The Battle of Shiloh with (Timothy B. Smith)

The Battle of Shiloh with (Timothy B. Smith) 

In this episode of American Civil War & UK History, host Daz is joined by acclaimed author and historian Timothy B. Smith to explore one of the war’s most pivotal clashes — the Battle of Shiloh 

The Battle of Shiloh (April 6–7, 1862), fought in southwestern Tennessee, was a major early clash of the American Civil War and one of its bloodiest battles up to that point. Union forces under Ulysses S. Grant defeated the Confederate Army of Mississippi, initially led by Albert Sidney Johnston, who was killed in battle and succeeded by P. G. T. Beauregard.


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Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:00

To keep up to date with everything American Civil War and UK history, head over to our website ACW and UKhistory.com. And remember, this podcast has a PowerPoint presentation that goes along with the show. So if you would like to see the PowerPoint presentation, then head over to our YouTube channel at American Civil War and UK History. Cheers. Hello everyone, I'm Daz and welcome to American Civil War and UK History Podcast. This presentation is available as a video on our YouTube channel or as a podcast from wherever you get your podcast from. And if you're watching on YouTube, remember to hit that subscribe button and give us a big thumbs up. And check out our website at www.acwandukhistory.com where you'll find podcasts, blog posts, and links to all of our social media pages. The link is also available in the podcast description. And joining me today is author and historian Timothy B. Smith. Of course, as I like to call you Tim, Tim Smith of the West. Welcome, Tim. Thank you, appreciate you having me. Excellent. And of course, we are going to be discussing the Battle of Shiloh. And it's something that I've wanted to discuss, and Tim has been the guest. I've wanted to get on to discuss this for quite some time. So, Tim, before we get into that though, can you please uh tell everyone, because it's the first time on American Civil War and UK history, how you first became interested in history?

SPEAKER_02 1:24

Well, I grew up in Mississippi, which is just full of history. Everywhere's full of history, of course, but Mississippi has a rich history, obviously, uh, especially from the Civil War. And uh grew up basically between Shiloh and Vicksburg and had ancestors in the Civil War, and we would trace them all over Vicksburg, all of that. Um, and so I just grew up absolutely fascinated with it and uh went to college and decided to major in it and on to graduate school, all of that. So uh it's it's uh turned out very well, no uh no regrets.

SPEAKER_00 1:59

Excellent. Thank you, Tim. Okay, so as I said, we're gonna discuss the Battle of Shiloh, which took place on the 6th and 7th of April, 1862. Um, so firstly, Tim, how Grant and the Confederate Army are gonna meet at Shiloh.

SPEAKER_02 2:13

Okay, of course, the uh the the Federal forces are moving southward along the rivers, uh, in this case the Tennessee River, and uh there the is the classic concentration uh in space, uh the old Jominian mindset. Henry Halleck is the brains behind all of this. Grant is commanding one army moving down the uh southward along the Tennessee River, actually up the up the river. It flows northward at this point. Uh Don Carlos Buell is moving overland from Nashville. Uh the whole intention is to uh uh concentrate at Pittsburgh Landing and then move on to to Corinth, Mississippi, which is about 20 or 22 miles farther south. Now, Corinth is especially important because of those Confederate railroads that cross there, two major trunk line railroads that uh one Confederate Secretary of War calls the vertebrae of the Confederacy. That's the backbone of the Confederacy. And um, so the uh the Federals are after those railroads. Uh the Confederates have concentrated as well in the purest Jomenian sense. Uh Albert Sidney Johnson and PGT Borg already brought their forces together, and they're playing uh classic Napoleon game here, uh using the central position. Johnston wants to get in between or deal one at a time with Grant and Buell. And so he opts to, even though his army's not ready, he opts to attack at Pittsburgh Landing in early April, trying to defeat Grant, trying to annihilate Grant in the quest for this annihilating victory that everybody wants to achieve. Uh and then he can turn his his uh attention to Buell. So he's he's playing the central position game uh that we see often with Napoleon, we see often in the Civil War itself, um, and uh it uh it sparks the Battle of Shalom.

SPEAKER_00 4:09

Okay, thank you. And so can I just ask, um, so how much information do they know about the army at uh Pittsburgh Landing at the before the battles uh you know, before before the battle really gets into the battle. Does Albert Sidney Johnson know about the army being at Pittsburgh Landing this time? What kind of information has he got?

SPEAKER_02 4:28

Yes, well, there's there's much less secrecy in those days. Um, you know, the the Northern Papers are uh writing where the armies are and and even in some cases the strengths and all that. So the Confederates have a pretty good idea um that one Federal Army is at Pittsburgh Landing with one division at Crump's Landing. They they know pretty pretty well about this. They know Buell's coming in, they're tracking him. Uh, and it's the it's the effort to deal with Grant before Buell arrives that's that's um that's pushing this forward, even though the the Confederates aren't quite ready. Now, what they don't know particularly about um is the terrain at what will become the Battle of Shalom. Um the terrain is extremely important, and I've often said you cannot understand the Battle of Shalow unless you understand the battlefield of Shalow. And so the Confederates have a general uh peripheral idea of the cul-de-sac that the battlefield is, um, but not the interior terrain features, creeks and ridges and and all that, and that comes back to to really bite them in the rear end uh during the battle itself.

SPEAKER_00 5:43

Okay, so we do get to the morning of April the 6th. Now, there's that and it's not a misconception because uh although you know historians debate this, don't they, and I'm sure you've had this debate as well, about the surprise element. Now, there are picket skirmishes, aren't there? And one of those guys is uh uh Colonel Everett Peabody, is that correct? And so tell us about that engagement in the morning. Now he's sending back information, isn't he? And they don't believe him, do they?

SPEAKER_02 6:09

Well, Peabody sends out a patrol uh in advance of the Union camps, uh deep in the night of April 5th, morning of April the 6th, and it's this patrol that uncovers um the Confederate deployment and initial advance. And uh yeah, he's he's hollering that that uh you know there are Confederates out there, nobody will believe him, his division commander Prentice doesn't believe him. Uh Sherman's getting the same thing from his uh advanced regiments, uh Colonel Appler, the 53rd Ohio, uh sending back messages, and Sherman just kind of scoffs at him. Uh so the high command is is dropping the ball here. Those on the ground uh know a different story. Fortunately, uh for the Federals, Peabody sends out this patrol, which uncovers uh the Confederate advance a mile out from the camps, and as a result, will provide um at least two or three or four hours advance warning for the attacks on the camps. Um Prentice uh scolds Peabody in the midst of this and says, I'm gonna hold you personally responsible for bringing on a battle. And Prentice doesn't understand that there's a battle coming either way. Uh Peabody's patrol just basically gave forewarning for that and uh and gave them a little bit of time to get prepared.

SPEAKER_00 7:34

And again, they hear this firing, don't they? And but again, Sherman just dismisses it as skirmishes, yeah?

