GFF Podcast

The Global Outlook on Tariffs, Trade and Reserve Currencies in 2026

• Clearstream • Season 5 • Episode 6

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In our Christmas special, we are joined by Charles Lichfield, Deputy Director of the Geoeconomics Center at the Atlantic Council, to discuss the major economic events and geopolitical shifts of 2025, and what we should expect next year. Charles will be the opening keynote speaker at our 2026 GFF Summit  and will also co-host the Central Bank and Sovereign Wealth Summit alongside our podcast hosts Andrew Keith Walker and Christian Rossler. We are talking about reserve currencies, China, U.S.-EU relations and the major news stories of 2025. Don't miss it!

SPEAKER_00:

Hello and welcome back to the GFF podcast. And yes, you can hear the sounds of our familiar Christmas jazz playing gently in the background because it is our December show. And whether or not you're celebrating Christmas this year or getting some holiday season or perhaps spending Christmas in the office with a sandwich and a sad mini bottle of Prosecco. We've all done that once or twice, especially in the finance industry. We will be thinking of you. And uh we want to bring you uh some festive cheer. Sadly, of course, that may not be coming because we have with us our very special guest, Mr. Charles Litchfield, who's the deputy director and C. Boyden Gray Senior Fellow from the Atlantic Council's Geoeconomic Center. And uh, Charles, we're delighted to have you. But will it be good news and festive cheer? That is going to be the question. Uh, so we're going to be asking Charles all about that. And also, Charles will be joining us this year at the Sovereign Wealth Fund and Central Bank Forum, uh, where he is going to be co-hosting and chairing a number of panels. Of course, none of this can come together uh without the sage-like expert advisor, the man who's organized it uh and is organizing our 30th anniversary uh uh forum as well. And that is, of course, my co-host, Mr. Christian Rossler. Christian, welcome back.

SPEAKER_02:

Hey, I'm happy to be back, Andrew, and uh happy to have Charles uh in the studio today. And yes, you're right, we are uh in the run-up to the 30th anniversary of the GFF Summit, which is you know, um, there's a couple of anniversaries here. We don't want to talk too much about um some of them, but uh it's uh it's definitely uh a milestone that we've reached here at um at the ClearStream GFF Summit. So the market meets for the last 30 years at the GFF Summit. This is why also the overarching team of the uh GFF Summit and the Central Bank Forum is uh where the market meets. And yes, uh both Charles and you have uh kindly accepted uh my um invitation to co-host the event, and you will both be handling a couple of um keynote conversations as well as as we're going to talk in this show, I guess, about some of the panels that are coming up.

SPEAKER_00:

Yes, that is right, Christian. So we're gonna cover all of that off. First of all, we should give a proper welcome to Charles Litchfield. Charles, you will of course know from our previous shows, uh, he's uh worked in this industry for a long time. He has uh been an analyst at the Eurasia Group. He's led coverage on France, Germany, Brexit, European security, trade, and energy policies, as well as neighborhood and social policy. Uh, you'll have seen Charles on Bloomberg, BBC. Uh you almost certainly have heard him on the Today program once or twice. Uh writing in the Financial Times, Le Figaro, the Bilt Zeitung. Uh Charles, you're here. You're back. Oh, James Bond of GFF. Uh thank you for joining us. This is very exciting stuff. Charles, are you having a good time over there in Washington? Are you busy, I'm guessing?

SPEAKER_01:

I still am. Uh thank you, Chris, uh, Christian and Andrew, for having me on. Uh it's yeah, never a dull moment in DC in 2025. Um it's been interesting, sometimes a little bit confusing. Um, but we at the Geoeconomic Center still feel useful. Um I don't think it was a given uh that we would manage to both um stay true to ourselves and um comment on policies as we saw them, but also manage to have the Trump administration uh speak at our center, which was the case uh just last week, um, when USTR Jameson Greer um came to uh the Atlantic Council to speak on the tariff policy and some of the things that might happen if the um legal underpinnings for the current tariffs are struck down by the Supreme Court. Um he didn't obviously give us a full backup plan, um, but it's been quite a year uh and we expect 2026 to be just as dynamic.

