Dmitry Suslov - Ukraine’s Endgame, Armenia’s Crossroads | Ep 566, Jul 11, 2026

Conversations on Groong - July 11, 2026

In this episode of Conversations on Groong, we speak with Dr. Dmitry Suslov about Russia's strategic position across multiple fronts: the Ukraine War, Armenia's post-election Western pivot, TRIPP and Syunik, and Europe's rearmament against Russia. We discuss the long-term confrontation between Russia and NATO, Pashinyan's Western alignment after the June 2026 Armenian Parliamentary Election, and how transport corridors in the South Caucasus may reshape regional containment lines.

Topics:

• Ukraine's long war and endgame
• Novorossiya and a landlocked Ukraine?
• Europe rearms against Russia
• NATO 3.0 and containment
• Armenia's post-election Western pivot
• EU promises versus EAEU dependence
• TRIPP, Syunik, and Russian red lines

Guest: Dmitry Suslov

Hosts:

• Hovik Manucharyan
• Asbed Bedrossian

Episode 566 | Recorded: July 9, 2026

SHOW NOTES: https://podcasts.groong.org/566

VIDEO: https://youtu.be/NFS46vZ039Q

#Russia #UkraineWar #NATO #Europe #Armenia #SouthCaucasus #TRIPP #Syunik #EAEU

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Transcript

Asbed: 0:03

Hello, everyone. And welcome to this Conversations on Groong episode. Today we are joined by Dmitry Suslov to discuss Russia's strategic position across several connected fronts, the war in Ukraine, Armenia's post-election pivot towards the West, TRIPP in the South Caucasus and the long-term confrontation between Russia and rearming Europe. Dr. Suslov is a Russian political scientist, foreign policy analyst, and commentator specializing in great power politics, especially Russia-U.S. relations, European security, and the evolving international order.

Hovik: 0:37

Friends, before we go to Dr. Suslov, thank you for your support and your previous contributions. We do a lot to bring you this independent type of coverage. Some of these guests you will not see anywhere else in Armenian media. We think it's important to hear all sides. Dr. Suslov is a very well-spoken commentator on Russian policy and I think you will enjoy this show greatly. there are no corporate or government shows here we do not get funding from any three-letter, four-letter, five-letter agency This is mostly 99% funded by Asbed and I so far and we're just looking to also offload some of that burden onto willing supporters so if you can support us in any way financially then go to podcasts.groong.org/donate and help us cover the costs for producing these podcasts and also increasing the speed at which we bring you these episodes and increasing the content that we produce as well

Asbed: 1:42

Dr. Suslov welcome back to the Groong podcast hello and thank you and it's a pleasure

Hovik: 1:47

to be here thank you Dr. Suslov we really uh enjoyed our last conversation with you and we appreciate you coming back again uh let's start with uh Ukraine if possible now Russian sources and pro-Russian sources and analysts describe recent battlefield developments as meaningful advances towards the Donbas fortress belt. The most significant development is the reported capture of the town of Konstantinovka. Now Western officials and Ukrainian sources deny these same developments and frame them as minor Russian gains over ruins and rubble. while insisting that Ukraine's long-range strike capability and NATO-backed production base are uh expanding and we heard some of that during the recent NATO summit in Ankara so can you tell us from your perspective um is Russia making real operational progress in Donbas and or is this essentially a slow grind uh conflict uh that that is uh attritional in nature

Dmitry: 2:56

Well, I think that Russia is making slow progress, but it is a war of attrition, and there is an escalation going on at the same time. So, of course, there is progress because Russia is moving forward. as you directly said about the capture of Konstantinovka that it's a very important town on the way to Slavyansk-Kramatorsk. Slavyansk and Kramatorsk are the last remaining places, cities or towns in the Donbas area still under the control of the Ukrainian armed forces and Konstantinovka was an extremely significant defensive line on the way to them so capturing Konstantinovka really brings Russia closer to capturing the whole Donbas so that's a very very important step forward at the same time of course the progress is slow because we are not witnessing maneuver warfare and maneuver warfare is impossible due to the abundance of drones now drones dominate the battlefield and the quality of drones and the quantity of drones the abundance of them basically makes it impossible to conduct maneuver warfare makes it impossible to concentrate forces to operate with big platoons or battalions or whatever actually all the movements are made by individuals or couples of soldiers you know the less the better because the more people the easier It's easier to be noticed and destroyed with the usage of drones Of course, the factor of drones favors the defensive side, which is Ukraine, not Russia it is costly of course for Russia to move forward so basically the changed nature of war explains the pace which is slow and predetermines the nature of the warfare which is the battle of attrition and since Russia still maintains advantage in manpower in artillery even partially in drones so Russia is moving forward and I have no doubts that the rest of Donbas will be taken in some observable future but at the same time you are also right that there is an escalation going on and the nature of this escalation is deep strikes because Ukraine now puts the major emphasis on deep strikes against the Russian energy infrastructure and the theory behind that is this that if Ukraine with the help of the West with the help of Europe destroys a significant portion of the Russian energy infrastructure refineries, oil refineries, gas stations, pipelines even power plants it will from their perspective and from the Western perspective, it would be harder for Russia to continue the current intensity of war. Because the Russian approach is based on the assumption that Russia will afford fighting as long as it takes. And they want to destroy that. They want to compel Russia to make concessions. basically political, very significant concessions. They want Russia to reject the demand that Russia must control the whole of Donbas. And they perceive those deep strikes as a means to accomplish that.

Asbed: 7:11

Do you think this is a justified presumption?