SPEAKER_02 7:42

Yes, well, there's been skirmishing in the in the days before. Um even on the fourth, there was a there was a pretty good little skirmish um with one of Sherman's brigades, uh, even a cannon shot. Uh, you know, so there there's been some skirmishing, and everybody knows there are Confederates out there, um, but they don't know to what extent. Um they don't know the full Confederate army is out there. To do to find that that out, they would have to probe, and they're under strict orders not to bring bringing on an engagement, don't bring on an engagement until we're completely ready, which means Buell gets here, uh, but also means the the brains of all this operation, old brains himself, Henry Halleck, gets here. Halleck's going to lead the operations against Corinth. So we're just not quite ready yet. The orders are don't bring on an engagement, just bide your time. And so as a result, they can't really be pushing to find out what's behind that screen of Confederates and those skirmishes. And um as a result, the the Confederate Army slips up on the Army of the Tennessee. Mm-hmm.

SPEAKER_00 8:50

Okay, let's uh let's uh bring in Albert Sidney Johnson again. And I know you said, you know, they've got fairly decent uh knowledge that the Union Army is sitting at Pittsburgh landing. Um so what is he thinking at that point? He he you know, what is his plan?

SPEAKER_02 9:07

Well, Johnston leaves us a convenient note that he writes to Jefferson Davis upon leaving Corinth, I believe it's on the 4th, um, and he tells him his plan. We are going to attack Grant and before Buell arrives, and we're gonna hook around the Union left and drive them into the swamps uh to the northwest of Pittsburgh Landing. A lot of people take this as capturing Pittsburgh Landing. Johnson's intention was not necessarily to capture Pittsburgh Landing. Um, he doesn't need it. He doesn't have any boats for the river. He can't combat the Union gunboats on the river if he got Pittsburgh Landing. He couldn't hold it. So his intention is not um necessarily to take Pittsburgh Landing, but it is instead to deprive the Federals of Pittsburgh Landing, which is that link up, that access point uh for a connection between Grant and Beale. So in the classic Napoleonic sense, he's playing the central position, holding Pittsburgh Landing, or at least depriving the enemy of Pittsburgh Landing, will provide him the central position. So Johnson attacks, and then throughout the day, he puts the emphasis, of course, and we'll talk about this, I'm sure, on the on the Confederate right. Um, but he doesn't realize the the terrain features, and we may get into this as well in a little bit, but he doesn't realize the terrain features, those huge ravines over on the east side of the battlefield near the river, um, that just severely disrupt um his uh his movement to the to the right around the Union left flank. He has a knowledge of the of the uh parameter creeks, the Tennessee River, Lick Creek, Owl Creek, Snake Creek, all of that. He he knows there's a cul-de-sac here. And in fact, um, when Beauregard's calling for uh delay in the battle, going back to Corinth, all of that the night before, uh, he makes that famous statement, I would fight them if they were a million. And then he goes on to say, we can present, they can present no greater front between these two creeks than we can. And the more men that crowd in there, the worse we can make it for them. So he knows about those creeks and the gap between them and plug in the gap. What he doesn't know are the interior creeks and ravines that's going to trip up his plan.

SPEAKER_00 11:22

Mm-hmm. Okay, thank you, mate. And uh, okay, let's talk about the union again. And uh again, so again, you know, I mean, a lot of uh you hear a lot about the you know, a lot of the guys obviously still sleeping or preparing breakfast uh when that big first wave comes through. So is there any truth behind that?

SPEAKER_02 11:41

Well, uh the the whole idea of the surprise at Shiloh, Wiley Sword called it the Pearl Harbor of the Civil War. Of course, bombs started dropping out of the clear blue sky at um at Pearl Harbor. Um it it is a surprise in the operational sense. No one in the Union Army of the Tennessee woke up that morning thinking we're going to fight the biggest battle in North American history today. Uh they just they had no concept of that whatsoever. And so in that sense, it is very much a surprise that that they get into this. Uh, on the tactical level, because of Peabody's patrol and uncovering the Confederate advance a full mile or so out from the Union camps, uh, it takes several hours for the Confederate Army to ultimately reach the Union camps. And it's only about uh 7.38 before they really start moving forward toward the camps at Shiloh Church. And as a result, that's um you know, the battle started at 4.55, 5 o'clock in the morning. That's that's two and a half, three hours right there. And so as we think about those those intervening hours uh and all the the firing that you hear and the loud noises and all that, Sherman and Prentice and all these naysayers finally are convinced, and they start forming their divisions, the rear divisions under WHL Wallace and Herbert and McClernon start to move forward. And so as a result, uh the Union Army basically meets the Confederate advance at the first line of camps. Uh, those first two divisions are in line of battle, ready to to fight it out, and indeed it takes the Confederate Army several more hours then to punch through that that initial line of camps. Now, are they cooking breakfast in the meantime? Yeah. Are there are there some still in their tents, probably some sick or or something like that? But this whole idea from White Law Reed and others that uh that the Confederates slipped up on the on the Union camps like uh, you know, um uh spies or ninjas or something and bayonetting them in their tents and and all that is is pure fabrication. That just doesn't uh that just doesn't happen to any great degree.

SPEAKER_00 13:54

Well, thanks for that, mate. Yeah, thanks for clearing that up. And uh again, Grant is not actually at Pittsburgh Landing, is he's further up the river uh with two other guys, and we'll bring those into it in a moment. But um, so what where is Grant and what is he doing when he receives the news that the attack has started from the Confederate Army?

SPEAKER_02 14:12

Grant is in Savannah, which is nine miles uh downriver, but north of Pittsburgh Landing. Again, the river flows north, and he is actually having breakfast. Uh he is he is at Pittsburgh, uh is at Savannah waiting on Buell. He's he's gotten word that Buell's in town, and he wants to meet with Buell that morning before heading on down to to Pittsburgh Landing. So um he's having breakfast around seven, a little after seven or so. Uh the first artillery fire at Shalow is documented a little after seven. So it's the rumble of that artillery that is uh is uh cascading up the valley there, and Grant hears that or his orderly hears it and tells Grant and it interrupts his breakfast, and Grant realizes that this is a uh uh moment, that uh um things haven't gone exactly the way uh I planned them, and we may be in for a uh rough couple of days here.

SPEAKER_00 15:08

Okay, I'll bring these two guys into it because they're an important part of the first day or not, if uh if you want to put it that way. Who is that? Lou Wallace and Bull Nelson? So we have Lou Wallace and Bull Nelson. So from what I understand, Lou Wallace gets completely lost, and Bull Nelson uh for some reason doesn't get there until the evening. Is that correct?

