Armenian News Network - Groong: Week In Review Podcast

Sergei Melkonian - Syria, Iran Unrest, TRIPP, Armenian Parliamentary Elections | Ep 508, Jan 18, 2026

• Armenian News Network / Groong • Episode 508

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Groong Week in Review - January 18, 2026

Topics:

  • Syria, Kurds, Turkish advance
  • Iran unrest, war postponed
  • TRIPP and sovereignty dispute
  • 2026 elections, foreign influence

Guest: Sergei Melkonian

Hosts:

Episode 508 | Recorded: January 19, 2026

SHOW NOTES: https://podcasts.groong.org/508

VIDEO: https://youtu.be/LDI5e7Tcu8k

#ArmenianNews #Syria #Iran #ZangezurCorridor #TRIPP #Geopolitics


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Asbed (00:00:07):

Hello and welcome to this Armenian News Network Groong Weekend Review for January 18, 2026.

Asbed (00:00:11):

Today we are joined by

Asbed (00:00:15):

Dr. Sergei Melkonian,

Asbed (00:00:16):

a research fellow at APRI Armenia,

Asbed (00:00:18):

a think tank based in Yerevan.

Asbed (00:00:20):

Hello, Dr. Melkonian.

Asbed (00:00:22):

Welcome to the Groong Podcast.

Sergei (00:00:24):

Good evening. Good morning.

Sergei (00:00:25):

It's always a pleasure to be with you.

Hovik (00:00:27):

Voghchuyn, Voghchuyn, Sergei jan.

Asbed (00:00:29):

Sergei, let's talk about Syria before we come to our region in Armenia.

Asbed (00:00:34):

Yesterday and today, we witnessed the continuation of dramatic developments in Syria.

Asbed (00:00:39):

After the apparent U.S.

Asbed (00:00:40):

abandonment of its Kurdish allies,

Asbed (00:00:42):

the Turkish-backed Syrian forces began a rapid advancement into territories held by

Asbed (00:00:47):

the Syrian Democratic Forces,

Asbed (00:00:49):

the SDF,

Asbed (00:00:50):

in the countries Northeast,

Asbed (00:00:51):

the Aleppo region,

Asbed (00:00:52):

Der Zor,

Asbed (00:00:53):

and Raqqa.

Asbed (00:00:55):

Turkish President Erdogan is insisting that a recent ceasefire agreement between

Asbed (00:00:59):

the de facto Syrian government of al-Sharaa,

Asbed (00:01:02):

formerly al-Jolani,

Asbed (00:01:04):

and the SDF be strictly observed.

Asbed (00:01:07):

And of course they would,

Asbed (00:01:08):

because they specifically demand that Kurdish fighters must be disarmed,

Asbed (00:01:12):

Syrian Kurdish fighters be integrated into the Syrian army,

Asbed (00:01:15):

and members of the PKK be extradited from Syria.

Asbed (00:01:20):

Now, supporters of Kurds in Syria are shocked at this development,

Asbed (00:01:23):

but of course,

Asbed (00:01:24):

any Armenian who knows the last 150 years of history would have told you that this

Asbed (00:01:29):

is coming.

Asbed (00:01:31):

In any case,

Asbed (00:01:32):

these developments cannot be understated,

Asbed (00:01:34):

and they constitute a serious blow to Kurdish autonomy in Syria.

Asbed (00:01:38):

Sergei, why did the US abandon its Kurdish allies,

Asbed (00:01:41):

and what is the significance of this development?

Sergei (00:01:45):

That's why I understand.

Sergei (00:01:46):

It's not only about the United States.

Sergei (00:01:49):

It's also about the great powers,

Sergei (00:01:51):

that if we go back a bit to political neorealism,

Sergei (00:01:56):

one of the points of this school is that countries,

Sergei (00:02:01):

they reassess their interests and priorities

Sergei (00:02:05):

according to their resources.

Sergei (00:02:07):

Their resources has changed, and then priorities and interests also may change.

Sergei (00:02:12):

So the story of northeast Syria is close to be similar to our Artsakh story.

Sergei (00:02:21):

When dependency of Russia from Turkey and Azerbaijan increased,

Sergei (00:02:26):

then in Russia there started discussions too.

Sergei (00:02:28):

Maybe we may have a new good ally in Baku rather than in Yerevan, so maybe we should not

Sergei (00:02:35):

interfere in the hard way as we do, etc.

Sergei (00:02:39):

And the same two places.

Sergei (00:02:41):

So the U.S.

Sergei (00:02:42):

umbrella was the strongest one in the Middle East for decades.

Sergei (00:02:48):

And I'll give you an example with actually with the SDF and with how did U.S.

Sergei (00:02:53):

umbrella work eight years ago.

Sergei (00:02:57):

In February 2018,

Sergei (00:03:00):

when PMC Buckner Group continued its advancement to the east,

Sergei (00:03:06):

they tried to reach the oil and gas fields that were under ISIS or under Kurdish

Sergei (00:03:12):

control, etc.

Sergei (00:03:14):

And one day, the US troops, they just destroyed them all.

Sergei (00:03:22):

According to different calculations in Russia,

Sergei (00:03:24):

almost from 300 to 600 PMC Barton Group members were killed.

Sergei (00:03:31):

And they were just one of the best two groups.

Sergei (00:03:36):

So the United States demonstrated that they have red line and they are not going to

Sergei (00:03:43):

state that someone is crossing.

Sergei (00:03:44):

They're just punishing at the moment.

Sergei (00:03:46):

And now,

Sergei (00:03:47):

actually,

Sergei (00:03:48):

the al-Sharaa army,

Sergei (00:03:49):

they just reached exactly the same oil and gas field where eight years before that

Sergei (00:03:56):

other groups were killed.

Sergei (00:04:00):

So now, as we know from Trump's statement, Turkey is one of the best allies who...

Sergei (00:04:08):

change the situation on the ground.

Sergei (00:04:10):

That's why the United States in these issues,

Sergei (00:04:12):

they rely,

Sergei (00:04:14):

Erdogan relies on,

Sergei (00:04:15):

Trump relies on Erdogan.

Sergei (00:04:17):

The same was actually in the South Caucasus.

Sergei (00:04:20):

So there were two proxies for Turkey.

Sergei (00:04:22):

One proxy is Azerbaijan.

Sergei (00:04:24):

The second proxy is al-Sharaa.

Sergei (00:04:26):

They were making pressure.

Sergei (00:04:27):

In case of Azerbaijan, they were making pressure on Armenia.

Sergei (00:04:30):

In case of Syria, al-Sharaa was making pressure on Turkey.

Sergei (00:04:37):

on Kurds,

Sergei (00:04:38):

and Turkey is the godfather of all this story,

Sergei (00:04:41):

everything backed by the United States.

Sergei (00:04:43):

And Turkey was managed to communicate it with both, with Russia, in case of Azerbaijan,

Sergei (00:04:50):

and with the White House in case of Sioux.

Sergei (00:04:54):

So United States,

Sergei (00:04:56):

they reassess their interest,

Sergei (00:04:58):

and they prefer to deal with Turkey and with Turk's proxies,

Sergei (00:05:03):

both in the South Caucasus and in the Middle East,

Sergei (00:05:07):

if we compare these two cases.

Asbed (00:05:10):

So since the Kurds haven't learned from Armenian history,

Asbed (00:05:15):

what lessons should Armenians draw from what's going on in current developments

Asbed (00:05:19):

from the Kurds?

Hovik (00:05:20):

Have Armenians learned from Armenian history else?

Asbed (00:05:24):

That's a different story.

Sergei (00:05:26):

Yeah, we are a very old nation, but with a short memory, as I hear from many people.

Sergei (00:05:33):

The main lesson, it's not only about the United States, it's generally about the allies.

Sergei (00:05:38):

It's impossible to have long-lasting allies and one ally forever,

Sergei (00:05:43):

because their interest change,

Sergei (00:05:46):

they might be recalculated somehow.

Sergei (00:05:48):

You need to...

Sergei (00:05:51):

not put all the eggs in one basket,

Sergei (00:05:54):

as we did,

Sergei (00:05:55):

for example, before it is curves we're doing now.

Sergei (00:05:58):

And you should be flexible,

Sergei (00:06:01):

but you definitely should check entry count,

Sergei (00:06:03):

all the interests are up.

Sergei (00:06:04):

Why we should be flexible?

Sergei (00:06:07):

Like, let me give an example with, again, with you.

Sergei (00:06:10):

So as you know,

Sergei (00:06:11):

Tahrir al-Sham is a terrorist organization,

Sergei (00:06:14):

and Julani is just raised as a new leader,

Sergei (00:06:18):

but a Syrian leader who came from the terrorist organization.

Sergei (00:06:22):

And they were fighting against Russia for all the time since the Russians are in

Sergei (00:06:28):

invasion to Syrian conflict.

Sergei (00:06:30):

But now,

Sergei (00:06:31):

al-Jolani actually needs Russia,

Sergei (00:06:33):

and there are negotiations to bring Russians to the south and Syria,

Sergei (00:06:37):

as it was during the upset,

Sergei (00:06:38):

when Russian military police were patrolling Israel-Syria border in order to

Sergei (00:06:45):

prevent of interference both Israel to Syria and the Iranians close to Poland

Sergei (00:06:50):

Heights.

Sergei (00:06:51):

So they were like a buffer zone between two countries.

