Armenian News Network - Groong: Week In Review Podcast

Trita Parsi - Prospect, Grounds and Consequences of a Second Israel-Iran War | Ep 482, Nov 1, 2025

Armenian News Network / Groong Episode 482

Conversations on Groong - November 1, 2025

Topics:

  •   Timing and intent for an Israel and Iran clash
  •   Unfinished business from the June war
  •   US role, limited support or full entry
  •   Iran’s escalation ladder and Caucasus spillover scenarios

Guest: Trita Parsi

Hosts:

Episode 482 | Recorded: October 30, 2025

SHOW NOTES: https://podcasts.groong.org/482

VIDEO: https://youtu.be/hn0UM3BPYOc

#TritaParsi #IsraelIran #MiddleEast #USForeignPolicy #Iran #Israel #SouthCaucasus #Armenia #StraitOfHormuz #Geopolitics


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Asbed (00:00:06):

Hello, everyone, and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode.

Asbed (00:00:10):

We are continuing to discuss different aspects of Israel's unprovoked war on Iran,

Asbed (00:00:15):

which torpedoed the U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations and are leading the region and

Asbed (00:00:19):

the world closer to a catastrophic war.

Asbed (00:00:22):

In a moment, Dr. Trita Parsi will join us.

Asbed (00:00:25):

He is the executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, a leading voice for diplomatic U.S.

Asbed (00:00:31):

foreign policy and an expert on Iran and Middle East affairs.

Hovik (00:00:35):

But before that happens,

Hovik (00:00:37):

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Hovik (00:00:41):

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Hovik (00:00:42):

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Hovik (00:00:45):

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Hovik (00:00:48):

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Hovik (00:00:50):

Parsi, so just don't forget to subscribe to continue getting content about Armenia

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Asbed (00:01:41):

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(00:02:03):

All right. Thank you.

(00:02:04):

And on to the show.

(00:02:06):

Dr. Trita Parsi, welcome to The Groong Podcast.

Trita (00:02:09):

Thank you so much for having me.

Hovik (00:02:11):

It is a genuine pleasure to have you, Dr. Parsi.

Hovik (00:02:13):

And since this is the first time on our show,

Hovik (00:02:16):

please introduce yourself to our audience and what you do,

Hovik (00:02:21):

what keeps you awake at night for those who may not know.

Trita (00:02:24):

Sure.

Trita (00:02:25):

Thank you so much. It's a great pleasure to be with both of you and to be on this podcast.

Trita (00:02:30):

Name is Rita Parsi.

Trita (00:02:31):

I'm the executive vice president and one of the co-founders of the Quincy

Trita (00:02:34):

Institute,

Trita (00:02:35):

which is a think tank in Washington that is explicitly in favor of a restrained

Trita (00:02:41):

oriented U.S.

Trita (00:02:42):

foreign policy,

Trita (00:02:43):

which means that we would have a much higher bar for the United States getting

Trita (00:02:47):

involved in military conflicts.

Trita (00:02:48):

We do not believe that it lies in the interest of the United States.

Trita (00:02:51):

to dominate the world militarily, and to be involved in so many different conflicts.

Trita (00:02:57):

We believe that there's a direct line between the domination of the US,

Trita (00:03:02):

the hegemonic approach,

Trita (00:03:03):

and the fact that the US has ended up in so many forever wars.

Trita (00:03:07):

Prior to this,

Trita (00:03:08):

I was the president of the National Iranian American Council,

Trita (00:03:11):

which I also co-founded,

Trita (00:03:12):

which worked very much on trying to avoid war between the United States and Iran.

Hovik (00:03:19):

Nice.

Hovik (00:03:21):

So let's just jump into it, shall we?

Hovik (00:03:24):

You have previously stated,

Hovik (00:03:25):

Professor Parsi,

Hovik (00:03:26):

that Israel would likely strike Iran by December,

Hovik (00:03:30):

tying the window to American politics.

Hovik (00:03:33):

However, despite Trump's pompous steelmaking,

Hovik (00:03:36):

Gaza remains at risk of ethnic cleansing,

Hovik (00:03:40):

Israel continues to occupy Lebanon,

Hovik (00:03:42):

Gulf capitals are weighing their exposure to war,

Hovik (00:03:46):

and U.S.

Hovik (00:03:47):

military...

