Chukas: Three Radical Takes on the Sin of Moshe and Aharon

Synopsis: This is the audio version of the 4-page article I wrote and published on rabbischneeweiss.substack.com/ on 6/25/26 titled: Chukas: Three Radical Takes on the Sin of Moshe and Aharon. There are over a dozen theories about which sin barred Moshe and Aharon from leading the people into the Land. Here are three relatively unknown approaches from three relatively unknown commentaries.

-----

The Torah Content for the month of Tammuz is sponsored by Yael Weiss. Thank you, Yael, for your support! It’s people like you who make it possible for me to continue doing what I do.

-----

If you've gained from what you've learned here, please consider supporting my work via Patreon, Venmo, Zelle, or PayPal — links below. Even a small contribution helps cover production costs and gives me the freedom to create more Torah content. To sponsor a day's or week's worth of content, or to inquire about tutoring or teaching, reach me at rabbischneeweiss at gmail. Thank you for listening, reading, and supporting my efforts to make Torah ideas available and accessible to everyone.

Patreon | [Venmo: @Matt-Schneeweiss] | [Zelle/PayPal: mattschneeweiss at gmail]

Substack | YouTube | YUTorah | Instagram

Podcasts: The Stoic Jew | Machshavah Lab | The Mishlei Podcast | Rambam Bekius | The Tefilah Podcast

