Armenian News Network - Groong: Week In Review Podcast

Fyodor Lukyanov - Russia in Evolving Global Geopolitics | Ep 502, Jan 9, 2026

• Armenian News Network / Groong • Episode 502

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Conversations on Groong - January 9, 2026

Topics

  • Venezuela
  • Ukraine War
  • Russia-Iran Relations
  • TRIPP and Russian-Armenian Relations

Guest

  • Fyodor Lukyanov (Фёдор Алекса́ндрович Лукья́нов)

Hosts

Episode 502 | Recorded: January 8, 2026

SHOW NOTES: https://podcasts.groong.org/502

VIDEO: https://youtu.be/d1XxQHSZUEE

#FyodorLukyanov #RussiaGeopolitics #UkraineWar #IranIsrael #VenezuelaCrisis #TRIPP


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Asbed (00:00:04):

Hello and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode.

Asbed (00:00:07):

We are joined by Fyodor Lukyanov,

Asbed (00:00:09):

editor in chief of Russia in Global Affairs and one of the leading voices in

Asbed (00:00:14):

Russian foreign policy analysis.

Hovik (00:00:16):

Before we begin, folks, a quick note to our listeners.

Hovik (00:00:19):

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Hovik (00:00:23):

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Hovik (00:00:25):

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Hovik (00:00:26):

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Hovik (00:00:30):

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Hovik (00:00:33):

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Hovik (00:00:40):

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Hovik (00:00:42):

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Hovik (00:00:48):

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Asbed (00:00:51):

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Hovik (00:00:52):

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Hovik (00:00:59):

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Hovik (00:01:03):

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Hovik (00:01:13):

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Hovik (00:01:14):

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Hovik (00:01:16):

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Asbed (00:01:40):

Yeah.

Asbed (00:01:41):

Check out our shows.

Asbed (00:01:42):

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Asbed (00:01:46):

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sustaining member by giving monthly or a one-time donation.

Hovik (00:01:56):

All right, let's get to the show.

Asbed (00:01:59):

Mr. Lukyanov, happy new year and welcome back to the Groong podcast.

Lukyanov (00:02:03):

Happy New Year.

Lukyanov (00:02:05):

I'm very happy to be this year with you again.

Hovik (00:02:08):

Yeah, this is our second podcast of the year, so we're glad to have it with you.

Hovik (00:02:14):

And to our Russian friends,

Hovik (00:02:16):

whoever celebrates Christmas,

Hovik (00:02:19):

that was a day ago,

Hovik (00:02:21):

and two days ago was Armenian Christmas,

Hovik (00:02:22):

so to all those who celebrate.

Asbed (00:02:28):

Okay, well,

Asbed (00:02:29):

let's hit our topics because on January 3rd,

Asbed (00:02:32):

President Donald Trump tried to make Venezuela great again,

Asbed (00:02:35):

and US forces invaded Caracas,

Asbed (00:02:39):

forcefully abducting Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife to face

Asbed (00:02:43):

charges in New York.

Asbed (00:02:44):

The UN Secretary General said the action was constituting a dangerous precedent

Asbed (00:02:49):

while China and Russia slammed the US.

Asbed (00:02:53):

US scholars and also House Senate Democrats called the US action wildly illegal.

Asbed (00:02:59):

And the reactions from Western countries were split,

Asbed (00:03:01):

but many leaders welcomed Maduro's removal while distancing themselves from the

Asbed (00:03:06):

methods used.

Asbed (00:03:07):

Regardless of anything that is being said here,

Asbed (00:03:11):

what stood out for me about this episode is not so much the condemnations,

Asbed (00:03:15):

but the fact that nobody can do or is willing to do anything about it.

Asbed (00:03:20):

So Maduro was friendly with Russia beyond the statements of support, dismay, shock, concern.

Asbed (00:03:25):

What's Russia's perspective on this?

Lukyanov (00:03:29):

of course it was absolutely shocking news to all i think whatever people thought

Lukyanov (00:03:36):

about maduro and they were yes he he was considered as almost an ally or or a

Lukyanov (00:03:45):

very close partner some people believed that Venezuela was not worth making a

Lukyanov (00:03:53):

stake at it but anyway so that that was an absolute shock and of course

Lukyanov (00:03:58):

You know,

Lukyanov (00:03:59):

there is not a very big news when Americans intervene somewhere,

Lukyanov (00:04:04):

especially in Latin America.

Lukyanov (00:04:05):

That's historically almost a normal situation.

Lukyanov (00:04:12):

Not recently, but it was many, many times.

Lukyanov (00:04:15):

But of course, President Trump is an extremely interesting person.

Lukyanov (00:04:20):

And if it would be a traditional operation of regime change,

Lukyanov (00:04:25):

that would be condemned,

Lukyanov (00:04:26):

but okay,

Lukyanov (00:04:28):

we did see it before.

Lukyanov (00:04:30):

But this way was, of course, absolutely confusing to everybody.

Lukyanov (00:04:35):

Go or come, take the president,

Lukyanov (00:04:39):

and leave.

Lukyanov (00:04:41):

And basically the regime remained in place.

Lukyanov (00:04:44):

Okay, now obviously very much constrained, but still.

Lukyanov (00:04:50):

And I would say that many people in Russia, including, I guess, the leadership, are

Lukyanov (00:04:58):

really they don't know exactly how to interpret this.

Lukyanov (00:05:03):

And on the one hand,

Lukyanov (00:05:05):

the first shock was that now Americans demonstrated the 100%,

Lukyanov (00:05:10):

200% brutality

Lukyanov (00:05:15):

and reliance on the force only.

Lukyanov (00:05:19):

And the statement by Stephen Miller on CNN was listened here to when he said that

Lukyanov (00:05:28):

guys forget about all international niceties.

Lukyanov (00:05:33):

This is only force and strength and power which matters.

Lukyanov (00:05:38):

But at the same time,

Lukyanov (00:05:40):

after a short consideration,

Lukyanov (00:05:44):

you can see that actually Donald Trump likes big shows and it's a very spectacular

Lukyanov (00:05:52):

move,

Lukyanov (00:05:53):

but actually he and his administration

Lukyanov (00:05:57):

are extremely afraid of being dragged in, in anything.

Lukyanov (00:06:02):

And of course, they try to avoid any involvement when they can count an insignificant response.

Lukyanov (00:06:11):

So in case of Venezuela,

Lukyanov (00:06:13):

it was almost,

Lukyanov (00:06:15):

yes, a very, very brilliant operation,

Lukyanov (00:06:17):

of course,

Lukyanov (00:06:18):

but certainly it was pre-agreed and it was some kind of people inside and so on.

Lukyanov (00:06:25):

Again,

Lukyanov (00:06:26):

Trump,

Lukyanov (00:06:27):

as before,

Lukyanov (00:06:29):

he leaves many people confused or at least without a clear understanding of his

Lukyanov (00:06:39):

intentions.

Lukyanov (00:06:41):

From my point of view, Trump operated in a very traditional way for him.

Lukyanov (00:06:47):

And this is exactly to make as much effect, as much noise as possible.

Lukyanov (00:06:56):

But in fact, it's very calculated.

Lukyanov (00:06:59):

And as it was in Iran, for example, in June last year.

Lukyanov (00:07:06):

Another event which provoked a lot of discussions here in Russia,

Lukyanov (00:07:11):

of course, was the seizure of this tanker a couple of days ago.

Lukyanov (00:07:17):

Two of them, I think, overnight.

Lukyanov (00:07:19):

Two of them.

Lukyanov (00:07:20):

But, you know, the first reaction was pretty angry and very critical.

Lukyanov (00:07:25):

But then when you start to try to understand what happened,

Lukyanov (00:07:30):

to whom those tankers belonged,

Lukyanov (00:07:33):

why one of those tankers suddenly obtained the Russian flag,

Lukyanov (00:07:38):

even not the flag to raise,

Lukyanov (00:07:41):

but just to imitate.

Lukyanov (00:07:46):

And of course, then the simple and clear picture starts to collapse.

Asbed (00:07:52):

I see.

Asbed (00:07:53):

That's an interesting aspect.

Asbed (00:07:54):

I hadn't really dug into the event enough to know that those flags may or may not

Asbed (00:08:00):

have been,

Asbed (00:08:01):

or rather those ships may or may not have been real Russian ones,

Asbed (00:08:04):

but just the flag was raised.

