Policy Vets

The Defense of Taiwan - Where does the United States Stand and Why?

October 29, 2021 Season 1 Episode 33
Policy Vets
The Defense of Taiwan - Where does the United States Stand and Why?
Show Notes Transcript

Today, Vincent Chao, the former Director of the Political Division at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, speaks to Lou Celli and Charlie Malone on behalf of Taiwan.  What are the ramifications of Washington's and Beijing's policies regarding this very important island? 

Vincent Chao:

I grew up with democracy. You know, I can't imagine any other system of governance. I mean, this is something that's very much ingrained in our culture. Now, this idea that the Chinese could swoop in and take it all the way that's terrifying. That's terrifying. Hong Kong was a wake up call, because many people have never felt that this was a pressing matter that the Chinese their intentions were always benign Cheung Kong shoulder to tensions, which is that their expansion is communist government, you know, committed to subverting democracy, freedom, any border region.

Charlie Malone:

Welcome to the policy vets podcast, engaging with leaders, scholars and strong voices to fill a void in support of Policy Development for America's veterans. With your host, former Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Dr. David Shulkin. And the Executive Director of Policy vets Louis Celli, today's guest Vincent Chow, former director of the political division at the Taipei Economic and Cultural representative office in the United States.

Louis Celli:

Hey, Charlie, thanks again for stepping in for the Secretary and and I checked with him and no, you do not get to call yourself acting secretary?

Charlie Malone:

Ah, well, you know, sometimes things stick and sometimes they don't.

Louis Celli:

So Charlie, you were you were Lieutenant Commander on a ship? You were your commander with the Pacific Fleet. You worked at NATO headquarters site, I think you're the perfect person to help host this podcast today.

Charlie Malone:

Yeah, it wasn't the commander of the Pacific fleet that was a commander in the Pacific Fleet. So I was just, I carry the water. I think I made copy for somebody who thinks about things for somebody else,

Louis Celli:

you know, I would receive briefings from the State Department, the Pentagon National Security Council every time I traveled to Taiwan, and one of the common things I used to hear was the status quo.

Charlie Malone:

The status quo is another way of saying strategic ambiguity. I mean, we have had a long time a policy in the United States of ambiguity between our relationships with the PRC, and the Republic of China, in Taiwan.

Louis Celli:

Well, you know, I'll tell you, Charlie, I get that I may not have all the information, and the strategists may have gained this out already. But I always hated the status quo thing. And, you know, the wink and a nod and will silently treat Taiwan as a sovereign nation. But publicly, we can't say that and such. No,

Charlie Malone:

it is an awkward situation. I mean, on one hand, we sell arms to Taiwan, and yet we don't recognize them as a nation. There's quite a disparity between the two,

Louis Celli:

we recognize them as a democratically run independent Island, you know, from the 50s, all the way to the 70s. And then, you know, we acquiesce to China, because China promised to be a gentler brand of communism. And I, I don't think the world got what they thought they were getting.

Charlie Malone:

Well, it was all about context, it started after the Vietnam War, they were supporting some of our policies in the Cold War, becoming more of an ally after having been an enemy. And so Carter in 79, decided to recognize the PRC, and it made a lot of people unhappy.

Louis Celli:

Well, you know, I can tell you that it's a beautiful island with with respectful and traditional people who are welcoming and grateful for the support of the United States. And they practice everything that we teach the world that we believe in, you know, the only reason that they're a free society today is because the United States supports them.

Charlie Malone:

You know, Lou, you're absolutely right. And our guest today is going to talk a lot about that. He's Mr. Vincent Chow. He was formerly the director of the political division of the Taipei Economic and Cultural representative office in the United States, essentially, Taiwan's embassy here in the United States. And he's now running for one of the city council seats in Taiwan's capital city, Taipei. And I've

Louis Celli:

worked with Vincent for a number of years, I can tell you that there are a few people who know as much about the current political situation in Taiwan and Vincent,

Charlie Malone:

well, having looked at this issue a lot, I'm really excited about this interview. And Vincent has served in a number of positions, both here in the US, as well as in Taiwan.

Louis Celli:

I couldn't agree more. So let's get them in here and get started.