Dmitry: 7:15

well not necessarily of course you know those deep strikes against civilian infrastructure right it needs to be emphasized and they don't even conceal it they claim that Ukraine should strike the Russian civilian infrastructure you know in order to in order to produce some civil unrest in order to trigger domestic discontent in the Russian society in order to inflict some economic problems on the Russian society and by doing so to increase the political pressure on the leadership so they're making some damage without question and Russia has faced certain problems such as the temporary deficit of gasoline for instance in the country it's clear but this damage is not critical and what is important is that they will not be able to inflict such a critical damage that could hypothetically compel Russia to change its war objectives and to make significant to make significant concessions more because this damage is felt but it is manageable it is manageable right lots of repairs are being conducted quickly Russia is strengthening its air defense and Russia is the world leader in air defense and so on and so forth but more important even is that the escalation on the Ukrainian side is met or logically with the escalation from the Russian side right Russian response to the Ukrainian and Western-led escalation into the deep strikes in terms of deep strikes into Russia you know resulted in Russian acceleration of Russian deep strikes inside Ukraine and Russia has started to conduct very regular and quite intensive strikes against Kyiv and multiple objects inside Ukraine and the intensity of Russian strikes against Ukraine and the damage which Russia inflicts on Kyiv Ukraine I would say is much more than the damage that Ukraine inflicts on Russia and today Russia has a certain advantage here which is the deficit of Ukrainian air defense systems right because in addition to drones multiple number of drones and cruise missiles the means which Russia uses and the means which Ukraine lacks so far is ballistic missiles and Ukraine simply does not have air defenses which are able to intercept the Russian ballistic missiles right and even officially Ukraine claims that it misses it can't intercept the uh the Russian ballistic uh so Dr. Suslov just

Asbed: 10:26

in the last two days and I know we're going to talk a little bit more about this when the NATO summit occurred in Ankara I believe that President uh Trump authorized the sale or the making of Patriot air defense systems in Ukraine. Is this going to cause some kind of a major problem?

Dmitry: 10:44

No, not an immediate problem, I would say, because Ukraine needs the Patriot missiles here and now. Trump refused to provide Ukraine the missiles the ready manufactured capable missiles right now what he did is he provided the license for Ukraine to produce those those missiles at the Ukrainian territory it will be extremely lengthy and complicated issue which will take years if it happens at all because first it's very difficult to produce such a complicated manufacturing in conditions of war because believe me it will be one of the most prioritized targets for Russia I strongly doubt you know also so that's number one number two it's impossible even to start production without the presence of American experts on-site from Lockheed Martin for instance which produces those missiles in the United States I strongly doubt that the American experts will be ready to go there while becoming targets simultaneously right because of course Russia will look for them and will try to kill them right and will try to destroy everything which which they try to which they try to build number three it's a lengthy process it's very lengthy and complicated process then there is a problem of the sharing of technologies the United States is not very keen to share advanced technologies for Patriot missiles today there are only two countries in the world which produce PAC-3 which is the most advanced version of the Patriot missile these are the United States itself and Japan PAC-2 which is a little bit outdated is also produced in Germany and that's it right so I strongly doubt also that the United States will be quickly sharing the technologies expertise and everything else with with Ukraine even in normal times in times of peace and and safety it takes years it takes years you know to to build them to build the plant and for the plant to become operational and there is also the problem of supply chains because not everything not 100% not all the components are produced right in place right there is the whole chain of production spread along the world and there are lots of bottlenecks here so my prognosis is that at best in several years from now Ukraine could build this plant if it survives by that time but it will not make any impact here and now when Ukraine is in the huge deficit of those air defense systems

Hovik: 14:02

Dr. Suslov at the same time in your answers you said that Ukraine yet doesn't have that capability you talked about air defense and also ballistic missiles on the ballistic missile front we have also developments that Ukraine is ostensibly developing its own capabilities and there's criticism that it is essentially a rebranded Western missiles that will be developed or maybe shipped and just stamped in Ukraine as Ukrainian so to me this indicates like a race against time and I'm wondering whether the slow nature of the conflict is coming right across is in conflict itself with the time requirements for Russia to end this in a reasonable period and some Russian analysts for instance Sergei Karaganov argued that Russia should increase or the escalations the speed of the escalation and potentially consider use of tactical nuclear weapons in order to ensure that this conflict ceases sooner than later in order to minimize damage and in order to prevent significant rearming of Ukraine. What are your thoughts on that?

Dmitry: 15:21

well first I exclude the possibility of Russia using tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine and against Ukraine and when my teacher actually and my supervisor at the HSE University Sergei Karaganov talks about the hypothetical use of tactical nuclear weapons he means Europe he doesn't mean Ukraine he means Europe as a result of a Russian-European direct clash because if God forbid uh there is a direct military clash direct not a proxy war but direct war uh between Russia and the European countries of NATO without question we will have the nuclear escalation and I think that the risk of such a development is uh going up because you are absolutely right that the missiles which Ukraine uses increasingly uses and tries to obtain are not necessarily Ukrainian first and foremost even the majority of missiles which Ukraine claims to produce are not entirely Ukrainian right and we know multiple places in Europe in European countries which actually produce those drones or the components of drones for Ukraine short-range drones medium-range drones and long-range drones the same refers to cruise missiles there is a very much advertised, even maybe over-advertised Ukrainian missile called Flamingo but it's not Ukrainian actually it is a European missile you know compiled from several European components and again they don't even conceal the participation of direct participation of many European military companies military industrial companies the French the German in the production of of this missile the same is with the so-called Ukrainian ballistic missile which does not exist yet they claim to have an aspiration to produce it by this autumn but we know again that this is not a Ukrainian missile, because even in Soviet times, and especially in the post-Soviet time, Ukraine lacked the competence of production of ballistic missiles. You have to have the whole school of thought, if you want, and the legacy of thought, the whole science of ballistics. Ukraine never had it. and even if it had something it was lost during the soviet time so it is the Western participation right and that's the point which Dr. Karaganov and many others in Russia and some of the officials even claim that the increasing number of deep strikes into Russia is not produced by Ukraine right they did this major change yes indeed this is the major change in the in the war which has occurred recently the intensification of the Ukrainian deep strikes into into Russia is conducted by the West with the direct participation of the West because the West produces the West supplies and the West targets and directs those strikes right the West also provides the intelligence data which allows those cruise missiles and drones to fly and hit and overcome the Russian air defenses and again the assumption is that this intensification of those deep strikes would eventually compel Russia to make fundamental compromises and for instance accept the freezing of the My assumption is that the opposite, a very different scenario could happen if they inflict too much damage, if the Russian leadership comes to conclusion that the current state of Russia status quo or the future status quo is unsustainable and that Russia simply cannot sustain really this abundance of deep strikes again produced by the West right because all the preparatory work is done by the West a more prudent scenario is Russian escalation against the West so far Russia has escalated against Ukraine as a result of the Ukrainian escalation of the Ukrainian-Western escalation against Russia but I do not exclude at all the Russian escalation against the West as a result of that because again the roots of that problem they all go to the uh uh to the West and I think that this topic of escalation is in the air so we are in a very dangerous process this is why I said that yes there is this slow progress there is still the war of attrition but in addition to that there is this escalatory component which is

