The Defuse Podcast: Where Experts Defuse Real Threats
🔊 The Defuse Podcast: Personal Threat Management for High-Risk Lives
When the threats are real, the stakes are high — so what actually works?"
Hosted by Philip Grindell — former Scotland Yard detective, behavioural threat specialist, and author of Personal Threat Management — this podcast lifts the lid on the proven methods used to keep prominent individuals, executives, and private clients safer.
Each episode features straight-talking conversations with trusted experts on:
Stalking, fixated individuals, and insider threats
Protective intelligence and behavioural profiling
Reputation management and media exposure
Doxxing, OSINT, and digital vulnerability
Crisis leadership and executive resilience under pressure
Whether you're in security, lead a family office, or are responsible for protecting people at risk, you'll get honest, practical insights into what actually works when lives and reputations are on the line.
No theory. No fluff. Just proven ways to defuse real threats.
Subscribe now and learn how to manage threats before they become crises.
The Defuse Podcast: Where Experts Defuse Real Threats
The Attack Cycle with James Hamilton
In this compelling two-part episode, Philip Grindell welcomes back security expert James Hamilton to explore the "attack cycle" - a proven model used by criminals, terrorists, and assassins to target victims. Following the high-profile New York CEO assassination, Hamilton breaks down the eight critical phases: target selection, surveillance, final target selection, planning, rehearsal, execution, escape, and exploitation.
The discussion reveals how attackers methodically progress through each stage and, crucially, how executive protection teams can identify and disrupt these phases. Hamilton shares practical insights on surveillance detection, threat assessment, and creating flexible security programs that balance protection with client accessibility.
BIO
James is a nationally recognized personal security expert and former FBI Supervisory Special Agent. For more than 33 years, he has been a protector, trainer, and advisor to the nation’s most at-risk individuals. He has real, practical, and unparalleled experience in executive protection, violence prevention, and personal security. This real experience was earned through service in local law enforcement, the FBI, and America’s premiere executive protection firm. He has protected government officials, high-net-worth individuals, and leading religious figures all over the globe and has empowered thousands of individuals to stay safe in an increasingly dangerous world. He has dedicated his life to this particular area of expertise and is sought after by those seeking practical and sound guidance.
https://www.hamiltonsecuritygroup.com/
https://www.linkedin.com/in/james-hamilton-752894104/
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Welcome to the Diffuse podcast with host Philip Grindel, CEO and founder of Diffuse, a global threat and intelligence consultancy that blends psychology and intelligence to mitigate threats and risks to prominent people and brands podcast and delighted today to welcome back a good friend.
Speaker 2:I think James is possibly the second only person that we've invited back, which speaks volumes because we've been blessed with who we have. So those of you who don't know James, james Hamilton, his background is hugely impressive and I know that many people listening to the podcast will probably know him and probably even been taught by him. He used to be a significant member at Gavin DeBecker out in the US. But, james, you've gone your own way now, so tell us what you're doing now.
Speaker 3:Thank you, thanks for that Good to be with you again, as always. I kind of went out and started this Hamilton Security Group where I'm the founder and kind of you know, main operator consultant and really just targeting the executive protection private sector side. You know what programs kind of could be doing to make themselves better, how to train them, really talking to CEOs about do you need EP, what is it, what does it look like on the private side, what are some options for me? And I'm doing most of that. And then a little bit of personal security stuff. There's something I call the safety seminar. It's about a 90-minute presentation to regular folks, just hey, how do I keep myself safe from violence? But, yeah, enjoying it and I'm grateful and it's good to be with you again, thank you.
Speaker 2:So you know, the attack on the New York CEO that must have your phone must have gone off the hook then, because that I mean even from sort of standards of violence and standards of attacks, the reason that one got so much publicity, because that is still quite unusual, that type of attack, it is.
Speaker 3:Yeah, it is. It was shockingly, you know, for you and I that kind of know that world, it wasn't very shocking because we kind of know what violence looks like, but for people that haven't seen it, I mean, that's as raw as it gets. But I think you know the belief that it wasn't a politician or a famous celebrity or you know some rock star. It was just a guy that a lot of people never even heard of. But he's still, you know, ceo of a major group and it really was kind of a wake up call and and, um, you know, yeah, not only have I been getting a lot of phone calls, my peers, uh, the organizations I represent from the ep side that's all we've been talking about I, you know a lot of clients are calling. You know, I want to know what do we do? And you know, like I kind of said to cnn, I think was, you know, a lot of clients aren't calling because they've had a long, sustained program and they're not nervous at all because they are prepared. It's the you know, the groups that don't have anything that are kind of freaking out right now, and then it's hard because you know you can't just pick up the phone and call what bodyguards are us? I mean, there's just not a lot of people laying around looking for work. You know, I don't think, and they're especially not going to be.