SPEAKER_02 15:29

Well, um Nelson, Grant immediately orders Nelson to move southward. Uh Grant realizes all right, we we are under attack. This is this is bigger than just skirmishing. If they're shooting cannons off, you know, this is we're in a mess. So he'll he'll send Nelson over land to Pittsburgh Landing. Now, the problem is the Tennessee River Valley at this point is the alluvial plain is completely waterlogged and covered with water, basically. So it takes him nearly all day to slog through the swamps. Um but he makes it. He gets there by the um uh nearly dark, and uh will start to put some troops over um even even before dark. Not many, but but a few. Uh Lou Wallace, conversely, is stationed at Crump's Landing, which is about six miles north of Shallow or Pittsburgh Landing, about three miles um south of uh of Savannah, between Savannah and Pittsburgh Landing. And so Grant, he initially thinks as he starts southward on his steamboat, the the Tigers, he thinks Wallace may be under attack. It's an isolated division, would be you know low-hanging fruit for the Confederates to grab. Um he gets to Crump's Landing, meets Wallace, and realizes okay, Wallace is not under attack, it's actually a Pittsburgh Landing. So he gives Wallace orders to concentrate his brigades, one at Crump's Landing, one at Adamsville, one at Stoney Lawson, uh, to concentrate those brigades and begin to move southward upon orders that I will send you. Grant wants to get to Pittsburgh Landing and figure out exactly what's going on before he pulls Wallace into this. And um, so Grant will get to Pittsburgh Landing, we'll figure out, yeah, we're we've uh bit off more than we chew here. Uh I need Wallace, so he sends Wallace orders uh to move um southward. Now, what those orders, this is this is the this is the misunderstanding. What those orders say, uh no one knows. The actual order's been lost. Um and really uh Grant says the orders say come to Pittsburgh Landing. Wallace says the orders say go to the right of the army, which would be Sherman's division shallow church area. That's three, two or three miles difference there. Um and it would involve taking a different road. If he's going to Sherman's division, he would take one road, the Shun Pike. If he's going to Pittsburgh Landing, he would take uh the river road. And so Wallace says my orders were to come to Sherman. So he starts down the Shun Pike. Um by the time he moves southward, Sherman is falling back. Grantstein and staff officers, where are you? What's going on? The army's falling back. So basically, Wallace has to turn around and come in by the river road. Um, he the the the common conception is that he's lost, he's not lost. He knows the road network. Um, he knows the Shun Pike. Uh he's he's cleared it. He's he's had Calvary out um scouting away to to to Sherman's division. He knows the river road, he knows the river road is underwater at places at this point, just like the uh Nelson's dealing with. And so he knows the road network. He's not lost. Um, it's just absolute miscommunication. And we don't know really what the the order says because when Grant gets there at Pittsburgh Landing, he gives an order to his um um to John Rollins, later chief of staff, um, to uh send somebody to Wallace. Rawlings orders the quartermaster, Baxter, to go to Wallace. Baxter says, Well, let me write this down. I don't, you know, I don't trust myself to get it right. Let me write it down. So they go on the Tigers, write it down, and Baxter takes off. So by the time it goes from Grant to Rollins to Baxter to Wallace, you know, it's like the old game where you whisper in somebody's ear and it goes around the circle, and when it when it gets back, who knows, you know, not even similar to what what the original message was. So we don't really know what it said, um, but it does produce a huge controversy uh that Wallace really never never gets out from under. Uh this plagues him the rest of his life.

SPEAKER_00 19:33

Yeah, great point. And I just want to point out to you know, people, you know this, Tim. These armies are not small, are they? And moving them on those kind of roads in the 1860s was not easy. So in hindsight, we can sit here and go, oh, well, you know, this, that, and the other. But you know, I'll put anybody in their position and move an army on those kind of roads back then. It's quite difficult, yeah? Yes, absolutely.

SPEAKER_02 19:58

Uh, in fact, when I worked at Shiloh, the national park 25 or so years ago, I decided I was gonna trace Wallace's route of March and uh worked with local landowners, had historic maps, overlaid them on modern maps, and lo and behold, everywhere out in the middle of the woods where it said a road should be, you go out there and there's a deep, there's a road cut, you know. So it was really cool. So then I got the idea I want to I want to hike this thing, march it. And uh I was thinking it was gonna be around 14 miles or so. We GPS'd it turned out to be over 17. Um and Wallace, uh it was a small group, uh the park superintendent and and several park rangers and and others, uh of uh Wallace biographer, one uh Gail Stevens was working on a by her biography of Wallace, and she came down and went with us. Um and Wallace actually made the trip about 15 minutes faster in 1862, carrying artillery and wagons and flooded roads and all that, than a small group in 2005 did it um without any fog of war type type stuff. So I think any claims of Wallace being slow and and and lethargic are put to bed uh with that.

SPEAKER_00 21:17

Absolutely. Well, yeah, that definitely needs to be uh spoke about a lot more, because again, you know, like you said, that has stuck with him and it's unfortunate. Um, okay, so let's talk about the troops now, because you know, one thing about Shiloh, it's still quite early in the war, isn't it? I know obviously a lot of the Union guys have been, you know, and so are the Confederates, but there's a lot of green guys, isn't there? So how much of a factor does that play into the chaos that ensues when this battle really takes hold?

SPEAKER_02 21:47

Well, Shiloh very quickly turns into a soldiers battle. Um really, neither Grant nor Johnston or Beaugaard um have uh uh there are some over Overarching command decisions and all of that is very important. But largely the local commanders on the division, brigade level on both sides really it falls to them to really make the the decisions and decide the moves and all that. The core structure in the Confederate Army basically becomes just irrelevant almost. Division division in some instances as well. And so in a lot of cases it actually falls to lower-level officers, regimental commanders, even company grade officers that uh uh that are are fighting this soldiers battle in their own little own little neck of the woods, if you will. Um and so greenness of the troops plays a huge role in this. Um estimates are that about 80 percent of the Confederate Army and about 60 percent or so of the Federal Army are well about 40 percent, 40 to 60 percent of the federal army are entirely green, never, never um uh been in action before, seen the elephant as they as they call it. Um what really fascinates me, there are artillery batteries at Shiloh on both sides, actually, that uh go into action at Shiloh, and the first time that they shoot their guns, that they fire their cannons, they're firing at the enemy. Yeah, imagine going into battle, never never shot your guns one time before. Um and the first time you you shoot them off, they're uh uh you're shooting at the enemy. That that just boggles my mind.

SPEAKER_00 23:42

Yeah, and again, you know, that first time of you know, like you said, maybe even killing someone, you know. They're not, you know, these people from normal life, they're not, you know, born to kill people, are they?

SPEAKER_02 23:53

You know, killers, yeah.

SPEAKER_00 23:54

Yeah, yeah, it must be horrible. Yeah. Um, so okay, let's talk about William Sherman because he has a day of it, doesn't he, on the first eight. So so tell us about William Sherman's uh you know experience. I think he also gets wounded at some point as well, is that right?

