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Armenian News Network - Groong: Week In Review Podcast
Abhinav Pandya - From Sindoor to Syunik: India’s New Geopolitical Frontline | Ep 443, June 6, 2025
Conversations on Groong - June 6, 2025
In this episode of Conversations on Groong, we speak with Abhinav Pandya about the emerging Turkey–Pakistan–Azerbaijan axis and its implications for India’s security and regional posture. We explore the symbolism behind the opening of an empty airport in Berdzor (Lachin), the broader strategic coordination among these three nations, and how India responded with Operation Sindoor following a major terror attack in Pahalgam. The conversation also looks at Armenia’s growing role as a strategic partner for India, the complexities of managing ties with Iran, and the challenges facing multilateral projects like IMEC. Pandya outlines the ideological and hybrid threats India faces and what it must do to stay ahead in a shifting geopolitical landscape.
Topics
- Turkey-Pakistan-Azerbaijan Axis
- Operation Sindoor
- Armenia As a Strategic Partner
- West Asia and Eurasia Context
- Future Outlook
Guest
Hosts
Episode 443 | Recorded: June 3, 2025
SHOW NOTES: https://podcasts.groong.org/443
VIDEO: https://youtu.be/nhKhHx_Tpwo
#OperationSindoor #IndiaForeignPolicy #TurkeyPakistanAxis #ArmeniaIndiaRelations #india #armenia
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Hello, everyone, and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode.
Today,
we're speaking with Dr.
Abhinav Pandya,
founder and CEO of the Usanas Foundation,
an Indian think tank focused on geopolitics,
security,
and ideology.
We are going to explore the emerging Turkey-Pakistan-Azerbaijan axis,
what it means for India,
why Armenia matters,
and how this growing alignment is redrawing India's foreign policies from Kashmir
to the Caucasus.
A quick shout out to everyone listening and watching,
and especially to those of you tuning in from India.
Namaste.
We're glad you found us.
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and by that we mean Caucasus and beyond,
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Head to podcasts.groong.org to support us through Patreon,
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All right, let's get to the show.
Dr. Pandya, welcome to the Groong Podcast.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Hovik.
It's a pleasure to join you here.
Yeah, hello, Dr. Pandya.
Thanks for accepting our invitation.
Thank you.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
So as this is your first time on our podcast,
please tell us a little bit about yourself,
your interests,
and your areas of expertise.
So I mean, very interesting question.
My journey in this field has been pretty diverse.
Actually, I was studying in the US.
I did my master's in public affairs from Cornell University.
After that,
I was working as a consultant with the United Nations and a couple of other
nonprofits in the US.
Then I had to come back to India in 2016.
And since, you know, my father served the police services and I also had some, you know,
interest in security issues.
I started writing on terrorism, mostly terror financing.
I was associated with the Vivekananda Foundation as a non-resident contributor.
And then there was a project for Kashmir.
And there I happened to visit for my field research.
Following that field research,
I was asked by the Prime Minister's office to join the Honorable Governor of Jammu
and Kashmir in those days.
And during my Kashmir research, I came across what we call today the Turkey phenomenon in India.
And I mean, it was to my utter shock and surprise, I realized that Turkey was active on
multiple fronts in India, in fact, in a very damaging manner.
And after that, I mean, my interest was aroused.
I was writing on all these issues.
I finished,
I mean,
I wrote,
I've so far authored three books on issues pertaining to international security,
terrorism,
and geopolitics.
My first book is on the radicalization scenario in India.
And in that, I have discussed at length about Turkey's activities in India.
And my second book is on terror financing in Kashmir,
in which I have discussed about Turkey's penetration and role in Jammu and Kashmir.
My third book is again about the Jaish-e-Mohammed,
which is a terrorist group that brought India and Pakistan twice on the verge of a
full-fledged war.
And then I started the think tank Usanas Foundation in the year 2020.
And since then,
we have been functioning as a leading voice in the field of international security
and foreign policy in India.
We organize various offline and online events.
Some of our major conferences are with the Ministry of External Affairs India, and we have...
Some of the top-level experts from across the world as a part of our team and our
advisory board.
Some top-level diplomats with long experience in the Indian Foreign Service,
they work with us,
they advise us.
And we have this annual flagship dialogue called Maharana Pratap Annual Geopolitics
Dialogue,
in which we discuss the relevant and critical global security and foreign policy
issues.
we have invited uh you know twice a big contingent from Armenia to this dialogue
and in fact I must say that you know uh when this first dialogue or a sort of a
prototype of the what you call today here one dialogue which was started by the
Orbeli Center the prime minister think tank in Armenia I was invited to that
dialogue as a speaker and from there it actually began the the warming up of ties
between India and Armenia
And following that,
you know,
we have published a lot of material on India-Armenia relationship.
I have written for various platforms like our own website,
National Interest,
and the Indian platforms.
We have invited delegates from the Orbeli Center to our various events,
online and offline conferences.
And today, well, I'm here, you know, to friends.
I'm very excited and very happy to be a part of this podcast.
Let's begin with some of the news from last week.
So last week,
Azerbaijan opened a new so-called international airport in Berdzor,
which they call Lachin,
in the occupied territories of Artsakh.
That is not so groundbreaking because it is the third so-called international
airport in occupied Artsakh.
But here's the thing.
There are no planes.
uh their land there the place is empty no cities no passengers no travelers so why
build so many airports in such a small region and the answer seems to be
self-evident it's not for tourism the runways seem to be military assets planted
deep in land taken by force are they for a future war
And against whom, exactly?
But the real story, I think, wasn't the airport itself.
It was who showed up to cut the ribbon.
Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey,
Shehbaz Sharif of Pakistan,
and,
of course,
the dictator in Baku,
Ilham Aliyev,
standing together in a corner of Caucasus ethnically cleansed of its indigenous
Armenian population less than two years ago.
We can guess that this wasn't a photo op.
I think it was a message.
And a new axis is taking shape,
one that blends military power,
petrodollars,
and ideological ambition.
So,
Dr.
Pandya,
let me ask you,
why did Erdogan and Shehbaz Sharif show up at an airport opening in a ghost town?
And what does that mean about the Turkey, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan axis, in your opinion?