Speaker 3:You know, great, if you say, well, I only want it for the next 30 days, which is a lot of companies will do that. They'll say we just until it blows over. Well, a lot of people don't want to do that. I can't pull people off of a detail and give them to you for 30 days, knowing they're going to get fired. Well, you know, that just doesn't make a lot of sense. So, yeah, it's definitely a wake up call make a lot of sense.
Speaker 2:So, um, yeah, it's definitely a wake-up call and and you know, I I know, you know we've talked through a previous podcast back in november 22 you and I've communicated over the last two or three years around various topics and and so you're right, you know this wasn't the type of attack, wasn't necessarily um a surprise. You and I have talked about targeted attacks. Were you surprised that a CEO, an executive, was attacked quite so openly and quite crudely, in a way?
Speaker 3:Yeah, I tell you and I think the next part of that question would be and that he was attacked because there was no security there. And I always tell people that wasn't an executive protection problem, because there was no executive protection in the environment, so it was really kind of just a personal attack type problem. The bigger question would be well, why wasn't executive protection present? That's a really good question and that's probably a really good point. And private sector is far different than public sector and private sector are paying the freight and anytime they want they can say, hey, I don't need you. It's what we call wave coverage. They can say, hey, stay wherever you are. I'm going to walk down the street or I'm going to go into that restaurant or I'm going to that bar, and there's nothing you can do about it. It's very difficult. And for all those Monday morning quarterbacks will say, oh well, I would have stayed with him no matter what. Well, I don't think you've probably ever been in that position where the CEO of the company you're working for turns to you if you're an FTE, not a vendor, because there's different types but if you're an FTE, and that CEO turns to you and says, stay here. I'm not saying that's what happened here, but it does happen. It's very difficult for you to tell the CEO no, I'm going with you because they'll probably fire you.
Speaker 3:So you know, to me that wasn't an EP issue. It was definitely a good example of targeting and how targeting is done, how it's always. Like we were saying earlier. You know, assassination has always been about access, it always will be, and if you give people access, they're going to try to take their shot and that's what that kid did. No pun intended, but you know I hate that. It happened, obviously. But for me, what I know is that CEOs that have trust and confidence in their detail usually don't waive coverage. But if you don't have trust and confidence in your team, you're more apt to waive coverage. You're more apt Also if you're not informed. They don't tell you hey, this is a threat, this is a concern. You might say I'm good and I find that that's. I say that a lot actually. You know I hate to see it, but you got to tell him, you got to let him know um, so that he doesn't wave it so that kind of complacency that I'm not being threatened right now.
Speaker 2:I don't, there's no threat against me, I'm not getting horrible messages, I'm, you know, no one's nasty to me. Even without that kind of direct evidence of a threat, in certain circumstances and perhaps in certain industries, you would still say yeah, but there is a threat against you.
Speaker 3:Yeah, and the way we look at it is through that lens of inappropriate pursuit. You know it's not the written threat or the spoken threat, as you know that really gets us excited because that's really not indicative of actual violence. You know Hunters and Howards made that very clear to all of us. You know Hinckley didn't threaten Reagan or Sirhan. Sirhan didn't reckon. You know he didn't threaten Kennedy, wallace, you know you can go down. Yigal Amir didn't threaten Rabin.
Speaker 3:But man, it's that coming, that focus, they just keep coming. The guy that shot Abe in Japan, you know he didn't threaten, he just kept coming, built a gun, he planned, he was patient, kept coming, kept coming. That's what we're worried about. Is that behavior that's off, that's obsessive, that's inappropriate. That's what gets us very like okay, we need to pay attention here. It's not the spoken threat and so I think a lot of people in EP get that wrong. They'll say things like well, you know that guy hasn't threatened us. Well, that's not indicative. It's the coming and showing up, especially known public appearances, especially known in advance. And this thing in New York was known. That's how he knew it. It was on the Internet, just like Hinckley read it in the paper he read in the Washington Post that Reagan was at the Hilton. That's how it happens. They read about it and they go. I'm going to go do it, you know, because now I know where he's going to be.
Speaker 2:So how do we know who needs protection?