WhatsApp Content Hub | Old Blog | Amazon Wishlist

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:00

Hello, I'm Rabbi Matt Sneweiss, and this is the audio version of the three-page article I wrote and published on my Substack at Rabbi Schneewiss.substack.com on June 25th, 2026, and the article is titled Khukas, Three Radical Takes on the Sin of Moshe and Aharon. The Age Old Dilemma. Shadal prefaces his commentary on Moshe's sin in Babmitbar 2012 by expressing his trepidation. Quote, Moshe Rabinu sinned one sin, but the commentators have heaped upon him thirteen sins or more, for each one of them invented a new transgression. Abravanel cited ten opinions and added one of his own. Rajbat in Magin Avos, page 75, added another opinion. Mendelson added one more, and perhaps several other opinions have been written of which I am not aware. As a result, all my life I have refrained from investigating this matter in depth, for fear that perhaps as a result of my investigations, there might come forth from me a new interpretation, and I too would have found myself adding on a new sin upon Moshe Urbano. End quote from Shadal, translated by Dan Klein with minor changes. My Gamara Rebbe always used to say that whenever you see a huge moch locus disagreement with many opinions, it usually means that nobody really knows what's going on. That was the sense I got when reading the Abravnel's list of eleven opinions and Shadal's preface. And I couldn't help but wonder why doesn't the Torah present the sin of Moshe Rabinu and Aaronakohain with greater clarity? Surely Hashem was aware of the confusion that would ensue from the ambiguous statements in the text. Footnote. I chose not to reference all the verses in the body of the article, but I'll cite them here for those who would like to investigate further. Bab Midbar 20, 7 through 13, Babidbar 20, 24, and Babidbar 2714, Divarim 137, 326, 421, and 3251, and Tahilim 106.32 through 33. For a comprehensive analysis, see Moshe's Mystep and May Mariva in Al-Hatura's study topics, especially the approaches section. Back to the text. This year I found three new approaches by three Mafarshim that the majority of readers probably haven't learned. Rubihuda ibn Balaam. Rubihuda ibn Balaam, who lived from 1000 to 1070, a relatively obscure early Andalusian commentator, prefaces his analysis of Moshe's sin by enumerating several theories, refuting each one in turn. For example, he argues that the sin cannot be Moshe's declaration, listen now, you rebels, from Bamidbar 2010, because our own didn't make such a statement, but is still punished along with him. For the same reason, the sin cannot be that Moshe struck the rock instead of speaking to it, especially because we are taught in Tehilim that the sin involved speech, quote, for they embittered his spirit and he spoke rashly with his lips. End quote from Tehilim 1063. He then states his own opinion. Quote, in my opinion, Scripture concealed the error that was committed by them altogether, and there is no basis for deriving it by way of conjecture, which is a path leading to the contending of opinions and to disparagement of Moshe and Aron, something which in attributing the iniquity to the messenger is forbidden and kept hidden. End quote. When I saw this, I felt vindicated in my reaction to the Abravanel's list and Shadal's Lamentation. According to Rabbi Hudd ibn Balaam, the sin of Moshe and Aaron was deliberately concealed, not because Hashem expected us to figure it out from the confusing clues, but because he didn't want us to figure it out. Ironically, this approach backfired, as Shaddal pointed out. But Rabihud ibn Balaam would chalk that up to our error, not Hashem's. He then mentions what appears to be a second possibility, or a second approach, quote. And it is possible that no fault was imputed to him, to Moshe, and that he is innocent of it. And the reason this iniquity is repeated many times is to inform us that no sin other than it was done by them, and that it was among the minor matters in which the messenger might take pride. End quote. On the surface, this is a bit contradictory. First he seems to say that Moshe didn't do anything wrong, but then he seems to indicate that he did do something wrong among the minor matters. Presumably he must mean that Moshe only committed the most minor of infractions, and that Hashem cleared him of it, and that the Torah only mentions it to highlight that it was the only flaw. It would be akin to a competitive gymnast who averaged a score of 9.99. Rather than speak of a perfect record, everyone would remark on the single slip-up that ruined an otherwise flawless record, and that would be something in which the gymnast might take pride. This alternative possibility makes for the perfect segue into the next view. Revavram Bibago. Revavram Bibago, 1420 to 1489, a Sephardic Ave Roist Aristotelian, expresses his view in Derach Amuna 2.6. His treatment there includes a full statement of his premises, his reasoning, and his proofs, all of which are creative and fascinating, but are too extensive to summarize here. Instead, we will focus on his actual position. Quote: As for the answer to all of this, I say first that Moshe Rubinu was not punished, and that death was not a punishment for Moshe and for Aharon, but rather it was for them a perfection. For the prophets and the men of renown at the time of death acquire a perfection greater than that which is available to them while they are alive, for they pass over from sensible existence to intelligible existence. For this reason the psalmist said, quote, precious in the eyes of Hashem is the death of his pious ones. From Tahilim 116, 15. For Hashem accords honor and preciousness to his pious ones, to transfer them from a deficient world to an exalted world and an eternal existence. End quote. For example, Bamidbar 2012 is usually translated as quote, Hashem said to Moshe and Aaron, because you did not believe in me, Ya'an lo Heemantembi, to sanctify me in the eyes of the children of Israel, therefore you shall not bring this assembly to the land that I have given to them. End quote. Rubi Bago creatively reads Heemantem as being in the hephial, causative form, contrary to the verb's typical use. He argues that in this case it should be translated as, because you did