Gettsyburg and Grant

We muse how a Rebel victory at Gettysburg would affect the ascension of Ulysses S. Grant and the pace of the final chapter of the Civil War. It’s stunning to think but Lee’s victory would actually end the war 8-12 months earlier than our history books write.

With the success at Vicksburg in July of 1863, Lincoln sees a rising military genius, who is hawkish and unafraid to aggressively pursue, and attack, the Confederate armies he faced. After the appalling casualties at the Battle of Shiloh in 1862, Lincoln dismissed Grant's critics, saying "I can't spare this man; he fights.”

In our timeline, in August of 1863, Grant was promoted to Lieutenant General, giving him command of all Union armies. His new rank had only been held by one man in American history, George Washington.

It’s important to note, what Grant will bring to the war, is different than any previous Union general. He will use the telegraph and other signal communications to modernize his command-and-control over the entire theater of operations. 

Prior to Grant's leadership, the armies operated independently to accomplish localized goals and defeat specific army groups. Grant will look at the theater in its entirety and coordinate attacks to strangle supplies and movement that will eventually render the Confederates incapable of fighting. Grant was not interested in capturing territory or towns unless those gains kept the Confederates from resupplying.

Grant will coordinate with generals, review troop movements, and issue orders in near-real-time. Only Sherman, who had been ordered to go dark, was not in constant contact to utilize intelligence to pressure and attack the different Confederate armies, including Lee’s. 

Grant will also bring a completely new attitude to the Union army: “Attack, pressure, drive the initiative against the enemy.” This philosophy would embolden the ranks of Federal forces in a way that was badly needed, particularly after the loss at Gettysburg.

Rather than mid-1864, our scenario has the coordinated theater-wide surge of Union forces happening during the late Summer months of 1863.

Transcript

Introduction
Hello, my name is Mark Bouffard. Welcome to What If World History?

Like you, I share a passion for civilizations, cultures, and stories of the past. This show looks at the epic events that sewed the fabric of our history and sculpted the world we now know. And it imagines: What If they happened a little bit differently?

Would it change the outcome? What might the “new history” look like? 

I invite you to explore the possibilities with me. 

Let’s take a trip.

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Our episode today is:
Gettysburg and Grant
We muse how a Rebel victory at Gettysburg would affect the ascension of Ulysses S. Grant and the pace of the final chapter of the Civil War. It’s stunning to think but Lee’s victory would actually end the war 8-12 months earlier than our history books write.


Listener Note:
There are more than 100 generals on both sides of the conflict. In order to simplify the storytelling, I will condense titles to General for many of the leaders, otherwise, it can get a little confusing. Many of the battle movements you hear will involve regiments, brigades, divisions, and corp-sized units. Again, to simplify I will highlight them in a general sense to focus on the action and movements rather than the names and designations of individual units.


Smoke, Blood and Mud
Private Elijah Hayden, 8th Ohio Volunteer Infantry Division
Little Round Top
July 2, 1863

Elijah Hayden wiped the dripping sweat from his brow with his blue woolen sleeve. He was careful not to lift his head above the boulder line as he did so. The Confederate sharpshooters below had killed a careless soldier who had forgotten they were under constant sight.

They say you can hear the bullets that miss, but you will never hear the one that gets you.

The bright afternoon sun hung high in the clear blue sky. At this elevation, there was a little breeze to cool Hayden and his fellow soldiers. Runners behind their rocky fortress had been bringing them water, hard bread, and bowls of stew to keep their spirits up. Hayden knew they would need every fiber of fortitude they could muster over the next few hours. The attack was coming.

Down below he could see waves of soldiers maneuvering through Devil’s Den and the Valley of Death to assault their position atop the hill. Their neat gray lines were pricked with raised rifles affixed with bayonets. It reminded Hayden of a moving forest as they marched over the rocky, uneven ground. 

His squad, along with the New York and Maine units to his flanks, poured fire into their ranks as they started up the slope. Men fell to the ground where they stood, and another man would take his place in the march. 

With a yell that sounded high-pitched and primal, the marching soldiers lowered their rifles and charged up the hill. Hayden knew it was dangerous to stand on the boulders to shoot down onto the soldiers below, but he knew times were desperate. 

As he sighted soldiers struggling up the hill, he could see the wild, frightened look in their bright eyes that were set into blackened and sweat-soaked faces. Hayden saw the look of surprise in the eyes of a young blond Confederate soldier as he was struck square in the chest. His gray uniform blossomed red as he fell to his knees and then face first, dead, into the dusty hill. 