Hovik (00:03:48):

presence and threat of force remains central essentially to avoid all-out war and

Hovik (00:03:52):

uh i believe that world markets are like very jittery about the you know issues

Hovik (00:03:57):

related to state of hormuz so all these issues are up in the air now has your

Hovik (00:04:05):

timetable for the second war on Iran shifted at all given the current realities and

Hovik (00:04:11):

developments on the ground

Trita (00:04:13):

Thank you. That's a great question.

Trita (00:04:14):

Let me first explain what my timetable has been.

Trita (00:04:17):

In August,

Trita (00:04:18):

I published a piece in Foreign Policy that I said,

Trita (00:04:20):

I believe that the Israelis were likely to strike and start the war again before

Trita (00:04:25):

December of this year.

Trita (00:04:27):

And this was driven by several different factors.

Trita (00:04:30):

The fact that they failed ultimately in the most important of their objectives,

Trita (00:04:34):

which was to turn Iran into the next

Trita (00:04:37):

Syria or Lebanon, a country Israel can bomb with impunity at will without American involvement.

Trita (00:04:44):

And the reason why December was the kind of outer edge of the prediction window

Trita (00:04:50):

that I had was because if the Israelis give the Iranians too much time,

Trita (00:04:54):

they will rebuild their air defense systems,

Trita (00:04:56):

perhaps by better ones.

Trita (00:04:58):

They are building missiles faster than the U.S.

Trita (00:05:00):

and Israel can build missile interceptors.

Trita (00:05:03):

The missiles of Iran turn out to be very, very crucial.

Trita (00:05:07):

are probably a key reason why the Israelis wanted a ceasefire at the end.

Trita (00:05:12):

but also because of the political window,

Trita (00:05:14):

which is that once the US enters the midterm election season,

Trita (00:05:20):

it becomes more complicated for Israel to do this.

Trita (00:05:23):

It's not an insurmountable obstacle,

Trita (00:05:26):

but Trump clearly is receptive to the demands of his base and his base doesn't

Trita (00:05:31):

wanna see another war.

Trita (00:05:32):

And they know very well that of course, in this next war, the US very likely will get sucked in.

Trita (00:05:37):

So the objection from the American side, I think, would become much stronger after December.

Trita (00:05:44):

Now, a couple of things have happened since then.

Trita (00:05:47):

The most important ones are these.

Trita (00:05:52):

Over the summer,

Trita (00:05:53):

as a result of Israel's war with Iran,

Trita (00:05:59):

we have seen that the support of Israel within the MAGA crowd,

Trita (00:06:04):

the America First crowd,

Trita (00:06:06):

has really plummeted.

Trita (00:06:08):

It plummeted further after the killing of Charlie Kirk.

Trita (00:06:11):

A lot of people in that crowd blame Israel.

Trita (00:06:14):

I've not seen any evidence for it,

Trita (00:06:16):

but a very commonly held view is that the Israelis did this because Charlie

Trita (00:06:21):

apparently had told a friend that he was afraid the Israelis would kill him.

Trita (00:06:24):

He had told other friends,

Trita (00:06:25):

and we have evidence for this,

Trita (00:06:27):

that he was now leaving the pro-Israel train essentially because of the pressure

Trita (00:06:32):

that he was under from some pro-Israel donors to break with Tucker Carlson and

Trita (00:06:36):

people like that.

Trita (00:06:38):

And this,

Trita (00:06:39):

I think,

Trita (00:06:40):

is a key reason as to why Trump,

Trita (00:06:42):

after the Israelis committed a huge mistake by attacking Doha,

Trita (00:06:48):

Qatar,

Trita (00:06:49):

decided to shift and really put pressure on Israel.

Trita (00:06:53):

It's because he realized that Israel was starting to become a political problem for him.

Trita (00:06:58):

He had told one of his pro-Israel donors that my people is starting to hate you.

Trita (00:07:04):

This is very crucial because it was a real awareness that his core base was

Trita (00:07:10):

starting to become increasingly negative on Israel.

Trita (00:07:14):

So when Qatar was attacked by Israel,

Trita (00:07:18):

and it really went too far,

Trita (00:07:20):

and the region reacted very strongly against that,

Trita (00:07:23):

Trump saw an opportunity and a necessity of shifting,

Trita (00:07:28):

and he did.

Trita (00:07:30):

And he came up with this out of the blue, this new idea of a Gaza peace plan.