Hovik: 20:46

which is clearly rising yeah talking about the front lines Dr. Suslov Some analysts and even Russian officials now argue that Russia's goals need to be expanded beyond Donbas and include Odessa, Kharkov and the broader Novorossiya concept. Do you subscribe to that belief? We were talking recently with Dr. Markedonov and he was saying that I think you know he was of the camp that you know Russia should be satisfied with capturing all of Donbas but uh what are your thoughts and uh is is is Novorossiya truly part of Russian strategic thinking or is that a potentially a threat uh for and for escalation uh what is the current uh current goal of Russia in terms of the well you know yeah

Dmitry: 21:35

I think it largely depends on the Trump administration because the agreement or the understanding at the Anchorage summit last year was that Russia Russia would be satisfied with taking the whole of Donbas and we will basically sacrifice the remaining part of Novorossiya which is Kherson and Zaporozhye region not under the Russian control so if the Trump administration still subscribes under those conditions which actually were formulated by the Trump administration itself then Russia will definitely stick to that position and keep that position if Trump administration under the pressure or bad advice, by the way of the Europeans and Ukrainians goes away from that position and starts demanding that Russia accepts the decision ceasefire, unconditional ceasefire at the current front line then it would make no sense for Russia also to keep the agreement which the United States no longer keeps right it would be awkward for Russia to keep that agreement unilaterally right uh and in this case of course Russia will revise its uh its war demands uh and aims and probably return to the original position or well not the the very original position of one of the longer uh previous positions that the whole of Kherson and Zaporozhye regions should come to the Russian control. As for Odessa, of course, very many hawks and nationalists in Russia, those who claim that Russian demands should be more maximalist, they, of course, argue that Russia should cut Ukraine from the Black Sea completely. it makes sense of course from the military and strategic viewpoint if Ukraine is completely cut from the Black Sea it will probably cease to be a viable state and if it ceases to be a viable state it will no longer pose any danger any security threat to Russia in the future so it makes sense but with the current military conditions I see no way for Russia to basically accomplish that purpose to take Odessa at a reasonable cost at the cost which Russia could afford because again with the factor of drones which now dominates the battlefield large-scale maneuver operations are not possible completely right so taking Odessa could be possible hypothetically if Ukraine cracks and collapses from within and as a result of the Ukrainian collapse from within there will be the crumbling and collapse of the front line and then basically Russia would take a guess without major resistance from the from the Ukrainian uh site but it is not uh it is not likely to put it mildly uh in the uh in the observable future um

Asbed: 25:20

this is a very interesting discussion one thing I did not hear is any kind of a timeline to finishing this conflict it's been four and a half years um uh

Dmitry: 25:30

Asbed, I hesitate to ask because the timeline uh is determined by the attrition of the sides today both sides have diametrically opposite purposes of course both sides are interested in ending the conflict but the conditions are still too separate, too opposites for a compromise so one of the sides should make a certain concession last year the paradigm which was shared by the Trump administration was that Ukraine as a much weaker side Ukraine as a side which was doomed basically for eventual attrition and defeat was the one to make this concession for the sake of Ukrainian survival actually Now Ukraine and Europe are doing their best to convince the Trump administration that Russia will probably decide which side will collapse from attrition or face a deep crisis from attrition quicker than Ukraine. and thus they claim that Russia should make a concession instead of Ukraine we will see what is the position of the Trump administration because viewed from Moscow now we have doubts very serious doubts that the Trump administration still keeps the conditions which it had offered itself again this is very important last year if it no longer keeps the proposal and keeps this agreement then as I said Russia will revise its war aims and of course will just continue continue fighting I mean because our understanding and our assumption is that we still have the advantage in terms of manpower in terms of military industrial power in terms of the intensity of strikes and so on and so forth so coming back to your original question it's impossible to identify any time because you know

Asbed: 27:55

because how would you you're right

Dmitry: 27:59

because it is simply determined by the pace of attrition of the sides.

Asbed: 28:08

But let me ask a question. We have two more topics with the Armenian South Caucasus front and then there's the whole rearming of Europe which we want to talk about. But within that context, at least from the Armenian perspective, whenever we've heard about Russia's engagement in the South Caucasus, line has been it's very busy in Ukraine and that is the top priority currently well as Europe starts turning and becoming more militarized arming itself and some of the news is that they're going to put a lot of money 70 billion dollars to infrastructure to help them move weaponry to their eastern front meaning you know the Russian front um Is Ukraine becoming just a pastime for them to keep this attrition going while they get ready for a larger war in 2030 or 2035 or whatever? in a sense is Russia being just occupied constantly because all all Europe has to do all France and the UK have to do is just throw money at it right

Hovik: 29:12

and also this uh it's not just France and the uh France and European countries there was I believe at the uh NATO summit there was also a separate agreement between the UK and Turkey. Turkey is basically sitting on the side and enjoying this conflict while yep increasing its potential and the agreement between the UK and Turkey includes I think self-defense some some mutual defense capability so is Russia concerned about Turkish plus NATO plus European encroachment into the South Caucasus

Dmitry: 29:44

well absolutely first Russia is very much concerned about the European remilitarization about this concept of NATO 3.0 which is the outsource of conventional deterrence and defense to the Europeans and basically Europe becoming responsible for the preparation of war against Russia and the bad thing is that the Trump administration basically wants Europe to play this role to invest more and more into the remilitarization and to prepare for a hypothetical conventional war against Russia. But again, if this war, God forbid, happened, it will not be conventional. That's the point, right? And the usage of nuclear weapons, unfortunately, would be quite quick. So, of course, we are very much concerned about the European desire to prolong the conflict in Ukraine. in order to win time for European remilitarization right because today Europe lacks the military potential for a hypothetical clash vis-à-vis Russia so they want Ukraine basically to become a shield and to win time for the uh for the Europeans you know to pump their military muscles to uh to build factories to uh build more uh capable armed forces and uh so on and so forth right and this is why that's right that's right