Lukyanov (00:08:08):

It is a very strange story because the flag was,

Lukyanov (00:08:12):

yes,

Lukyanov (00:08:13):

officially this ship has been registered in Russia,

Lukyanov (00:08:16):

but very recently,

Lukyanov (00:08:18):

during already when the U.S.

Lukyanov (00:08:23):

forces followed this ship.

Lukyanov (00:08:26):

And then they sent message to Moscow or to Russian authorities,

Lukyanov (00:08:32):

and they were registered actually bypassing the procedure.

Lukyanov (00:08:37):

Why somebody did it, very difficult to understand.

Lukyanov (00:08:41):

My guess is that behind this story,

Lukyanov (00:08:44):

there is some very much private interest,

Lukyanov (00:08:47):

nothing to do with the Russian state interest.

Lukyanov (00:08:50):

Anyway, what I want to say is that

Lukyanov (00:08:53):

The moment you see something happening from the United States,

Lukyanov (00:08:57):

from the Trump administration,

Lukyanov (00:08:59):

and you immediately jump to conclusions,

Lukyanov (00:09:02):

but then after a short while,

Lukyanov (00:09:04):

you understand that that conclusion was probably wrong,

Lukyanov (00:09:08):

and it should be reconsidered again and again.

Lukyanov (00:09:10):

So that's the new way.

Asbed (00:09:13):

That's a very interesting aspect that I really was not aware of.

Asbed (00:09:17):

So we'll watch for those news a little further down.

Asbed (00:09:21):

Russia and China have had expanding trade and energy relations with countries in South America.

Asbed (00:09:27):

But the U.S.

Asbed (00:09:28):

is starting to treat the American contents as its exclusive zone of interest and influence.

Asbed (00:09:34):

What does Russia...

Asbed (00:09:37):

say about this?

Asbed (00:09:38):

Does it simply concede that the United States can do anything it wants in the

Asbed (00:09:42):

Western Hemisphere because it has declared that it is its own space?

Asbed (00:09:46):

Is there any kind of a parallel to this aspect of feeling of ownership of the

Asbed (00:09:52):

Western Hemisphere with Russia's feeling of ownership maybe of Ukraine and the

Asbed (00:09:58):

periphery of the old Soviet Union?

Lukyanov (00:10:02):

There are some people here who would love to interpret those events in this way.

Lukyanov (00:10:09):

I don't think it's the case, fortunately or unfortunately, I don't know.

Lukyanov (00:10:15):

Because yes,

Lukyanov (00:10:16):

indeed,

Lukyanov (00:10:17):

the statements we hear from the Trump administration,

Lukyanov (00:10:20):

not only in the context of Venezuela,

Lukyanov (00:10:23):

but also before in December when this national election

Lukyanov (00:10:28):

Security strategy has been published.

Lukyanov (00:10:32):

And there, there is a clear statement that Monroe Doctrine,

Lukyanov (00:10:36):

which is based on the sphere of influence approach,

Lukyanov (00:10:39):

is the,

Lukyanov (00:10:40):

so to say,

Lukyanov (00:10:41):

leading idea for the Trump administration and so on.

Lukyanov (00:10:45):

Of course, it sounds for many conservatively thinking Russians as an invitation.

Lukyanov (00:10:54):

So we have this and then you should define others, Russia, China, maybe India, I don't know.

Lukyanov (00:11:02):

which spheres you have.

Lukyanov (00:11:04):

But in fact,

Lukyanov (00:11:05):

it's not the case because,

Lukyanov (00:11:06):

of course, the American strategic thinkers,

Lukyanov (00:11:09):

even those who support the Trumpian approach,

Lukyanov (00:11:13):

they don't mean,

Lukyanov (00:11:14):

of course, that United States will totally withdraw from the rest of the world.

Lukyanov (00:11:18):

And certainly it will be reconsideration of many approaches,

Lukyanov (00:11:24):

but it does not mean that Trump or any American president would leave the Middle

Lukyanov (00:11:29):

East or Southern Caucasus or Eurasia or Europe.

Lukyanov (00:11:35):

different approach,

Lukyanov (00:11:37):

maybe a redistribution of resources allocated,

Lukyanov (00:11:42):

but at the end of the day,

Lukyanov (00:11:44):

American administration never will say that this is ours and the rest you take it.

Lukyanov (00:11:51):

No, and in this regard,

Lukyanov (00:11:53):

I think we should not have any illusions,

Lukyanov (00:11:56):

and maybe it's even good,

Lukyanov (00:11:58):

because if the world will go to this system of clear-cut spheres of influence,

Lukyanov (00:12:06):

It might be beneficial for a while, but after that, I'm not sure.

Asbed (00:12:11):

Well, of course, Venezuela is not the only place that Trump is trying to make great again.

Asbed (00:12:16):

He's also trying to make Greenland great again.

Asbed (00:12:18):

I'm sure you've followed the ramping rhetoric on why the United States absolutely

Asbed (00:12:24):

needs Greenland for its national security.

Asbed (00:12:27):

is now having a little bit of a row with Denmark and the EU and France has chimed in.

Asbed (00:12:32):

Is Russia concerned about such statements or are you all having a great laugh in

Asbed (00:12:36):

Moscow watching these exchanges?

Lukyanov (00:12:39):

Russia is certainly not concerned because at the end of the day,

Lukyanov (00:12:43):

United States is a dominating power in that area anyway.

Lukyanov (00:12:48):

Belongs Greenland to Denmark or not, it doesn't matter.

Lukyanov (00:12:53):

It's fact of life.

Lukyanov (00:12:54):

And,

Lukyanov (00:12:55):

of course, the United States is,

Lukyanov (00:12:58):

under any circumstances,

Lukyanov (00:12:59):

the biggest vis-a-vis of Russia in Arctic.

Lukyanov (00:13:02):

There are two biggest powers there.

Lukyanov (00:13:05):

As far as this very strange story is concerned,

Lukyanov (00:13:09):

of course,

Lukyanov (00:13:10):

it's ironic because for me,

Lukyanov (00:13:14):

I'm initially many,

Lukyanov (00:13:16):

many decades ago,

Lukyanov (00:13:17):

I was trained specialist in Scandinavian affairs.

Lukyanov (00:13:23):

I spoke Swedish and I spent a lot of time in Scandinavia.

Lukyanov (00:13:27):

I love these countries.

Lukyanov (00:13:29):

And for me, it's, of course,

Lukyanov (00:13:30):

extremely strange to listen to all this debate because I know very well and all of

Lukyanov (00:13:36):

us know that if Americans need something concrete in Greenland and if they ask the

Lukyanov (00:13:42):

Danish government to give it,

Lukyanov (00:13:43):

they will give everything.

Lukyanov (00:13:45):

New bases, concessions, I don't know, the mines, whatever.

Lukyanov (00:13:51):

Why does Trump need to insist on basically annexation?

Lukyanov (00:13:56):

That's a very strange idea,

Lukyanov (00:13:58):

but probably it's really this new post-liberal globalization approach when powers

Lukyanov (00:14:07):

or leaders like Trump,

Lukyanov (00:14:10):

those who want

Lukyanov (00:14:11):

the past come back, the great again and so on.

Lukyanov (00:14:15):

They try to reassure that territory matters because in the global age,

Lukyanov (00:14:21):

age of globalization,

Lukyanov (00:14:22):

all of us believe that territory actually doesn't matter that much anymore.

Lukyanov (00:14:27):

It doesn't make much difference our country's neighbors or not neighbors.

Lukyanov (00:14:34):

They can communicate anyway with the contemporary means and so on.

Lukyanov (00:14:38):

But now we are back to the classics,

Lukyanov (00:14:40):

to the basics,

Lukyanov (00:14:41):

that territory matters and the neighboring area,

Lukyanov (00:14:45):

that's the most important.

Lukyanov (00:14:47):

You need to control it.

Lukyanov (00:14:49):

And the deeper control, the better.

Lukyanov (00:14:54):

And that's what Trump is doing.

Lukyanov (00:14:56):

As for Russian reaction,

Lukyanov (00:14:58):

I think still people don't believe that it's possible that Trump will by force take

Lukyanov (00:15:06):

Greenland, but who knows?

Asbed (00:15:08):

Yeah. Yeah.

Asbed (00:15:09):

I actually don't believe that it's a national security need.

Asbed (00:15:12):

I'm sure that there are a lot of natural resources buried under all that ice that's

Asbed (00:15:16):

starting to begin to get exposed.

Asbed (00:15:18):

And, um, the oligarchs here in America want access to it.

Asbed (00:15:22):

Sure.