SPEAKER_00:

Well, that's a great place for us to kick off, because when we spoke uh earlier in the year, we did, of course, talk about tariffs and trade coercion, as it's sometimes called, and how these were once occasionally used tools and they're kind of now mainstream policy. So let's start there. Um has tariff escalation moved to a sort of baseline norm now for international relations? Um, and what near-term uh events can we expect? What would we flag as the sort of the next step in the new tariff-based world order?

SPEAKER_01:

Well, certainly from the US um perspective, and this is uh probably a problem that most people living in Washington have, they see it everything through the prism of what the US is doing. But there's been a huge shift in how the US engages with the world. The US used to use uh the rule book that uh it itself had created as part of the Bretton Woods institutions in which you have uh a per product tariff. A country can set currently go up tariffs per product and they can derogate them from them if they do specific deals. Um usually when you derogate from them, you go down, not up. Uh in this case, uh the US now has a per country tariff that it can dial up on down, um, including when it's unhappy with uh what the country is doing on completely different matters. So it can be to do with matters that have nothing to do with trade. Um, they can be used as a stick, they can be used as a reward. Um, this is a completely new way of doing things. Um but I think it's important not to exaggerate uh what effect this is having on other countries' behavior. Um most other countries are still trying to um follow the uh so-called WTO rules, which means that you have a per product tariff, you derogate from it if you do a free trade agreement. Um so the US has uh moved away from the system that it itself had created in some way. I don't want to minimize how important that is. But then everyone else is sort of still pretending to exist under the old system unless they have a real problem. Um so the China problem is what I'm hinting at. Um when dealing with China and Chinese overcapacity, you have countries taking unilateral measures, and I think we're going to see more and more of that. You asked for um a signpost. Um again, I'm falling into the trap of looking at everything through the prism of what the U.S. is doing, but I think the most immediate one will be the Supreme Court uh ruling that will come probably in January, uh where it seems pretty likely at this point that they will strike down um the use of AIPA, uh the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, as a basis to um uh impose tariffs. Um AIPA doesn't mention the word tariffs once, so that's one of the reasons why they uh will probably strike it down. I think another important point for those who haven't been following too closely is that they think um w whether or not you um think the tariffs are justified, they think that using the w an emergency to justify such a shift without going through Congress would give power to a Democratic administration in the future to do similar things on the climate. So even Republican-leaning judges will probably take the risk uh of exposing themselves to the wrath of the Trump administration. So that's a really big signpost. And then everything else moves much more slowly, but we are seeing some really fundamental shifts. How other countries who don't want to go the same way as the US but have a fundamental problem with Chinese overcapacity and cheap Chinese goods uh flowing into their markets, how do they react? How do they engage with China? Uh could there be a win-win solution? Um I think economists and um uh people who uh do things by the textbook would be able to say, well, China needs to change the structure of its economy and uh engage in more social spending and put boost consumer spending. Europe needs to rein in its c its its uh social model. There are win-win approaches, but I just don't think the political um situation, the geopolitical situation in the world allows for these grand bargains to be made. So I think all of those difficulties will be quite exposed next year. Um the US will have the G20, France will have the G7. They want both want to make Chinese overcapacity uh one of their big um issues of focus. But I don't think there's geopolitical room for a deal, unfortunately.

SPEAKER_00:

And this this kind of leads us on, doesn't it, to the the story that's been in the press uh recently about uh there was a policy document uh uh released uh in the States which sort of redrew the relationship between uh the US and Europe uh somewhat in terms of its outlook on uh security, mutual defense, NATO, those long-standing institutions. Um I mean, looking at the relationship between the US and the EU, often it's it what maybe is reported being said by uh the president in the US and by policymakers in the EU doesn't always translate, does it, into significant change? There's still a lot of cooperation and institutional uh relationship. So, you know, looking behind the headlines, is the US becoming institutionally hostile to the EU? Is there tension there? Uh, or is there still a lot of pragmatic engagement uh with Europe when it comes to things like trade, stability, cooperation around uh international affairs?