Trita (00:07:34):

You know, there's plenty of flaws with it.

Trita (00:07:36):

But one crucial thing happened.

Trita (00:07:39):

For the first time, he really started exerting real pressure on Israel.

Trita (00:07:45):

You just had J.D.

Trita (00:07:46):

Vance say that.

Trita (00:07:47):

I think it was yesterday at the Turning Point USA event in which he was asked,

Trita (00:07:52):

by a student, why is the US giving so much money to Israel?

Trita (00:07:56):

And he said that it's precisely because Trump is not controlled by pro-Israel

Trita (00:08:03):

elements,

Trita (00:08:04):

that he has been able to use leverage.

Trita (00:08:07):

And this is why we actually got a ceasefire,

Trita (00:08:10):

because we use that leverage,

Trita (00:08:11):

implicitly saying that other presidents were controlled by the pro-Israel crowd.

Trita (00:08:17):

So this is very crucial.

Trita (00:08:19):

This changes the picture.

Trita (00:08:22):

It doesn't mean that it changes the fundamentals of Israel's interest.

Trita (00:08:27):

Its interest is to establish what essentially is military hegemony in the region,

Trita (00:08:32):

get rid of or weaken all countries in the region that can pose a challenge to

Trita (00:08:37):

Israel's maneuverability.

Trita (00:08:38):

Turkey is one of those countries.

Trita (00:08:41):

if it manages to first establish it over Iran.

Trita (00:08:45):

So that interest is still there because the Israelis don't believe that you can

Trita (00:08:49):

just balance these different countries.

Trita (00:08:52):

They believe that they're all out there to get Israel.

Trita (00:08:54):

And as a result, you need to be able to completely dominate them militarily.

Trita (00:08:59):

So that interest remains.

Trita (00:09:00):

But the opportunity and the window may have changed dramatically because of this

Trita (00:09:04):

turn against Israel within the American pro-MAGA,

Trita (00:09:08):

America First crowd.

Trita (00:09:09):

the manner in which the rest of the region,

Trita (00:09:12):

under the leadership of Qatar and other countries,

Trita (00:09:14):

have really united against Israel and put pressure on Trump to put pressure on

Trita (00:09:19):

Israel. So this changes things.

Trita (00:09:21):

Now, I've spoken to Israelis who believe that precisely because of this reason,

Trita (00:09:26):

Israel is more likely to strike before the end of December.

Trita (00:09:30):

That precisely by striking Iran and dragging the US into that war,

Trita (00:09:34):

it can once again change the dynamics in the region away from the way that it has

Trita (00:09:38):

shifted as a result of their mistake by striking Qatar.

Trita (00:09:42):

And that Netanyahu's own personal interest is even stronger now.

Trita (00:09:47):

If he doesn't have a war with Gaza,

Trita (00:09:48):

he needs another war to stay out of jail and just keep on bombing Lebanon is not

Trita (00:09:54):

sufficient.

Trita (00:09:55):

He needs something bigger.

Trita (00:09:56):

So you have people, former Israeli officials,

Trita (00:09:59):

who are of the view that the risk may have actually increased.

Trita (00:10:02):

If you're sitting in Washington as I am,

Trita (00:10:05):

you definitely have a sense that the risk has decreased because there's a lot of

Trita (00:10:10):

satisfaction of seeing that Trump's pressure on Israel work,

Trita (00:10:14):

which of course it would.

Trita (00:10:15):

Of course, if the U.S.

Trita (00:10:17):

finally decided to put pressure on Israel, of course it would work.

Trita (00:10:20):

The only reason why we don't have much data points proving this is because it

Trita (00:10:24):

almost never happens that the U.S.

Trita (00:10:25):

puts pressure on Israel.

Asbed (00:10:27):

Dr. Parsi, is the need for war on the part of Israel a domestic need?

Asbed (00:10:32):

Is it, for example,

Asbed (00:10:33):

Netanyahu's domestic problems or what is driving that need for constant engagement?

Trita (00:10:39):

Yeah, so there's many different things.

Trita (00:10:41):

So under normal circumstances, you would not have a situation in which a president

Trita (00:10:48):

or a prime minister of Israel would need a war to simply stay out of jail.

Trita (00:10:53):

But that is the specific circumstances that exist now.

Trita (00:10:56):

And that obviously reinforces the broader need in a very significant way.

