Norway's Balancing Act

In this final episode of "Cross Currents" we explore Norway's challenging balancing act in their relationship with the United States in the years after 9/11. How would Norway maintain a close partnership with the US, on the one hand, while also remaining committed to keeping NATO a strong and relevant worldwide alliance? In addition to this, Norway's leaders had to continue answering to their own domestic constituencies, reassure their European allies, and of course, achieve their own nation's long-term defense and security objectives. 

This episode features interviews with multiple of the key players in this balancing act, including Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik, and the two leaders pictured above with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: Norway's Defense Minister Kristin Krohn Devold and Norway's Ambassador to the US, Knut Vollebæk.

Transcript

Season 1 – Cross Currents: Navigating U.S.-Norway Relations After 9/11

Episode 3: Norway’s Balancing Act

Release Date: June 9, 2022

Hosts:

Dr. LaYee Leong 

Fellow, SMU Center for Presidential History; Senior Fellow, John G. Tower Center for Political Studies

Polina DeClue

Student Research Assistant, SMU Center for Presidential History

Editorial Note and Disclaimer: 

This transcription has been prepared according to the strictest practices of the academic and transcription communities and offers our best good-faith effort at reproducing in text our subject's spoken words. In all cases, however, the audio of this interview represents the definitive version of the words spoken by interviewees.

Citation:

Leong, LaiYee, host. “Norway’s Balancing Act.” Firsthand History, Season 1, Cross Currents: Navigating U.S.-Norway Relations After 9/11 (podcast). SMU Center for Presidential History. 9 June 2022. Accessed [date, month, year]. https://www.smu.edu/Dedman/Research/Institutes-and-Centers/Center-for-Presidential-History/Podcasts/Firsthand-History/Season-1---Cross-Currents---Navigating-US-Norway-Relations-After-9-11 

[Begin Transcription]

DeClue: [00:00:19] Welcome to Episode 3 of the SMU Center for Presidential History podcastserie, “Cross Currents: Navigating US-Norway Relations after 9/11." We are talking about how 9/11 impacted diplomatic relations between the US and our European allies as seen through the lens of the US-Norway alliance during the Bush presidency. My name is Polina DeClue and with me is Dr. LaiYee Leong, a Fellow at the Center. The material for our podcast comes from oral history interviews that Dr. Leong conducted. Hi Dr. Leong.

Leong: [00:00:49] Hi Polina.

DeClue: In our previous podcast episode, we highlighted Norway’s security dilemma as it got caught in the middle of rising tensions between the United States and some NATO allies. Like others, Norway faced significant pressure to sign on to US-led military action in the Middle East even though such moves were unpalatable with voters at home. At the same time, Norway was keen to keep up robust ties with the US while honoring its commitment to NATO multilateralism. To meet these challenges, one thing Norwegian leaders did was to [00:01:19] invest in personal relationships, such as the one between its defense minister Kristin Krohn Devold and US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

Leong: That’s right, and in this episode, we’ll explore in more detail how Norway balanced the need for a close partnership with the US, on the one hand, with the imperative to keep NATO relevant, on the other. Norway offered critical support in reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan / and to a much lesser extent made a [00:01:49] contribution to stabilizing Iraq. It also backed the US initiative to restructure NATO for the post-Cold War era. We’ll be discussing the following questions – how did Norwegian leaders steer their country amid the conflicting priorities of (1) their domestic constituencies, (2) their European allies, and (3) Norway’s own longer-term defense and security objectives? Given such cross currents [00:02:19] in the post-9/11 world, did Norway achieve its diplomatic and strategic goals?

Kjell Magne Bondevik: “In Norway, we agreed immediately that we should stand side-by-side with the US, because it was in fact an attack on the US, and I think the US and President Bush, whom I learned to know, and gradually more and more, appreciated our cooperation and support.  My expectation was also, regardless of this special situation, [00:02:49] that we could develop the very good and close relations between our two countries.  The US is a big power, a superpower, and Norway’s a small country, but in spite of that, we have much in common.  We cooperate closely within NATO, bilaterally.”  