Asbed: 31:24

I mean that's exactly what's happening uh at uh in Ankara, Ursula von der Leyen basically said that the EU budget for defense is going to be over 200 billion dollars in 2020 well I mean that's a year and a half from now essentially next year their budgeting will start including 200 billion dollars and Russia is looking at of course you're looking at the USA now you're going to be looking at the USE, the United States of Europe uh spending a lot of money and that money never sits in bunkers uh

Dmitry: 31:54

yeah so this this is a long-term threat well NATO defined Russia as a long-term challenge or a long-term threat to the Euro-Atlantic community but basically we see NATO and Europe right and the European part of NATO is a long-term threat confrontation between Russia and Europe unfortunately will be quite long much longer than they pay than the military conflict in Ukraine itself and Europeans they want also to use Ukraine as a as a sword you know as a as a military factor against Russia first to win time for their militarization second also to use Ukraine as the first kind of expendable in a hypothetical conflict with Russia. They want Ukraine to play a role in any hypothetical military clash between Russia and Europe if it happens in the future, and they emphasize military integration between Europe and Ukraine. they don't want Ukraine to become a member of the European Union and no one believes that Ukraine will become a member of the European Union in any hypothetical future because it will be suicidal for the EU and actually the central and Eastern European countries will be the first and they are already the ones take Poland for instance or witness Poland right which are resisting the actual economic integration of Ukraine into the European Union but what they want is the military integration right the military integration the integration of the military industrial complexes right Ukraine Ukraine uses lots of what Europe produces but also Europe wants to use much of the Ukrainian expertise experience and so on and so forth in the future and Russia of course sees that link and the growing military integration between Ukraine and EU as a threat and if we move to the political settlement negotiations of course Russia will insist on certain limits and revision of the current military integration between Ukraine and Europe as for Turkey of course we have no illusions here as well Russian-Turkish relations are partnership But we perceive Turkey as a regional adversary, as a regional competitor in the South Caucasus, in the Eastern Mediterranean, and in Central Asia Probably Africa too absolutely absolutely uh uh that's a paradox of Russia-Turkish relations so that you spot any place we are clashing with Turkey but the whole paradigm is uh partnership still right and we need each other by the way I think President Erdogan did not conceal that Turkey helps Ukraine. Turkey provides certain assistance to Ukraine. Turkey wants Ukraine also not to be defeated, at least. in this conflict Turkey did play a role in providing Ukraine with drones with some other weapons before and probably continues to do that also Turkey, of course, wants a lot from the United States, like F-35s, for instance, from the United States. Turkey remains a country of NATO, a member of NATO, so we have no illusions, of course, about the Turkish role. As for the situation in the South Caucasus in general, well, yes, of course, the Russian position in the region has weakened. over the recent time, unfortunately. As a result, not just of the Russian preoccupation with the Ukraine war, which took longer than Russia originally anticipated because of the Western penetration into this war, but also because of the Western role. Because Europe but also the United States and here I again see a combination and the convergence of the interests both Europe and the United States see South Caucasus as a region where Russia should be undermined from which Russia should be basically kicked out. Europe wants another conflict zones vis-à-vis Russia in the South Caucasus. The United States simply wants to weaken the Russian position in the region and to increase the presence in the West. Unfortunately, Armenia is playing a growing role in the implementation of these policies.

Asbed: 37:19

So this is a good segue for US to go to our next segment, which revolves around Armenia. There was a parliamentary election a month ago, and following that 2026 parliamentary election, Pashinyan's government appears to be accelerating Armenia's so-called Western pivot. Civil Contract retained power and will have three-fifths majority owing primarily to irregularities which pushed Prosperous Armenia Gagik Tsarukyan's opposition party and so this creates kind of a structural is a contradiction for because Armenia's government is now going to start moving closer to the West while Armenia's energy trade security labor core economic dependencies are all tied to Russia we can say Eurasian Economic Union but primarily that's going to mean Russia for Armenia so the question here is does Moscow view Armenia's continuing Western pivot as something that Armenians want that Pashinyan has a vision or is this like a Maidanization of Armenia it's a Western operation just so that they Armenia becomes a tool against Russia well uh I think

Dmitry: 38:32

the latter is much more correct uh we see many comparisons between Pashinyan's policies and the policies conducted by a previous Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili uh in two thousands by the way lots of similarities both in domestic politics and in foreign policy right because we remember that Saakashvili came to power in Georgia as a result of uh colored revolution pretty much like Pashinyan did Saakashvili, after a certain time, started to transform Georgia into a repressive authoritarian state just the same what Pashinyan is doing Pashinyan is trying to eradicate political opposition there are repressions against opposition going on in Armenia

Asbed: 39:29

It's like a pattern. It's a project plan which is being implemented milestone by milestone, phase by phase.