SPEAKER_01:

I think it sounds like you're a little bit more confident that things will um remain collaborative than I am. Um I think the National Security Strategy document um doesn't necessarily mean um that it's the end to collaboration. And there are a lot of things that aren't mentioned, um especially in the military sphere, which um people feel reasonably confident about. Uh Trump during this term has seemed more committed to uh the NATO um promises the U.S. makes. Um he's seemed more committed uh when answered direct questions on whether he'd defend a Baltic state if it were to be invaded, he's just said yes. Um and uh the same week as the ASS, there was an appropriation document published from the Pentagon which showed that the U.S. um commitment to Europe um is still pretty strong. You will have some fewer troops, which I think is natural in um so many years after the settlement of both the uh Second World War and the Cold War. Um but uh the uh presence of the US in Europe, I don't think, will be um uh severely undermined. The problem, I think, is that that merely covers the military aspect. And then there are all the other aspects to do with how the EU goes about regulation, and then a general sort of zeitgeist statement on the direction of travel in Europe, which this administration doesn't like. It doesn't feel shy about expressing its dislike, and it doesn't feel shy about um justifying interventions when necessary into domestic European affairs. And that really is new. Uh and we'll have to wait and see what exactly this is used to justify that. The official document, the effectual, the official statement on the direction set by the US and what its different agencies should do. And you're already seeing different um parts of the US government commenting, for instance, on EU regulation on um tech, uh, but you can see it in other areas too. They just have a problem with the EU going about its own business and regulating um firms, especially when they're US firms, and they will be quite aggressive in supporting forces within the EU that don't support this and that support the US and support this Trump administration. This is very new.

SPEAKER_00:

Okay, okay, good. Well, I was looking for some uh good news there, but it sounds like it's more Schwarzer Peter than Chriskint uh at the minute. Uh okay, let's move on. Uh, can it get better with the UK? Is the UK still that sort of trade bridge between the EU and the US? Are we still, you know, leveraging that special relationship uh effectively with the new Labour government? Uh, Keir Starmer and Donald Trump seem to be uh on very friendly terms when you see them together. Um is the the UK still i in a strong position outside Europe, between Europe and America?

SPEAKER_01:

It's surprising that uh President Trump and Sir Keir Starmer get on so well. Uh they don't have much in common in their backgrounds, at least. Um one property dealer speaking to a former human rights lawyer. Um it is surprising they got on so well. I think the seer and the s I think the Sir in front of Keir Starmer's name is helpful. Um Donald Trump likes the POMP and uh the UK inviting him on a state visit very quickly and making sure he understood that he was the first and only president or only person so far to have been invited on a second state visit. Uh I think that um definitely pulled at his hard strings, which is good. Um the UK is proud of the fact it got a slightly better trade deal from a tariff perspective, although if you look at the detail, in some cases the EU has it slightly better because the 15% adds to is added on to nothing, whereas the 10% that the UK got sometimes adds on to the previously existing tariff the US had. And so in some sectors the UK is uh is less well off the than the EU in its deal. Still, this has been sold as one of the first um Brexit benefits in international trade. Um but I mean, if you a few months ago you might have um been surprised if I told you that the U.S. was going to impose any sort of blanket tariff, even on the UK. So I think the point is that allies are not really being treated as allies. Uminally they still are. And I was as I was saying, the U.S. is still committed to defending Europe in a crisis. Um but there really is um not much difference in how countries are being treated, uh, even if the alliance is long-standing. And I think that goes for the UK as well. The other point I'd make is that whether or not Donald Trump has a personal positive relationship with Keir Starmer, most elements in his uh administration um regard the UK with some suspicion. Um, they don't like various institutions the UK has, and this spans from the UK's uh justice institutions all the way to its um state broadcaster. And so you have the US um administration jumping on various bandwagons in UK public opinion and trying to push UK public opinion in a certain direction, um, which wasn't really the case before. Um so the final question is whether the UK can still serve as a bridge for trade. Um I think there's a broader question on on which direction the UK goes it. Does the UK want to repair its relationship with the EU and um improve on the suboptimal Brexit deal? I think that actually remains um where there is the most low-hanging fruit from an economic growth perspective, and this really is a priority for the Labour administration, for the Labour government, um, pushing growth so that people feel a sort of sense of uplift, which they haven't yet under the Starmer government. Um and then on the US, I think it's um a case of damage limitation.