On the Rebels came. Despite withering fire from Hayden’s Union comrades, they just kept climbing. The order to fix bayonets came down the line and Hayden knew this fight would be decided face-to-face. 

Shouts behind him alerted his weary position that reinforcements had arrived. The sun was setting low over the tree line, but still the battle raged. Fresh troops took the line on his left and joined in shooting down into the columns of soldiers. 

Twice they repulsed attacks, but ammunition and energy were running low. One more concentrated attack and they could be overrun, even with the troops that had just helped reinforce their position.

To Hayden’s surprise, the order was given to charge the slow climbing soldiers with bayonets. With their own primal yell, the men climbed over the boulders and, moving as one blue wave, rolled down the hill. The Confederates broke ranks and ran back down the hill leaving their rifles and wounded comrades behind. 

Seeing success in front, Hayden’s unit pivoted to the right to push the flank of Confederates still climbing the hill. With punishing fire in front of them and blood-crazed, bayonet-wielding soldiers charging them from the side, the Confederates quickly gave up.

Little Round Top, by blood, sweat, and bravery, had remained in Union hands. Hayden’s flank had won the day.
  

General Lee Invades the North
Contrary to common perception, Gettysburg was not the last battle of the American Civil War. It was, however, the largest, bloodiest, and arguably, the most decisive battle of the war. During four days in July, the fortunes of American history turned in favor of the Union cause. 

Not only was the Union Army successful at heading off General Robert E Lee’s invasion of the North, but on July 4, the day after fighting at Gettysburg, 30,000 Confederate soldiers finally surrendered to Major General Ulysses S Grant at Vicksburg, Mississippi. This loss effectively closed the Mississippi River, a vital link in the wartime supply chain, to the Southern Army and split the Confederacy in two.

But before we move on to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, we need to first visit Chancellorsville, Virginia. There, from April 30 to May 6, 1863, Lee’s Confederate Army of Northern Virginia soundly defeated the Army of the Potomac under Major General Hooker. This defeat sets into motion two vital events that would shape the Battle of Gettysburg two months later.

On the Union side, General Hooker resigned, and President Abraham Lincoln replaced him with Major General George Meade, who took over the Army of the Potomac on June 28. Meade immediately ordered the pursuit of Lee’s army of 72,000, which by then had crossed the Potomac River into Maryland and marched into southern Pennsylvania.

On the Confederate side, the situation was much different. According to Edwin Coddington in his book “The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command”: “Shortly after the Army of Northern Virginia won a major victory over the Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Chancellorsville, Robert E. Lee decided upon a second invasion of the North. The first was the unsuccessful Maryland campaign of September 1862, which ended in the bloody Battle of Antietam. 

Coddington goes on to say: “Such a move would upset the Union's plans for the summer campaigning season and possibly reduce the pressure on the besieged Confederate garrison at Vicksburg. The invasion would allow the Confederates to live off the bounty of the rich Northern farms while giving war-ravaged Virginia a much-needed rest. In addition, Lee's 72,000-man army could threaten Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington.”

Other historians believe that Lee, and Confederate President Jefferson Davis, hoped a series of victories would give Britain and France leverage to recognize the Confederacy and strengthen the cause of northern “Copperheads” who favored peace.

And so we have two massive armies moving towards each other. Lee’s army of 72,000 was bolstered by victory and a feeling of invincibility. Meade’s army of 100,000, under new leadership, was dressing its wounds from a demoralizing defeat.  

Meade's movements toward the Rebels were inadvertently helped by Lee's cavalry commander, Jeb Stuart. Instead of reconnaissance missions, where they would have picked up the Union movements, Stuart, under Lee’s direction, had undertaken a series of foraging raids deep into the Union Rear. 

This action left Lee blind to the Union's position. When a scout reported the Union approach, Lee ordered his scattered troops to link up west of the small village of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. And it would be this small hamlet of 2,000, at the convergence of a dozen roads, that would decide the fate of the war.


Gettysburg Day 1: Fighting on the Ridges
According to Stephen Sears in his book “Gettysburg”: “On the morning of July 1, Union cavalry under General John Buford was awaiting the approach of Confederate infantry forces from the direction of Cashtown, to the northwest. The Rebels mistakenly believed the cavalry they faced were Pennsylvania militia of little consequence. Instead, they were seasoned, regular army cavalry that was screening the approach of the Army of the Potomac.”

The first shot of the Battle of Gettysburg is said to have been fired by a Union cavalry officer at 7:30 A.M. on July 1, 1863, along the Chambersburg Turnpike three miles west of the town. The Southern column halted and threw skirmishers forward.