Thank you very much, Hovik.
I'll get into the details of this trilateral alliance and partnership a little
later,
but I guess first I'd like to focus on the immediate objectives that Azerbaijan
might have wanted to achieve through this photo op of the ceremony of opening an
airport in a ghost town.
Well,
I feel that with this possible conquest of that Armenian territory and forcing out
the original Armenian population,
they are trying to seek some sort of an international legitimacy,
a global recognition for what they have done.
And since in today's world,
most of the multilateral institutions like UN and all,
they seem to be losing legitimacy and credibility.
The nations prefer to work with the minilateral and plurilateral arrangements,
which work at a slightly smaller scale.
And you can get like-minded countries.
So in this case,
you know,
you have Turkey,
which is again a sort of a semi-Islamist dictatorship.
Again, Baku is again a dictatorial government.
Pakistan is also a de facto military dictatorship running on Islamist principles.
So you have an alliance of three like-minded countries joining there together.
making a show of their strength.
Azerbaijan gains some sort of a global recognition for what they have done in that region.
Pakistan gets a strong support of Azerbaijan on Kashmir issue and on its terrorist
activities in the region of Jammu and Kashmir.
And Turkey, I see, has much longer term objectives.
Turkey's new Sultan, the new Caliph, Mr. Erdogan, wants some sort of a greater
Turkic region,
combining a sphere of influence of all the Turkic people extending up to Central
Asia.
And perhaps with that ambition,
with that strategic calculus,
Azerbaijan is very crucial to them.
And if they are able to
at least create some sort of a structure,
a base,
which superficially looks civilian,
but can have a deep-rooted military utility and strategic utility,
then it serves a long-term purpose.
And as you mentioned rightly, it is likely to have some deeper...
military objectives also,
because we know that what are the Azerbaijan's long-term objectives and also
Turkey's long-term objectives and this burgeoning alliance between these three
countries is not simply about the economic exchange or some sort of geopolitical
diplomatic exchange.
It is also an alliance which is,
you know,
focusing on a major intelligence cooperation and coordination,
a major,
you know,
comingling of these three countries on strategic issues,
on tactical operational issues.
These three countries are going to work against the interests of India, interests of Armenia.
And when we look at the modus operandi of these three countries,
we must look at the fact that,
you know,
they have multiple ways of sabotaging and that includes the
uh sabotaging through the proxy Islamist actors the fighters conventional wars the
drones so that way i feel that you know this new airport which is coming up in that
region is definitely going to have a military objective first and secondly it is an
exercise to seek a global recognition legitimacy and you know by doing that uh
airport building they want to send a message that you know
We are going ahead with the rebuilding, reintegration.
And that is also an act which is purported to consolidate its conquest,
an illegal conquest of that region,
so that people...
tend to forget you know just to inject a very artificially created amnesia in the
minds of the global community uh that the people were forcibly driven out of that
region now just imagine today the media portals are talking about this airport
construction but there is hardly any literature beyond that region on how the
people were forcibly driven out of that region
So how far do you think this alliance can go or will go between the three so-called
brotherly nations that we talked about and what does it mean for India and for
Armenia?
Well,
I see this alliance going a long way because,
you know,
if not three,
then at least two of these countries,
you know,
two countries of this alliance have very long-term ideological ambitions,
you know.
Certainly, Azerbaijan is a part of it.
Azerbaijan has very concrete, immediate territorial objectives.
And that is,
you know,
we know that,
you know,
what they want to do in the Zangezur corridor,
that,
you know,
connecting it with the Nakhijevan region.
And also, I mean, just to...
against Armenia what they want that's very clear but coming to the other two
partners Turkey and Pakistan they have much longer term objectives so Turkey has
this objective of you know leading the global umma and you know they know that in
the arab world they are going to face major resistance from the arab leadership
arab monarchies because they have been
controlling the Islamic religious places and religious sites.
Even in the past,
when the Arab monarchies arrested control from the Ottomans,
there was a clash between the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia under the leadership of Al
Saud dynasty and the Ottoman rulers.
So that rivalry is very old and it's very, very, very, very, very historic.
That's why they want to create that massive following and a major constituency in
the regions beyond the Arab world.
And for that reason,
India,
the Indian subcontinent is very crucial because it has a large number of Muslims,
about 200 million Muslims in India itself.
And if you add the number of Muslims in Pakistan and Bangladesh, it makes a huge chunk.
And in India,
in this region,
Turkey has a history of ruling certain portions and certain parts.
In fact, the Mughal Empire in India was in a way very strongly associated with the Turks.
The founder of the Mughal Empire was a half Turk and half Mongolian.
So today's Pakistan sees itself as some kind of an inheritor to the Turkish Empire
that ruled in India in the past.
So they see themselves as an inheritor and an ideological brother to the Ottomans.
They look at themselves through that historical prism.
So if they are able to get this kind of support among the Muslim population of
India,
it makes their candidacy,
makes their claim to lead the global ummah very strong.
And the second area where Mr. Erdogan wants to have a very strong say is Central Asia.
In Central Asia, there's this huge Muslim population.
Traditionally, the region has been under the Russians.
You know, it was a part of the Soviet Union.
But after the Soviet Union disintegrated,
we see a very strong absurge of Islamic extremist movements in the various Central
Asian countries.
Uzbekistan's case is very severe in other parts also in Tajikistan Kazakhstan
these movements are emerging but the dictatorships in these countries are somehow
able to control these Islamist sentiments and these tendencies but i i feel that mr
erdogan wants to expand its tentacles you know through that common turkic
linguistic ethnic linkages and that you know common identity he wants to expand
that influence
Now coming to Pakistan, the second partner of this alliance.
Pakistan has always seen itself as a real Islamic state,
as an inheritor to the Mughal Turkic empire in this region.
And their longer term aim is Ghazwa Hind,
that is to annihilate India,
either through the nuclear power.
And they have very intense, very deep-rooted hatred towards India.
And they see India as a Hindu India.
Pakistan was formed on the basis of the idea of two-nation theory which advocated
that Hindus and Muslims constitute two different nations they have two different
ways as recently as 2025 General Asim Munir the mastermind of the
Pahalgam terrorist attack
gave a speech just a few days before the Pahalgam terror attack in which he
highlighted the idea of the two-nation theory and spewed venom against Hindus and
against India.