Leong: That’s a clip from my interview with former Norwegian prime minister Kjell Magne Bondevik. We hear him outlining the historically strong ties between the US and Norway. After 9/11, [00:03:19] Mr. Bondevik was among the first world leaders to visit Washington DC and express solidarity with President Bush and the US. 

DeClue: But we know from our last podcast episode that even though Norway joined the attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan, Mr. Bondevik rejected President Bush’s request, in a dramatic phone call, to assist in the invasion of Iraq. Media polls at that time indicated that 85% of Norwegians opposed the invasion. What did that mean for the government’s desire to [00:03:49] demonstrate its willingness to follow US leadership?

Leong: Yes, the war in Iraq presented a serious dilemma for Norway. It didn’t join in the campaign to overthrow Saddam Hussein. But to show it was willing to follow US leadership nonetheless, AFTER President Bush declared an initial end to military operations in Iraq, Norway quickly volunteered to take part in a multinational force aimed at stabilizing that country. [00:04:19] The UN soon passed a resolution calling on member countries to contribute to Iraq’s security. So THAT legitimized Norway’s move, and also provided political cover for Mr. Bondevik’s government. Still, Norway kept its role in Iraq quite limited – the 300 personnel who made it over there largely comprised engineers and bomb disposal experts / rather than active combat troops. [00:04:49] Most of the contingent left by mid-2004. For all the reasons we talked about in the last episode, Mr. Bondevik’s government never found a good enough case to engage in the Iraq War; domestic opposition of course played a significant part. It was really in Afghanistan / that Norway went ALL-IN to show its commitment to US leadership as a dependable NATO ally. 

DeClue: So no to Iraq but a big yes in Afghanistan. How did Norway [00:05:19] get involved in Afghanistan? 

Leong: In episode one, we talked about how foreign governments immediately recognized the earthquake in world affairs that 9/11 caused. Just hours after the Twin Towers in New York City went down, Norway’s government released a statement framing 9/11 as / an attack on open, democratic society. It also called on all democracies – and here I quote – “to join in an uncompromising struggle against international [00:05:49] terrorism.” End quote. Norwegian leaders recognized such words had to be supported with deeds. The US did not work through NATO, so Norway’s response was not coordinated by the alliance (of which it’s a member). Once Norway DID receive a request from the US, it moved speedily to deploy transport and fighter aircraft, as well as technical personnel and special forces trained for winter and high terrain action. [00:06:19] Here’s former Defense Minister Kristin Krohn Devold talking about Norway’s unique contribution to that early effort:

Kristin Krohn Devold: “Of course then we discovered we had a few capabilities that not all other countries had.  For instance, mine clearing equipment that was excellent, that even the United States didn't have, so we found that what we had, like mine expertise, also some special forces expertise, other expertise, also the F-16 [00:06:49] pilots.  We had things that were very useful and that helped also.  We could ask all parts of the military, it you're not able to do anything about your country, are you really relevant any more?  And people actually wanted to participate, they wanted to show that their capability was useful, even if you were in the navy or in the air force, or in the armed forces, everybody wanted to show that we are comparable with the best.”

Leong: It’s worth [00:07:19] pointing out that Norwegians did not take the decision to get involved in Afghanistan lightly. Before this, the last time Norwegian soldiers engaged in active combat was during the Second World War. 

DeClue: How did Norway justify such a momentous decision in a country so far away?

Leong: There were three objectives that Norway’s government made explicit. By far the most important was supporting the US as a  NATO ally and, in doing so, safeguarding [00:07:49] the relevance of the NATO alliance. Bilateral relations with the US also figured prominently: early on, there was concern in official quarters that, as Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan got underway, Norway didn’t present a high enough military profile compared to other NATO countries.  