Sears continues: “Union General Buford recognized the importance of the high ground directly to the south of Gettysburg [where Meade would consolidate his troops later that day]. He knew that if the Confederates could gain control of the heights, Meade's army would have a hard time dislodging them. Buford decided to utilize three ridges on the opposite end of Gettysburg: Herr Ridge, McPherson Ridge, and Seminary Ridge. These were appropriate terrain for a delaying action by his small division against superior Confederate infantry forces. His goal was to buy time awaiting the arrival of Union infantrymen who could occupy the strong defensive positions south of town, Cemetery Hill, Cemetery Ridge, and Culp's Hill.”

By mid-morning, the Confederates had pushed the smaller, dismounted Federal cavalry from Herr Ridge back to secondary positions at McPherson Ridge. At that time, the vanguard of the main Federal army arrived to reinforce Buford’s men on the ridge.

At the Union center, forces under General Reynolds put a solid defense against superior numbers and focused artillery from Herr’s Ridge. Reynolds was killed when a stray bullet from a volley of fire hit him behind the ear. He was replaced by his next in command, General Abner Doubleday, who you might recognize as the disputed inventor of baseball. 

On the left flank in Herbst Woods, the famed Union Iron Brigade, formed from regiments of Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin, put up a fierce fight that halted the strategic advance of Confederate forces. 

According to Tim Smith of the American Battlefield Trust, occupation of this wood lot was deemed crucial to the Union defensive position west of the town.  A soldier in the 2nd Wisconsin said, “the grove was our citadel, and it furnished the means for a strong defense.  Every tree was a breastwork, every log a barricade, every bush a cover and concealment, and we made good use of every defensive object.”  

To attack this position, the Rebels were forced to cross the open ground under fire, and forcibly drive the Union defenders from the woods. During the fighting on the left flank, General Archer was captured by Union forces, the first member of Lee’s staff to suffer the indignity.

As forces paused mid-day, the Confederates were facing significant losses with little gain to show for the effort. 

Sidenote: It was about this time that Lawrence Burns joined the Union cause. He was the oldest veteran to fight at Gettysburg and was a veteran of the war of 1812. Burns showed up with his flintlock rifle and powder horn and fell in with one of the defending regiments.

As the afternoon unfolded, reinforcements from the main forces of both armies arrived to bolster troops who had fought in the morning. Unfortunately for the Union defenders, the Confederates jumped to a 2 to 1 advantage in manpower. On the right flank, the Union forces were in a poor defensive position below the Confederates who occupied the high ground on Oak Hill. 

By mid-afternoon, Lee had arrived, and recognizing the magnitude of the fight, immediately ordered his forces to resume the mid-morning attack. And it was the overwhelming number of Rebel forces, now coordinated in their movement and attacks, that drove the Union troops out of their defensive positions.

In different varieties of disorder and panic, the Union forces retreated through Gettysburg. Fierce holding actions and hand-to-hand fighting enabled the Federal troops to reach the safety of Cemetery Hill. 

Seeking to press his advantage before more Union troops could arrive, Lee gave discretionary orders to General Richard Ewell to attack Cemetery Hill “if it was practicable”. His men were exhausted so he declined to push forward. This reticence would give Meade the high ground for the remainder of the battle.

By dusk, a Union Corps under Winfield Scott Hancock had arrived and extended the defensive line along Cemetery Ridge to the hill known as Little Round Top. Three more Union Corps arrived overnight to strengthen its defenses.

While July 1 had been a Confederate tactical victory, it ultimately forced Federal troops to the strong defensive ground.

According to Noah Trudeau in his book “Gettysburg” A Testing of Courage”, “The first day at Gettysburg—more significant than simply a prelude to the bloody second and third days—ranks as the 23rd biggest battle of the war by a number of troops engaged. About one-quarter of Meade's army (22,000 men) and one-third of Lee's army (27,000) were engaged. Union casualties were almost 9,000, Confederate slightly more than 6,000.” 

But Day 1 was just the beginning of the unending slaughter that would define Gettysburg in the history books.



Gettysburg Day 2: Death Beyond Imagination
As July 1 transitioned into the morning of July 2, both Union and Confederate forces were finishing their long marches and moving into position. Meade’s 100,000 men in seven Corps and an artillery reserve solidified the high ground in a three-mile fishhook. 

The strong defensive positions and compact interior lines circled Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill at the “hook” and ran straight through Cemetery Ridge, and Little Round Top. There were additional Union troops in a “salient” or bulge, below Little Round Top. The bulge consisted of troops in the Devil’s Den and the Peach Orchard, which was elevated ground that mirrored Little Round Top.

