477. The Spy Trade

Check out host Bidemi Ologunde's new show: The Work Ethic Podcast, available on Spotify and Apple Podcasts.

Email: bidemiologunde@gmail.com

In this episode, host Bidemi Ologunde examines the reported U.S. rejection of a Russian proposal to curb intelligence support to Iran in exchange for Washington ending intelligence sharing with Ukraine, and asks what that incident reveals about intelligence as one of the most valuable currencies in modern war. How did intelligence sharing become a bargaining chip between rival powers? Why does battlefield information now carry almost as much strategic weight as weapons themselves? And what happens when surveillance, targeting data, and early warning stop being quiet support tools and start becoming geopolitical leverage in their own right? 

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Transcript

SPEAKER_01 0:16

In the past week, multiple reputable outlets reported a striking back channel proposition. Russia supposedly offered to stop providing certain intelligence support to Iran, including, as reported, targeting related information relevant to US forces in the region if United States would end intelligence sharing with Ukraine. The US reportedly rejected the offer. So this matters because intelligence is not only knowledge, it is operational power. In modern conflict, intelligence sharing can enable target engagements, it can warn of attacks, it can harden defenses and also shape diplomacy. So that makes it a form of leverage, sometimes as consequential as weapon shipment or sanctions, precisely because it is scalable, deniable, and reversible. So in this episode, I'll describe what's known about the proposal and the denials, why intelligence sharing is uniquely tradable, what kinds of intelligence are likely implicated, and how history from World War II to the Cold War and the Russia-Ukraine war shows intelligence can decide battles while also distorting policy. I'll close the episode with strategic consequences, ethical and legal risks, and concrete policy options for the US and Allies grounded in official doctrine and oversight frameworks. On a cold night in World War II, Allied leaders faced a dilemma that still defines intelligence politics today. When you know something because you've cracked the enemy's secret, acting on that knowledge can expose how you learned it. When you know something, because you've cracked the enemy's secret, acting on that knowledge can expose how you learned it. So Britain's codebreakers were reading high-level enemy communications, what became known as Ultra, but they often had to manufacture a cover story for their actions. Instead of striking immediately on the basis of a secret decryption, they might first fly an apparently routine reconnaissance mission over a location they already knew mattered, so that the enemy would blame the aircraft, not the broken cipher, when an attack followed. So that was not paranoia, it was strategy. Protect the source, even if it limits how fast you can use the truth. So keep that image in your head. Intelligence as a decisive advantage and intelligence as a fragile asset. Now fast forward to 2026, where intelligence itself is being floated as a bargaining chip between wars. So here is what multiple reports attributed largely to unnamed officials and sources familiar with the discussions have said, alongside what is formerly on the record. There was a proposal that was said to have been conveyed by Kirill Dmitriev to U.S. interlocutors Steve Whitkov and Jared Kushner at a meeting in Florida. The summary of that proposal is that Moscow would curb or halt intelligence support to Iran, and that was described in some accounts as targeting related data relevant to U.S. military assets. If Washington stopped providing intelligence support to Ukraine, the U.S. response was reported as a rejection. So that meeting itself is confirmed publicly. A Russian delegation led by Dmitriev met a U.S. delegation in Florida. Whitkov said the teams discussed a variety of topics and agreed to stay in touch. On the Iran intelligence side of the story, there were previously summarized reports alleging that Russia was providing Iran targeting information that included locations of U.S. warships and aircraft. The White House press secretary, Caroline Levit, publicly downplayed those reports in early March, suggesting that the alleged sharing was not making a difference. Russia's position as publicly captured across multiple items is denial, sometimes categorical denial. The reports of Whitkov saying that after a Trump putting call, Russia denied sharing intelligence with Iran on US military assets. Separately, Russian state media cited Dmitriev dismissing the political originated claim of an intelligence deal as fake news. Reuters also reported the Kremlin rejecting a related Wall Street Journal claim about Russia providing Iran intelligence as fake news in the days before this latest of her story. So one more key context point. So what exactly is solid and what is not exactly solid information? So we can responsibly say this. The Florida meeting happened. Russia and US teams acknowledge that meeting happening. We can also say that credible news agencies reported a specific quid pro quo involving intelligence, with the US reportedly rejecting it while Russia disputes the existence or framing of the proposal. So what remains murky and made actually stay murky is the precise operational content of any intelligence that Russia is or is not providing to Iran, because those details sit exactly where governments prefer ambiguity, which is the nature of intelligence itself. So to understand why this