Inside Japan’s Evolving Legal Culture

John is joined by Hidetaka Mihara, Senior Counsel at Tokyo International Law Office.  They discuss three major legal developments in Japan: (1) the criminal and civil litigation arising from the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, (2) the rise of shareholder activism, and (3) Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel.

On March 11, 2011, a massive earthquake and ensuing tsunami triggered the Fukushima nuclear disaster.  Executives at the company that ran the nuclear power plant had been warned of tsunami risks years before the event, but did not report the risk to the government until days before the earthquake.  The trial court found the executives not guilty of criminal negligence reasoning that tsunamis of this size were so rare and the cost of addressing the risk, cutting off electricity to the region while repairs were made, was so high that the company’s delayed report did not amount to negligence.  Related civil claims against the government and management were also dismissed, with courts holding that neither breached their obligations under Japanese law.  Despite some public criticism, most Japanese have moved on from the tragedy, focusing on rebuilding rather than retribution.

The recent rise of shareholder activism in Japan is a notable shift in a culture traditionally averse to corporate confrontation.  This rise follows reforms in Tokyo Stock Exchange rules, greater emphasis on corporate governance, and changes in ownership thresholds that empower minority shareholders to propose changes.  One example is the Seven & i Holdings case, in which activists pushed for a corporate restructuring.  While their proposal failed, their recommendations for improving the company were eventually adopted by management.  Although shareholder litigation remains rare in Japan, shareholder proposals and negotiations have become increasingly effective, aided by the gradual unwinding of entrenched cross-shareholding relationships.

Finally, Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel which has been politically controversial in the U.S., is widely seen in Japan as a strategic and mutually beneficial partnership.  Japan views the acquisition as a way to strengthen both nations’ competitiveness against Chinese and Indian steelmakers.  Ultimately, the U.S. government approved the acquisition based, in part, on obtaining “golden share” rights, including the right to block certain potential managerial changes at the company.  

The conversation reflects how Japan’s legal and corporate culture is gradually adapting to global norms while maintaining its distinct approach to risk, accountability, and trust.

Podcast Link: Law-disrupted.fm
Host: John B. Quinn
Producer: Alexis Hyde
Music and Editing by: Alexander Rossi

Transcript

Note: This transcript is generated from a recorded conversation and may contain errors or omissions. It has been edited for clarity but may not fully capture the original intent or context. For accurate interpretation, please refer to the original audio. 

JOHN QUINN: This is John Quinn and this is Law, disrupted and today Law, disrupted moves to Tokyo, Japan. And we are speaking with a very distinguished law practitioner in Tokyo, Hidetaka Mihara, who is Senior counsel with the Tokyo International Law Firm. Thanks very much for joining us today. 

We're going to be talking about three subjects, which have been in the news a lot, lately in the legal world. And also for that matter, in the general news in Japan and elsewhere, we're gonna be talking about some decisions relating to,  a company called Tepco,  criminal liability relating to the,  Relating to the tsunamis, the out fallout from the tsunamis, an important decision coming from the Supreme Court of Japan.

We'll be talking about what the development of shareholder activism in the business and legal world in Tokyo, and maybe a little bit about whether the legal culture is changing at all in Japan, whether we're seeing more of a, you know, of course the, in the Japanese business world, famously Japanese businesses and professionals are less eager to litigate and engage in disputes then. Perhaps people in other cultures around the world. We'll talk a little bit about whether that is changing. And then finally we're gonna talk about Nippon Steel,  the long running issue over Nippon Steel's acquisition of US Steel,  which now seems to have been resolved, which has been the news a lot.

Let's begin by talking about the TEPCO decisions. And first, can you tell us what the background is to this? What? What is TEPCO all about? 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Thank you for introducing myself to the audience here. I'm very pleased to be a part of the podcast of Quinn, that is a prestigious podcast.

I'm always enjoying seeing them and then learning about them, and that is good for the audience and client as well as in the legal industry as a whole. That very good contribution. I think you very much, that's why I agree with John to have a little bit of contribution, try to be here. And then the first question, is that the background of Tepco?

Yes. Was the coast on March 11 of 2011, about 13, 14 years ago. And then that was the big earthquake that hit the north part of Japan. The northeast part is the,  near the coastline facing the Pacific, [00:03:00]  Pacific Ocean. And that was,  almost,  more than a hundred years of the old history, similarly,  hit it at that time. But, no one expected that a big wave would come based on the earthquake. Yeah. But that, that, that happened actually. And then, in Fukushima, those places are on the coastline. There are several nuclear pipelines installed there. And Tepco Tokyo Electric Power Company, Tepco installed it based on the subsidy from the Japanese government.