For the Confederate’s 72,000 men organized into three Corps and a Cavalry division, the positions were less optimal. General Longstreet’s men were arranged on the left flank opposite the Federal forces at Little Round Top. General Hill’s forces were opposite Cemetery Ridge in the center. And General Johnson’s men were opposite the right flank, or “hook” at Culp’s Hill. 

I have walked the battlefield a few times and it is astounding to see how well-fortified the Union positions were. In each section of their lines, the Union had the high ground and had natural defenses that included boulders, rock walls and trees. They bolstered these with wooden fencing, stockades and earthen works. The Confederates would have to attack these imposing positions with little natural cover.

Lee did not issue his orders until 11 a.m. and put the focus of his attack through Longstreet on the Union left flank at Little Round Top. His goal was the high ground. Lee wanted to roll up the Union left as he attacked the right flank of the fish hook. This would collapse their lines and allow him to take Cemetery Hill.

According to Longstreet’s memoirs, “Lee's plan, however, was based on faulty intelligence, multiplied by Stuart's continued absence from the battlefield. Though Lee personally reconnoitered his left during the morning, he did not visit Longstreet's position on the Confederate right. Longstreet advocated moving beyond Meade's left and attacking the Union rear, capturing the supply trains and effectively blocking Meade's escape route.”

In his book, “Gettysburg: The Second Day” Harry Pfanz weighs the factors that led to Lee’s battle plans. He says: “Lee rejected this argument because he was concerned about the morale of his soldiers having to give up the ground for which they fought so hard the day before. He wanted to retain the initiative and had a high degree of confidence in the ability of his army to succeed in any endeavor. It was an opinion bolstered by their spectacular victories the previous day and at Chancellorsville. He was, therefore, determined to attack on July 2.”

Longstreet’s attack kicked off late in the day, at 4:30 p.m., with a punishing artillery barrage on the soldiers in the Peach Orchard. Early in the fighting Rebel General Hood was wounded by an enemy artillery shell that exploded overhead. This meant his Confederate troops were not under central control. 

The fighting was fierce, often hand-to-hand, and featured attacks and counterattacks by both sides. But the 5,500 Confederate troops eventually overwhelmed the 2,400 defenders. Sections of this part of the battlefield became known as the “Slaughter Pen”, “Bloody Run” and the “Valley of Death”. The Union soldiers eventually re-formed along Cemetery Ridge and solidified their lines along the straight edge of the fishhook, where Meade had wanted them all along.

Meanwhile, at Little Round Top, the fighting became the centerpiece of the entire 3-day battle. Keep in mind this position was essentially abandoned at the start of the day since General Sickles had ignored his orders to fortify the position and instead moved downhill to the Peach Orchard and Devil’s Den. Seeing an imminent attack, General Sykes had the position reinforced with soldiers from the rear. They arrived 10 minutes before they had to repel a ferocious Confederate attack.

According to author Henry Pfanz in “Gettysburg: the Second Day”, the attacking rebels were exhausted after marching more than 20 miles to reach their launching position. The day was hot and their canteens were empty. The attack was initiated before they could refill their water.

 If you have ever stood among the rocks at Little Round Top, it’s easy to see why the Confederates were repulsed time and time again. Huge boulders and high steep ground give excellent defilade, or cover, to the defenders who could rain fire down onto attackers slowly making their way up the rocky slopes. It would be here that a few hundred men would protect the entire flank of the Union army and decide the success or failure of Lee’s plans.

Under command of Colonel Joshua Chamberlain, the men were stretched single file along the top of the ridge. From these positions, they repelled two different charges over 90 minutes, but casualties and low ammunition made their position tenuous. Another charge would have broken the lines and forced the Union off the hill, which would endanger the entire Union flank.

In an astounding and brilliant maneuver, Chamberlain ordered his men to fix bayonets and counterattack from the top of the slopes. He had his left flank move forward and pivot right like a door swinging shut. The combined frontal assault and flanking maneuver broke the Confederate attackers and many were captured. 

Reinforcements arrived to bolster defenses, which were still tenuous, and drive back assaults on the right flank of Little Round Top. At the end of the day, the hill would remain in Union hands.

Back at the Union center, the fighting had been so desperate at the Peach Orchard salient that reinforcements from the center positions had been sent to the left flank to avoid a route. As a result, the center was undermanned for a large assault against Cemetery Ridge, which came late in the day.