Hovik (00:15:23):

So we kind of,

Hovik (00:15:26):

the fighting in Ukraine,

Hovik (00:15:28):

hits year four,

Hovik (00:15:29):

now Russia has a momentum and Ukraine is burning through both men and,

Hovik (00:15:35):

Many analysts believe that Ukraine at this rate can go for maybe a year more.

Hovik (00:15:42):

I'm not sure.

Hovik (00:15:43):

And Europe just has doubled down, pledging another 90 billion to Ukraine.

Hovik (00:15:48):

And two days ago, at the coalition of the ruling meeting,

Hovik (00:15:52):

We all witnessed Witkoff and Trump's son-in-law standing and smiling with EU

Hovik (00:16:01):

bureaucrats who pledged to send troops to Ukraine in the case of a peace deal,

Hovik (00:16:08):

despite multiple times Russia's reiteration of its red lines that no NATO in

Hovik (00:16:17):

Ukraine.

Hovik (00:16:18):

It was surreal because

Hovik (00:16:19):

All these EU leaders were proclaiming that everyone is like 90 percent close to a peace deal.

Hovik (00:16:28):

So, you know, leads me to question whether the Russian red lines have changed.

Hovik (00:16:31):

But let me just also add some more.

Hovik (00:16:34):

Trump made an interesting pivot.

Hovik (00:16:35):

You know, he backed away from believing that Putin's residence in Novgorod was attacked.

Hovik (00:16:44):

In fact, such an attack

Hovik (00:16:48):

would undoubtedly be supported by the U.S. CIA.

Hovik (00:16:51):

But basically he said, you know, I'm disappointed in Putin.

Hovik (00:16:55):

And also, you know, we didn't attack or the Ukraine didn't attack his residents.

Hovik (00:17:01):

So that is mixed messaging.

Hovik (00:17:03):

And at least one question, I think, who is trying to end this war?

Hovik (00:17:07):

if anyone, and who is trying to manage it into its next phase.

Hovik (00:17:12):

So with that intro,

Hovik (00:17:14):

Mr. Lukyanov,

Hovik (00:17:15):

why is this war still going on and how do you see its resolution?

Lukyanov (00:17:22):

First of all, those mixed messages, mixed messaging, it's not at all new.

Lukyanov (00:17:31):

So we hear this and we follow this for a year now, almost a year.

Lukyanov (00:17:37):

Since the very beginning,

Lukyanov (00:17:39):

when Donald Trump called Vladimir Putin in February,

Lukyanov (00:17:43):

and then the whole process started,

Lukyanov (00:17:45):

we saw probably four...

Lukyanov (00:17:51):

four turns of this spiral with approximately the same trajectory.

Lukyanov (00:17:57):

Beginning of very promising talks, expectations, raising hopes,

Lukyanov (00:18:04):

Then something happens, and once again.

Lukyanov (00:18:08):

Even with such heights and culminations as the meeting in Anchorage, but anyway.

Lukyanov (00:18:18):

I think that the changing...

Lukyanov (00:18:24):

view of trump he changes his views and on the details and this what you mentioned

Lukyanov (00:18:34):

to be very frank is a very strange story with this attack on the Putin residence so

Lukyanov (00:18:40):

i don't know who who said what and why

Lukyanov (00:18:46):

Anyway, tactically, Trump is changing.

Lukyanov (00:18:50):

You can remember them a couple of months ago.

Lukyanov (00:18:53):

He suddenly said that, oh, I'm disappointed.

Lukyanov (00:18:56):

Russia is a paper tiger.

Lukyanov (00:18:58):

Ukraine will be able to restore its borders of 1991.

Lukyanov (00:19:04):

And everybody was shocked.

Lukyanov (00:19:05):

Then he withdrew those statements after two days.

Lukyanov (00:19:08):

And so that's Trump style.

Lukyanov (00:19:11):

Strategically,

Lukyanov (00:19:12):

I think he is still committed to the idea that he will force both sides into some

Lukyanov (00:19:19):

kind of agreement.

Lukyanov (00:19:22):

He tries to change targets.

Lukyanov (00:19:25):

And actually,

Lukyanov (00:19:27):

since from my point of view,

Lukyanov (00:19:28):

I might be wrong,

Lukyanov (00:19:29):

but it looks like this from the outside.

Lukyanov (00:19:34):

For Trump, it doesn't matter what will be the end game.

Lukyanov (00:19:38):

He doesn't care who will win, basically.

Lukyanov (00:19:42):

For him, it's important to stop it.

Lukyanov (00:19:45):

And he tries to find leverage to put pressure on both sides.

Lukyanov (00:19:51):

But the bigger pressure is being put on site,

Lukyanov (00:19:56):

which he believes is easier to force to some conclusion.

Lukyanov (00:20:04):

And he tried with Russia, he tried with Ukraine.

Lukyanov (00:20:07):

Both sides, I must say, both sides are very difficult for him.

Lukyanov (00:20:11):

And I think he was really surprised, especially about the Ukrainian stubbornness and firmness.

Lukyanov (00:20:20):

But of course,

Lukyanov (00:20:21):

Americans have more leverage on Ukraine,

Lukyanov (00:20:24):

objectively,

Lukyanov (00:20:25):

because Ukraine is very much dependent on the West and the American intelligence

Lukyanov (00:20:29):

and so on.

Lukyanov (00:20:30):

But again, he tries to mix.

Lukyanov (00:20:33):

He tries to put pressure on Russia as well.

Lukyanov (00:20:37):

Yesterday, Senator Graham said that Trump, allegedly,

Lukyanov (00:20:45):

give the green light to this legislation in the US Congress,

Lukyanov (00:20:50):

which would give Trump much more leverage to impose sanctions on all clients of

Lukyanov (00:20:56):

Russia and so on.

Lukyanov (00:20:57):

I will not be very much surprised if he will introduce sanctions against Russia soon.

Lukyanov (00:21:05):

as he did a couple of months ago.

Lukyanov (00:21:08):

But again,

Lukyanov (00:21:09):

at the end of the day,

Lukyanov (00:21:11):

at least so far,

Lukyanov (00:21:13):

he concluded each time that Russia is impossible to change.

Lukyanov (00:21:19):

So Russia is continuing keeping the same while Ukraine at least is trying to

Lukyanov (00:21:29):

slightly change its position.

Lukyanov (00:21:31):

So I think that

Lukyanov (00:21:33):

we will go into the same circle once again, at least once, maybe more.

Lukyanov (00:21:42):

I still believe that 2026 might be the year when this war will be ended.

Lukyanov (00:21:48):

It will be ended, of course,

Lukyanov (00:21:52):

in case Ukraine and supporters of Ukraine in Europe will understand that

Lukyanov (00:21:57):

continuation of the process will only worsen conditions for Ukraine.

Lukyanov (00:22:03):

We see it now, but pretty slow, slowly.

Lukyanov (00:22:09):

And then probably they will be forced to change position.

Lukyanov (00:22:15):

But at this point, it looks like everything is back to the battlefield, only this.

Hovik (00:22:23):

It's interesting. You mentioned what Trump believes he can do.

Hovik (00:22:26):

Does Trump believe that he is fully in control of the United States?

Hovik (00:22:31):

And also, does the president of Russia believe that Trump can deliver on what he's negotiating?

Hovik (00:22:39):

And also,

Hovik (00:22:40):

at the same time,

Hovik (00:22:41):

does President Putin even believe that Trump is negotiating in good faith?

Lukyanov (00:22:49):

Of course, I cannot be sure what President Putin thinks.

Lukyanov (00:22:53):

I guess that, first of all, yes, he believes that Trump is negotiating in a good faith.

Lukyanov (00:23:02):

It does not mean that he trusts everything Trump is saying or doing,

Lukyanov (00:23:08):

but he believes and he said it many times publicly that Trump really wants this

Lukyanov (00:23:15):

conflict to be over.

Lukyanov (00:23:20):

Whether Trump can deliver,

Lukyanov (00:23:21):

that's the question,

Lukyanov (00:23:22):

because regardless what Putin believes or not believes,

Lukyanov (00:23:29):

we see that Trump is more or less in control or in full control of the system in

Lukyanov (00:23:35):

the United States,

Lukyanov (00:23:37):

at least until the midterm elections.

Lukyanov (00:23:42):

But at the same time,

Lukyanov (00:23:44):

we see that Trump cannot impose conditions on Europeans and Ukrainians,

Lukyanov (00:23:52):

even despite the fact that both of them,

Lukyanov (00:23:54):

especially Ukrainians,

Lukyanov (00:23:55):

are very much dependent on the United States.