So it shows how deeply rooted this idea of India hatred or this concept of Ghazwa
Hind is in Pakistan's military psyche and their subconscious mind.
Most of the terror groups that are operating in Pakistan under the patronage of the
state,
they strongly believe in the idea of Ghazwa Hind.
And Pakistan also wants to incite the Muslims living in India against the Indian state.
radicalize them, indoctrinate them, induce them towards the acts of terrorism.
Incidentally, Turkey is also active in pursuing its Islamist agenda in India.
They are in touch with the various extremist scholars in India.
In Kashmir,
one of the former chiefs of research and analysis,
that is India's external intelligence agency,
explicitly stated that Turkey has sent fighters in Kashmir to aid the Mujahids.
Even in the recent Operation Sindur, Turkey sent its drones and military advisors to Pakistan.
Even in early 1990s,
we had Mujahideens from Turkey coming to Madrasa Benorea in Pakistan and also
fighting the Kashmir Jihad,
Afghanistan Jihad.
So all these things look like very long-term ideological aims.
which is why I see that this partnership is going to go very long and it is very deep-rooted.
And later or sooner, Azerbaijan will be involved in this dragnet in a much stronger way.
Right now, because of the geographical distance,
People in India think that Azerbaijan is not as strongly involved as it ought to be.
But I feel that at a deeper level, Azerbaijan is very intricately involved in this partnership.
There is a very robust intelligence cooperation and also coordination and
cooperation on strategic and operational angles here.
Dr. Pandya, as you mentioned, the terror attacks in Pahalgam, India responded with strength.
And it wasn't just a face-saving effort that it put together.
It really struck deep into Pakistani territory near areas where even close to
nuclear installations.
So it was trying to really send a message.
What did Operation Sindoor reveal about the regional security architecture?
Who's really backing Pakistan in this from the perspective of global superpowers?
So I'll mention all the different actors who are supporting Pakistan.
Let's begin with Turkey.
But of course, the West is behind Turkey.
Yes, definitely.
I'll come to that.
Okay, let us begin with Pakistan's creation.
Pakistan is a Western project.
Let me be very clear.
When the British left India, they had this baggage of Great Game in this region.
Right from 1900s till 1950s,
they were thwarting the Russian ambitions in Central Asia and Afghanistan.
And the Brits conquered Afghanistan.
They waged three wars, although they could not completely conquer it.
Three wars, I think, beginning from 1840s till 1900s.
And the basic objective, the underlying objective of the Brits was to keep the Russians away.
So in those years,
it was a great game between the Russians and the Brits who were controlling this
Indian region.
So for them, this entire region of Pakistan, Afghanistan was very crucial.
Now, after India got independence, they wanted a pliant state.
Basically, they means West.
Brits and the Americans,
they are on the same page when it comes to the strategic interest in this region.
So they wanted a pliant state which could be used as a base station or,
you know,
stationing your troops or to do all kinds of your dirty works against the Soviets
and against the Chinese.
Pakistan was a very easy, lucrative bait in that scheme.
Because they knew that India would not really,
you know,
offer itself to all those,
you know,
I would say projects and schemes because they didn't think that,
you know,
they could really work with India on those lines.
But Pakistan was definitely under the tutelage of its military dictatorship was
always ready to do all kinds of dirty jobs.
So Pakistan...
It has certainly been a Western project.
In fact,
all these,
you know,
this idea of global jihad,
I must say this is a product of the Western geopolitical ambitions,
you know,
in Afghanistan.
Certainly,
Pakistan,
right after its formation,
was going through a very strong internal churning that was aimed towards Islamizing
the country.
And Deobandi Islamists were at the forefront of that project.
But when Americans aided Pakistanis through its CIA in training and arming and
financing the Mujahideens against the Soviets,
this bond between the US and Pakistan got very,
very strong.
Later,
we saw that even after the 9-11,
during the global war on terror,
Americans were in Afghanistan and Pakistan was supporting the American global war
on terror.
And despite the fact that Pakistan was arming the Taliban,
Pakistan was hands in glove with the Taliban in its drug trade and doing all kinds
of damage to the American interests.
Americans did not act against Pakistan.
Ideally,
they should have bombed Pakistan if they really wanted to solve the problem of
global terrorism.
Because Osama bin Laden was hiding in Pakistan.
All the Taliban were hiding in safe centuries offered by the Pakistan.
American government support,
Afghanistan's government supported by the Americans was regularly complaining and
they were giving all kinds of information about the Taliban's bases in Pakistan,
particularly Amrullah Saleh,
the intelligence chief of the Afghan government.
was feeding information on a regular basis to the American commanders that please
go to Pakistan just get hold of these taliban terrorists their commanders but
Americans completely ignored that so certainly west is behind Pakistan and i also
want to highlight one very crucial aspect recently in this operation Sindoor when
India
tried to bomb some of one of their nuclear storage facilities.
Indian missiles hit the gates,
the entrance to the nuclear storage facility,
and that created some kind of uproar and major ringing alarm bells in the Pakistani
strategic establishment.
Americans intervened
Americans send their aircrafts,
which had the capacity to monitor the radioactive release and everything.
So now people are having apprehensions that whether the nukes which are in
Pakistan,
are they the arsenals belonging to the Americans or are they owned by the
Pakistanis?
So all these questions are now arising.
So certainly West is behind Pakistan.
Now coming to the other partner that Pakistan has against India,
is Turkey.
Turkey has been supporting Pakistan and various international platforms for several decades.
But after Erdogan's rise, this partnership has become very strong.
They're giving all kinds of latest innovative technology, particularly in the drones.
They have given Bayraktar TB2.
YIHA drones and Songar drones.
Some of these drones were used in this operation,
in this recent escalation of conflict between India and Pakistan.
In fact, Turks sent their military advisors to Pakistan.
And even,
you know,
behind the Turks,
you can see that,
you know,
this growing banhami between the Turks,
between the Turkish country and the Americans,
I think that gets reflected and that gets manifested on this particular South Asian
front also.