Sergei (00:06:55):

And now, as Turkish presence in the South in Syria is unacceptable for Israel,

Sergei (00:07:02):

now Syrians are discussing with Russians to bring them back,

Sergei (00:07:07):

but they were killing each other like literally a year and three months ago.

Hovik (00:07:13):

Yeah.

Hovik (00:07:15):

Where does Israel stand in all of this?

Hovik (00:07:20):

Because it seems like sometimes Kurds are viewed as allies of Israel,

Hovik (00:07:25):

but Israel seems to be basically very hands-off in this situation.

Sergei (00:07:33):

Since 1950s, Kurds were one of the most important allies of Israel around the Middle East.

Sergei (00:07:43):

Because within this periphery doctrine,

Sergei (00:07:45):

Israel was working and making alliances with non-Muslim minorities and non-Arab

Sergei (00:07:54):

minorities in different countries.

Sergei (00:07:56):

in the 20th century in order to make pressure on Iraq and the Syrian government,

Sergei (00:08:02):

and now in order to make pressure more on Iran and the U.S.

Sergei (00:08:06):

government.

Sergei (00:08:07):

And Israel was working with the Syrian courts for decades.

Sergei (00:08:12):

And for the last decades, Israel was able to enlarge its cooperation with Kurds because of U.S.

Sergei (00:08:21):

presence and engagement.

Sergei (00:08:23):

And if United States will step out and will leave northeast Syria,

Sergei (00:08:31):

It means that for Israel it will be much more complicated to deter,

Sergei (00:08:35):

actually,

Sergei (00:08:37):

Turkey and to deter the current Syrian regime.

Sergei (00:08:41):

They tried to conduct the negotiations.

Sergei (00:08:46):

One of the meetings was last year in Baku, after that in Paris.

Sergei (00:08:50):

There were discussions in Israel that soon they were reaching an agreement with the

Sergei (00:08:54):

new Syrian government to make northern Israel or southern Syria some kind of ski

Sergei (00:09:01):

resort,

Sergei (00:09:02):

etc.

Sergei (00:09:04):

But I don't think that's real in a short term,

Sergei (00:09:08):

because from an Israeli perspective,

Sergei (00:09:11):

the number one threat after Iran is Turkey.

Sergei (00:09:15):

Turkey is moving closer to the Israeli border.

Sergei (00:09:18):

And if Turkey has such a proxy that is pushing back Israel is a lie,

Sergei (00:09:26):

so that's a big headache for Israel.

Sergei (00:09:28):

But they cannot do anything at this moment without United States assistance.

Sergei (00:09:34):

But if United States, they decided to leave the region, so that's a problem.

Hovik (00:09:40):

All right, well, coming closer to Armenia's border,

Hovik (00:09:46):

We were witness to three weeks of protests which escalated to a full-blown riot.

Hovik (00:09:54):

Many analysts would say externally instigated riots.

Hovik (00:10:00):

The number of casualties is in the thousands.

Hovik (00:10:03):

We don't know the actual amount because internet in Iran is still limited and there

Hovik (00:10:07):

is a trickle of information.

Hovik (00:10:10):

But what's interesting is that the immediate drumbeat for the U.S.-Israel-Iran war

Hovik (00:10:17):

was suddenly postponed,

Hovik (00:10:19):

at least for now.

Hovik (00:10:20):

I mean,

Hovik (00:10:21):

we were pretty sure last time this week that we were going to wake up to some

Hovik (00:10:26):

terrible news from Iran.

Hovik (00:10:28):

Now, reports suggest that Iran and Israel

Hovik (00:10:32):

have been negotiating through Russia as a back-channel to signal that neither plans

Hovik (00:10:37):

to preemptively strike each other.

Hovik (00:10:40):

I don't know how much that is significant,

Hovik (00:10:45):

except that Russia also seems to be very active diplomatically,

Hovik (00:10:49):

trying to minimize any major issues.

Hovik (00:10:54):

Meanwhile,

Hovik (00:10:55):

war hawks in the US,

Hovik (00:10:56):

such as Senator Lindsey Graham,

Hovik (00:10:59):

framed the debate less as whether to strike and more as how to strike,

Hovik (00:11:05):

whether a limited operation or a big one.

Hovik (00:11:09):

Sergei, a week ago, we appeared on the verge of war, as we said.

Hovik (00:11:15):

What accounts for the apparent postponement of this conflict?

Sergei (00:11:19):

Let's start from Russia.

Sergei (00:11:21):

I don't think that Russia was the first and the only one who mediated between

Sergei (00:11:27):

Israel and Iran because we have other countries,

Sergei (00:11:32):

especially Portugal.

Sergei (00:11:34):

As I understand,

Sergei (00:11:35):

almost no one was interested in the war except Israel and some people in the White

Sergei (00:11:43):

House.

Sergei (00:11:45):

Because even Arab countries,

Sergei (00:11:47):

they understand that in case that a regime understands that it's going to be

Sergei (00:11:53):

collapsed,

Sergei (00:11:55):

they will push all the buttons they have on the table.

Sergei (00:11:59):

And everyone in the region will face very big problems, especially neighboring countries.

Sergei (00:12:07):

Because they have nothing to lose.

Sergei (00:12:08):

I mean, the Iranian gov.

Sergei (00:12:11):

Russia's engagement and Russian mediation was very active in the very last days.

Sergei (00:12:19):

When I read the Kremlin website that Netanyahu called to put it in,

Sergei (00:12:24):

I wrote in our working chat that it seems he's going to transfer some message to

Sergei (00:12:28):

Iran.

Sergei (00:12:30):

And one hour later, there was a message that Putin called Pezeshkian.

Sergei (00:12:34):

So that was obvious because, I mean, this model, it works before.

Sergei (00:12:40):

But as we know from different leagues,

Sergei (00:12:44):

some countries,

Sergei (00:12:47):

especially Egypt,

Sergei (00:12:48):

Saudi Arabia,

Sergei (00:12:49):

they tried to communicate with the White House.

Sergei (00:12:53):

I don't know.

Sergei (00:12:54):

It wasn't that. We'd call for some other officials that the United States should not launch in.

Sergei (00:13:01):

massive attack because there are different targets from the US perspective.

Sergei (00:13:09):

First,

Sergei (00:13:10):

nuclear facilities that are partly destroyed because there are hundreds of reactors

Sergei (00:13:16):

in Iran that are actually operating.

Sergei (00:13:18):

Second,

Sergei (00:13:19):

military infrastructure,

Sergei (00:13:20):

especially ballistic missiles,

Sergei (00:13:22):

because after 12 days war,

Sergei (00:13:23):

Israel realized that,

Sergei (00:13:25):

okay, we pushed back somehow a nuclear program,

Sergei (00:13:30):

maybe for years,

Sergei (00:13:32):

but the ballistic missile program is going to be a biggest threat to Israeli

Sergei (00:13:37):

national security. That's why that was target number two.

Sergei (00:13:40):

And target number three is spiritual, political, and military leadership.

Sergei (00:13:46):

maybe they will inspire some power with the case of in Israel,

Sergei (00:13:51):

or they think that they may conduct a manageable transit of power inside Iran.

Sergei (00:14:01):

Because as we know, there are many discussions who will come after Khomeini, etc.

Sergei (00:14:06):

And there are different scenarios.

Sergei (00:14:08):

In order to avoid the

Sergei (00:14:11):

the worst one,

Sergei (00:14:12):

maybe there in Israel or United States,

Sergei (00:14:14):

there were discussion how to accelerate such transit and do it manageable.

Sergei (00:14:23):

And coming to different scenarios that may happen, I mean, with a wide range of scenarios.

Sergei (00:14:30):

And I think we are at one of the best case scenarios.

Sergei (00:14:35):

But we avoided a large-scale escalation, any escalation.

Sergei (00:14:38):

This escalation actually was postponed.

Sergei (00:14:42):

And if we take serious the news that we had from Israel,

Sergei (00:14:49):

because as you know,

Sergei (00:14:50):

in Israel, there were many security preparatory work.

Sergei (00:14:52):

They opened shelters.

Sergei (00:14:54):

We saw some shots of moving air defense system, relocating the positions, et cetera.

Sergei (00:15:00):

It means that we were very close to this escalation, but it doesn't mean that it's canceled.

Sergei (00:15:06):

It mostly is highly likely postponed if they do not reach any agreement.

Sergei (00:15:13):

That may be considered on nuclear program, missile program, Iranian allies slash proxies.

Sergei (00:15:23):

So I think these are three key issues that are on the table.

Sergei (00:15:28):

And I don't know really which case worked because there are many rumors and leaks

Sergei (00:15:39):

from the US media,

Sergei (00:15:40):

from Israeli media,

Sergei (00:15:41):

from Iranian media,

Sergei (00:15:42):

etc. I think we should wait to answer properly,

Sergei (00:15:45):

but it does mean that we avoid the escalation at all.

Sergei (00:15:52):

Most probably postponed as even this area of the U.S.

Sergei (00:15:58):

is moving from Taiwan to the Middle East.

Sergei (00:16:01):

So the past is still changing in the region.

Hovik (00:16:06):

Do you believe it's credible that this postponement was requested by Netanyahu?

Hovik (00:16:14):

I'm just wondering what would be the cause,

Hovik (00:16:17):

because we know Iranian red lines have been stated repeatedly that they're not

Hovik (00:16:21):

going to touch their ballistic program.