And they expected to have that on the more than 10 meters above sea level they installed on the coastline, right? That was on the coastline, because the sea water had cooled down. That nuclear power, 

JOHN QUINN: the power plants. Yes. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Yes. But that is,  generated by the, another, you know,  electricity by pumping the water coming up and down.

But, the earthquake was about 14 or 15 meters above sea level.

People lost or died or missing time. Then,  several cease to have operation because of the, have no power because of the seawater coming up. Then that hitting up, up that problem. That's why.  There were, there were some legal, you know, [00:05:00] requirements that periodically that, you know, problems should be tested by third party investigators or reports, or I think academics, something.

Some of the academic reports say that there's a possibility of a tsunami. More than 10 meters of height, that may be over the near, near plant there. But the question really was two things. One, that prediction or academic report is reliable to make a further investment on that report is make article Japan of government that reports, report. Several reports were there. The last report was given to Tepco two years, more or less before the work happened. Discussed internally whether this makes the government about two more decided tsunami covering a nuclear power plant. That happened four days before the actual tsunami happened. Seven of March, four days before. So they did make, they did make a, they did make a report. Yes. They did make a report. But four days, that's, that's not enough to cover and to, to have a, a protection.

Then that happened on March fifth of this year, court decided on a criminal case of former CEO, vice President of whether they're subject, criminal of,  a negligence to make a report, and then the court ruled there's such a report made, but that's not enough to make them close to install the protection or another set of investments or stop the operation based on the report. That's not so reliable. That's the decision of one judge.

In Japan's system, court judges each can make their own, you know, opinion in the court ruling. That's a possibility. 

JOHN QUINN: Yeah, of course. That's true in the US as well. US Supreme Court. Right. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Okay. That's, that's, that's the thing. Yes. Yeah. One judge said, but because that report was made four days before the actual tsunami happened, they should have made that report earlier, not to wait for two, two years.

No. Then there's a possibility. Some, some,  think,  additional measures could be taken. That's a possibility. Uhh that matter should also be discussed in the,  in terms of the,  criminal case because they delayed, that's kind of a failure. Yeah. To comply with a reporting requirement. But they waited for two years.

But actually four days before the actual Tsunami, they made a report they should have been done earlier that kind of discussion, but provided that the criminal case did not focus on that matter of delay or failure of report, that's why. Two Vice are non guilty. That's additional opinion, but no, no guilty ruling was set aside.

JOHN QUINN: Right. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Other judges reported this is not, not guilty. Okay. That's it. That's one criminal case. Yes. 

JOHN QUINN: So what, what had happened in the lower court?  Had they been found criminally liable in the trial 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: court? No, 

JOHN QUINN: no, no. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: First,  took no,  the high court, no. 

JOHN QUINN: Right. And the Supreme Court affirmed that result. Said that there was no criminal liability for making this report.

Was this decision controversial or was this a significant precedent, or, or is this, what the result that you would've expected under existing Japanese law?

HIDETAKA MIHARA: In the common sense of the industry and also other, you know,  like,  society as a whole, or politicians, everybody said that kind of such a big wave came on that coastline, but that happened about several hundred years ago. Right? But no, no actual record kept in a hands, 

JOHN QUINN: yes. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: That's why,  everybody expects that that will not happen. 

JOHN QUINN: Right? So it's so rare. So rare, and been such a long time since there had been such a large tsunami. It was not foreseeable. And since it wasn't foreseeable, the court,  I mean, correct me if I'm, if I'm wrong, if it wasn't foreseeable, this wasn't common, then there wasn't a basis for criminal liability in filing this report so late. Is that essentially the conclusion? 

HIDETAKA MIHARA:  Yes, but I can add one thing.

If management believed the only way to protect it is to cease the operation of the nuclear pipeline there. If they cease that operation, almost no electric, no electricity available in that region. Right. That's a problem. 

JOHN QUINN: Right. So, I mean, yeah, it sounds like there was a need to really sort of balance, um, you know,  dealing with this very remote risk versus the very serious and known consequence that a large population would be deprived of electricity. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Yeah, that's right. They put too much on the nuclear pipeline there. Yeah. In that region. If they have alternatives,  I think fire, water, or other alternatives available in that region, the operation of the nuclear pipeline and then installing it,  for the time being, but they have no such alternative. 

JOHN QUINN: Yeah. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Yeah. That's it. 

