Armenian News Network - Groong: Week In Review Podcast

Hrant Mikaelian - War on Iran, Russia on TRIPP, New MPG Poll in Armenia, Economy | Ep 471, Sep 7, 2025

• Armenian News Network / Groong • Episode 471

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War on Iran, Russia on TRIPP, New MPG Poll in Armenia, Economy

Topics

  • War in Iran
  • Russia’s Stance on TRIPP
  • New MPG Poll in Armenia
  • Armenian Economy in H1/2025

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Episode 471 | Recorded: September 8, 2025


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Asbed (00:00:06):

Hello, everyone,

Asbed (00:00:07):

and welcome to the Armenian News Network Groong Weekend Review for September 7,

Asbed (00:00:10):

2025.

Asbed (00:00:12):

Our guest today is going to be Hrant Mikaelian,

Asbed (00:00:14):

a multidisciplinary researcher in social sciences based in Yerevan.

Asbed (00:00:19):

Welcome back, Hrant.

Asbed (00:00:20):

Glad to have you on the Groong podcast again.

Hrant (00:00:22):

Hi, thank you for having me.

Hovik (00:00:24):

Hrant,

Hovik (00:00:25):

this week the E3,

Hovik (00:00:26):

which is France,

Hovik (00:00:28):

Germany and the UK,

Hovik (00:00:29):

triggered the snapback mechanism of the JCPOA,

Hovik (00:00:34):

the agreement between Iran and other countries on nuclear issues.

Hovik (00:00:41):

And this snapback mechanism would allow them to reimpose sanctions on Iran for

Hovik (00:00:46):

alleged non-compliance with nuclear limits.

Hovik (00:00:50):

Iran, Russia and China

Hovik (00:00:52):

condemned the move and vowed not to abide by those sanctions and these demands look

Hovik (00:01:00):

set to sink the deal essentially.

Hovik (00:01:03):

One of the demands is international inspectors going back to the ground to Tehran

Hovik (00:01:09):

and Iran and the second is a return for talks to Washington and on top of that

Hovik (00:01:16):

essentially Washington wants nothing less than Iran's

Hovik (00:01:20):

complete abandonment of uranium, of missiles, and more.

Hovik (00:01:26):

At the same time, there are reports that Iranian MPs are considering a motion in parliament to

Hovik (00:01:32):

withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty .

Hovik (00:01:36):

So is the West pushing Iran into a corner?

Hovik (00:01:39):

Could this be like the first steps towards another escalation,

Hovik (00:01:43):

possibly also including the resumption of the war,

Hovik (00:01:46):

or even worse?

Hrant (00:01:47):

Well, I think that as of now,

Hrant (00:01:53):

probability of new Israel-Iran war is gradually increasing.

Hrant (00:01:59):

What I can see is that both sides are preparing.

Hrant (00:02:02):

Of course, maybe the experts were diving deep into Iran or Israel.

Hrant (00:02:08):

Maybe they have another opinion.

Hrant (00:02:10):

But what I can observe is that both sides are preparing for another round of

Hrant (00:02:15):

escalation,

Hrant (00:02:16):

which I think will be different in nature and form from the previous one.

Hrant (00:02:21):

I'm not meaning that it will be completely different because the sides still don't

Hrant (00:02:25):

have a border and they will have to throw weapons on each other through the air.

Hrant (00:02:30):

But as of now,

Hrant (00:02:32):

Israel does not have or almost does not have its spies in Iran anymore because Iran

Hrant (00:02:40):

has caught hundreds of spies.

Hrant (00:02:42):

So as of now, Iran is prepared much more because Iran is expecting the real war.

Hrant (00:02:48):

Beforehand,

Hrant (00:02:49):

Iranians would expect that there might be some conflict,

Hrant (00:02:52):

some shooting,

Hrant (00:02:54):

but not a real war.

Hrant (00:02:55):

Now they do expect a real war,

Hrant (00:02:58):

and from what I know,

Hrant (00:02:59):

they are preparing to the next round,

Hrant (00:03:01):

and they are cooperating with Chinese,

Hrant (00:03:03):

and they are producing new weapons on behalf of themselves,

Hrant (00:03:07):

and so on.

Hrant (00:03:08):

Well, so does Israel, but still Israel has very...

Hrant (00:03:13):

small territory and very high density of population and so on.

Hrant (00:03:18):

Although many Iranian agglomerations are also vulnerable because Tehran has huge

Hrant (00:03:25):

population and so on.

Hrant (00:03:26):

So I think that Iran is preparing to a new war.

Hrant (00:03:31):

Regarding the West's actions, West

Hrant (00:03:38):

is not seeking any possible solution as of now.

Hrant (00:03:41):

What we see, they are pushing more and more.

Hrant (00:03:44):

U.S. does not want to withdraw from its policy towards Iran.

Hrant (00:03:47):

And basically, this war was caused by Israel and U.S.

Hrant (00:03:51):

because Trump, in his first term, he abandoned JCPOA.

Hrant (00:03:55):

And now JCPOA is not in action anymore in reality.

Hrant (00:03:58):

And Iranians also have made a statement that if the West will continue like this,

Hrant (00:04:03):

they will abandon JCPOA as well.

Hrant (00:04:05):

And they are not letting the Western nuclear experts to their sides anymore because

Hrant (00:04:12):

we have seen how it affected the strategic defense of Iran.

Hrant (00:04:17):

So as of now, I think, yes, Iran is pushed back and I think it will try to strike back as well.

Hovik (00:04:24):

How about the timing?

Hovik (00:04:26):

I was going to say,

Hovik (00:04:28):

Trita Parsi,

Hovik (00:04:29):

who is a well-known and respected analyst,

Hovik (00:04:31):

said that the attack could come before December and definitely as early as August.

Hovik (00:04:37):

So we're past August,

Hovik (00:04:38):

we're now in September,

Hovik (00:04:39):

but he seems to believe that it will happen this year.

Hrant (00:04:45):

I think there is such possibility.

Hrant (00:04:49):

And I think, yes, before December is more likely than after.

Hrant (00:04:53):

But still,

Hrant (00:04:55):

I'm sure that there is an ongoing second-track negotiations,

Hrant (00:04:59):

because Iran never abandoned those.

Hrant (00:05:01):

So maybe they are trying to somehow avoid it, but I don't think it will work out.

Hrant (00:05:08):

Netanyahu is in same position where he was before.

Hrant (00:05:11):

He did not achieve his goals.

Hrant (00:05:13):

So basically, the previous round of Iran-Israel escalation was a draw.

Hrant (00:05:20):

Neither side has won.

Hrant (00:05:22):

Both sides have seen their vulnerabilities.

Hrant (00:05:26):

Iran has seen more vulnerabilities, but it has fixed more of them as well.

Hrant (00:05:30):

So as of now, it was draw.

Hrant (00:05:33):

So if it was draw,

Hrant (00:05:34):

then it is likely that sides will seek renewal of hostilities to see who is

Hrant (00:05:42):

stronger by now.

Asbed (00:05:44):

Since the Iran war, which was in June,

Asbed (00:05:47):

Pashinyan and Aliyev were in the Oval Office and signed an intent to open

Asbed (00:05:52):

transportation links between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan via Syunik.

Asbed (00:05:56):

This is essentially Turkey's Zangezur Corridor, rebranded as TRIPP or the Trump route.

Asbed (00:06:02):

The concern for us is that with the potential of U.S.

Asbed (00:06:05):

presence in Armenia along the border with Iran comes the potential of turning the

Asbed (00:06:10):

region into a powder keg.

Asbed (00:06:12):

How credible do you think are the reports that TRIPP itself could be leveraged by

Asbed (00:06:18):

Israel and the United States in the next war against Iran?

Hrant (00:06:21):

I think they will try to use it.

Hrant (00:06:23):

But the main goal of TRIPP is not to use it against Iran, but to use it against Russia.

Hrant (00:06:32):

Because...

Hrant (00:06:34):

i think it's becoming more and more obvious that turkey is striking striving to

Hrant (00:06:41):

achieve uh Caspian sea and pass to the central Asia to start fueling it with

Hrant (00:06:48):

weapons and prepare it to the conflict with Russia so basically they want to turn

Hrant (00:06:58):

the central Asia into new Ukraine

Hrant (00:07:02):

Now, as of now,

Hrant (00:07:04):

Russia and China are,

Hrant (00:07:06):

as I stated,

Hrant (00:07:07):

they are standing back to back to each other.

Hrant (00:07:10):

So China is,

Hrant (00:07:13):

you know,

Hrant (00:07:14):

projecting its power to the South China Sea and Russia is projecting its power to

Hrant (00:07:19):

the Eastern Europe.

Hrant (00:07:20):

So they're kind of, if we consider them as a union, some

Hrant (00:07:28):

or or treaty then they are trying to expand their influence right now but if there

Hrant (00:07:34):

is a conflict in between they will have to shift into middle of eurasian region so

Hrant (00:07:41):

interest into central asia both will have to you know deal with the new situation

Hrant (00:07:46):

and that is how west will try to deter them on the uh on the Taiwan and Ukraine

Hrant (00:07:53):

directions respectively so

Hrant (00:07:55):

Basically, I think this is the main reason for the so-called Zangezur Corridor.

Hrant (00:08:00):

Because if all you want is transportation, then they have many roads through Georgia.

Hrant (00:08:08):

And by the way, that roads, including Baku-Tbilisi-Kars, Kars...

Hrant (00:08:15):

Railway are utilized by 50%, but not more.

Hrant (00:08:19):

And they also have proposed roads through Iran.

Hrant (00:08:23):

Iran said we also have a road for Nakhijevan and Azerbaijan to connect.

Hrant (00:08:30):

Azerbaijan does not want it.

Hrant (00:08:32):

Azerbaijan uses Georgian road, but still wants a corridor.

Hrant (00:08:38):

What is the reason for the corridor?

Hrant (00:08:41):

They need to transport something which you cannot transport through regular

Hrant (00:08:45):

economic relations with third parties.

Hrant (00:08:48):

So Georgia did not let Turkey to transport weapons to Azerbaijan through the land road.

Hrant (00:08:57):

And now they want to transport weapons and maybe some,

Hrant (00:09:01):

you know,

Hrant (00:09:02):

drugs,

Hrant (00:09:03):

nuclear materials,

Hrant (00:09:04):

something which is illegal,

Hrant (00:09:06):

basically, through that corridor.

Hrant (00:09:08):

This is the main reason for that corridor.

Hrant (00:09:10):

Now, regarding the Iranian case,

Hrant (00:09:14):

there are lots of discussions of militants transported here and there.

Hrant (00:09:20):

Those are not very credible.

Hrant (00:09:22):

But if Americans appear on the northern border of Iran, that will mean that they can effectively

Hrant (00:09:32):

surveil of northern part of Iran.

Hrant (00:09:36):

So Americans can have surveillance points there, which they most likely will use.

Hrant (00:09:43):

Because what is a big reason for U.S.

Hrant (00:09:45):

to be between Nakhijevan and Baku?

Hrant (00:09:49):

I think it's not a very big deal.

Hrant (00:09:52):

Of course, if we take into consideration the Central Asia, that adds to the equation.

Hrant (00:09:56):

If we add Iran, that makes the whole puzzle there.

Hrant (00:10:02):

And also what is interesting here is that initially Turkey and Azerbaijan were

Hrant (00:10:07):

trying to sell Zangezur Corridor to Iran.

Hrant (00:10:10):

saying that it is part of the middle corridor and so on and so forth.

Hrant (00:10:13):

And now we see that it will not work out like that,

Hrant (00:10:17):

especially given Americans are there,

Hrant (00:10:18):

but not only.

Hrant (00:10:20):

So it is corridor of war, corridor of Western Azerbaijan and corridor of global conflict.

Hrant (00:10:26):

And statements of lasting peace coming to the Caucasus cannot be far from reality.

Hrant (00:10:34):

The final thing is that in Iran,

Hrant (00:10:37):

there is a clash of interpretations on that,

Hrant (00:10:40):

because in reality,

Hrant (00:10:41):

the current government,

Hrant (00:10:42):

current government headed by President Pezeshkian and also his MFA,

Hrant (00:10:51):

they basically they support both corridor and they support

Hrant (00:10:56):

basically all of these pro-Azerbaijani activities in this region.

