Arman Grigoryan - Revolutionary Recklessness: Armenia After the War | Ep 546, May 15, 2026

Conversations on Groong - May 15, 2026

Dr. Arman Grigoryan joins Groong to discuss Armenia's post-2020 foreign policy and his argument that Pashinyan's government has replaced one failed project, maximalist claims over Artsakh, with another: a risky strategic pivot away from Russia and toward the West. The conversation examines "revolutionary recklessness," the roots of the 2020 war, Armenia's worsening ties with Russia, the surrender of Artsakh, TRIPP and Syunik, Western encouragement, and the absence of firm security guarantees. Grigoryan also considers whether Armenia is gaining real sovereignty or exposing itself to greater pressure from Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia.

Topics:

• Revolutionary recklessness after 2020
• Armenia's pivot away from Russia
• Artsakh's surrender and strategic reorientation
• TRIPP, Syunik, and security guarantees
• Western backing, Armenian risk

Guest: Arman Grigoryan

Hosts:

• Hovik Manucharyan
• Asbed Bedrossian

Episode 546 | Recorded: May 13, 2026

SHOW NOTES: https://podcasts.groong.org/546

VIDEO: https://youtu.be/K3fj1Y35Dsw

#ArmanGrigoryan #Armenia #Russia #Pashinyan #Artsakh #TRIPP #SouthCaucasus #Geopolitics

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Transcript

Asbed: 0:04

Much has been said about the evolution of Pashinyan's policy since the 2020 44-day war in Artsakh. Some claim it was ineptitude, some others claim it was treason. But our guest today has used the term revolutionary recklessness to describe the Pashinyan regime since 2020 in a paper that tries to explain many interesting aspects of the story. Hello everyone and welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode. We are joined by Dr. Arman Grigoryan, who is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania. Dr. Grigoryan, welcome back to the Groong Podcast.

Hovik: 0:40

Glad to be with you, Asbed and Hovik. It has been a long time, Dr. Grigoryan. Sorry for that. We have been quite busy, especially during this election season, but truly honored to talk to you.

Asbed: 0:52

The honor is all mine. Indeed, all ours. Okay, well, let's jump into our extensive material. Relations between Armenia and Russia are at their lowest point today. (00:01:05): On May 8th, Vladimir Putin was specifically asked about Armenia hosting the EPC summit in Yerevan, where a number of anti-Russian narratives were heard. He responded by saying that perhaps citizens of Armenia should hold a referendum on Armenia's direction, and if people vote to go in the direction of the EU, So be it, that'll be a soft separation. He also recalled Ukraine's path a decade ago, which also started with a quest to join the EU at all costs. So, Dr. Grigoryan, your new paper argues that Armenia's post-war diplomacy is not A case of sober adjustment after defeat, but a continuation of the same kind of political recklessness that helped lead to the 2020 disaster. Only this time, the goal is no longer maximalist claims over Artsakh, but a strategic reorientation away from Russia and towards the West. So let's begin with your core argument. What is Pashinyan trying to do, and why do you believe this course brings Armenia more risk than security?

Arman: 2:10

So the paper you are referring to has not been published yet, in case the viewers think that it's published material that they have missed. It will come out sometime in the fall, and I have already submitted the final draft.

Asbed: 2:26

We were privileged to have an advance copy.

Arman: 2:28

Yes, I did send you an advance copy. So the argument is in some ways a reaction to a very popular Perception among observers of Armenia abroad and inside Armenia alike that Pashinyan has responded to negative feedback. Pashinyan has re-evaluated his positions on the basis of the war and the consequences of the war and he has sobered up and he has learned to adjust Armenia's aspirations and Armenia's ambitions to its To its real capabilities, as well as to the diplomatic environment. Now, in my earlier paper, which you referred to, I'd argue that the war was not a consequence of You know, the common arguments about wars of that nature, which is private information about capabilities or uncertainty about resolve or some diversionary motives. The war was a consequence of a willful neglect of the distribution of power, willful neglect of the diplomatic environment and of wishful thinking that was almost pathological. It was a consequence of a political establishment and a government that was in the grip of a set of strategic myths that produced the catastrophe. Now, I argue that they have not really changed their nature. The war really has not had the sobering effect that everybody thinks it has. They are not responding to negative feedback. They are not accommodating to the new situation.(00:04:23): Rather, they have decided that after having failed to rescue Karabakh, now they are going to rescue Armenia. Now they are going to liberate Armenia. and they have generated and entrenched a very dangerous narrative that Armenia is essentially an occupied colonized country by Russia and Armenia's chief strategic aim must be liberation from Russia and we should not stop at anything to achieve that result And his diplomacy, Pashinyan's diplomacy in the post-war period has essentially, the diplomacy, the primary aim of which is strategically reorienting the country and kind of distancing Armenia from Russia, from the alliance with Russia and integrating it with the West in some undefined fashion. The strategic reorientation of the country has been the primary goal of that diplomacy and I argue that it is as chimerical, as unrealistic, as dangerous as Pashinyan's diplomacy was before the war and certainly the recent escalation of rhetoric and kind of the The coming to the surface of the conflicting views of the Russian army and governments expressed by the Russians is demonstrating that things are coming to a

Hovik: 5:54

head If you had to pick one or two, I guess, things, which evidence convinces you the most that this is not a rational adaptation after defeat? Because I think that's a very important point. We recently had Anatol Lieven and we asked him about the fact that Armenians think of Ararat, despite not wishing to be, let's say, conquering Turkey,

Hovik: but it's part of our identity, (00:06:31): 6:28

right?