JOHN QUINN: Okay. That's very interesting. I'm wondering if the result might have been different in the US because as I understand it, TEPCO was informed a couple of years before it happened that there was a real risk, you know, if the big wave came in and they didn't act on it immediately, and, and they filed this report over two years later. But of course, the filing of the report, the timing of the filing of the report didn't really have anything to do necessarily with the damage. Um, I guess it, if they'd filed the report and the government had said in response, You have to take the following actions. You need to build bigger walls or barriers or something like that. You know, arguably then there would've been some basis for finding,  finding greater fault. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: I can add one thing. Three years ago, June 17th, 2022, there was, civil claims. By civilians and shareholders against the Japanese government that the Japanese government did not, did not properly, operate that report, stop it or make investment or protection, something like that. 

Because of this Article 40 Business Law, but government, government claimed, alleged that they did not perform,  properly, that power to make an order that claim. Civilians against the government, but the court also doubts that it's not the fault of the Japanese government to make an order based on that [00:15:00] rule of article.

That' Supreme Court ruling, 17th of June 2022, so that was a discussion already done three years ago. Then, based on that Supreme Court decision of civil this year. March five of this year, the CEOs and two vice President Teco were held Not guilty,  about their criminal cases based on that decision.

JOHN QUINN: Okay. And that was based on the decision rejecting the claim against the Japanese government. Yes. Were there civil cases that were brought by shareholders? Or residents, shareholders of TEPCO or residents of Fukushima, did they bring civil actions against the company as well?

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Yes. That is the Japanese, the special law, allowing any person affected by the government,  action or non action. Not nearly the shareholder's, right, because that is a defendant is a government itself. 

JOHN QUINN: Mm-hmm. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: There's a civil liability of special law allowing anybody who, who suffered something by the government's, you know, actions on actions.

JOHN QUINN: And, and the result of that, in the trial court, was there an award in favor of the shareholders or residents? 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: No. The Supreme Court held the government did not commit any fault based on non action of power order to order. That's not, that's not a failure. 

JOHN QUINN: Yeah, I thought I read somewhere that there was a civil derivative action against the former management and in the trial court. TEPCO was ordered to make a large damage award, but yet that was reversed on appeal. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA:  That was,  I think, another high decision. 

JOHN QUINN: Yeah. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: That is shareholder action against the former,  the management of June 6th of this year, 2025 June 6th, Tokyo Haiko decided, they're not liable for the damages caused by, um, because of the tsunami. The defendant was former management. Mm-hmm. Share deduction of that amount. Decided to buy Tokyo Discord for a huge amount, if I, my recollection is correct. That is 13 trillion Japanese yen, 13 trillion yen. Huge. 

JOHN QUINN: That was, that was the court of first instance or the trial court? 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: First instance. Yes. Yes. But the high court, set aside that decision,  because as I mentioned, the criminal case, not held guilty on March five, Tokyo High Court district. The High court decision was June 6th this year, about three months later, I think they, the high court followed. The decision on March five of the criminal case. Of course. Criminal cases are different. 

JOHN QUINN: Yeah. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: But the substance based on the fact itself is whether vice comply with something or fight each duty. Something that's a kind of  basic fact. That matters. Civil,  Supreme Court decided not guilty March five. The high Court decided no liability of civil cases on June 6th, I think. 

JOHN QUINN: Right. So in all, when we step back and take a look at these, this litigation,  management was found not liable.

The company was found not liable. No. The government was found not liable. No. Has there been criticism of these decisions in public discussions in the media,  in Japan? 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: There are some. But it's, it's, I think about,  13 years ago, more so 14 years ago. 

JOHN QUINN: Yeah. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: People are looking forward, not claiming back.

Yeah. But they, we walk, walk towards the future. If money is back, the debt man can't come back. Right. 

JOHN QUINN: Right.  looking towards the future, you know, as,  yeah. And, and rather than focusing on the past is a good strategy in, in many circumstances. Yeah. Are those React, is the Fukushima plant up and running again now?

No. Will it ever be operational again? 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: No, not possible. Yeah. Um, and because,  the pipeline itself has a Crush, something still in it,

JOHN QUINN: mm-hmm. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Is struggling to take it out and then settle it. No, not yet. Right. 

JOHN QUINN: Well, that's very interesting. Let's, let's move on to our second subject that we wanna discuss here.  and that is the development of shareholder activism,  in Japan, which is a yes, which I understand is a kind of relatively new phenomenon and very much a real phenomenon now in the business and legal culture in Japan.

I mean, what, what has,  What has caused this and what has enabled the development of shareholder activism in Japan? 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: First of all,  Tokyo Stock Exchange. The has,  some development of,  Of Japanese stock market, so that,  all the,  I think,  management should pay more attention about share price and,  information disseminated to the market, and also corporate governance that they have to rebuild because of the series of, um, management problems in the past of big companies.