unknown:

Good.

SPEAKER_00:

Now I should say at this point, full disclaimer, I I I have actually reported for the BBC a little bit myself uh back in the day, back in 2010. And I'm gonna say now, Charles, I will not be editing that to make it sound like you said something completely different. Uh moving on, Christian. Um what have we got on the uh table at the Sovereign Wealth Fund that's gonna be a burning issue for some geoeconomic analysis?

SPEAKER_02:

Yes, thank you, uh Andrew. Um I mean, obviously, talking about the central bank form, we're talking about central banks, and so we will kick off with uh keynote conversation that Charles uh will be having with uh Imen Ramuni Rousseau, who is the general director of the market operations at ECB. So they're going to discuss obviously the euro. This is um the European Central Bank, but then um Charles will also be um talking with a couple of uh distinguished guests on the panel about reserve currencies. And I think what you just touched upon is also I think impacting the uh world of reserve currencies because if the US administration is doing one thing, it is trying to support a strong dollar, and so the dollar dominance is a topic that uh is definitely um something that uh has been uh also discussed uh in the day-to-day business at ClearStream. I think when we went to the IMF uh four meetings, we saw that there's there's a lot of voices that say that there's a de-dollarization uh underway, so that some central banks have moved out have moved out of of dollar assets, which uh sometimes maybe is linked to to sanctions. But I would like to to maybe ask Charles what he sees uh coming up in 2026. Uh given that you know um Europe is looking at uh a digital euro, but the the US is looking at uh stable coins which are dollar backed. So where is the where's the road uh going to lead us in 2026 when we talk about uh the dollar and the and the euro?

SPEAKER_01:

Broad question. Um so um I know that your question is about next year, just one or two points on the year we've just been through. Um yes, the dollar is now weaker than it was when we uh met in um Luxembourg last January. The factors behind that are manifold. Um there's been rumors about um allocation changes by various sovereigns, uh both sovereign wealth funds and and central banks. Time will tell. Uh, we don't have all the data, but it's important also to um remind listeners, viewers, that one of the main factors behind the dollar's depreciation is just a less good outlook for US GDP. Um so that's one of the main reasons that explains the behavior and people uh moving out of the dollar. It's not necessarily just different driven by geopolitics, although that's a factor. Let's always remember that the GDP outlook is one of the main um explainers. And it's certainly not interest rates because they're um coming down very slowly in the US. Um what we should expect in 2026, are stable coins going to win or is a more sort of central bank-backed approach uh going to win in Europe? Um the US has many advantages, um, simply because of the attractiveness of the dollar still and the richness, the rich tapestry of the uh financial or the fintech ecosystem, although I think the EU is probably an honorable second, um, or Europe in general is an honorable second and all of that. Um of the funny reasons why we're moving along with we're moving ahead with stable coins in the US is that you cannot talk about central bank digital currencies anymore in Washington. They've been banned by the Genius Act. Um, and I suppose the irony of this is that the technology is sort of similar between stable coins that are provided by provided institu private institutions and a digital euro, which is um figure which is going to be built by the by the ECB. So it's backed by a central bank, but it's in fact quite similar. It's it's digital cash. Um I can't really say who's going to win. I think the US has certain advantages here. Um but in a way, um I think there's some jealousy, even in the US, of the fact that there's a Collaborative approach on the European side because uh central bank digital currencies haven't become as controversial. Um, so that I've I although the US has certain advantages, I would um tell your listeners that there is some jealousy in FinTech and payment circles that there is a collaborative approach in Europe and that there is a central bank that is able to innovate, whereas domestic legislation hamperings the Fed a little bit. Um so that's one point um that may make some listeners a little bit more optimistic.