Dmitry: 39:39

Yes, absolutely. In Ukraine, by the way, a similar situation. No elections and the dictatorship of Zelenskyy. and in foreign policy also Armenia is becoming a pawn of the Western players and unfortunately our major disconnect the intent with Pashinyan is that he makes Armenia an expendable he makes Armenia an instrument of the Western policy against Russia contrary to the objective interests of the Armenian people and the Armenian nature because it would be suicidal for Armenia in its very complicated geopolitical surroundings having Azerbaijan and Turkey nearby to antagonize Russia and Iran the countries which are interested in Armenian survival safety and security who are Armenian friends and have been supporting Armenia throughout decades and Pashinyan's pivot to the West and the fact that Pashinyan allows the West to start using Armenia as a pawn undermines the relations between Armenia and Russia and Armenia and Iran without actually improvement, without significant improvement or qualitative improvement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Turkish Turkish relations because I do not see right now and I do not anticipate in the observable future any honeymoon between Armenia and Turkey right but at the same time Armenia persistently undermines relations with both Russia and Iran this is definitely against the national interests of Armenia you're absolutely right after the re-election after the parliamentary elections the current Armenian government doubled down on the policy which they had started even before which is pivots to the to the European Union to the West not just European Union but also to the to the United States increasingly you know turn to the to the to the West while keeping their membership in the Eurasian Economic Union so far as long as they need it as long as there is no replacement and that's the contradiction which you identified right because economically Armenia is integrated with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union but politically Pashinyan wants to strengthen and does strengthen relations with the European Union and the United States and wants to keep Armenian membership in the Eurasian Economic Union and wants to preserve economic relations with Russia as a temporary measure in order to make this term more comfortable for Armenia and he doesn't conceal that this membership in the Eurasian Economic Union and preservation of relations with Russia is a temporary measure that's not a strategic choice that's a temporary means and Pashinyan claims that when time comes he will make a decision or the Armenian government will make a decision of whether to continue cooperation with Russian membership in the Eurasian Economic Union or not from the Russian perspective we are not interested in such a play right we are not interested in basically paying for the Armenian reorientation to the to the European Union we don't want to make this term comfortable for the for the current Armenian government this is why the Russian message is make the choice now right if you make a strategic choice proved by the national referendum this is why Vladimir Putin is talking about referendum and encouraged Armenia to conduct the referendum if Armenia conducts the referendum and the result of the referendum is European Union then there is a clear situation and unfortunately Armenia will be no longer perceived by Russia as a friendly country with all the relevant circumstances at the same time if the national referendum claims that Armenia should stay with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union then of course uh official Yerevan should recalibrate uh its foreign policy right and we do not of course demand or the cancellation of Armenian relations with the West of course not right uh we simply do not want Armenia to be the pawn uh of the uh Western uh unfriendly to put it mildly policy vis-à-vis Russia

Asbed: 44:57

you know what's interesting about being a pawn is that everyone seems to be demanding that Armenia have a referendum or constitutional change Aliyev wants to have something on paper that says Armenia has no demands on Azerbaijan because he wants something on paper because he doesn't believe that Armenians believe that the outcome of the 2020 war is a cultural shift he doesn't believe that and Putin doesn't believe that Armenians really believe that they need to disconnect from Russia So everybody wants the voice of the people to be heard rather than this shill of a government.

Dmitry: 45:32

Well, from the Russian perspective, Pashinyan, when he talks about the desirability of integration with the European Union, that he does not reflect the Armenian nation, the Armenian people. He reflects himself, maybe a significant part of the Armenian nation, but not necessarily the overwhelming majority. So this is why we're interested in the referendum. in a democratic referendum, by the way. From the Russian perspective, the latest elections in Armenia were not 100% democratic because they were conducted in conditions of repressions, in conditions of threats, imprisonment of the participants and so on.

Hovik: 46:15

Dr. Suslov, on that matter, so far, Vladimir Putin has withheld congratulating Pashinyan or even recognizing the results, but I believe from the Pashinyan-Mishustin meeting, which happened in Yekaterinburg, I think we can surmise that that recognition, at least, will be forthcoming in the future, or some kind of a statement from Putin will be forthcoming. As part of the Mishustin meeting, Mishustin underscored that they expect the Armenian government to conduct more friendly, more cooperative policies with Russia. What do you think, is there some kind of a barter going on in terms of what is expected from the Armenian side in order for the Russian government to formally at least acquiesce that Pashinyan is the leader of Armenia and it will deal with him in the next five years?

Dmitry: 47:13

Well, I think that as long as Pashinyan is the leader of Armenia and as long as Pashinyan conducts the policy which he conducts, which is reorientation towards European Union and the United States, Russia is unlikely to revise the restrictive measures which it has implemented already vis-à-vis Armenia. Because again, Russia is not interested in helping Pashinyan in making this reorientation comfortable right at the same time I think there is a modus vivendi in terms of not to accelerate the conflict too much because Russia is not interested in a in a clash right Russia is not interested in a Russia is still interested in Armenia as a partner, as an ally, and as a brotherly nation. Russia is not interested in a quick withdrawal of the Russian military base, for instance, in Armenia, and it is still there. Russia is not accelerating the expel right and the procedure of expelling Armenia from the Eurasian Economic Union although Russia takes punitive measures so I think that there are more restrictive measures. I think that there is some modus some workable modus vivendi with Pashinyan, with which Russia is not satisfied, but it is better than what could be the alternative. However, as we discussed above, Russia is still looking forward to a referendum. in Armenia and referendum in the short-term period of time not somewhere in the future like Pashinyan was

Hovik: 49:16

as a result of these elections the Armenian opposition itself has changed Strong Armenia brings a corporate business-minded and economically pragmatic bloc into parliament even though the combined opposition is still less than one-third of the total. So, Pashinyan has almost carte blanche in most types of legislative measures in the parliament. But this new makeup where the opposition leader is a business-minded person is different from the more nationalistic and the Artsakh or Karabakh-war veteran class that used to exist before. but the opposition collectively is still seen as not pro-Russian but more realistic in terms of Armenia's policies but I want to ask does Moscow see Samvel Karapetyan and his Strong Armenia alliance as a more serious long-term partner than previous let's say Robert Kocharyan and the previous Karabakh war political class

Dmitry: 50:31

look uh from the Russian perspective what is the fundamental difference between the opposition in Armenia and Pashinyan is that the opposition is Armenia centric right they are not pro-Russian they are pro-Armenian whether there are nationalist pro-Armenian like Robert Kocharyan and the Artsakh or the Karabakh-originated uh politicians uh in Armenia or more business-like like Samvel Karapetyan. They are still pro-Armenia. They do not want Armenia to be sacrificed in the geopolitical battle of the big players. They want Armenia to prosper. They recognize the realities, the regional realities, the economic realities. They do not want Armenia to be used in geopolitical battlefields. Unlike Pashinyan, who wants Armenia to be used as a pawn as an instrument in the geopolitical battlefield so Russia will work with any Armenia-oriented politician or a political movement or a political party in Armenia which is popular which is supported by the people of course from the perspective of longer term stability the business-oriented ones like Samvel Karapetyan could be more comfortable to deal with and moreover they are the new people the new people are usually better supported by the population than the old guard so yes of course Russia will be very much eager to work work with the uh with Karapetyan and with the Armenian opposition well but as I said I mean as a matter of principle Russia will work and welcome everyone who represents the interests of Armenia as a country the interests of Armenia as a state not the interests of the European Union through Armenia