SPEAKER_02 24:10

He does in the initial action, he goes out to scout. Um his commanders have been telling him, hey, they're out there, and he doesn't believe it. He rides out and and fools around, gets shot, and that makes a believer of him, of course. Um, but thereafter he holds that ridge at Shiloh Church uh very uh determined. Um in fact his position is never taken by frontal assault. Uh it is outflanked by what happens to the east when Prentice's division, uh when the Confederates break through there, they turn and get on the flank of uh of Sherman's division and force it back. But then he'll fight uh farther back around the crossroads, Jonesfield even leading a counterattack. He works closely with McClernand, his support, and um they will actually counterattack and drive the the Confederates back during the the day at one point. Um and so he fights very well uh and and essentially redeems himself. He he gets a second chance uh from this this um insanity that's been he's been labeled as uh people call him crazy, and he he basically has a nervous breakdown. Uh but he gets a second chance and he makes the most of it. And and in fact, uh in terms of newspaper coverage and all that, uh Grant's kind of the goat coming out of this. You know, you lost how many casualties and got surprised and all that. Sherman comes out much, much better and and is is essentially in the uh public opinion of the day one of the heroes of Charlotte. And I still think uh to a certain degree, even today, he fights uh he fights very hard and very well uh under extreme circumstances.

SPEAKER_00 25:49

Oh, yeah, absolutely. 100%. Okay, you did mention uh quickly there the eastern side of the battlefield. So just explain what goes on there before we get on to something that really important is going to happen during this battle.

SPEAKER_02 26:03

Well, the the as the Confederates are pushing in this effort to hook around the Union left flank that Johnston is is giving his personal attention to, um, they will push on each flank uh much more successfully than they will in the center. Uh Sherman and McClernan over on the western side of the battlefield will counterattack, but they'll eventually be pushed back into what's called a last line of defense. Um same thing over on the eastern side, despite those deep ravines that Albertin Johnson knows nothing about. Um eventually the Confederate forces in that area will push uh Stephen A. Hurlbutt and John MacArthur and David Stewart and others uh back on that flank. And so each of the flanks are falling back. Um uh it's the center uh that doesn't fall back, but each flank will fall back, and that includes that that eastern side of the battlefield. That uh Albert Sidney Johnson, of course, is uh is given his personal attention in this effort to turn the Union left flank. Uh and unfortunately it cost him his life.

SPEAKER_00 27:12

Mm-hmm. Okay, yeah. So tell us about Johnson and and the the moment when he's gonna be wounded and then eventually die.

SPEAKER_02 27:19

Well, Johnston, going into this, of course, he is the he's the on the Confederate side the goat. He's lost uh virtually all of Kentucky, um most all of Middle Tennessee and West Tennessee, Nashville, the iron-producing regions and the what's today, the land between the lakes. Uh, he has lost a lot of territory. The debacle at uh Forts Henry and Donaldson is is um um laid at his feet in in many ways. And so he is is really looking for a rebound, and he realizes that the only way I can I can turn the tide, both for the Confederacy as well as for my own personal opinion. You know, who among us, even if we say we won't, but but you know, going into something, we're we're interested in how it's gonna reflect on us and our reputation and all that. Uh, and so you can't separate that for an army commander. He's he's got his own own uh feelings uh uh involved in this as well. And so he wants to to win a victory. Um unfortunately there are no good choices. If he's gonna keep Grant and Buell separate, he's gotta attack before he's ready, before the army's ready. It's just concentrated in literally the last week at um at Corinth. And so he launches the attack and um achieves some initial success. Uh, but that whole intention to turn that Union right flank is stalling on the Con, or the Union left flank is stalling on the Confederate right flank. And so again, he goes forward, puts his his personal attention there, and becomes really a leader of, you know, on the regimental brigade division level, then Army Commander. Now, uh there's a lot of debate. Should an Army commander be on the front lines leading charges? Well, obviously not. Um, you stand the risk of getting killed, which he which he does. However, if this is the critical moment of the critical gamble uh that is do or die, he goes into battle saying we must this day conquer or perish. Um, this is do or die, and we're not doing. So I've got to get in there and lead and and make it happen. And so you can understand his his sentiment. Um, and so you know, unfortunately, it doesn't turn out well for him. He's hitting the back of the leg. Um the bullet cuts the the uh poplatil artery and he basically bleeds to death within a matter of thirty minutes or so um in one of those ravines. He is the highest ranking American military officer uh ever ever killed in action. Um now there's the distinction that he's not United States personnel at the exact time. Um, you know, small footnote that he's fighting against the United States, but in terms of American military officers, he is the highest ranking uh ever killed in action right there at SHILO.

SPEAKER_00 30:22

And again, they didn't have a tourniquet, did they?

SPEAKER_02 30:25

It's uh well uh supposedly he did in his pocket. Uh but he he doesn't know that he's wounded uh by all accounts. Um and there's several several reasons for that. We could do a whole hour on Albert City Johnston, but um his doctor, he the the Army Medical Director Yandell had been left back treating Union wounded. Um and so he wasn't there to pick up on the signs of something's going on type thing. The tournament probably could have saved his life, um, and supposedly he had one in his in his pocket, but um it was not used and and he bled to death.

SPEAKER_00 31:01

Okay, thank you, mate. Thanks for explaining that. Uh uh, yeah. So that again is really important part of uh the the battle, but this part is where the battle is really gonna and it and so I'd like to know about the Hornet's Nest and it's you know, it's so famous, you know. I mean just explain what this is like for the people fighting in that area at that time.