Hovik (00:16:24):

I mean, it seems it would be very difficult for Iran to compromise on its ass.

Hovik (00:16:31):

I mean, on all of those points, it seems like Iran was very strong red lines.

Hovik (00:16:35):

So what was the cause for this,

Hovik (00:16:40):

you know,

Hovik (00:16:41):

if this is true,

Hovik (00:16:42):

for requests by Netanyahu to postpone?

Hovik (00:16:44):

Or do you believe that as actually there are other causes besides Netanyahu's request?

Sergei (00:16:51):

I will not exclude that there was a request from Israel,

Sergei (00:16:55):

and there is only one reason why Israel,

Sergei (00:16:58):

or two reasons why Israel might be interested in postponing this escalation or this

Sergei (00:17:04):

attack.

Sergei (00:17:05):

First, they came to conclusion that it's impossible to collapse regime after attack.

Sergei (00:17:14):

And point number two,

Sergei (00:17:16):

the retaliation will be much more worse comparing with the 12 Days of War.

Sergei (00:17:22):

So taking into account these two considerations,

Sergei (00:17:26):

there might be a reason why Israel may ask the United States to know this soon.

Sergei (00:17:30):

The same story might be with Trump.

Sergei (00:17:34):

Let's imagine Trump is sitting somewhere in BC and he's getting messages from Arab

Sergei (00:17:43):

countries, from Turkey,

Sergei (00:17:44):

from Israel,

Sergei (00:17:45):

do not do so.

Sergei (00:17:46):

We do not have 100% guarantees that this attack will be very short and very quick

Sergei (00:17:54):

at the same time,

Sergei (00:17:55):

very hard for Iran to collapse with you.

Sergei (00:17:58):

So you will have a victory within a couple of days.

Sergei (00:18:02):

So there is 100% guarantee what such scenario will not work.

Sergei (00:18:08):

It means that, okay,

Sergei (00:18:09):

maybe United States in this case will be engaged in not short-term escalation,

Sergei (00:18:15):

but even longer.

Sergei (00:18:16):

And this perspective was not such positive for Trump.

Sergei (00:18:21):

And maybe he took also into consideration this problem.

Sergei (00:18:27):

So, I mean, there might be different explanations why.

Hovik (00:18:32):

Now, since the 12-day war,

Hovik (00:18:33):

we know that Iran,

Hovik (00:18:35):

or at least it's being reported that Iran is working very closely with Russia and

Hovik (00:18:40):

China to rebuild,

Hovik (00:18:42):

revamp its air defenses,

Hovik (00:18:44):

its missile program and stockpiles.

Hovik (00:18:47):

Do you think that Iran is ready for the second renewed confrontation with Israel and the U.S.?

Sergei (00:18:56):

It depends on the scale.

Sergei (00:18:58):

If the scale is the same,

Sergei (00:18:59):

I think Iran might be prepared even better,

Sergei (00:19:03):

but I don't think it will be the same scale.

Sergei (00:19:06):

If the scale will be, I mean, it's about time, it's about the geography of attack,

Sergei (00:19:13):

If scale changes,

Sergei (00:19:14):

I mean, qualitatively and quantitatively,

Sergei (00:19:18):

I don't think Iran is well prepared.

Sergei (00:19:21):

If we talk not only about,

Sergei (00:19:23):

for example, US attack in the very last minute and very limited attack,

Sergei (00:19:28):

but if we talk about joint Israel-US

Sergei (00:19:32):

air operation, I don't think Iranian air defense system is well prepared for such scenario.

Sergei (00:19:41):

Yes, they have some air defense system from Russians.

Sergei (00:19:46):

That's mostly based in Isfahan to protect the nuclear sites.

Sergei (00:19:50):

They, as we know, they got air defense system from China.

Sergei (00:19:55):

Actually, some of them Azerbaijan has.

Sergei (00:19:59):

But that's not enough.

Sergei (00:20:01):

And what we discussed with the Iranian colleagues were the key lessons.

Sergei (00:20:06):

They told that actually from their perspective,

Sergei (00:20:09):

Iranian-made air defense system was more effective compared with Russian that they

Sergei (00:20:17):

had.

Sergei (00:20:18):

So if we take this perspective into account, it means that they might...

Sergei (00:20:24):

produce again there some air defense facilities in a very quick way and but that

Sergei (00:20:31):

will be not enough if they will be enjoying Israel I mean that's impossible

Hovik (00:20:38):

Yeah,

Hovik (00:20:39):

and it seems that at some point,

Hovik (00:20:42):

Russia and China,

Hovik (00:20:46):

just from a pure resource perspective,

Hovik (00:20:50):

Iran would be unmatched with a combined Israel and US war.

Hovik (00:20:55):

So it seems that at some point, Russia and China would have to put a stop to it if they can.

Hovik (00:21:03):

And that is my question.

Hovik (00:21:04):

How committed are Russia and China

Hovik (00:21:07):

to ensure that their partner in BRICS is not dismantled and disintegrated and

Hovik (00:21:13):

turned into another Syria.

Sergei (00:21:16):

First,

Sergei (00:21:17):

we should underline that there are zero commitments from Russia and from China to

Sergei (00:21:26):

provide direct military assistance to Iran in case of it.

Sergei (00:21:30):

There are zero obligations and zero agreements, at least as we know.

Sergei (00:21:35):

Maybe there are some of the records in Britain.

Sergei (00:21:39):

So they do not have legal obligations, number one.

Sergei (00:21:42):

Number two, as we know, Russia is extremely busy in Ukraine.

Sergei (00:21:46):

They did not have enough capacity and then will to do something in the South

Sergei (00:21:53):

Caucasus and in 2023 and in Syria in 2025.

Sergei (00:21:59):

So they are very limited in their actions.

Sergei (00:22:02):

The same, China is not in the same story,

Sergei (00:22:06):

but we do not have any case of Chinese direct engagement in practice,

Sergei (00:22:12):

but it does not come to its pure national interests that are only around China,

Sergei (00:22:20):

as they call it,

Sergei (00:22:21):

in the extended neighborhood.

Sergei (00:22:23):

So the risk of direct Russia's and China's engagement, from my perspective, is very low.

Sergei (00:22:29):

Yes, they may provide some intelligence information,

Sergei (00:22:32):

they may provide some military equipment,

Sergei (00:22:36):

they may maybe act asymmetrically,

Sergei (00:22:40):

for example, may create a tension point,

Sergei (00:22:43):

let's call this way, in other parts,

Sergei (00:22:45):

in other regions,

Sergei (00:22:46):

in order to shift the attention and resources of the United States.

Sergei (00:22:54):

but not directly involved.

Hovik (00:22:58):

Okay.

Hovik (00:22:59):

And lastly,

Hovik (00:23:01):

do you see any off-ramps available to the three parties,

Hovik (00:23:07):

Iran, US and Israel,

Hovik (00:23:10):

that could,

Hovik (00:23:11):

you know,

Hovik (00:23:12):

essentially avoid a major war in the region?

Hovik (00:23:15):

Some kind of a way to save face and de-escalate, maybe postpone even further?

Hovik (00:23:21):

I'm not sure.

Sergei (00:23:24):

Well, that's an interesting question.

Sergei (00:23:28):

I think both in the United States and Israel, they soon will focus more on internal problems.

Sergei (00:23:35):

As far as we have elections in the United States in November,

Sergei (00:23:39):

then not we'll have elections in Israel.

Sergei (00:23:43):

And both leaders, they will act accordingly based on how their support internally changed.

Sergei (00:23:52):

For example, Netanyahu, we know, I mean, his patterns, how he acts.

Sergei (00:23:59):

And there is a direct correlation when the level of support is reduced.

Sergei (00:24:02):

We see escalation somewhere around Israel.

Sergei (00:24:06):

Southern Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, West Bank, etc.

Sergei (00:24:09):

So according to last polls in Israel,

Sergei (00:24:13):

Netanyahu and coalition,

Sergei (00:24:15):

they are very close to keep the power.

Sergei (00:24:21):

So it means that maybe Netanyahu will be less interested in this coalition.

Sergei (00:24:26):

I don't know how it works in case of Trump.

Sergei (00:24:28):

I have no idea.

Sergei (00:24:30):

But if we will have a look,

Sergei (00:24:32):

originally,

Sergei (00:24:33):

I don't see Iran will step back from its position regarding enrichment and

Sergei (00:24:41):

regarding ballistic missile problem first.

Sergei (00:24:44):

Because they realized after this postponed or canceled,

Sergei (00:24:49):

temporary canceled escalation,

Sergei (00:24:51):

that actually ballistic missile program is the only security guarantee for them.

Sergei (00:24:58):

If Iran,

Sergei (00:24:59):

let's imagine this scenario,

Sergei (00:25:00):

Iran doesn't have ballistic missiles,

Sergei (00:25:05):

launchers, or something else,

Sergei (00:25:06):

then most probably the escalation will not be postponed or canceled.

Sergei (00:25:11):

So they reaffirmed that they need this hard power to keep the country safe and to

Sergei (00:25:19):

reduce the risk of attack.

Asbed (00:25:23):

Sergei,

Asbed (00:25:24):

some Iranians in Armenia,

Asbed (00:25:26):

reportedly dozens,

Asbed (00:25:28):

have protested in front of the Iranian embassy.