Lukyanov (00:23:58):

But despite this, the capacity, the might of the United States is limited.

Lukyanov (00:24:06):

And I think it's quite an interesting phenomenon,

Lukyanov (00:24:08):

so putting aside the particular story about this war.

Lukyanov (00:24:16):

But in general,

Lukyanov (00:24:17):

we see on the one hand that the United States is able to do things which no one

Lukyanov (00:24:22):

else can do.

Lukyanov (00:24:25):

like in Venezuela and others.

Lukyanov (00:24:27):

But at the same time,

Lukyanov (00:24:28):

more and more at different occasions,

Lukyanov (00:24:31):

we see that the power of the United States is huge,

Lukyanov (00:24:34):

but it's limited.

Lukyanov (00:24:36):

A very clear example is China,

Lukyanov (00:24:39):

and the whole tariff story,

Lukyanov (00:24:43):

tariff attempts to put pressure actually ended up in something completely

Lukyanov (00:24:48):

different.

Lukyanov (00:24:51):

And another part of this is Ukraine, because with all its might, with all its range of leverage,

Lukyanov (00:25:00):

Trump cannot force Ukraine to accept what he probably would like them to accept,

Lukyanov (00:25:06):

what Putin is proposing.

Hovik (00:25:09):

Right.

Asbed (00:25:11):

Okay, let's turn our attention southward to Iran.

Asbed (00:25:17):

Since the 12-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025,

Asbed (00:25:19):

Tehran has moved fast to close its defense gaps that the strikes exposed.

Asbed (00:25:26):

It has pushed deeper defense coordination with Russia and China,

Asbed (00:25:29):

and it has worked to rebuild air defenses and restock missiles,

Asbed (00:25:33):

preparing for what many analysts describe as a likely second round.

Asbed (00:25:38):

Netanyahu has raised the idea of renewed strikes in 2026 directly with Trump.

Asbed (00:25:42):

He was talking to him,

Asbed (00:25:43):

I think,

Asbed (00:25:44):

I can't remember if it was before the new year or after the new year.

Asbed (00:25:47):

He was here in Washington, D.C.

Asbed (00:25:50):

Yeah.

Asbed (00:25:52):

And essentially,

Asbed (00:25:53):

Trump has signaled that he could back new attacks if Iran rebuilds its ballistic

Asbed (00:25:57):

missile or nuclear programs.

Asbed (00:25:59):

Iran's foreign minister says Iran does not want war,

Asbed (00:26:02):

but it's ready to defend itself if it is attacked.

Asbed (00:26:05):

And Iran's president in December said that Iran is in a full scale war, actually.

Asbed (00:26:11):

In previous discussions with you,

Asbed (00:26:13):

you have indicated,

Asbed (00:26:14):

just like other analysts,

Asbed (00:26:15):

that you were surprised how

Asbed (00:26:18):

unprepared Iran was to face Israeli attacks.

Asbed (00:26:22):

So at this point, is a second Israeli attack inevitable on Iran?

Asbed (00:26:28):

And do you think that Iran is going to be ready or is ready this time?

Lukyanov (00:26:33):

First of all, yes, indeed, I was surprised that Iran was pretty badly prepared for the war.

Lukyanov (00:26:41):

But having said that, we must admit that the main goal of attackers has been achieved.

Lukyanov (00:26:51):

Iranian state, Iranian regime survived.

Lukyanov (00:26:56):

Iranian state and Iranian regime managed to deliver significant blow to Israel, significant.

Lukyanov (00:27:03):

And I think that despite all statements from the Israeli side that it was a fantastic victory.

Lukyanov (00:27:09):

And so I guess that they learned a couple of lessons and they understood that it

Lukyanov (00:27:15):

was more complicated than probably they expected.

Lukyanov (00:27:20):

So in this regard,

Lukyanov (00:27:22):

I think, first of all,

Lukyanov (00:27:23):

Iran demonstrated a higher degree of resilience,

Lukyanov (00:27:30):

despite all weaknesses inside,

Lukyanov (00:27:32):

which are obvious,

Lukyanov (00:27:33):

but demonstrated a higher degree of resilience than people could expect.

Lukyanov (00:27:38):

Secondly, of course, Iran learned a couple of lessons after that.

Lukyanov (00:27:42):

And I think that they, yes, as you said, they made the big efforts to close those gaps.

Lukyanov (00:27:51):

And that means, from my point of view,

Lukyanov (00:27:52):

again,

Lukyanov (00:27:53):

I haven't been to Iran since quite a while,

Lukyanov (00:27:56):

but I think that they are much more

Lukyanov (00:28:01):

not only prepared for something coming,

Lukyanov (00:28:05):

but also they know how to play this game of bluffing,

Lukyanov (00:28:10):

because now I think both sides are bluffing.

Lukyanov (00:28:12):

Netanyahu is bluffing as well,

Lukyanov (00:28:15):

because whatever they say,

Lukyanov (00:28:16):

whatever Israel is stating,

Lukyanov (00:28:19):

and of course Israel demonstrated a lot of significant achievements in the last

Lukyanov (00:28:24):

year,

Lukyanov (00:28:25):

but still their capacity is limited as well.

Lukyanov (00:28:28):

It's not endless.

Lukyanov (00:28:30):

So I think that now this dancing around hypothetical war,

Lukyanov (00:28:38):

which actually none side wants to start,

Lukyanov (00:28:42):

will continue.

Lukyanov (00:28:44):

What is probably more important,

Lukyanov (00:28:47):

especially at this stage when we see a lot of protests and even partial riots in

Lukyanov (00:28:52):

Iran against the economic hardship and partially against the regime,

Lukyanov (00:28:58):

That's an all good attempt to undermine Iran from the inside,

Lukyanov (00:29:06):

not through the military operation,

Lukyanov (00:29:09):

but through other means.

Lukyanov (00:29:11):

Again, I don't know what is happening there.

Lukyanov (00:29:14):

You can listen to Israeli and Western commentators who say almost that Iran is on

Lukyanov (00:29:20):

the brink of collapsing.

Lukyanov (00:29:23):

You can listen to Iranian people.

Lukyanov (00:29:25):

For example,

Lukyanov (00:29:26):

my counterparts whom I know,

Lukyanov (00:29:29):

they say, yes,

Lukyanov (00:29:30):

it's a difficult situation,

Lukyanov (00:29:31):

but of course don't believe what they say.

Lukyanov (00:29:33):

It's absolutely not that bad and so on.

Lukyanov (00:29:36):

I think that we might suggest that actually Iran is resilient enough to survive

Lukyanov (00:29:43):

another wave of social unrest because of economic problems.

Lukyanov (00:29:49):

But, of course, the general situation is not improving there.

Lukyanov (00:29:54):

And so I guess that the next stages in this controversy will be not so much about

Lukyanov (00:30:04):

the military pressure.

Lukyanov (00:30:06):

And you're right that both Russia and China contributed...

Lukyanov (00:30:12):

something, at least after that war, to strengthen, to re-strengthen Iranian defense capacity.

Lukyanov (00:30:19):

But neither China nor Russia can improve the internal situation in Iran,

Lukyanov (00:30:25):

because it's something else.

Lukyanov (00:30:28):

And I guess that that will be the main field for confrontation.

Lukyanov (00:30:37):

And it's not a big surprise that what happened in Venezuela immediately has been

Lukyanov (00:30:44):

used by Iranian opponents to say,

Lukyanov (00:30:46):

look,

Lukyanov (00:30:47):

we need to find creative ways to undermine this regime.

Lukyanov (00:30:52):

And I guess that Israel and Israeli security services,

Lukyanov (00:30:57):

they,

Lukyanov (00:30:58):

of course, will work hard to find those ways without direct military attack.

Asbed (00:31:03):

Actually, the level of infiltration by the Mossad was something that we talked about.

Asbed (00:31:09):

And I was referring to with Iran being somewhat not ready to withstand the attacks.

Asbed (00:31:15):

But I think they've dealt with a significant amount of that issue.

Asbed (00:31:19):

That was, by the way, that conversation was right after Iran.

Asbed (00:31:23):

the June War.

Asbed (00:31:24):

And that was episode 477.

Asbed (00:31:25):

For our listeners, if you want to go check it out, it's podcasts.Groong.org/477.

Asbed (00:31:32):

Basically, you can check out our conversation with Mr. Lukyanov.

Asbed (00:31:36):

But that brings me to another question, because at that conversation, you said that Russia

Asbed (00:31:42):

You know, Iran is a very important ally, but Russia might not get involved militarily.