We just saw how this fellow, Ms.
Ahmed al-Sharaa Julani,
was very warmly received by the European countries and also the American
leadership.
And this man is nothing but a proxy of the Turkey’s in that region.
And through this man,
Turkey wants to expand its Islamist and Caliphate dreams in the entire Central
Asia.
So this, we're looking, I mean,
I kind of expect a very troubled future in terms of Islamic radicalized radicalism
and jihadism for Central Asia but particularly because of the recent development in
syria so yes west is behind Turkey Turkey is behind Pakistan west is innovate
directly supporting Pakistan against the Indians and then the another global power
that is with Pakistan is China because for China it has always been their strategy
to
ally with Pakistan to keep India under control.
And Chinese wanted that India should be kept on tenterhooks by keeping Kashmir on
the boil because a large part of their oil supplies go through the Malacca Strait
in the Indian Ocean.
and Indian navy is very powerful so they fear that if Indians align with the west
and if Indians are mentally free to operate and to conduct naval exercises in that
Indian ocean region that could actually
threaten the supply lines of particularly the oil supplies running towards the
Chinese territory.
So to keep India away from that region,
China wants to keep India completely embroiled in its internal security related
concerns and conflicts.
That's why,
you know,
but certainly China has been assisting the rebels in the northeast and in Kashmir.
China supports Pakistan to ramp up a terrorism problem in Jammu and Kashmir to
create just to keep a large part of Indian forces and Indian,
you know,
diplomatic and political wit completely absorbed in that region.
What I find deeply hypocritical as an aside about Al-Julani is that the West is now
claiming that he is the president of Syria where there have been absolutely no
elections.
I have no idea how that happens, but go figure.
The West just likes to do these shows for everyone in the world.
It's not new.
It's something which they've done in Afghanistan.
Once they were fighting tooth and nail against Taliban.
Now Taliban formed the government in that region and Americans are dealing with Taliban.
And now Americans have no qualms partnering with Taliban against the ISIS fighters.
And I can tell you that more or less, they're the same, just two sides of the same coin.
Ideologically, there's hardly any difference between Taliban and the ISKP.
And even the hardcore terrorists which are hiding in Pakistan,
terrorists like Hafiz Saeed,
terrorists like Masood Azhar,
they're residing in Pakistan.
Americans know that.
And even then, Americans are not pressurizing Pakistan to hand these
terrorists to India.
And some of those terrorists have actually harmed American interests.
Hafiz Saeed orchestrated that Mumbai 11 hotel attack,
Taj Hotel attack,
in which several Israelis died,
American citizens died.
Maulana Masood Azhar is heading that organization,
Jaish-e-Mohammed,
which actually planned the murder and killing of Daniel Pearl,
that Wall Street Journal journalist.
There was a huge uproar in America after that killing.
But then Americans are not doing
Americans were giving all kinds of financial assistance and aid to the Pakistanis
during that Afghan war.
And Pakistanis were sending the American soldiers in body bags.
Even then, Americans were silent.
So, I mean, the silence now looks very fishy, very dubious, and it looks deliberate.
Dr.
Pandya,
what I find interesting is that when we were doing research for this conversation,
we realized that India's response to the Pahalgam terror attacks were not just
military.
Most people just hear military and fighters attacking and stuff like that.
But India's response extended into the economic realm as well.
Indian tour operators announced cancellations of travel packages to Turkey and Azerbaijan.
the Indian government revoked the security clearance of a number of Turkish firms
like Çelebi,
handling ground operations at several major airports,
effectively ending its role in India's aviation sector.
This is very interesting that India is putting its money where its national interests are.
So those moves signal that India is now willing to leverage its economic tools,
its economic might for its diplomacy.
Do you think that this response...
especially against Turkey and Azerbaijan, are going to be of a temporary nature?
Or do you think these are going to become more of a permanent feature of Indian foreign policy?
I think it's,
again,
a very interesting question because you mentioned about Indian foreign policy.
For long,
there was some sort of lack of awareness or complete ignorance or a deliberate,
neglectful attitude towards what Turkey was doing.
I remember back in the year 2019,
2020,
I was the only one talking about Turkey's Islamist agenda in India,
writing articles,
papers,
and here there were several senior diplomats,
military veterans,
who would very mockingly talk about the Kemalist Turkey,
and they would say that,
well,
you know,
all your new findings and research,
you know,
they don't really,
you know,
uh sync well with the facts on the ground Turkey follows the kemalist legacy of
secularism and liberalism and you know i mean they hardly knew what Turkey was
doing to assist and aid the ISIS buying its oil we interviewed several Turkish
military veterans with the left for left the country to us and they were talk
openly exposing talks meetings with the isis and
So for long, there was this complacency.
Even after the 2019 year,
when India abrogated Kashmir's special status,
Turkey came up as the staunch partner of Pakistan in the multilateral forums.
They supported Pakistan everywhere.
I think that was for the first time when Indians and particularly the Indian
diplomatic brass realized that now this is a different Turkey and certainly it's a
threat.
But after that also, it kind of fizzled out.
And it took India almost four to five years to cancel a shipbuilding consultancy
contract with Turkey,
which was this cancellation was done in 2024.
And then during the Operation Sindoor,
the people here realized that the Çelebi was operating nine critical airports of
India,
including Mumbai,
Bangalore,
Delhi.
And particularly in this drone warfare and given the way how Turks operate,
I mean, that control could have led to any major damage.
I mean, anything possible.
It is just a matter of imagination.
So now India will have to continue some of these...
because it's a necessity.
It's a security necessity.
It's a tactical necessity because,
you know,
when you have very bitter relationship with Pakistan and the Turks and Azerbaijanis
are openly supporting Pakistan,
you cannot,
I mean,
dehyphenate your relationship with Turkey,
your tourism and your development and your economic exchanges with Turkey and your
ties with Pakistan.
I mean,
if Turkey had done so,
then we would have been in the position to dehyphenate this issue.
But that doesn't look like, it doesn't look like that.
Turkey has been openly and very strongly supporting Pakistan in this Operation Sindoor.
In fact, they were militarily aiding Pakistan, sending their drones and their military advisors.