Hovik: 6:31

So genocide and Ararat and Artsakh, he was arguing that, for instance, for the Hungarians, you can never take off old Hungarian territories that are part of their psyche and their identity from them. but it seems Pashinyan is trying to do exactly that as part of his quest so why is this not a rational adaptation and why is this an ideological project that you're

Arman: 7:02

trying to you know frame it as well that's exactly the case I mean if you look at again I apologize for referring to my own paper In responding to every question, but that first paper I just mentioned, where I discussed the pre-war diplomacy of Pashinyan, the primary argument in that paper was that there are certain pathologies that systematically characterize revolutionary movements and revolutionary governments. And I'm not going to go through the entire list, but one of the pathologies is that they all have, well, as the name suggests, revolutionary ideas and revolutionary goals, which often include changing the entire nature of the state, the entire nature of the population, fundamentally changing the core of its aspirations, its culture,

Arman: etc., (00:07:58): 7:57

etc.

Arman: 7:58

I mean, the truly revolutionary movements that we know the truly revolutionary governments that we're familiar with have been pursuing precisely such goals, often goals that seem crazy in retrospect. For example, if we look at the Bolsheviks or at Mao or at Pol Pot now, I'm not comparing Pashinyan to Stalin,(00:08:21): Pol Pot, and Mao, but the core idea is that revolutionary movements are not just about You know incrementally revolutionary movements are not about incremental change incremental improvement addressing, you know, obvious problems imposed by reality economic issues, (00:08:39): etc, etc, their core preoccupation is. Fundamentally transforming things. Before the war, it was about liberating Karabakh. It was about the full liberation of Karabakh, de jure independence or unification of Karabakh with Armenia, which the previous governments had failed to achieve. He thought he was going to become one of the Armenian greats. He couldn't give speeches without mentioning Hayk Nahapet, Tigran the Great, and Ashot Yerkat in all of them. And comparing himself to Jesus, right? And this is another aspect of revolutionary movements. They think of their projects as salvation projects. It's not just political change, it's salvation projects. And when you look at the post-war diplomacy, I mean, their character has not changed. Their agenda has changed. I mean, Karabakh became impossible to liberate even as a chimerical dream, right? Even as an unrealistic aspiration that could not be held anymore. And they decided actually to do one better and get rid of Karabakh entirely. Even though they didn't have to. It is my belief that they didn't have to do that. And now they think doing so, or they have articulated it clearly themselves, that doing so was necessary for rescuing Armenia, for liberating Armenia, for protecting Armenia's sovereignty, and making sure that it doesn't remain or become a Russian guy.

Hovik: Yeah, yeah. (00:10:20): 10:19

You know,

Hovik: 10:20

I'm trying to compare it to other revolutionary say movements and most revolutionary movements had Some ideological framework on top of it, right? Whether it was to bring socialism, Marxism or whatnot, how can a foreign policy that is so diametrically opposite with the same leader in charge... I haven't seen many examples of that in history.

Arman: It is ideology, (00:10:53): 10:52

Hovik,

Arman: 10:53

and I think there was something else I was going to say, but I forgot in the end. I don't think when they are sitting to negotiate with Azerbaijanis or with Kılıç, with the Turks, Turks have put an ultimatum on the table saying you have to remove the picture of Ararat. Maybe they have, but I kind of have a hard time believing That they've gone to that extent, forcing Armenia to change the symbols on its coat of arms or whatever. I think it's coming from them. And it is ideological. I mean, they do have an ideology. It's not simply giving up in response to demands. They're actively trying to reshape the Armenian identity. Now, I think there were aspects of Armenian identity and the Armenian narrative. I have been critical of them myself. I mean, some of these aspects actually Pashinyan himself embraced with vengeance between 2018 and 2020. I mean, he was giving a run for the hardliners' money. He had become so hardline and some of his hardline rhetoric and policies were were rooted in those hardliner myths and some of the things in the Armenian nationalist narrative that I myself find objectionable. But now he has gone completely, I mean the pendulum has swung in the completely opposite direction, and now he finds everything that characterizes tradition, Armenian attachment to certain symbols, important institutions of the Armenian identity, as consequences of myths, as consequences of foreign-imposed narratives, even the genocide. I don't remember if he himself has gone so far as to question the core of the genocide narrative, but some people who are his supporters are freely arguing that, (00:12:56): well, it wasn't the Turks' fault, it was the Russians' fault. had it not been for the Russians, which actually is the Turkish narrative partially. The Turkish narrative also insists that it was our betrayal and our cooperation with the Russians that produced it. But, you know, everything has been deprived of nuance and he has gone completely in the opposite direction. And it is, again, characteristic of revolutionary movements that they try to fundamentally upend everything and fundamentally reshape and change the core of the identity of their societies. The only difference is he's not doing it violently like a lot of other revolutionary movements have done, but who knows what will happen if he meets real resistance on this path. And if we were talking about his ideology, his ideology is, it's hard to call it an ideology, but I guess it substitutes for an ideology. On one occasion he said you should earn more so that you can spend more. I think that's the ideology of New Armenia and that's kind of the identity that Pashinyan and the crowd around Pashinyan champions these days.