SPEAKER_02:

You know, we are talking about the dollar. I mean, we have to talk about the Federal Reserve Bank. Um, it's it's clear that uh there again also the technical facilities that the Fed has in place, the so-called swap lines between the central banks are uh a land of last resort, and that they have been always technical facilities. But is there a risk that these are now turned into political pressure tools?

SPEAKER_01:

Uh the risk is there, absolutely, and the whole um question of whether the Fed can remain independent is a key one for 2026 because uh Governor Powell's uh r successor will be appointed. And exactly how this successor is appointed and the comments that will be made by that successor early on, even before he or she takes office about how they're going to work with um the White House, I think these will be watched extremely closely by markets. Um my sense is that the Trump administration knows that this is one thing it can't play fast and loose with. Um, and you've seen Trump pulling back on some of the aggressive rhetoric on the Fed because the markets didn't like it too much. Uh, but the risk is always there. And then your question was about whether um swap lines will be used as a tool for political pressure. I think that's possible. It's suddenly becoming more politicized, but the one example we have from 2025 is one where uh swap lines were used as a sort of reward rather than as a means of um putting pressure on a country. When the swap lines were extended to Argentina, this was a means uh of helping uh someone they regard as a sort of political and ideological ally, uh President Millet. And it was actually quite helpful. Um he was going through um some political turmoil. It didn't seem likely that he would have a majority in the Argentinian parliament, and therefore some of the reforms that he'd started would uh not be able to be completed or be reversed. Um and so the markets were starting to take a little bit more interest uh than they had been previously for the previous months in um Argentinian debt. Uh and the swap line was actually very helpful at that particular point. And then he did actually do better in the elections than uh was predicted. Um so this is the first example, I think, recently, of a swap line being used as a reward. Um, and withdrawing swap lines as a punishment seems very much within um the framework of how the Trump administration works. Um so that's something to be a little bit more concerned about.

SPEAKER_02:

So so if we talk then about um China, I mean, in that um uh perspective, I mean, when we talk about uh, you know, alternative payment systems, you know that um you have your CBDC track at the geoeconomic center and uh, you know, Embridge, which is uh a cross-border um central bank digital currency proof of concept between, you know, uh China, Hong Kong, but also some states in the Gulf. Um how is that blending in with what you just said?

SPEAKER_01:

So I was happy to mention Embridge in my presentation last January, and I'll be updating um people who come to Luxembourg in in late January 26 uh on what we're seeing. Um not to um tantalize people and not put everything in this podcast, but I th there are some points that I'll I'll wait till January to make. Um I think we're we're sort of seeing proof of what what some of the things I dangled last January in that Embridge, um, in terms of uh how much it's being used in volumes is is not at all um a dominant factor. But that is using it as a lagging indicator. That's just saying, well, so much, so many billions, this minimal amount of billions of business has been done on Embridge and it's not important, it's not systemic yet. But that but treating it as a lagging indicator is a mistake. Um if you think about it as a leading indicator of what's to come and the fact that the technology enables certain things already, um, I think it's really quite interesting. Embridge can be used for transactions between uh Saudi and China to buy Saudi oil. The transaction can be done in Renminbi, and all of the technology is completely independent from the purview of US or EU sanctions authorities. Uh I think that's the really important point. And we should see um we we should expect to see Embridge and the use of Embridge grow quite fast. Now I'm not saying that um this transaction was in any way worthy of being sanctioned. Um China doesn't face um that many EU or US sanctions except for um its dealings with Russia and Saudi the same, or not at all. Um but the availability of that option and the fact it's now seen as load-bearing, capable of dealing with large transactions, I think is a very big change.