                        There were TWO other objectives as well: ensuring Afghanistan would no longer be a safe haven for terrorists and rebuilding a peaceful [00:08:19] and democratic Afghanistan. The second objective was initially considered to have been achieved once al-Qaeda went on the run. The third objective came to the forefront once attention turned to state building and promoting civil development in Afghanistan. 

DeClue: Did Norway achieve its aims? 

Leong: Yes…and no. As we know, the US war in Afghanistan would drag on for two decades. In 2016, Norway published a comprehensive report [00:08:49] of ITS part in the international intervention in Afghanistan. This report – produced by a high-level independent commission – gave the government an A for accomplishing its first goal of being a good US and NATO ally. But it evaluated the second and third goals more negatively. 

DeClue: How did the report come to such an assessment? 

Leong: The report itself provides a detailed narrative showing how Norway got more and more [00:09:19] drawn into Afghanistan, even as the political and humanitarian crises remained unresolved. (BTW Our listeners can find the report on this project’s webpage.) It helps to understand that the overthrow of the Taliban proved the easy part. Keeping the peace turned out to be much harder. It also helps to know that there was more than one military authority in Afghanistan at any one time. In other words, there were many cooks in the kitchen. [00:09:49] At the get-go, Norway contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom, which the US led. But then, the US set its sights on Iraq / and as a result could only spare the resources to focus on a small region of Afghanistan. That increased the need for allies to move in and do the work in other regions. Apart from this practical imperative, diplomatic tensions rose over the Iraq War. Anti-US sentiments [00:10:19] at home made it harder for Norway to keep supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. So Norway stepped back from that operation and shifted most of its contributions to ISAF, a NATO-led force. ISAF stands for International Security Assistance Force and had been established by the UN. Over time, ISAF expanded to assume responsibility for all of Afghanistan. Having declined to participate in the [00:10:49] war against Saddam Hussein, Norway saw investing in Afghanistan as an opportunity to show its solidarity with the US. Just as importantly, with the US disposed to acting UNILATERALLY, Norway and other European allies also keenly felt the need to prove the continuing importance of NATO as a MULTILATERAL alliance. Compared to Iraq, Afghanistan was not as controversial. So along with other NATO members, [00:11:19] Norway agreed to give high priority to reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and not to set any time limit to its commitments there.

DeClue: That sounds like a tremendous commitment! How did it turn out?

Leong: It certainly served Norway’s first objective of proving itself a good ally, an ally willing to invest significant manpower, money, and other resources to an operation that produced one challenge after another. Norway was always [00:11:49] clear-sighted about showing support for the US and fulfilling obligations to NATO. When it finally pulled out of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, it made sure to be SEEN to be upping its responsibilities elsewhere in Afghanistan. Norway even took charge of a Provincial Reconstruction Team or PRT in Meymaneh, despite reservations from its own military about whether it was [00:12:19] a good idea. PRTs were military and civilian units spread out across the country to help strengthen the Afghan government’s control. Each one was led by a country participating in ISAF. It became clear that the PRTs didn’t coordinate well with one another and therefore fragmented the overall effort to stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Another problem was the PRT model tasked military [00:12:49] personnel to implement civil development projects, not necessarily an area of competence. Having had long experience in foreign aid work, Norway’s government TRIED to get NATO to rethink the approach. But it failed. 

DeClue: Was that why the independent report took a more scathing tone about the other objectives of Norway’s involvement in Afghanistan?

Leong: That’s right. As the operation in Afghanistan dragged on, Norway found itself embedded in the [00:13:19] quagmire. International conflict and violence in Afghanistan had never been entirely quelled, and by 2006 had clearly reignited. The Taliban was again on the ascendant. State-building had not taken root and civilian development – despite billions of dollars in aid from many countries – had been uneven and in many circumstances ineffective. In fact, a Norwegian diplomat by the name of Kai Eide headed the United Nations’ [00:13:49] mission for assistance to Afghanistan, and he tried to coordinate the various military authorities and civilian organizations. But there were just too many entities involved, with their own agendas. And one of them was, of course, the US. This is Norway’s then International Development minister Hilde Frafjord Johnson:

Hilde Frafjord Johnson: there was a lot of coordination between Nordic like-minded countries.  They tried their level best [00:14:19] within thematic groups, and all the usual coordination frameworks that one establishes in all these countries was also established in Afghanistan.  But it coordinated between those who wanted to be coordinated, and the rest was outside.  And of course the US did not want to be part of that coordination.  They ran their own shop, basically.  And so there’s limits as to how much coordination you can achieve then.  