Trita (00:11:02):

But the fundamental need that is there is not a need for a war.

Trita (00:11:07):

It is essentially the Israeli military doctrine.

Trita (00:11:11):

Most states define a threat

Trita (00:11:16):

as being a combination of capability times intention.

Trita (00:11:21):

So if a country has the military capability and is hostile, then you see them as a threat.

Trita (00:11:27):

The Israelis assume that the intent of hostility, the intent to destroy Israel is constant.

Trita (00:11:36):

It's always there in every country in the region, more or less.

Trita (00:11:40):

So you cannot count on them not having bad intent.

Trita (00:11:43):

You have to always assume that they have bad intent,

Trita (00:11:46):

which then leaves you only focused on whether they have the capability.

Trita (00:11:51):

So it's setting aside intent,

Trita (00:11:53):

focus entirely as to whether they have capability or if the combination of certain

Trita (00:11:57):

states have that.

Trita (00:11:59):

This is incidentally part of the reason why it is legislated in the United States.

Trita (00:12:04):

that we have to help ensure Israel's, what is called, strategic qualitative edge.

Trita (00:12:10):

The US never sells weapons to other countries in the region that are at the same

Trita (00:12:16):

technological and advanced level as it sells it to the Israelis.

Trita (00:12:19):

The Israelis always get the absolute best.

Trita (00:12:21):

Everyone else gets one or two or three steps below.

Trita (00:12:25):

This is part of US law.

Trita (00:12:27):

It is as a measure to help Israel sustain that qualitative strategic edge.

Trita (00:12:33):

And as a result,

Trita (00:12:35):

if you're sitting in Israel 30 years ago,

Trita (00:12:37):

40 years ago,

Trita (00:12:38):

50 years ago,

Trita (00:12:39):

when Iran,

Trita (00:12:40):

the region was in some ways larger because Iran didn't have the technology to hit

Trita (00:12:45):

Israel.

Trita (00:12:46):

So Israel could not even see Iran as a threat.

Trita (00:12:49):

And back then, of course, they were close allies partnering against Arab states.

Trita (00:12:56):

And it didn't matter to the Israelis what technology the Iranians had.

Trita (00:12:59):

In fact, the Israelis were providing technology to the Iranians that the U.S.

Trita (00:13:03):

refused to sell Iran.

Trita (00:13:04):

during the time of the shock.

Trita (00:13:06):

But that was fine because the distance were greater.

Trita (00:13:09):

Now you have a scenario in which the region has become much smaller because of the

Trita (00:13:12):

advancement of technology.

Trita (00:13:14):

The Iranians have missiles that can reach Israel in 12 minutes,

Trita (00:13:17):

which then means that Israel needs to dominate Iran for its own survival strategy,

Trita (00:13:23):

a survival strategy that I find to be completely self-defeating.

Trita (00:13:27):

No country can sustain this type of a policy indefinitely.

Trita (00:13:30):

This is the policy of empire, essentially.

Trita (00:13:32):

Right.

Trita (00:13:34):

But this is the key reason.

Trita (00:13:35):

So this is why also when Assad falls in Syria, what is the first thing the Israelis did?

Trita (00:13:42):

They went in and they bombed everything they could,

Trita (00:13:45):

every military installment,

Trita (00:13:47):

everything they could find,

Trita (00:13:48):

because it didn't matter to them who replaces Assad.

Trita (00:13:52):

What matters to them is,

Trita (00:13:53):

does the next Syrian government have the capability of challenging Israel's

Trita (00:14:00):

domination?

Trita (00:14:01):

Does the next Syrian government have the capability to have a deterrence against Israel?

Trita (00:14:07):

This is the fundamental issue.

Trita (00:14:08):

So even when Netanyahu is out of office and the next prime minister may be clean as

Trita (00:14:14):

snow, no illegal activities,

Trita (00:14:18):

you would still have this problem.

Trita (00:14:19):

And even once Trump is out of office, you will still have this problem.

Trita (00:14:24):

Even if the regime in Iran changes, you will still have this problem.

Trita (00:14:28):

It may be manifested differently.

Trita (00:14:30):

But this is not as simple as to think,

Trita (00:14:32):

oh, as long as the mullahs of Iran are gone,

Trita (00:14:34):

Iran and Israel are going to become friends again.