Asbed (00:25:31):

And this has led the new ambassador Khalil Shirgholami to say that Tehran is

Asbed (00:25:36):

beginning to think that Armenia is becoming a hub of anti-Iranian activities.

Asbed (00:25:42):

And Pashinyan was very quick to reply that this is not true.

Asbed (00:25:47):

Meanwhile, the TRIPP politics continue.

Asbed (00:25:49):

This is the Trump route we're talking about.

Asbed (00:25:52):

And this week,

Asbed (00:25:53):

Ararat Mirzoyan and Marco Rubio signed agreements to add detail to this agreement,

Asbed (00:25:57):

to the shape of this project.

Asbed (00:26:00):

And the documents say that

Asbed (00:26:02):

They repeat over and over and over that Armenia's sovereignty is not questioned or

Asbed (00:26:07):

encroached upon.

Asbed (00:26:09):

But, you know,

Asbed (00:26:10):

anyone who is a good reader of documents like this knows that something that's

Asbed (00:26:14):

repeated so many times,

Asbed (00:26:15):

it's because it's trying to obfuscate the fact that the exact opposite is true.

Asbed (00:26:20):

What were your main takeaways from this TRIPP business in Washington, D.C.

Asbed (00:26:23):

this past week?

Sergei (00:26:26):

I think we should have different perspectives on TRIPP document.

Sergei (00:26:30):

First is economic one, second is legal, and third is geopolitical.

Sergei (00:26:35):

But I prefer to analyze and vice versa, because as for me, TRIPP is a geopolitical project first.

Sergei (00:26:44):

Then it's the economic, like it's secondary in this case.

Sergei (00:26:49):

But I think, I mean, we should have like different angles.

Sergei (00:26:53):

So as I'm not an expert on legal issues or economist,

Sergei (00:26:57):

I will try to bring more geopolitical perspective on this.

Sergei (00:27:02):

Definitely, Azerbaijan is not 100% happy what happened after Mirzoyan and Rubio met.

Sergei (00:27:11):

Because when we met with the Azeri colleagues, their expectations, they were high.

Sergei (00:27:19):

But we should come to the very details to understand whatever their requests were

Sergei (00:27:28):

taken into account.

Sergei (00:27:29):

Because from an Azerbaijani perspective,

Sergei (00:27:32):

The unimpeded access means that Armenia has no right to allow or not to allow

Sergei (00:27:38):

Azerbaijan to cross its borders and to reach Nakhichevan.

Sergei (00:27:43):

But we cannot answer this question based on this implementation framework that was published.

Sergei (00:27:51):

So we need some new details.

Sergei (00:27:55):

Meanwhile,

Sergei (00:27:56):

point number two,

Sergei (00:27:58):

as for me,

Sergei (00:27:59):

definitely,

Sergei (00:28:00):

if we compare the TRIPP project,

Sergei (00:28:03):

and for example,

Sergei (00:28:04):

Armenia-Georgia border,

Sergei (00:28:06):

and Armenia-Iran border,

Sergei (00:28:08):

definitely we see that this is something new,

Sergei (00:28:11):

this is something special,

Sergei (00:28:12):

and this is something special for Azerbaijan too.

Sergei (00:28:15):

So if we have the same,

Sergei (00:28:17):

if we have some new approach,

Sergei (00:28:20):

let's call this three,

Sergei (00:28:23):

why we do not implement the same approach,

Sergei (00:28:25):

for example,

Sergei (00:28:26):

when it comes to Georgia or when it comes to Iran,

Sergei (00:28:28):

the two open borders?

Sergei (00:28:30):

So it means that still from Armenian position,

Sergei (00:28:33):

there is a big shift when we try to implement the front office,

Sergei (00:28:38):

back office options.

Sergei (00:28:40):

So we do not have such options on our other forces.

Sergei (00:28:43):

So why do we have such options in this case?

Sergei (00:28:47):

It means that we try to take into account Azerbaijan requests.

Sergei (00:28:53):

Other citizens should not see any Armenian on the ground.

Sergei (00:28:57):

Okay, let's establish a front office.

Sergei (00:29:02):

We don't know what does need front office.

Sergei (00:29:04):

It's about all the technical stuff or there will be some people on the ground who

Sergei (00:29:11):

will, I mean,

Sergei (00:29:12):

cause a bit other's passport,

Sergei (00:29:14):

scan them,

Sergei (00:29:15):

etc. Or front office is just about some scanners, some machines on the border, etc.

Sergei (00:29:22):

So we have both perspective here.

Sergei (00:29:24):

Is it 100% what Azerbaijan wanted based on the conversation with them?

Sergei (00:29:29):

I don't think so.

Sergei (00:29:30):

But the key expectation,

Sergei (00:29:34):

I mean, from the Azerbaijani side was from the very beginning that was shifted for the last

Sergei (00:29:41):

years,

Sergei (00:29:42):

that Azerbaijanis should pass Armenia and reach Nakhichevan the same way they

Sergei (00:29:49):

reached from Baku to Ganja.

Sergei (00:29:52):

It means they see the car, no one stock, no one check.

Sergei (00:29:57):

They should pass like it's Azerbaijani territory.

Sergei (00:30:00):

Down here, we see that there are some new passes.

Sergei (00:30:04):

But this, okay, there was a 100% demand.

Sergei (00:30:08):

But now, okay,

Sergei (00:30:09):

we, let's say,

Sergei (00:30:10):

accepted 80% or 90%,

Sergei (00:30:13):

but still we accepted more than a half because we do not provide such special

Sergei (00:30:19):

conditions,

Sergei (00:30:20):

let's call this way,

Sergei (00:30:21):

for Iran or for Georgia.

Sergei (00:30:23):

Why are some other neighbor that was keeping us our other blockade should have some

Sergei (00:30:30):

special conditions?

Sergei (00:30:33):

And there is a risk that, okay, if this modality work,

Sergei (00:30:37):

Maybe Turkey will ask the same, because you have a precedent.

Sergei (00:30:42):

Okay,

Sergei (00:30:43):

if we have,

Sergei (00:30:44):

and Armenia accepted,

Sergei (00:30:45):

okay, Turkey may ask Armenia to implement the same modalities if border opens,

Sergei (00:30:50):

and that will be some new precondition.

Sergei (00:30:53):

But coming to the very beginning of your question about Dr. Shirgholami statement,

Sergei (00:30:59):

It was a reference to the TRIPP implementation framework and protest because they

Sergei (00:31:05):

also reacted to the protest underlining that that was an unfriendly act.

Sergei (00:31:12):

And Iran will remember what happened in Iran because from their perspective,

Sergei (00:31:18):

the Iranian government allowed to have a protest right in front of the Iranian

Sergei (00:31:23):

embassy.

Sergei (00:31:24):

So from Iranian and Khalil's perspective, there were two options.

Sergei (00:31:28):

If you give approval for some protest, why in front of Iranian embassy?

Sergei (00:31:33):

You may choose the different location.

Sergei (00:31:35):

And if you did not,

Sergei (00:31:37):

in case you did not give any approval,

Sergei (00:31:40):

why did the police did not act if this protest was not legal?

Sergei (00:31:47):

So this is a project.

Sergei (00:31:51):

perception regarding Armenia is shifting slowly.

Sergei (00:31:58):

Remember the Iranian MFA statement right after August 8.

Sergei (00:32:03):

OK, we have concerns, but later Armenians mitigated our concerns.

Sergei (00:32:09):

So they took into account our interests.

Sergei (00:32:12):

Now let's compare with the same MFA rhetoric after half a year.

Sergei (00:32:18):

it's become harder and shifted more to, as we heard, for example, from Mr. Velayati.

Asbed (00:32:26):

Yeah.

Asbed (00:32:28):

Sergei, Fyodor Lukyanov was on our show a couple of weeks ago,

Asbed (00:32:32):

and he warned that despite Russia being tied up in Ukraine,

Asbed (00:32:36):

it really does have genuine interest in the South Caucasus,

Asbed (00:32:39):

which shouldn't be ignored.

Asbed (00:32:41):

Now,

Asbed (00:32:42):

do you think that Armenia is taking into account these interests of Iran and Russia

Asbed (00:32:47):

in this TRIPP deal?

Asbed (00:32:48):

And what are the consequences of not taking those concerns seriously?

Sergei (00:32:53):

I do not think that Armenia takes their interest for 100%, both Iranian and Russian.

Sergei (00:33:01):

because we see,

Sergei (00:33:02):

I mean,

Sergei (00:33:04):

reducing Russia's presence on the ground and increasing to SN1 from the EU mission

Sergei (00:33:10):

to three.

Sergei (00:33:12):

And I would like to remind that,

Sergei (00:33:14):

okay,

Sergei (00:33:15):

Russia's border source,

Sergei (00:33:16):

they left,

Sergei (00:33:17):

Armenia's south border,

Sergei (00:33:18):

they left,

Sergei (00:33:19):

Zvartnots airport,

Sergei (00:33:20):

they left.

Sergei (00:33:21):

Armenia-Iran trade point.

Sergei (00:33:24):

Some military units left Sunni.

Sergei (00:33:26):

There are discussions that border troops will leave the Armenia-Turkey border to

Sergei (00:33:32):

decide how Russia's presence is declining for the last years.

Sergei (00:33:38):

The same might be with Iran, but in Iran, we have some other indicators.