Charlie Malone:

Let's do it. Benson, welcome to policy bets podcast. Thanks for joining us all the way from Taiwan.

Vincent Chao:

Thank you for having me. It's great to be here.

Louis Celli:

You know, Vincent, when you were here last year as a director of the political division of the Taipei economic, cultural representative office of the United States tech grow, you know, we had a chance to talk about Taiwan and the importance of the US Taiwan relationship. But before we get into that, can you tell our listeners a little bit about your career working with President Tsai and and what you're doing now?

Vincent Chao:

Well, thank you. Oh, that's a great question. And you know, first of all, I just like to thank you guys for everything you guys are doing to support you know, the Taiwan us relationship. For myself. I didn't start off working in politics. I was a journalist after graduating from university in Canada. So being a journalist was quite an eye opening experience. The free media is something we take quite seriously here in Taiwan. And as a journalist, I found that this opened up many doors and gave me insight into many different areas of Taiwan society. So one of these areas was obviously politics. So after journalism, I served in Taiwan's Army as a conscript. I did my law degree, and then I joined President Simons Foundation. So she wasn't President back then. But she was planning on running for it. So I was fortunate to have joined that campaign, and then having served in our NSC, as Chief of Staff and then in office of the president and Ministry of Foreign Affairs after she was elected in 2016. So all that has been quite the experience.

Charlie Malone:

Since then, as you know, Taiwan has a complicated relationship with the United States. The US switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing and 1979 under President Carter. And then later, the Taiwan Relations Act was signed by President Carter, supporting arms to Taiwan. And after Reagan took office, there were three joint communiques with the PRC and six assurances that the US would acknowledge the PRC as the sole government of China to include Taiwan. And from then on, we've been tuning our words, very careful. Diplomatic norm. Can you tell us a little more about this history from your perspective?

Vincent Chao:

Sure. I think you know, there's a lot of nuances in this history. And you're right. I mean, I think both sides, the talent side and the US side have chosen our words very carefully as a diplomatic norm. I think one thing that has been clear is that the US one China policy, so the US doesn't have a one China principle. And I'm not going to speak on behalf of the US. But this is all very much in the public domain. The US one China policy is quite different from the Chinese one China principle. So the one China policy from the US perspective, essentially is this is based on three things, it's based on the Taiwan Relations Act is based on the three communities, as well as the six assurances, which are formalized under President Ronald Reagan. So these these kind of formulate the basis. And what does that mean, that essentially means this, so the US recognizes that the PRC is the sole legal government of China, but as to whether Taiwan is part of China, it doesn't recognize it acknowledges the Chinese position on that. So you can see there's a very careful play on words there. But I think that plan where it says, given a lot of wiggle room for us to develop this relationship. And so, you know, that's, that's sort of what's been happening since 1979. But I want to also make clear, there are a lot of things happening within Taiwan during this time period, as well. And, you know, namely our democratization. I mean, we've seen, for example, in 1979, we were under martial law, a one party dictatorship, essentially. But since the 1990s. In particular, we've seen our democracy really take off, we've seen direct presidential elections, we've seen changes in our political parties. We've seen our first female president elected in 2016. And so Taiwan back then was far as far different from Taiwan today. So we have to also acknowledge that I think back in 1979, the US policies towards Taiwan may have reflected a certain set of realities that are no longer present today, namely, the fact that, you know, we are a democratic, free market nation today, as opposed to 1979. When we were into martial law and one party rule,

Louis Celli:

you know, you talked a little bit about the language earlier, let's go back to that for a second. That isn't just a disagreement on the language between how China interprets it, and how the United States interprets it. That was that was actually well crafted in a way that translated so that China felt that they got what they wanted. And the United States felt that they got what they wanted. Really, what the same language, isn't that right?