Asbed: 14:20

Arman, you have said in your paper that revolutions are by nature high risk affairs. Change is high risk. Results sometimes may not be what you expect, so obviously there are problems. That kind of matches in my less scholarly way of looking at what Pashinyan has done over the last five years, I've always said. He's gambling the house, essentially. And essentially, he did gamble Artsakh away.

Asbed: We don't have that anymore. (00:14:49): 14:47

And at present,

Asbed: 14:49

I feel with the course that we are on, there's a certain element of gambling,(00:14:54): for example, Syunik gambling, possibly Armenia, when you're playing with the identity and you're changing things. It's like changing the engines of an airplane in flight. Where do you think this stops? How do you assess the current process?

Arman: Yeah, (00:15:13): 15:12

again,

Arman: 15:14

it's one of the things that characterize, one of the pathologies that characterizes revolutionary radical movements, kind of the tolerance for very high risks and adjusting the material environment or the perception of the material environment to their aspirations, (00:15:35): right? So at the same time, They look at evidence very selectively and very tendentiously to fit it to their aspirations. And on the other hand, they are prepared to take high risks because if you convince yourself that you are in the business of salvation, saving something, and otherwise it will

Arman: It will be destroyed, (00:15:57): 15:54

then,(00:15:57): you know,

Arman: 15:57

taking high risks or being prepared to pay high costs seems to be justified psychologically and otherwise. So if these people have convinced themselves that, well, Russians are our main problem. Then the salvation requires making all sorts of concessions and taking all sorts of risks with regard to a resolution and establishment of a certain status quo with Azerbaijan and Turkey that will make it possible to get rid of the Russians. So it is kind of axiomatic in Armenian politics that As long as you have unresolved issues and unresolved disputes with your neighbors, you cannot get rid of an existing security architecture, you cannot get rid of the Russian base, the alliance with Russia, etc. But they think if they somehow somehow achieve the signing of that treaty and the ratification of it and if they normalize the relations with Turkey, all will be fine and Russians can leave and will leave happily ever after. I think that's an extremely risky policy, especially when you look at the very clearly articulated goals of Aliyev and Azerbaijan. If you look at the rhetoric in Azerbaijan, And it is pretty clear, I've been arguing this for quite some time, that Aliyev is probably interested in peace, but the kind of peace that he's interested in can best be described as a Versailles peace, which is no peace at all. So it has gotten to the point where Aliyev and some other high ranking officials in Azerbaijan are demanding that Armenians re-elect Pashinyan and issuing fairly transparent threats that if we don't do so, they will consider that a hostile act toward Azerbaijan and they will take the appropriate measures. So that level of menace coming from Azerbaijan and that level of willingness to coerce and pressure Armenia and in the presence of such a relationship, in the context of such a relationship and such an adversary, thinking that signing some piece of paper and getting rid of the existing security architecture is going to protect you. I don't know where these people have taken their courses in international relations, but that's not what I teach my students.

Hovik: 18:46

It's clear that they haven't, but I'm still going to push back a little bit on the revolutionary aspect. If it was a revolution in 2018, yes, he had massive support, he had the support of the streets, but after 2021, especially now, we see that his popularity is in the gutter, and the only reason why he's able to command still authority is reliance on repression. Is there some agency among the West or among the other powers who are interested in keeping him in power and at what point did it stop becoming a movement that was supported by the people as is claimed in 2018 some would say 2018 was also part of it but and it became a more of a reliance on foreign powers just to keep their personal seat and how strong is the influence of external factors in

Arman: 19:47

keeping passion in power today okay so i'm going to try to give as nuanced an answer to this as possible i do not subscribe to the view I have been always resistant and I've never veered off that position even though some of the evidence you look at kind of challenges my position but subsequent evidence but I've been consistent in arguing that the revolution was not

Arman: orchestrated from outside (00:20:26): 20:23

Now,

Arman: 20:26

outsiders may have played some role, may have played some indirect role, and all these NGOs and their training programs about organizing and canvassing and political activism and getting the message out and even civil disobedience and that sort of thing may have helped. But framing that as triggered, organized by outsiders, I think is fundamentally wrong. There was sufficient energy inside Armenia. I think the previous regime had become way too calcified and unresponsive to the needs of the Armenian people. It wasn't the first attempt at changing that regime and there had been several others in the decade, decade and a half prior to that. There was palpable discontent in the public about where things were.