Sergei (00:33:46):

For example,

Sergei (00:33:47):

it's important to remind that two Iranian companies are working to construct the

Sergei (00:33:51):

southern part of the transport corridor in Armenia,

Sergei (00:33:56):

and Iran opened consulate generally Kapan.

Sergei (00:34:01):

So based on these at least two indicators,

Sergei (00:34:05):

it means that we have some special approach towards zero.

Sergei (00:34:10):

But it's impossible to take into account all the interests of all neighbors, of all partners.

Sergei (00:34:17):

That's impossible because there are some limits every day.

Sergei (00:34:21):

But I would like to disagree with Lukyanov that South Caucasus is important and

Sergei (00:34:28):

Russia is ready to act.

Sergei (00:34:30):

I don't think so,

Sergei (00:34:31):

because as we know from discussions in Moscow,

Sergei (00:34:36):

definitely there are priorities.

Sergei (00:34:38):

And the key priority is still Ukraine.

Sergei (00:34:41):

And we do not see what is the Russian national toolkit to do something.

Sergei (00:34:46):

For example,

Sergei (00:34:47):

Nikol Pashinyan asked RZD,

Sergei (00:34:50):

South Caucasus railway company,

Sergei (00:34:55):

to construct the missing part of railway,

Sergei (00:34:59):

from Gyumri to Akhurik,

Sergei (00:35:00):

to Turkish border,

Sergei (00:35:02):

and from Ijevan to Gazakh,

Sergei (00:35:06):

to Azerbaijan border,

Sergei (00:35:08):

and from Yerashk to Nakhichevan.

Sergei (00:35:11):

There are some calculations in Russia.

Sergei (00:35:14):

about the timeline about the price i mean the cost of construction but they are not

Sergei (00:35:21):

in a rush to to construct so there are no discussion okay we should implement

Sergei (00:35:25):

otherwise we'll be out of regional connectivity um i don't know what they are

Sergei (00:35:31):

thinking i mean i don't know these thoughts um uh and because there is no clear

Sergei (00:35:39):

strategy what to do in the south coast

Sergei (00:35:41):

They are just very reactive,

Sergei (00:35:44):

and they try to keep a...

Sergei (00:35:48):

From Soviet movie there was,

Sergei (00:35:53):

let's drink our expectations,

Sergei (00:35:56):

meet our capabilities.

Sergei (00:36:02):

So this is very Russian.

Sergei (00:36:04):

They have many dreams and expectations, but the capabilities...

Sergei (00:36:09):

capabilities are limited.

Sergei (00:36:10):

But it doesn't mean nothing changes after the deal with the United States or after

Sergei (00:36:18):

the war in Ukraine.

Sergei (00:36:20):

I mean, they have more than one million army.

Sergei (00:36:24):

and i don't think all russians are happy to have this army back because there are

Sergei (00:36:31):

many discussions how we should reintegrate all of them uh because it's not only

Sergei (00:36:37):

about the mental death it's about the salary now it's

Sergei (00:36:41):

have high expectations.

Sergei (00:36:43):

So they need to do, they need to manage.

Sergei (00:36:46):

And now we have increasing different statements from Russia that,

Sergei (00:36:50):

okay,

Sergei (00:36:51):

this hard deterrence tool works because we see what the United States are doing

Sergei (00:36:56):

against Greenland,

Sergei (00:36:58):

against Venezuela,

Sergei (00:36:59):

et cetera.

Sergei (00:37:00):

So maybe they will agree that Russia's backyard is a special zone of interest of Russia

Sergei (00:37:07):

and Russia may do whatever it wants.

Asbed (00:37:09):

Yeah.

Asbed (00:37:10):

So you're absolutely right that there hasn't been.

Asbed (00:37:13):

I haven't seen any kind of a response from Russia about what to do about the

Asbed (00:37:18):

railroads when Pashinyan requested or demanded that they spend some funds into

Asbed (00:37:24):

restoring the railway.

Asbed (00:37:25):

I just haven't hired anything back from them.

Asbed (00:37:28):

But let me quickly note,

Asbed (00:37:29):

I have one more question,

Asbed (00:37:30):

but let me quickly note that Fyodor Lukyanov simply said that Russia continues to

Asbed (00:37:35):

have interests and they shouldn't be ignored,

Asbed (00:37:37):

but he didn't say that Russia was immediately ready for action.

Hovik (00:37:42):

Okay, then let's come to Armenia and the topic of the upcoming elections in June 2026.

Hovik (00:37:49):

Armenia is very much already into electioneering season.

Hovik (00:37:58):

But I want to approach this from the perspective of our southern-southwestern neighbor, Turkey.

Hovik (00:38:10):

Last week, Hakan Fidan, Turkey's foreign minister, essentially endorsed

Hovik (00:38:15):

that's the opposition perspective, endorsed Pashinyan as Turkey's candidate to govern Armenia.

Hovik (00:38:24):

And if I may channel the opposition, the Armenian vilayet.

Hovik (00:38:28):

He said that the elections will be, quote, an important stage.

Hovik (00:38:34):

But we see that Mr. Pashinyan is currently leading in opinion polls.

Hovik (00:38:39):

And we sincerely support his constructive role in this matter.

Hovik (00:38:44):

this is this line this determination must continue end quote now

Hovik (00:38:51):

I guess this is a little bit less harsh than the 2021 position of Turkey,

Hovik (00:38:58):

which was that there was some talk about military intervention in Armenia in case

Hovik (00:39:05):

the opposition takes over.

Hovik (00:39:07):

So I guess this is a more moderate approach than 2021.

Hovik (00:39:12):

But still,

Hovik (00:39:13):

nevertheless, I would imagine if these words were said by,

Hovik (00:39:17):

I don't know,

Hovik (00:39:19):

let's say, Sergei Lavrov.

Hovik (00:39:21):

What would the Europeans say and do?

Hovik (00:39:24):

And isn't this,

Hovik (00:39:25):

in your opinion,

Hovik (00:39:26):

effectively foreign influence and interference in Armenian elections?

Sergei (00:39:30):

I would like to remind that in the very beginning of 2021,

Sergei (00:39:37):

Turkey,

Sergei (00:39:38):

officially different levels for the first time in history,

Sergei (00:39:42):

commented about Armenians' internal politics.

Sergei (00:39:45):

When General Staff openly opposed Prime Minister,

Sergei (00:39:53):

and other official bodies in Turkey,

Sergei (00:39:57):

they raised their concerns,

Sergei (00:39:58):

but that was for the first time in the history when they referenced it somehow to

Sergei (00:40:03):

our internal domestic affairs.

Sergei (00:40:07):

Second,

Sergei (00:40:09):

I think that there's nothing new,

Sergei (00:40:12):

and this is not a surprise that both Turkey and Azerbaijan,

Sergei (00:40:17):

they are interested in the redaction of the overruled party.

Sergei (00:40:22):

And they, I mean,

Sergei (00:40:24):

this message comes not only from their media,

Sergei (00:40:29):

from their propaganda,

Sergei (00:40:30):

but also during the conversation.

Sergei (00:40:33):

And I mean, that's obvious from their perspective.

Sergei (00:40:35):

Their argumentation is understandable,

Sergei (00:40:39):

is a good partner,

Sergei (00:40:41):

it's good to make deals with them,

Sergei (00:40:44):

etc.

Sergei (00:40:46):

I mean, that was not a secret.

Sergei (00:40:49):

But coming to the second part of your question, that's interesting.

Sergei (00:40:52):

When we have official statements from EU, that we have official statements from Turkey,

Sergei (00:41:00):

But we did not have any statement from other countries.

Sergei (00:41:04):

But for example, we had official statements from Russia in 2021.

Sergei (00:41:08):

And when Vladimir Putin stated that Nikola Pashinyan is not a traitor, he was fighting, etc.

Sergei (00:41:18):

And that actually was indirect supported to ruling party if we analyze all the

Sergei (00:41:27):

comments that came from Russia after that.

Sergei (00:41:32):

Definitely all

Sergei (00:41:34):

uh external powers have their interests here in the region and many things not only

Sergei (00:41:40):

so armenia's election is not about armenia armenia's elections upcoming collection

Sergei (00:41:45):

is about digital conflict rich and yes and the problem uh the problem like initial

Sergei (00:41:53):

like a problem here is that turkey has its own vision turkey has its own project uh

Sergei (00:42:00):

west okay not west

Sergei (00:42:02):

Europe or in the United States,

Sergei (00:42:04):

they have their vision,

Sergei (00:42:05):

they have their project,

Sergei (00:42:07):

but there is no alternative.

Sergei (00:42:09):

I mean, global, not on the ground here.

Sergei (00:42:12):

What is the opposite vision?

Sergei (00:42:14):

What is the opposite perspective?

Sergei (00:42:16):

And this is making again a reference to Mr. Lukyanov.

Sergei (00:42:22):

What is their perspective?

Sergei (00:42:23):

What is their general vision?

Sergei (00:42:24):

What is their general strategy to the South?

Hovik (00:42:28):

Do you think it's different from 2021?

Hovik (00:42:29):

Because in 2021,

Hovik (00:42:31):

we can say that Pacino was the consensus candidate for everyone,

Hovik (00:42:35):

all the major powers.

Hovik (00:42:38):

Do you think that it will also be like that this year?

Sergei (00:42:42):

I have a feeling...

Sergei (00:42:44):

that their perspective from Russia has changed and it's not the same as it was in 2021.

