Behar: The Torah’s Double Standard for Slave Labor

Synopsis: This is the audio version of the 7-page article I wrote and published on rabbischneeweiss.substack.com/ on 5/7/26 titled: Behar: The Torah’s Double Standard for Slave Labor. In this article (first published in 2024), we examine three approaches to understanding why the Torah forbids us to work a Jewish slave with oppressive labor but permits it for a non-Jewish slave.

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Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:11

Hello, I'm Rabbi Matt Schneewiss, and this is the audio version of the seven-page article I originally wrote as a series of four articles between May 24th and May 31st, 2024, which I'm republishing on May 7th, 2026. And the article is titled Bihar, the Torah's Double Standard for Slave Labor. Preface. This article, originally published as a series of four articles, then combined, will not address the more basic question of why the Torah permits slavery. For a concise explanation, read the short excerpt from Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sachs Zatzal at the beginning of my article, Behar, the Prohibition to Free a Canaanite Slave. For my general approach to answering such questions, check out my shir, how the seemingly outdated elements of Torah are evidence of its perfection. The facts and the questions. The Torah's presentation of the laws of an Evid Ivri, Jewish servant, concludes with a prohibition. Quote, If your brother becomes impoverished with you and is sold to you, you shall not work him with slave labor. Like a laborer or a resident shall he be with you. Until the Jubilee year shall he work with you. Then he shall leave you, he and his children with him. He shall return to his family, and to his ancestral heritage shall he return. For they are my servants, capital M, whom I have taken out of the land of Egypt. They shall not be sold in the manner of a slave. You shall not subjugate him Bifarek, you shall fear your God. You shall hold them as a heritage for your children after you to inherit as a possession, you shall work them with them forever. But with your brethren, the children of Israel, a man with his brother, you shall not subjugate him before. And quote from Vikra twenty-five, forty-four through forty-six. It is clear from the written Torah that we are forbidden to work an Evid Ivri with Avodas Parech. But this prohibition does not extend to an Evidnani. What is Avodas Parich? Rambam in Hilkos Avadim 16 explains It is prohibited to work any Ivri, any Evid Ivri Bafarech. What is Avodas Parich? This is labor without a set limit or labor which the master does not need, but rather one's intent is just to keep him working so that he's not idle. From here, the sages said that he shouldn't tell him, dig under these vines until I come back, for he didn't give him a limit. Rather he should say to him, Dig until such and such a time or until such and such a place. Likewise, he should not say to him, Dig this spot, but he doesn't need it. Even to warm up a cup of water or cool it for him, if he doesn't need it, this is prohibited, and one transgresses a Torah prohibition, as it is stated, you shall not work him Bafarach. You are only permitted to make him do something with a set limit that you need. Similarly, if a Jewish slave were sold to a non-Jew, if the non-Jew worked him Bafarach, every Jew is commanded to prevent the non-Jew from doing this. And if the Jew leaves him without intervening, he transgresses the Torah prohibition. As it is stated, he shall not subjugate him Bafarach in your sight. However, we are not required to enter the non-Jew's property to check after him that he is not working a Jew Bafarach, as it is stated in your sight, meaning that this prohibition only applies when you see. End quote from the Raman. The question is, why the double standard? If it is wrong to work a Jewish slave befarach, why isn't it wrong to do the same to a non-Jewish slave? Moreover, shouldn't we Jews be especially opposed to a vodas parek, given our experience in Egypt? The only other time the term parak is mentioned in Torah is in the description of our Egyptian slavery, quote, from Shemos 1, 13 through 14, Egypt enslaved Benezer al-Befarech, and they embittered their lives with harsh labor, with mortar and bricks and with all work in the field. All the work that they worked them with was Bafarach. End quote. The bitterness we experienced from Avotas Parch was so intense that we were commanded to memorialize it through the mitzvah of Maror. How can we oppose Avodos Parek when it is done to our own people but subject our non-Jewish slaves to this form of slave labor? Three approaches. I thought these were powerful questions. To my shock, I have not found a single explicit answer in the writings of Hazal, the Rishonim, or the Aharonim. Nevertheless, I have three approaches