Asbed (00:11:02):

Is it support or have they taken a wait-and-see attitude?

Hrant (00:11:06):

In reality, they support it.

Hrant (00:11:09):

And I've seen one of the reports which they were presenting to the government that

Hrant (00:11:16):

if there is a power change in Armenia,

Hrant (00:11:18):

there will be risk of corridor implemented by pro-Russian forces or by

Hrant (00:11:24):

nationalists.

Hrant (00:11:25):

which is completely fake approach, but what does it serve?

Hrant (00:11:30):

They want to keep this government into power, first.

Hrant (00:11:34):

Second,

Hrant (00:11:36):

they are competing with the religious authorities,

Hrant (00:11:40):

which are against the corridor and against any increase of influence of Azerbaijan.

Asbed (00:11:47):

So you are saying that we actually have to dig into Iranian political divisions to

Asbed (00:11:55):

really understand exactly what's going on in their split response for the TRIPP.

Hrant (00:12:02):

Right.

Hrant (00:12:03):

In the beginning, Araghchi has said that he does support this corridor,

Hrant (00:12:07):

this TRIPP,

Hrant (00:12:09):

and the Trump Corridor.

Hrant (00:12:12):

And then there were statements on behalf of religious authorities that they are against.

Hrant (00:12:18):

And then the government started, you know, using the same language.

Hrant (00:12:22):

They adopted the language of their counterparts,

Hrant (00:12:26):

but they are trying to achieve completely different goals.

Hrant (00:12:31):

And this is very important to observe.

Hrant (00:12:33):

And we have seen some other statements by them,

Hrant (00:12:37):

which also makes it obvious that they do support.

Hrant (00:12:40):

And they are trying to limit the influence of religious leaders over the foreign

Hrant (00:12:45):

politics and also provide them with false information about the situation.

Hrant (00:12:51):

So I think this should be tracked carefully.

Hovik (00:12:55):

well i have to say i am very flabbergasted by your response because uh i mean we

Hovik (00:13:03):

knew that there was a mild response uh but outright support from Iranian uh the the

Hovik (00:13:10):

uh constructivist camp is is shocking but not as shocking as to me what uh i'm

Hovik (00:13:18):

gonna say next because as you say you know this corridor seems to be designed

Hovik (00:13:22):

against Russia

Hovik (00:13:24):

And many experts,

Hovik (00:13:25):

in fact,

Hovik (00:13:26):

see the TRIPP corridor as a strategic win for the U.S.,

Hovik (00:13:29):

opening the door for a direct American role in the South Caucasus.

Hovik (00:13:33):

I was able to watch an interview by Paul Goble.

Hovik (00:13:37):

who is the architect of the famous or infamous global plan,

Hovik (00:13:41):

which proposed that we trade Armenians,

Hovik (00:13:43):

trade land in Syunik for independence of Artsakh.

Hovik (00:13:48):

And he was giddy.

Hovik (00:13:50):

He seemed like to be that nerd in class who had solved the math problem before

Hovik (00:13:57):

everyone else and was now happy that at least part of his solution is coming to

Hovik (00:14:02):

life.

Hovik (00:14:03):

Well, we can go...

Hovik (00:14:06):

into details how much he predicted what would happen he he was saying completely

Hovik (00:14:09):

different things he was but but in any case it effectively what he was predicting

Hovik (00:14:15):

did happen or what he wanted to happen did happen um and he says global says that

Hovik (00:14:22):

the stakes in this uh trump route are

Hovik (00:14:27):

far more global than what they would seem.

Hovik (00:14:30):

They would conflict with the INSTC,

Hovik (00:14:33):

they would conflict with even the Belt and Road Initiative by China.

Hovik (00:14:37):

So against this backdrop, Russia's muted response is striking.

Hovik (00:14:41):

A week ago, Pezeshkian and Putin declared that they backed the 3 plus 3 format as a more

Hovik (00:14:47):

effective mechanism for solving regional issues,

Hovik (00:14:50):

but that was just declaration.

Hovik (00:14:51):

And days ago,

Hovik (00:14:54):

Deputy Prime Minister Overchuk told Ria that Russia favors,

Hovik (00:14:59):

Russia in fact favors unblocking communications,

Hovik (00:15:02):

and he voiced only limited concern about outside forces in the region.

Hovik (00:15:08):

The only firm opposition to the Trump route is from the conservatives in Iran.

Hovik (00:15:14):

How do you explain the Russian position on TRIPP so far?

Hrant (00:15:18):

Okay, so let me start from the global plan.

Hrant (00:15:23):

which was implying that Artsakh is becoming part of Armenia,

Hrant (00:15:31):

legally recognized part of Armenia,

Hrant (00:15:32):

not even an independent state,

Hrant (00:15:34):

but Artsakh within Nagorno-Karabakh borders,

Hrant (00:15:37):

so autonomous borders.

Hrant (00:15:39):

The rest is given to Azerbaijan.

Hrant (00:15:42):

Artsakh is getting the corridor and Azerbaijan is also getting the corridor.

Hrant (00:15:47):

Now the forms of corridors would be different.

Hrant (00:15:50):

What Kocharyan has agreed,

Hrant (00:15:52):

and which was, in fact,

Hrant (00:15:54):

pre-signed by the sides,

Hrant (00:15:56):

including Heydar Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan,

Hrant (00:16:00):

with mediation of Americans,

Hrant (00:16:03):

was that the corridor would be,

Hrant (00:16:06):

let's say, a non-territorial corridor.

Hrant (00:16:08):

Basically, a bridge between Nakhijevan and other parts of Azerbaijan.

Hrant (00:16:14):

So that was a bit different from what Azerbaijan wants now,

Hrant (00:16:17):

because they want now extraterritorial corridor on the land.

Hrant (00:16:20):

And by the way,

Hrant (00:16:21):

we have seen the map,

Hrant (00:16:23):

which appeared in occupied Hadrut,

Hrant (00:16:25):

where Azerbaijan has portrayed whole

Hrant (00:16:29):

Olmehri region, as well as part of Kajaran region in the Azerbaijani rule, let's say.

Hrant (00:16:37):

So basically, as of now, situation has changed.

Hrant (00:16:41):

There is no Artsakh anymore, but Gobel is still happy.

Hrant (00:16:45):

Why is he happy? Because the real reason for that plan was not about Artsakh conflict.

Hrant (00:16:50):

It was about the corridor.

Hrant (00:16:53):

And basically, the whole US policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan was about the corridor from the

Hrant (00:16:58):

very beginning.

Hrant (00:17:00):

It is very important because they have fueled the power change in 2018,

Hrant (00:17:04):

and they have fueled identity change so that Armenian society is accepting these

Hrant (00:17:09):

changes much more mildly than it would be expected in the 90s.

Hrant (00:17:14):

So they have worked with public opinion and with political field in Armenia to make

Hrant (00:17:20):

this happen for decades.

Hrant (00:17:21):

I think this is important to state.

Hrant (00:17:24):

And now regarding Russians.

Hrant (00:17:29):

Basically,

Hrant (00:17:30):

what Russians say,

Hrant (00:17:31):

3 plus 3 and so on,

Hrant (00:17:34):

indicates that Russians already have given up on the idea that they will be solely

Hrant (00:17:40):

controlling the whole region of the South Caucasus.

Hrant (00:17:43):

Because initially, 3 plus 3 initiative was proposed by Erdogan in mid-2000s.

Hrant (00:17:51):

And it was his idea to enter the region.

Hrant (00:17:55):

So at that time,

Hrant (00:17:58):

Russia was dominating force in the region,

Hrant (00:18:00):

while Turkey was competing force,

Hrant (00:18:03):

and the West was also competing there.

Hrant (00:18:05):

So Turkey was trying to present itself to the West as its own representative.

Hrant (00:18:12):

Although we see how Turkey in reality tries to utilize West's position,

Hrant (00:18:17):

but for its only own interest,

Hrant (00:18:19):

ultimately.

Hrant (00:18:21):

the same they did with Russia as well now uh now regarding the three plus three

Hrant (00:18:28):

Iran and Russia still want this format or already wants this format but turkey

Hrant (00:18:34):

doesn't want it anymore we have not seen any statement on Turkish side about three

Hrant (00:18:39):

plus three for a rather long period of time why it is so because in reality turkey

Hrant (00:18:44):

is getting increased influence in this region

Hrant (00:18:48):

They have rather big influence in Georgia,

Hrant (00:18:50):

both economic and political,

Hrant (00:18:52):

and they have signed a military agreement between the sides.

Hrant (00:18:55):

I mean, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia all together.

Hrant (00:18:59):

Now, in Azerbaijan, they have complete influence.

Hrant (00:19:03):

They can do whatever they want.

Hrant (00:19:04):

They affect the government policies completely.

Hrant (00:19:07):

And now Armenia.

Hrant (00:19:09):

In reality, this government is very friendly towards Turkey.

Hrant (00:19:12):

And so we can say that Turkey is now the major power in the South Caucasus already.

Hrant (00:19:19):

So 3 plus 3 would somehow balance it and let Iran and Russia gain more legal

Hrant (00:19:27):

mechanisms in the South Caucasus and at the same time to limit influence of the

Hrant (00:19:33):

West in the South Caucasus.

Hrant (00:19:35):

So basically,

Hrant (00:19:36):

as of now,

Hrant (00:19:38):

Russia and Iran see this initiative as a possibility for them to regain influence

Hrant (00:19:43):

or to keep influence and so on.

Hrant (00:19:47):

But it's not the same.

Hrant (00:19:48):

I mean, I'm blocking communications.

Hrant (00:19:50):

As Russia portrays it, it's not the same as Turkish claim to open the borders.

Hrant (00:19:56):

Because first of all,

Hrant (00:19:57):

Turkey wants to open the borders,

Hrant (00:19:59):

but for them to work only in Turkish direction.

Hrant (00:20:02):

I mean, for example, now we see that...

Hrant (00:20:06):

Azerbaijan is discussing opening the corridor,

Hrant (00:20:08):

but is not discussing Armenian citizens' possibility to enter Azerbaijan,

Hrant (00:20:13):

right?

Hrant (00:20:14):

So the conflict is over,

Hrant (00:20:15):

as they say,

Hrant (00:20:16):

but Armenian citizens and basically any Armenian in the world cannot enter

Hrant (00:20:21):

Azerbaijan.

Hrant (00:20:22):

still uh or there are of course 23 uh prisoners of war in Azerbaijan including the

Hrant (00:20:30):

military and political leadership of Artsakh but anyway I'm sorry uh let me let me

Hovik (00:20:35):

just ask also ask something else and feel free to uh add whatever you think is

Hovik (00:20:40):

missing you're an economist and um

Hovik (00:20:44):

or at least you have an economic background as well as a political.

Hovik (00:20:48):

In his interview with RIA, Overchuk noted that the TRIPP still needs investors.

Hovik (00:20:54):

And he was saying that this is a stage that they haven't yet achieved.

Hovik (00:21:00):

And he said that it will face stiff competition from other regional projects,

Hovik (00:21:05):

such as the Baku Tbilisi railway and highway.

Hovik (00:21:10):

And he said that this is good for shippers because the prices will be cheaper,

Hovik (00:21:13):

but it will be difficult to achieve profitability.

Hovik (00:21:17):

Meanwhile,

Hovik (00:21:18):

you know,

Hovik (00:21:19):

the staunch advocates of the corridor,

Hovik (00:21:22):

including some Armenian ones who I would say maybe are,

Hovik (00:21:25):

you know, sponsored by foreign money,

Hovik (00:21:30):

argue that this TRIPP will bring prosperity to Armenia and Armenians will become

Hovik (00:21:34):

very rich.

Hovik (00:21:35):

So let me ask you,

Hovik (00:21:36):

you know,

Hovik (00:21:37):

how would you assess the economics of the Trump route and are Armenians going to

Hovik (00:21:42):

get filthy rich and prosperous as a result of this corridor?