Sergei (00:42:54):

It has changed for last years,

Sergei (00:42:59):

but I don't think that Russia openly will oppose the ruling party,

Sergei (00:43:04):

because Russia doesn't want to put itself in the position when there is a high risk

Sergei (00:43:10):

that a civil contract will be re-elected,

Sergei (00:43:14):

and then they will face some

Sergei (00:43:17):

limits, let's call this way.

Sergei (00:43:19):

This way,

Sergei (00:43:20):

I don't think they will do any open statement or will play openly comparing with

Sergei (00:43:25):

the EU or with Turkey.

Sergei (00:43:27):

Because, I mean, it's obvious that they have interest,

Sergei (00:43:29):

but they may allow themselves to play openly,

Sergei (00:43:35):

to provide some finance,

Sergei (00:43:39):

but Russia will not allow itself to up this

Hovik (00:43:47):

So you mentioned that there's a lot of interest and there's a lot riding from all sides, right?

Hovik (00:43:53):

What is there to lose by Turkey, by EU, by the West, if Pashinyan loses?

Hovik (00:44:01):

And I guess conversely,

Hovik (00:44:05):

Can the opposition have a dramatically different foreign policy if they suddenly

Hovik (00:44:10):

win the elections,

Hovik (00:44:11):

given the geopolitical constraints that are present?

Sergei (00:44:17):

I don't think it's possible to have dramatically opposite foreign policy.

Sergei (00:44:23):

But it's first about the concessions that you are ready to do, the limit of their concessions.

Sergei (00:44:31):

Second is about the implementation of agreements that are not on the paper.

Sergei (00:44:37):

because I think it's an important matter for us,

Sergei (00:44:40):

because when it comes to the agreements at a very high level that are not on the

Sergei (00:44:45):

paper,

Sergei (00:44:46):

it means that the new faces,

Sergei (00:44:51):

new leaders,

Sergei (00:44:52):

they do not have any obligations.

Sergei (00:44:57):

But in this case,

Sergei (00:44:58):

definitely, there are some non-written prayer agreements,

Sergei (00:45:03):

at least, let's call it this way.

Sergei (00:45:06):

And there might be priorities changed in foreign policy.

Sergei (00:45:11):

That's point number three.

Sergei (00:45:12):

If we change priorities in the foreign policy,

Sergei (00:45:19):

it will not bring some dramatic change in the region,

Sergei (00:45:22):

but it will put regional processes in some other way.

Sergei (00:45:26):

Because the balance in the region has changed.

Sergei (00:45:30):

That's for sure.

Sergei (00:45:31):

But it doesn't mean that Armenia will be able to not implement the agreements that

Sergei (00:45:37):

are laid on the paper.

Sergei (00:45:40):

That's understandable.

Asbed (00:45:41):

Would it change anything about the modality of TRIPP,

Asbed (00:45:44):

for example,

Asbed (00:45:46):

as far as sovereignty concessions and things like that that are not on paper?

Sergei (00:45:51):

Definitely. If it's not on the paper, new people, they don't have any obligations or pre-agreements.

Sergei (00:45:58):

And if modalities are not agreed 100%,

Sergei (00:46:01):

because as for me,

Sergei (00:46:02):

when I read this paper for three times,

Sergei (00:46:04):

I had much more questions than before.

Sergei (00:46:07):

yeah and and it means that there are a lot of things to discuss and then you may

Sergei (00:46:13):

navigate these technical details and you understand that all the struggle coming uh

Sergei (00:46:20):

years will be around the technical details and if if you are able to manage in the

Sergei (00:46:26):

way that uh you want and or to bergen somehow okay to open the Nakhichevan one that is

Sergei (00:46:34):

much more important for us as for me

Sergei (00:46:36):

Comparing with the Armenian-Turkey border.

Sergei (00:46:39):

Yes, because in case of Armenian-Turkey border,

Sergei (00:46:41):

we have first alternative access to Black Sea ports and Europe in general.

Sergei (00:46:47):

And point number two, we have access to Mediterranean Sea.

Sergei (00:46:50):

But in case of Nakhichevan,

Sergei (00:46:52):

we'll have a direct railway access to Persian Gulf that will bring us to rich Arab

Sergei (00:46:58):

market and it will bring us to Asian market that are increasing.

Sergei (00:47:03):

And Asian countries,

Sergei (00:47:05):

they continue to side and negotiate and around FTA agreement with duration economy.

Sergei (00:47:13):

So it means that we'll have some preferential access to these markets like Vietnam,

Sergei (00:47:18):

like India,

Sergei (00:47:19):

like Indonesia, et cetera.

Sergei (00:47:21):

And it's not comparable with, for example, Mediterranean market.

Sergei (00:47:26):

So this was for me,

Sergei (00:47:27):

the Nakhichevan railway section is much more important for Armenia than opening the

Sergei (00:47:34):

Armenian Turkish.

Sergei (00:47:35):

But that's coming to point number three.

Sergei (00:47:38):

It's about priorities.

Sergei (00:47:39):

How do we prioritize our interest in the foreign policy and connectivity in the region?

Hovik (00:47:49):

Okay,

Hovik (00:47:50):

I have to ask this one more,

Hovik (00:47:51):

one last question,

Hovik (00:47:52):

because,

Hovik (00:47:53):

you know, you said that Turkey does,

Hovik (00:47:54):

you know,

Hovik (00:47:58):

we're already hearing that

Hovik (00:48:00):

Of course, we heard Fidan.

Hovik (00:48:01):

We are already hearing rumors that Turkey is making constructions on the border and

Hovik (00:48:08):

is going to open or do some kind of a change on the border,

Hovik (00:48:12):

maybe open the border for diplomatic visa holders,

Hovik (00:48:17):

diplomatic passport holders.

Hovik (00:48:19):

But what other cards does Turkey have to play until June 2026 to help Pashinyan or

Hovik (00:48:29):

to help influence the results?

Hovik (00:48:31):

We saw, of course, also Aliyev releasing some of the hostages.

Hovik (00:48:37):

We expect maybe a few more to be released, but does Turkey itself have any

Hovik (00:48:43):

hard or soft cards to play in terms of ensuring that its desired leader is elected

Hovik (00:48:50):

in these elections.

Sergei (00:48:52):

I agree with you that the key card is partial or mostly partial of the border.

Sergei (00:48:59):

Then we have a new flight to Armenia-Turkey.

Sergei (00:49:04):

We have Turkish Airlines here.

Sergei (00:49:06):

That might be some business agreement.

Sergei (00:49:09):

As we know, Armenia has actually traded with Turkey.

Sergei (00:49:12):

So Turkish market is not closed for Armenia.

Sergei (00:49:14):

The Armenian market is not closed for Turkey.

Sergei (00:49:16):

But if we have some new agreement that will make this perspective of making

Sergei (00:49:24):

business with Turkey much more preferable and beneficial for different circles and

Sergei (00:49:29):

make this trade much more tangible.

Sergei (00:49:34):

I don't think they have some new cars to play except the economy, but the

Sergei (00:49:43):

The main problem,

Sergei (00:49:44):

I mean, in this case,

Sergei (00:49:47):

coming to you, coming to the previous question,

Sergei (00:49:49):

is discussions,

Sergei (00:49:50):

are discussions around Kars,

Sergei (00:49:53):

Nakhichevan, Railway.

Sergei (00:49:54):

So how Armenia will manage this situation?

Sergei (00:50:00):

And the options are really bad when we come to the competition with the Turkish

Sergei (00:50:07):

project and let's call Armenian project.

Sergei (00:50:12):

This is why it's about who will negotiate and how he will negotiate.

Sergei (00:50:19):

But I think that's coming to your last question,

Sergei (00:50:23):

the cars that Turkey has,

Sergei (00:50:25):

even some statements will be enough.

Sergei (00:50:28):

if they do some positive or positive neutral statements about common interest,

Sergei (00:50:37):

about common history,

Sergei (00:50:39):

about let's forget old brief essays,

Sergei (00:50:45):

let's look forward,

Sergei (00:50:47):

et cetera,

Sergei (00:50:48):

such soft statements,

Sergei (00:50:51):

that will be enough.

Asbed (00:50:54):

Sergei Pashinyan's diversification of the Armenian economy is in full swing.

Asbed (00:50:59):

Armenia's trade with Russia was cut in half from 2024 to 2025.

Asbed (00:51:04):

And even after that, of course, Russia still is Armenia's main trading partner, still.

Asbed (00:51:10):

Which means that in order to compensate for a lot of these trade deals and the loss

Asbed (00:51:16):

of state revenues,

Asbed (00:51:17):

borrowing also stepped up.

Asbed (00:51:19):

We borrowed over $1.4 billion in 2025 to keep Armenia afloat.

Asbed (00:51:25):

What are Russia's interests in Armenia?

Asbed (00:51:28):

And what actions and responses would they be envisioning to Turkish and Western

Asbed (00:51:32):

meddling in Armenia's elections that would result in anti-Russian outcomes?

Sergei (00:51:40):

First, it's important to note that,

Sergei (00:51:43):

according to our conversations with the Russian colleagues,

Sergei (00:51:48):

Armenia's diversification is OK for most people.

Sergei (00:51:54):

But pivot is unacceptable.

Sergei (00:51:57):

So they have a clear understanding that, in some cases, there are attempts to make a pivot.

Sergei (00:52:04):

And in some cases, there are diversification attempts.