So now,
I think the Indian strategic establishment,
they see the Turkish state as a direct threat to India's security.
So certainly they are not going to entertain firms which have the direct
involvement of either Turkish intelligence or the Turkish political heavyweights
like Erdogan and his daughter.
So they are not going to allow these firms to operate in India because this will be
a major challenge.
And thirdly,
regarding the tourist reaction,
I must say that depends to a large extent on the people also.
Because Turkey and Azerbaijan,
until recently,
they were the most favored tourist destinations in India,
and people were going there in droves.
But now the role played by Turkey and Azerbaijan in this India-Pakistan conflict
has come in the open.
and people now they don't really they're not happy with the idea of Turkey
supporting Pakistan and there's a lot of resentment a lot of anger among the common
people so people are doing on their own out of their own volition so i think this
is going to get stronger in the future and i guess you know i mean if turks
continue to extend that kind of a very strong ideological support to Pakistan then
i mean these things are going to get better
Well, there are lots of beautiful places in Armenia.
I suggest maybe lots of Indians going to Armenia.
Well,
I have already advocated,
I've already projected that idea to the people here in the system.
I guess we need direct flights to Armenia.
And I think that Armenia is one of the most suitable places with beautiful weather,
beautiful locations to invest in the hotel industry.
And Indians are fond of organizing destination weddings.
So if there's the right infrastructure,
proper connectivity,
Armenia can get loads of money from India,
I can tell you.
Right.
So coming to Armenia,
let's talk a little bit more about Armenia's security relationship with India.
It was once reliant on Russia.
Armenia was very reliant on Russia.
And now it is looking for India as one of its partners for hardware and strategic support.
Armenia has become a significant buyer of Indian weaponry,
just,
you know,
Pinaka,
you know,
ATAGS,
howitzers,
and so forth,
just to name a few.
And while,
you know,
previously there was some criticism that much of this equipment hasn't been
battle-tested,
many of these systems were,
in fact,
used in Operation Sindoor.
So is there news or feedback on the effectiveness of Indian weapons
homegrown weaponry, especially against Turkish systems.
What can you tell us about that aspect?
Well,
our weapons performed really well in this Operation Sindoor and all these myths
surrounding the high-class and very high-tech Turkish drones and all,
they're kind of busted now.
We completely neutralized and just destroyed the Chinese air defense systems,
the HQ-9 systems and
Also, their PL-15 missiles have also come out as like really hollow duds.
And Pakistan,
I mean,
some of our air defense systems like the S-400 system and the indigenously
developed systems like Akash,
they destroyed all the Pakistani projectiles coming into our territory.
And I can tell you, I was very actively involved in that.
During that escalation phase in the media circuit, I also visited the
for battle lines in the frontier regions.
And I can assure you that,
you know,
Pakistani projectiles could not do even a small amount of damage to the Indian
installations.
They send their drones in large numbers,
but all of them were shot down with air defense systems like Shilka and also the
local defense systems like Akash.
So India deployed a four-layered air defense system, you know,
S-400 was for like very high altitude and high range objects.
Then we had indigenously developed different systems like Akash and Shilka.
They were for the lower altitude projectiles and drones.
So they were very, very successful.
And then the final punch came through our Brahmos.
So Indians,
you know,
fired a barrage of Ramos and destroyed Pakistani air bases and also a lot of their
aircrafts parked in those hangars.
And I can assure you,
if India had continued the war,
even for a day or two,
they would have destroyed entire Pakistan's air force,
all the air capability.
They would have destroyed, dismantled everything.
Because now,
in the current Indian system,
in the strategic establishment,
the perception has become really strong that you just need 100 Brahmos missiles to
completely annihilate Pakistan.
Nothing more than that.
That's just going to make Pakistan completely dysfunctional.
And Chinese weapons...
are of no use.
India downed six fighter jets of China and also their air defense systems.
So I think,
yes,
Indian weapons have proved their utility and capability in the real battlefield
test.
And I think now Armenians can be more confident about buying these weapons systems.
How much of those weapons systems have Israeli technology in them?
Because we know that Israel is unfortunately a strong,
it's a partner for India,
but it's a strong supporter of Azerbaijan and an enemy of Iran.
And this is Azerbaijan as a tool in that game.
Does Israel have a veto power,
for instance,
on the types of technology that India can sell to Armenia?
No,
because India's traditional defense partnership and technology transfer
arrangements have been with the Russians.
So certainly,
Russians have their major involvement,
particularly in the production of missiles like Brahmos,
S-400 is Russian.
And traditionally, Indian weapon systems, you know, Indian munitions, Indian arsenal,
has a very strong Russian flavor.
That's why even when we buy the fighter aircrafts,
we want those fighter aircrafts to which we can upload and we can fix our Russian
missiles or our indigenous weapon systems which are based on Russian technology.
As far as Israel is concerned,
with Israel,
we have more of an intelligence cooperation,
not much of,
I would say,
technology partnership.
Yes,
we have bought assault rifles from Israel that are mostly used in
counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir.
like their Tavor rifles and all.
Besides that,
Israel has offered systems to protect,
to basically shield our borders,
but India is not yet very positive about that because Indian borders are quite
different from the Israeli borders.
Indian borders are like, in terms of terrain, it's very diverse.
There are mountains, jungles, marshes, swamps.
So I think what Israelis are offering cannot be really applicable in the Indian scenario.
So I don't think that Israelis have any veto over the Indian weapon system.
But yes, Russian partnership is certainly there.
Now they're offering Su-57 to India, the fifth generation aircraft.
Maybe there is a possibility of joint production.
So Armenia doesn't need to worry about that part because certainly Israel is
aligned with Azerbaijan,
but Israel's ties with India are on an entirely different planes.
And Israel understands it well that India believes in the idea of strategic autonomy.
And they also, again, Israelis know that they also need India on their side because they're
bigger,
larger fight,
ultimate fight is against the Islamist actors,
against the Islamic extremism.
And in this entire region,
from Europe to Southeast Asia,
I think India is the country which is,
again,
a non-Muslim country and a functional democracy and fighting a very determined war
against Islamist terrorism.
Israel is one of them.
So I think Israel is looking at a longer term partnership.
