. And now I think this is he finds this to be his opportunity to hit back, uh, to say, well, oh, I made a bad deal, you made a bad deal. Um uh so I think there's an element of pettiness. Obviously, this is this is politics, and uh Israeli politics are unfortunately uh pettiness is the pettiest. Just watch a Knesset debate, guys. It's it's it's hilarious sometimes. Um and and and so this brings us to the government. Look, I think the average Israeli wants peace, peace with Lebanon. I think, and we'll get into why if you want in a second. Like where do the perceptions on each side, uh, the public perceptions of each side, where do they go wrong? The Israeli perception of the Lebanese and vice versa. Um, but when we get to the government, obviously, look, we seem to forget that Prime Minister Netanyahu, all the statements that him, uh he, sorry, Defense Minister Katz, his entire government are making, this is an election year. And they just have to maintain an image of strength until October. It's already July, right? That's what, four months from now, uh, three months from now. They just have to cross that threshold where, yeah. And so when it comes to uh you know winning, and Prime Minister Netanyahu has said he intends to run in the election. He obviously intends to win, he wants to form the next government, right? This is a man whose ambitions have not ended. Um and Prime Minister Netanyahu is bread and butter, the source of his support for decades uh now has been that he is Mr. Economy and Mr. Security. But Mr. Security, the biggest security failure in the state of Israel's history, occurred on his watch. Um and now, so that's point one. He has, I'm not going to say that every action he has taken, everything he's authorized over the past nearly three years, since October 7th of 2023, has been purely motivated by um, you know, uh political cynicism. I think a lot of the actions any Israeli prime minister uh of any, you know, of any caliber would have taken. But there has been, obviously, he is looking forward, he is a master politician, and Netanyahu is always campaigning. So that's point one. Point two was something that then opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu said to, I forget which part of the rotation it was, whether it was the Bennett or the Lapide part of the rotation of the uh Bennett-Lapede government, but he said one of the things that is required of an uh Israeli prime minister is the ability to say no to a U.S. president. Um and right, uh yeah. I mean, maybe Menachem Begin can do that, right? But Menachem Begin was a very unique, uh unique creature. May he rest in peace.

Neri 1:00:12

Aaron Powell It's easier to say no to an American president when you haven't literally alienated everyone else in Washington, D.C., over the course of 30 years in power. Yep.

David 1:00:23

Uh include and increasingly on the Republican side. And you know, you can perhaps say no to a President George H.W. Bush, President Clinton, a president George W. Bush, President Obama, President Biden. Uh you don't really get away with saying no to President Trump. And President Trump has been making it very, very, very clear that Bibi has not been saying no to him. Uh he has not been sparing the Israeli Prime Minister in terms of media leaks, in terms of confirming those media leaks. There's an element of I'm bringing this man, you know, I'm putting him in his place, right? Especially when saying things like, Shara could do it better, Shaddrah could deal with Hezbollah better. There's there's an element of humiliation that's involved here. And I think it's deliberate. Um and the prime minister going into the election can't have these. I mean, imagine, these are the sound bites that are going to play on every Israeli TV station as the uh uh the general election uh campaign heats up. And Bibi has no response to this. So obviously he has to say things like, this is a historic agreement. Obviously he has to say, no, look, look, I wasn't forced into this. This is exactly what I wanted. This is giving Israel exactly what it wants. We're restoring security in the north, we're staying as long as we want. And Israel only has to stay as as late as October, right? For BB to be able to kind of pass this off.

Neri 1:01:43

Uh that's the key.

David 1:01:44

Which isn't that far off.

Neri 1:01:45

No, it's not that far off, but that is the key question to my mind. Um how how much pressure you're gonna get from the Trump administration to actually speed up and expedite the IDF redeployment, right? That you want to show the Lebanese that hey, this is not just uh kind of a Potemkin Potemkin withdrawal or whatever whatever metaphor and term you want to use. Uh, and uh that you're going to actually um well hope that the LAF uh you know delivers the goods and also that the IDF and and by you know obviously the Israeli government shows more flexibility. Um and yet, David, as we're speaking, live hot off the presses, um the Prime Minister's office issued a notice. BB went uh to the security zone in southern Lebanon today and met with troops. And he said, uh, we are staying, we are not leaving the security zone. Now, again, security zone could mean many things. It could be 10 kilometers uh wide, or it could be a narrow band you know across the across the border. It could be the five points, it could be the five points that you had after the November 2024 ceasefire. So yeah, uh obviously Netanyahu um making it very clear that the IDF um on his watch will will stay. I imagine this isn't going to go over very well uh in Beirut, the Netanyahu, I guess. I mean, he he went to into Lebanon uh again. I think he's done it before, but he went and did a Lebanon and then Syria.

David 1:03:13

I mean, yeah.