Sergei (00:52:07):

Even in some cases, for me, not very successful.

Sergei (00:52:12):

Because,

Sergei (00:52:13):

for example, when it comes to diversification in terms of arms supplies and military partners,

Sergei (00:52:22):

we replace one dependency when we had more than 80-90% weapons from Russia.

Sergei (00:52:31):

We switched to India, where we have almost 70% of weapons caused from there.

Sergei (00:52:37):

So we replaced one dependency with another one.

Sergei (00:52:41):

When it comes to economy,

Sergei (00:52:43):

it's much more complicated to talk about diversification because the share of

Sergei (00:52:50):

Russia is still high.

Sergei (00:52:51):

I mean, in trade turnover, it's close to 40%, 35%, 40%.

Sergei (00:53:01):

The share of, for example, the European Union is increasing very slow.

Sergei (00:53:06):

Last year, that was a decline.

Sergei (00:53:08):

And we have some signs of increasing cooperation with the Middle Eastern and Asian market.

Sergei (00:53:17):

So even when it comes to tourism,

Sergei (00:53:22):

approximately 40% of tourists come from Russia,

Sergei (00:53:27):

Iran,

Sergei (00:53:29):

Georgia, and other countries.

Sergei (00:53:30):

So there is not diversification in this sense.

Sergei (00:53:34):

It's about quantity.

Sergei (00:53:37):

If we focus on quality, there are extra choices.

Sergei (00:53:41):

For example, we see that the United States are becoming a key partner in AI cooperation.

Sergei (00:53:49):

Again, it's not diversification if you put all X in one basket.

Sergei (00:53:54):

But now we see that most of the projects in AI with the United States are based on

Sergei (00:54:02):

the MOUs that we signed in the beginning of 2025.

Sergei (00:54:08):

Coming to the second part of your questions about Russia's interests,

Sergei (00:54:13):

I mean,

Sergei (00:54:14):

they're understandable.

Sergei (00:54:17):

First, to keep this zone safe in order to...

Sergei (00:54:23):

to prevent any escalation that may be closer to the North Caucasus,

Sergei (00:54:28):

because for Russia,

Sergei (00:54:29):

North Caucasus is much more important compared with the South Caucasus and

Sergei (00:54:34):

neighboring countries.

Sergei (00:54:36):

So they need the security here while they are busy in Ukraine.

Sergei (00:54:40):

At the same time, they need less waste as possible in the region.

Sergei (00:54:46):

But there is an interesting shift in their perception that I noted for maybe last half a year.

Sergei (00:54:56):

Before that,

Sergei (00:54:57):

Russia was 100% fine with 3 plus 3,

Sergei (00:55:02):

like Armenia,

Sergei (00:55:03):

Georgia,

Sergei (00:55:04):

Azerbaijan, plus Russia,

Sergei (00:55:06):

Iran, and Turkey.

Sergei (00:55:07):

to solve all the problems in the regional format,

Sergei (00:55:12):

South Caucasian neighbors,

Sergei (00:55:13):

to not allow any Western activity.

Sergei (00:55:18):

Now,

Sergei (00:55:19):

when there comes statement from Europe that there is a perspective to integrate

Sergei (00:55:26):

Armenians and Turkish electricity briefs,

Sergei (00:55:29):

that was this statement was a very negative signal for Moscow that maybe the

Sergei (00:55:36):

problem was not the West in the region maybe the problem is the increasing Turkish

Sergei (00:55:41):

influence so there is a small shift of perception towards Turkey in the Santa

Sergei (00:55:49):

Coppola but it doesn't mean that Russia will start act just now I'm

Sergei (00:55:57):

I mean, other interests are clear, and I was listening for your conversation with Mr. Lukuanov.

Sergei (00:56:04):

I mean, he impacted quite good.

Sergei (00:56:08):

But when it comes to technical details,

Sergei (00:56:10):

so Russia is interested to have its presence in a new configuration.

Sergei (00:56:16):

If Armenia-Turkey border is opening,

Sergei (00:56:18):

okay,

Sergei (00:56:20):

if Russia doesn't have a presence on the ground,

Sergei (00:56:24):

there should not be Western presence.

Sergei (00:56:26):

So Russia should not be replaced.

Sergei (00:56:28):

This is why, for example,

Sergei (00:56:29):

Russia was fine when Armenia asked to leave Armenia-Iran border,

Sergei (00:56:35):

leave Syunik,

Sergei (00:56:36):

leave Zvartnots,

Sergei (00:56:37):

etc.

Sergei (00:56:39):

Russia was not replaced by someone.

Sergei (00:56:43):

But when it comes, for example,

Sergei (00:56:44):

the perspective that CSTO was ready to send its mission for Armenia-Artsakh and

Sergei (00:56:54):

Armenia-Azerbaijan border,

Sergei (00:56:56):

Armenia rejected and decided to have a European Union morning project mission,

Sergei (00:57:01):

that was a very negative bridge.

Sergei (00:57:03):

So from this pattern,

Sergei (00:57:05):

we may come to a conclusion that if the new configuration is without Russian

Sergei (00:57:11):

presence and also without any Russian enemies or frenemies when it comes to Turkey,

Sergei (00:57:19):

Russia might be fired with that.

Sergei (00:57:21):

And this is why Russia has several marks.

Sergei (00:57:24):

How does it calculate?

Sergei (00:57:25):

First is agreement on new nuclear power plant.

Sergei (00:57:30):

We know that there are different auctions.

Sergei (00:57:32):

And when we meet with Russian experts,

Sergei (00:57:35):

every time we discuss this issue,

Sergei (00:57:38):

we realize that this is an important marker for them.

Sergei (00:57:42):

Point number two, any non-Armenian engagement in Armenia-Turkish ports are open.

Sergei (00:57:50):

whatever some Turkish activity will be in the regioning areas or some Western or U.S.

Sergei (00:57:59):

slash European presence will be on Armenia-Turkish border.

Sergei (00:58:03):

And point number three,

Sergei (00:58:07):

when it comes to Armenia's connectivity,

Sergei (00:58:11):

because Armenia has Iranian companies,

Sergei (00:58:14):

Armenia is three.

Sergei (00:58:16):

what will be with the other sections of Armenian railways, with whom Armenia will copy.

Sergei (00:58:22):

So there are different markets based on which Russia will understand.

Sergei (00:58:26):

Is it replacement or is it diversification?

Hovik (00:58:29):

That's the million-dollar question, right?

Hovik (00:58:31):

Replacement or diversification?

Hovik (00:58:33):

Because it seems that Russia has a lot riding on north-south communication.

Hovik (00:58:41):

And I don't think that these recent details have completely...

Hovik (00:58:50):

or have alleviated any concerns that Russia and Iran have,

Hovik (00:58:57):

that their north-south communication will be hampered by this.

Sergei (00:59:04):

There were expectations in Russia that,

Sergei (00:59:07):

sorry for interrupting you,

Sergei (00:59:08):

there were expectations after August 8,

Sergei (00:59:10):

when there was written that there might be third party engagement within this two

Sergei (00:59:15):

project,

Sergei (00:59:16):

and there were expectations in Moscow that maybe they didn't try to be there.

Sergei (00:59:22):

And even here,

Sergei (00:59:24):

in TIF, it's mentioned some other party,

Sergei (00:59:28):

might be private company or country,

Sergei (00:59:31):

might be engaged in different processes.

Sergei (00:59:33):

maybe they will have some expectations too that that will be Russia and not Turkey

Sergei (00:59:38):

because it's also important to understand who will construct this railway because

Sergei (00:59:46):

there are two or okay three countries that may do so Azerbaijan,

Sergei (00:59:53):

Turkey and Russia

Sergei (00:59:57):

Okay, we may outsource this to India, China, but I don't think that will be an option.

Sergei (01:00:04):

So who will do so?

Sergei (01:00:06):

Who will have the press there?

Asbed (01:00:10):

Yeah, this is a very interesting topic, and there's so much more to discuss.

Asbed (01:00:14):

I think that in the last month,

Asbed (01:00:16):

Overchuk was the person who said that Russia expects to be involved in any kind of

Asbed (01:00:24):

east-west

Asbed (01:00:25):

opening or de-blocking of the Armenian South.

Asbed (01:00:28):

So we don't know exactly what the modalities of that is going to be.

Asbed (01:00:32):

But we are out of time for today.

Asbed (01:00:34):

I just want to ask each of you for some thoughts that you want to share with our listeners.

Asbed (01:00:40):

I'll come to you first this time.

Asbed (01:00:42):

Sergei, what's on your mind?

Sergei (01:00:45):

The first that came to my mind is about how we had our four prisoners of war back to Armenia.

Sergei (01:00:53):

And I do not think that it was coincidence that we transferred two mercenaries back to Syria.

Sergei (01:01:03):

But it's important to know that still we have both prisoners of war,

Sergei (01:01:07):

we have our self-leadership in jail.

Sergei (01:01:15):

we have much more cards to play to bring them back but it still should be in the

Sergei (01:01:24):

very top of our foreign policy priorities especially when it comes to negotiations

Sergei (01:01:29):

with Azerbaijan because these people there imagine what is to be in a jail in Baku

Asbed (01:01:38):

for 45 years very important thoughts

Asbed (01:01:45):

Hovik, what's on your mind?