kind of offer is even unthinkable, you need to understand how intelligent cooperation is built and how it can be hampered. In American practice, foreign intelligence liaison is not an ad hoc favor. It is a structured ecosystem of relationships, agreements, and controlled disclosures. A Congressional Research Service report, a CRS report, describes foreign intelligence cooperation as ranging from exchanging raw data or finished intelligence to basic rights, joint operations and training, all built around mutual interest and trust and constrained by risks of compromise, manipulation, or unethical partner conduct. The legal and policy scaffolding is similarly explicit. Executive Order 1233, which is foundational for US intelligence, authorizes agencies to conduct liaison relationships and intelligence exchange programs with foreign services while also situating such activities within a framework of responsibilities and prohibitions. Most important, intelligence sharing is not just give or don't give, it is a spectrum. And that is what makes it useful as a leverage. So here are some mechanisms that make intelligence tradable. First, releasability controls. So the US uses dissemination markings such as no foreign, N-O-F-O-R-N, which means not releasable to foreign nationals, and also RHEL2, R-E-L-T-O, meaning releasable to specified foreign partners. And all of that is basically to encode who can receive what. The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency's training guidance defines no foreign and RHEL 2 as intelligence control markings that govern whether and how information can be provided to foreign governments or partners. Second, the existence of formal foreign disclosure processes. The Intelligence Communities Directive on Foreign Disclosure ICD 403 establishes policy governing the disclosure and release of classified national intelligence to foreign entities, emphasizing protection of sources and methods. It also underscores that disclosure decisions are inherently governmental functions and it details roles, escalation parts, and the need for coordination. Third, legal and ethical compliance checks. Notably, ICD 403 instructs foreign disclosure authorities to consult legal counsel as necessary about whether releasing intelligence could violate US or international law, including disclosures that may support or facilitate lethal action. That line is critical. It demonstrates that sharing intelligence can become materially connected to the use of force, not just information exchange. Fourth, classification discipline and source protection. Under the US classification system, information is classified when unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to damage national security, and the system is designed to safeguard national security information while balancing open government principles. In practice, protecting sources and methods means intelligence can be shared in tier lines, which is basically the sanitized analytic conclusions separated from sensitive collection details, and that allows partial sharing without burning the crown jewels. So now let's add the incentives that turn sharing into leverage. For the provider, sharing intelligence can buy influence, it can align operations and reduce risk to one's own forces. For the recipient, it can substitute for expensive collection capabilities they do not have, especially space-based and signals collection. CRS notes, liaison can expand coverage, provide warning, enable access in contingencies, and serve as a diplomatic back channel while the risks include compromise and overreliance. Finally, let's add signaling and deniability. Intelligence sharing can be a signal without being an overt military action. You can quietly increase the tempo of intelligence feeds to show commitment, or you can quietly reduce them to apply pressure, often without a public announcement. The Russia-Ukraine war itself offers a vivid precedent. In March 2025, around this time last year, the US paused intelligence sharing with Ukraine explicitly as pressure in a negotiation context, and then lifted the pause and resumed sharing shortly afterward. That precedent is not ancient history. It is the immediate blueprint for why Moscow might believe intelligence can be traded between theaters. So let's anchor all of that in four brief historical snapshots. First, World War II. The ultra example earlier in the episode is the classic lesson in operational use versus strategic risk. If the enemy learns that you are inside their communications, they would change their procedures, they would rotate their keys, or even shut down the entire channel. The NSA's historical account describes Britain going to great lengths to disguise how Enigma-derived information was obtained, including establishing deceptive reasons for military actions. So this dynamic, use it but don't expose it, explains why intelligence sharing is also rationed. The more widely you share high grade intelligence, the higher the chance that you are going to compromise the method you use to obtain that high grade intelligence. Another historical snapshot is the Cold War, when intelligence was used as proof for policy. So during the Cuban missile crisis, imagery was not merely operational, it was diplomatic evidence. The US National Archives highlights an aerial photograph showing Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba used at the early stage of the crisis and tied to presidential warning and policy decisions. So this is the second role of intelligence during wartime, not just helping you to fight, but helping you to justify your actions to allies, adversaries, and even the general public.