Leong: We can hear the frustration in Ms. Johnson’s voice there. Even before the PRTs became an issue, [00:14:49] public opinion in Norway was already turning against the US a year into the intervention in Afghanistan. Norwegians found it difficult to stomach the idea of their troops taking part in combat – it seemed to have run counter to their DNA as a peace nation. Its ambassador in Washington DC Knut Vollebæk related a story to me about begging the US State Department NOT to release a statement thanking Norwegian special forces in a particularly successful [00:15:19] bombing operation, because it would have been politically costly for the government in Norway.

DeClue: Given such constraints, did Norway’s participation in Afghanistan evolve? 

Leong: Yes, it did. Part of it reflected the situation in Afghanistan and part of it reflected a CHANGE in political leadership in Norway itself.  The RIGHT-of-center coalition government led by Mr. Bondevik lost to a LEFT-of-center coalition in 2005. This new government [00:15:49] included the Socialist Left party, a small party that had a strong anti-war platform. Some observers credit the coalition’s electoral win to this anti-war appeal. As a result, Norway actually turned down requests from ISAF and the US to engage in fighting in southern Afghanistan when the need arose. To make up for it, Norway sent more special forces to the Afghan capital, Kabul. Again, we see the attempt to maintain [00:16:19] a delicate balance – taking away here, putting in more there. At that time, some people in government feared it caused Norway to be marginalized in NATO operations. And apparently the US and UK governments also gave Norway’s diplomats some grief. 

DeClue: I know your oral histories focused on US-Norway relations during the Bush presidency. But can you wrap up the story of Norway’s role in Afghanistan after 2008?

Leong: Sure! [00:16:49] Once President Obama assumed office and announced an exit strategy for Afghanistan, Norway also began its own withdrawal of military personnel. That was completed in 2014. Norway promised to continue monetary and expert support for civilian development to the Afghan government, but that aid has been complicated by the resurgence of the Taliban. In fact, the independent report notes that the dangerous security situation [00:17:19] has often prevented international aid workers and diplomats from getting to the very areas that needed the help. All in all, more than nine thousand Norwegian men and women were deployed, ten of them lost their lives, and the country spent about three billion dollars in Afghanistan. It might seem small potatoes in the big scheme of things, but – bear in mind, it’s a small country. That’s the most extensive [00:17:49] and costliest overseas operation that Norway has ever undertaken. 

DeClue: Norway behaved as a good ally, a good team player – but did it really pay off in terms of its bilateral relations with the US?

Leong: It wasn’t all smooth sailing, despite the great effort on the part of Norway’s government. Norway’s government believed it was fulfilling its obligations on an outsized scale in the Middle East, but the public at home still regarded the US negatively. As I said, [00:18:19] the change of government in 2005 represented a partial repudiation of that policy. Here’s US ambassador John Ong:

John Ong: “The Norwegian media was almost uniformly critical of the Bush administration for any number of things but in particular for the Iraq War.  They didn’t have a lot of good things to say about President Bush, and they viewed him as being a kind of warmonger or [00:18:49] certainly a hawkish president who, anybody got in his way, we’re going to run over them with an Abrams tank.”