that I'd like to share. These correspond to the three logical possibilities. One, Avotus Parch is inherently wrong from an ethical standpoint, but there's a reason why the Torah limits the prohibition to Jewish slaves. Two, Avotas Parch is not inherently wrong, but it is only but is only wrong when done to Jews. Three, Avotas Parch isn't ethically wrong at all, but is prohibited for philosophical reasons which pertain to an Evid Ivri, which only pertain to an Evid Ivri. We will explore these approaches one at a time. Even if you don't agree with a particular explanation, I believe there is value in the art in the approaches themselves, insofar as the methodology of Tama Mitzvos, analysis of the reasons for the commandments is concerned. Approach number one. The Torah's double standard in ethical legislation. The first approach requires us to address a larger question. Why does the Torah have double standards in so many other Mishpatim? Mitzvos which promote justice and righteousness in society? Certain Mishpatim apply across the board. It is forbidden to murder any human being, whether a Jew or a nonju, quote, for he made man Betzel Melokim in the divine form, end quote, from Varatius 9.6. It is forbidden to steal from a Jew and from a nonju. It is forbidden to rob a Jew or a Nanju. But most Mishpatim only regulate our interactions with fellow Jews. Do not go as a gossipmonger among your people, Vaikra 1916. Do not hate your brother in your heart, Vaikra 1917. You shall rebuke a member of your people, Vaikra 1917. Do not take revenge or bear a grudge against the children of your people, Vikra 1918. You shall love your fellow as yourself, Vaikra 1918, and many more. Shouldn't these ethical standards be universal as well? Why differentiate? The answer in a word is pragmatism. The Torah legislates in group ethics because this is the most effective route to its ultimate objective of establishing universalist ethics among all mankind. The Torah's ethics are universalist in nature. This is why Hashem chose Avramavino, as the Torah explicitly states, quote, from Brahis 1819, I have chosen him so that he will charge his children and his household after him, that they will keep the Derah Hashem, the way of Hashem, to do Tsedaka, righteousness, and Mishpat, justice, end quote. That is, Tsedaka and Mishpat for all human beings. This is clear from the context of the aforementioned verse in which Hashem responds to Avram's concern about the possibility of divine injustice towards the citizens of Sodom and Amorah. The Torah's goal is to extend the Derah Hashem of Tsadaka and Mishpat to all of humanity, that all humans should practice love thy neighbor as thyself, not speak Lash and Har against any human being, not be vengeful towards anyone, and so on. But to legislate this universalist ideal would be unrealistic. Consider an analogy from parenting. Every parent wants their child to acquire the virtue of generosity and to practice the behavior of sharing. How do they go about instilling this value? By capitalizing on the child's natural affinities, by urging their child to share their toys with their siblings, or to split their candy with their friend, or to take turns with the neighbor at the local playground. They do not, at the outset, compel their toddler to share and practice generosity equally and indiscriminately with all children, forcing them to give their toys to random orphans, or send their kids their candy to kids in Africa, or join the local children's communist chapter. Why not? Shouldn't generosity know no bounds? Shouldn't we teach our children to be generous to all those in need? The answer is yes, but that's not how one instills these virtues in a self-centered, immature, emotional being. Instead, one promotes and enforces the young child's generosity towards family, friends, and neighbors until these behaviors and their corresponding character traits take root. At that point, under the right kind of guidance, these virtues will flourish and radiate outwards in ever-widening circles of compassion towards all. This is how the Torah operates. The most baseline moral standards are legislated universally, but most Mishpatim only govern the interrelationships between Jews. If the Torah were to impose universal ethical standards on Israel by force of law, these standards would not be upheld and would likely backfire. Natural affinity and in-group favoritism are strong among Jews today, but were even stronger in the ancient Near East, where tribalism and xenophobia reign supreme. Instead of attempting to oppose these feelings of in-group preference, the Torah harnesses them by making them into the foundation of the Tsadaka and Mishpat in our nation. Once these values and behaviors become entrenched through legislation, the midos, character traits they promote will, if properly guided by the Torah's teachings, naturally evolve