Vincent Chao:

I think there's some nuances. I mean, I think we, you know, this wall I you see kind of the language and the differences between the Chinese and English translations. Certainly, I think, if you look at the Chinese translations, they're certain. There are certain words that are used in that, that document that I think may not fully reflect the English original text of it. But I think the US has always been quite clear, which is that obviously, the US position is based on the English language pollution exposed in the three communities and in the town relation, second six assurances, and in terms of that English language document that has always been quite clear as well, which is that the US recognizes the PRC as the sole legal government of China, but only acknowledges their claim over Taiwan. So it doesn't recognize their claim. It acknowledges it and I think you know, as English speakers we can understand that acknowledge and recognizer too far different words. With far different meanings. And so we have to be, I think, quite clear in terms of what the US position is and the differences between the US and China position.

Charlie Malone:

So we acknowledge Taiwan, we don't formerly recognize Taiwan, yet we sell billions of dollars of military aircraft tanks and combat equipment to Taiwan. Can you talk about that a little bit?

Vincent Chao:

Yeah, I think I think this is an important point to make. Because it's, you know, when I was in the States, sometimes when you meet people that are less than knowledgeable about the whole situation about our relationship with us, there is this sense that, hey, why is the United States defending a country, you know, 1000s of miles away across the Pacific? And so we have to make clear at the outset that, no, I think Taiwan is committed to our own self defense. And that's what's, you know, the most important facet of our defense policy, which is, we need to have a determination, we need to have that commitment. And we do. And so buying billions of dollars of defense equipment from the US, but also domestically is, is reflective of that. And so, you know, we we're not asking for military aid from us, we don't ask for a free lunch. I mean, what we do is we look at the steps we need to take to protect Taiwan's freedom, democracy, and we take, you know, the necessary steps to, to achieve that. So, you know, buying military hardware, I think, you know, that's, that's very much reflective of the position where it China's PLA military budget is, you know, I think 14 or 15 times Taiwan's military budget, and that's just the part they have on paper, I think we all know, there's a lot of, there's a lot of that that's, that's actually hidden between funny accounts and hidden under funding counting. So the point is that there's a, there's a growing military imbalance, Taiwan has a need for this sort of defense weaponry to maintain our democracy and our infrastructure stability. And so buying weapons from the US is a critical part of that. And actually, Charlie, if you could look at through the history, actually, one of the main gripes that the Chinese have had towards the US since the third communicate, has been the US policy of selling weapons to Taiwan. I mean, the Chinese don't like it, the Chinese feel that or if if, for example, if if you want to have lost a piece, then you should stop selling weapons to Taiwan. But you know, it's very much the opposite of that. Yeah, that's precisely why we won't have cross strait peace, because you've got to maintain a balance of power here.

Louis Celli:

So then, so, you know, we've heard recently that the US has actually taken some more intentional steps to help Taiwan Self Defense Force by sending military trainers to teach the Taiwan troops. So why would you as training be important here?

Vincent Chao:

Well, frankly, put, because we don't have as much well, we don't have any combat experience in recent history. And that's a big problem. You know, that's, that's, you know, that's probably a good problem to have. But at the same time, it is still a problem. One we're facing against an adversary that has, you know, a million troops in uniform and has a valid declaration to take over Taiwan, and has said that, you know, that they want all of Taiwan and China to be united under the People's Republic and the Communist rule, that's a very serious problem. And so our military needs to be prepared. And, you know, I think we're actually very grateful to the US has chosen to support Taiwan through training, through defense sales. And all of this will help ensure that Taiwan is better able to provide for own defense, I mean, I'll put it this way to the better train talent troops are, the more better equipped our troops are, the less likely it becomes possible that we'll be enrolled in conflict, and the less likely that the US will have to be involved. So, you know, is this is like, you know, this is like treating a symptom of the onset rather than leaving it later on when you're in ER, so so we see the problem there, and we're committed to fixing it kind of right from the start. And so training is actually an very, very helpful part of the

Charlie Malone:

the PRC has really been flexing their muscles lately. I think it was in July when the PLA fire warning shots at the USS benfold near the Paracels. And then recently worked. warplanes. overflew Taiwan in the last couple of months. What what does all that mean to you? Sure.