The Confederate troops were successful in pushing the Union lines back, even capturing some battery guns. But the penetration of one section, all the way up the ridge, was not supported by success on the flanks, and vicious Union counterattacks created an untenable situation for Confederate troops. They were soon forced to withdraw. For the moment, the Union center had held, but it showed Lee that it had a weakness.

On the Union right flank, at the fishhook at Culp’s Hill, Lee wanted a diversionary attack under General Ewell. The purpose was to keep Meade from pulling reinforcements from that area to assist at the center and left flanks. Meade had indeed pulled defenders from some of the defenses, but the elevated and reinforced position was so stout that the Confederate attack, which launched at 7 p.m., only made modest gains, with severe casualties, to the lower part of the hill.

Actions on the battlefield ceased about 10:30 p.m. Only the sounds of the wounded and dying men and animals could be heard. General Meade telegraphed General-in-Chief Henry Halleck a report on the day. 

The note read: “The enemy attacked me about 4 p.m. this day and, after one of the severest contests of the war, was repulsed at all points. ... I shall remain in my present position tomorrow, but am not prepared to say, until better advised of the condition of the army, whether my operations will be of an offensive or defensive character.”

The Union generals were somber about the casualties, particularly the number of soldiers lost defending the salient. But they were bolstered by the bravery and fortitude of their men in holding their overall defensive positions, even under the fierce attacks of the determined enemy.

According to Stephen Sears in his book “Gettysburg”, “Meade made his decision late that night in a council of war that included his senior staff officers and corps commanders. The assembled officers agreed that, despite the beating the army took, it was advisable for the army to remain in its present position and to await an attack by the enemy. There is some evidence that Meade had already decided this issue and was using the meeting, not as a formal council of war, but as a way to achieve consensus among officers he had commanded for less than a week. 

Sears goes on to relate that “As the meeting broke up, Meade took aside Gen. John Gibbon, and predicted, ‘If Lee attacks tomorrow, it will be in your front. ... he has made attacks on both our flanks and failed, If he concludes to try it again, it will be on our center."

At the Confederate headquarters, the mood was quite melancholy. Lee’s troops had gained ground, particularly at the Peach Orchard salient on the right, but the casualties were a price the South could not afford to pay. And at the end of the day, the South had failed to dislodge the Union from their defensive positions, but Lee felt confident. 

His official battle report reads: “The result of this day's operations induce the belief that, with a proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. ... The general plan was unchanged.”

Historian Norah Trudeau puts Union casualties at 10,000 and Confederate casualties at 6,800. When you consider the fighting barely lasted six hours, it is easy to see how ferocious and deadly the battle was on the second day.


Gettysburg Day 3: The Slaughter
According to the writer Harry Pfanz in his other great book on the subject, “Gettysburg: Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill”, General Lee wished to renew the attack on Friday, July 3, using the same basic plan as the previous day. Two Confederate actions would define the day: Pickett’s famous charge and Stuart’s cavalry battle. 

In Lee’s plan, Longstreet would attack the Union left, while Ewell attacked Culp's Hill. Federal forces initiated the day’s actions on their right flank before Longstreet could initiate his second attack on the left flank. 

Union troops started a dawn artillery bombardment against the Confederates on the lower portion of Culp's Hill in an effort to regain their lost position from the night before. The Confederates attacked, and the second fight for Culp's Hill ended around 11 a.m. Harry Pfanz judged that, after some seven hours of bitter combat, "the Union line was intact and held more strongly than before."

In addition to the center assault that would be known as “Pickett’s Charge”, Lee wanted Jeb Stuart’s cavalry, which had finally arrived on the afternoon of July 2, to harass the rear of the Union communications and supply areas. Lee hoped the chaos would pull troops and attention away from his attack at the center.

At 11 a.m. Stuart’s cavalry ran directly into prepared Union defenses, who had expected the maneuver. Fighting was fierce and often was saber-to-saber on horseback. Armed with Spencer Repeating rifles, the Union defenders poured fire on the attackers. Despite effective artillery support, a frontal assault by Stuart scattered a portion of the Union defensive line.  

A young General George Custer personally led his Michigan cavalry against the break to force a retreat after close-quarter fighting. Stuart responded by pushing all of his reserves, at a gallop against Custer at the center. 

According to author Stephen Sears “As the two columns approached each other, the pace of each increased, when suddenly a crash, like the falling of timber, betokened the crisis. So sudden and violent was the collision that many of the horses were turned end-over-end and crushed their riders beneath them.”