They're not going to force or they're not going to just exercise any pressure
tactics with India,
particularly in the case of Armenia,
Azerbaijan.
And even in Azerbaijan's case, I think Israel will be right now.
They're worried more about Iran and the dynamics emerging in the West Asian region.
With Azerbaijan,
I think,
yes,
that oil dependence,
that oil exchange arrangement is definitely there and that trade is there.
But besides that, they feel that it's another Muslim country which is friendly with Israel.
So that gives them a certain degree of legitimacy in the Muslim world because most
of the global narrative war is very strongly against the Israelis.
So they're always desperately looking for seeking some kind of recognition from the
Muslim countries.
I remember when I was researching the history of Armenian-Indian partnership,
I think there were some pretty strong documents signed between Armenia and India
even back in the 1990s.
But for whatever reason,
those documents did not transform from words into action as much as I would like,
at least.
But I think that...
with the recent geopolitical shifts,
for India,
Armenia now offers not just to be a customer of Indian arms,
but it offers geography,
it offers access and alignment in a contested region.
Do you think that Armenia is becoming a permanent node in India's Eurasian
strategy,
or is the partnership purely tactical?
Well, I think, you know, definitely India was having many hesitations until recently because
Indian government setup,
Indian diplomatic setup,
generally it's a very conservative and a skeptical setup.
They take time to react and they have a very conservative approach.
So initially,
they didn't want to make the Chinese uncomfortable or even the global powers
uncomfortable by projecting the idea that India is expanding its strategic and
military footprint in that South Caucasus region.
But then at the same time,
India was interested in selling its weapons to Armenia and also just to give that
image that India is again friends with Armenia and India can
is trying to forge some sort of a grouping of like-minded countries against Pakistan or Turkey.
That idea was there.
But the biggest inspiration,
the driving factor in India's strategic calculus was to sell weapons to Armenia.
But then I think now the way things are unfolding,
India doesn't have much of a choice because things are unfolding in a very
different manner.
India is forced.
India is compelled to play a very crucial role in the emerging geopolitical
dynamics and the new world order.
And given that background, the strategic connectivity projects will be very crucial.
So, Armenia that way is very crucial to India because India wants to bypass Pakistan.
And INSTC particularly in the recent times have become very crucial because IMEC
seems to be running into a dark future.
Again, because of the
Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Russians are very much interested in promoting INSTC and opening a completely new
domain of markets in Central Asia and the Asian economic region.
So with that thing in the background,
I guess the efforts to reinvigorate and to re-energize INSTC have become really
strong.
So for India, Armenia, given that
particular INSTC point of view,
Armenia is very crucial and India would want to expand its ties,
the connectivity ties through this unique region,
you know,
because particularly because of the bad equation with Azerbaijan,
there's a possibility of some kind of a sabotage to Indian...
trade interest and the connectivity routes if there's a war-like situation between
India and Pakistan.
So as an alternate transit route and for the regional economic stabilization,
I guess India would want to strengthen,
expand its ties with Armenia and connectivity will be a major constituent of that.
And I feel that in this emerging
world order,
most of these,
you know,
the strategic connectivity projects are likely to be weaponized.
And we see a lot of them, BRICS is coming, INSTC is coming, Turkey has a Middle East corridor.
So,
though people don't agree,
people always say that these are complementary,
but well,
you know,
as a student of geopolitics,
I don't think that they are complementary.
Definitely,
there are very strong geopolitical intelligence and military motivations underlying
all these projects.
And at some stage, they're going to be very, very competitive to each other.
So we do need alternate routes and transit systems.
And for that reason, I guess Armenia is very crucial to us.
so in the future what i want to say is that this partnership is not just going to
be very tactical that is not you know an option available for India given India's
escalating tensions with Pakistan and also given the fact that Pakistan is getting
more support from countries like China Turkey Azerbaijan India will have to expand
its global strategic footprint and in that you know in the that frame i guess south
caucasus will be very crucial yeah
Well, you know that for Armenia, security right now is a very big dilemma.
And Azerbaijan is so brazen after its conquests that it's essentially dictating or
telling countries to not sell weapons to Armenia.
and threatening Armenia with military action in case more dangerous weapons are acquired.
So I wanted to ask how far can India go in terms of supporting Armenia in its security dilemma?
You know, I'm thinking military exercises, I'm thinking intelligence support.
Are leaders in India willing to withstand threats from Azerbaijan and Turkey in this regard?
Well, now they don't have any option.
They have no option left.
They will have to.
And economically, India is very strong and capable.
And I think it's certainly better than Turkey.
Turkey's economy.
India is the fourth largest economy.
Militarily, we are a very powerful country, you know.
Yeah,
on the diplomatic front,
certainly India currently faces a degree of some sort of an isolation because,
you know,
you see all these powerful global actors like China,
America,
Pakistan,
sorry,
Turkey,
Azerbaijan are falling on the Pakistani side and just supporting the Pakistani
camp.
But then that doesn't really bother us because Russia has been an active supporter of India.
And even these global powers,
when it comes to the real conflict and battle,
they will calibrate their actions and their response because even they cannot...
ignored the fact that India is a large economy, a big market, and a responsible global actor.
So certainly India,
withstanding Azerbaijani pressure,
I mean,
that's not something that really India is worried about.
India has the capability, India has the will to do that.
Now, it's just about the, it's a question of the will.
India has all the capability as of now we have a very strong leader in the in the
in the form of prime minister modi and he has a vision he has the right will uh but
yes i would like to add a caveat that Indian foreign policy is very still very
strongly dominated and influenced by the bureaucrats the diplomat the career
bureaucrats so
sometimes they might act as restraining factors because they are very status quoist in nature.
And also,
you know,
they might have some of them or the influential players in the bureaucracy or in
the national security setup,
they might have some ulterior motives and maybe some sort of,
you know,
dubious alignments with other actors.
So they may try to, you know,
influence Prime Minister Modi to act in such a manner that it doesn't really pose a
major challenge to Azerbaijan and Turkey.
But then, yes, if he's rightly convinced and if he has the right set of advisors,
then I think he will be very bold and he will be very proactive.
We saw in the Operation Sindoor,
I mean,
people were thinking that,
well,
India's response will be very calibrated and very measured.