Vincent Chao:

I mean, we if we look at the past pattern patterns of when the warplanes events or talents or defense identification zone, it's normally been around major events, both in China and in Taiwan. So the most recent large scale exercise was early October and as you know, the PRC, the Chinese celebrated their national data EU first so to celebrate that descend I think 149, or four fates into Taiwan's Adi z. So that was a big celebration, I guess from their perspective. What does it mean? Well, it's I think There's a couple of factors involved. The first one is they want to make this the norm. So we didn't really start seeing Chinese warplanes enter Taiwan at AIC until about I think 2019 was when they started kind of in any sort of regularity. Before that, it was very much like one off occurrences that garnered a lot of international attention. And so we're at the phase kind of two years from that, where the international community sort of says, oh, you know, they're orphans, again, I mean, it's no longer a big deal as it once was. I mean, certainly, the numbers continue to go up. But that's also part of regular rising kind of the scoping numbers of war points that are flying over the Taiwan Strait, every single day. So that's that's part of it. That's regularizing and process making, making, giving the impression that this is all part of China, that Taiwan, Taiwan's airspace, all of this is part of China's internal airspace. The second part is to where our town's Air Force. And it's a huge problem, because there's they're flying in many cases, old fighters, like Obama's old fighters and old surveillance planes. And, you know, Taiwan's Air Force is actually quite modern, we have a good fleet of F 16. And we're, you know, getting new F 16 visa, we have Mirage 2000s, we have quite a good modern fleet of aircraft. And so what they're doing is they're final these, like pieces of junk into towns at AIC and forcing us to scramble, kind of our modern warplanes in response to that. And so it's worried all pilots is wearing our training, it's, it's wearing our airframes, it's costly in terms of maintenance. And so there's a very clear tactical purpose to this as well. And so we sort of adjusted our policy towards that, for example, we're no longer flying aircraft intercept, every sortie that the Santa Claus, we're doing no more missile tracking, we're doing more attempts, through, for example, other ways to ditch force them out, but not no longer fighter planes in every single instance. So that's, that's the second part. But also the third part. Again, I think it's this, it's, it's the idea that, that shooting pain can get away with all of this, it's the I mean, these are really test innocence tests in terms of what Taiwan will do and what the international community will do. And so and they're, they're, they're fishing for response, right? And the, you know, if we don't give him any response to they'll just take it one step further and one step further. And if you look at the past history of the Communist Party of China, that's what they do. I mean, that's what they do. So we have to also be very careful. And, you know, I think we're quite grateful that the US and other countries have spoken up pretty strongly against this sort of behavior. Because, you know, these sorts of comments really need to take place, otherwise, the Chinese will be like, well, you know, if no one says anything, well, I might as well do something more. And so I think there's a meaning behind all of this. And so I've covered a few points. But certainly, I think from a Chinese perspective, these flights are worth having. And, and, you know, unfortunately, I think we're going to see more as time goes on.

Louis Celli:

You've brought up some really good points. But let's back up for a minute. Let's learn let's we dove right into this. Can you tell our audience a little bit about Taiwan, you know, the population, the strategic location in the Pacific Ocean, and, you know, the economic value to the world? Sure,

Vincent Chao:

I mean, well, Taiwan, we have to meet 3.5 million people. We're really strategic and Pacific, if you look at a map of Asia Pacific, we're right in the middle there. And, you know, there's something that's called the first island chain, or first island chain is really this idea that that, you know, we all across the Asia Pacific question from the north to the south, you have a whole chain of US partners and allies of countries that believe in democracy and freedom. So you start from Korea, and South Korea, and then you go to Japan, and Japan stretches down Okinawa, and the US is airbase there, and then you go down to Taiwan and the Philippines and you know, further down so, and that stretches, you know, all the way in a sense to Australia, if you look at the broader map, so Taiwan's right smack in middle debt, and so if Taiwan, for example, no longer like if the if the Communist Chinese headed their way, I mean, Taiwan will be subsumed within China. And there'll be a huge gap within that first island chain that stretches right from the north to the south. And so what we would have to do is, look at the second island chain, and second island chain is a list of Pacific countries that the US had had a part in, you know, in the Second World War and, and it becomes very hairy actually, if you go if you lose the first island chain and have to go to the second island chain. So there's a there's a strategic component to Taiwan as well, but there's also a economic component to it. And Taiwan's probably the world's leading manufacturer of semiconductors. So, you know, this has been on the news recently, but the Taiwan semiconductor manufacturing company TSMC. It's their data critical. I mean, they play a critical part between, you know, in almost every single piece of electronic people today, I mean, really from cars, to phones to computers and all And so the continued supply of electronics and continuous supply of the strategic parts of the world, and it has implications not only for a consumer economy, but also for military hardware for military hardware, if you look at any piece of you know, high tech weaponry today, I think it'd be hard pressed to find a piece of weaponry that doesn't have parts made in Taiwan. You know, I think it's difficult to define a country by strategic value economic value, I think we have to look at, you know, as a townies, our inherent value to the world as freedom loving people. And so we have 23 point 5 million people here, you know, people like myself, and I'm in my 30s, but I grew up with democracy. You know, I can't imagine any other system of governance. I mean, this is something that's very much ingrained in our culture now. And so this idea that the Chinese could swoop in and take it all the way that's terrifying. That's terrifying. And Hong Kong was a wake up call, because many people in Taiwan never felt that this was a pressing matter, that the Chinese their intentions were always benign. And there was a way of saying that, well, you know, if only they did this, they wouldn't do that. And Hong Kong showed all that was fake. I mean, Hong Kong showed their true intentions, which is that their expansionist communist government, you know, committed to subverting democracy, freedom anywhere in the region. And so that kind of opened our eyes to danger. And I think you're seeing a lot more awareness of China, within Taiwan nowadays, precisely because of Hong Kong. And so, you know, back to the point about Taiwan, there's a lot of inherent value, I think, as as a Taiwanese in keeping Taiwan free and democratic. But I think there's also a lot of inherent value for that around the world as well.

Charlie Malone:

You've mentioned a lot about the strategic value of the island. I'm wondering about the the security of the entire Pacific Rim at Taiwan, were overtaken by China. Can you do you have thoughts on that? Yeah,

Vincent Chao:

I mean, he would see, that'd be a terrifying possibility. So the reason why if you look at the Chinese overflights into Taiwan's air defense identification zone, it's sort of like this, our ADC on the lower side, it directly connects with Japan's ADC and on the south side, it directly connects with the Philippine ADC. So if the Chinese, for example, want to reach the Pacific don't have to cross one of these three ACs. And obviously, as you can see, they've chosen the cross Taiwan CDAC. They also chosen across, you know, on the southern border as well. But the point is, that if, for example, Taiwan were to fall, there'll be a critical critical cap gap that would open up and you would see, I think, rapidly, rapidly, China start claiming, not only military, hegemonic, but also moral hegemonic over the Pacific, they would quickly assume a position as the preeminent Pacific power, and that they would demand demand. A reflection of that, for example, in terms of Korea and Japan's allegiances, they would, you know, assume, for example, that the Pacific islands that are so strategic and scattered across the Pacific, you know, would have to fall in place, then all of that. And so, you know, I think it's it's part of this, it's shooting has made it pretty clear that Taiwan is part of China's, you know, how to say rise to power. But I guess, in his words, return to power. And so if Taiwan were to be subsumed, I think you would very, very, very quickly see China and the free world, in an increasing in a growing course of action that could lead to a clash down the road, like, I'm not being, I'm not being alarmist, I think, I mean, if you just pull out a map and look at how the strategic situation will work and make, you know, I think several key assumptions based on information that's out there, based on information that the CCP has published, based on what Xi Jinping has said, in terms of China's place in the Pacific, all of that, you can quickly see how this could be the case. And so, you know, again, Taiwan has a value there. And we have a government here and talent that's committed very, very much committed committed to, you know, increasing our defense budget, you know, through unprecedented numbers, essentially. But we have government is very, very committed to keeping Taiwan free and to keeping Taiwan out of the PRC. And and so, you know, we, we do need a lot of international support, but at the same time, we have our own recognition of what we need to do.

Louis Celli:

I've visited Taiwan a couple of times, you know, I've met with your ministers of defense, foreign affairs, Veterans Affairs, I've met with President Tsai several times. And, you know, it certainly appeared to me that the democratically run government is successful by any measure. Talk to me a little bit about what it would mean for the people of Taiwan. What would happen if Taiwan were to follow the path of Hong Kong?