Union counterattacks at the left and right of Stuart’s flanks forced his men to withdraw, and Lee’s plan to cause chaos in the Union rear was defeated. This left more reinforcements to support Union lines on Cemetery Ridge.

Lee had wanted Pickett's men to start at first light but the preceding artillery bombardment did not start until 1 p.m. Even though it was considered the largest barrage of the war, the range and accuracy did little to diminish the Union positions.

Confederate General Longstreet, who was the overall commander of the advance, was against the action and had begged Lee to consider a flanking maneuver around Little Round Top. When the time came to order the attack, Longstreet wrote in his memoirs, “The effort to speak the order failed, and I could only indicate [to Pickett] by an affirmative bow.”

Again delayed, Pickett’s 12,000 men did not initiate their advance until after 2 p.m. The Union forces expected this movement and were waiting with cannon, grapeshot, bullets, and bayonets. 

The Confederates advanced across the open field in a line over a mile long. Flanking artillery from Cemetery Hill on the Union right and Little Round Top from the Union left poured rounds into the tightly packed soldiers as they advanced.

On the right flank of the Union center, devastating rifle and artillery fire quickly broke the Rebel assault and caused them to retreat through the center of the attacking Confederates. This confused the advance, as some of those soldiers retreated as well. Here again, concentrated, effective fire from lines of soldiers four deep, kept the Confederates from advancing to their objective on Cemetery Ridge.

It was only on the left flank of the Union’s center that Pickett’s men made progress. Despite withering fire from their flanks and front, Pickett’s men were able to open two gaps in the Union line. 

In one instance, an artillery battery was alone after their infantry support retreated. Desperately, they fired double canister shot at the advancing Confederates. This meant firing, at close range, two shells filled with round metal bearings the size of walnuts into packed infantry. The entire Confederate line in this gap disintegrated from the barrage, which ended the immediate threat.

In a hand-to-hand battle of rifle fire, bayonets and fists the Union minimized the penetration. Reinforcements were rushed to support the Federal troops and the Confederates were forced to withdraw. No senior officers were alive to call the retreat, but once soldiers saw their comrades withdrawing, they fled as well.

After the charge, the Union had lost about 1,500 killed and wounded. Confederate losses were more than 50% of their effective attacking forces. 6,500 casualties was a price the South could not afford to pay.

According to several historical accounts, Lee feared a Union counteroffensive and tried to rally his center, telling returning soldiers that the failure was "all my fault". Pickett was inconsolable for the rest of the day and never forgave Lee for ordering the charge. When Lee told Pickett to rally his division for the defense, Pickett allegedly replied, "General, I have no division."

The Union counterattack did not come. After three days of intense fighting, Meade’s men were exhausted and as badly depleted as their Confederate counterparts. An informal truce was declared on July 4, and both armies collected their wounded and dead. 

According to Jeffry Wert in his book “Gettysburg: Day Three”: “History may never know the true story of Lee's intentions at Gettysburg. He never published memoirs, and his after-action report from the battle was cursory. Most of the senior commanders of the charge were casualties and did not write reports. Pickett's report was apparently so bitter that Lee ordered him to destroy it, and no copy has been found.” 

According to author Stephen Sears, “The two armies suffered between 46,000 and 51,000 casualties, nearly one-third of all total troops engaged. Union casualties were 23,055. Many authors estimate as many as 28,000 Confederate casualties. In addition to being the deadliest battle of the war, Gettysburg also had the highest number of generals killed in action. Nearly a third of Lee's general officers were killed, wounded, or captured.”

Lee’s army moved out of Gettysburg late in the evening of July 4 and waded across the Potomac to the safety of the South. His wagon train of wounded was reported to be 17 miles long.

Despite pleas from both Abraham Lincoln and General-in-Chief Halleck, Meade did not pursue Lee. His army was too exhausted, wounded, and broken to engage in a protracted series of running battles with Lee.

The loss at Gettysburg, combined with the surrender of Rebel forces at Vicksburg, squashed any hope of European recognition of the Confederacy. It also ended the ability of Lee’s army to invade and direct offensive actions against Union territories and forces. Over the next two years, action would be dictated by Ulysess S Grant, as Lee maneuvered to scavenge supplies and retreated to avoid decimation.


What If Scenario
But What If Lee was successful at Gettysburg? There were multiple instances where the Union’s grip on their defense was tenuous at best. Further effort directed against strategic gaps, supported by better flanking coordination, could have easily swung the battle towards the Confederates.

On July 1, Ewell could have used his numbers to aggressively attack the retreating and disorganized forces on Cemetery Ridge. The Union was still trying to figure out if they would defend this area, and Meade had not yet arrived. 