SPEAKER_02:

Well, I mean uh given that uh we have um talked about um you know the US a lot and um and also the US-Europe relationships and uh the fact that um you know we are in a world where um you know we are uh moving towards um weaponization of uh of some of the uh currencies as well. Is there a a threat that um the US can no longer use the dollar uh to weaponize it against China?

SPEAKER_01:

I think the dollar is really starting from an extremely high base. And uh while we've seen many things choose, it's change fast, and Embridge I think is a really key leading indicator. Uh we'd be foolish to to ignore it. Um access to the dollar, dollar financing, the fact that many countries or most that do business with China still want to be paid in dollars. Um the fact that China itself needs to have access to dollars to um keep up with some of its own financial liabilities. It just means the dollar is starting from an extremely high base, and therefore that's one of the key parts of US leverage over China. Um but it can't this is I'm speaking about the US, it can't use it in a profligate way. Um, we've seen with with Russia, which is a much weaker economy than than China. Um, there are certain things you can only do once, once um one-shot actions, if you're talking from a sort of game theory perspective, um, which do a little bit of damage, but in some way they backfire if they don't do the anticipated damage on time. So um a famous case in February 2022 when G7 uh allies uh decided to sanction Russia and immobilize its central bank assets. We that's been done, and we're now facing a very complicated debate almost four years later on what exactly the fate of those assets will be. Don't need to go into that debate. But the problem is that that was initially done um to uh generate some sort of financial crisis within Russia, a run on banks which may have given the Kremlin pause. It may have been worth a try, given what Russia had just done, um, but it didn't actually produce the desired effect. And we are now still here wondering and scratching our heads on what to do. And uh doing such um a thing to China or even something a bit softer, uh, like cutting off their banks' access to financing or or um refinancing in dollar markets, um that would generate a lot of unintended consequences, to put it mildly. Um so I think that this is how we need to think about it. There's a lot of leverage that the West still has over China, but a lot of it is sort of one-shot in inverted commerce, and will it really produce the desired effect?

SPEAKER_00:

And what about in terms of regulatory regimes? We're we're already seeing some divergence between the UK and the EU on sort of large uh regulatory frameworks like uh Amir and uh MiFID and MIFI. Um what about more broadly? Are we seeing regulatory authorities and uh domains of regulatory uh uh control um encountering friction against one another? There was the big CFTC rewrite in January. That had implications obviously for market participants uh across the world who are trading uh across different zones. We've seen changes in Australia and in Asia, uh um in Japan uh changes to uh supervisory oversight and regulations are similar in in the same vein as a mere, sort of really looking at derivatives trading, but obviously having impacts on securities finance. Um do you see there's a different direction of travel uh between the EU, the US, uh Asia Pacific Group, the Middle East, uh, when it comes to regulatory oversight? Is that going to become more friction for market participants?

SPEAKER_01:

I hope not. I think it's important to remember um some of the lessons from um recent years. I think a little bit of uh competition and uh seeking business by uh updating the regulatory framework and making it that bit more efficient um should be part of the toolkit. Um yes, now these are sort of um confronted with the tougher geopolitical questions, but I think we should be able to separate these and and simply see updates to regulation as as just that updates making things more efficient and uh competing on the margins just to attract a little bit more business. I personally don't see anything wrong with that, but um maybe you do.

SPEAKER_00:

No, I mean ESMA's recent uh obviously call for evidence uh to look at how do we simplify and change the the cost of regulation for market participants uh within the EU. That's quite an interesting one, isn't it? Because it seems to be kind of following suit with uh some of the comments that were made uh before uh the the uh President Trump was elected about changing uh the the sort of the drag and the the friction on uh the US domestic market. Uh and I'm wondering if you know the direction of travel is towards clearing, but also lighting uh lightening regulatory loads. Can we expect to see more clearing as well in the US uh going along uh with uh a rollback of regulation?