Asbed: As a matter of fact, (00:21:24): 21:23

Arman,

Asbed: 21:24

I thought 2008, the issues in 2008 were basically a first attempt, but they didn't work. Exactly right.

Arman: 21:31

Does that make sense? That makes perfect sense. And yes, some of the issues like struggle against a corrupt regime, (00:21:41): etc., etc., were exactly identical. Even though the overlap between the agendas and the methods were different, but there were many attempts. The reason Raffi Hovannisian's campaign was very popular in 2013, Raffi Hovannisian did not articulate anything. If you have looked at Raffi Hovannisian's

Arman: rallies. (00:22:06): 22:05

I mean,

Arman: 22:06

you would have to decipher their speeches to figure out what the hell they were

Arman: talking about, (00:22:11): 22:10

right?

Arman: 22:11

But it was very popular. And by many accounts, Raffi Hovannisian won the elections in 2013, and they were falsified. So there was this discontent, you had an unresponsive government, you had a government that had decided that they cannot be pushed out, they cannot be touched, especially every time there was any hint of a popular mobilization, they would play the Karabakh card, namely that destabilization in Armenia would destabilize the front in Karabakh and most of the time the public was deterred from going too far or their opponents were deterred from going too far not to risk that. The second important element was that revolutions sometimes succeed when nobody expects them. So the revolution in 2008 or the movement in 2008 failed partly because they (00:23:11): anticipated they knew it was going to happen, and they prepared for it for six months, both in terms of their contacts with external actors and the police,

Arman: the army, (00:23:22): 23:21

all of it,

Arman: 23:22

right? In 2018, people were making fun of Pashinyan and company when they started their march from Gyumri. And there is a fantastic paper about how revolutions succeed as a snowball effect as kind of a tipping point relying on the tipping point mechanism where progressively people lose their fear and start joining a movement and that cascade effect eventually produced a revolution, eventually produced a kind of mobilization that Serzh Sargsyan could do nothing about. So the unexpectedness of it or not taking the opponent seriously actually played to the opponent's hand. Now having said that, I think it was very clear even before they came to power that they had certain preferences and certain views on Armenia's external relations, external partners and adversaries and they had expressed a distinct preference for Armenia's rapprochement with the EU and they criticized Serzh Sargsyan for joining the Eurasian Economic Union in 2013 and halting the negotiations, the association negotiations with the EU. And I mean, some of their members went so far as to throw, you know, the Russian embassy with eggs. And it was clear where their preferences lay, what their rhetoric was, who the supporting main NGOs and political organizations were. And they were, to a person, they were They were very pro-Western in outlook and very anti-Russian. (00:25:07): But of course, in the first two years after he came to power, it was kind of muted, although we were seeing periodic manifestations of their preferences, but it was clear that, you know, they have just come to power, they don't want to take on Russia immediately while they were dealing with Azerbaijan and the negotiations and while they had adopted that very hard line with regard to the Karabakh negotiations. Now after the war they also for some period tried to be somewhat cautious But after they were re-elected, after the re-election of Pashinyan in 2021, and especially after the conflict escalated in Ukraine, they decided that there is no point in hiding their preferences too much. And they basically became very overt in their goals, in their rhetoric, in their aims, in their preferences. And these days, sometimes I read Facebook posts or articles in the Armenian media,

Arman: in the Armenian press, (00:26:21): 26:19

saying,

Arman: 26:21

well, this rhetoric should not be taken seriously. We haven't done anything that has severed the relations with Russia. And my reaction to it is quite similar to the argument that one of your guests recently made. I'm talking about Suslov, which, by the way, was a very interesting conversation. I recommend everybody watch that conversation. And these people in Armenia don't draw distinction between an event and a process. So they imagine if something hasn't happened yet, there is nothing to talk about. But clearly we have a process, not just an event. And it is pretty clear also that the Russians have come to a conclusion that Armenians are going on this path and they are thinking that they will choose the timing of severing the ties with Russia and making the more radical moves of changing the status quo with regard to Armenia's relations with Russia when it's most convenient to them and we're not going to allow it.

Hovik: 27:28

It's like being married and also trying to date on the side and the partner asking, (00:27:34): well, what are you going to do? I'm still married to you, but you know, it's an open relationship. It's an open marriage.

Arman: 27:42

I'm waiting for the other guy to make a better offer and to give me guarantees and and only then I will file for divorce. But before then, you know, I want to be on your health insurance.

Asbed: 27:58

And I think that's a question I've been waiting to ask. What's in this change? What's in this revolution, let's say, if the revolution is about changing patrons from Russia to the West? What does Pashinyan think the West can do for Armenia that Russia cannot or is not doing?