Leong: Still, US officials seemed to have regarded a lot of those sentiments as domestic politicking, nothing that affected the big picture, that is, government to government relations. Ironically, bilateral relations did take a dive later, not because of policy, but because the new prime minister Jens Stoltenberg misreported a [00:19:19] conversation he had with President Bush. Mr. Stoltenberg told the Norwegian media he had informed Mr. Bush that Norway was pulling out the last of its very small contingent in Iraq, but American officials said the communication didn’t happen. And that discrepancy caused serious misunderstanding. This is Norwegian foreign policy analyst Asle Toje:

Asle Toje: “It came to that curious situation where Norway, who was doing a disproportionate [00:19:49] amount of the lifting in Afghanistan, and who had actually come to the fore both in Kosovo and in Iraq, was effectively shunned by the White House and the Norwegian prime minister was not invited to the White House, even when he was in Washington, D.C. So there was a deep freeze in the relationship between Norway and the presidential administration over this.”

Leong: Apparently the air only cleared when President Obama came into office and Mr. Stoltenberg got his White House [00:20:19] invitation. In the longer term though, that spat didn’t fundamentally hurt bilateral relations. With Norway active in Afghanistan until 2014, the experience laid a strong foundation for the US and Norway to work closely in counter terrorism, both in special forces operations and in intelligence cooperation. So in that sense, Norway achieved its goal of maintaining strong bilateral ties.

DeClue: What about its own [00:20:49] strategic interests? Did Norway achieve those? Presumably that was one underlying goal of being a good ally?

Leong: Right, Defense Minister Kristin Krohn Devold leveraged the alliance with the US and NATO to accomplish a couple of Norwegian priorities. First, she accelerated the modernization of the Norwegian armed forces, turning a defense force into a mobile, expeditionary force. This Ms. Devold did [00:21:19] while she was also a vocal proponent of Secretary Rumsfeld’s plan to restructure NATO. It killed two birds with one stone. Her close collaboration with Mr. Rumsfeld meant she could make sure necessary reforms in the Norwegian military were taking place in sync with NATO restructuring. Norway’s armed forces and bases would be developed to align closely with NATO’s force posture [00:21:49] so that Norway would play a critical role. At the same time, it ensured NATO (and of course the US) remained actively engaged in the High North. Here’s journalist Kristoffer Egeberg speaking of Ms. Devold’s role:

Kristoffer Egeberg: “She really worked hard in this transitional period, for the Norwegian Armed Forces, and she worked hard, doing her part in reforming NATO, parallel with this very fantastic [00:22:19] relationship she had with Mr. Rumsfeld. It brought Norway, really into the center of, you know the inner circle of NATO, and with the relationship to Donald Rumsfeld, the inner circle in Washington, D.C., you know both places, which was the mission she had, which was the whole concept of the new foreign kind of policy of Norway, to be in the center, in the circle anywhere, in the alliance, [00:22:49] in Washington, D.C., in the UN, to make sure that nobody forgets Norway.  That's the whole purpose.”  

Leong: The second thing Ms. Devold accomplished was to keep NATO as relevant as possible, even when the theater of action was in the Middle East. Multilateralism is important to Norway not just as a matter of principle. It being a small country means it depends on alliances; it’s the only way to exercise international influence and to protect [00:23:19] itself. But, as we noted throughout this conversation, the transatlantic alliance – the one most critical to Norway – came under stress after the Cold War and especially over the Iraq War. The US and European countries (especially those in a European Union bloc led by France and Germany) were drifting apart. That left Norway, which is a NATO but NOT an EU member, dangerously exposed. Here’s Kristoffer Egeberg again [00:23:49]:

Egeberg: “We want to have everything, all our strategic alliances must be within a format where we are a member, which is NATO.  That is why we needed a strong relationship to the U.S., which is not EU member but a NATO member, and also our very strong, at that time, relationship to Britain, which already at that time was a skeptic to the EU defense cooperation, and also, [00:24:19] aligned with Norway's opinion, wanted all these to be put into NATO and not to EU.  They wanted NATO to be the sole defense alliance also for Europe.  That is why Norway was a strong supporter of tying Afghanistan to NATO, to ISAF, more than to the Enduring Freedom, because in order to bring most of these conflicts from ad hoc alliance, into NATO, which Norway was a part of, [00:24:49] and not to EU.”  