SPEAKER_01:

That's certainly part of the Trump administration's agenda for 2026. 2025 was about tax and uh international trade and replacing some of the tax burden with a tariff um um income, um, which has been substantial, perhaps more substantial than we would have predicted last January, but is sent to Peter Ed because um supply chains reorganize themselves uh and uh there are more and more exemptions also being brought in for different sectors. So the income will start getting higher on a month uh go lower on a month-to-month basis in 2026. Um and so what do you need to do to keep um growth going and keep a sort of sense that the Trump administration is um helping the U.S. economy grow? So the next big um workshop is on deregulation and financial deregulation is one of those uh pillars, absolutely.

SPEAKER_00:

So a deregulated future coming. That could be a Father Christmas moment uh for some of our listeners. Uh yeah, it could be good news. There's something coming down the chimney, it's a suitcase full of Euros. Um it's not. I'm sorry. If you're listening, Esma, uh, I do apologize. Just a little joke for you there. Um, so uh moving on, it is crystal ball time, I think, uh for us to look ahead. And we're gonna have a slightly, a slightly loaded crystal ball question here uh for Christian. I'm gonna start with, because you know what's coming in 2026 because you're organizing part of the event. So tell us, what can we expect at the GFF's 30th anniversary and at the anniversary, of course, for the uh Central Bank and Sovereign Wealth Fund Forum. Um, what have we got coming up in 2026? What are you going to predict? Uh, he said, knowing you've actually got it all written on a sheet in front of you.

SPEAKER_02:

Well, I think what what we already uh mentioned in the beginning is that uh we're celebrating 30 years, so where the market uh meets since 30 years, we look back back at uh you know the milestones over those 30 years, which products we have uh been um bringing to the market, not mentioning you know the GC pooling, which is um becoming a benchmark in the overnight money market. Uh they had the global financial crisis in 2007 when uh the banks didn't trust each other anymore in the overnight money markets, and they moved into you know centrally cleared uh triparty repo baskets, which uh which is the the GC pooling that we launched in in 2005. Prior to the crisis, actually, then we had um all of those um links to those uh domestic markets where we sever off collateral management from collateral locations. So and we've just announced uh in uh early December that we have uh signed a memorandum of understanding with the ADA group in in Saudi Arabia, which is uh very thrilling and interesting. So we are moving uh into um uh geographic expansion. We have uh, as you know, already had um uh you know collateral management, uh white labeling agreements in place with Australia, South Africa, Brazil. We do the um partnership with TMX and Canada since more than a year, and now uh we're expanding into the Middle East, which shows also we're trying to um maybe we try to go with the flow. I mean, if you blend in with the vision of 2030 of Saudi Arabia, they are gearing up for uh you know not only um digital economy, but uh um there is um you know this aspect, and then obviously there is the the aspect of um you know Europe. We have uh two um keynote guests that really are um from key uh European institutions, uh Imen, Ramon Irousau, who is the general director of money market operations. She will talk about you know the future of the money markets and the bond markets, and then you have the pleasure, Andrew, to interview uh Carlin Anevians, who is the CFO of the European Stability Mechanism. So is it a European moment? I think that's that's the question that we're trying to address as well at the Central Bank and Sovereign Wild Fund Forum. I think everybody has um his eyes uh also on Europe to see how are we going to come out of this uh new world order, which Charles has just uh described and which is still a moving target. We don't know where the US administration is going to um put the pressure point in 2026, although Charles has given us some uh hints. Uh but um I mean we're all waiting for signals, and so I'm I'm not uh the only one who has here, you know, um the crystal ball uh wisdom.