Arman: 28:14

I don't know what these people think. What did Zelenskyy think? What did Saakashvili think? And at least these guys didn't have the experience, right, to draw on. Now we have Ukrainians' and Georgians' experience. I don't know what they think the West is going to do for them, but they are certainly moving in that direction. And that entire gigantic army of pro-Western NGOs and political forces constantly is picking the most minor We have a minute expression of support or sympathy. Macron's speeches and Ursula von der Leyen said this and that. We really value our relationship with Armenia. Armenia is an important partner for us. They came to Yerevan for that circus and that is presented as evidence. I'm extremely worried about that having taken place in Yerevan, but they present it as evidence of Europe's commitment to Armenian security. Back in the day in 2022 after the Jermuk attack, when the EU stationed observers

Arman: They were observers. (00:29:32): 29:31

They weren't armed.

Arman: 29:32

They didn't have any mandate. It wasn't based on any security commitments. You probably have seen all the very exaggerated claims about the importance of that demand. And people think that manifestations of this kind of sympathy and the sort of rhetoric that sometimes comes from Macron amounts to security guarantees. You have to really have lost your ability to see reality, actually, to think that you can get any help from the West. First of all, there is no actual evidence, no commitment coming from anybody. When they're asked point-blank, it's obvious what the answers are. A couple of years ago, when Kristina Kvien was interviewed on Radio Liberty, the interviewer asked her, you know, what can Armenia expect by way of security guarantees from the United States if Armenia severs its ties with Russia? Kristina Kvien mentioned three things in response to that question. One was that the United States was prepared to provide armored ambulances to the Armenian army. The other one was that they were prepared to help Armenia to build food storage facilities. And the third one was that they're willing to give free English lessons to refugees from Karabakh. You should go back and watch the interview.

Asbed: 31:10

Storage areas will be specially tailored for rice as the main grain for Armenia. But how can you say that Armenia does not have a valuable relationship with Europe? Have you seen how many press releases they put out about giving Armenia $2.6 billion?

Arman: 31:26

So I want to continue on this. You should look at the document about TRIPP. There is an explicit point there that this does not amount to any security guarantees. I mean, they felt the need to point it out. You should look at the document that they negotiated and signed with the Biden administration, the strategic partnership thing. Go look at it and tell me that there is any any security any security component there. (00:31:56): Now, let me say something else, even if they gave any security guarantees any explicitly, (00:32:03): you know, promises, not guarantees, but promises to protect Armenia. against Azerbaijan, Turkey, or in this case also Russia, if Russia becomes an adversary, or if Russia feels threatened about Armenia's relations with the West. How exactly the West is going to do that? I mean, you look at what's happening to the United States in Iran. You look at Europe's capacity to project power. outside of the area. I mean, the Germans don't have an army. They're talking about rebuilding their army by year 2039, right? The French have no power projection capabilities. I don't know what people are talking about right so these sort of arguments are just manifestations of wishful thinking and interpreting certain statements in creative ways and then there is the other thing which is every time you point this out they're like well Russians have abandoned us Russians have not been good allies Russians have not been reliable allies I'm like okay even if I agree with you That the Russians have not lived up to our expectations and the Russians certainly have not lived up to my expectations. There are two problems you have to deal with. You think that the counterfactual world of a Russia that has withdrawn from the Caucasus is the same as the bad world now? with the Russian presence. Moreover, it's one thing that the Russians have been an unreliable, (00:33:41): quote unquote, unreliable ally or an ally that hasn't lived up to our expectations. It's a totally different thing to have Russia as an adversary. What are you going to do? What's your alternative? I can sit down and criticize the Russians like the best of them. Nobody can even compete with me if I sit down and start criticizing the Russians. But again, that's not the conversation. If you're not articulating an alternative, that's just metaphysics. It's not a serious political conversation and nobody has articulated an alternative.

Hovik: 34:13

I think we should cut this segment and just Try to upload it every day on our youtube channel because after every single episode that we have some guy comes in and comments well Russians you know sold Karabakh so we have to essentially do blah blah blah but um let me say something yeah tell us more details about that because like especially how do you address that argument in in more detail this this is the one thing that works me out more

Arman: 34:42

than anything else The same people who are arguing that Russians have sold Karabakh are celebrating the liberation of Armenia from the Russians, the cost of which was getting rid of Karabakh. It was a rope around our neck. It was a ballast. We had to get rid of it, right? which implies two things first we got rid of it not the Russians right so in order for our to restore our our sovereignty I mean they said it Gevorg Papoyan said that September 19 2023 should be commemorated or should be celebrated as the as the day of independence of Armenia this is the day of exodus of Karabakh Armenians from Karabakh right and Pashinyan pretty much said something similar afterwards and he has been repeating this and Pashinyan even last year on August 23rd On the day of the Armenian Declaration of Independence,