On the second day alone, there were multiple opportunities to swing the battle to Lee’s army. Only furious fighting and swarms of reinforcements kept the Confederates at bay in the salient. Little Round Top was one charge away from falling to the Confederates. And the Rebels had successfully reached Cemetery Ridge at the center but did not   have flank support to hold the position, which would have cut the Union forces into two.

On July 3, better coordination between Longstreet and Lee could have led to a pre-dawn kick-off of Pickett’s charge. Forces that had mistakenly been held back from the advance could have been used to support Pickett’s success and exploited the breaches more fully.

In our What If? scenario, Lee’s continued field brilliance has led to a rout of the Union forces who have retreated from Gettysburg towards Baltimore. There, they could regroup their forces with fresh recruits, supplies, and ultimately a new leader, who has been rushed from Mississippi sooner than history records.

In our timeline, the Union suffers a devastating defeat, but a brilliant general and future president, Ulysses S Grant, takes over the entirety of the war effort. And believe it or not, Lee’s success at Gettysburg will lead to a quicker defeat of his forces and a shorter end to the Civil War.


The Blue River
Lafeyette McLure
17th Regiment, Louisiana National Guard
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
July 3, 1863 

Lafeyette McLure and his regiment moved out from the safety of the treeline across the smokey, open farmland. General Pickett had ordered them to head for the copse, or grove, of trees atop Cemetery Ridge. But his view of the target was blocked by the fading darkness of dawn, the low hanging morning mist and the rolling clouds of smoke from Union and Rebel batteries.

The cacophony of cannons exploding and shells whooshing overhead overshadowed the sound of his rapidly beating heart. McLure knew he was walking to his death. He just didn’t know when it would strike. As he marched forward, abreast of his fellow soldiers, he focused on the task at hand: reach the high ground at all costs.

As the batteries exchanged fire, shells began to fall among the 15,000 men making their way across the open pastures and fields. From his position in the middle of the division McLure can see the explosions upend his comrades. To his right, about 50 yards over in the next field, McLure saw five men tossed end-over-end in a spinning mass of dirt, body parts and rifles as a cannonball exploded among their shoulder-to-shoulder ranks.

The drums beat faster to signal a double-time march, and soon the Rebels surged forward in a gray swarming mass. The wave of men swept across the half-mile of open ground into the barricades that guarded the Union forces. In some sections of the charge, dozens of men simply disappeared in a puff of red mist as double canister shot exploded at close range into the tightly packed men.

But McLure and thousands of men around him were driven on by fear, anger and a desire to carry the day. They quickly overran the forward positions of the Union defenders and made their way to the base of Cemetery Ridge. Fire from their flanks on Little Round Top slowed them down, but the wave of men rushed onward.

The Union defenders were brave and steadfast, putting up concentrated and unhurried fire. But in some sections their numbers were too small to impede the Rebel charge. Sensing impending doom, some defenders broke and ran. Soon more joined them, and a rout was on.

McLure charged into the camp that served as Meade’s headquarters. Fires were burning maps and important correspondence. Tents were hastily emptied of important items as the Union soldiers quickly evacuated the area.

Pausing for a moment to appreciate the magnitude of their success, McClure looked past the ridge to see the Union army making its way down several roads away from Gettysburg. It looked like a long, blue river of men. The Union was defeated and humiliated once again at the hands of General Robert E Lee.

Bring Me General Grant
In our What If? scenario, President Lincoln is desperate to turn around the perception that the Union is losing the war. He needed the country’s people, industry, and government to fully support the war effort.

With the success at Vicksburg in July of 1863, Lincoln sees a rising military genius, who is hawkish and unafraid to aggressively pursue, and attack, the Confederate armies he faced. After the appalling casualties at the Battle of Shiloh in 1862, Lincoln dismissed Grant's critics, saying "I can't spare this man; he fights.”

In our timeline, in August of 1863, Grant was promoted to Lieutenant General, giving him command of all Union armies. His new rank had only been held by one man in American history, George Washington.

It’s important to note, what Grant will bring to the war, is different than any previous Union general. He will use the telegraph and other signal communications to modernize his command-and-control over the entire theater of operations. 

Prior to Grant's leadership, the armies operated independently to accomplish localized goals and defeat specific army groups. Grant will look at the theater in its entirety and coordinate attacks to strangle supplies and movement that will eventually render the Confederates incapable of fighting. Grant was not interested in capturing territory or towns unless those gains kept the Confederates from resupplying.