Vincent Chao:

I mean, it would be a disaster. humanitarian disaster, the political disaster would be a strategic disaster. I mean, it'll be a disaster of unsurmountable proportions, I think, in the 21st century. I mean, certainly there's been a lot of tragedies around the world. Afghanistan being one of them. But you know, Taiwan has the potential to shake up the entire geostrategic picture. And Taiwan has the potential to either avert or to accelerate sort of a clash between great powers in the 21st century. And so, you know, for the people of Taiwan, I'll put it this way. I'm currently running for office. So I've announced my candidacy for the Taipei City Council. I'm running in a democratically fair election, we have a primary coming up next year. And then we have our general elections in winter 22. So you know, all these opportunities will be lost. I mean, if you looked at young people in Hong Kong today, do they have a chance to run in free, fair election, they don't. I mean, they did, I think, at one point, at a very, very small period of time, and you can even argue if that was free and fair. But in Taiwan, we do have to, and we have a culture, and we have this way of life. And so if we go the route of Hong Kong people, young people like me, just, we will have an opportunity to participate in politics. And you know, more than that, having served in our coverage, especially in our NSC, I'll probably be locked up in Xinjiang somewhere. I mean, that's not even joke. That's a terrifying possibility. But you know, I think that, yeah, I struggle to even imagine what that would look like, I can't

Charlie Malone:

even imagine what that weight would be like for you. So you're planning to run later for the Taipei City Council? What kind of efforts? Or are you thinking about? And can you name a street after Lu?

Vincent Chao:

Well, we have a lot of streets named after people. So you know, Lou would be definitely somebody we would consider given his contributions to our society. Well, you know, to your point, Charlie, I'm, it's a very much a campaign that's going to be focused up certainly on my perspective, municipal issues. You know, there's Taipei's, our capital, it's a it's a city that's very much aging, not only in terms of its population, it but it is aging, but it's also in terms of its infrastructure, I think we've lost a lot of impetus for change in Taiwan, I'm not saying that as a pop a politician, but I'm saying that if you look at figures and facts, for example, the fact that, you know, over 40% of our buildings are like, over 3040 years old at this point. So, you know, Lou has been here, you know, kind of the city, there's a very much a huge part of the city that's, that's, that's in need of change. And that, you know, it's a need of people with the commodities are reformed. And so I'm, I'm running as part of that, that commitment. But you know, more naturally, it's, it's, it's really democracy. I'm a young person in this political process in Taiwan. And I feel that, you know, any young person in our political process needs to go through this democratic process this this election, are you really able to authenticate whether the things you say makes sense or not, and whether you're able to secure votes and support? I mean, that's the heart of politics is the heart of policies in the US, it's hard to politics in Taiwan, that's what brings our countries together, young people, young Republicans, Democrats, you know, with that one have a future in politics in the US, what do they do? I mean, they join young, they join party chapters, they run for city council or for state legislator or, you know, for the state senate, and then they go on to federal politics. I mean, that's, that's the process for democracies, if you want to bring about change, you can't just talk about it all the time, you got to do it. And so this is, I think, part of my drive as well, which is that, as a young politician, you know, I want to have this process. I think it's important and I think it's important to be able to lay out and articulate a vision for for the city and to be able to receive support. And so, you know, there's still a long way ahead of me and still have a year to go but I'm fully committed to it. It's, it's actually quite tiring. But nevertheless, it's still quite fun. It's an interesting experience.

Louis Celli:

All right, well, we're gonna round back to Louis Celli square later, right. But right now, on on the positive front, this seems to be a growing show support for protecting the sovereignty of Taiwan around the world, and especially in the Asian, Australian and European continents. How does Taiwan feel about this growing global support?