Asbed (00:31:46):

And you indicated Russia's interests in the region are very diversified.

Asbed (00:31:50):

Does that calculus change at all in light of Venezuela?

Asbed (00:31:55):

I'm kind of trying to understand at what point it becomes important enough for

Asbed (00:32:00):

Russia to get involved or at least to try and stop one of its allies or partners

Asbed (00:32:06):

from being attacked.

Lukyanov (00:32:11):

As we discussed already at that occasion Russian capacity to to do

Lukyanov (00:32:20):

something to operate is of course limited by the Ukrainian war and as long as this

Lukyanov (00:32:29):

conflict continues Russia will not be deeply involved in any other major

Lukyanov (00:32:39):

stories strategic or even tactically maybe tactically but but also in a limited to

Lukyanov (00:32:48):

the limited scope in general I think that we in Russia are moving pretty slowly and

Lukyanov (00:33:02):

with a lot of internal hesitations

Lukyanov (00:33:09):

But we are moving towards a new evaluation of the whole area,

Lukyanov (00:33:17):

of the whole Eurasian area,

Lukyanov (00:33:19):

of the neighborhoods,

Lukyanov (00:33:20):

all of them.

Lukyanov (00:33:24):

Because whatever people think about the past,

Lukyanov (00:33:29):

the Soviet Union,

Lukyanov (00:33:30):

the post-Soviet period when Russia was the ultimate dominance in the area,

Lukyanov (00:33:39):

but this period is over.

Lukyanov (00:33:41):

So this year, we will mark 35 years since Soviet Union collapsed.

Lukyanov (00:33:49):

And that's enough.

Lukyanov (00:33:51):

time to, so to say, say farewell to the previous perception and to formulate something new.

Lukyanov (00:34:00):

And those attempts already started,

Lukyanov (00:34:03):

both on the intellectual level,

Lukyanov (00:34:06):

among experts like myself,

Lukyanov (00:34:08):

and even on the official level.

Lukyanov (00:34:12):

I cannot say what the conclusion will be, but the late motive of all

Lukyanov (00:34:19):

those discussions is, of course, the realization that Russian resources are limited.

Lukyanov (00:34:28):

We need to choose priorities.

Lukyanov (00:34:31):

And among priorities,

Lukyanov (00:34:33):

we need to make a hierarchy,

Lukyanov (00:34:35):

which is more important,

Lukyanov (00:34:36):

which is less important.

Lukyanov (00:34:37):

And in this regard,

Lukyanov (00:34:39):

I think that this year and maybe a couple of years after,

Lukyanov (00:34:43):

at the backdrop of enormous changes everywhere,

Lukyanov (00:34:49):

we will see the gradual shift of Russian approaches.

Lukyanov (00:34:54):

In general,

Lukyanov (00:34:55):

so here I don't mean any region particularly,

Lukyanov (00:34:58):

but in general,

Lukyanov (00:34:59):

the process has started and it will lead to some conclusions.

Lukyanov (00:35:05):

When it comes to Iran,

Lukyanov (00:35:06):

and then probably for you,

Lukyanov (00:35:08):

it's the most important is the whole region with Armenia included.

Lukyanov (00:35:15):

Southern Caucasus and so on.

Lukyanov (00:35:18):

I think that the prioritization of this region will remain on the very high level.

Lukyanov (00:35:25):

Because putting aside a lot of emotions,

Lukyanov (00:35:30):

which we inherited from the past,

Lukyanov (00:35:33):

putting aside some ideological views or...

Lukyanov (00:35:40):

I don't know how to call it,

Lukyanov (00:35:42):

but of course,

Lukyanov (00:35:43):

the objectively,

Lukyanov (00:35:44):

the transportation routes from the north to the south,

Lukyanov (00:35:51):

Under any circumstance,

Lukyanov (00:35:52):

whoever will be in place in Armenia,

Lukyanov (00:35:56):

in Iran, in Azerbaijan,

Lukyanov (00:35:57):

in India,

Lukyanov (00:35:59):

but this is something which will define a lot for Russia in the 21st century.

Lukyanov (00:36:05):

And that's why I believe that Russia will,

Lukyanov (00:36:08):

step by step,

Lukyanov (00:36:09):

become much more flexible and pragmatic vis-a-vis all those partners.

Asbed (00:36:14):

I am simply concerned that as long as,

Asbed (00:36:17):

for example, the EU can funnel money into keeping Ukraine fighting,

Asbed (00:36:21):

that means they can paralyze Russia into that one theater and keep Russia

Asbed (00:36:29):

inert in the other theaters.

Asbed (00:36:31):

Well, in my opinion, things only get worse over time.

Asbed (00:36:36):

We have seen, for example,

Asbed (00:36:37):

the C5 plus one agreements that were made in Washington about two months ago,

Asbed (00:36:43):

I think, where Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian countries signed many agreements with

Asbed (00:36:49):

the United States about natural resources,

Asbed (00:36:51):

minerals and such.

Asbed (00:36:53):

And of course, there are agreements with Russia as well.

Asbed (00:36:56):

But as NATO starts infiltrating into Central Asia,

Asbed (00:37:00):

that's probably not a very good thing for Russia.

Lukyanov (00:37:03):

Yeah, that's for sure.

Lukyanov (00:37:04):

But at the same time, we should be a little bit more calm.

Lukyanov (00:37:10):

And here, I used to say it here as well all the time.

Lukyanov (00:37:14):

Because yes,

Lukyanov (00:37:15):

indeed, the C5 plus one or other formats with the participation of Americans or this

Lukyanov (00:37:23):

corridor Trump route.

Lukyanov (00:37:27):

Right.

Lukyanov (00:37:28):

Yeah, and so on.

Lukyanov (00:37:29):

For peace and prosperity, of course.

Lukyanov (00:37:30):

Peace and prosperity, of course, yeah.

Hovik (00:37:32):

Don't forget international.

Lukyanov (00:37:35):

You know,

Lukyanov (00:37:36):

if we start to dig in,

Lukyanov (00:37:42):

then of course a lot of it,

Lukyanov (00:37:44):

not everything,

Lukyanov (00:37:45):

but a lot of it is just PR.

Lukyanov (00:37:49):

Uzbekistan promised to invest billions of dollars in the U.S.

Lukyanov (00:37:54):

economy.

Asbed (00:37:55):

It did.

Asbed (00:37:56):

It was like 115 billion or something like that.

Lukyanov (00:37:58):

Uzbekistan will invest in the United States.

Lukyanov (00:38:04):

I asked a friend of mine who is quite an important person in Tashkent, why do you do it?

Lukyanov (00:38:12):

He said, oh, come on.

Lukyanov (00:38:15):

That's for many, many decades.

Lukyanov (00:38:17):

Something will happen.

Lukyanov (00:38:19):

Of course, we have no money.

Lukyanov (00:38:20):

We will not do it.

Lukyanov (00:38:21):

But they need, Trump needs this sign to show that, look.

Lukyanov (00:38:28):

So what I mean is that not everything which is being proclaimed,

Lukyanov (00:38:33):

be it C5 plus one or Armenian-Azerbaijan-US,

Lukyanov (00:38:38):

not everything will be implemented,

Lukyanov (00:38:40):

to put it in mind.

Hovik (00:38:43):

Let's come back to the TRIPP.

Hovik (00:38:46):

We're talking about transportation corridors.

Hovik (00:38:49):

We talked in June, and since that time, for our listeners, the U.S.

Hovik (00:38:54):

role has, at least on paper and in media, expanded in the South Caucasus.

Hovik (00:39:01):

In August, Pashinyan and Aliyev were at the White House, and they...

Hovik (00:39:06):

It initialed what was presented as a peace framework that is yet to be signed.

Hovik (00:39:12):

There are many preconditions for it to be signed yet.

Hovik (00:39:15):

But at the same time, Pashinyan endorsed a US-Armenia project branded TRIPP.

Hovik (00:39:21):

Trump route for international peace and prosperity.

Hovik (00:39:23):

Azerbaijan continues to describe this as a Zangezur corridor.

Hovik (00:39:27):

And frankly, I believe we should call a spade a spade.

Hovik (00:39:30):

And to me,

Hovik (00:39:32):

that is, you know,

Hovik (00:39:33):

when you look at the principles behind it,

Hovik (00:39:35):

it seems to be identical to what the Azeris and the Turks want.

Hovik (00:39:40):

But this concept overlaps with the transport provisions of 0.9 of the November 2020

Hovik (00:39:47):

ceasefire statement that Pashinyan signed with Aliyev and Mr.