not successfully cause the people to believe in me, and that the verse was intended not as an indictment of Moshe and Aaron, but as an explanation of why the people were not on the level to merit being led into the land by Moshe and Aaron. He provides similar readings for all the other verses that seem to indicate that Moshe and Aron sinned. Those who are interested can read his lengthy and comprehensive analysis in Derachamuna. Ho'il Moshe. One of my new favorite commentators is Ho'il Moshe, Moiseh Tedeski, aka Moshe Yitrach Ashkenazi, 1821 to 1898, who was part of Shadal's inner circle in Italy. He begins with a nod to Shadal's view, noting that Shadal's analysis of the quote, opinions of the Kadmonim, early ones, was the most compelling. But then he shares his own radical take, quote, but my view inclines to say that Moshe did not sin at all in any way. And this too was the view of the great master, Rav Moshe Halevi Erinreich, and of the wise Ravietzak Chaim Castiglioni. And the view that there is no death without sin and no suffering without iniquity, from Shabbos 55a, was widespread among the nation in those days, as I wrote above, in 1906, and needed strengthening. And Moshe and Aron died when their time came in the way of all the earth. But if the children of Israel were to see the death of Moshe without sin, and the death of Aron after the iniquity of the golden calf that had been forgiven him, they would say that there is death without sin. Therefore, God reckoned this matter to them as a transgression, even though it is an empty matter. End quote. However, the Israelites' belief in the doctrine that there is no death without sin and no suffering without iniquity was so tenuous that if Moshe and Arun died without any discernible sin, their deaths would shake the people's belief in reward and punishment. Therefore, Hashem fabricated a sin, allowing the people to misread these deaths as punishments. What does he do with, quote, because you did not believe in me to sanctify me, etc.? He explains, quote, the explanation of you did not believe in me is, according to the correct words of Shadal, you acted in such a manner that to the multitude it appeared as though you did not believe, and it was reckoned to them as iniquity, namely, that they were not scrupulous to do exactly as the word of Hashem had said, without addition or subtraction, even though many times they acted of their own accord, like the incense of Arun during the plague over the affair of Korach, or deviated slightly from the command of God, as in the drawing near of the nobles to the glory of God at Mount Sinai at the end of Parshis Mishpatem, and God gave his assent to their action. End quote. In other words, Ho'il Moshe understands this verse to be telling us what sin the people were led to believe was committed by Moshe and Aaron, namely that they didn't do exactly what Hashem commanded. This was undoubtedly a good message to relate to the people, especially when paired with a vivid lesson about how Hashem holds even his servants accountable. But in reality, for high-level prophets like Moshe and Aaron, Hashem often approved of their initiative taking, even if it meant deviating from his precise instructions. Even when it sorry, even if it involved them deviating from his precise instructions. Of course, the major difficulty with this entire approach is how could the Torah falsely ascribe sins to Moshe and Aaron? Hoel Moshe answers by providing another example of benevolent deception. Quote. At times his face, uh you know, I should say not will, of favor and anger. At times his face smiling as and he passes over transgression, and at times his face is scowling and he rages and punishes. In order to lower God, in other words, sorry, let me read that again. The Torah depicted God as a possessor of favor and anger, at times his face smiling and he passes over transgression, and at times his face scowling and he rages and punishes, in order to lower God to the understanding of the people of that generation who were lowly in its opinions, and to raise them little by little up to the heavens. For such is the way of the one enthroned on high who wishes to bring himself uh to to bring up to himself a man dwelling in the depths. He lowers himself to support him by the hand and to lift him up to the height of his station. End quote. In short, this is another example of the expanded version of Dibra Torah Kiloshambine Adam. The Torah speaks in human language, as expounded by Shadal. Just as the Torah ascribed corporeal attributes and emotions to the unchanging non-physical creator, because this is what the people of that generation developmentally needed in order to relate properly to his mithos, the same is true here. The Torah falsely framed the natural deaths of Moshe and Arun as punishments in order to reinforce the beneficial belief in reward and punishment. Footnote two. Readers familiar with Ramam's distinction in the Moria 328 between the two types of beliefs taught in the Torah may wonder why I didn't invoke it here, since Hoyel Moshe's explanation seems to be predicated on it. Two reasons. One, I felt it would distract readers from the core question that this article aims to address. And two, I didn't want to be guilty of a Moria hit and run. If you're curious, start with my article, Yisro, Shadal's unfortunate stance on idolatry, belief, and the value of knowledge. Concluding thoughts. We opened this article with two questions, one implicit and the other explicit. The implicit question, what sin did Moshe and Arun commit? The explicit one, why does the Torah communicate its answer in such an unclear way? Unlike the 13 plus answers to the first question that gave Shadal such anxiety, the three commentators cited here address the second question instead. Ruvihuda ibn Balaam answers it directly. The concealment was intentional. Ruv Bibhau and Ho'il Moshe dissolved the first question altogether, which is what accounts for the Torah's obliqueness on their view. My goal in this piece was not to convince anyone to accept one of these three approaches. Rather, it was to showcase how a question that has vexed centuries of commentators can inspire out of the box thinking, yielding solutions that provoke further thought and insight beyond the scope of the problem they solve.