SPEAKER_00 14:12

Third, Iran and Afghanistan.

SPEAKER_01 14:15

Intelligence that can mislead and intelligence that becomes the campaign. So the Iraq weapons of mass destruction case is the cautionary tale that intelligence, especially when it is uncertain, can become a political accelerant. The 2005 WMD Commission called the intelligence community's performance on Iraq's pre-war WMD programs a major intelligence failure, emphasizing shortcomings in how assessments were made and communicated. That matters here because it shows why governments guard not only sources, but analytic credibility. Intelligence can launch wars, not just win battles. In Afghanistan, intelligence became inseparable from how the war was fought. The CIA's public museum exhibit describes the president ordering the agency to collect real-time, actionable intelligence to help shape the battlefield with CIA teams on the ground within 15 days of 9-11. The US Air Force's historical overview of Operation Enduring Freedom explicitly notes the breadth of ISR operations using satellites and aircraft such as the U-2 and RC-135, emphasizing that large-scale campaigns depend on persistent collection. Last but not the least, the Russia-Ukraine conflict from 2014 up until 2024. Intelligence as a live operational lifeline. So Ukraine's post-2014 security environments featured expanding intelligence cooperation with the US. Reporting traces the origins of deep CIA Ukraine intelligence ties back to 2014, years before the 2022 full-scale invasion. After February 2022, public reporting repeatedly indicated US intelligence enabled Ukrainian effectiveness, including help in targeting Russian forces. Reuters summarized reporting that US intelligence helped Ukraine target and kill Russian generals. Reuters also reported that US officials described providing critical intelligence enabling Ukraine to target Russian troops on land and at sea, paired with ongoing discussions about escalation risk. Just as important are the constraints. In 2024, Reuters reported U.S. policy shifting to allow limited use of U.S. supplied arms to strike inside Russia near Kharkiv, illustrating how intelligence and strike policy are calibrated to manage escalation. And again, the most direct demonstration of intelligence as leverage came in 2025. The US paused intelligence sharing, then resumed it as negotiations moved forward. This history is the backdrop for Russia's reported 2026 offer.

SPEAKER_00 17:15

It is not a novelty, it is a recognition of an existing pressure point.