Vincent Chao:

If I could use one word to describe it, it would probably be essential, essential. So we've always felt this, we've always felt at number one, Taiwan is part of this International Community of Democracies, that town is an essential member of it. So that's the first bar. And second of all, we've always felt as part of this community, we're kind of on the frontlines, like, and you can understand how we can feel that way. Right? I mean, how we would feel that way. So, but I think in the past, like other countries, sort of seen Taiwan, as you know, they've been doing their own thing. And there has been, I think, limited participation from countries outside the US. And so we're seeing that change. So we're seeing Japan we're seeing you're you're seeing a studio sort of recognizing very explicitly recognize Taiwan as being part of this global community of democracies. And that's important for us like morally, there's a lot of moral support there. And that, that gives us confidence that we're on the right track. So that's that's responded first part. The second part, the part about Taiwan been on frontlines, I think that is also receiving increasing traction around the world, especially by Japan. Actually, if you look at the statements from senior government officials in Japan, they very much acknowledge kind of talents, Critical Role and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and how we need to support that. And so, you know, I think if you look 1015 20 years ago, in a sense, we were very much alone, I think we had this friend, the United States, and that was very, very important. But but other than that, I think, other countries sort of more or less turn a blind eye to not a blind eye. But you know, in a sense, it wasn't a high priority for the Taiwan Strait. But now that's completely changed. And so I think that starting from the Trump administration, all the way to the Biden administration now, you know, especially under Device administration, we've seen a growing growing effort by folks close to President Biden, that have been working on convincing the Japanese convincing Australia convincing European countries and other democracies around the world about the strategic importance of Taiwan. And I think that has really paid dividends.

Louis Celli:

You know, Vincent, people are making comparisons between Afghanistan and Taiwan. Is that fair? Is that a fair comparison to you?

Vincent Chao:

Well, so I've written an article on this. And I think comparisons isn't the right word, to be honest. Like you just simply can't compare Afghanistan and Taiwan. I mean, I mean, certainly Afghanistan is a humanitarian disaster. All of us know that. But Taiwan, I mean, if, for example, the worst case scenario or to take place would be a strategic disaster. And I think you would be hard pressed to I mean, there'll be people to say that, yes, Afghanistan is a tactical disaster, in certain respects, is there strategic implications as well, but not to the degree where we see in Taiwan, where we see a free, freedom loving, you know, democratic people, if 23 million people be subsumed into China and giving China the confidence it needs to really consume the Pacific. I mean, that just can't it's it's not the case with Afghanistan. And so, so So that's, that's the first part, which is that I think comparisons are really invalid, because you just can't compare Afghanistan and Taiwan. But I think lessons is valid. So there are lessons that can be learned from Afghanistan. And the most critical lesson of that all is that, you know, if we would hope for support from democratic countries, we really got to show that we are 120%, committed to our own self defense, and we have to show that we are capable of winning this conflict. And I think this is what you know, this administration in Taiwan has very much been committed to I mean, we're seeing a huge increase in defense budget, we're seeing, you know, in passing, you know, we couldn't fill our ranks in our military, we there would be like 20% of positions that would just go unfilled at the end of the year. Not right now. I mean, right now, we're seeing a huge commitment from our population to participate in our military. We're seeing growing awareness of the peer PRC, we're seeing a lot of support for so we have our regular military budget, do we also have special military budget. So these military budgets are really kind of one off huge purchases and defense equipment. And so Reis just recently, a couple months ago, this government announced that we do 9 billion US dollars and just like missiles, and this is hugely important. So there's a commitment here in Taiwan. And this commitment, I think, has been reinforced by the lessons from Afghanistan. And you've seen a lot of policymakers here in Taiwan say that say that, you know, we can't be Afghanistan, we have to show that we are 120% capable of defending ourselves, and only through defending ourselves, can we possibly energize other countries to counter defense? And so that's that's that has been probably the most important lesson where,

Charlie Malone:

you know, the the ruling party in the DPP has communicated its support for independence. The response from Beijing has been, let's just say less than positive. What is the thought among the Taiwanese people regarding independence? So I think