toward universalism. This, I submit, is why the Torah only prohibits Avodas Parak for an Evit Ivri, not because it is ethically acceptable to mistreat an Evikanani, but because the Torah's general approach is to legislate ethical behavior at home before extending it to the world at large. I believe my answer is supported by the Ramam's codification. He does not simply state, it is permissible to work a non-Jewish slave before and end there. Such a formulation would have been sufficient if the Halakos of Avudas Parach did not aim at any larger ethical objectives. Rather, the Rahm concludes the laws of Evikanani as follows. In Hokosavatium 9.8, quote, It is permissible to work a non-Jewish slave before. Even though this is the law, the Midas Chasidus, conduct of kindness, and Darche Hakachma, ways of wisdom, dictate that one should be a merciful person who pursues righteousness. He should not make heavy the yoke upon his servant, nor should he afflict him, and he should feed him and give him to drink from all of his food and beverages. The early sages would give to their servants from each and every cooked dish they ate, and they would prioritize the sustenance of their animals and their slaves before their own meal. For it is stated in Tahalim 123, too, like the eyes of servants toward the hand of their masters, like the eyes of a maidservant toward the hand of her mistress. Likewise, one should not degrade his non-Jewish slave physically or verbally, for scripture gave them to you for service, not for shame. One should not shout and rage at him excessively, but should speak with him gently and listen to his grievances. Likewise, it is explicitly stated about the good ways of Eov, with which he praised himself. In Eov 31, 13 and 15, did I did I despise the justice of my servant or the case of my maidservant? Did not his maker make me, and were we not prepared in one womb? Cruelty and brazenness are only found among the uncircumcised non-Jews, but the seed of Avramavino, namely the Jews, to whom Akkadushbarhu bestowed the good of the Torah, and commanded them in righteous decrees and judgments, they are merciful to all. Likewise, of the Metus of Accurush Baruch, which we were commanded to emulate, it is said, He is merciful to all his creations. Tilum 145, 9. Anyone who is merciful will receive mercy, as it is stated, I shall give you mercy, and you should be merciful and multiply. Dvarim 13, 18, end quote from the Ramah. It is clear from the Rambah, A, that although we are allowed to work in Evikanani with a vodas parach, we are discouraged from doing so for ethical reasons. B, these ethical reasons are universal in nature, stemming from a recognition that, quote, his maker made me and we were prepared in the same womb, and from the fact that God is good that God's mercy is universal, for he is merciful to all his creations. C. The Ramam uses in-group rhetoric to argue for universalist mercy, accusing those who are cruel to their non-Jewish servants of acting like non-Jews and asserting that the welfare of Jewry is contingent on our practice of mercy towards all. Approach number two. A Vodaspark is only ethically wrong for Jews. In our first approach, we assume that a Vodasparak is inherently unethical. But what if we were wrong? This might seem counterintuitive, but I believe it is supported by the Sifra, Taurus Kohanim 2546 on the Pasak, quote, and with your brethren, the children of Israel, each man with his brother, you shall not subjugate him Bafarach. That's from Vyikor 2546. From here the sages infer, quote, you shall not subjugate him, i.e. a fellow Jew who is an evid Bafarach, but you may subjugate a free Jew Bafarach. End quote. Tor T Mimah, uh on that Pusak note 248, explains the rationale. Since he accepts this upon himself willingly on account of the pleasure of receiving reward and the like. End quote. If Avodas Parak were inherently unethical, the Torah would not permit an employer to subject a Jewish employee to it simply because he's willing to get paid for it. For example, Halah does not permit us to strike or wound or curse a fellow Jew, no matter how much money he accepts as a payment. However, the Torah does prohibit the physical abuse of a non-Jewish slave, say stating, quote, from Shemos 21, 26 through 27, if a man strikes the eye of his slave or the eye of his maidservant and destroys it, he shall send him free for his eye. And if he knocks out the tooth of his slave or the tooth of his maidservant, he shall send him free for his tooth, end quote. According to the Oral Torah, this is not limited to eyes and teeth. Rather, quote from the Ramam Hilchos of Vadim 5.4, if a person intentionally struck his slave and caused him to lose one of the 24 tips of his limbs or organs that will not regenerate, he is granted his freedom, end quote. We initially assumed that the Torah permitted a vodas parak with a non-Jewish