SPEAKER_01 17:24

So when the news says stop providing intelligence, that can mean radically different things from a low-risk analytic brief to near real-time targeting feeds. US joint doctrine defines the major intelligence disciplines in ways that clarify what could be in play. So the first I want to consider is geospatial intelligence, also known as GeoInt. So GeoINt is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to depict physical features and geographically referenced activity. It includes everything from satellite imagery to product like full motion video. So operationally, GeoInt can identify fixed sites, it can map air defenses, and it can actually verify activity. If targeting data involves coordinates derived from satellites, then GeoInt is a prime candidate. Another intelligence discipline is human intelligence, humans. Humans is derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Doctrine also flags legal restrictions and the requirements for trained personnel in interrogations and source operations. Operationally, humans can reveal intent, planning, and networks, often crucial against clandestine actors, but slow and high risk to share because it can expose the human sources. Another major intelligence discipline is Signals Intelligence, SIGINT. SIGINT is produced by exploiting foreign communication systems and non-communications emitters. Doctrine explicitly notes that SIGINT is often used to cue the other sensors. So SIGINT can kill geoint, and geoint changes can kill SIGINT detection. Operationally, SIGINT can provide warning of attacks, it can identify unit movements, and it can support time-sensitive targeting. If Russia were providing Iran precise coordinates or location queues, a plausible pathway is SIGINT to JoeInts fusion or the release of fused tracks. Another major intelligence discipline is open source intelligence, OSINT. OSINT is based on publicly available information and it complements other disciplines, but Doctrine emphasizes that it is vulnerable to manipulation and it requires tradecraft and review. Operationally, OSINT can fill gaps and provide context, but it is rarely the limiting factor in a peer or near-peer fight. The leverage comes from scarce classified capabilities, particularly the ones from national technical means. So now let us link all of this to sharing policy. If you share time-sensitive intelligence that helps a partner enable target engagements, you are not just informing them, you are increasing their combat power. That is why foreign disclosure policy emphasizes legal review for disclosures that may support lethal action. And it is why the ultra lesson remains relevant. High grade intelligence can be decisive, but sharing it too broadly increases the chance that the adversary adapts or that the intelligence becomes politically radioactive. So what are some risks, legal and ethical issues? So the central ethical risk is complicity in harm. When intelligence is shared to enable lethal action, the provider must consider whether it is facilitating unlawful strikes or civilian harm. The US Foreign Disclosure Directive explicitly requires legal consultation when releases may support or facilitate lethal action and could violate US or international law. The strategic risk is precedent. Once intelligence sharing is openly treated as a tradable commodity between wars, it invites coercive linkage. Risk. Intelligence can be wrong or wrong in the way it is communicated. The WMD Commission's description of Iraq as a major intelligence failure underscores that analytic shortcomings and communication failures can have war-level consequences. Finally, there is an alliance trust risk. CRS emphasizes that liaison relationships depend on perceived credibility and professionalism while acknowledging risks of compromise, manipulation, and over-reliance. So here are some policy options and recommendations. First, refuse cross-theater or stage bargains while imposing costs for cross-theater harm. If Russia is, in fact, enabling Iranian targeting of US forces, treating that as a separate escalatory act rather than something to be traded against Ukraine reduces Moscow's incentive to fuse theaters for leverage. Public ambiguity may remain, but private deterrent messaging and sanctions tools can be tied to verifiable behavior rather than headline-driven swaps. Second, formalized tiers of intelligence support that are resilient to political turbulence. The US and allies can distinguish one, force protection and air defense warning intelligence, two, operational level situational awareness, and three, time-sensitive targeting intelligence. This aligns with Doctrine's view of intelligence roles, warning, enabling engagements, assessing effects, all while allowing policymakers to manage escalation risk with explicit policy ceilings rather than ad hoc pauses. Third, strengthen European collection capacity and interoperability without creating blind duplication. The French president's claim that France now provides a major share of intelligence support to Ukraine, whether precisely accurate or politically framed, points to a strategic direction. Europe increasing independent ISR is a hedge against US political throttling. The US should support that growth with ensuring fusion standards, counterintelligence screening, and deconfliction, because fragmented intelligence architectures can create seams that adversaries will exploit. Fourth, tighten interagency process and disclosure governance for high-stakes back channels. ICD 403 underscores disclosure decisions as governmental functions and highlights the need for coordination, especially for disclosures that could be construed as foreign policy pronouncements. In practice, that argues for ensuring any diplomatic intelligence trade discussion is anchored in established foreign disclosure authorities and legal review, not improvised deal making. Last but not the least, communicate clear red lines about intelligence-enabling attacks on US forces. If US officials believe Russian intelligence support materially increases threats to US forces, signaling that such support triggers consequences can change incentives. The point is not to publicize sources, but to make the cost legible while sustaining defensive intelligence support to partners under attack. Ultimately, intelligence is power, but it's also trust. And in war, trust is harder to rebuild than any satellite. If you like this episode, please share it with a relative, a friend, a coworker, a neighbor, an acquaintance, and so on. And then please leave a rating andor a review on your favorite podcast app. My name is PDM Logunde, and this is the Big Picture Podcast. Thank you for listening.