SPEAKER_02 31:24

Well, the the Hornet's Nest is is Shallo's Pickett's Charge, is Shalow's Bloody Lane, is Shallo's Stonewall at Fredericksburg. It's it's the iconic figure at Shalow or the iconic place. Um and it it it's the sole uh position still holding out uh midday uh when both of the or late afternoon, when both Union flanks fall back, the Hornets Nest defenders, uh Prentice and WHL Wallace, do not fall back. There's some debate over orders. Grant issues each of orders to each of his division commanders, hold at all hazards. Uh Sherman and McClernon and Herlbutt interpret hold at all hazards differently than Wallace and McClernon, than Wallace and Prentice apparently do. Uh, and eventually they uh they hold out a little longer and uh get surrounded and surrender. The the Hornets Nest itself faces uh what everyone described as an impenetrable thicket, uh chaparral, uh they'll call it. Um so just heavy, dense woods, uh heavy fighting there, charges, countercharges, all that kind of stuff. The woods catch on fire at one point, uh similar to the wilderness that we that we think about. And so it's uh it's a brutal place. Um I happen to think uh that the Hornet's Nest has been overemphasized throughout history. Um there's just as brutal, probably more brutal fighting on the western side, uh, where Sherman and McClernon over Shallow Church, Crossroads, Jones Field area. The casualties are much higher over there. Um there's there's uh heavy fighting on the eastern side, but they don't get the attention that the Hornet's Nest obviously does. And uh and you know, it's just a it's a cool name. But you go into kind of the historiography of the battle a little bit, and I'm not saying the Hornet's nest is not important at all. Some of your uh viewers will probably go away from this saying he said the hornet's nest wasn't important. I'm not saying that at all. Um I'm just saying it's it's been a little overemphasized in terms of in relation to other areas of the of the battle. And I think it starts with the first historian of the national park, David W. Reed, who um it literally became his job to write the history of the battle to mark the battlefield. This is in the 1890s. Um, and he emphasizes the Hornet's nest. Um any idea why he would emphasize the Hornet's nest? Well, he fought in the 12th Iowa, right smack in the middle of the Hornet's nest. Um I firmly believe if the if the historian had come out of the third Iowa over on the eastern side, he probably would have have emphasized the peach orchard and Johnston's death and uh the the Union forces holding that critical left flank, which the Confederates are trying to turn. Hey, we we held it. This was the the key to the battle. If the historian came out of the 11th Iowa, which fought over on the western side, um, he might have emphasized, you know, the heaviest fighting of the day back and forth and the counterattack and and crossroads and all that, but the historian came out of the Hornet's Nest and will emphasize that. And since then, the the Park Service, the early um uh park superintendents, DeLong Rice, and some of those, um, would institutionalize the Hornet's Nest. Uh, and in particular in the 1950s, we get the old film that was shown at the visitor center for 56 years, Shiloh Portrait of a Battle. And literally, you walk in that film and come out of it, and all you get is Hornet's Nest, Hornet's Nest, Hornet's Nest. That's pretty much all you're you're giving. So, what else will millions and millions of visitors over the course of 56 years leave Shiloh thinking was important? Obviously, it was the Hornet's nest. So that's my take on the Hornet's nest. It was extremely important, obviously. I'm not saying it wasn't important. I'm saying looking more broadly, um the the Hornet's nest has probably been a little overemphasized because there was very important fighting on each flank uh and elsewhere throughout the throughout the day. And, you know, to pick out one certain spot that was the the key to all this, uh, I think we do ourselves a little bit of of disservice. And you know, you see this elsewhere. This is not just specific to Shalow. You know, for all those years, Batchelder at at Gettysburg and all that emphasized the the uh the angle and pickett's charge on the third day and all that, but now Gettysburg historiography um has shifted to uh you know, maybe it wasn't the Pickett's charge third day and all that. Maybe the really important part was Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain holding little roundtop on the second day and all of that. So things, you know, go back and forth, schools of thought. Um, but uh that's that's uh that's kind of my thoughts on the Hornet's Nest.

SPEAKER_00 36:34

Oh, yeah, thanks for that. And and I'm gonna actually bring in so I'm gonna mention Chamberlain. Obviously, Chamberlain was a writer himself, and he made himself, you know, hit the centre of the story. So, and again, I'm not you know disrespecting him or what they did up there, but that's a similar kind of uh you know thing, isn't it? I suppose you know, so yeah, thanks to I didn't know that. I honestly didn't know anything about that guy uh that wrote the history that that survived it. And again, you're gonna put yourself in the middle of the story. So that's really interesting point. So thanks for bringing that up. Okay, so we're gonna get to the end of the first day's fighting, and Grant's gonna eventually, everyone's gonna, you know, he's gonna get everything he needs in place, and they're gonna have a defensive line. And I also understand that the uh Tyler and uh Lexington is also involved at this point, isn't it? So that's gonna cause the Confederates a problem um from the river itself. So tell us about that defensive line at the uh you know come coming towards a close at the on the first day.

SPEAKER_02 37:36

Well, the the the gunboats are very important. You've got it, let me look on here. Uh the 50 plus guns, all of that. Yes. Um, all of that is important. Uh, and even even Bull Nelson coming in the the van of Buell's army, all of that. What is is way more important, probably, in the whole scheme of things, though, is the terrain that Grant utilizes to form that last line of defense. Over there, you can even see, I don't know if it's labeled, yeah, you see Dill Branch there um flowing into the Tennessee River just across the the uh high ground there on the other side of the battlefield is Tillman Branch. And so Grant uses these two huge ravines to to force the Confederates to come through just to get to his last line of defense. And so um as the Confederates try to do this, they'll find the terrain uh impediments just just absolutely huge. And so um the the last line of defense from you know 5, 6, 7 p.m. time frame uh is tested in a couple of different places, but not ever just terribly heavily tested. Uh part of that is because of the terrain, part of it is just because the Confederates are absolutely wiped out by this point. They've been fighting 12, 13 hours. Uh they're bloody, lost a lot of officers out of ammunition, all that kind of stuff. And so the battle kind of peters out. Now, uh a lot of times Beauregard will get the blame for this, and Bourgard can be blamed for a lot of things. Um but he basically calls off the attacks late in the afternoon, uh approaching dark. Um, and he has his reasons for doing this, but uh the he kind of makes the right decision for all the wrong reasons. Uh his intelligence that he's gotten is is faulty. And um, in fact, he's gotten word that Buell is not coming to support Grant, but is going to North Alabama. Well, yeah, there's one division of Buell's army going to North Alabama, but five more coming in here at Pittsburgh Landing. Uh so he makes the right decision for a lot of the wrong reasons, never going forward and taking a look at the terrain itself. Um, and what I found in doing the book and all that is that these Confederates on the ground actually make the decision to halt and stop this uh well before Beauregard's order arrives. So they're they're already in the process of calling it a day uh when Beauregard's order uh actually arrives. So it's hard to hard to necessarily fault Beaugaard for for this, although the Johnston camp, uh particularly Johnston's son, William Preston Johnston, will blame Beauregard for throwing away his father's victory. He argues that his father uh died uh on the cusp of victory, and all Beorgaard had to do was just continue the fight, but yet he called it off and uh and threw away his dad's victory. Well, the truth is his dad wasn't winning a victory uh when he died, much less later in the afternoon, and there was no victory to to uh uh to throw away.

SPEAKER_00 40:52

No, not when you add those, like you said, those ravines and everything else that goes with it into the mix. Definitely not.

SPEAKER_02 40:58

And you have to you you have to visit Shallow to understand this, and when you visit Shallow, you have to get out of your car and and walk some of the terrain. The tour route's not going to show you much of of what the the terrain is like, what the soldiers are dealing with. Um and I have people I've quit arguing with people about this and the common conception, you know, we're talking a lot about public history and common conception, all that, is that oh man, if Beauregard just continued on, he he would have driven Grant in the river and won the battle and and all that. Um you spend a little time walking around those ravines and you're gonna quickly find out, okay, this ain't as simple as you think it is. Um, and it really didn't matter whether it was Beauregard or Johnston or Napoleon or Joshua R. Chamberlain leading these attacks. They're they're not gonna be successful at that point, that time, that environment, that geography terrain. Um, it's it's uh it's just not possible, in my view.

SPEAKER_00 42:01

Okay, thank you, mate. Thanks for telling us that. Okay, I'm gonna bring these two gentlemen up because one of the most famous quotes is gonna come from the night of the battle of after the first day of the battle of Shiloh under a tree in the rain, I believe. And so tell us the story behind that, please.