SPEAKER_00:

Indeed. And on that front, Charles, uh a crystal ball moment for you. I mean, we've got some great predictions already, so you know I don't want to push your your crystal ball uh too hard, but uh uh tell us, I mean, uh what can we expect? Is it gonna be a European moment 2026?

SPEAKER_01:

In April uh of 2025, when the phone boards of Liberation Day were presented and there were um there were jitters in US markets and in the bond market, um, there was a little bit of um wishful thinking, maybe even hubris in Europe, driven by the fact that investors were looking for an alternative to dollar, and this pushed yields down in um uh European sovereign debt. Um, and this m was even sold as a moment when Europe could start issuing um jointly uh for um goals other than um the COVID pandemic. So there was a sort of moment of flurry of excitement, which I sense uh less of now, if I'm honest. Um there are still a lot of things that need to be uh done in Europe, sorted out. Um some countries still have very high debt burdens, and uh this causes mistrust coming from the uh less indebted countries. So this is a very old debate. Everyone knows this, but I think that's still there and limiting um how fast Europe can progress. Um then on the other end, on the other side, uh on the other hand, there are things that are happening on in European defense um that I don't think were would have been seen as possible only a few years ago. And this has been jolted by uh comments from the Trump administration and also the the very real threat that Russia poses. Um I don't want to be entirely pessimistic and gloomy, and hopefully I'll have some more optimistic things to say by January. I'm seeing things that are happening sort of behind the scenes, sort of in the classified uh domain, that really do um screen collaboration moving forward, and maybe even uh this will spill over in a funny way into the capital markets because as these projects become more successful and more promising, you need to fund them and fund them in a joint cross-border way. And so I think we may see some progress there. But in a way, the def the imperative to defend Europe and um stand for Europe to stand on its own two feet is sort of the backdoor entrance into conversations on um new uh joint debt issuance, obviously in a reasonable and measured way. But that's uh how hopefully how we get there.

SPEAKER_00:

Okay, thank you. Um sadly that is it. We've come to the end of the show. We're gonna have to draw it to a close. Uh but don't worry, if you want uh more of Charles, uh who's gonna go in more depth on all these topics, uh you can hear him speak as keynote speaker at the GFF Summit. He's uh keynote speaker on day one, kicking everything off. And the day before that, he's at the Central Bank and Sovereign Wealth Fund Forum with Christian and myself, where he will be uh hosting a panel and interviewing uh various important people from around the world, um, NCB and such, all very exciting. Do uh make sure you come along to that and don't miss out. In the meantime, I guess all that remains is for us to uh say thank you and a very Merry Christmas to you, Charles. And can we get a Merry Christmas for everyone from the Atlantic Council?

SPEAKER_01:

Uh so happy holidays or Merry Christmas, depending on who celebrates. And very much looking forward to seeing everyone in January.

SPEAKER_00:

Great. And uh Christian, uh I guess that's it for us too. Uh do you have a uh shine kristag for uh the good people listening to the show?

SPEAKER_02:

I mean, Merry Christmas and and happy uh holiday season as well from uh from my end and uh looking forward to meet everybody in person in January here in Luxembourg uh for the 30th anniversary of the of the GFF Summit.

SPEAKER_00:

And of course, don't forget to join us on our LinkedIn page. That's LinkedIn.com slash company slash clear stream, where you can find out all about uh the work that Charles has been doing at the Atlantic Council and his various publications and so on. You can network with him and with Christian and with me and with everyone else who's been on the show this year in 2025. And for me, Andrew Keith Walker, and everyone here in the virtual studio. Uh I'd like to wish you a very happy Christmas, uh, a good, restful holiday season. And if you work in the world of uh securities, finance, regulatory reporting, and find yourself in the office this Christmas, you know what? Sneak yourself another Ferrero Roche. No one's going to notice. Okay, have a lovely Christmas break. A happy 2026, and we'll be back in January with live highlights of the GFF Summit and more besides. Until then from all of us, bye-bye.