Grant will coordinate with generals, review troop movements, and issue orders in near-real-time. Only Sherman, who had been ordered to go dark, was not in constant contact to utilize intelligence to pressure and attack the different Confederate armies, including Lee’s. 

Grant will also bring a completely new attitude to the Union army: “Attack, pressure, drive the initiative against the enemy.” This philosophy would embolden the ranks of Federal forces in a way that was badly needed, particularly after the loss at Gettysburg.

Rather than mid-1864, our scenario has the coordinated theater-wide surge of Union forces happening during the late Summer months of 1863. With the weather still on his side, Grant is able to effectively move his forces to pressure Lee in Virginia in the Overland Campaign. 

While Lee often won their direct confrontations, Grant outmaneuvered Lee to keep the Confederates away from Richmond. Grant ordered one of his subordinates, General Meade: "Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also." 

With waterborne supply lines unhindered by winter weather, Grant’s armies are able to constantly flank Lee deep in enemy territory. His overwhelming manpower advantage is quickly wearing down Lee’s army, although Union casualties remain astoundingly high.

As summer moves to fall, the Confederates need harvest time to bring them both food and money. Food will be rationed among the population and sent to support the soldiers who are constantly on half-rations. Cotton and other exports will be sold illegally North, and legally to France and England, to bring in desperately needed gold to fund the war effort.

But during this crucial time, General Sherman is carving a 60-mile path of destruction through Georgia. Sherman used census data from 1860 to plan his march through the most productive farm and cattle hamlets. Carrying only 20 days of rations, his army would have to “live off the land” as they made their march to Savannah and the sea.

Since Lee’s army was tied up with Grant in Virginia, he was not able to muster more than 13,000 men to oppose Sherman’s 62,000. Sherman kicked off his campaign by burning Atlanta as he left. His march was methodical in its destruction, purpose, and direction. 

Railroad ties were dug up, heated, and bent around trees to form millions of “Sherman neckties”. Farms were raided, towns burnt, and supplies confiscated to feed the moving army. By December of 1863, Sherman would capture Savannah, a crucial Confederate port. 

He would wire on December 25 of 1863, “Lincoln, I beg to present you as a Christmas gift, the City of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, and about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton."

This loss devastates the Confederate war effort during a time when Lee and Grant are sparring in battles at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Petersburg. As winter of 1863 crashes into the troops, the battle lines settle into 30-miles of trenches around Richmond and Petersburg. 

Lee does not have the effective manpower, or supplies, to man such a long line of trenches. In some areas, men in the trenches are five feet apart from each other to cover the defensive ground. His forces are under constant probing and flanking attacks from Grant, and hundreds of Confederates are deserting each night because of starvation and lack of winter clothing. 

Grant breaks through at Petersburg, a vital railroad junction below Richmond, and Lee is forced to abandon the Southern capital. By April of 1864, Lee’s forces are a shell of what they once were and he surrenders to Grant a year earlier in our scenario. 

This victory in mid-1864 propels Lincoln to a second term on a wave of popularity. He was so popular in fact, that Andrew Johnson is not needed as a compromise choice to secure Southern votes. In his place is the only person who could possibly outshine Abraham Lincoln. The newly retired, and easily elected, Ulysses S. Grant takes his place at the seat of power.

Grant is still not at Ford’s Theater on the night of Lincoln’s assassination. His wife’s hatred of Mary Todd Lincoln would not have changed those course of events. But with Grant ascending to the presidency, the reconstruction of the South would look much different.

Unlike Andrew Johnson, Grant would have aggressively enforced the Civil Rights Act of 1866, elevated African-Americans out of second-class citizenship, and would have used the military to ensure the success of the three Reconstruction Acts. Most importantly, the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment would have happened sooner, and more support would have gone towards the “proper treatment” of Native Americans.

Most people don’t realize Grant was a true progressive for this time, and our American History might have looked much more accepting and integrated if Grant had taken the reins of leadership.


Conclusion
Thank you for joining me, Mark Bouffard on this trip. I’d like to thank my editors, including Clint Buehle, my twin brother Matt Bouffard, my retired journalist uncle Kevin Bouffard. The music you hear is Shane Ivers of silvermansound.com.

Don’t forget to review, like and subscribe to this podcast. Check out our blogs on whatifworldhistory.com and follow us on your favorite social media channel.

This has been What If World History? In our next episode, we will detail a successful plot to assassinate Adolph Hitler at his Wolf’s Lair headquarters on July 20. And we will ponder how his death would save 10 million lives and lower the heat of the coming Cold War.