SPEAKER_02 42:17

Okay, well, Grant um has been pushed back all day. Now, he I mean, he's he's taking it on the chin. He's he's uh um been hit pretty hard here, driven back two or three miles, obviously, to this last line of defense, but he's still holding Pittsburgh Laney and he's still holding the Snake Creek Bridge where Wallace is going to come in. So he's got reinforcements coming in. Um and to me, the the the critical decision at SHALO, there are two major things that are that are definitive at SHALO. One is the terrain, and one is Ulysses S. Grant. Um, Grant makes the critical decision here that I'm not sure a lot of other commanders would have made, and that is to stay, even after getting knocked back two or three miles, to but to to stay, uh, and then to counterattack the next morning. Now, reinforcements obviously help you, but you know, we think about um uh what would what would some other commanders have done in Grant's situation? Um George McClellan retreated after winning Malvern Hill. Um, and I have a low opinion of George McClellan. I've done some work on him recently, and the opinion has gotten even lower. Um Joseph Hooker, what would Joseph Hooker have done uh from what we know about him at Chancellorsville? Uh had had he been in this situation, both probably would have ordered a retreat across the river. Uh several of his commanders, of Grant's commanders, um, come to him, McPherson, the engineer, uh Buell supposedly himself, uh Sherman comes to him, says, We've had the devil's own day today. Uh let's let's get out of here. Grant, of course, basically says, lick them tomorrow, though. And so the decision to stay. Uh a lot of people say Grant won the battle on the first. First day. I don't necessarily agree with that. He put himself in a position to win the battle, but he still could have lost the battle by retreating during the night. So the decision to stay and fight it out is when Grant wins the victory. Now, how much of a victory he actually wins will be determined on the second day, and that uh is determined by his counterattack. Many lesser commanders would have counterattacked on the second day either. Think um uh McClellan at Antietam, or think uh Buell at Perryville, or think Rosecrans at Corinth or Stones River, when uh you know similar situations they battled all day um and both sides are are absolutely worn out, and whichever one really is going to take the Grant talks about this at Fort Donaldson. Whoever takes the initiative is gonna have the upper hand. And so none of those uh launch attacks on on second days, which probably could have been um very very changing um dynamic in terms of of each of those battles. Had Rosecrans counterattacked on at Stones River or Corinth or uh Buell at Perryville or McClellan and Antietam, um they they perhaps are meet at Gettysburg. Um potentially could have uh really done some major damage to the to the broken army um that that um that is getting attacked. Uh Grant does that. Grant counterattacks on the second day. And of course, what we think of as the major victory of Shiloh now um is very different than what we consider all of those battles that I just talked about. When we talk about Perival or Stones River or Antietam, what's the word that we normally use with them in terms of the tactical fight? Oh, they were a draw, they were a stalemate, um, which uh which Shiloh was very definitely not, mainly because Grant counterattacked on the second day.

SPEAKER_00 46:08

Excellent. Thank you, mate. And now before he counterattacks, though, he's gonna order the gunboats, isn't he, to fire upon the Confederate lines. Well, is that true? Or it and and if it is, how much morale um you know damaging is that for the Confederates that are still out in the field or still out stationed where they are?

SPEAKER_02 46:30

Yeah, the the gunboats do do fire during the night, and toward the end of the day is the Confederates are crossing Deal branch and and all that. Um I I think it's more along the lines of Bull Nelson, who's holding the the position just at Pittsburgh Landing or right by the river, uh, or and his former naval officer, of course, uh orders the gunboats to to fire during the night. And so the Lexington will exchange, you know, uh take turns during the night firing at 10 or 15 minute intervals. Uh the purpose is to keep the Confederates up, but good grief, don't you think you're gonna keep your own side uh up a little bit too with these big guns and and all that? So I'm not sure about the um uh the thinking behind that. Uh it does uh uh affect Confederates who are back in the Union camps and tents and all that uh during the night when these these big cannonballs are falling randomly throughout the battlefield. Obviously, that's gonna that's gonna have a uh an impact on your morale and psyche as well.

SPEAKER_00 47:36

Okay, thank you, mate. Okay, let's bring in Beaugaard again. I know you've spoken a little bit about him, but from what I understand, he sends a telegram or um a letter, doesn't he, saying that um not a letter, but a telegram saying that he's won the battle. Is that right?

SPEAKER_02 47:49

Declares victory to Richmond, and then of course on the the next day he has to talk his way out of that a little bit. But uh early on the morning of April the 7th, when Federals start coming out of the woodworks, like termites coming out of the woodwork, you know, they're they're everywhere, oh to his right and to his left, in front of him. Um he realizes he's been duped. Buell is not in North Alabama, Buell is here, um, and they're bringing it on us. And and Borgard eventually, of course, later in the day, we'll talk about the second day, I'm sure, but um, he'll he'll decide, all right, this is we're not getting anywhere with this. Let's just head pack it up and head on back to Corinth.

SPEAKER_00 48:31

And so how how intense compared to the first day is the second day? Is it more of a fact of the counter that the the uh the federals counterattack and the and the confederates they sort of kind of leave, or is it does it is it drawn out all day as well?

SPEAKER_02 48:45

No, there there are heavy areas of fighting, um, particularly around the wheat field and the old cotton field, Sarah Bell's cotton field, peach orchard area, uh, even in the Hornet's Nest uh over on the on the left, uh Confederate left. There's heavy fighting um that would match every bit of the heaviest fighting on the first day. Now, it probably wasn't quite as sustained and continuous on the second day, and it was not as lengthy. Uh Borgard orders the retreat back to Corinth at 2 30 in the afternoon. So it doesn't continue on, and there's sporadic fighting after that on the way to four or five o'clock. Uh, but it certainly is not heavy fighting on large areas of the battlefield all day like the the first day. So it's it's um uh there are episodes that reach the the intensity of the first day, but not quite as widespread and not quite as as um as as lengthy.

SPEAKER_00 49:47

Okay, thank you, mate. Okay, now I want to bring Grant back into it again because I've I've uh from what I understand there's an incident that could have killed him. Is that right?

SPEAKER_02 49:56

Well, yeah, the I I suppose you're talking about um the bullet that hits his sword scabbard and dents his his sword. Yeah. Uh there's a little bit of debate in his memoirs. This story's in his memoirs, and he puts it on one day, and some historians think that he got the day wrong. Um, so you know, we don't we don't really know, but uh we do know that he was hit, and if that bullet had been, you know, one way or the or the other, we know what'll happen if a bullet clips an artery in a leg, you know, it could be it could be life-threatening. Um if the bullet had no more force though than to to hit a scabbard and dent it, uh, it's probably more of a spent ball, perhaps, that may not have done quite as as much damage. We do we don't know. Um but yes, he he was hit at some point, and um and an inch or two either way could have done major damage.

SPEAKER_00 50:50

And I believe one of his aides horses was shot as well, is that right?

SPEAKER_02 50:55

Uh yeah, I think a horse was was shot. Grant's Grant's in the middle of it all the late on the first day. One of his his orderlies or staffers or somebody um gets his head blown off with a cannonball and brains and blood spatter over Grant and all that. So yeah, he's uh he's in the thick of it a lot.