Arman: he said, (00:35:48): 35:46

I mean,

Arman: 35:48

I'm not quoting verbatim, but the meaning of his statement was, I kind of intentionally provoked the conflict in Karabakh to have a radical solution to it, to get rid of that problem once and for all. And the same people, when the context is different, when they have to blame the Russians, when they have to look for scapegoats, when they are being accused of having lost Karabakh or having provoked a war that

Arman: they were going to lose, (00:36:20): 36:19

they were like, (00:36:20): well,

Arman: 36:20

it wasn't our fault. It was these damn Russians that First betrayed us in Karabakh and then afterwards they just packed up and left. The same Russians who somehow have used Karabakh as an instrument of pressure on Armenia and Azerbaijan decided all of a sudden that they don't need that pressure (00:36:40): anymore. and they just packed up and left because they just didn't like the Armenians. I mean, this is what the conversation has degenerated to. You can't have a serious conversation. Everybody is just interested in defending some silly position. They have planted a flag and they're defending that position at any cost. And you can't have a serious conversation with people like that.

Hovik: 37:02

I'm going to go back to the Russia thing, cutting off your essentially head because you have a broken nose if it was not a plan to give Artsakh away from the beginning at which point did they decide that this was going to be the price that Armenia needs to pay in order to reorient itself whatever the reason what do you think that decision boundary moment was

Arman: 37:32

It's hard to say when they have decided it. It's hard to say whether it was always in their head and they were looking for an opportunity. But I think shortly after they were elected,(00:37:45): I mean, before they were elected, there wasn't much happening, right? Because everybody was waiting to see what will happen with the political situation after the war and who is going to be at the helm of the country. And not much was I mean they were making some silly promises about restoring Karabakh, restoring Shushi and Hadrud to Karabakh and there is future in Karabakh and they were making some sort of some kind of promises like that during the election campaign but it wasn't serious and we don't know what they were really thinking now after they got elected I think they started thinking that something has to be done with Karabakh and I believe two parallel processes took place how parallel they were the timing of it I can't really I don't have evidence but eventually that's what that's what emerged as a picture now on the one hand Armenians started resisting the process the kind of process of peace negotiations that were being conducted with Azerbaijan with Russian mediation. Two things in particular Armenians were not very happy about. (00:39:13): Actually, they articulated only one at the time, so they were not happy about paragraph 9 of the ceasefire agreement, which was very important for Azerbaijan and which was very important for the Russians. And we decided that we're going to drag our feet, we're not going to do that, and eventually, later on, we found out, I think this is already beyond reasonable doubt, that this was something that the West also didn't think was a good idea, and they had an alternative plan in mind, which eventually became TRIPP. Now, when did they start talking about this? We don't have evidence for, but I think it doesn't take too much imagination to think that they probably were having conversations about that early on. The second thing was the negotiations about the peace treaty where an important issue was Karabakh status. And if you remember Lavrov made a statement about this and Russians were quite clear about that, that they think Karabakh status should not be determined in the first phase of the resolution, kind of the revamped phased solution type of thing where they thought peace negotiations should not be held hostage to the issue of the status and they thought that Karabakh's de jure status should be postponed for a later date and the peace treaty should be signed without it. and Europeans quite distinctly preferred that there should be a package solution where all issues should be resolved and it's pretty clear again in retrospect that Europeans also thought that if there is a package complete final quote unquote final solution to the Karabakh conflict That will facilitate Armenia's strategic drift toward the West. It would undermine Russia's positions there. It would make Russia's military presence in Karabakh unnecessary and untenable. And it would free Armenia's hands for putting the daylight between Armenia and Russia and building closer ties with the West. Now, this is already happening at the same time that the Ukraine conflict has escalated. And as the Ukraine conflict escalated, the relationship between the West and Russia became zero-sum. And I mean it shouldn't surprise anybody and you know from the perspective of Europeans and Americans it makes perfect strategic sense that if they could create a headache for Russia wherever right that would be that would be strategically beneficial and if the Armenians were willing to participate in the creation of that headache all the power to them right So this, in my view, is the context and the process and these two parallel processes that have taken place with regard to the Western encouragement, kind of it becoming more overt, how it has been connected to the Karabakh negotiations and how it has been connected to Pashinyan's aspirations for changing the country's strategic

Arman: orientation. (00:42:28): 42:26

Arman,

Asbed: 42:28

just listening to you describe the step by step versus the package solutions, which felt like there was a 15 year, 20 year period where that was the entire discussion. Which way to go? Because there was kind of a clear path to a resolution, but not the steps in that direction. But as I listened to you, I was thinking, well, if at that time the Europeans were interested in going with the package. It was because the Armenians were a little stronger. And at the end, they decided after 2020, they decided Azerbaijan was stronger. So let's just solve it. Does that mean that Europe actually did not care how the issue was resolved? Because for them, that was just a stopper from Armenia, not depending as heavily on Russia.