Asbed: 52:46

Dr. Suslov, during the Kocharyan and Sargsyan presidencies, the West actively cultivated oppositions and NGOs that eventually culminated in the current Pashinyan regime that is going on. So they really were very actively with them. In general, Russia prefers to deal with the the government rather than the opposition but here currently we have an opposition in Karapetyan and Kocharyan who would like to develop relations with Russia they they're not necessarily going to stop or anything it's not going to be a zero-sum situation for Armenia Armenia has had a policy or diplomacy of complementarity since 1998 essentially how come Russia is so hands-off is it because they think oh well we can work with Pashinyan because he doesn't work against US but maybe at present some red lines may seem to have been crossed I'd like to know why it's quite hands-off and just kind of watching what's going on rather than saying that these people are friendly to US these people are not

Hovik: 53:57

I know that Russia has condemned, but we are seeing unprecedented pressure against opposition members, arrests, humiliating treatment of them, like going into their own houses and putting them on the floor and then just walking them to their car.

Asbed: 54:09

We have a situation of criminalizing the opposition, jailing them, lawfare, as you like to say, Hovik.

Dmitry: 54:19

well I said before that from the Russian perspective Pashinyan is building an authoritarian repressive regime that he is conducting repressions against the opposition he wants the opposition to be eradicated and put in jail right and I made a comparison with Mikhail Saakashvili in Georgia before I think that Pashinyan is going the same path why is Russia not interfering much as you said right this is due to the long-term patterns and traditions of foreign policy which is indeed non-interference into domestic affairs which is a maybe it is a weak sign you know a weak aspect of Russian foreign policy but that's really the the fact the West unlike Russia is really I mean interference and penetration into the domestic affairs is a crucial instrument of the Western policy not just in Armenia but elsewhere in the post-Soviet space and beyond the post-Soviet space. Building NGOs, building opposition, using that in the projection and promotion of the Western interests is a crucial component of the Western foreign policy which results into color revolutions which results into destabilizations sometimes in state failures but that's the way for the West to project its interests Russia lacks that tradition because respect of state sovereignty, a very Westphalian approach towards international relations has been and partially continues to be a prominent feature of Russian foreign policy. I personally think that that's a weakness of Russia, that Russia probably would have been more effective in projecting its interests through the influence on civil societies and oppositions and so on, rather than what Russia is doing in Ukraine right now. But indeed, due to patterns and due to the conceptual approaches to international relations, it's quite difficult for Russia to shift and to fundamentally transform its foreign policy in this regard. I hope it might change in the observable future because the international relations are objectively changing. I think that Russia should work with the Armenian opposition much more actively than Russia is doing right now. I think that there are no illusions with Pashinyan as a counterpart. So we'll see.

Hovik: 57:32

Dr. Suslov EU is offering Armenia tariff relief infrastructure grants and credit lines these are measures that are framed as a way to reduce Armenia's dependence on Russia and soften the impact of the Russian trade restrictions that are in place right now but Armenia's economy remains deeply tied to Russia through exports remittances gas labor access transport realities and the wider Eurasian Economic Union integration and the question is whether the EU can actually in reality replace all these structures or whether it is offering a short-term relief a sort of a mirage to quell the Armenian business population and this relief cannot match the depth of the Eurasian integration what are your thoughts can EU tariff relief and funding replace Russian markets

Dmitry: 58:29

I think that the measures of the European Union are very symbolic, limited and political in order indeed to make an impression that Europe could become an alternative in fact it cannot because you cannot deny geography and you cannot deny the fact that the European agricultural market is perhaps the most protectionist and restricted market in the world. Armenian geopolitical position is that Russia is nearby and Turkey is nearby and by the way Turkey is not a member of the European Union and will not become in any observable future I don't think that Turkey would be eager to open its market and to replace Russia as a market for the Armenian goods. I think Turkey produces much of the things which Armenia produces itself like fruits you know apricots you know lots of other stuff wine even and and so on as for Europe objectively Europe is not interested in opening its market for Armenia and Europe is too far right Europe is too far whereas Russia is nearby moreover it's not just pure trade it is a de facto deep integration of businesses this is investments this is the whole ecosystem of economic relations you just can't replace it overnight and by the way this is the reason why Pashinyan wants Armenia to continue to stay in the Eurasian Economic Union while it deepens relations with the EU because it's impossible to reorient in a short period of time so the short question is European Union cannot replace Russia as an alternative for Armenian markets and look at Ukraine and Georgia again right Georgia was one of the most advanced countries in the post-Soviet space in terms of approximation with the EU legislature but it has a deep and comprehensive free trade area with the with the European Union under the association agreement which they had signed many years ago who are the major trade partners of Georgia not the European but again Turkey and Russia or Russia and Turkey right despite the fact that they have the DCFTA uh with the uh with the European Union because you can't deny geography and you can't overcome the European restrictions and I know this situation very well Georgia failed in convincing the European Commission that Saperavi was wine and that Sulguni was cheese they failed to convince the European Commission of that and they can't export their stuff Armenia will be in the same situation if it goes that path also look at Ukraine is the EU agricultural market open for Ukrainian goods no and the eastern and central European countries like Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic no matter what is the government there is very much against the liberalization of trade with Ukraine so again it's impossible to open the agricultural market of the European Union and it's impossible to deny geography