Hrant (00:21:46):

Yeah, one of pro-government propagandists said that now the prices of property in Mehri

Hrant (00:21:54):

will skyrocket,

Hrant (00:21:55):

which is,

Hrant (00:21:56):

you know, nonsense.

Hrant (00:21:58):

In reality,

Hrant (00:21:59):

what Azerbaijan has said,

Hrant (00:22:01):

and basically Armenian government has already confirmed that they will not pay

Hrant (00:22:05):

anything to Armenia.

Hrant (00:22:07):

So yes, there will be some traffic, maybe even big.

Hrant (00:22:10):

But it doesn't mean that Armenia will get anything out of it.

Hrant (00:22:13):

That's first.

Hrant (00:22:14):

Second, they will not stop in Armenia, most likely.

Hrant (00:22:17):

And they will not be stopped by Armenian authorities.

Hrant (00:22:21):

So initially,

Hrant (00:22:23):

Armenian government has stated that they are completely against the corridor,

Hrant (00:22:28):

but they are for opening the road.

Hrant (00:22:30):

So then they started speaking of outsourcing Armenian territory.

Hrant (00:22:35):

And Trump said it will be 99 years and then with extension of 99 more years.

Hrant (00:22:41):

So, you know, if a state which is 34 years old is outsourcing its territory for 99 years and then

Hrant (00:22:49):

plus 99 more years expected,

Hrant (00:22:51):

then we're speaking of giving up the land.

Hrant (00:22:55):

And then lately Pashinyan has said,

Hrant (00:23:00):

that for Nakhijevan citizens or for Nakhijevan there will be an exception that they

Hrant (00:23:07):

will not be checked they will get the free road to Azerbaijan so that's the first

Hrant (00:23:13):

step towards the real corridor now we have two conflicting ideas about it

Hrant (00:23:21):

One is that the government in Armenia.

Hrant (00:23:23):

One is that the government said that it is insisting that there will be a whole

Hrant (00:23:27):

control,

Hrant (00:23:28):

complete control over the territory on Armenian side.

Hrant (00:23:31):

And another is that Aliyev is demanding that there will be no Armenian control over

Hrant (00:23:37):

the road and over Azerbaijan and Turkish transportation.

Hrant (00:23:41):

Now, who will win?

Hrant (00:23:43):

Basically, we can remember that there were many times that Aliyev was stating something,

Hrant (00:23:48):

Pashinyan was stating the opposite side,

Hrant (00:23:51):

And ultimately, Aliyev always won.

Hrant (00:23:53):

So unfortunately,

Hrant (00:23:54):

I'm expecting this to happen again,

Hrant (00:23:57):

maybe because Pashinyan was dishonest from the beginning.

Hrant (00:24:02):

Maybe because he was weak diplomatically.

Hrant (00:24:05):

Or maybe he doesn't understand how to run the foreign politics and how to achieve your goals.

Hrant (00:24:11):

I think all three approaches are correct in this situation.

Hrant (00:24:15):

But I'm not seeing him being able to achieve the stated goal.

Hrant (00:24:20):

Because what he is doing is a policy without proper means.

Hrant (00:24:25):

Now getting back to Russia.

Hrant (00:24:28):

Russia's main issue is...

Hrant (00:24:32):

Poor strategic school and poor quality of long-term policy.

Hrant (00:24:37):

And the second issue is its high engagement into Ukrainian conflict.

Hrant (00:24:44):

So what they are trying to do is they are skipping any possible problems worldwide

Hrant (00:24:52):

in order to finish the Ukrainian war.

Hrant (00:24:56):

Now,

Hrant (00:24:58):

in the discussions with Russian experts,

Hrant (00:25:02):

we have said that,

Hrant (00:25:03):

you know, this policy will lead to complete collapse on Armenian side,

Hrant (00:25:08):

and we have seen already that Nagorno-Karabakh Republic or Artsakh has collapsed.

Hrant (00:25:14):

And what they say is that basically we don't care about your collapse,

Hrant (00:25:18):

we care about our collapse.

Hrant (00:25:21):

and that means that if we might have problems here or in this region we should

Hrant (00:25:27):

avoid it at any cost so that's their approach and basically they will try to avoid

Hrant (00:25:33):

any possible conflict until the situation in Ukraine is resolved that is why their

Hrant (00:25:38):

response is mild but what i can observe in Russian media including the pro-state

Hrant (00:25:44):

media

Hrant (00:25:46):

I see that they are very discontent and I see that the official response was mild,

Hrant (00:25:53):

but not because it's their political approach,

Hrant (00:25:56):

but because they consider themselves not to be ready to,

Hrant (00:26:00):

you know,

Hrant (00:26:01):

back as a stronger position.

Hrant (00:26:03):

So I think the position,

Hrant (00:26:05):

Russian position towards the corridor will change after the end of Ukrainian war,

Hrant (00:26:09):

or at least the hot phase of Ukrainian war,

Hrant (00:26:12):

especially given the quality and direction of Russian-Azerbaijani relations.

Hrant (00:26:17):

which since since since russians let Azerbaijan to destroy Artsakh has decreased and

Hrant (00:26:25):

has devaluated towards towards towards almost open conflict and by the way one of

Hrant (00:26:32):

Azerbaijani resources has spread opinion poll results which we don't know how

Hrant (00:26:38):

accurate it is but anyway

Hrant (00:26:41):

According to that survey,

Hrant (00:26:44):

60% said that Russia is the main enemy of Azerbaijan,

Hrant (00:26:48):

and the second was Armenia with 53%.

Hrant (00:26:52):

And then there was Iran, there was France, and there was India.

Hrant (00:26:57):

So basically five countries which are enemies of Azerbaijan.

Hrant (00:27:02):

Russia armenia Iran, India and France which we understand what it is basically it's

Hrant (00:27:10):

all about armenia again but anyway uh armenia has decreased because yeah now they

Hrant (00:27:15):

don't see a threat in armenia at least in armenia under Persian rule, oh other

Hrant (00:27:21):

ways the figures have been but they're targeting all the allies of armenia

Hrant (00:27:27):

Yeah,

Hrant (00:27:28):

well, at least the lies of this current government,

Hrant (00:27:30):

not Armenia,

Hrant (00:27:31):

definitely,

Hrant (00:27:32):

but of current government.

Hrant (00:27:33):

That is obvious.

Hrant (00:27:34):

And basically,

Hrant (00:27:36):

what we have seen in the days of Shanghai Organization Summit,

Hrant (00:27:42):

we have seen that Pakistan has recognized Armenia.

Hrant (00:27:45):

I think that was by mediation of Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Hrant (00:27:51):

So basically, I think that again, Armenia is trapped into Turkish foreign policy.

Hrant (00:27:56):

We can remember recognition of Palestine by Armenia, which was obviously directed from Turkey.

Hrant (00:28:02):

So now we see more and more Armenian foreign policy is in line with Turkish foreign policy.

Hrant (00:28:08):

But anyway, I think that as of now, Russia's stance is not what they really think.

Asbed (00:28:17):

Okay, Hrant, let's go to the next section,

Asbed (00:28:18):

which is going to be the MPG poll that just came out a few days ago.

Asbed (00:28:23):

For the audience, you are going to see the slides on the screen.

Asbed (00:28:28):

That's going to be in Armenian,

Asbed (00:28:29):

but we are going to have an English version of the questions and everything in the

Asbed (00:28:34):

show notes.

Asbed (00:28:35):

So you can go there, podcasts.groong.org / episode-number.

Asbed (00:28:39):

Okay,

Asbed (00:28:40):

let's go to the first slide,

Asbed (00:28:42):

actually slide three,

Asbed (00:28:44):

which was about the August 8th meeting in the White House.

Asbed (00:28:48):

An agreement was signed in Washington between Azerbaijan and Armenia's governments

Asbed (00:28:52):

and the United States witnessing it regarding the TRIPP corridor.

Asbed (00:28:56):

This agreement provides for certain communications and infrastructure to pass

Asbed (00:28:59):

through Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Asbed (00:29:01):

The poll question asks,

Asbed (00:29:03):

what is your attitude towards this agreement according to the following options?

Asbed (00:29:07):

And gave them options from positive to negative.

Asbed (00:29:11):

And 42% were generally positive, 48% were generally negative, 10% undecided.

Asbed (00:29:17):

So people seem to have a split view of the August 8th reality show,

Asbed (00:29:22):

as I call it in the White House,

Asbed (00:29:23):

between Pashinyan and Aliyev and Trump.

Asbed (00:29:26):

What are your thoughts about this poll result?

Asbed (00:29:30):

And why are these numbers important, Hrant?

Hrant (00:29:32):

Well, these numbers show some change in public opinion because what we have observed

Hrant (00:29:37):

during at least last two years or maybe three years was that on any foreign

Hrant (00:29:42):

political matter,

Hrant (00:29:44):

Some, maybe 35% would support the government, and maybe some 50% would be against.

Hrant (00:29:53):

Basically, not even 50, but 55 or 60.

Hrant (00:29:58):

Basically, that was the overall picture of the polls regarding the foreign politics.

Hrant (00:30:04):

Now we see 42 against 48 or even a bit less than 48.

Hrant (00:30:09):

So we see that support has grown and negative responses has decreased.

Hrant (00:30:16):

There are basically two reasons.

Hrant (00:30:18):

One is the overall expectation of peace, because in reality, many people do want peace.

Hrant (00:30:23):

peace and if they do believe that this uh this agreement will be will bring peace

Hrant (00:30:29):

they might you know welcome it or at least they want this to be true uh if we look

Hrant (00:30:35):

at other questions we see that people understand that it's not that much bringing

Hrant (00:30:40):

peace but still they they want it to happen that's what the perception is yeah yeah

Hrant (00:30:45):

yeah they don't believe but they still want it which is understandable uh on

Hrant (00:30:50):

another hand we see that

Hrant (00:30:53):

how coverage affects the public opinion here.

Hrant (00:30:57):

And the coverage in this case is very important because during the summer,

Hrant (00:31:01):

we had several main events which affected public opinion,

Hrant (00:31:05):

which were very densely packed in late June and July and beginning of August.

Hrant (00:31:13):

So in the beginning, government started crackdown on opposition.

Hrant (00:31:17):

First, they attacked church and church leaders.

Hrant (00:31:20):

So I want to remember that two archbishops of Armenian Apostolic Church are in

Hrant (00:31:25):

prison,

Hrant (00:31:26):

Bagrat Galstanyan,

Hrant (00:31:27):

and many of his supporters.

Hrant (00:31:29):

Bagrat of Tavush and Mikhail Ajapahyan, Mikhail of Shirak province of Armenia.

Hrant (00:31:37):

So two archbishops of Armenian church are in prison.

Hrant (00:31:40):

Both had very strong political attitude towards this government and both are in jail.

Hrant (00:31:47):

And also government tried to

Hrant (00:31:49):

attacked the Catholicos and tried to dispose him and put a loyal person there,

Hrant (00:31:56):

but this side of their plan did not work.

Hrant (00:32:01):

Also because of weak response on the Armenian church side.

Hrant (00:32:06):

They did not fully support Bagrat or Mikhail, which is also true.

Hrant (00:32:10):

But anyway, the attack on church was one side, so public opinion has directed there.

Hrant (00:32:16):

Then there was a

Hrant (00:32:18):

attack on Samvel Karapetyan and his supporters and he's also still in jail so

Hrant (00:32:23):

basically he's the richest armenian in the world right now and he has rather big

Hrant (00:32:29):

support in armenia and in diaspora as well so he has done lots of aid in armenia on

Hrant (00:32:36):

the contrary to many other businessmen from Russia and from the west so he has been

Hrant (00:32:41):

engaged in with armenia from the very beginning now that is also important

Hrant (00:32:48):

And those three were very important critics of the current government.

Hrant (00:32:53):

And also many people are, after that, are afraid to speak out.

Hrant (00:32:58):

So government took the informational space under control.

Hrant (00:33:02):

They silenced the critics.

Hrant (00:33:03):

That was the first step.

Hrant (00:33:05):

Then they started finding minor and major PR issues.