Vincent Chao:

our president has a very much a moderate position that is reflective of what the Taiwanese people support, which is that Taiwan formerly called the Republic of China is already an independent country that is independent of the People's Republic. So our national days on October 10, and our president made her remarks focusing on the cross strait relationship that that the PRC is not subordinate to the RLC Republic of China, Taiwan, and the Republic of China, Taiwan is not subordinate to the PRC. And that has to be very, very clear that there is no there is those sub subordinate relationship going on. Between the two sides. We are very much an independent country. That is, you know, committed to our own self defense that is committed to our freedom democracy. So, you know, I think in terms of Taiwan independence, sometimes that phrase is a bit misleading, because it assumes that we're trying to achieve something that isn't here already. But if we look at sort of where our current position is that for Taiwan's history is that we are very much an independent country. And we have been this way for quite some time. And this has been reinforced again and again, through our direct presidential elections. I mean, only Taiwan's 23 point 5 million people have any say in Taiwan's future, only part 23 million people can vote in our elections, only 23 million people can decide on futures. So, you know, it's very hard to argue that Taiwan is not an independent country called the Republic of China right now. And so the Chinese sort of twist that around, they say that, Oh, you're pursuing Taiwanese independence, you know, you're charting a course for war, and all of that, and DVP, or, I mean, they're separate as party that are doing things in violation of the common destiny of the Chinese people. But, you know, they say all of this, but what they don't understand and they fundamentally don't understand is democracy, and that the DPP, rather than push people to do something, you know, as a democracy as a political party, we follow the people. And the people are very, very much committed to this fact that, for example, we are counties. So if you look at polls, you know, a huge majority of people see counties like less than 3% say that they're Chinese. So the vast majority of like, solely Chinese, the vast majority of people in Taiwan say that their top ponies. And if you look at, for example, recent polls on a President's remarks, the huge majority of people say that, you know, it's true, we don't have any sort of subordinate relationship to the PRC. And so what DPP does is or government does reflective of this, you know, and so the, the CCP, they just, they don't understand democracies, and because they don't understand that they can't respect it.

Louis Celli:

So Vincent, what's next for you?

Vincent Chao:

Well, this, this election is all consuming. So we're going to American route. And I don't know if this is good or bad, Lou, but we're going to American route where elections are take a huge amount of time. So I can't believe I'm running for city council. You know, more than a year before this election is due to take place. But I am in this process. So I am committed to running for Taipei City Council, I have a huge a huge writing sort of constituency. So this this writing that I'm running in town was done is very much at the heart of Taipei, we have 560,000 people. So as you can imagine, it's a probably medium sized city in the US. And so there's a lot of there's a lot of work associated with that. You know, there's a there's a lot of events, there's a now counties, politicians, I'll put it this way. It's, it's we're not unlike us politicians, there's a lot of canvassing, there's a lot of handshaking, there's a lot of that. But there's also a lot of things maybe kissing, baby kissing, but there's also a lot that's not part of American politics, for example, how to put it this way, and like in the US, because a lot of those are suburban, right? If you're outside the city, you know, you go from door to door. I've volunteered in political campaigns before you go to door to door and you knock on doors and you hand out literature. Yeah, Taiwan's almost all apartment buildings, you can't go in an apartment building. I mean, no one's gonna let you in the door is not gonna let you and so many of the engagements have to take place on public sphere. So for example, you would go to weddings, you would go to the morgue, you would go to many, you know, you'd go to anywhere where people congregate. And that's very much a hallmark of Tallinn politics. And you know, it's there's no right or wrong to it. It's just a unique part of Taiwan's culture.

Louis Celli:

I'm going to leave the more comment alone. Football fits, thank you so much for for helping our listeners understand what's happening with Taiwan. I, hey, best of luck with your campaign. And when you win, maybe you can come back and let us know how successful you've been with your campaign initiatives.

Vincent Chao:

Thank you. Thank you, Charlie. It's a pleasure to be on. You know, again, I think what you guys are doing in terms of sharing with the veteran community policy initiatives. I think that's awesome. I hope you guys keep up the good work, keep fighting the good fight, and I do look forward to seeing you guys in DC sometime in the future. Well, it

Charlie Malone:

was great to have you here. Thank you.

Louis Celli:

And that's it for today. That's all the time we have. Join us next week we're going to have Professor Russell foster with us. He's the head of the new field laboratory for ophthalmology and sleep circadian Neuroscience Institute. The smart guys out of Oxford University. He's going to talk about some research that's going to be helping veterans. See you next week.

Charlie Malone:

Thanks for listening to the policy bets podcasts. For more information about projects and other podcasts go to policy vets.org