Trita (00:14:36):

That's a complete misread of the geopolitical situation in the region,

Trita (00:14:40):

a belief that,

Trita (00:14:41):

you know,

Trita (00:14:42):

whatever geopolitical situation in the region was back in the 1970s when the

Trita (00:14:45):

Iranians and the Israelis were close,

Trita (00:14:47):

that that is some sort of the natural permanent state of the region.

Trita (00:14:50):

It is not.

Hovik (00:14:53):

Professor Parsi,

Hovik (00:14:55):

you frame Israel's,

Hovik (00:14:58):

or at least you had framed Israel's push for a second round as quote-unquote

Hovik (00:15:03):

unfinished business from June.

Hovik (00:15:06):

And we know that from those times Netanyahu tested ways to pull Washington in more fully.

Hovik (00:15:14):

Israel tried to degrade Iran's command nodes and create freedom,

Hovik (00:15:19):

as you say,

Hovik (00:15:20):

to strike Iran at will.

Hovik (00:15:23):

And you argued that those efforts fell short and we saw Tehran replace key

Hovik (00:15:29):

commanders within days or in a day and showed that it could punch through any air

Hovik (00:15:35):

defenses that Israel had.

Hovik (00:15:37):

But so according to your thesis what remains unaccomplished specifically that

Hovik (00:15:44):

Israel would need to accomplish, let's say in the first 48 hours of a potential

Trita (00:15:50):

second war that could happen well the key thing for the Israelis is that despite

Trita (00:15:57):

the fact that Ian's network of organizations from Hezbollah to hashed in Iraq and

Trita (00:16:03):

others

Trita (00:16:05):

Despite that being more or less not destroyed,

Trita (00:16:09):

but significantly weakened,

Trita (00:16:11):

despite the fact that the nuclear program,

Trita (00:16:13):

at least the civilian aspects of it were bombed,

Trita (00:16:15):

whether they have a non-civilian aspect or not,

Trita (00:16:18):

we don't know. It seems to me that they certainly didn't have it before.

Trita (00:16:20):

Whether they have it now is a different story because we don't have any inspections to know.

Trita (00:16:26):

But nevertheless, it did show that the missiles were a very,

Trita (00:16:30):

very effective deterrent against Israel.

Trita (00:16:34):

The Israelis, I mean, we have to keep one thing in mind.

Trita (00:16:36):

We do not yet know the full extent of the damage that the missiles did because

Trita (00:16:41):

Israel's military censorship does not allow

Trita (00:16:45):

for that to be reported.

Trita (00:16:47):

And this is what part of the problem with the Western media covering this story.

Trita (00:16:51):

The Israelis allow them to show if a missile had hit something that appeared and

Trita (00:16:56):

may have been a civilian target.

Trita (00:16:59):

but they never allowed the media to film any military targets.

Trita (00:17:03):

And then the media ends up saying all of the Iranian missiles hit civilian targets.

Trita (00:17:07):

Yeah, that's because that's the only thing you're allowed to see.

Trita (00:17:10):

And you know that you're being censored.

Trita (00:17:11):

If you're operating in Israel as a Western media,

Trita (00:17:14):

you know completely that the military censorship is very,

Trita (00:17:17):

very clear and very vast and completely explicit.

Trita (00:17:20):

Yet you don't tell that to the audience.

Trita (00:17:22):

Instead, you only report what you're allowed to see and say that this is the full picture.

Trita (00:17:25):

This is beyond journalistic malpractice.

Trita (00:17:28):

But my point is that we don't know the degree to the damage that it did because the

Trita (00:17:32):

censorship doesn't allow it.

Trita (00:17:34):

We do know, however, they were running out of the interceptors.

Trita (00:17:37):

We do know,

Trita (00:17:38):

however,

Trita (00:17:39):

that the interception rates became higher and higher as the war went forward,

Trita (00:17:44):

both because of the fact that the Iranians had successfully taken out

Trita (00:17:47):

big parts of the air defense systems,

Trita (00:17:50):

but also because they apparently became more and more efficient on how to penetrate

Trita (00:17:56):

the air defense systems without destroying them so that they found the gaps in

Trita (00:18:00):

them.

Trita (00:18:01):

This then has shown that

Trita (00:18:05):

Iran's ability to actually deter Israel and its ability to challenge Israel's

Trita (00:18:12):

domination is actually more effective using the missiles than using a latent

Trita (00:18:18):

nuclear program or even some other different groups such as Hezbollah,

Trita (00:18:22):

etc.