Hrant (00:33:10):

you know cases including the j-lo concert in armenia so they brought Jennifer Lopez

Hrant (00:33:16):

paid for that from the state budget rather big big amount of money and started you

Hrant (00:33:22):

know hysteria's campaign that whoever is is not supporting this concert he is enemy

Hrant (00:33:28):

of the people and so on and so forth well they're you know as they as they love

Hrant (00:33:34):

And then, so they created a positive, you know, preparation for that.

Hrant (00:33:39):

And one of the next days,

Hrant (00:33:41):

Pashinyan unexpectedly goes to Washington and signs this TRIPP with Trump and Aliyev.

Hrant (00:33:50):

And while the whole opposition camp was in complete disorder,

Hrant (00:33:57):

the government camp was completely ready.

Hrant (00:33:59):

So they started the PR that, OK, now the long lasting war is ended and so on and so forth.

Hrant (00:34:06):

bringing the peace and so on, an hour closer to the West than ever, and so on and so forth.

Hrant (00:34:12):

And they were able, with all these PR means, to increase their support rate.

Hrant (00:34:19):

At the same time, on opposition side, what we see...

Hrant (00:34:22):

You know,

Hrant (00:34:23):

they basically are unable to somehow contradict or somehow speak out because,

Hrant (00:34:28):

you know, the leaders of opposition parties,

Hrant (00:34:31):

their statements,

Hrant (00:34:32):

you don't understand it.

Hrant (00:34:33):

They are not even criticizing it or supporting it.

Hrant (00:34:36):

What they speak is just purely irrelevant,

Hrant (00:34:40):

purely irrelevant,

Hrant (00:34:41):

not only to the TRIPP,

Hrant (00:34:42):

but to anything everywhere,

Hrant (00:34:44):

anywhere in Armenia.

Hrant (00:34:46):

Well, not to say that they are competing with each other and, you know, attacking each other.

Hrant (00:34:52):

I mean, the parliamentary parties in Armenia.

Hrant (00:34:55):

And by the way, again, according to this poll,

Hrant (00:34:57):

They are losing the ground in Armenia.

Hrant (00:35:01):

But at the same time, yeah, they are the main enemies of each other.

Hrant (00:35:05):

So they are completely relevant to the case of Armenian politics.

Asbed (00:35:09):

So basically,

Asbed (00:35:11):

a lot of government propaganda and jailing of opposition views has basically

Asbed (00:35:18):

contributed to...

Asbed (00:35:19):

Not jailers, but...

Hrant (00:35:21):

Yeah.

Hrant (00:35:22):

Well, that also works.

Asbed (00:35:24):

Let's go to the second slide.

Hovik (00:35:29):

Okay, well here's another question on the poll.

Hovik (00:35:34):

It's talking about the road through Sunni.

Hovik (00:35:36):

It basically says,

Hovik (00:35:38):

it has been announced that Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed to open transport

Hovik (00:35:42):

links.

Hovik (00:35:43):

This also implies the establishment of a road through Armenia's Sunni region

Hovik (00:35:47):

connecting Azerbaijan mainland with Nakhijevan.

Hovik (00:35:50):

Do you support the opening of such a road?

Hovik (00:35:54):

In this case, I think that the results are a little bit more shifted.

Hovik (00:36:00):

So only 35% are positive, while about 59% are against this.

Hovik (00:36:08):

And, you know, around 48% fully opposes.

Hovik (00:36:13):

I guess our question is, will Pashinyan's democratic...

Hovik (00:36:16):

quote-unquote government listen to the popular opposition to this,

Hovik (00:36:20):

which seems to be,

Hovik (00:36:21):

you know,

Hovik (00:36:22):

60% is not a bad number in terms of opposition to this project.

Hrant (00:36:27):

Well, I will divide my answer into three parts.

Hrant (00:36:31):

First, start with democratic government of Pashinyan.

Hrant (00:36:35):

Basically, if we look at major steps by Pashinyan, almost all of them were unpopular.

Hrant (00:36:43):

So he's strong at creating overall impression, positive impression, but nothing specific.

Hrant (00:36:49):

While if you look at a public opinion over specific steps and specific policies,

Hrant (00:36:55):

most of those have strong opposition in the society,

Hrant (00:36:58):

which is very important to note.

Hrant (00:37:00):

So if he was listening to the public opinion, he should have resigned long ago.

Hovik (00:37:05):

So how do you reconcile that?

Hovik (00:37:08):

How is it possible to have individual positions that people disagree with,

Hovik (00:37:13):

but overall people are still sort of favorable to you?

Hrant (00:37:16):

Well, what they do is narrative and emotional control over the society.

Hrant (00:37:21):

And also they are trying to create a framework of opinions where you put something

Hrant (00:37:28):

which is discussable,

Hrant (00:37:29):

something which is outside of overall discussion pattern,

Hrant (00:37:32):

and they are trying to exclude most of contesting or

Hrant (00:37:38):

most of opposition narratives outside of the mainstream agenda.

Hrant (00:37:44):

That's what they do.

Hrant (00:37:45):

And by the way, this is very similar to what we can observe in many Western countries as well.

Hrant (00:37:49):

And I'm sure this media policy is also constructed not in Armenia.

Hrant (00:37:53):

So that's the first and important side.

Hrant (00:37:56):

Second is the extent of opposition towards this project.

Hrant (00:38:05):

And the third is the wording itself.

Hrant (00:38:08):

So, yes, you said 59% are negative about this road.

Hrant (00:38:14):

But, you know, beforehand it was like 75%.

Hrant (00:38:17):

So it's not that good as of now if we consider this road as a bad thing.

Hrant (00:38:22):

So, again, Pashnian has largely improved his position in this term.

Hrant (00:38:27):

But, which is also important, the wording was rather manipulative.

Hrant (00:38:31):

Because in the wording of the question, we have seen that

Hrant (00:38:35):

Do you support the road in Sunik for Azerbaijan,

Hrant (00:38:42):

provided that Armenia also gains a similar road through Azerbaijan,

Hrant (00:38:47):

which is unrealistic term.

Hrant (00:38:49):

Because in reality, Armenia doesn't gain any

Hrant (00:38:51):

any similar road through Azerbaijan.

Hrant (00:38:54):

I mean,

Hrant (00:38:55):

if we could discuss this,

Hrant (00:38:57):

if, for example,

Hrant (00:38:58):

Armenia could get the uninterrupted road from Ijevan to,

Hrant (00:39:02):

you know,

Hrant (00:39:03):

Derbent in Russia,

Hrant (00:39:05):

where no Azerbaijanis are stopping the goods.

Hrant (00:39:08):

In this case, we would be able to speak about the similar road.

Hrant (00:39:12):

You know, yeah, it is longer, but it is uninterrupted corridor.

Hrant (00:39:16):

And yes, it is similar in this case.

Hrant (00:39:19):

Moreover, Azerbaijan is not even discussing opening the border.

Hrant (00:39:22):

But anyway, what I can say is that the question is rather manipulative.

Hrant (00:39:26):

So if you ask as it is, you would still get a much bigger share of negative responses.

Hrant (00:39:32):

And those who were negative, they are not negative of mutual border opening and so on.

Hrant (00:39:38):

Well, many of them are, but many of them are not.

Hrant (00:39:42):

They just don't believe the wording.

Hrant (00:39:44):

They just don't believe that it will be mirrored by Azerbaijani policy.

Hovik (00:39:48):

Yeah, this framing of narratives is very interesting.

Hovik (00:39:51):

I don't want to,

Hovik (00:39:52):

I don't have a question,

Hovik (00:39:53):

but I just want to say that the same poll asked whether they agree that people will

Hovik (00:39:59):

bring in,

Hovik (00:40:00):

that this Washington agreement will bring in long lasting peace.

Hovik (00:40:04):

And

Hovik (00:40:06):

40 of our 39 of Armenians believe that yes uh this would bring a long-lasting peace

Hovik (00:40:13):

so i'm just dumbfounded at that um and that seems to talk about your um you know

Hovik (00:40:20):

your your idea about narrative control okay the next

Asbed (00:40:24):

slide we want to look at was about changing the Armenian constitution.

Asbed (00:40:29):

And the slide says,

Asbed (00:40:30):

according to published information,

Asbed (00:40:31):

Azerbaijan has emphasized constitutional changes in Armenia as a condition for

Asbed (00:40:36):

signing a peace agreement.

Asbed (00:40:38):

The question is, which statement do you support the most?

Asbed (00:40:42):

And it said the constitution of Armenia belongs to the people of Armenia and no

Asbed (00:40:46):

country,

Asbed (00:40:47):

including Azerbaijan,

Asbed (00:40:48):

has the right to interfere.

Asbed (00:40:50):

And 58% agreed with this statement.

Asbed (00:40:54):

The second one was,

Asbed (00:40:55):

this is Azerbaijan's internal political move and has no importance for Armenia,

Asbed (00:41:01):

25%.

Asbed (00:41:02):

And I would support changes to Armenia's constitution if it helps establish lasting

Asbed (00:41:06):

peace and good neighborly relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan,

Asbed (00:41:10):

and 12% were okay with that.

Asbed (00:41:12):

Difficult to answer, or I don't know how to answer, was about 4.7% of that.

Asbed (00:41:19):

So to me,

Asbed (00:41:20):

basically,

Asbed (00:41:22):

58 percent of the people said that Azerbaijan has no business telling us what to

Asbed (00:41:27):

do.

Asbed (00:41:28):

The message sounds clear,

Asbed (00:41:30):

and this presents a major hurdle for Pashinyan,

Asbed (00:41:34):

who's planning a referendum to change the constitution according to Aliyev's wishes

Asbed (00:41:38):

in 2027.

Asbed (00:41:39):

And now,

Asbed (00:41:40):

although that seems like a distant future because we still have elections to go

Asbed (00:41:43):

through in 2026,

Asbed (00:41:44):

what do you think about these results?

Hrant (00:41:47):

Well, first of all,

Hrant (00:41:48):

add 25 more percent to that 58 because they were also opposing,

Hrant (00:41:53):

but in different wording.

Hrant (00:41:55):

Right.

Asbed (00:41:56):

Yeah, the questions were not exactly choice one, choice two that are diametrically opposed.

Asbed (00:42:01):

They really kind of crossed each other and I didn't quite understand why they did that.

Hrant (00:42:07):

Yeah, the wording is still problematic, but you know what is the problem here?

Hrant (00:42:13):

If Pashinyan starts constitutional change, he will never say that it was imposed by Azerbaijan.

Hrant (00:42:18):

We might imply that, but he will not say that.

Hrant (00:42:20):

So he can say, we ourselves need the constitutional change.

Hrant (00:42:25):

So I think...

Hrant (00:42:28):

Pashinyan understands that no one wants to change the constitution under Aliyev's demands.

Hrant (00:42:32):

Although, yeah, not no one.

Hrant (00:42:34):

Now 12% is for that.

Hrant (00:42:37):

Previously, it was like 4% to 5%.

Hrant (00:42:39):

So there is a big shift here as well.

Hrant (00:42:42):

But still, a vast majority is opposing.

Hrant (00:42:46):

But what is important here is that if you present it in a different way,

Hrant (00:42:53):

many people might support it.

Hrant (00:42:54):

So it will again be dependent on narratives and on propaganda and so on.

Asbed (00:43:00):

Yeah, I was not happy with this question, actually.

Asbed (00:43:04):

So as far as the constitutional changes go, the referendum, is it going to be in 2026?

Asbed (00:43:09):

Is it going to be in 2027?

Asbed (00:43:11):

Because I've read both ways.

Asbed (00:43:14):

And what do you think about the feasibility of this?

Asbed (00:43:18):

Is Pashinyan actually going to do it?

Asbed (00:43:20):

Is he going to be successful?

Asbed (00:43:22):

What's your view?

Hrant (00:43:24):

What I do expect is that they are going to have parliamentary elections in June

Hrant (00:43:30):

2026, 7th June 2026,

Hrant (00:43:32):

and then in the shortest possible election.

Hrant (00:43:39):

According to the law term, they will try to have a referendum on that matter.

Hrant (00:43:43):

So this will be presented as the same process.

Hrant (00:43:47):

Of course,

Hrant (00:43:48):

it will be a different process,

Hrant (00:43:50):

but still this will be presented as the same process,

Hrant (00:43:53):

part of the same process.