slave despite its immorality. But what if these laws which regulate our physical treatment of the Evid Knani reflect the threshold of immorality? What if a votas parach is permitted because it is not inherently immoral? Let us reassess the practice of a votas parch from this fresh perspective, beginning with a review of the definition. A votas parch is any task that has no defined limit or whose output is not necessary in and of itself. When you think about it, there are many legitimate reasons why a slave owner might command his slave to engage in a votos parach, to prevent idleness, which is the source of much trouble, to deter laziness, which is an undesirable quality in a slave, to reinforce his own authority, which may be necessary even in a free workplace or institution, and is vital in the relationship between a slave and his master, to maintain his slave's physical fitness, which is necessary from both a practical and economic standpoint, to preserve routine and order, thereby ensuring a baseline of smooth operations, to train his slave for future tasks by developing his skills, such as just as apprentices practice on raw materials, and to prevent the slave from getting into trouble or engaging in other problematic behavior. My point is not that a votus parach is inherently justified, only that it is not inherently objectionable. It is a morally neutral tool that can be utilized by a master in a targeted manner in specific situations. Review the list above and consider how many similar activities take place in our free society for similar purposes. Coaches subject their players to a votus parach all the time, making them run laps, do push-ups, practice maneuvers, and nobody views this as immoral. Students engage in countless unproductive exercises when preparing for standardized tests. And although one might object to this practice on educational grounds, nobody deems it abuse. Try bursting to a gym and shouting, I'm here to liberate all ye oppressed by the Avotas parach of dumbbells, and you'll likely be thought of as a crazy person. The gym bro endlessly lifting weights is a paradigm of an evid engaged in a votas parich. But because our society justifies this in the framework of physical fitness, we don't bat an eye. Why do we condemn the Egyptians for enslaving our ancestors with a votas parach? The answer is simple. Just because a votas parach isn't intrinsically ethical doesn't mean it can't be done unjustly. The Egyptians didn't deserve punishment because they utilized the Israelites for a votas parach from time to time. Rather, quote, Egypt enslaved B'n'srael Bafarach, and they embittered their lives with harsh labor, with mortar and bricks with all the work in the field. All the work they work them with, all the work they work them with was Bafarach. End quote. Their entire enslavement of Israel was characterized by a Vodas Parach, and they did so deliberately in order to oppress us, as it is stated, quote, from Devaring 26.6, and the Egyptians wronged us and afflicted us and placed harsh labor upon us. End quote. Consider this analogy. Soldiers in basic training are subjected to a votus parach all the time, performing tasks with no practical necessity and engaging in limitless physical exertion. And you'll keep at it until I say so, soldier. Soldier, do we view basic training as evil? No. Why not? Because we recognize that this Avodas parach trains the soldier's mind and body, instills discipline, builds stamina and endurance, and breaks down the individual ego to build it up as part of his unit, his branch of the armed services, and his country. But what if a soldier's boot camp had no end? What if he was left there forever? What if an entire nation was enslaved in a boot camp-like existence for generations, like the Soviet gulag, the North Korean prison camps, or the Chinese re-education camps? That would be evil. That is what Egypt did to us. If you found this argument compelling thus far, you may be wondering if we've made too strong of a case. According to this approach, why would the Torah prohibit a voter's park for Jews? The best answer I've heard so far was given by my Talmud Michael Gordon, who has his own Substack, in a comment on my original article. Quote, the guidelines of how to treat a Jewish slave seem to be tied to a unique quality of a Jew. His ancestors were slaves in Egypt. If the reason of the mitzvah is not about cruelty, but rather to avoid a reenactment of the slavery in Egypt, then it makes sense. The issue isn't a Jew inflicting a vodas parak, but a Jew experiencing a vodas parach. The Halacha in the Ramam supports this too. Even if a Jew isn't inflicting it, we are obligated to prevent a Jew from reliving the slavery of Egypt. End quote from Michael. I like Michael's answer, but would frame it slightly differently. The prohibition of Avodas Parch aims to prevent the Jewish people from experiencing national re-traumatization. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration defines re-traumatization as, quote, reliving stress reactions experienced as a result of a traumatic event when faced with a new similar incident, end quote, from SAMHSA.gov. A recent example can be seen in Holocaust survivors whose traumas can be reawakened when they are placed in similar situations to what they experienced in the camps. A growing number of studies have shown that such trauma can be passed on to subsequent generations. We experienced national trauma from the Avodas parch of Egyptian slavery. The Torah prohibits re-traumatizing a fellow Jew by imposing Avodas parach or ignoring it when done by non-Jews. Thus, there is nothing inherently wrong with subjecting an Evid Kanani to a votas parich, since they don't share our history of national oppression. For us, Avodas Parch revives our national trauma, while for them it is a normal part of being an Evid. Approach number three. A votas parch as a philosophical prohibition. Rambam in the Mornibuchim 331 prefaces his explanation of the reasons for the mitzvos as follows. Quote, every one of the 613 mitzvos serves to inculcate a true view or remove a false view, or to establish righteous conduct in society or remove an injustice, or to train us in a good character trait or to caution us against an evil character trait. Everything is dependent on these three things, hashkafos, ideas, mitos, character traits, and actions which shape society, justice. Thus, these three principles suffice for assigning a reason for each and every mitzvah. End quote. Until now, we've assumed that a votus park is prohibited for reasons of midos or justice. But what if it is prohibited for philosophical reasons, to inculcate a true view or remove a false view? This approach emerged naturally from the previous one. Once we consider the possibility that a votas parak isn't inherently ethically wrong, we must also entertain the possibility that it is not ethically wrong at all. Before delving into a new theory about a vodas parach, I'd like to showcase an example of a mitzvah that at first glance aims at ethical or societal ends, but can also can also be interpreted as having a philosophical objective. This will serve as a paradigm for our analysis of a Vodas Parak. The Torah prohibits us from returning to Egypt to settle there. We are only permitted to travel there for business or to pass through en route to another land. Ramam in the Sefer Mitzvah's Losa 46 incorporates the reason for this mitzvah into the formulation of the mitzvah itself. Quote, God prohibits us from dwelling in the land of Egypt forever, so that we not learn from their practices and not follow their disgraceful ways. End quote. Sefer Chinach, mitzvah number 500, offers a similar explanation. Quote, the reason for this mitzvah is because the people in Egypt are evil and sinners, and God, blessed is he, in his kindness, took us out from their hand and redeemed us to make us meritorious by following the ways of truth, and desired in his great goodness for us to no longer return to become impure among them, so that we don't learn their behaviors and we don't follow their despicable ways over our Torah. End quote. See, for example, Vycra 18, 3 and 24 through 30, began their decline with the Persian conquest in 525 BCE, continue dwindling through the Hellenistic period, 332 BCE, the Roman Conquest, 30 BCE, and the era of Christianization, 4th through 6th century CE, and had all but vanished by the Arab conquest in the 7th century CE. Today, 85 to 90% of the people living in modern-day Egypt are Muslim, and 10 to 15% are Coptic Christians. The forms of institutionalized slavery, sexual depravity, and primitive of vodazar are long gone. This mitzvah is still binding, but its purpose, according to Rahmam and Sefrachinach, is obsolete. It's possible that Ramam and Seifrachinach hold that this prohibition was given specifically for the time period when Egypt was a dominant power on the world stage. If the Jewish people had returned to Egypt at any point within the first millennium after the giving of the Torah, it would have been disastrous. And this prohibition safeguarded against that outcome. The fact that this mitzvah is no longer, quote unquote, relevant in the same way is similar to Torah's prohibitions against the burning of infants to Molech, shaving the corners of one's head in emulation of idolatrous priests, or any other mitzvos that have reached their mission accomplished stage and have served their purpose in the history of Israel and mankind. Parenthetically, you see my shir how the seemingly outdated elements of Torah are evidence of its perfection for an elaboration on this general approach. And parentheses. I would like to suggest that there is a secondary reason for this Torah prohibition. Dozens of mitzvos were commanded