Asbed: 1:02:29

Let's turn our attention a little bit to the TRIPP project, Dr. Suslov. It's not just an Armenian domestic infrastructure. It's not just a little issue that concerns Armenians. It's basically part of the East-West Corridor, the Zangezur Corridor, the Turanic Corridor, the NATO Corridor, whatever you want to call it. Basically, it intersects Russia's position in the South Caucasus, it's the Eurasian Economic Union's connectivity to Iran and it puts the keys right there in the hands of the United States. So Russian officials have spoken about the possible participation in the TRIPP project because it's also essentially the same thing that the trilateral statement the ceasefire statement of November 2020 was .9 the key question is how Moscow views this does Russia see TRIPP as an ordinary piece of infrastructure or as a strategic line of containment that changes the balance in the South Caucasus

Dmitry: 1:03:34

Well, first we consider TRIPP as a violation of the Sochi agreement, the ceasefire agreement because the ceasefire agreement entailed that this infrastructural corridor linking Azerbaijan with its region through the Armenian territory will be under the Russian control or was considered to be under the Russian control and supervision and as a part of the Russian and Eurasian or Russia-centric and Eurasian infrastructural developments in the region TRIPP is not right although geography is similar the political meaning is different TRIPP is supposed to be controlled by the United States no Russian participation right and as I said that's the violation of the 2020 agreement and moreover I think this American control will be shared with Turkey We've discussed before the role of Turkey as a regional rival for Russia in South Caucasus The TRIPP project controlled by the United States will contribute to the strengthening of the role of Turkey in South Caucasus and building and projecting the Turkish influence in the South Caucasus and moving beyond to the Caspian region and Central Asia. So Russia is quite concerned about this project and considers it unfriendly. we discuss it with the United States but without any illusions you know the as I said before the Trump administration is also trying to undermine the and replace Russia and undermine the Russian influence and presence in in South Caucasus the American policies largely remain unfriendly This is how we approach this project.

Asbed: 1:05:55

let me make a very quick comment about that trilateral statement of 2020 sure you do say that it was essentially a violation of that agreement but that agreement was violated so early and so many times that I just don't see exactly how any part of it remains valid prisoners of war were never released on the part of Azerbaijan the line of demarcation was not held the November 10 line of demarcation everything was abrogated so

Dmitry: 1:06:25

And Nagorno-Karabakh Republic no longer exists.

Asbed: 1:06:28

Absolutely. That's another show. So is Russian participation in the TRIPP a red line for Russia? Is it a bargaining chip? Is it a condition for accepting Armenia's new political reality? How do you view this?

Dmitry: 1:06:45

well Russia is not interested in withdrawal right and in nullifying its presence so if there is a way for Russian participation in this project I think Russia would be eager to consider that as I said that's one of the points of the U.S.-Russian negotiations about the broader issues beyond Ukraine and there are such such negotiations that could be some of the modus vivendi in Russian-Armenian relations in the new situation when Russian influence in the South Caucasus is weaker and Russian influence in Armenia objectively is weaker than it used to be but as I said I mean Russia is not interested in just a complete withdrawal and Russia understands that if it simply criticizes the TRIPP project and demands its complete revision probably it will not be accomplished so let's discuss some way of Russian uh some way of Russian participation so yeah I mean Russia could be could be interested in playing a role in this project making it I would say less dangerous eventually for Armenia because if this project turns into the corridor of the projection of the Turkish influence in the region it will not be in favor of the Armenian long-term interests

Hovik: 1:08:21

Dr. Suslov thank you for being with US already for 15 minutes I hope you can entertain one or two more questions about longer term. we talked a little bit about the Russian-EU potential confrontation now Russia presents Europe as a declining periphery of the Western order but we see Europe is rearming Poland is expanding its military role Turkey is active from the Black Sea to the Caucasus including through geoeconomic projects and NATO allies are taking more initiative in fact um Germany is now there are talks about Germany being nuclear armed so under this possible NATO 3.0 model uh where the US is encouraging its partners to manage the regional security uh more directly uh we think this could create a more uh fragmented but also aggressive and less predictable containment line around Russia is Russia underestimating the rearming of Europe especially Poland Germany and Turkey

Dmitry: 1:09:27

We are taking the remilitarization, the rearmament of Europe very seriously and actually from the Russian perspective the confrontation between Russia and Europe could be very long term as a result of this remilitarization the current elites in Europe definitely wants to turn the EU into a new reich right they want to use by the way they want to continue long-term confrontation with Russia in order to stay in power themselves and in order to deepen the European integration in the military and defense area and turn the European Union into some kind of new federation into a proto-state right the project which failed so far but they think that this illusionary threat from Russia and the confrontation with Russia on the one hand and the changed transatlantic relations the objective crisis and transformation of the transatlantic relations on the other hand will create favorable preconditions for the deepening of the European integration so European Union really under the current elites is becoming more consolidated more militarized the mill the conventional military power and potentially nuclear power of European Union will rise while keeping and even strengthening confrontation with Russia in the long term right even beyond the war in Ukraine and that's very important that for instance NATO summit in Ankara uh claimed Russia a long-term threat right long-term also means beyond the uh the war in uh in Ukraine so uh the relations uh thus are very likely to remain adversarial European elites are interested in keeping those relations adversarial the military threat vis-à-vis Russia from Europe both through Ukraine and directly because Ukraine will be kept as a European big pawn in this confrontation with with Russia you know this threat will persist it will create preconditions for dialogue in the future for dialogue about management of this confrontation confrontation relationship elements of arms control the confliction mechanisms and so on and so forth but having said all that that's just one scenario which is plausible but not without alternatives because the implementation of this scenario is based on the current elites preserving their power and I already said that the current elites in Europe they are interested in deepening and accelerating confrontation with Russia in order to stay in power because objectively they are losing popularity look at the rating of German Chancellor Merz it's 13% he is the most unpopular chancellor of Germany since the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 the same in France Emmanuel Macron is the least popular president of the fifth republic Keir Starmer in the UK is one of the most unpopular prime ministers in Britain so they understand that they are very unpopular and they want to use the confrontation with Russia as a means to preserve their power but if they lose their power if there are new elites coming to power in major European countries then we might have a different scenario right uh for instance if alternative for Germany or Rassemblement National come to power in Germany and France then we will have different European Union less integrated less militarized and more positive relations with Russia so the uh the trajectory the the the the future of Russia Europe relations will ultimately depend on domestic situation in the major European countries if the current elites keep their power then we have the confrontational scenario and the new cold war and a big risk of the cold war transforming into a hot war uh if we have the change of leaderships in the major European countries then we have less centralized European Union more national oriented governments in the major European countries and much better relations with Russia not a return to the status quo but partial normalization and I would say quite crucial normalization between Russia and Europe

Asbed: 1:14:34

Dr. Suslov, look, we had Pashinyan, whose popularity ranged between 15% and 35%, let's just say 25%, and look what happened. They could do similar things in Europe to their very unpopular governments.