But it was Prime Minister Modi's single-minded initiative,
you know,
to completely bypass the diplomatic and the bureaucratic brass and,
you know,
empower the military armed forces,
you know,
and just to go whole hog against Pakistan.
And we saw the impact.
Within two days, Pakistan was on its knees, you know,
So yes,
India,
I think Armenia and India should think of joint military exercises,
intelligence cooperation and coordination.
And this is an area which India really needs to work hard.
And India has to have a strong presence.
And one more thing that I want to highlight is that if the tensions between
the Russians and the rest of the European countries the Western Europe if they
escalate particularly i mean after the recent drone attack on the Russian bombers
it seems that uh now there's nothing that can stop
or control things in that region.
If they escalate,
then India's complexities and India's challenges in defining its geopolitical
stance and role will multiply,
will become more challenging and more complex.
Dr.
Pandya,
as India is adjusting to the new geopolitics,
to the new world order,
as you were talking,
its neighborhood is a little different.
Iran has suddenly become a partner, but it's also, as an Islamic country, it's a critic.
So it's a little bit of a wild card.
And then Israel,
as you mentioned,
is an ally,
but it has deep hostility towards Iran,
and that complicates everything as well.
So there are these...
global infrastructure projects like INSTC,
IMEC,
et cetera,
which are also competing with China's Belt and Road Initiative,
right?
And they use Chabahar in Iran.
So the question from me was,
can India rely on Iran long-term,
especially for critical corridors like the Chabahar-Armenia-Georgia corridor to get
to Europe eventually?
Well,
now,
particularly after the Modi's rise to power,
as the Prime Minister,
we are witnessing a lot of discomfort in the India-Iran ties.
And there are many reasons for that.
First of all, the Iranian regime is essentially a hardcore Islamist regime.
religious motivations are a quintessential part of their existential philosophy.
And in the recent times,
particularly in 2016,
a hardcore Indian terrorist mastermind Burhan Wani was neutralized by the Indian
security forces in Jammu and Kashmir.
After his killing, he was hailed as a hero in several Iranian universities.
And also in the recent Operation Sindoor,
the message that came from Iran in the beginning was not something which was very
supportive of the Indian interests.
I think they said that the rise of the majoritarian extremism in India is giving
rise to all kinds of terrorism problems.
And besides that,
also India's strengthening ties with Israel are also making Iran uncomfortable.
But well,
if you ask me a very fundamental question,
I don't rule out the possibility of a tactical and some kind of a very immediate
level cooperation and coordination between Iran and India.
But then there are some very fundamental areas in which there's hardly any
possibility of compromise or arrangement.
Now, firstly, that fundamental area is of the Islamic extremism.
India is majorly challenged by the forces of Islamic extremism, terrorism, radicalization.
And now the Indian population, the people here, they feel the threat genuinely.
Even the government in India is a Hindu nationalist government.
And they also feel that this...
Islamist threat is going to shatter India very badly.
So India is not going to go soft on that front.
And I don't think that Iran will understand or accommodate India's concerns because
Iran,
definitely in this particular area,
Iran is not a very rational actor.
The religious considerations,
they play a very crucial role in defining their approach towards India,
particularly in the minority-related matters and all.
Secondly, China's strengthening ties with Iran are also becoming a major concern for India.
They have signed a long partnership agreement in 2020.
And certainly China is friends with Pakistan.
China is getting friendly with Iran.
So India thinks that there's a new hub, some sort of an alliance that is emerging against India.
And that includes Pakistan, China, Iran, and North Korea.
So all these are non-democratic countries.
Again, another area of fundamental divergence between Iran and India is the issue of democracy.
Iranian regime is a religious, conservative, Islamist dictatorship.
India is a functioning democracy, believes in multiculturalism, women's rights, etc.
the modern liberal open lifestyle where you have a very,
you know,
permissive,
sexually open society.
But on the other hand, Iran is a very, you know, orthodox conservative society.
So I think these are some of the fundamental areas.
But yes,
you know,
for very immediate tactical reasons,
you know,
there will be coordination and there will be,
you know,
engagement between India and Iran,
like,
for example,
Chabahar.
But yes, you know,
in the longer run,
it will be difficult to have some kind of a major trust-like situation between
India and Iran.
And as India's equation with Israel grows stronger,
and in the future,
if Israel gets into some major conflict or crisis with Iran,
India will be in a very difficult position.
India will be pressurized to make choices.
And so,
I mean,
I don't know what India is going to do,
but then India cannot choose to be a bystander.
Yeah,
actually,
we did have a question about how India is going to balance the relationship with
Iran and the relationship with Israel.
It'll be difficult,
but I think,
you know,
India will have to make a choice at some stage,
you know,
what's important for you.
And in Iran's case,
I feel that,
well,
I guess the problem lasts as long as this Islamist regime in Iran survives.
You know, if this Islamist regime is taken out or like, you know, if a regime is ousted,
by some measure like in the near or immediate future and if iran and the regime
which succeeds the current Islamist regime def is definitely going to have a better
equation with the you know let's say israel in that case India will not have a
problem with iran because historically you know we have always had great ties with
iran we are civilizational partners again like it's the same iran Armenia India
same that Aryan ancestry
So those bonds and those emotional linkages continue to exist at a very deep-rooted
subconscious level.
I guess we are the same people.
We are the same blot.
But then some of these ideological issues need to be addressed.
Right.
Well, I, for one, vote for less conflict and more.
I think that definitely,
from what you're explaining,
Iran seems to be very key in India's strategy to expand or project its diplomacy,
project its power into Armenia and beyond.
And I just don't see how it can be done without Iran's support and partnership in this project.
Let's look a little bit into the future because this Turkey,
Pakistan,
and Azerbaijan axis isn't just about war.
You've done a lot of research on it.
It's about information, ideology.
It's about networks from social media campaigns.
You've done research on cyber funding.
So India definitely faces a hybrid challenge.
You know, the question isn't, I believe, how to respond, but how to prepare.
So what do you see as the next...
flashpoint and challenge for India?
Is it going to be the Kashmir?
Is it going to be the Caucasus somewhere else?
Well, Kashmir is in a very difficult situation right now.