Hrant (00:43:54):

And maybe they will even try to present another referendum on joining the EU.

Hrant (00:44:00):

Of course, we know that EU does not, you know, supporting Armenia joining EU.

Hrant (00:44:06):

But EU supports Armenia trying to join the EU.

Hovik (00:44:11):

Herant,

Hovik (00:44:12):

why wouldn't the Armenian government change the legislation so that both the

Hovik (00:44:18):

elections and the constitutional referendum happen at the same time?

Hrant (00:44:22):

They might try.

Hrant (00:44:23):

Right now, they don't have a constitutional majority in the parliament.

Hrant (00:44:28):

But there are several problems with that.

Hrant (00:44:31):

First problem is that they don't have constitutional majority and the things

Hrant (00:44:37):

related to referendum,

Hrant (00:44:38):

if I'm not mistaken,

Hrant (00:44:39):

require it.

Hrant (00:44:40):

I think you need specialists on constitution or on laws regarding that.

Asbed (00:44:46):

But they have super majority already.

Hrant (00:44:49):

They have majority, but not the constitutional majority.

Hrant (00:44:52):

So to change,

Hrant (00:44:53):

you know,

Hrant (00:44:54):

foundational laws,

Hrant (00:44:56):

they need more MPs than they have now because several MPs have left the ruling

Hrant (00:45:02):

party.

Hovik (00:45:02):

But have they not replaced those guys?

Hrant (00:45:08):

no no they're still in parliament yeah now that's the first part second part is

Hrant (00:45:15):

let's imply they are putting both issues on the same ballot let's say one is the

Hrant (00:45:21):

election another is referendum now it's both a possibility and a risk because

Hrant (00:45:29):

usually people do not support change of constitution in reality armenia has adopted

Hrant (00:45:35):

or changed constitution through referendum three times

Hrant (00:45:39):

And in 95,

Hrant (00:45:42):

in 2005 and in 2015,

Hrant (00:45:45):

both three times,

Hrant (00:45:46):

according to what we know,

Hrant (00:45:50):

there was major electoral fraud.

Hrant (00:45:52):

Both three times it was rejected by the population and then faked by the government.

Hrant (00:46:00):

And now they will have to do the same, but there is a difference.

Hrant (00:46:04):

The institutional change,

Hrant (00:46:05):

which happened starting from 2016 especially,

Hrant (00:46:11):

brought major changes to the electoral code.

Hrant (00:46:14):

And now fraud is much more difficult to implement than previously.

Hrant (00:46:20):

And you cannot have as big fraud.

Hrant (00:46:24):

So it is really problematic for the government and especially,

Hrant (00:46:28):

you know, the constitutional referendum or referendum is not supervised by other parties.

Hrant (00:46:34):

While there will be a big mission of observers or party representatives in any

Hrant (00:46:41):

remote place in Armenia,

Hrant (00:46:43):

during the parliamentary elections.

Asbed (00:46:47):

You're talking about observers from the OSCE and other institutions?

Hrant (00:46:53):

And also from parties themselves and the journalists and so on.

Hrant (00:46:56):

So the attention towards parliamentary elections will be very big.

Hrant (00:47:00):

Attention towards referendum is usually lower, especially on the side of political players.

Hrant (00:47:06):

So if government wants to have a fraud,

Hrant (00:47:08):

they need to distribute these processes and they need to divide these processes.

Hrant (00:47:15):

Now,

Hrant (00:47:16):

even if they expect themselves to win in the parliamentary elections,

Hrant (00:47:20):

they pretty much know that they will not have lots of votes,

Hrant (00:47:24):

but what they can have is they can try to create a coalition with some minor

Hrant (00:47:30):

partner.

Hrant (00:47:31):

For example, the Republic Party by Aram Sargsyan, as they did in the Yervan Council.

Hrant (00:47:37):

So that's a realistic scenario for them to win.

Hrant (00:47:41):

Now, imagine having at the same time the constitutional referendum,

Hrant (00:47:46):

where most likely majority will oppose,

Hrant (00:47:49):

and then the elections.

Hrant (00:47:52):

If any of major opposition players will bet hardly on the no in constitutional

Hrant (00:47:59):

changes, they will get more votes,

Hrant (00:48:01):

while government will lose.

Hrant (00:48:02):

So they understand this scheme very easily.

Hrant (00:48:06):

So for them, it makes a lot of sense to divide these processes.

Hrant (00:48:10):

That's what they will do,

Hrant (00:48:11):

because Azerbaijan is long time awaiting for this referendum to happen.

Hrant (00:48:17):

first because they know that most likely population will reject it and then they

Hrant (00:48:21):

will have you know kind of uh or if it is adopted even better they will gain what

Hrant (00:48:29):

they want

Hrant (00:48:30):

at least on this stage, through, you know, maybe not peacefully, but without the war.

Hrant (00:48:38):

So basically Azerbaijan wants this to happen.

Hrant (00:48:41):

They understand that Pashinyan's legitimacy is limited,

Hrant (00:48:44):

but a referendum will improve their legitimacy over their claims.

Hovik (00:48:50):

So let's talk about political prisoners in Armenia.

Hovik (00:48:53):

There are several slides in the report about that.

Hovik (00:48:57):

Slide number seven asked whether you think there are political prisoners in Armenia today.

Hovik (00:49:01):

And 62% said yes.

Hovik (00:49:02):

18% said no.

Hovik (00:49:08):

That, like, 80% is probably the same amount that strongly supports Pashinyan.

Hovik (00:49:13):

So that seems to jive.

Hovik (00:49:15):

And then when they asked to name a political prisoner,

Hovik (00:49:20):

Samvel Karapetyan was named 71% of the time.

Hovik (00:49:24):

After Samvel Karapetyan, it was Bagrat Srbazan, 38%, and Mikayel Ajapahyan.

Hovik (00:49:29):

So all in all, and there was another question about Samvel Karapetyan.

Hovik (00:49:

34) and how people felt about Samvel Karapetyan's arrest and I would say about...

Hovik (00:49:45):

Let me see, let me read this.

Hovik (00:49:46):

So 64% said that they were either fully or somewhat negative while 18.5% said that

Hovik (00:49:52):

they were positive towards that move.

Hovik (00:50:00):

Now that may seem to be a lot,

Hovik (00:50:03):

but also the devil is in the detail because if you compare that to figures from

Hovik (00:50:08):

July or from June,

Hovik (00:50:11):

in June 16.5% had said that they were supportive of the move to arrest

Hovik (00:50:20):

Samvel Karapetyan.

Hovik (00:50:21):

Meanwhile 77% were against.

Hovik (00:50:22):

So the

Hovik (00:50:26):

The positive camp, you know, it's within the margin of error, which is 3% for this poll.

Hovik (00:50:31):

So,

Hovik (00:50:32):

you know, you could compare 16.5% to 18.5%,

Hovik (00:50:35):

but in the negative camp,

Hovik (00:50:38):

there was a huge shift from people who are against the arrest to undecided.

Hovik (00:50:43):

So our question to Hrant is, what does this mean?

Hovik (00:50:47):

How can a few months,

Hovik (00:50:49):

you know,

Hovik (00:50:50):

cause such a huge change,

Hovik (00:50:52):

at least in the people who are against Samvel Karapetyan's imprisonment?

Hrant (00:50:57):

Okay, let me put it simple.

Hrant (00:50:59):

Net negative of imprisonment of Samvel Karapetyan was 61% in July,

Hrant (00:51:09):

in beginning of July,

Hrant (00:51:11):

and 46% in the end of August.

Hrant (00:51:15):

So 15% less net negative, which is significant shift, right?

Hrant (00:51:22):

Now, how did it happen?

Hrant (00:51:23):

First,

Hrant (00:51:24):

the media campaign of Pashinyan,

Hrant (00:51:26):

which I already have cited,

Hrant (00:51:28):

and especially if there is expectation of peace,

Hrant (00:51:31):

and most probably Pashinyan is trying to portray Samvel Karapetian as radical,

Hrant (00:51:37):

so I will bring the peace,

Hrant (00:51:39):

you will bring the war,

Hrant (00:51:40):

so if you support peace,

Hrant (00:51:41):

you should support his imprisonment,

Hrant (00:51:43):

and so on and so forth.

Hrant (00:51:44):

That's the overall idea about it.

Hrant (00:51:48):

But what is also important that when they cite the number that 71% consider,

Hrant (00:51:55):

71.5% consider Samuel Karapetian to be a political prisoner,

Hrant (00:51:58):

that refers only to that part of the population who said that they are political

Hrant (00:52:04):

prisoners in Armenia.

Hrant (00:52:05):

If we look at overall population,

Hrant (00:52:08):

then 44.3% say that Samvel Karapetyan is a political prisoner,

Hrant (00:52:13):

which is a very significant part of the overall concept.

Hrant (00:52:18):

Because those who do not say that there is political prisoners,

Hrant (00:52:23):

they were not asked the question,

Hrant (00:52:24):

who is a political prisoner in Armenia?

Hovik (00:52:28):

OK, point well taken.

Hovik (00:52:31):

And we're just going to skip to the last slide,

Hovik (00:52:35):

which is how would you vote if elections were held this coming Sunday?

Hovik (00:52:39):

Again, here we see an interesting dynamic.

Hovik (00:52:42):

Civil contract party was mentioned with 17.3%,

Hovik (00:52:48):

which is a rise of 4.2% from June,

Hovik (00:52:52):

I guess,

Hovik (00:52:53):

of this year.

Hovik (00:52:54):

Meanwhile,

Hovik (00:52:55):

Samir Karapetian is now a prominent second runner,

Hovik (00:52:58):

and he got his party,

Hovik (00:53:02):

or the party that would be run by him,

Hovik (00:53:04):

was 13.4%,

Hovik (00:53:05):

which is a 10% rise.

Hovik (00:53:09):

So we see clearly that Samvel Karapetyan is rising in post.

Hovik (00:53:12):

Meanwhile, most others, I guess, remained unchanged in terms of their support.

Hovik (00:53:18):

Is there an opportunity for the opposition,

Hovik (00:53:21):

for instance,

Hovik (00:53:22):

Samvel Karapetyan's new movement,

Hovik (00:53:24):

to record some success in 2026?

Hrant (00:53:27):

Well, I think there is a chance.

Hrant (00:53:29):

First of all, these figures definitely indicate the chance.

Hrant (00:53:32):

Although there have been some other polls which have shown,

Hrant (00:53:38):

let's say, more conservative results towards opposition and had some

Hrant (00:53:43):

higher shares of the government and lower shares of the opposition.

Hrant (00:53:47):

But still, what is important as of now is that Samvel Karapetyan's bloc is on the second place

Hrant (00:53:52):

right now.

Hrant (00:53:53):

So he displaced the Armenia bloc from the second position, which it held for four years.

Hrant (00:54:01):

So as of now,

Hrant (00:54:02):

the main opposition in Samvel Karapetyan,

Hrant (00:54:04):

who is cannibalizing the parliamentary opposition of Armenia.

Hovik (00:54:08):

We didn't see any drops in the parliamentary opposition.

Hovik (00:54:13):

I guess...

Hrant (00:54:15):

They did have, it's just not mentioned.

Hrant (00:54:18):

I mean, they mentioned only changes in top two blocks.

Hrant (00:54:22):

But if you can see that they're joined,

Hrant (00:54:25):

they have increased their percentages by 15%,

Hrant (00:54:28):

who has lost that percentages.

Hrant (00:54:30):

So basically,

Hrant (00:54:31):

Sanvel Karapetian took the percentages from Armenia Alliance and from the

Hrant (00:54:35):

Republican Party of Armenia.

Hovik (00:54:36):

But there are also some undecided, right?

Hovik (00:54:38):

Because I think the undecided last time was about 60%.

Hovik (00:54:41):

Yeah.

Hrant (00:54:42):

I think that was based on the... The last time it was more or less like this.

Hrant (00:54:45):

So, no, they are cannibalizing opposition.