Dmitry: 1:14:51

Well, this is why actually there is a discourse about prohibition of the most popular parties in Europe, like AfD, right? It is the most popular political party in Germany, and they propose to prohibit it simply in order for the current elites to keep the power

Asbed: 1:15:15

Now, this pivot to the West is certainly a political movement. What would Russia need to offer Armenia to make Eurasian integration attractive again? It's obviously not the economics of it, it's the politics of it, but what's the way forward for Armenia and Russia together?

Dmitry: 1:15:36

well I think that Russia can and will offer to Armenia security despite the Russian preoccupation with Ukraine Russia will continue to exist Russia will be the geopolitical reality in Caucasus at large Russia will not disappear Russia will not collapse Turkey and Azerbaijan will continue to be long term threats and challenges for the Armenian security and in order to deal with them Armenia will need allies and as I said before there is no replacement for Russia as an ally and the means to guarantee Armenian survival and security so first and foremost Russia could offer security to Armenia secondly in the increasingly fragmented world there is no way for countries even big countries let alone small countries like Armenia to survive on its own we are in the period of regional integration and regional integrations since the chance for Armenia to become a full member of the European Union is less than zero I see no alternative for Armenia than the Eurasian Economic Union actually as the way to preserve Armenian competitiveness to preserve and to stimulate Armenian economic development and look Armenia is still a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and Armenia prospered lately that's a paradox Pashinyan wants to orient vis-à-vis the West whereas the reasons for Armenian growth during the recent time is due to Armenian relations with Russia in the Eurasian Economic Union, I think it's necessary for the Armenian people to recognize them. Pashinyan deceives them in saying that he is the reason for their prosperity. It is not. It is the relations with Russia and Armenian membership in the Eurasian Economic Union which Pashinyan now sacrifices or wants to sacrifice in the future for the sake of the implementation of not even the Armenian so definitely security, economic development plus also cultural heritage Armenia is the most ancient Christian nation it's the first country in the world to have adopted Christianity European Union in its current phase in its current stage I would say is culturally different from what the Armenian values and the Armenian cultural heritage has always been so this cultural connectivity and commonality is also a crucial I think pillar of the Russian-Armenian relations

Asbed: 1:18:51

so a final question if Russia defeats Ukraine finally and uh that conflict is resolved to Russia's satisfaction but in the meantime loses Armenia Moldova influence in other parts of the South Caucasus etc etc is that going to be a strategic win for Russia

Dmitry: 1:19:11

Well, first, I don't think that Russia will lose Armenia and Moldova forever. Today we are at the stage when the Russian influence is weakened in those countries without question. However, look at the Russian-Georgian relations. I've already repeated several times, you can't deny geography and you can't deny geopolitics and the objective realities. after the Russian-Georgian war in august 2008 there was a conviction that the relations are over that the relations are destroyed whatsoever yes we still lack diplomatic relations but paradoxically Russian-Georgian relations are today the most stable and probably the best in the South Caucasus at the same time there is a very deep crisis of the Georgia and West relations because Georgia doesn't want to become a pawn so nothing is irreversible andI'm sure that there will be a normalization and the creation of a new modus vivendi in Russia's relations with Armenia and Moldova what I hope for is that the way there will be not such problematic one than the one as was between Russia and Georgia I do not want a Russian-Armenian military conflict okay well thank you

Asbed: 1:20:55

so much for joining US today I personally have at least two more hours in me of uh topics and questions but um that just means we're gonna have to ask you back on the show sometime soon thank you so much for joining US

Hovik: 1:21:10

thank you it was my pleasure thank you very much the pleasure was ours

Asbed: 1:21:14

but thank you thank you that's our show today this episode was recorded on July 9 2026 folks thank you for staying with US that was a very interesting show

Hovik: 1:21:26

thank you for listening and thank you in any language that you speak we appreciate your confidence in US regarding our dedication to bring you these what we think are intelligent and independent conversations and analysis on Armenian news frankly I would like to gloat a little bit more because we don't find English-language content like this too much on the internet and we are going both Asbed and I are going out of our way to bring this to you completely free and in exchange for that if you can afford it we would appreciate if you could support US which will allow US to uh improve the pace at which we produce these episodes which will allow US to increase our reach it will allow US to um produce more content for you so and obviously we will also uh be able to measure the level of thanks we get for producing this content which is you know uh nice to see some money rolling in

Asbed: 1:22:32

it's a real show of support so we we appreciate that even though it's absolutely not uh mandatory it's entirely up to you but um uh go ahead and uh support US by liking the show sharing the show commenting on our shows and um hope you remind me because I don't even remember that new method of uh supporting a show what was it called it's called hype uh so I was remembering vibe

Hovik: 1:22:58

on YouTube on the app only you get to do three hypes a week and we will be honored if one of those hypes came to US frankly it's still a big bar for US to cross because we have to get like a hundred thousand hype points in order to be featured by YouTube or pushed up by YouTube but hey you know one step at a time so you know try to give US a hype and let's see how far we get it still feels like nice to get some hype sometimes so we appreciate it

Asbed: 1:23:28

So just for the record, we've been talking with Dr. Dmitry Suslov, who is a Russian political scientist, a foreign policy analyst, and commentator specializing in great power politics. The entire bio is in our show notes. Please go to podcasts.groong.org/<episode-number>, and you can click on his bio, you can click on my bio, you can click on Hovik's bio, and we also put any kind of link, news articles, references, etc. in the show notes. Okay, well,I'm Asbed Bedrossian and thank you for listening and we'll talk to you soon