Neri 1:03:14

Yeah, he's gotten to Gaza again. Uh this is all part of it. But my question to you, and we'll have to end it here, David. Um, this is not the first uh I don't want to say peace deal, but kind of pathway to a peace deal signed between Israel and Lebanon. There was a famous slash infamous deal signed in May of 1983, um, in the midst of the IDF campaign, uh, the first Lebanon War, as it's called here. Uh, this was signed. Uh well, it I think they were formulating it under then President Bashir Jamael. He was assassinated uh in September of that year of 82, and then in May of 1983, his brother Amin Jamael signed uh this deal with uh with Israel, uh, and that agreement did not last a year and it collapsed, uh, and it was kind of a you know a footnote in history. So do you think this latest Israel-Lebanon deal will will meet the same fate? And are you concerned about the fate of this current Lebanese leadership as well?

David 1:04:16

Uh, that's uh big order. Look, I I I don't know. I I think again, the pilot zones give me some sliver of hope, but I I think my pessimism outweighs, just given the historical track record, and seeing that in Lebanon, the conditions have not changed sufficiently uh for uh bringing about Hezbollah's disarmament. Look, I I'm not, you know, I'm probably one of the very few people on the pro-Israel side, or you know, very few people in the Jewish community or Israelis who are saying, I don't care for peace between Israel and Lebanon. I think it would be a one-sided agreement in Lebanon's favor. And you see, even the Lebanese that are making the case for Israeli-Lebanese peace, it's almost like, look at all the benefits we can derive from Israel. What are the benefits to Israel? Right? So I'm not exactly like, you know, I can I can live without it. What I think is necessary right now, and I think look, on the Lebanese side, the average

Can Peace Be Achieved?

David 1:05:06

Lebanese, right, these types of Lebanese are trying to inflate their numbers as the Lebanese national consensus, the average Lebanese doesn't like Hezbollah, wants probably Hezbollah disarmed in some way, maybe wants to get things out of Israel first, right, to get Hezbollah's disarmament. But overall, the Lebanese want Hezbollah's disarmament. Um, but also doesn't like, you know, doesn't like Israel at all. Uh so they don't want peace with Israel anytime soon. And look, those are for justified and unjustified reasons, right? There are some, you know, the is Israel hasn't exactly gone into Lebanon with the lightest touch, let's put it lightly, over the years. But there's also a lot of conspiratorial thinking about Jews and Zionism and Israel that exists in Lebanon that fuels this. Um so uh putting, you know, put it putting that aside, like let's just aim for quiet here. Let's aim for quiet. Here's the absurdity for me, Mary. Yeah, 2006 happened. I was a soldier in the IDF. Uh, we talked about this before the show. And you know, I was a young punk back then. And uh this is 20 years ago, right?

Neri 1:06:03

A nice Jewish boy from Beirut. Uh nice Jewish boy from Beirut.

David 1:06:06

Joining the IDF paratroopers. Um first time going back to Lebanon, too, and and in the IDF uniform. But look, the I the kind of the the the surrealism of this for me has been that there were there were children that were born when I was fighting in Lebanon that are today fighting in the same villages. And what I do not want is for their children, for my children or their children to be fighting in those same villages 18, 20 years from now. And I don't want the same for Lebanese either, right? Like I think, you know, the waste that's happening of Lebanese youth on the other other side, you know, these young people that are joining Hezbollah's ranks, that energy is wasted that could be put into building up their country. Um, so how do we put into place a situation that, again, forget peace, quiet, genuine quiet for the next 20-something years. Uh whereby, you know, I don't know if you've been to the border, Mary, but I'm sure you could see Lebanese on the other. You can see them, not just at a distance. In some cases, your backyard is a Lebanese guy's backyard, right? You're you're you're the only thing dividing your farming area is some artificially drawn line. Um, and what I would like to see is a situation that this deal creates, an environment that this deal creates, where a Lebanese farmer looks southward and doesn't see a potential invader, doesn't see a potential soldier, sees a farmer, sees someone, and thinks, oh, I'm growing tomatoes, they're growing tomatoes. What is he putting on his tomatoes? Let me take a closer look. And an Israeli looks northward and doesn't worry about laser pointers into their house, threatening uh billboards in poor Hebrew, digging sounds, sees a shepherd and doesn't think, is that shepherd a Hezbollah lookout, or is he just a shepherd? Sees just a shepherd. Twenty years on, let's talk about peace then when genuine quiet is created. And genuine quiet can only be created if Hezbollah is disarmed in the meantime. If this deal leads to Hezbollah's disarmament in the meantime, then we can have genuine quiet. We can resolve the border issues with, you know, with Lebanon and Israel being brought together under the American Aegis. Um, and then 20 years on, when there's no bloodshed, no suspicion, no perception of threat, then you can have a situation where peace is viable. But let's at least get to quiet now. Now, will this deal bring quiet? I genuinely hope so. I genuinely want to overcome my cynicism and pessimism here and hope so. But ultimately, I keep thinking about the historical failures that have occurred, and again, that the conditions in Lebanon have yet to ripen to disarm Hezbollah. And so long as Hezbollah remains armed or active or has the ability to regenerate, then any quiet that exists along the blue line, I don't care if it lasts five years, ten years, fifty years, will be a deceptive quiet, will be another another lull in between the in between one round of fighting and the next. And I think that's the worst possible outcome for this deal.