Hrant (00:54:48):

And I think Samvel Karapetyan technically he can win in election if his team will work, you know,

Hrant (00:55:01):

in modern terms,

Hrant (00:55:03):

active,

Hrant (00:55:04):

aggressive and professional way,

Hrant (00:55:07):

which I'm not sure,

Hrant (00:55:08):

frankly speaking, because the way I described the campaign,

Hrant (00:55:13):

this is how the government is running the campaign.

Hrant (00:55:15):

But opposition was never successful in this matter.

Hrant (00:55:18):

And now what we see that Samvel Karapetian's team is betting on economy.

Hrant (00:55:22):

which is rather wise move,

Hrant (00:55:25):

but you cannot win only with economy because Pashinyan is betting on the

Hrant (00:55:29):

geopolitics and that's where he's winning right now.

Hrant (00:55:32):

And if you don't compete with him on that term, I mean, you have no chance as well.

Hrant (00:55:37):

So I think that Samvel Karapetyan has chance.

Hrant (00:55:41):

He has potential.

Hrant (00:55:43):

And he has lots of potential.

Hrant (00:55:46):

But how he will utilize it,

Hrant (00:55:48):

how his team will be able to utilize it,

Hrant (00:55:51):

that's dependent on them as well.

Hrant (00:55:53):

And I think that if they will do everything correctly, they will win.

Hrant (00:55:59):

But what I see, I don't like one major fact.

Hrant (00:56:07):

Samvel Karapetyan is in jail already for almost three months.

Hrant (00:56:12):

and nothing major happens in the country many people we have seen as of now 64

Hrant (00:56:18):

percent are against that so it's easy to accumulate that that approach nothing is

Hrant (00:56:24):

being done and that i see as a big problem of his campaign so if they are able to

Hrant (00:56:30):

utilize this protest energy to accumulate you know these approaches i think they

Hrant (00:56:36):

can win but that will depend on them now regarding the civil contract party

Hrant (00:56:42):

They have limited pool of voters who can vote for them.

Hrant (00:56:46):

So they will bet either on the electoral code,

Hrant (00:56:51):

which will give them majority,

Hrant (00:56:54):

even if they don't have enough votes.

Hrant (00:56:57):

I mean,

Hrant (00:56:58):

guaranteed majority,

Hrant (00:56:59):

which is a principle of Armenian electoral code,

Hrant (00:57:03):

which was also adopted with many positive changes.

Hrant (00:57:06):

That was also adopted by the Republican Party in

Hrant (00:57:10):

uh 2016 and by the way uh there was a discussion that they should remove it after

Hrant (00:57:16):

passion came to power but he decided to leave it as it was and then he will bet on

Hrant (00:57:22):

the minor partner and on spoilers which he will try to you know raise until the

Hrant (00:57:27):

elections

Hrant (00:57:28):

As of now, spoilers are very weak, but still he will try to do his best to get their support.

Hrant (00:57:36):

So we see Dog Party has decreased,

Hrant (00:57:39):

Republic Party has decreased,

Hrant (00:57:41):

but he will try to somehow raise them again.

Asbed (00:57:44):

But I want to ask you exactly about those parties.

Asbed (00:57:46):

For example, Vartan Ghukasyan's DOG party, which currently has about 2.5% at this poll.

Asbed (00:57:53):

Are they taking their voters from civil contract or are they taking it from the opposition side?

Asbed (00:57:58):

Who are they poaching more?

Hrant (00:58:03):

Initially, I think they took voters from civil contract.

Hrant (00:58:06):

But then they have completely split it.

Hrant (00:58:09):

And now their voters are,

Hrant (00:58:11):

you know,

Hrant (00:58:13):

belong to the pool of undecided because they play,

Hrant (00:58:17):

you know, against everyone.

Hrant (00:58:19):

But this stance of against everyone has played in favor of Pashinyan in Yerevan

Hrant (00:58:24):

elections because they did not let the opposition coalition to reform.

Hrant (00:58:29):

But anyway,

Hrant (00:58:31):

anyway, I think the dog party is more connected to the pool of electors who are undecided.

Asbed (00:58:36):

Yeah.

Asbed (00:58:37):

And it looks like all of these things that we're talking about represent about 55,

Asbed (00:58:41):

56% of the electorate,

Asbed (00:58:42):

because in the polling results,

Asbed (00:58:44):

we see about 45% are in the sort of undecided bucket,

Asbed (00:58:50):

will not participate,

Asbed (00:58:51):

undecided, difficulty telling you an answer.

Asbed (00:58:55):

Those three categories are 45%.

Asbed (00:58:57):

So really, there's some convincing to be done.

Asbed (00:59:00):

So I think that if the opposition wants some votes,

Asbed (00:59:02):

they have to go out there door to door and start convincing people that they are

Asbed (00:59:06):

the right.

Hrant (00:59:06):

That's what they never do.

Asbed (00:59:11):

Okay, well, let's go on to our final topic, which is going to be the Armenian economy, Hrant.

Asbed (00:59:17):

The Lewis Foundation released its report on the Armenian economy in the first half of 2025.

Asbed (00:59:23):

And as expected, there is some slowdown which may have bottomed out in March or April.

Asbed (00:59:27):

And since then, it's been rebounding.

Asbed (00:59:29):

The slowdown is attributed to a 12% decrease in the industrial sector.

Asbed (00:59:35):

For our listeners,

Asbed (00:59:37):

I'm big on rounding these numbers and giving you something that we can remember,

Asbed (00:59:42):

12%. It's actually 12.1%,

Asbed (00:59:43):

but I'm going to round things up or down so that we can remember what the number

Asbed (00:59:48):

was.

Asbed (00:59:49):

Anyway, the slowdown is attributed to a 12% decrease in the industrial sector,

Asbed (00:59:53):

which itself is being blamed on the very significant decrease in the re-export

Asbed (00:59:58):

sector, which last year had reached,

Asbed (01:00:00):

I think, a $12.4 billion mark.

Asbed (01:00:03):

And as Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Ovechuk has been citing,

Asbed (01:00:07):

it's barely over $6.1 billion right now.

Asbed (01:00:11):

Hrant, we knew that this re-export sector was by its nature a temporary phenomenon.

Asbed (01:00:16):

Everyone called it due to external factors to avoid saying Russian sanctions busting trade.

Asbed (01:00:23):

What do you think will be the effect of the sector's decline on the Armenian economy in 2025?

Hrant (01:00:31):

So,

Hrant (01:00:32):

right,

Hrant (01:00:33):

everyone was expecting that if re-export stops,

Hrant (01:00:37):

then Armenian economy can lose significantly and can contract like,

Hrant (01:00:43):

you know, 10% or something.

Hrant (01:00:45):

That was overall expectation.

Hrant (01:00:47):

Now we see that it will not work like that because the sanctions against Russia are

Hrant (01:00:52):

not released in one day and are not expected to be released in one day.

Hrant (01:00:56):

but rather what we see that effective release of sanctions will happen gradually.

Hrant (01:01:02):

First stage will be Russia avoiding sanctions in a more and more efficient way.

Hrant (01:01:08):

Second stage will be West blinding an eye of sanction avoidance.

Hrant (01:01:13):

Third stage will be removal of sanctions by some actors,

Hrant (01:01:18):

which is more likely as of today to be the United States.

Hrant (01:01:21):

And then the last stage will be removal of all sanctions,

Hrant (01:01:24):

which will imply that Armenia will lose its re-export potential very gradually.

Hrant (01:01:29):

And it will not have that much effect on Armenian economy as it was expected in the beginning.

Hrant (01:01:36):

That's one thing to note.

Hrant (01:01:38):

Another thing to note is that the re-exports

Hrant (01:01:44):

significantly stretches the economy and creates wrong impression of economic

Hrant (01:01:51):

growth,

Hrant (01:01:52):

but also on economic decline as well.

Hrant (01:01:54):

For example,

Hrant (01:01:55):

if we look at the industry from the beginning of the year,

Hrant (01:01:58):

we have seen,

Hrant (01:01:59):

you know, 20% decrease.

Hrant (01:02:01):

Now it's 12% decrease or even 9.8% decrease right now, you know, January, July data.

Hrant (01:02:10):

But if we exclude re-exports,

Hrant (01:02:14):

we see that there is 4% growth.

Hrant (01:02:16):

So basically there are two economies right now.

Hrant (01:02:19):

One is Armenian economy.

Hrant (01:02:21):

Another is re-exports and everything connected to sanctions avoidance.

Hrant (01:02:28):

And those two do not interact with each other that much.

Hrant (01:02:32):

because those are just geographically close to each other, but not in terms of economic output.

Hrant (01:02:40):

So that's also important to note.

Hrant (01:02:44):

And dynamics of exports is very complex,

Hrant (01:02:48):

a bit high to track,

Hrant (01:02:50):

but I have an impression that it's still growing at rather slow pace,

Hrant (01:02:57):

but it's still growing,

Hrant (01:02:58):

not decreasing by half as we see,

Hrant (01:03:01):

because, you know,

Hrant (01:03:02):

yeah,

Hrant (01:03:03):

re-exports last year,

Hrant (01:03:04):

it was some 80% of overall export of Armenia.

Hrant (01:03:09):

So decrease of exports by,

Hrant (01:03:12):

you know, 60% is causing like decrease of exports by 47% or something.

Hrant (01:03:18):

So it distorts Armenian statistics to the extent that we are not able to see the

Hrant (01:03:23):

real economic situation in the country anymore.

Hrant (01:03:25):

But still, yes, and we have Armenian drum increasing towards

Hrant (01:03:30):

US dollar, which also creates, you know, tensions and creates problems for local businesses.

Hrant (01:03:37):

But anyway, not that big that it starts collapsing.

Hrant (01:03:40):

Although we have some sectors which have been affected and those are externally

Hrant (01:03:47):

oriented sectors,

Hrant (01:03:48):

including IT and tourism in

Asbed (01:03:51):

The services sector, maybe.

Hrant (01:03:52):

In services sector, yes.

Hrant (01:03:55):

And the agricultural exports and some industrial exports in the real sector.

Hrant (01:04:00):

But anyway, still we see that overall economy is rather growing and at rather high rates.

Hrant (01:04:07):

It's about, if we exclude exports, it will be some 8,5% of economic growth, which is

Hrant (01:04:13):

which is rather high still.

Hrant (01:04:16):

Of course,

Hrant (01:04:17):

it is being fueled by the incomes from re-exports,

Hrant (01:04:20):

which is also important because if we lose those,

Hrant (01:04:25):

then the economy might contract.

Asbed (01:04:27):

Harad, is the re-export money actually playing in the Armenian economy?

Asbed (01:04:31):

Is that money actually coming and doing something inside the country?

Hrant (01:04:35):

Yes, some of it comes as investment money.

Hrant (01:04:38):

Some of it finances imports,

Hrant (01:04:41):

including not only the consumption imports,

Hrant (01:04:46):

but also imports of,

Hrant (01:04:47):

you know,

Hrant (01:04:49):

raw materials or imports of some technical equipment and so on.

Asbed (01:04:54):

Yeah, I was actually wondering if it's feeding into the construction industry because

Asbed (01:04:57):

that had a 20% growth rate recorded in 2025,

Asbed (01:05:02):

which is very significant.

Asbed (01:05:04):

And I was wondering if that re-export money is being invested by oligarchs,

Asbed (01:05:08):

rich people,

Asbed (01:05:09):

and what have you.

Asbed (01:05:10):

Those are the people who are doing the exporting and re-exporting kind of stuff.

Asbed (01:05:13):

They are the ones who would be investing in, let's say, real estate construction, et cetera.

Hrant (01:05:18):

It is, but not only that is the reason,

Hrant (01:05:20):

because Armenian construction rates were low during the whole period of

Hrant (01:05:26):

independence,

Hrant (01:05:27):

with a very short period of high gross rates in 2005 to 2008.

Hrant (01:05:33):

And since then, there was a collapse during the economic crisis of 2009 to 2010.

Hrant (01:05:39):

And then there is a gradual recovery, which includes this year's 20% growth.

Hrant (01:05:44):

So as of now, the demand on construction market is exceeding the supply.

Hrant (01:05:51):

So that is another reason.

Hrant (01:05:53):

But yes, oligarchs play a major role here as well.

Asbed (01:05:56):

Okay.