Speaker 3:Oh, that's a great question and there's so many variables to that. One could be that they're vain and they want it and they want to pay for it. Well, okay, then they're going to get it. But if you ask me who needs it, I would say anyone who's experiencing some type of inappropriate pursuit that can lead to violence and they have the financial means to do it. That's usually the that's kind of the big like kicker the financial means because it's freaking expensive. Right, I deal with people all the time who are being stalked or threatened by a coworker. They can't afford an executive protection team, but I give them, you know, what I can, but they got to be their own bodyguard type of deal. But, yeah, I think people, especially, you know, if you're a CEO, major corporation, that definitely is something to consider. If your company is involved in something highly controversial, yes, if you are involved in things that public sentiment is not in your favor right now, you know. You look at Musk. You know the threat profile on a Musk, you know, today is far different than it was 10 years ago. Right, that thing has changed dramatically and so, yeah, I think those are the types of people that definitely should be considered and it's not.
Speaker 3:You know, it's not all the way it's, it's piecemeal, it's like residence only or office only or just transport or just public speeches. Very rarely do you find the clients like, yeah, I want it all because it's expensive, it's the most expensive and it's a super imposition into their life. Right, and I was telling a client yesterday you know, this is about, you know, obviously, keeping you safe, but also, how much can you handle? How much of an imposition into your life can you really handle? Because you know to do this right with full time coverage, it is a tremendous imposition into your family and a lot of people. I don't want to do that. Okay, well then let's help you with other things. But yeah, it's difficult, it's not easy, it's not like in the government I'd have a government protectee and that poor guy, he had to take it. He had to take it all, all the imposition, because it came with a job.
Speaker 2:It just doesn't work that way on the private side. So what's the basis? So a client comes to you and says, james, I'm concerned. I'm now just going to become the CEO of ABC Corporation and there are people that don't like what we do. So what's your first step? How do you kind of assess the threat, how do you assess what's going on in this guy's life?
Speaker 3:Yeah, make them less accessible to the public as I possibly can. So what's out there about them, what's available? I mean residential targeting is surprising, what you can find on a Google search. And then let's start to harden up those areas the office, the home, the transport between the two. You know, let's make you less accessible to this pursuit. That's where I would start. And then let's see how this goes right and let's see let's get a real and here's a big one.
Speaker 3:You know threat assessment management. You know everyone says they have that or someone's doing some type of threat assessment. But you know you need a real, professionally trained threat assessment person assigned to that, that CEO and or the company and they are taking in all that communication you do. But if you received, or as a company received, inappropriate visits and they'll say, oh yeah, we had this guy shown up 15 times but law enforcement thinks he's not a threat, okay, boom, who's that guy? Like, all of a sudden, now we got a guy immediately on the radar that, okay, we got to fill this gap. You've got to consider, you got a real issue here. And then the people that are writing or emailing, who is monitoring that traffic, you know. And then what are they telling us, like, what's their assessment? That is a huge piece that I think is not as consistent as I'd like to see it.
Speaker 3:And then we start to put, you know, a team together, if they don't already have one, and implement the protection around the known gaps, or you know where they are expected to be accessible, you know. And then we you know, look at their schedule. Okay, what do you? Got on the horizon and it's like, well, I got a speech to 5,000 people. Okay, well, I'm going to put some people on you.
Speaker 3:And I think, unfortunately, what happens, phil, is that they'll say, okay, we're going to get a team together and put them on a CEO, and then they don't change the dynamic. And what I mean by that is public speech 5,000 people. Okay, I'm going to have a significantly higher footprint than if this person is going to play golf on Sunday and no one knows they're going to be there. Unfortunately, what happens is these details will just take the same package to golf on Sunday and the protectee is like, well, what the hell, I don't need all these people here, man. And again, they haven't been able to stop the. When I say they, I mean the protectors. You got to say wait, wait a minute. Who could access him here? Who would even know he's here? Because if the answer is no one, well then give him a lot of space, man, because no one can notice that up on him. Um, and I don't see that being kind of stressed as much as it should be so a kind of flexible program around around as as the kind of threat changes.
Speaker 3:You have a flexible program because you're knowing you got to be able to ramp up, yeah, and ramp down. But it's really hard to ramp up if you don't have any structure. So that's what I help them do is develop structure. You know, get people in there, get them trained, get some policies together, use effective protective strategies and I explain what those are, you know and then we start to kind of implement and let's see. And then we can always plus up, right, like I can take one piece of executive protection, like you know, transport, secure transportation, and I can plus that thing up or bring that thing down, based on what's going on. I can do it five, six different ways. And then it's really what? What can you handle? What can you all afford? You afford All that matters.