Hovik (00:39:51):

Putin.

Hovik (00:39:52):

Russian officials, including President Putin, Deputy Minister Overchuk,

Hovik (00:39:57):

have recently reiterated that Moscow views those 2020 commitments as still in force

Hovik (00:40:04):

and expects to be involved in any unblocking of routes in Armenia's south.

Hovik (00:40:11):

We should mention that Russian railways has a concession and operates in the south

Hovik (00:40:16):

in Armenia,

Hovik (00:40:17):

and that will be important in our discussion a little bit later.

Hovik (00:40:21):

But to be honest,

Hovik (00:40:24):

this came a little bit as a surprise to me because until now,

Hovik (00:40:30):

it seemed that Russians had backed away from the November 9 crisis.

Hovik (00:40:34):

2020 statement because everything else in that statement didn't materialize.

Hovik (00:40:40):

So what are the Russian expectations when it comes to unblocking the east-west

Hovik (00:40:45):

communications or what is called the middle corridor,

Hovik (00:40:49):

you know,

Hovik (00:40:50):

TRIPP and so forth?

Hovik (00:40:51):

What does Russia expect to do in this formula?

Lukyanov (00:40:59):

You know,

Lukyanov (00:41:00):

I think that the main priority for Russia,

Lukyanov (00:41:03):

which I mentioned earlier,

Lukyanov (00:41:06):

is that the transport capacities

Lukyanov (00:41:15):

unifying the northern part of Eurasia with the southern part of Eurasia would be developed.

Lukyanov (00:41:23):

And actually, for Russia, almost any option is fine.

Lukyanov (00:41:30):

so the okay Russia might play bigger or smaller role but just geographically

Lukyanov (00:41:35):

geostrategically Russia occupies the place which makes it almost impossible to to

Lukyanov (00:41:42):

bypass to the our territory and our capabilities so when it comes to this peace

Lukyanov (00:41:53):

and prosperity stuff again i think that many people here

Lukyanov (00:42:00):

actually expect this project to to be slow not to develop too fast and of course we

Lukyanov (00:42:11):

see that the attention of the American leadership is

Lukyanov (00:42:22):

That's quite a short span, so they cannot focus too long.

Lukyanov (00:42:28):

Trump, for sure, but following him, also the apparatus.

Lukyanov (00:42:33):

Of course, there are strategic interests which will be pursued by the deep state or whatever

Lukyanov (00:42:38):

the state structures in the United States.

Lukyanov (00:42:41):

But anyway, Trump is hyperactive.

Lukyanov (00:42:46):

The White House with him is hyperactive,

Lukyanov (00:42:48):

and they cannot,

Lukyanov (00:42:51):

so to say,

Lukyanov (00:42:52):

follow and push all projects at the same time.

Lukyanov (00:42:57):

And we see that priorities are changing.

Lukyanov (00:43:02):

Why Russia reminds this paper,

Lukyanov (00:43:06):

this memorandum,

Lukyanov (00:43:07):

this document,

Lukyanov (00:43:09):

which, as you rightly said,

Lukyanov (00:43:11):

is almost irrelevant in many other points,

Lukyanov (00:43:15):

I think simply because it's important to remind that Russia is there and there are

Lukyanov (00:43:23):

interests which remain.

Lukyanov (00:43:25):

And if now everybody is fascinated with something else,

Lukyanov (00:43:33):

it does not mean that the previous ideas and agreements totally disappeared.

Lukyanov (00:43:40):

And it might happen that the current fascination can go away and suddenly some

Lukyanov (00:43:47):

other instruments will be demanded.

Lukyanov (00:43:51):

In general, I think, again, maybe I'm not that deep in this issue, but I think that...

Lukyanov (00:43:59):

Of course, Russia understands very well,

Lukyanov (00:44:00):

and that's what Asbed asked in the previous question,

Lukyanov (00:44:06):

that Russia is so much occupied with Ukraine,

Lukyanov (00:44:10):

and things are going,

Lukyanov (00:44:15):

whatever we do,

Lukyanov (00:44:16):

but there are a lot of processes and trends around.

Lukyanov (00:44:20):

And that's correct.

Lukyanov (00:44:22):

That's absolutely correct.

Lukyanov (00:44:24):

But at the same time,

Lukyanov (00:44:26):

the dynamics in the Southern Caucasus,

Lukyanov (00:44:29):

including,

Lukyanov (00:44:30):

by the way,

Lukyanov (00:44:31):

the approaches by Azerbaijan,

Lukyanov (00:44:36):

And despite attempts on the Russian side,

Lukyanov (00:44:39):

and Putin in particular personally,

Lukyanov (00:44:42):

to overcome this crisis of last year,

Lukyanov (00:44:46):

which started,

Lukyanov (00:44:48):

or rather,

Lukyanov (00:44:49):

which got visible because of this plane crash,

Lukyanov (00:44:55):

But it didn't work so well, because we see that the rhetorics of Baku didn't change much.

Lukyanov (00:45:03):

Yes, it's slightly better now, but in fact, nothing changed.

Lukyanov (00:45:11):

And if so,

Lukyanov (00:45:13):

then we see that the Azerbaijani leadership,

Lukyanov (00:45:17):

they actually are extremely self-confident,

Lukyanov (00:45:21):

to put it in a polite way.

Lukyanov (00:45:25):

And this self-confidence might be displayed not only vis-a-vis Russia,

Lukyanov (00:45:31):

but by the way,

Lukyanov (00:45:32):

vis-a-vis Turkey as well.

Lukyanov (00:45:34):

Paradoxically,

Lukyanov (00:45:35):

but we can imagine that relationship is not that easy either between those two

Lukyanov (00:45:40):

leaders.

Lukyanov (00:45:42):

To make a long story short,

Lukyanov (00:45:44):

I think that,

Lukyanov (00:45:45):

yes,

Lukyanov (00:45:46):

indeed, it's not a good situation that Russia is tied by something else.

Lukyanov (00:45:51):

But some processes are not linear.

Lukyanov (00:45:56):

They might go in circles.

Lukyanov (00:45:59):

And with this peace and prosperity stuff, I would imagine that it would be possible as well.

Hovik (00:46:10):

You mentioned north-south communication several times.

Hovik (00:46:13):

We know that Azerbaijan is the primary route for north-south, especially rail communication.

Hovik (00:46:23):

I think that Armenia has been viewed in the past as a secondary backup route,

Hovik (00:46:29):

and you also mentioned the current strain in Russian and Azerbaijani relations.

Hovik (00:46:35):

Are you concerned that the TRIPP would be used as a means to

Hovik (00:46:42):

further blockade,

Hovik (00:46:44):

not actually open communications,

Hovik (00:46:45):

but further blockade north or constrict north and south communication,

Hovik (00:46:50):

especially where Armenia is concerned.

Hovik (00:46:53):

And is that,

Hovik (00:46:54):

you know,

Hovik (00:46:57):

you mentioned that Russia is okay with any sort of almost any format,

Hovik (00:47:01):

but we see that Azerbaijan,

Hovik (00:47:04):

I mean, there are a lot of questions that remain to be answered,

Hovik (00:47:07):

right? You know, if Azerbaijan has exclusive

Hovik (00:47:12):

unimpeded access through this corridor,

Hovik (00:47:16):

I mean, how is north-south traffic prioritized if it's at Azerbaijan's will to dictate the

Hovik (00:47:27):

communication on this corridor?

Lukyanov (00:47:29):

Yes, indeed.

Lukyanov (00:47:31):

We live in a new world where,

Lukyanov (00:47:34):

according to President Trump and many other speakers,

Lukyanov (00:47:42):

in particular from the United States,

Lukyanov (00:47:45):

each country,

Lukyanov (00:47:46):

each leader does what it or he can.

Lukyanov (00:47:55):

And that's it.

Lukyanov (00:47:56):

If you can, do it.

Lukyanov (00:47:57):

If you can't, shut up.

Lukyanov (00:48:00):

And yes, unfortunately, it's not unique.

Lukyanov (00:48:04):

So we remember periods in history when it worked exactly in this way.

Lukyanov (00:48:10):

But when it comes to the contemporary world and when it comes to such thing as

Lukyanov (00:48:17):

communications,

Lukyanov (00:48:19):

be it information or logistics or whatever,

Lukyanov (00:48:25):

it's not ninth century.

Lukyanov (00:48:27):

It's not Monroe Doctrine world.