Asbed (01:05:57):

I want to ask you a little bit about the export difficulties that we've had,

Asbed (01:06:03):

because over the past few months,

Asbed (01:06:05):

we've seen areas of industry and manufacturing,

Asbed (01:06:08):

which have often been among the country's top taxpayers,

Asbed (01:06:11):

for example,

Asbed (01:06:12):

beverages, including alcoholic beverages.

Asbed (01:06:14):

Those have come down.

Asbed (01:06:15):

Minerals, those have come down.

Asbed (01:06:18):

Are the problems on Armenia's side of producing these things or are they on,

Asbed (01:06:23):

I'm just going to say political problems,

Asbed (01:06:25):

for example,

Asbed (01:06:26):

exporting them through Georgia or to Russia?

Hrant (01:06:30):

Yeah, there was some conflict with Georgians.

Hrant (01:06:35):

Because Georgians are trying to leverage their geographical position towards

Hrant (01:06:39):

Armenia and they are trying to gain more out of this trade.

Hrant (01:06:43):

They proposed a deal to Armenian exporters and to Armenian exporters unions that

Hrant (01:06:51):

Georgians will,

Hrant (01:06:52):

you know, somehow

Hrant (01:06:53):

become part of Armenian producing chains.

Hrant (01:06:56):

Although Georgian materials there were more expensive than what Armenians were

Hrant (01:07:03):

importing from other countries.

Hrant (01:07:05):

But Georgians were trying to leverage.

Hrant (01:07:08):

Armenians tried to avoid, you know...

Hrant (01:07:12):

complying with these agreements.

Hrant (01:07:14):

And Georgians started leveraging their position in a very direct manner,

Hrant (01:07:20):

just stopping Armenian exports.

Hrant (01:07:23):

And I think this is also due to Georgian industrial lobby,

Hrant (01:07:28):

which affects its government,

Hrant (01:07:29):

and also due to more and more nationalism in Georgian politics,

Hrant (01:07:33):

because right now Georgian government is very nationalistic and is rather

Hrant (01:07:38):

anti-Western.

Hrant (01:07:40):

and anti-Western it is because it is nationalistic,

Hrant (01:07:43):

not because it's per-Russian as some,

Hrant (01:07:45):

you know,

Hrant (01:07:46):

propagandists would say,

Hrant (01:07:47):

but anyway it is nationalistic and of course it will support its own industrial

Hrant (01:07:52):

sector and it will support its own producers at expense of Armenians,

Hrant (01:07:59):

of course,

Hrant (01:08:00):

given that they have this leverage.

Hrant (01:08:04):

Even until now, there are problems with different products appearing here and there,

Hrant (01:08:10):

especially with some agricultural and industrial products.

Hrant (01:08:14):

But again, even industrial are connected to the natural production and so on.

Hrant (01:08:19):

And then wines, beverages and tobacco and flowers and so on.

Hrant (01:08:25):

So these problems did not stop.

Hrant (01:08:27):

And then there is another expected problem with Russians.

Hrant (01:08:30):

Because Russians say,

Hrant (01:08:32):

you need to understand,

Hrant (01:08:33):

are you staying in EU,

Hrant (01:08:36):

I mean, Eurasian Economic Union,

Hrant (01:08:37):

or you are joining the EU,

Hrant (01:08:40):

as you are stating.

Hrant (01:08:41):

If you are going to EU, let us abandon EU and let you lose all the benefits you got there.

Hrant (01:08:49):

And what Pashinyan has said, that as of now, we don't know.

Hrant (01:08:52):

when there will be time to choose, we will make the choice, but not now.

Hrant (01:08:57):

Which basically implies that since EU does not make any offer to Armenia,

Hrant (01:09:02):

we will stay in Eurasian Economic Union,

Hrant (01:09:04):

but

Hrant (01:09:06):

At the moment, we have any chance to join the EU or to join any,

Hrant (01:09:09):

you know,

Hrant (01:09:10):

form of EU association or something.

Hrant (01:09:13):

We will do that.

Hrant (01:09:14):

And we will still, by the way, try to keep all the benefits from Russian side.

Hrant (01:09:19):

But Russians are saying that if you are going in that direction,

Hrant (01:09:23):

we will stop you from benefiting there.

Hrant (01:09:27):

And that is another question to arise,

Hrant (01:09:29):

but not now,

Hrant (01:09:30):

maybe the next year,

Hrant (01:09:32):

especially after the Ukraine war is over.

Asbed (01:09:36):

I think all this talk about the EU,

Asbed (01:09:38):

even Pashinyan knows that nothing's going to happen for 10 years.

Asbed (01:09:42):

And if he expects to be the person to solve those problems in 10 years,

Asbed (01:09:46):

then I think he's going to

Asbed (01:09:49):

Deserve the same medal that Aliyev has for staying in power for long enough.

Asbed (01:09:54):

Back to the economy,

Asbed (01:09:55):

Hrant,

Asbed (01:09:56):

one of the areas in the Lewis report was of interest,

Asbed (01:10:01):

and that was the area of the government's programs which have been underperforming.

Asbed (01:10:04):

And in some cases, they're underperforming by three quarters.

Asbed (01:10:08):

like they've been achieved by about 25%.

Asbed (01:10:11):

I don't want to go down the list because we don't have time.

Asbed (01:10:14):

We'll put those things in the show notes if you want to see them.

Asbed (01:10:17):

But I wanted to ask about why some of these areas are deeply underperforming.

Asbed (01:10:23):

I do want to mention a couple of them, which are very, very important.

Asbed (01:10:26):

The Ministry of High Tech Industry

Asbed (01:10:29):

has implemented their digital transformation program 7.4%.

Asbed (01:10:34):

That's basically not doing the job.

Asbed (01:10:37):

Another area is the development program for the military industrial complex achieved 4.7%.

Asbed (01:10:43):

These are things that are simply not being achieved.

Asbed (01:10:48):

Why do we have this radical underperformance on the part of the government?

Asbed (01:10:51):

What are they doing if they're not doing their jobs?

Hrant (01:10:56):

Well, first, let me create an overall picture.

Hrant (01:11:02):

The budget has increased.

Hrant (01:11:04):

Incomes have increased by 14%.

Hrant (01:11:06):

Expenditures have increased by 15.6%.

Hrant (01:11:11):

So overall budget is increasing, which is important.

Hrant (01:11:17):

So this is mainly due to economic growth and the inflation, of course, because

Hrant (01:11:24):

it's not inflation adjusted but still budget is increasing now regarding

Hrant (01:11:30):

underperformance of some sectors basically since this government came into power in

Hrant (01:11:36):

2018

Hrant (01:11:38):

we have this picture repeated again and again.

Hrant (01:11:41):

So capital investments in Armenian economy are underperformed since 2018,

Hrant (01:11:47):

every year by some 50%.

Hrant (01:11:50):

So that's how they work.

Hrant (01:11:52):

I don't know exact reasons.

Asbed (01:11:54):

Let me interject for one second.

Asbed (01:11:56):

We have talked to American experts who have said incompetence and inability to

Asbed (01:12:01):

carry through the projects is one reason.

Asbed (01:12:03):

I'm not going to put that on you.

Asbed (01:12:05):

We've heard this offline with them that a lot of these ministries don't have the

Asbed (01:12:09):

competence to actually carry through the projects to their completion.

Asbed (01:12:12):

They just bog down and stop.

Asbed (01:12:14):

Go ahead.

Hrant (01:12:16):

This is obvious.

Hrant (01:12:17):

This you could not even mention because of this government.

Hrant (01:12:21):

I mean, everything they touch, they do it incompetently.

Hrant (01:12:24):

But still, this should be not the only reason.

Hrant (01:12:28):

But I don't know exactly of other reasons.

Hrant (01:12:30):

But yes, incompetence is in play for sure.

Hrant (01:12:33):

But there is another thing regarding to finances, which I want to mention.

Hrant (01:12:38):

is that yes on one hand you see that the you know budget is increasing economy is

Hrant (01:12:43):

increasing but the debt is increasing as well and at rather high pace so basically

Hrant (01:12:51):

at the beginning of august we had we had 14 billion dollars of uh state debt that's

Hrant (01:12:59):

right

Hrant (01:13:00):

including mainly distributed by equal halves.

Hrant (01:13:05):

One is 7 billion,

Hrant (01:13:07):

almost 7 billion being the external debt and a bit more than 7 billion being

Hrant (01:13:13):

internal debt.

Hrant (01:13:14):

So the debt is increasing at a very high rate and it has increased since the end of

Hrant (01:13:22):

the previous year by more than $1 billion.

Hrant (01:13:28):

and in last month it has increased by 240 million dollar so in armenian scale it is

Hrant (01:13:35):

very big big change especially given that you know when you do have economic growth

Hrant (01:13:44):

you basically need to give your debts back and then you acquire new debts when you

Hrant (01:13:50):

have a war or economic crisis

Hrant (01:13:53):

Now we acquire new debts during the period of economic growth,

Hrant (01:13:57):

which is also can bring us to the incompetence.

Hrant (01:14:00):

But we see that, yes, they do a lot of spending, especially on their own salaries.

Hrant (01:14:04):

But anyway,

Hrant (01:14:06):

I think this is rather worrying because as of now,

Hrant (01:14:11):

right now, the state debt is increasing at very high rate.

Hrant (01:14:16):

In just seven months, we see 1.2 billion increase, 1.25 billion increase.

Hrant (01:14:22):

So in one year, it might climb up to 2 billion new debt just within one year.

Asbed (01:14:33):

You know what worries me about this is that when you talk to experts,

Asbed (01:14:36):

they say,

Asbed (01:14:37):

well, as long as the debt to GDP remains stable and there is economic growth,

Asbed (01:14:43):

this is not a major problem.

Asbed (01:14:44):

But the reality is that the GDP actually counts in that crazy inflated number for

Asbed (01:14:49):

re-exports,

Asbed (01:14:50):

which are,

Asbed (01:14:51):

you know, we've talked about this,

Asbed (01:14:52):

that they're probably going to go away.

Asbed (01:14:54):

So in a couple of years,

Asbed (01:14:55):

when we look at the GDP and it has shrunk,

Asbed (01:14:58):

it means that the debt to GDP effectively is going to be extremely high.

Asbed (01:15:03):

That's going to hurt Armenia's financial rating, international financial rating.

Asbed (01:15:08):

And it's going to be very difficult to refinance some of the debt and acquire new debt.

Asbed (01:15:13):

I see this coming down the pike at some point.

Hrant (01:15:16):

that's for sure you are you are very on point with with this comment because yes

Hrant (01:15:22):

armenian drum is uh exaggerated because of uh because of you know these re-exports

Hrant (01:15:29):

and so on so in dollar we have

Hrant (01:15:32):

had 25 billion dollar GDP last year but but if drum will devaluate back to its

Hrant (01:15:38):

normal normal pace of 480 to one dollar it might drop to you know 18 billion

Hrant (01:15:44):

dollars but the size of that will remain almost the same so the share of debt to

Hrant (01:15:51):

gdp will increase but not only that i mean yes during the periods of high economic

Hrant (01:15:56):

growth

Hrant (01:15:57):

the debt to GDP ratio should decrease.

Hrant (01:16:00):

It should not stay stable.

Hrant (01:16:02):

As I say, it should decrease.

Hrant (01:16:05):

Because if you are acquiring 8% of GDP new debt in one year,

Hrant (01:16:09):

that's what we observe right now,

Hrant (01:16:12):

it's not normal.

Hrant (01:16:13):

The EU has normative of 2% of GDP new state budget deficit within one year,

Hrant (01:16:22):

which I would say is a normal share for a country like Armenia too.

Hrant (01:16:29):

So I would say that Armenia should try to avoid increasing this threshold at any

Hrant (01:16:35):

period other than war or crisis.

Hrant (01:16:38):

Now we have neither.

Hrant (01:16:39):

So we should be having very moderate debt growth or even not to have it at all.

Hrant (01:16:48):

and try to, you know, somehow cover the debts or at least keep the debt stable.

Hrant (01:16:53):

I mean, acquire a new debt to cover previous one, but not the new one at all.

Hrant (01:16:58):

So that is rather worrying, I would say.