Speaker 3:What's the threat? Is it nation state or is it some nut? Because if it's nation state, you're going to need an armored vehicle, you might need two, you might need to do a decoy. It's different. It's not a fire and forget. Everyone gets this standard thing. That's why I hate benchmarking. Can't stand it. It sounds interesting. But just because one CEO of a financial company has X, that doesn't mean that the guy I'm dealing with is a CEO of a financial company, deserves the same thing, because all threat and risk is nuanced.
Speaker 2:Yeah, and I guess the other thing is, if you ramp everything up all the time, then when actually there is a threat, you've got nowhere to go.
Speaker 3:Oh, yeah, well yeah, and then the client's not going to tolerate it for 12 seconds. You're like you all need to calm down. I don't need all this around me. You know, for a cocktail party that you know is at my house and no one even knew I was going to throw it. You know, like they always say the same thing. They all say they won't lose coverage. Why do they say that? Because they've had tight coverage forever. Because the people don't know when to give space. Right, that's, I teach that that's a critical piece of executive production training. But when do you give space? Because they want it and we need to give it. Because if you can never give space and you're always one and a half foot, you know off right, offset, governmentgov model that dude, the CEO is going to say look, I'm sick of this you never give me any space and unless you're dealing with somebody who's super notorious you know a lot of these CEOs you don't know who they are Give them the space they want because you can't.
Speaker 2:Yeah, it's claustrophobic, isn't it, when you've got all that all around you all the time, and it's not just you, it's your family, it's your kids, it's everything else that have to get wrapped up around that, and you know, it sounds very sexy, but actually, when you're living it, it's claustrophobic, it's intrusive, it's unpleasant that's why I use that word imposition, you know, and that's what it is it's.
Speaker 3:You know, how much of that can you take? Because you know, wow, if you can take a lot, great, I can put a whole program around you and you can afford it. Great, awesome, that's the best way to do it. But, man, it's a tremendous imposition into your life, for sure. But I think that's the biggest hurdle with clients is to get them to understand that. You know the lack of like, seriousness of my concern about a spoken threat versus inappropriate pursuit. That's the A and then. Second is, you know, making them, you know, inaccessible when they want to be accessible. Right, that's always the balance beam you know we talk about. I have a teeter-totter slide I use in my training, but we don't want them to be accessible to the public, but they want to be accessible. So we've got to find that balance because that's, as we know, from an assassination standpoint, that's, as we know, from an assassination standpoint. That's what they need. They need access.
Speaker 2:So it's like, kind of, we're always doing this so you, you shared a really good I mean, I'm not with this, me, but on linkedin you shared an article last week which was, um, primarily kind of driven by the execution in in in new york. Um, and I found it really interesting because you're talking about this concept of of attack cycle. So can you just give us a bit of history about the attack cycle? What is it and how did that develop?
Speaker 3:yeah, I, I learned about it about 20 years years ago in the fbi and then, I think shortly thereafter, the department of homeland Secret Service. They started using it and it really just works through. How do criminals, terrorists, assassins, how do they target someone? And they called it this thing called the attack cycle, and it usually starts out, you know, first step is you know general target list, and that could be, you know, ok, health care CEO, and you can name five of them, right, and then they go out and they do some type of initial surveillance and a lot of times that could just be keyboard warrior stuff, you know, or they actually get off their ass, can I say?
Speaker 2:I guess you said it, that's fine.
Speaker 3:They have to go out and actually do surveillance right, and what are they looking?
Speaker 2:for If someone gets upset by the word ass on our podcast, they're in the wrong podcast.
Speaker 3:Yeah, I apologize, but they go out and they're you know what they're looking for is you know, is this individual a hard or soft target? Is this individual someone I can get to, I can access, or do they have some type of real, bumped out, visible protection? That's like man, I can't, I can't do it, I won't be successful, right? Because they want to be successful. Even crazy people, whatever you want to call these folks, they want to be successful. So then what happens is step three is they've done their work, they've done their surveillance and, by the way, that can be years, and then they come to, or that can be days. I mean, it can happen that quick and they say, okay, final target selection, it is going to be John Smith. And then they, okay, what is the intent? What do we want to do? Because now they've had final target selection, okay, it's John Smith. Now what is our goal? Organizational goal, individual goal I want to kidnap, kill, embarrass, whatever, right. And, by the way, kidnapping is a hell of a lot harder than killing, right? So then they'll find, okay, I'm going to kill him. Okay, then it is more surveillance to figure out what, where am I going to kill him? Right, and as we know from the book, just two seconds 64 percent attacks in and around the vehicle. 77 percent are fatal.