as a Zekir L Yitzias mitzraim, a remembrance of the exodus from Egypt. Yetsias mitzraim is a core part of our identity and the foundation of our knowledge of God. Perhaps the prohibition against returning to Egypt is another form of Zechar Litus Mitzraim, which reinforces these essential ideas. However, this doesn't quite function as a commemoration. Imagine a modern Jew who moved to Poland as if it were any other country, giving no thought to the fact that 90% of Poland's Jewish population, around 3 million Jews, had been rounded up by the Nazis and murdered. To neglect or forget that tragedy would severely distort our national memory. However, if there were a prohibition against Jews moving back to Poland because of what happened there, it would ensure that we never forget. Similarly, prohibiting Jews from living in Egypt functions as a Zechir Litzyz Mitzraim by preventing a Shikachas Yetzyz Mitzraim, a forgetting of the Exodus. Perhaps this is why we are prohibited from working in Evidevri with Avotas Parech or allowing a non-Jew to subject him to a Vodasparach, not because it is unethical, but because we must not forget the Egyptian slavery in which our entire people were oppressed through Avodas Parich before Hashem redeemed us. You know, I should actually change that last sentence in the other paragraph too. Similarly, prohibiting Jews from living in Egypt functions as a Zeichelitzias Mitzraim by preventing a shikachas avdus mitzraim, a forgetting of the Egyptian slavery. That's better. Okay, going back. Let me read on again. Perhaps this is why we are prohibited from working in ivry with a votas parach or allowing a non-Jew to subject him to a votus parach. Not because it is unethical, but because we must not forget the Egyptian slavery in which our entire people were oppressed through a votas parach before Hashem redeemed us. If this explanation isn't compelling, here's another idea. Let's review the Torah's presentation. Quote: If your brother becomes impoverished with you and is sold to you, you shall not work him with slave labor. Like a laborer or a resident shall he be with you, until the Jubilee year shall he work with you. Then he shall leave you. He sh he and his children with him. He shall return to his family, and to his ancestral heritage shall he return. For they are my servants, whom I have taken out of the land of Egypt. They shall not be sold in the manner of a slave, you shall not subjugate him before, you shall fear your God. End quote. First it states a set of laws about the Evidebri, followed by a statement about Hashem taking us out of Egypt. Only afterwards does it state the prohibition against selling a slave in the manner of a slave, and the prohibition against Avodas Parak. Why does the Torah interpose with a Zahir Litis Matrain? Abravanel answers, quote, For they are my servants whom I have taken out of the land of Egypt. And if so, why should you work him like an eternal slave with humiliating Avodas Parak? Especially since this constitutes a desecration of my honor, for they are my servants whom I took out from the land of Egypt. Therefore it is not proper for you to seize them like your slave, thereby stealing my servant. Rather, they should be with you like a hired worker or resident, and you shall fear your God who lowers people and raises them up, and it is possible that you or your offspring will be like this. Abravanel also maintains that Avotas Parak is not prohibited because of ethical or justice-related considerations, but for philosophical reasons. We are permitted to use, we are permitted to use our Jewish brethren as Avadim with within certain parameters, but if we sell them in the manner that other slaves are sold, or work them with Avotasparech, then we are acting as though they belong to us, and it is as if we are stealing Hashem's servants. This is a false idea, as Khazal state in Bhavamitzia 10a, they are my servants and not the servants of servants. Concluding thoughts. I'd like to reiterate that my primary objective was not to convince you of any particular answer to our original question. Rather, my goal was to explore three general approaches to such an answer. The double standard of Avotas Parach for an Evikanani might stem from the Torah's overarching strategy with interpersonal mitvos, in which ethical conduct is inculcated in the nation by in-group legislation with the ultimate goal of universalist ethics, approach number one. Alternatively, the Torah might permit Avodas Parach of an Eviknani because Avodas Parch is only ethically wrong when done to a Jew due to our national trauma, approach number two. Or perhaps the prohibition against Avotas Parch serves a philosophical end, reinforcing our relationship with Hashem as the one who redeemed us from Egyptian slavery, an idea unrelated to an Eviknani, approach number three. I hope this has been an enlightening exploration.