Arman: Exactly right. (00:43:18): 43:16

I mean,

Arman: 43:18

if before the 2020 war, Azerbaijan recognized Karabakh's independence or annexation to Armenia, Europeans and Americans would be as happy.

Asbed: 43:27

I mean, it just didn't matter which way it landed.

Arman: 43:32

As long as that conflict had a total and final solution. Right. Their perspective, their view was that these countries could be more free to pursue whatever without Russia being able to manipulate that conflict against one side or the other. And if it was a phased solution, it would be guaranteed by Russia. It would be a much more complicated situation. Even if there was a peace treaty, they would be continuing to negotiate Karabakh status. context of the 5+2. methodology, there would still be the problem of Kelbajar and Lachin status and whatever was achieved eventually it would be guaranteed by the Russians and the Russians would be the primary third party guarantor and consequently they would be in a much more privileged strategic position in the region which the West didn't want. But I mean, so one thing that changed was the was the war right which made any notion of Karabakh in a package solution Karabakh being given Armenia. A pipe dream, but also it was related to the kind of escalation of the relations between the West and Russia, which which. that triggered the closer involvement of the West in the region and in this process.

Asbed: 45:13

Arman, let me thank you, first of all, for your kind comment about our interview with Dr. Suslov. Thank you for listening to our shows. Perhaps you've also listened to Hrair Balian's show where he said, basically, at the end of the day, the TRIPP project is really a security project. Similar to basically point nine of the 2020 November ceasefire agreement, where it was essentially a corridor through Armenia, but this time overseen by the Russians. So it's always been a security corridor. Can you talk a little bit about the implications of basically changing the security provision from the Russians to the United States?

Arman: 45:52

Yes, so I completely agree with Dr. Balian. By the way, I know Dr. Balian and he has my utmost admiration and respect and we seem to agree on quite a bit.

Hovik: 46:08

So the

Arman: 46:11

That's exactly right.

Arman: I mean, (00:46:14): 46:13

first of all,

Arman: 46:14

if you look at the rhetoric coming from the West and from Turkey, there was this interesting statement that Erdogan made at some point, I think shortly after Pashinyan's visit to Turkey, Erdogan gave an interview and said the corridor project, I don't remember if he called it corridor, I think he called it Zangezur Corridor, he said it's also an economic project. so uh it was it was pretty and it wasn't a freudian sleep i mean they they clearly no no not at all in those terms there are two very interesting interviews i think last year maybe it was before trip maybe yeah it was around then uh one was by paul gobel there is this podcast called osman kaze um so um i don't remember the name of the lady that uh that does the podcast but she interviewed

Arman: Goble and then she interviewed, (00:47:12): 47:10

back to back,

Arman: 47:12

she interviewed Paul Goble and Matthew Bryza and I'm sure your viewers know who Goble and Bryza are. I mean, there was absolutely no secret, no prevarication. This is a geopolitical, this is a strategic project and the, I mean, people are not even talking seriously about its economic aspects. I haven't seen any serious studies of its economic consequences. In fact, the only serious analysis I have seen was by my friend Levon Zargaryan, who analyzed how the link between Azerbaijan and Turkey through Georgia is working under capacity. So why they need another such project is not all that clear. One could argue that this is a shorter pass, more economical. But again, nobody has done serious economic Serious Economic Analysis You should also or your viewers should also go back and look watch the interview of James O'Brien when he was in Armenia, I believe in 2023. He gave an interview to Radio Liberty. And I was actually surprised how open he was. He said, you should not agree to implement paragraph nine. You should not only not allow the Russians to become responsible for the security of that passage. Russians should not even be involved in any economic projects that would stem from the implementation of that project. Russians should be completely isolated from that project, right?

Arman: So and then, (00:48:54): 48:52

you know,

Arman: the final thing was all of these, (00:48:57): 48:54

by the way,

Arman: 48:57

is on my on my Facebook page if people want to go back and watch it. There was also a meeting at the CSIS,(00:49:05): I believe,

Arman: in Washington, (00:49:06): 49:05

D.C.,

Arman: 49:06

where they were talking about this. And again, it's all about circumventing Russia. Some people talk about also, you know, isolating Iran. And connecting Turkey and Europe to Central Asia. And that's kind of the geopolitical project. That's kind of the meaning behind this idea. and the economic aspects of the connectivity and all these NGO buzzwords are just for the consumption of the Armenian electorate. That's all there is.

Hovik: 49:44

But Dr. Grigoryan, can I just interject here? So it's not an economic project, we established that, it's a geopolitical project, but some people actually use that as an argument in saying that, see,

Hovik: this draws in the United States as, (00:50:01): 49:58

you know,

Hovik: 50:01

it brings in the interests of United States, which also brings in some soft kind of security guarantees. Is that the case? And what would be a more prudent policy to projects like TRIPP Especially, you know, it's now an issue in the political campaign, what to do with TRIPP. Some opposition parties even are arguing that,(00:50:29): yes, TRIPP is acceptable on paper, but we have to build in some kind of security guarantees. What would be a more prudent policy? Because I think that unless Iran, God forbid, gets completely destroyed as part of this war in Iran, I think they're going to have something more strong to say about TRIPP in the coming (00:50:52): So how do you navigate that cluster? I don't want to continue, but how do you navigate that?