Speaker 3:So what that tells us is, though they do have attacks at a residence like the Pennsylvania governor mansion, that's a whole thing. But usually it happens in transit because they see the bumped out security or they. What happens with that is they see the home and there's some unknowns. They can see the cameras. They might be able to see you know, alarm signs or dog signs or dogs, but they, there's an unknown factor with a home, and I'm not sure if you're there, I'm not sure where you sleep, I'm not sure if you have a safe room, I'm not sure you have a bodyguard in your bedroom or a dog that's going to launch my you know eat when you leave. Why? Well, because I can see all your security, I can see all you got right, and then I can figure out how I want to do it. If you're not in armor, it's a lot easier. And then I'm going to, you know, figure out a place where I want to do it, and that's a real thing. And then they launch right. So then the attack cycle is okay. Then they deploy right, then target right, then target arrives and then action. And so what we always tell the? You know the quote unquote good guys and this if you're using the attack cycle, good guys, bad guys, bad guys are using it. Good guys, you have some opportunities.
Speaker 3:And the good guys opportunity is definitely step two, initial surveillance. As a professional protection protection person, I want to create an environment, a protective strategy, where they see, oh shit, they got it all right. We're doing decoy runs with the motorcade. We have visible security. We're doing roving patrols. We're making it very difficult for you to do physical surveillance in and around our place. Right, I don't want you to put my guy's name at step three. I want you to see all my stuff and go nope, I'm going to go down the road to this corporate security or this other CEO who's got nothing right. That's my goal.
Speaker 3:And then so, after step three, final target selection you can still see the planning, if you're paying attention. You can still see the surveillance. You can still see maybe staging. You might see that. And then, lastly, is action. You might have seconds. You're driving the limo, car throws a block, guy gets out with a gun. Okay, you do have something. You can run him over. You can make a decision. It's seconds now, split seconds, but you still have an ability to affect the outcome here.
Speaker 3:But that's what the adversary uses, that's what Bremer used, that's what this kid in New York used. I can go down a line of assassins. Yeah, it's really good. I've used it for years. I think it's super important and I think a lot of times what folks do and I've seen this is when they see step two. So when I mean they, I mean when good guys at an estate see step two, physical surveillance, they'll say that's nothing, they'll see it. They'll see the guy in the car and they'll go oh, it's nothing, it's just a dude no-transcript. Why would it be a guy waiting on his girlfriend? Why couldn't it just be a guy outside of protected estate where a notorious celebrity or CEO is living and he's sitting in his car taking notes? That looks like surveillance to me. Why not start there, because it's hard? That's the answer.
Speaker 2:I think what's really important here, also for the purpose of the podcast, is to. Some people might say okay, this is all very American. Let me just remind people of how Jo Cox the MP was killed, because she was killed as she got out of her vehicle and as she began walking towards where she was about to meet her members, and the guy that killed her was no criminal mastermind or a trained assassin or anything else, was no criminal mastermind or, you know, a trained assassin or anything else. So this isn't about somebody who is a highly trained former, you know, special forces, whatever. This guy was a? Um, a loner, who'd, who'd, had no history of doing this sort of stuff, but he followed exactly the same protocol that you're talking about in a tiny little village in the north of england and, um, you know, attacked her, killed her, um, and, and you know, just kind of wandered off down the road.
Speaker 2:So for those people who are listening and thinking, yeah, but we don't get this in the uk, yes, you do, yes, we do, and and if we, and, and we talked about this earlier, so we're touching it if we look at how British politicians are attacked, every single one of them has been attacked at or near their office because access and predictability. They're not going to hang around their house because they don't. They're going to get pinged and they don't know whether they're there. So everything you've just been articulating is exactly what we see here. So the challenge, I guess, is, if you are going to a, you're taking your client to a venue where they're going to be, where it's predicted everyone knows they're coming. Lots of advertising, all that sort of stuff. He's a kind of some CEOs are almost celebrities in their own right because of who they are. How then, do you manage that in terms of the surveillance and identifying that when there's crowded places, and what are you looking for then?