Asbed (01:17:00):

For the sake of time, I think I'm just going to call it done, except for one question.

Asbed (01:17:05):

What's your outlook for the balance of 2025 for the economy?

Hrant (01:17:09):

I think overall, it shows a bit better track than it was expected in the beginning of the year.

Hrant (01:17:17):

So I can say that as of now, we stay in positive trend of economic growth.

Hrant (01:17:24):

But to which extent it is supported by these increased debts or some other external

Hrant (01:17:31):

circumstances,

Hrant (01:17:32):

that we should also understand.

Hrant (01:17:34):

But at least two significantly positive things I have observed this year.

Hrant (01:17:39):

First is renewed agricultural growth,

Hrant (01:17:43):

because since 2017,

Hrant (01:17:46):

we had a decline in agriculture almost every year.

Hrant (01:17:51):

And now we had resumed growth in agricultural production.

Hrant (01:17:54):

Of course,

Hrant (01:17:55):

we need to wait until the end of the year because first half is not enough to

Hrant (01:17:58):

understand because main period for the agriculture is the third quarter of the

Hrant (01:18:03):

year.

Hrant (01:18:04):

And we have the statistics of the first two quarters, but still we have seen

Hrant (01:18:11):

noticeable economic growth in agriculture and the second thing is that there is

Hrant (01:18:16):

continued growth in a number of registered registered employees in armenia so it's

Hrant (01:18:24):

not as high as it used to be but it's still significant so now on one hand we have

Hrant (01:18:29):

observed growth in unemployment

Hrant (01:18:33):

But that also can be attributed to growth in overall population because there was

Hrant (01:18:37):

influx of Artsakh refugees.

Hrant (01:18:40):

And of course, it's a bit harder for them to find a job.

Hrant (01:18:42):

But at the same time,

Hrant (01:18:44):

we have number of registered employed growing,

Hrant (01:18:49):

which is also a positive trend.

Hrant (01:18:50):

So overall,

Hrant (01:18:51):

I would say that Armenian economy as of today is still rather healthy than

Hrant (01:18:56):

unhealthy.

Asbed (01:18:57):

Yeah, the agricultural sector has actually reported that the crops were very good.

Asbed (01:19:02):

The difficulties that they were experiencing were mostly on the export side rather

Asbed (01:19:06):

than the growing side,

Asbed (01:19:08):

at least for 2025.

Asbed (01:19:09):

It's a good thing.

Asbed (01:19:10):

So I'm just going to call it quits at this point,

Asbed (01:19:13):

even though I had a number of other questions in the economy,

Asbed (01:19:17):

we'll go forward.

Asbed (01:19:18):

But let's move forward.

Asbed (01:19:20):

I do want to ask you,

Asbed (01:19:21):

even though we are going long today,

Asbed (01:19:23):

I do want to ask everybody for any thoughts that they have to share with our

Asbed (01:19:28):

listeners.

Asbed (01:19:29):

Rant, what do you want to talk about?

Hrant (01:19:31):

I want us to track the developments around the Genocide Memorial very intensively and actively.

Hrant (01:19:40):

and carefully because with what we are observing as of now is pure vandalism

Hrant (01:19:45):

towards this monument many people believe that they are trying to destroy it or

Hrant (01:19:51):

somehow keep it busy with renovation until you know the next April 24th and of

Hrant (01:19:59):

course Turkey is looking at it and is definitely

Hrant (01:20:03):

considering it as a good message on behalf of Armenian government,

Hrant (01:20:07):

and we have heard like,

Hrant (01:20:09):

you know,

Hrant (01:20:10):

when,

Hrant (01:20:12):

of course,

Hrant (01:20:13):

it's a major shame,

Hrant (01:20:15):

Israel's president (PM),

Hrant (01:20:16):

when he recognized Armenian Genocide,

Hrant (01:20:19):

it was a hypocrite recognition,

Hrant (01:20:22):

but still he did.

Hrant (01:20:23):

And now we can count Israel as one more country, which is recognizing Armenian Genocide.

Hrant (01:20:28):

Although again, it was not parliament, but still.

Hrant (01:20:30):

And then what Pashinyan said, he said, it's not good for Armenia as of now.

Hrant (01:20:35):

Of course, for Pashinyan's Armenia, which is pro-Turkish, it is not good.

Hrant (01:20:40):

But basically,

Hrant (01:20:42):

what we see is very well-shaped policy against keeping the memory of Armenian

Hrant (01:20:49):

genocide and trying to give it to the historians.

Hrant (01:20:53):

And it would be adequate on one hand, but with keeping remembering about it.

Hrant (01:21:00):

But only in the case if the consequences of genocide are eliminated, like Israel has.

Hrant (01:21:08):

Consequences of Holocaust are eliminated.

Hrant (01:21:12):

Jews, of course, remember it and make their own understanding of it.

Hrant (01:21:20):

but consequences of Armenian genocide are continuing.

Hrant (01:21:24):

And part of it was ethnic cleansing in Artsakh, which took place just two years ago.

Hrant (01:21:31):

So I want us everyone to keep track on,

Hrant (01:21:35):

keep a close eye on the Armenian genocide memorial and its renovation,

Hrant (01:21:44):

which is being done in a very barbaric way.

Asbed (01:21:48):

Yeah, Hovig and I have been tracking it.

Asbed (01:21:52):

We haven't really talked about it on the show because it's been very difficult to

Asbed (01:21:55):

find any kind of renovation plan or anything.

Asbed (01:21:58):

We had a friend who went to Tsitsernakaberd and sent us some video about what's going on.

Asbed (01:22:06):

Obviously, there is renovations needed.

Asbed (01:22:09):

It needs a little bit of a facelift,

Asbed (01:22:11):

but we cannot tell exactly what they're doing,

Asbed (01:22:14):

how long it's going to be.

Asbed (01:22:15):

It's just very difficult to find any kind of details.

Asbed (01:22:19):

Hovig, what's on your mind?

Hovik (01:22:21):

I'm going to skip today.

Hovik (01:22:23):

So let me ask you, Asbed, what's on your mind today?

Asbed (01:22:27):

Well, I don't actually,

Asbed (01:22:28):

I don't have a statement either,

Asbed (01:22:30):

but I do have another question for Hrant.

Asbed (01:22:35):

And we have asked this from other guests,

Asbed (01:22:37):

so it's always good to have a little bit of a ability to bring many people's

Asbed (01:22:43):

thoughts on the same thing.

Asbed (01:22:45):

At the August 8th reality show at the White House,

Asbed (01:22:48):

why didn't Pashinyan demand the return of any portion of our sovereign territory

Asbed (01:22:53):

back and even just one prisoner back?

Asbed (01:22:57):

In fact, we have it on video that he- He demanded them to stay there.

Asbed (01:23:01):

Yes, exactly.

Hrant (01:23:02):

He demanded them to stay there.

Asbed (01:23:06):

I mean, Trump offered him to request from Aliyev to release the 23 prisoners.

Asbed (01:23:14):

He says, you want your Christian leaders to come back, right?

Asbed (01:23:16):

And Pashinyan just looked at him like a deer caught in headlights and basically

Asbed (01:23:22):

said, no, he didn't want it in writing in the thing.

Asbed (01:23:24):

Whether it was in writing or verbally,

Asbed (01:23:27):

why didn't he say, yeah,

Asbed (01:23:28):

it would be nice to have those people back?

Hrant (01:23:30):

I will bring two reasons here and will try to be exact on the point.

Hrant (01:23:35):

First, Pashinyan plays Turkey's and Azerbaijan's game.

Hrant (01:23:39):

Just like that.

Hrant (01:23:40):

That's first.

Hrant (01:23:42):

And second is that he understands that if those are back,

Hrant (01:23:46):

his political position will worsen a lot.

Hrant (01:23:49):

He's catching people whom Azerbaijan does not like in Yerevan.

Hrant (01:23:55):

And Aliyev is catching people whom Pashinyan does not like in Baku.

Hrant (01:23:59):

That's a joint game.

Hrant (01:24:01):

No question about that.

Asbed (01:24:04):

Okay.

Asbed (01:24:05):

We're going to be done for today.

Asbed (01:24:07):

Thank you, Horan, for joining us.

Asbed (01:24:08):

I appreciate it.

Asbed (01:24:09):

Thank you.

Asbed (01:24:10):

Thank you for your questions.

Asbed (01:24:12):

Hovig, did you want to do a kitchen sink?

Hovik (01:24:16):

Well, I don't know.

Hovik (01:24:17):

I mean, you always complain that our shows are too late, too long.

Hovik (01:24:22):

And you did add an entire economy section the last hour of the recording.

Hovik (01:24:28):

You're blaming me for lengthening the show.

Hovik (01:24:32):

Sort of, yeah, kind of.

Hovik (01:24:34):

But I think that we've kept our audience...

Asbed (01:24:38):

But you know,

Asbed (01:24:39):

our audience has basically responded supporting you in this.

Asbed (01:24:42):

They've said that they don't mind the longer shows.

Hovik (01:24:46):

Yeah. The other thing is it's really hot where I am right now.

Hovik (01:24:50):

So I think I'm going to kindly request that we not do the kitchen sink.

Asbed (01:24:57):

Okay, folks,

Asbed (01:24:59):

whether it's weird or too corrupt,

Asbed (01:25:01):

I guess we're going to blame the weather and not do the kitchen sink this time.

Asbed (01:25:04):

We'll do it next time.

Asbed (01:25:06):

So that's the show.

Asbed (01:25:07):

That's all the time we have for it.

Asbed (01:25:09):

And that was our Week in Review recorded on September 8th, 2025.

Asbed (01:25:14):

We've been talking with Hrant Michaelian,

Asbed (01:25:16):

who is a political scientist and multidisciplinary researcher in social sciences

Asbed (01:25:20):

based in Yerevan.

Asbed (01:25:22):

And he is also a senior researcher at the Caucasus Institute.

Asbed (01:25:26):

For more information on everyone in this episode,

Asbed (01:25:29):

you can go to podcasts.groong.org / episode-number.

Hovik (01:25:35):

Yeah. And just a regular reminder,

Hovik (01:25:39):

you know,

Hovik (01:25:40):

if you're not subscribed to us on Apple Podcasts yet,

Hovik (01:25:45):

you know, we really want to grow on that platform.

Hovik (01:25:47):

So please go ahead and do that.

Hovik (01:25:49):

Whip out your phone and just do it right now so you don't forget.

Hovik (01:25:51):

We'd really appreciate it.

Asbed (01:25:54):

Yeah, subscribe to our Substack pages also.

Asbed (01:25:57):

I've been trying to get my friends to subscribe to us.

Asbed (01:26:00):

Boy, do we have a lot of friends who are not subscribed.

Asbed (01:26:04):

You know,

Asbed (01:26:05):

they talk to us about watching the video or whatever,

Asbed (01:26:07):

but they haven't subscribed to the channel.

Asbed (01:26:09):

They don't add to our, let's call it influentialness, influence.

Hovik (01:26:16):

yeah yeah it's a very interesting dynamic i haven't i've got a lot of friends who

Hovik (01:26:21):

uh i would think would be very interested in uh monitoring our podcast listening to

Hovik (01:26:26):

it but we our audience comes from different places i know it's kind of good it's

Hovik (01:26:30):

like you know it's interesting yeah

Asbed (01:26:33):

They go, hey, I didn't get notified that you have a new video.

Asbed (01:26:36):

I want to see that.

Asbed (01:26:37):

And you go, are you subscribed?

Asbed (01:26:39):

Oh, well, no, I'm not subscribed to the channel.

Asbed (01:26:41):

You have to hit that subscribe button, folks.

Asbed (01:26:44):

And then you'll probably get notified when we add new shows.

Asbed (01:26:48):

Take care. I'm Asbed Bedrossian in Los Angeles.

Hovik (01:26:51):

And I'm Hovik Manucharyan in Los Angeles.

Hovik (01:26:55):

Take care. Good to have you here.

Hovik (01:26:56):

Bye-bye.

People on this episode

Head Shot

Asbed Bedrossian

Co-host
Head Shot

Hovik Manucharyan

Co-host
Head Shot

Hrant Mikaelian

Guest

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