SPEAKER_00 51:14

Yeah, excellent. Okay, so again, um, so obviously the Confederates have left, like you said, about half past two, they've left the battlefield pretty much. Um, and so um why does Grant not decide to you know um pursue the retreating Confederates at this point? What what what's the thinking behind that at that point for him?

SPEAKER_02 51:35

That's a debatable point. Um, and it is it is uh I've come to the conclusion. I've just finished a book comparing Civil War and Napoleonic battles and campaigns. And the Civil War general that is most Napoleonic, in my view, the conclusion I came to in studying this uh is Ulysses S. Grant. But he is totally non-Napoleonic in terms of the pursuit with cavalry after Shalom. Um had he pushed forward a large cavalry force, you would have to concentrate them. They're split out in, you know, detailed different divisions and brigades and all that. But had you concentrated and sent them forward, they could have wreaked havoc probably on a very disorganized and jumpy and broken Confederate army, uh, which is exactly what Napoleon does with Murray. Uh the shock troops at the end of a battle send them in at the critical point, and they just ride, just create massive panic at you know, Austerlitz and Jena and elsewhere. Uh Grant doesn't do that. Uh there are probably several reasons. Um one, and he doesn't say this, but he's probably thinking, man, I've stepped in it for two whole days now and produced 13,000 casualties. I don't want to produce any more casualties. I'm not going hunting. If they'll leave me alone, I'll leave them alone, type thing. Uh what he actually says in his memoirs is that my guys are tired. They've been fighting for two days. I didn't want to send them in pursuit. Buell's forces are much more um or less worn out, but he says I did not feel like I had the authority to send Buell and to order Buell, um, which is I think a little bit of an empty excuse because Halleck has has made the point that Buell and Grant under him are both autonomous unless there is an emergency, at which time Grant, the senior officer, would take command of both. So Grant Grant has the legal authority and the orders to to command uh if he'd wanted to, but he says, I didn't feel like I had the authority to send Buell. And so really nothing happens. Um they do follow on the 8th. Um Grant will send uh Sherman on one road and one of Buell's divisions on another road. Um Sherman will run into the rear Confederate rear guard, that's Nathan Bedford Forest, Fallen Timbers, all of that stuff, which is very minor in the in the whole scheme of things. Um but there is no no actual pursuit per se. Uh certainly in the Napoleonic fashion of Mirae riding down the panicked uh fleeing enemy.

SPEAKER_00 54:18

And it's and it's a topic that constantly comes up with every battle. I mean, you get it after get us, but for goodness sake, people, they they've just fought a three-day battle. They're not gonna go running after them, are they? You know, they're all tired, you know. This is the thing. And again, like you just pointed out, they have fought a hellish battle for two days. It's gonna be the highest casualties at that point during the well, the bloody, you know, one of the bloodiest battles in American history ever. And you know, they they're that they need they need to take a few minutes, don't they? You know. Okay, so let's talk about the press, because the press really do put it in him, don't they, or give him a jab in the ribs over over Shiloh, don't they? And uh the the crap that he has to put up with in the future comes from Shiloh, doesn't it?

SPEAKER_02 55:06

Yeah, um the h high heavy casualty um list, obviously. Um it's not like Grant and Halleck are on the best terms anyway. That whole episode after Fort Donaldson when Halleck basically pulls him from command. And um, and so there's some you know rumors about Grant's drinking, and some start saying, you know, Grant was drunk when the battle started and and all that. No evidence of that whatsoever. But um, yeah, Grant Grant uh took it on the chin for two days at Shiloh, and then he takes it on the chin in the media and the newspapers, um, and somehow miraculously survives this. Uh a lot of that, of course, is because of the backing of Abraham Lincoln. Yes, exactly.

SPEAKER_00 55:53

And now Halleck, Halleck, uh, you know, um thankfully he gets moved east, doesn't he? But he just really doesn't like Grant, does he?

SPEAKER_02 56:02

Yeah, he he thinks he uh there's part of jealousy there, but you know, Grant's winning the victories and becoming unconditional surrender grant. Halleck's not getting anything really. Um getting promoted, but uh the uh John Marzalek, Halleck's biographer, brings out that Halleck is old school by the book. He wrote the book, actually. Um and he thinks Grant's sloppy. Grant just doesn't wear you know the formal uniform, he doesn't do the uh the formal things that that an army commander needs to do. He's just he's just sloppy. Um and the the the best story of this, Halleck, when he gets word of Shallow, immediately leaves St. Louis and comes down and and I got to go take care of rectify the situation. And he immediately launches into Grant, rings him a new one, you know, uh your army's not prepared, your army's not ready for another assault if the if another attack came. Your army's not this, your army's not that. And at one point, Halleck actually sends a message and says, Grant, I'm getting a bunch of letters from your guys, your officers, and none of them are folded correctly. Have your guys fold their letters correctly to according to army protocol. And you can just imagine Grant thinking, gee whiz, how are we gonna win this war if we can't fold our our letters correctly? You know. Um, so that that's the that's the kind of difference in old brains hallock and and just no nonsense, Grant.

SPEAKER_00 57:30

Like you said, you can't win the war, you know, by thinking like that, can you? That will come to fruition as time goes on, as we all know. Um, okay, so Tim, I did mention obviously the casualties. Now, how much of a and again it's huge, isn't it? I mean, what is it, 23,000 casualties, something like that?

SPEAKER_02 57:50

Well, the official number is 23,746, I believe, but there's evidence that that the actual rates are much higher, particularly in the Confederate Army, uh, maybe by as much as a third. Um, so these are these are are monumental casualty lists, particularly in American history. Yes, never seen anything like that. How how shocking is that to the people at home? Well, it's it's this is America takes a collective gasp. They've never seen anything like this. The the armies in the revolution in War of 1812, Mexican War are smaller actually than the casualty figures at at SHALO. Um the uh casualty figures in the battles are you know, Mexican War and all that are minuscule compared to this. Not saying it's not important. If you're one of those that got killed at Monterey in Mexico, it's very important to you, obviously. But but they're much smaller than than um than SHALO. And so uh, you know, America takes a collective gasp at at what's going on, and they try to uh to compare this to the we have nothing to compare this to in American history, and they have to literally go back to Napoleonic days uh to to compare uh and there's a lot of comparison that that goes on to compare what we saw at Shalow to uh Waterloo and Austerlitz and Jena and and other uh very famous Napoleonic battles.

SPEAKER_00 59:23

Thanks, mate. Okay, um I'm just gonna bring Johnson up one more time. So it's often said that you know um of a huge loss he was in the West, but like you say, he didn't really win that many victories, did he? Um and I'm not saying he was a bad commander or anything like that, but and and also there's that comparison, isn't there, to like losing Jackson sort of thing in the East. So what what kind of impact does it have on the Confederate in the Western theatre losing Johnson? Is it well important?