Lukyanov (00:48:30):

And whatever Russia,

Lukyanov (00:48:33):

Turkey,

Lukyanov (00:48:34):

Iran,

Lukyanov (00:48:35):

Azerbaijan,

Lukyanov (00:48:36):

Armenia are trying to push,

Lukyanov (00:48:42):

maybe believing that it corresponds to their national interests,

Lukyanov (00:48:50):

at the end of the day,

Lukyanov (00:48:52):

everything will fail because in general,

Lukyanov (00:48:56):

it's a complex system,

Lukyanov (00:48:58):

interconnected system.

Lukyanov (00:49:00):

you cannot block others from participating expecting that only you will exert

Lukyanov (00:49:13):

dividends it will not work it will not work with the countries like Azerbaijan or

Lukyanov (00:49:20):

turkey it will not work even with the united states i'm pretty sure that's the

Lukyanov (00:49:25):

difference between

Lukyanov (00:49:28):

post-globalized world and pre-globalized world.

Lukyanov (00:49:32):

Because pre-globalized world was much more state-centric.

Lukyanov (00:49:38):

And now,

Lukyanov (00:49:39):

yes,

Lukyanov (00:49:40):

indeed,

Lukyanov (00:49:41):

and what we hear from Trump and even from Russia,

Lukyanov (00:49:43):

from Moscow,

Lukyanov (00:49:44):

from Putin,

Lukyanov (00:49:45):

that's again the rhetoric that state matters and the states as the structural units

Lukyanov (00:49:53):

of the international system are back,

Lukyanov (00:49:55):

which is correct.

Lukyanov (00:49:56):

But those states are different and the environment is different.

Lukyanov (00:50:00):

So the post-globalization is not globalization anymore,

Lukyanov (00:50:05):

liberal globalization,

Lukyanov (00:50:06):

but it's not the pre-globalized world either.

Lukyanov (00:50:10):

So sorry for this very vague description,

Lukyanov (00:50:13):

but what I mean is that whatever Azerbaijan is trying to do or any other potential

Lukyanov (00:50:20):

members of this cooperation,

Lukyanov (00:50:22):

at the end of the day,

Lukyanov (00:50:24):

no one will succeed without others.

Hovik (00:50:27):

Yeah.

Hovik (00:50:29):

OK,

Hovik (00:50:30):

in 2025,

Hovik (00:50:31):

Pashinyan's government has imprisoned many opposition leaders,

Hovik (00:50:34):

as well as influential businessmen not aligned with their ruling party.

Hovik (00:50:38):

For example,

Hovik (00:50:39):

Samvel Karapetyan,

Hovik (00:50:40):

who holds Russian citizenship in addition to his Armenian citizenship,

Hovik (00:50:45):

who owns or used to own the electric networks of Armenia,

Hovik (00:50:49):

which has been nationalized or taken away from him.

Hovik (00:50:55):

Pashinyan is also escalating his campaign against the Armenian church.

Hovik (00:51:00):

In Armenia,

Hovik (00:51:02):

anyone in the opposition,

Hovik (00:51:03):

anyone in the church is classified as a Russian asset,

Hovik (00:51:09):

Russian puppet,

Hovik (00:51:10):

Russian agent.

Hovik (00:51:12):

And in fact, Armenia went to the EU recently to request assistance from the EU,

Hovik (00:51:20):

from Kaja Kallas,

Hovik (00:51:21):

of all people,

Hovik (00:51:22):

to help Armenia like it did in Moldova and help Armenia fight against,

Hovik (00:51:28):

what was it,

Hovik (00:51:31):

malign influences and hybrid warfare.

Hovik (00:51:36):

So anyway, the parliamentary elections are in June.

Hovik (00:51:39):

It's very interesting because many in Armenia are asking this question,

Hovik (00:51:47):

why doesn't, for instance,

Hovik (00:51:48):

the Russian church,

Hovik (00:51:50):

even at the church level,

Hovik (00:51:51):

why doesn't the Russian church support the Armenian church?

Hovik (00:51:56):

But I was thinking about that,

Hovik (00:51:57):

and I said, okay, well, if it did,

Hovik (00:51:58):

then they would say,

Hovik (00:51:59):

aha, so the church is an agent of the Russian,

Hovik (00:52:04):

is controlled by Russia.

Hovik (00:52:05):

But in reality,

Hovik (00:52:09):

involvement from Russia has been very hands-off I mean Russia has been completely

Hovik (00:52:13):

not involved so far in armenian internal politics does the outcome of the

Hovik (00:52:22):

elections in June 2026 matter for Russia and what is Russia

Hovik (00:52:31):

Is Russia okay to see,

Hovik (00:52:33):

for instance,

Hovik (00:52:34):

another Moldova scenario being unrolled in Armenia right now?

Lukyanov (00:52:42):

First of all,

Lukyanov (00:52:44):

I don't think that any scenario of another country can be repeated somewhere else.

Lukyanov (00:52:55):

So we can find some similarities,

Lukyanov (00:52:58):

but in general,

Lukyanov (00:52:59):

there is a very different situation in Moldova and Armenia.

Lukyanov (00:53:04):

With all due respect to Moldova,

Lukyanov (00:53:06):

I think that Armenia is a little bit sounder state than Moldova.

Lukyanov (00:53:11):

As for Russian indifference or what looks like indifference, you know, I don't know.

Lukyanov (00:53:18):

I'm not involved in this.

Lukyanov (00:53:20):

I don't know whether there are any agents or actors who participate in some

Lukyanov (00:53:27):

activities inside the Armenian political life,

Lukyanov (00:53:32):

but I can say one thing.

Lukyanov (00:53:35):

If we look at the whole period

Lukyanov (00:53:40):

after collapse of the Soviet Union, almost 35 years now.

Lukyanov (00:53:46):

To be frank,

Lukyanov (00:53:47):

to be honest,

Lukyanov (00:53:49):

can we find any successful example of Russia intervening in other countries'

Lukyanov (00:53:59):

domestic situation and achieving goals which it wanted?

Lukyanov (00:54:04):

No,

Lukyanov (00:54:06):

because there were,

Lukyanov (00:54:09):

during all those years,

Lukyanov (00:54:10):

there were regime change or there were changes,

Lukyanov (00:54:13):

shifts, political shifts in particular countries,

Lukyanov (00:54:16):

which were in favor of Russia.

Lukyanov (00:54:19):

For example,

Lukyanov (00:54:20):

Yushchenko in Ukraine was replaced by Yanukovich,

Lukyanov (00:54:23):

or Gamsakhurdia was replaced by Shevardnadze or somebody else.

Lukyanov (00:54:31):

Even Aliyev, Geydar Aliyev.

Lukyanov (00:54:33):

Heydar Aliyev came after Elchibey, which was, of course, much better for all in that situation.

Lukyanov (00:54:41):

But none of those cases was...

Lukyanov (00:54:45):

because of Russian interference.

Lukyanov (00:54:47):

That was a development in countries.

Lukyanov (00:54:50):

Yes, we had a couple of examples when Russia tried to influence elections in other countries.

Lukyanov (00:54:58):

In Ukraine,

Lukyanov (00:54:59):

it was 2004,

Lukyanov (00:55:01):

if you remember the Orange Revolution,

Lukyanov (00:55:03):

Putin openly supported Yanukovich and lost.

Lukyanov (00:55:10):

Maybe the only case when Russian position played a role was Belarus 2020,

Lukyanov (00:55:18):

when Putin clearly said that in case of overthrown of Lukashenko,

Lukyanov (00:55:25):

Russia would intervene militarily.

Lukyanov (00:55:28):

He just said he didn't do anything.

Lukyanov (00:55:30):

And that was enough to calm down situation there.

Lukyanov (00:55:33):

But that is unique case.

Lukyanov (00:55:35):

In all other cases,

Lukyanov (00:55:37):

Russia didn't intervene or if it did it would be better not to do so that's my deep

Lukyanov (00:55:46):

deep conviction that it's not our way to operate unfortunately we are not Kaja Kallas

Lukyanov (00:55:54):

we are not brits British not Americans we we were not um we we don't master those

Lukyanov (00:56:03):

skills

Lukyanov (00:56:05):

Coming back to Armenian situation, of course, for Russia, it's important.

Lukyanov (00:56:11):

I don't think that Prime Minister Pashinyan enjoys a lot of love and trust in

Lukyanov (00:56:21):

Russian corridors because of his...

Lukyanov (00:56:31):

changing rhetorics depending on the situation he speaks.

Lukyanov (00:56:38):

He says one kind of things in Moscow or St.