DeClue: With Norway’s strategic interests inextricably tied up with NATO’s, how about ensuring a future for NATO in the 21st century – did Norway succeed in that goal?

Leong: Yes. To the extent that Norway and other allies like the UK strongly backed NATO restructuring. Yes to renewing its hardware and capabilities, and Yes to ensuring access to key bases - along the lines the US wanted. [00:25:19] But the larger question of NATO’s FUTURE as a security alliance, that’s a question that remains to be answered. NATO’s role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan can hardly be called a success. Tensions within NATO remain, resurfacing now and again. It’s not just the possibility of the US going its own way. Talk of an EU army comes up now and then. Should that happen, where would it leave Norway? [00:25:49] Here’s foreign policy expert Asle Toje summing up the Bush years:

Toje: “The Europeans and the Americans found new and surprising ways to disappoint each other, and this was basically the story of the Bush presidency.  A great deal of turmoil, a great deal of new initiatives that came to naught, America's attempt at revitalizing the alliance, didn't find any takers, the EU attempts at developing a security and defense [00:26:19] policy, got bogged down, they didn't really go anywhere, and as the Iraq -- now, the war in Afghanistan rattled on without any end in sight.”  

Leong: That was Dr. Toje speaking in 2018. We know now / that a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan would take place in time for the 20th anniversary of 9/11. However, the future in that war-torn country looks grim. As for Norway: Mr. Stoltenberg, [00:26:49] after leaving his position as prime minister, is now secretary general of NATO. So Norway continues to invest in multilateralism and, for now at least, gets to play a pivotal role at the center of the security alliance.

DeClue: Well, maybe the Center of Presidential History will have to do another oral history project in 20 years to get another set of historical perspectives. Working on this podcast has given me unexpected insights into the many dimensions of international diplomacy. As we said at the start of the podcast [00:27:19], we usually hear about the bigger players on the world stage. It’s been refreshing to hear how a smaller country like Norway has navigated the cross currents of international relations, especially in the turbulent years immediately after 9/11. 

Leong: It’s really been fascinating talking to American and Norwegian policymakers and diplomats for the oral history interviews, to hear their first-hand accounts, and then piece them together for a retrospective understanding of a critical period in history. You know, Polina, we’ve only touched [00:27:49] on a couple of major themes. I hope our listeners will check out our Center’s website and listen to the project’s original interviews, or read their transcripts. There are more interviews and also much more material than we’ve been able to include in the podcast.  

DeClue: While you’re on the Center’s website, please also have a look at other CPH podcasts you can stream or download. Thank you for listening!

Leong: Thank you!

Brian Franklin:  [00:28:19]That’s it for Season 1 of Firsthand History, “Cross Currents: US-Norway Relations After 9/11.”  We are so glad you joined us for this journey into the firsthand stories of American and Norwegian leaders who played integral roles in their own nations—and in the alliance between the two nations—in the years after 9/11. Thank you especially to Dr. LaiYee Leong, our project leader for the oral history collection this podcast is based on, “Transatlantic Diplomacy after 9/11: The U.S. and Norway.” [00:28:49] And thank you to Polina DeClue and Wardah Alvi, both former research assistants with the Center for Presidential History. 

                        Season 1 of Firsthand History, “Cross Currents,” is a production of the Center for Presidential History at Southern Methodist University.  Our thanks to the SMU Dedman College of Humanities and Sciences for their support. Thank you to Pro Podcast Solutions, who helped edit and produce this episode. Theme music—entitled “Endless Story”—was written by Nick Petrov, [00:29:19] and licensed through PremiumBeat. 

                        For more information on this podcast, to watch and read the full oral history interviews on which this podcast was based, or to explore all the work we’re doing at the Center for Presidential History, visit our website at www.smu.edu/cph. Thank you for joining us, and we look forward to next time!”

[End Transcription]