Arman: You just answered your question. (00:51:01): 50:59

I mean,

Arman: 51:01

looking at what's happening there with Iran and the United States and thinking

Arman: that, (00:51:06): 51:05

well,

Arman: 51:06

this is the way to go. And nobody's going to have a problem and the United States is going to be able to ignore the interests of the regional actors, including Iran, where it has essentially been defeated by Iran. And this is something Iran has on numerous occasions described as a red line for its own interests,

Arman: for itself. (00:51:32): 51:30

And by the way,

Arman: 51:32

if people think I'm exaggerating, I've been actually talking about the United States, Israel,

Arman: Having been defeated in this war, (00:51:40): 51:38

I think,

Arman: 51:40

on the third day of the war, since the third day of the war, it was, you know, I had no doubt that this was going to be the outcome of this war. Or I had little doubt. I mean, I shouldn't say I never have no doubt, actually. Otherwise, I would be a politician.

Hovik: 51:57

Not a scholar.

Arman: 52:00

But people don't have to take my word for it. They can look at a very stunning and interesting article that came out in The Atlantic, the most neoconservative hawkish interventionist outlet in the United States by one of the most interventionist hawkish Zionist imperialist characters in Washington DC by Robert Kagan. who wrote pretty unequivocally that the United States has been defeated and that this has been the most significant defeat and catastrophe in American foreign policy ever, worse than Vietnam. And this is a guy who has always been in favor of wars like this. And when it's coming from somebody like Robert Kagan, and your viewers probably know his wife better, he's married to Victoria Nuland. So when you hear this stuff coming from these circles, and when the New York Times is writing articles about, (00:53:01): oh, it was just Netanyahu's pressure, stuff that people describe as conspiracy theories and anti-Semitic tropes and that sort of thing, the New York Times is now pretty openly saying that the Trump administration was forced into this conflict without having any You know exit strategy without having any strategy for victory just just the hope that the regime would collapse everything would fall in place and now they are facing a disaster. a foreign policy and strategic disaster, the likes of which they haven't faced ever. I mean, Saudi Arabia has prohibited the use of its airspace, right? They can't enforce that blockade. People are talking about hyperinflation in the United States and famine in parts of the world because of the fertilizer situation. This is an unmitigated disaster that the United States has brought upon itself And then you look at it and you're like,(00:54:04): oh, TRIPP, you know, yeah,

Arman: these are soft guarantees, (00:54:09): 54:07

all right.

Arman: 54:09

Soft being the upper.

Asbed: 54:11

Yeah. I mean, what is the priority of TRIPP right now for Trump? I just don't see it.

Arman: 54:18

I don't see it either. I mean, I think that that project is now mothballed and I don't think if by some miracle the United States pulls a victory out of the jaws of defeat, that project is not going to be implemented.

Asbed: 54:35

Dr. Grigoryan, thank you for joining us. This was very, very interesting, although we have other topics on deck.

Asbed: So, (00:54:44): 54:43

for example,

Asbed: 54:44

we didn't talk at all about the currents and the trends that are driving the electoral process in Armenia right now, but maybe we can have you back soon for a deep dive on those topics. Let me also say that while you were talking about Robert Kagan, I was looking out my window to see if there are any IRGC troops on the streets, but I didn't see anything. So I think that his level of concern is a little premature as well.

Arman: 55:14

Good that we left some things undiscussed. Maybe next time you'll invite me sooner. Oh, definitely, definitely.

Asbed: 55:20

We've missed you and we'll have you very soon.(00:55:24): Okay.

Arman: 55:24

Thank you very much. Take care.

Asbed: 55:26

Thank you. That's our show today. This episode was recorded on May 13, 2026. Fascinating conversation. We've been talking with Dr. Arman Grigoryan, who is an associate professor of international relations at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania. He has a doctorate in political science from Columbia University in New York and a master's in IR from The University of Chicago. His research has appeared in International Security, Security Studies, International Studies Quarterly, International Political Science Review, Nationality Papers, Ethnopolitics, and International Analytics. That's a mouthful. For more information, of course, you can go to our website and click on his link. podcasts.podcasts.groong.org/[episode-number].

Hovik: 56:14

Don't forget to like, comment and share. We're not doing too many groveling sessions at the beginning of the show nowadays, but it's important to impress upon you that we still rely on your contributions. We are doing a lot of work behind the scenes to optimize things. A lot of coding to help improve the speed at which we can push these out. It all depends on more AI credits. So we'd appreciate your support. And yeah, let us know what you think about this podcast. I'm Hovik Manucharyan.

Asbed: 56:54

And I'm Asbed Bedrossian. Talk to you soon.