Trita (00:18:23):

So if you're sitting in Israel right now, you cannot possibly be happy.

Trita (00:18:26):

You can, yes, go out and say that this was a success.

Trita (00:18:29):

The nuclear program took huge hits.

Trita (00:18:32):

A lot of the Iranian officials were killed.

Trita (00:18:35):

But you scratch the surface.

Trita (00:18:37):

I do not believe for a second that the Israelis are particularly content.

Trita (00:18:41):

At best, they will say, well, look, this is just the first phase.

Trita (00:18:43):

You cannot expect to have complete success after just one phase.

Trita (00:18:47):

Even smaller states that Israel has managed to subjugate took time.

Trita (00:18:51):

And I think that's a fair position for them to take.

Trita (00:18:54):

But to go out and say that it was a complete success,

Trita (00:18:57):

and as a result, there's no need for them any longer to view Iran as a challenge,

Trita (00:19:02):

I find that completely unconvincing.

Asbed (00:19:07):

Professor, since June, Iran appears to be adjusting its playbook a little bit.

Asbed (00:19:12):

It seems like they are getting ready for a possible second phase,

Asbed (00:19:15):

but the picture is not really clear.

Asbed (00:19:17):

There are reports of drills that stress quick,

Asbed (00:19:21):

massive fire responses,

Asbed (00:19:23):

tighter links with Hezbollah,

Asbed (00:19:25):

Iraqi groups,

Asbed (00:19:26):

Houthis.

Asbed (00:19:27):

These steps suggest that they have learned certain lessons, but we're not sure.

Asbed (00:19:32):

Are these steps real readiness steps or how much of it is signaling?

Trita (00:19:38):

No, I do think that they strongly believe that the Israelis are going to attack again.

Trita (00:19:44):

They have said so publicly.

Trita (00:19:46):

The Israelis have said so publicly that they will attack.

Trita (00:19:50):

And it would be complete malpractice for the Iranians not to prepare themselves.

Trita (00:19:56):

Now, is their preparation adequate or not?

Trita (00:19:58):

That's a different story.

Trita (00:20:00):

There's a lot of question marks.

Trita (00:20:02):

The Israelis had a tremendous benefit because it turned out that they had a massive

Trita (00:20:07):

Mossad presence inside the country.

Trita (00:20:09):

A lot of the attacks were actually taking place from inside Iranian territory.

Trita (00:20:14):

Israeli jets,

Trita (00:20:15):

many reports indicate,

Trita (00:20:17):

actually never really penetrated Iran's airspace,

Trita (00:20:19):

but was shooting the missiles from outside of Iranian airspace.

Trita (00:20:24):

What was in Iran's airspace was drones and other things,

Trita (00:20:27):

and those were shot from inside the territory.

Trita (00:20:29):

Now, we do not know.

Trita (00:20:30):

Did the Israelis consume the majority,

Trita (00:20:34):

perhaps all of their Mossad assets inside the country for this attack?

Trita (00:20:39):

Did they save some?

Trita (00:20:42):

Can they restore it?

Trita (00:20:44):

These are obviously questions that we cannot know.

Trita (00:20:46):

This is all classified and it's not even clear to me whether other countries have a

Trita (00:20:51):

good assessment.

Trita (00:20:52):

Israeli media has said that a lot of these different cells were not inside the

Trita (00:20:57):

country as sleeper cells,

Trita (00:20:59):

but rather these were Iranians that for good reason had a lot of problems with the

Trita (00:21:03):

Iranian regime,

Trita (00:21:04):

but then had made a decision to join the Israelis.

Trita (00:21:07):

The Israelis have managed to flip them, essentially.

Trita (00:21:10):

They had trained them outside of Iran,

Trita (00:21:12):

and three days before the war,

Trita (00:21:14):

they slipped back into Iran.

Trita (00:21:16):

If that is the case,

Trita (00:21:17):

perhaps there's another reservoir of people that they are training and they can

Trita (00:21:22):

slip them back in.

Trita (00:21:23):

So it's not just about what the presence is inside the country,

Trita (00:21:28):

but the presence that they can inject into the country.

Trita (00:21:32):

Now,

Trita (00:21:33):

much indicates that this operation was something they had trained for for many,

Trita (00:21:36):

many different years,

Trita (00:21:37):

prepared for for many different years.