Speaker 3:Well, the best thing for me, then, is how do we set the environment? Because, I mean, you're way past the surveillance point of that. We're going in. They're probably already set up Now. It's all about creating an environment. It puts basically a lot of the advantages on our side, and one of that would be access control.
Speaker 3:Okay, who's coming in here and are we searching them? And if they're like, no, you're not searching, okay, then I'll tell the boss we're going to be closer, because the more we can search and the more we can check out who these folks are, seat them in a place we want, keep them back. That 25 feet is a good rule. We get out of just two seconds. Keep someone back. 25 feet gives us time. The more that I can do of that, the less close I need to be to the protectee, and what I tell them is look, if I can do all these other security things check for weapons, all that keep them back, create a barrier then I don't need to be as close to you. But if you don't let me do access control, you don't let me search for weapons, you don't let me create setback. I got to get right up on your belt, buckle right and then like, oh okay, but that's how you do it.
Speaker 3:You create a safe environment where you're always thinking how do I cover an evac? How do I cover an evac? Am I close enough to grab him and move him to a safe room? Am I close enough to grab him and move him back to the car? If you're just like you know, like I see all the time protector at the back of the room watching, well, you're going to be too late. You know you're going to watch it happen and you're going to watch the attack and that is not what you're being paid to do. So that's how we do it, that's how I do it. But again, it's a balancing act between you know how much do they want? You know an MP is difficult because they want to be accessible to the people, but you got to create barriers If you can't search the people, then I got to be in the room and let's put a table between you and the member from the public. It's all those little protective strategies that you have to deploy to increase your odds of safety.
Speaker 2:So what I want to do is in our next episode we're going to really dig into this attack cycle in a little bit more detail through the stages. But one thing that struck me was how does that differ, or how does it fit together with the pathway to violence?
Speaker 3:Okay, yeah.
Speaker 2:Happy to do it. So. So let's talk about that then, because before we end this session, because they're two different models, yeah, but it seems to me that there is some, there is some crossovers and some of the perhaps the attack planning sits into various stages of the pathway to violence. Would that be?
Speaker 3:right. Yeah, well, a lot of times, like if you look at pathway to violence, there's a grievance. It usually starts with some type of grievance I don't know necessarily on a, you know, for the attack cycle, because the attack cycle is really so, it's assassin, it's. You know, criminal groups, terrorist groups. They may not have a grievance, they just may like, not like you, or just hey, I want to hurt somebody and so I don't need a grievance, right, I'm just, I'm going after it.
Speaker 3:No, there are parts of the pathway, you know, planning, research, weapons, getting a weapon, you know that type of that's all exploit, exploitation, that's all. They're kind of very similar. But to me, the biggest difference would be there's not a lot of surveillance talk on the pathway. Yeah, if you read about the path of violence, they don't talk a lot. They may say research, but the attack cycle is a lot of surveillance. Right, it's, it's the initial, who we're going to do, then it's the okay, we've chosen you, we're going to do more, because we've got to figure out where we want to do it.
Speaker 3:To me there's more opportunities. Well, I wouldn't say more opportunities, there's. There's opportunities on both, just to see it, to spot it and stop it, and I think that's true and I think good threat assessment can can do that with pathway to violence, you know, workplace violence type situation. But yeah, I think that's the biggest factor to me. And if you look at the pathway, it never gives any type of credibility to the person being targeted. It doesn't say the person being targeted has any chance, it's just like, just like, well, this guy's on a pathway to violence, he's going to do it and you have no choice. Well, the attack cycle doesn't say that, it lets the good guys know okay, you have opportunities. And so I kind of like that part of it, um, because I think that's true and I think it's also true on, you know, the workplace side. But, um, yeah, those are the big differences, I think okay.
Speaker 2:So what we're going to do is, you know, this has been a really as I knew it would be a really interesting discussion. In the next episode we're going to dig deep into this model, the attack cycle, and we're going to pick out all the various phases of it and go into a bit more detail around what they are and how do we mitigate against them, and we're going to do that in the second bit. So, before we end this podcast, let's remember everyone to sign up to the Diffuse News, our newsletter that comes out every Monday morning. Don't forget to subscribe to the podcast so that you don't miss any episodes that come down. And, of course, don't forget to buy my new book come down. And, of course, don't forget to buy my new book, personal Threat Management, which James very kindly wrote in as well and available on Amazon, and I think you'll find it's a good read and fits into this subject nicely. But for now we'll close off. Thank you, james, and see you in the next episode.