Lukyanov (00:56:42):

Petersburg.

Lukyanov (00:56:43):

He says completely opposite things in Brussels or in Washington or wherever.

Lukyanov (00:56:51):

But the question is, has Russia enough leverage

Lukyanov (00:56:59):

to support forces, which probably would be seen as more convenient.

Lukyanov (00:57:05):

I'm not sure, unfortunately.

Lukyanov (00:57:07):

I know that in Armenia,

Lukyanov (00:57:08):

many people have this idea that if only Russia wanted,

Lukyanov (00:57:15):

then Pashinyan would be overthrown.

Lukyanov (00:57:20):

I'm afraid that's an illusion.

Lukyanov (00:57:22):

Sorry to say it,

Lukyanov (00:57:23):

but...

Lukyanov (00:57:24):

And of course,

Lukyanov (00:57:25):

it depends on the scale of...

Lukyanov (00:57:28):

If we talk about Moldovan scenario,

Lukyanov (00:57:31):

Moldovan scenario was very remarkable because all manipulations were made to

Lukyanov (00:57:37):

achieve a very particular result.

Lukyanov (00:57:40):

and supported by Europe, of course, because that result was in interest of the European Union.

Lukyanov (00:57:46):

To what scale this election will be rigged in the same way in Armenia as in Moldova

Lukyanov (00:57:52):

last year,

Lukyanov (00:57:53):

I don't know.

Lukyanov (00:57:54):

It's up to you to judge whether it's possible or not.

Lukyanov (00:57:58):

But of course,

Lukyanov (00:57:59):

depending on the scale of this alleged manipulations,

Lukyanov (00:58:02):

I think the position of Russia might alter.

Hovik (00:58:06):

Now, for instance,

Hovik (00:58:07):

one of the anticipated activities that people are talking about is a potential

Hovik (00:58:14):

banning of political parties in Armenia and banning of the participation of Salvat

Hovik (00:58:20):

Karapetian, who currently is enjoying high,

Hovik (00:58:24):

you know,

Hovik (00:58:28):

So, you know,

Hovik (00:58:30):

what tools does Russia have in terms of,

Hovik (00:58:34):

you know,

Hovik (00:58:36):

or could Russia do anything if that happens?

Hovik (00:58:38):

Like if the Armenian government alleges that anyone in the Armenian opposition,

Hovik (00:58:43):

like the most,

Hovik (00:58:44):

the biggest parties are Russian agents and therefore bans them simply from

Hovik (00:58:49):

participation.

Hovik (00:58:50):

I mean, it doesn't seem like Russia...

Hovik (00:58:54):

So-called democracy promotion has been a tool set of Russian foreign policy

Hovik (00:59:01):

explicitly,

Hovik (00:59:02):

but what would be the Russian response to that kind of an event?

Lukyanov (00:59:08):

Frankly, I don't know.

Lukyanov (00:59:11):

Yes, democracy promotion is not a fashionable thing at all anymore.

Lukyanov (00:59:16):

Not just in Russia, but everywhere.

Asbed (00:59:22):

Well, at least the hypocrisy level is a lot less,

Asbed (00:59:25):

because what happens in the name of democracy between Europe and the United States

Asbed (00:59:30):

is...

Asbed (00:59:31):

It's a different scale from where we see from Russia.

Lukyanov (00:59:35):

Absolutely, absolutely.

Lukyanov (00:59:37):

I think that,

Lukyanov (00:59:38):

of course,

Lukyanov (00:59:39):

Russia has leverage,

Lukyanov (00:59:41):

but the question is,

Lukyanov (00:59:46):

the traditional means to stop trade,

Lukyanov (00:59:51):

to stop or to higher gas prices,

Lukyanov (00:59:57):

which we saw before in case of Ukraine,

Lukyanov (01:00:00):

in case of Moldova,

Lukyanov (01:00:01):

by the way,

Lukyanov (01:00:02):

not recently, but before.

Lukyanov (01:00:05):

Did it work?

Lukyanov (01:00:07):

Maybe to some extent,

Lukyanov (01:00:09):

yes, but it was the way to punish actually not the ruling group,

Lukyanov (01:00:15):

but people in respective countries.

Lukyanov (01:00:19):

As I understand,

Lukyanov (01:00:21):

it's not about too much sentimentality and sentiments,

Lukyanov (01:00:25):

but it's a very clear understanding that to use those means and through this to

Lukyanov (01:00:35):

basically undermine trust of Armenian people to Russia would not be the great idea.

Lukyanov (01:00:47):

I don't know, maybe some...

Lukyanov (01:00:50):

brilliant minds here would finally arrive to this.

Lukyanov (01:00:55):

But as I know for now, it's not the option which is being discussed.

Lukyanov (01:01:01):

And as for what you asked about,

Lukyanov (01:01:04):

the election which would be rigged,

Lukyanov (01:01:11):

frankly,

Lukyanov (01:01:15):

that's now almost a new normal.

Lukyanov (01:01:18):

To be honest.

Asbed (01:01:20):

Yeah. I mean, if we look at the rhetoric and the money that is flowing from the EU into the

Asbed (01:01:26):

Armenian election system to "prevent foreign influence",

Asbed (01:01:30):

that is the new normal,

Asbed (01:01:31):

I think.

Asbed (01:01:32):

Yeah.

Asbed (01:01:33):

Mr. Lukyanov, let's wrap it up there for today.

Asbed (01:01:36):

Thank you so much for sharing your insights with us.

Asbed (01:01:39):

And we look forward to more conversations in 2026.

Lukyanov (01:01:42):

Always a big pleasure.

Hovik (01:01:44):

This was a great, great discussion, Mr. Lukyanov.

Hovik (01:01:47):

Thank you.

Asbed (01:01:48):

That's our show today.

Asbed (01:01:49):

This episode was recorded on January 8th, 2026.

Asbed (01:01:52):

We've been talking with Mr.

Asbed (01:01:54):

Fyodor Lukyanov,

Asbed (01:01:55):

who is the chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy,

Asbed (01:01:59):

a Russian think tank providing expertise in the foreign policy field.

Asbed (01:02:03):

He is also editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs,

Asbed (01:02:07):

a platform for publication in English and Russian of research in political science

Asbed (01:02:12):

and international relations.

Asbed (01:02:13):

Mr. Lukyanov is also director of research at the Valdai Discussion Club.

Hovik (01:02:18):

Folks, thank you for sticking with us for the show.

Hovik (01:02:22):

I hope you found it as interesting as we did, especially as a listener.

Hovik (01:02:29):

And before we go, I do have one small request.

Hovik (01:02:32):

Hundreds of you listen to us on platforms like Spotify and Apple Podcasts.

Hovik (01:02:37):

If you're one of them, then please take a moment to subscribe.

Hovik (01:02:41):

to our show on those platforms,

Hovik (01:02:43):

even YouTube,

Hovik (01:02:44):

because we have many listeners on YouTube and viewers who simply will watch this

Hovik (01:02:49):

program but not subscribe.

Hovik (01:02:50):

But please don't forget to do that.

Hovik (01:02:52):

That's a great measure of help to us and a way for us to increase our reach and

Hovik (01:02:58):

push our episodes to more people and allow us to grow on all of these platforms.

Asbed (01:03:03):

Podcasts are great, Hovik.

Asbed (01:03:05):

I mean, a lot of people have been moving to video podcasts.

Asbed (01:03:08):

I mean, that's been the big thing in 2025.

Asbed (01:03:10):

And you see platforms like YouTube growing,

Asbed (01:03:14):

but we do have a stable base on Apple Podcasts and Spotify.

Asbed (01:03:19):

Most people don't really think about it,

Asbed (01:03:21):

but you can take us on your drive,

Asbed (01:03:23):

your commute in the morning from work to home,

Asbed (01:03:27):

from home to work,

Asbed (01:03:28):

and you can just listen to us.

Asbed (01:03:29):

You won't be missing anything if you're just watching us talk.

Asbed (01:03:32):

So do that.

Asbed (01:03:33):

We would love to have you download our shows on your Apple Podcasts or on Spotify.

Asbed (01:03:39):

I'm Asbed Bedrossian in Los Angeles.

Hovik (01:03:42):

And I'm Hovik Manucharyan in Yerevan.

Asbed (01:03:44):

We'll talk to you soon, folks.

Head Shot

Asbed Bedrossian

Co-host
Head Shot

Hovik Manucharyan

Co-host
Head Shot

Fyodor Lukyanov (Фёдор Алекса́ндрович Лукья́нов)

Guest

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