So after this recent,
you know,
this Operation Sindoor,
India has made a major change in its stance on terrorism.
Now India says that any act of terror will be tantamount to an act of war.
And during this recent conflict situation between India and Pakistan,
Pakistan actually infiltrated more than 50 hardcore terrorists and fedain attackers
into the Indian territory.
and I don't think that they've come here just to have fun or like have a cup of tea
you know they've come here to stage orchestrate very deadly terror attacks that's
likely to happen so if that happens India will not be left with any option except
to engage Pakistan secondly Pakistan has seen India's capabilities now and Pakistan
knows that I mean if India is given sufficient time now let's say about five years
seven years
then India will develop and build its military capabilities to such an extent that
after that will be impossible for Pakistan to defeat India.
And thirdly,
Pakistan has also basically understood or got an idea of India's weaknesses and
strengths.
Because of all their surveillance drones, they could do the 3D mapping of Jammu and Kashmir.
They also saw that in the recent war,
no big power came and stood with India in a very open and a very clear manner.
So I think that they feel that it's now that they have the right opportunity to
again attack India and bring India to its knees.
So I feel that hopefully very soon,
maybe a few months or let's say not a few months,
then a few years,
Pakistan is going to strike back.
with the support of its international global friends.
And for India also,
again,
it's an opportunity because if India allows Pakistan to gather its strength and
basically build again its air defenses,
acquire all kinds of advanced military technology,
lose this moment, it will be difficult for India to deal with Pakistan in the future.
Also,
at the moment right now,
there are a lot of internal rebellious insurgencies,
the plaguing Pakistan,
like the Baloch Resurgence,
Baloch Freedom Movement.
Also, the TTP terrorists are attacking the Pakistani establishment.
So this is,
I think,
a very opportune moment for India to attack Pakistan and just disintegrate them.
Pakistan has been an existential problem for India, and it has two dimensions.
First is the external dimension,
the conventional dimension that,
I mean,
they can attack India anytime.
They have the nukes and those nukes are definitely made and they're definitely
aimed to attack India.
The internal dimension is the Pakistan-sponsored proxy terrorism in Jammu and
Kashmir and the other parts of India.
And the third, and the second internal dimension is that
a huge overwhelming chunk of the Indian Muslims here they're very highly
radicalized and fanatic and they can feel more empowered and emboldened and
encouraged when they see a very strong radicalized and fanatic Pakistan so if India
doesn't take care of Pakistan in the immediate future and arrives at some kind of a
final effective solution of Pakistan,
by which I mean disintegration of Pakistan into a few parts.
If India doesn't go for that kind of solution,
India's own existence will be severely threatened,
majorly threatened in the future,
because I see that Pakistan attacking India with the nukes is a real-time
possibility.
Secondly,
The internal population of,
huge population of India's highly radicalized and overwhelmingly indoctrinated
Muslim population can wreak havoc internally and create a very bad security
situation for India.
That can be taken care of only if India deals with Pakistan effectively.
Once Pakistan problem is solved the external front,
then India can think of dealing with the internal front.
So that's definitely a major flashpoint for India.
Again,
Karabakh,
certainly we know that,
you know,
what Azerbaijan was planning and we were expecting that this year in March itself,
Azerbaijan would do some major operation in the Zanzegur region.
And if you remember,
Donald Trump made a statement that he made two nations,
you know,
just convince them not to go for a war.
Then, I mean, we all kind of made a guess that
They must have been Armenian, Azerbaijan.
But Azerbaijan continues to nurture those ambitions.
And even that is a very active front.
And Azerbaijan can go for any major offensive, let's say, anytime soon.
And now how to counter this?
I think,
first of all,
we need some kind of a global coalition or global,
I would say,
grouping of like-minded countries to counter Turkey,
Pakistan,
Azerbaijan access at multiple levels,
on multiple fronts.
And that coalition can be of countries like Armenia,
India, Greece and Cyprus.
So these four countries and even France can be the part of that grouping to counter
these countries because they are all equally hurt by what Turkey is doing,
whether it's the Islamist agenda,
whether it's forcing the illegal immigrants or supporting the jihadist and Islamist
groups or supporting their enemies internationally in the multilateral forum.
So I think these four countries can come together and start some sort of an
information,
narrative war against Turkey through media,
through think tanks,
by organizing conferences.
And then at the second level, they can have intelligence cooperation and coordination.
At the third level,
they should go for joint exercises,
military exercises,
and more vibrant economic exchanges.
So I think this way, India, with the help of the like-minded countries, can invest heavily into
some kind of an information narrative campaign or just to expose what Pakistan,
Turkey and Azerbaijan are doing.
Dr.
Pandya,
you're a step ahead of me because I was actually going to ask you for some closing
thoughts about India-Armenia relations,
next steps or something like that,
but you already gave us that.
So I think we can leave it there for today.
That was wonderful.
Thank you for coming on the Groong podcast.
We really appreciate your insights and we hope to talk with you soon again.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Thank you, Dr. Pandya.
Thank you, Asbed.
Thank you, Hovik.
It was a pleasure talking to you.
Well, that's our show, folks.
This episode was recorded on June 3rd, 2025.
We've been talking with Dr.
Abhinav Pandya,
who is the founder,
director,
and CEO of the Usanas Foundation,
an India-based security and foreign policy think tank.
He's a Cornell University graduate in public affairs in St.
Stephen's College, Delhi.
Dr.
Pandya is a policy analyst specializing in counterterrorism,
Indian foreign policy,
and Afghanistan-Pakistan geopolitics.
For more on Dr.
Pandya,
see his link in our show notes at podcasts.groong.org slash episode number.
Want to keep this going?
Well, in that case, head over to podcast.groong.org slash donate.
That's where you'll find ways to support us.
Patreon, buy me a coffee, buy me a chai maybe.
All of it.
It's quick, it's easy.
I'm Hovik Manucharyan.
I'm Asbed Bedrossian in Los Angeles.
You can follow us across all platforms wherever Armenian news travels and yes,
even WhatsApp groups in Bengaluru now.
Check out our show notes for all the links.
Thank you for listening.
And we'll talk to you soon.
Bye-bye.