Trita (00:21:39):

And that may suggest that it's not so easy to just restore all of those different

Trita (00:21:44):

Mossad capabilities within just six months or so.

Trita (00:21:48):

Again, we do not know.

Trita (00:21:49):

It's one of the big unknowns of what will the big presence be inside Iran from

Trita (00:21:56):

Mossad's end prior to this.

Trita (00:21:59):

Do the Israelis have another trick up their sleeve?

Trita (00:22:01):

Very few people expected the pager attack against the Hezbollah officials and their families.

Trita (00:22:09):

Is there something of that kind or something completely unexpected that they also

Trita (00:22:13):

have in their reservoir?

Trita (00:22:14):

We do not know these things.

Trita (00:22:17):

What we do know is they are restoring launchers.

Trita (00:22:21):

They're building more missiles.

Trita (00:22:23):

They're getting stuff from the Chinese.

Trita (00:22:25):

They are in conversations with the Russians about...

Trita (00:22:30):

fighter jets,

Trita (00:22:31):

those may not be very efficient in shooting down drones,

Trita (00:22:35):

but they may be very useful in challenging Israeli jets outside of Iranian airspace

Trita (00:22:41):

if the war happens again.

Trita (00:22:43):

Can they train up pilots on these new Su-35s in such a short time span?

Trita (00:22:50):

We have no idea. But bottom line is, even if there isn't an attack...

Trita (00:22:55):

before December.

Trita (00:22:56):

It does not mean that the window has closed and that the Israelis will just move on

Trita (00:23:00):

and start focusing on other things.

Trita (00:23:02):

This is going to be a long term competition struggle rivalry between the Iranians and Israelis.

Trita (00:23:10):

And even if it doesn't lead to another phase of the war before December,

Trita (00:23:14):

it is very likely to lead to another confrontation down the road later on.

Hovik (00:23:19):

Professor Parsi, let me just jump in here.

Hovik (00:23:23):

We know that Iranian media has reported that Azerbaijan,

Hovik (00:23:28):

for instance,

Hovik (00:23:29):

was used during the territory of Azerbaijan,

Hovik (00:23:33):

was used during the June War.

Hovik (00:23:36):

And, you know, there's obviously Iran is very diplomatic about it with Azerbaijan.

Hovik (00:23:44):

but how likely do you see if that is true how likely do you see a repeat of that

Hovik (00:23:50):

tactic or uh process if the if a new war starts especially with all the changes

Hovik (00:23:57):

that are going on there is this new trip corridor that we won't have time to cover

Hovik (00:24:02):

today but um you know it seems like

Hovik (00:24:06):

the geopolitical uh sort of uh processes are continuing and and and the us is more

Hovik (00:24:13):

the more involved in the region than before so um yeah what are your thoughts about

Hovik (00:24:21):

this conflict if if it does begin to become hot what do you think about it spilling

Hovik (00:24:27):

over to the south caucasus as well

Trita (00:24:30):

So I think that if this leads to a fuller confrontation,

Trita (00:24:35):

meaning that the Israelis attack the U.S.

Trita (00:24:39):

is more than it was last time.

Trita (00:24:42):

I mean, last time the U.S.

Trita (00:24:44):

was obviously very involved in shooting down Iranian missiles and drones,

Trita (00:24:48):

and it was involved completely when it comes to a single attack on the nuclear

Trita (00:24:53):

program. But Trump did not agree to be

Trita (00:24:56):

offensively involved in the war beyond that.

Trita (00:25:00):

But if it leads to a war with a significant confrontation between Iran and Israel,

Trita (00:25:05):

and the Iranians are successful in hitting the Israelis very hard,

Trita (00:25:10):

perhaps high casualties on the Israeli side,

Trita (00:25:13):

then the pressure on Trump to step in will be very significant.

Trita (00:25:16):

If that then happens,

Trita (00:25:18):

then the restraint the Iranians have shown,

Trita (00:25:21):

which is clear,

Trita (00:25:22):

they don't want a confrontation with the US,

Trita (00:25:25):

it is reasonable to believe that that restraint will be out the window at some

Trita (00:25:29):

point in that type of a phase.

Trita (00:25:32):

And that means that the Iranians who have a much larger reservoir of shorter range

Trita (00:25:38):

missiles will likely start using them.

Trita (00:25:41):

And given at least deep suspicion, perhaps some evidence of Azerbaijan's role in all of this,

Trita (00:25:49):

there is a likelihood that the confrontation could extend there.