SPEAKER_02 59:54

Yeah, uh you wouldn't say that Johnson was a bad commander, but I'll say it. Johnson was a bad commander. Um, and you you look at at his earlier life and you see patterns, and I talked about this in the Johnston book that I did. Um, he's just too lethargic. He he doesn't think and move quite fast enough to keep up with things. He's way too lenient with some he's uh some of his subordinates and who don't follow orders and and all that. Uh the bottom line, he's he's probably just too nice of a guy to be a commander. You gotta have that that killer instinct to to be a commander. Uh, and Johnson's just too nice a guy. Now, that said, um what we know for the rest of the Western theater, um the Braggs and the Johnstons, Joseph E. Johnston and Hoods and and so on, um they don't do any better and probably do a do a lot worse. Uh and particularly Bragg, um, you know, when Bragg is elevated above his fellow corps commanders to Army Command, uh, particularly above Leonidas Pope, um that in and of itself institutes major problems. Uh everybody agreed Johnson was head and shoulders above everybody. He's a full general, we give him our respect and and all that. Whether he's making good decisions or not, whether we agree with him, that's that's another thing. But he is our commander, he's a full general, all of that. Um Bragg was an equal to all those corps commanders. And when he's eleven when you elevate an equal above former peers, uh there's always a lot of problems. And of course, of those four corps commanders, when Bragg becomes the the Army commander for the next 18 months, um Periville, Stones River, Tullahoma, Chickamauga, all that, who are the three biggest thorns in his side and causing all kind of backbiting and trouble and all that, it's Leonidas Pope, William J. Hardy, and John C. Breckenridge, who were the other three corps commanders at Shallow that Bragg superseded. And so you you promote an equal above the others, and there's going to be a lot of resentment. We see that here. So, in that sense, I'm not sure if Johnston um had lived and retained command, I'm not sure he would have done uh as bad as as Bragg or some of those. Um, he certainly would have held the esteem of the corps commanders in the army probably much higher. So I I think the South, uh I think Johnston's death didn't make a difference at Shallo. There's some that argue that when he died, you know, the South lost Shawlow. I think the South was spinning its wheels and and losing uh well before Johnston died. Uh they they probably lost the battle and and uh shot their bolt you know early on the morning of April the 6th and just got too far behind. I don't think they they're they're gonna win the battle after that point. Um But I think it does, Johnston's death does play this major role in going forward when there's really no Jefferson Davis himself said there's no one to pick up his his his slack, his his work in the in the West. And I think there's a lot of um a lot of truth in that. Now, some have argued that had Johnston lived, he would have learned from his mistakes, similar to what Lee did. You know, he stumbled pretty badly in the seven days and first taking command and then became the the Lee of Second Manassas and Chancellor and and all of that. Um I'm not sure Johnston would have learned from his mistakes like Lee did. Uh, and again, go back to what I was talking about, too lethargic, too lenient. Um, I think Lee's issues at first at um at the seven days uh where he stumbles are are executional. He he knows what he wants to do and he's willing to do it, and he's he pushes his guys to do it. Is it's just not executed. Um what Johnston's issues are, I think are systemic. It's not an executional thing, it's a systemic thing that he's just too lenient, lethargic, and all that, that I don't think he ever could have overcome that personality um to become a Lee, you know, like like Lee did.

SPEAKER_00 1:04:23

Oh, yeah, but no, some really, really good points there. Right, let's talk about you for a minute, young man, and the battlefield, of course. You know, so obviously I know you were a part ranger at Shiloh for many years, wasn't you, Tim? Now, how accessible is the battlefield, and you know, you know, what would you say to people that want to go and visit this amazing battlefield?

SPEAKER_02 1:04:43

Well, of all the battlefields that are the major battlefields, Shiloh is probably the most pristine of them. Now, there's some that little small skirmishers or something that hadn't been touched at all in you know, private land type stuff and steel woods or something. But for the major battlefields, Shalow is probably the most pristine uh simply because it's not fought around an urban area. You you name Civil War battles, uh, Gettysburg, Fredericksburg, Murfreesboro, uh, Petersburg, uh, Chattanooga, Nashville, all of those, they're fought right around towns uh because they're largely fighting over transportation routes, and those transportation routes cross um in towns. And so urbanization has engulfed a lot of these Atlanta, you know, those battlefields around Atlanta. Uh, but SHALO has fought out in the middle of nowhere around a river landing. Uh, there is no urban area at the time. There is no urban area now. Um, and for that reason, Shalow has has um uh been able to miss the the uh the urbanization and growth. So it's very, very uh well preserved. Now, nothing is going to stay the same after 160 years. There, there are a lot of changes. But as far as probably the most pristine battlefield, I would say it's it's Shallo. And it's a lovely place. If you get a chance, come out to Shalow. I think it was Tom Conley or Albert Castell, somebody back in the 60s talked about the the um the aura of Shallo and the Shalow mystique kind of thing. And and there is very much something of a mystique at uh at Shallow. It's just a special place.

SPEAKER_00 1:06:32

Thank you, Tim. Absolutely. And again, let's talk about you again, mate. About you know, and you've written some books, haven't you? I mean, you're I think you're competing with Chris Mikowski at this point, isn't it?

SPEAKER_02 1:06:42

There's a there's a few there, yeah.

SPEAKER_00 1:06:44

There certainly is. So now obviously you've written quite a few books. Is there any that particularly stick out as your favourites that you you were involved in? I know you probably, you know, at the time everyone would be your favorite, but is there anything that you really enjoyed researching and writing out of any of those?

SPEAKER_02 1:07:00

Yeah, it's it's it's like picking your favorite kid. I've got two daughters. Um keep assuring me that they're my favorite one. And I keep saying, no, I don't have any favorites, love them both. Um, and books are kind of the same way. There are aspects of a lot of them that um are very special. The the Shallow one uh was a labor of love, obviously. Um just absolutely loved doing it, enjoy doing it. Um of the Mississippi ones, you see Jay-Z George, Mississippi Secession Convention, um uh Homefront, Mississippi Homefront, though those books. Uh, I did a lot of the research um earlier in my career down in Mississippi. I grew up there, of course, live in Tennessee now, but we would go down, our girls were little, just just you know, toddlers kind of thing. We would go down and spend the the uh two or three days with my parents, and my dad would go with me to the archives in Jackson, Mississippi, Mississippi Bar of Archives and History. And uh those were just fun times because both parents now, one had Parkinson's, one had Alzheimer's, and and they're both gone now. And I cherish that type of of memory, just just what good times they were when we went to grandma and grandpa's and did the research, and it was just uh just a lot of fun. But then uh you get into the five volumes of the Vicksburg campaign, and it was fun um producing a large you know scale campaign history. So all of them are all of them are fascinating. I love every one of them. They're um each each one has a special special uh affinity um with it.

SPEAKER_00 1:08:43

Well, I want to thank you, Tim. These amazing books to that that narrative, and and you know, that the you know, you're well, well, you know, they're well received by many his uh you know people that love this history. So, you know, thank you for that. Yeah, appreciate that. Um anyway, mate, all that is left to say is um thank you very much for giving up your your morning to come and speak to me about the philo. And all that is left to say, my friend, is cheers.