Neri 1:08:59

Really well put, David. Um, and on the issue of the fate of this Lebanese government, I mean, if they take it too too far or maybe not far enough with regard to pressing Hezbollah to to give up its weapons.

David 1:09:12

Like the genuine their personal safety. I don't see Lebanon, I don't see Hezbollah has like I think when it comes to civil war, I think the threat of civil war, having civil war hang over hang as a democli sword over the head of the Lebanese state, the Lebanese government, security forces, and the Lebanese public serves Hezbollah more than actually acting on that threat. Because right now, right, the Lebanese have something to lose. They're still, oh, we haven't gone to civil war, let's avoid that, guys. Once you, once you know, you you you break that glass, then then it's it's you know, it it it's it's any man, every man for himself. And Hezbollah realizes this. And also, I can't imagine on the Israeli side uh that if Hezbollah initiates a civil war against the rest of Lebanon, that the Israeli side won't step in and hit Hezbollah from the back. And I imagine Hezbollah is very aware of this. So keeping Lebanon in fear of civil war uh is more it, you know, it's more helpful to Hezbollah because it stays Lebanon's hand, right? It keeps Lebanon not moving, it maintains a status quo, and that creates a gap that allows Hezbollah to regenerate. Um, same thing with assassinations. I think where Hezbolla wants to lean into now, or we've seen them lean into, uh, and this is why I've actually kind of been very annoyed where Israelis uh uh dismiss Naim Qasim, or where kind of the anti-uh Hezbollah Lebanese activists feed into this dismissal of Naem Qasim. Look, yeah, Naim Qasim doesn't have the bombast of Nasrella, but Hezbollah doesn't need bombast right now. Hezbollah needs the you know the quiet, soft-spoken, mousy uh uh you know, former chemistry teacher who's able to kind of calm temperatures, who's who's disregarded, who's underestimated, who's able to take Hezbollah below the radar on one hand and lean into Hezbollah's Lebanese-ness, if you will, on the other hand, to show no, we are not the problem in Lebanon. We are a responsible actor. Everything we've done has been in Lebanon's interests. And if assassinations happen right now of either government officials or military officials, the finger is automatically going to be pointed against Hezbollah. So if anything, uh, you know, it's in Hezbollah's interest, and I say this somewhat facetiously, to give Joseph on a bodyguard detail, right? In case someone else wants to make it look like them, right? But they're not going to go for the assassination right now because that's another thing that could, you know, the Lebanese will say, screw it, we're already at war with you then, right? We no longer have to fear civil war. You just killed the president. That represents, if there is such a thing as the Lebanese consensus on an individualistic basis, he represents the Lebanese consensus. He represents to some degree what we all want. What we don't want is definitely maybe we don't like this deal. Maybe we don't like the Israelis, maybe we don't like details about the deal. We don't like political assassinations. You are the enemy, Hezbollah. You've now proven yourself the enemy again. So I think for Hezbollah, again, they have to maintain the threat of civil war, not the action of civil war, not moving towards assassination. Again, flying below the radar, acting like a responsible Lebanese actor and avoiding attacking Lebanon because they realize if that happens, all of Lebanon will line up against them, and Israel will, Israel will definitely take advantage of that situation to finish off the organization. So I'm not so much worried. I think what we could see is street pressure, political pressure, political paralysis. Hezbollah has done this before, and it's achieved the goals without firing a single without a single firing a single shot.

Neri 1:12:23

I'll take that as a silver lining. I don't want to see another civil war in Lebanon. I don't think that would be good uh for anyone, and despite certain certain voices here in Israel kind of uh saying that uh whoa, it it may actually serve our interests. I I don't quite see it that way. Um Chaos doesn't serve Israel's interest. No, I don't I don't believe so. I don't believe so. Uh the last civil war in Lebanon didn't quite uh serve Israeli interests either for I mean it was over 20 years, Israel's involvement, whether overt or covert. Um we could go for another hour uh to talk about the 1980s, uh, but we won't do that this episode, David. Uh thank you so much for coming on. This is great.

David 1:13:00

It was a pleasure, it's always a pleasure, Narry.

Neri 1:13:03

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