Hovik (01:01:47):

I recently made a post on LinkedIn about normalcy bias when you think that you live

Hovik (01:01:54):

your life,

Hovik (01:01:55):

you go to wine festivals,

Hovik (01:01:57):

you attend concerts,

Hovik (01:01:59):

but your entire surrounding environment changes.

Hovik (01:02:03):

I used business examples such as when Kodak was reporting quarterly profits but

Hovik (01:02:12):

completely forgetting or ignoring that its entire core business line was being

Hovik (01:02:18):

consumed by digital photography.

Hovik (01:02:20):

But obviously in the geopolitical sense, I think that we are

Hovik (01:02:24):

very much in such a situation.

Hovik (01:02:28):

You can also use the boiling frogs scenario.

Hovik (01:02:32):

And nowhere is that more apparent than on LinkedIn, unfortunately.

Hovik (01:02:36):

And with all due respect to my compatriots on LinkedIn,

Hovik (01:02:41):

Armenians,

Hovik (01:02:42):

when you go into LinkedIn,

Hovik (01:02:44):

your feed is all about motivational posts,

Hovik (01:02:47):

business.

Hovik (01:02:48):

Some people even transform the loss of Artsakh into some kind of a

Hovik (01:02:53):

motivational business story nothing against that but you know the one thing that i

Hovik (01:02:58):

hate i really hate people who post pictures of Mount Ararat and again nothing

Hovik (01:03:06):

personal my friends please don't take this personally but if you're posting a

Hovik (01:03:09):

picture about climbing Mount Ararat and how this is very motivational for you in

Hovik (01:03:13):

terms of reaching your life's accomplishments

Hovik (01:03:17):

reaching your business accomplishments,

Hovik (01:03:19):

and you then go ahead and post this very long post about,

Hovik (01:03:24):

you know,

Hovik (01:03:25):

the lessons you learned from climbing Mount Arad,

Hovik (01:03:28):

then the least you can do is be concerned about the real value of Mount Ararat to

Hovik (01:03:32):

Armenians,

Hovik (01:03:34):

or pick a different mountain to climb.

Asbed (01:03:38):

I love that thought, Hovik.

Asbed (01:03:39):

We're going to leave it there.

Asbed (01:03:40):

Thank you so much for joining us, Sergei.

Asbed (01:03:43):

We appreciate your insight.

Asbed (01:03:44):

Hope to talk to you again many times.

Sergei (01:03:48):

Yes, shnorhakalutyun, always ready.

Hovik (01:03:51):

Thank you, Sergei jan.

Asbed (01:03:53):

Well, that was our Week in Review, recorded on January 19, 2026.

Asbed (01:03:57):

It's MLK Day, Martin Luther King Day here in the United States.

Asbed (01:04:03):

We've been talking with Dr.

Asbed (01:04:04):

Sergei Melkonian,

Asbed (01:04:06):

who is currently a research fellow at APRI Armenia,

Asbed (01:04:09):

a Yerevan-based think tank.

Asbed (01:04:11):

He served as assistant to President of Armenia Armen Sarkisian on foreign policy,

Asbed (01:04:16):

Middle East, and post-Soviet space matters.

Asbed (01:04:18):

Sergei is also a guest lecturer at Yerevan State University,

Asbed (01:04:21):

And the Russian Armenian University.

Asbed (01:04:25):

Hovig, you know,

Asbed (01:04:26):

the other day you and I were talking about whether we're asking all the right

Asbed (01:04:29):

questions or we have the right follow throughs and stuff like that.

Asbed (01:04:33):

And I want to ask what your impressions are,

Asbed (01:04:36):

whether we throw too many softballs or too many hardballs.

Asbed (01:04:40):

at our guests and this these thoughts were coming to me after we talked to Anna

Asbed (01:04:46):

Grigoryan um in the past episode because you know we're not going to be asking

Asbed (01:04:51):

Benyamin, or Sergei, these analysts,

Asbed (01:04:55):

tough questions.

Asbed (01:04:57):

They're analyzing, they're fact-based, they're just sticking with the facts and their analysis.

Asbed (01:05:02):

But when we talk about current affairs with politicians,

Asbed (01:05:06):

should we be following thorough in asking why they do certain things, or why they

Asbed (01:05:11):

don't do certain things?

Asbed (01:05:12):

What are your thoughts?

Hovik (01:05:14):

Well, being self-critical, I think, yes, we can always ask tougher questions.

Hovik (01:05:21):

I think that our format,

Hovik (01:05:23):

though,

Hovik (01:05:24):

this podcast format,

Hovik (01:05:25):

especially also not being in a studio where there's a little certain lag in terms

Hovik (01:05:29):

of the speech,

Hovik (01:05:32):

makes it a little bit difficult to interject and sort of ask pointed questions.

Hovik (01:05:37):

But

Hovik (01:05:38):

I don't want to blame it all on that.

Hovik (01:05:40):

And it just sort of, you know, our style is we ask questions and we let the guest answer.

Asbed (01:05:46):

We listen.

Hovik (01:05:46):

That's right.

Hovik (01:05:48):

Maybe if we had like two hours or three hours and we had more lengthy discussions,

Hovik (01:05:52):

we could dive deeper into each.

Hovik (01:05:55):

The other thing I noticed is we always run out of time.

Hovik (01:05:57):

So, for instance, with our guest...

Hovik (01:06:00):

Even with our politician guests,

Hovik (01:06:02):

we have like 45 minutes and then we have so many topics that doesn't really give us

Hovik (01:06:07):

a lot of time to drill down into specific responses and ask for follow-ups.

Asbed (01:06:19):

Can I say a quick thing?

Asbed (01:06:21):

It's our own self-imposed 45 to 60-minute time limitation.

Asbed (01:06:26):

And that comes primarily because...

Asbed (01:06:29):

of the effort that it takes on the back end to get these shows out.

Asbed (01:06:32):

It takes us hours and hours to edit and publish.

Asbed (01:06:35):

So in the past week,

Asbed (01:06:38):

we've had six or seven shows or something like that,

Asbed (01:06:40):

pretty much one episode a day.

Asbed (01:06:43):

And we're backed up.

Asbed (01:06:44):

There are a couple of episodes that we need to get out.

Asbed (01:06:46):

And that's why,

Asbed (01:06:47):

I mean, if we were to record a two,

Asbed (01:06:48):

three hour episode,

Asbed (01:06:50):

we can certainly just dump it on the internet and say,

Asbed (01:06:52):

here,

Asbed (01:06:53):

listen to it. But

Asbed (01:06:55):

it's raw.

Asbed (01:06:57):

It's not right.

Hovik (01:06:59):

So, I mean, it's a constellation of issues,

Hovik (01:07:00):

but I think in the end,

Hovik (01:07:02):

we could have asked,

Hovik (01:07:03):

specifically using a specific example with Mrs.

Hovik (01:07:06):

Anna Grigoryan,

Hovik (01:07:07):

I think we could have asked more pointed questions because I think that in general,

Hovik (01:07:13):

We are all wondering if there's more that the opposition,

Hovik (01:07:18):

the collective opposition,

Hovik (01:07:19):

I'm not singling anyone out,

Hovik (01:07:21):

can do,

Hovik (01:07:22):

and why certain things weren't done,

Hovik (01:07:24):

why we're so sure that things will be different this time.

Hovik (01:07:27):

I have a lot of concerns about that, but...

Hovik (01:07:31):

Maybe it's also something that we have to learn because we are just two techies.

Hovik (01:07:36):

I don't know.

Hovik (01:07:37):

Let us know how we can improve our questions and if we should do things differently.

Hovik (01:07:42):

We're always open to feedback on that as well.

Asbed (01:07:44):

Yeah,

Asbed (01:07:45):

that's important because at the start,

Asbed (01:07:48):

sort of, or not quite the start,

Asbed (01:07:49):

but not quite the middle either of this election campaign that's coming up,

Asbed (01:07:54):

we are thinking about bringing on more politicians.

Asbed (01:07:58):

And we'd like to, so there was one listener, for example, who said, bring Armand Tatoyan.

Asbed (01:08:02):

We'll try and do that at some point.

Asbed (01:08:04):

No commitments, but we will try to get him on the show.

Asbed (01:08:08):

We would like to know your opinion as a listener,

Asbed (01:08:11):

whether we're too softball,

Asbed (01:08:13):

we're too hardball,

Asbed (01:08:15):

whether we don't follow through right so that we can get these things more and more

Asbed (01:08:19):

correct and on,

Asbed (01:08:21):

let's say,

Asbed (01:08:22):

on the money.

Hovik (01:08:23):

Speaking of money, podcasts.Groong.org/donate.

Hovik (01:08:29):

That will motivate us to work harder and ask more better questions.

Hovik (01:08:32):

Just kidding. Our principles and our style stays the same, but your donations help us increase our reach.

Hovik (01:08:40):

As always, we are planning to do a lot of things with your money in 2026.

Hovik (01:08:45):

And thank you to everyone who has donated so far.

Asbed (01:08:49):

Thank you. I'm Asbed Bedrossian in Los Angeles.

Hovik (01:08:51):

And I'm Hovik Manucharyan in occupied Yerevan.

Asbed (01:08:53):

Stay well.

Asbed (01:08:54):

We'll talk to you next week.

Hovik (01:08:54):

Bye bye.

Head Shot

Asbed Bedrossian

Co-host
Head Shot

Hovik Manucharyan

Co-host
Head Shot

Sergei Melkonian

Guest

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