Trita (00:25:53):

Now, the Iranians are very disinclined to have a direct confrontation with Azerbaijan

Trita (00:25:57):

for a variety of reasons,

Trita (00:25:59):

including ethnic reasons.

Trita (00:26:01):

But there is undoubtedly a tremendous amount of anger and suspicion,

Trita (00:26:06):

not just because of this,

Trita (00:26:07):

but because they have seen,

Trita (00:26:09):

of course, that Israel and Azerbaijan's alliance has been forming over the course of the last

Trita (00:26:15):

two decades.

Trita (00:26:17):

This suspicion is not based on nothing.

Trita (00:26:21):

It's very clear that the Israelis are extremely active with the Azeri military,

Trita (00:26:26):

extremely active in Azerbaijan intelligence-wise.

Trita (00:26:29):

And it's certainly not without an eye on Israel.

Trita (00:26:33):

Iran.

Trita (00:26:35):

If anything, from the Israeli standpoint,

Trita (00:26:37):

it's far more interested in that relationship with Azerbaijan because of its

Trita (00:26:41):

rivalry with Iran rather than because of Israel's viewpoints or relationship or

Trita (00:26:46):

absence of that with Armenia.

Asbed (00:26:49):

We are very interested in exploring this issue,

Asbed (00:26:53):

especially since the August 8th agreement between Armenia,

Asbed (00:26:56):

Azerbaijan and the White House on August 8th,

Asbed (00:27:01):

to understand if this trip actually extends the risk of war all the way to Armenia

Asbed (00:27:07):

in case this Middle East conflict flares up in the future.

Asbed (00:27:11):

But we'll leave that for the future conversation.

Asbed (00:27:14):

Thank you so much.

Trita (00:27:15):

Thank you so much for joining us.

Trita (00:27:16):

I really appreciate it.

Trita (00:27:17):

Thank you.

Asbed (00:27:18):

Bye-bye.

Asbed (00:27:19):

Well, folks, that's our show today.

Asbed (00:27:21):

This episode was recorded on October 30th, 2025.

Asbed (00:27:24):

We've been talking with Dr.

Asbed (00:27:26):

Trita Parsi,

Asbed (00:27:28):

who is executive vice president of the Quincy Institute,

Asbed (00:27:31):

which is a leading voice for diplomatic U.S.

Asbed (00:27:33):

foreign policy.

Asbed (00:27:35):

He's an expert on Iran and Middle East affairs,

Asbed (00:27:37):

and his insights appear regularly in The Washington Post,

Asbed (00:27:41):

New York Times,

Asbed (00:27:42):

and he frequently appears on CNN,

Asbed (00:27:44):

BBC, NPR,

Asbed (00:27:45):

Al Jazeera,

Asbed (00:27:46):

and of course,

Asbed (00:27:47):

Groong. Dr.

Asbed (00:27:48):

Parsi has been named one of Washingtonian Magazine's 25 most influential foreign

Asbed (00:27:53):

policy figures annually since 2021.

Asbed (00:27:57):

For more information on him,

Asbed (00:27:58):

his bio,

Asbed (00:27:59):

my bio,

Asbed (00:28:00):

and Hovig's bio,

Asbed (00:28:01):

you can go to podcasts.groong.org/episode-number and click on the links.

Hovik (00:28:07):

folks don't forget to like comment and share this episode we appreciate your

Hovik (00:28:12):

patronage and we hope you enjoy these episodes and that's the thing that i would

Hovik (00:28:18):

like in exchange is just a little bit of support so that we can get in front of

Hovik (00:28:22):

more eyes

Hovik (00:28:23):

And if you feel so inclined,

Hovik (00:28:26):

feel free to provide us a donation that will help us increase our reach even

Hovik (00:28:30):

further.

Hovik (00:28:31):

That's podcasts.groong.org/donate.

Hovik (00:28:35):

You can do a monthly donation or a one-time donation as you see fit.

Asbed (00:28:39):

Well, I'm Asbed Bedrossian in Los Angeles.

Hovik (00:28:42):

And I'm Hovik Manucharyan.

Hovik (00:28:43):

I'm normally based out of Yerevan, but currently also in Los Angeles.

Asbed (00:28:47):

We'll talk to you soon.

Hovik (00:28:49):

Have a nice day.

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