There are some,  not, not some, there are many, I would say that will lose the trustworthiness of the Japanese market from the viewpoint of shareholders or investors from overseas especially. Then they announced the management or compliance better and what the requirements they have to comply with in the last 5, 10 years. 

Also, they said that the shareholders should be treated as more specially minded shareholders. That's kind of the message that the Tokyo Stock Exchange is announcing periodically. So that activists are not the kind of,  I think evils or, or kind of bad guys to short term investors.

Not really. Actually, activists now make up a kind of publication dot. They said we made an investment, but after that, the share price will go up. In many cases they said, and actually they request management to dividend out more than before or make delinquent assets or business to cut out so that better business can be kept and then performance made better. 

In some cases, some delinquent assets, but the management cannot sell out. However, activists request that this is not good. I can give one, one example. A big Canadian investor made a proposal to acquire Seven & I in Japan. 

JOHN QUINN: Yeah. This has been in the news a lot. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Yes. They have two, two segments.

One is an old fashioned supermarket store. I call it I. They have another business called 7-Eleven convenience store. That idea came from us. They introduced Japan and developed small retailers throughout Japan. Many that's profitable, they made two segments combined into one company.

That's why Seven & I is very good. I am delinquent. Mm-hmm. The Canadian said that I should be kicked out. Right? Seven. Seven may better split.

That company was originally from Itto Family Company, huge. But   as a government ruled, ruling out that that company, then they started,  delinquent Business Supermarket. Now the investors propose to take over. Then they make,  more profitable because they sell off to others. But seven huge.

They're the seven segments as a core business. What do you think about that result because of the Canadian investor? I wanted to buy this company and then cut off the I segment, but the actual result was the same. 

JOHN QUINN: Yeah, 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: We're not, not, I think, concerned about who are the shareholders, who is the go, who is the CEO, but 7-Eleven companies become better.

That's the result. 

JOHN QUINN: Right? So this is an example of a shareholder. The shareholders were not successful in taking over the company, but their idea was actually executed by existing management. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: That's right. Their proposal was anyhow, I think, achieved. 

JOHN QUINN: Right. So as this,  the increased recognition of rights for shareholders was that, facilitated based on some changes in the law or the stock exchange rules? I mean, how, how did this come about? 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Shareholders' proposal is based on,  I think 1% or 300 unit or something. I don't remember correctly, but I can come back if this is not good. That matter is,  I think reducing in terms of the actual amount.

1% or three, 300 body units are becoming smaller in, in the past.  That kind of, you know, amount is huge, but because of the trading unit is,  is reducing right from the TCS requirement. Because of Nisa is, Nisa is a kind of investment trust,  and a benefit trust tax beneficial scheme for small investors.

These companies make voting power smaller, smaller, smaller, so that small investors can easily invest in it. Actually, you know, the result was that activists can more easily make a proposal. 

JOHN QUINN: It takes a fewer number of shareholders in order to make a proposal than in the past.

Yes. In terms of the amount. Right. So I know, at least in the past, in,  you know, Japan, the  business world, many of these companies. Insurance companies and, and other companies and large corporations have cross shareholdings so that they're able to work together. And it was hard for shareholders to get proposals accepted because there were large shareholders who were linked by cross shareholdings with the company and with existing management.

Has that changed at all the existence of these cross shareholdings? 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Very good point. Shareholders, shareholding is a kind of,   in fact scheme to protect the,  I think,  activities or something, but token exchange,  corporate governance, as I touched before. Corporate governance call requires. If any company holding that cross shareholdings, they have to either explain the reason or to comply that they'll sell off everything.

JOHN QUINN: Are the number of cross shareholders in the business world in Japan that being reduced? 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Yes. That's, but that is reducing. Yeah. TSE requires, if you wanna hold CRO shareholding of other companies, please explain why. 

JOHN QUINN: Right. And I assume it's not a good explanation because, you know, for some reason other than, trying to protect existing management.

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Yes. Yeah. I can give you one example. Toyota. Toyota was,  more than a hundred years ago, spin out from Toyota Automotive Company, I don't remember the English name, but that, you know, former parent has more than 1 trillion in Japanese Toyota Company shares because that was the former share,  parent company but activists said that there's no such justification to hold that former parent holding still. Toyota,  shareholders of more than 1 trillion Japanese, have to sell off or make a justification to use it.

Actually Toyota this year made a, friendly takeover bid to acquire that company as hundred percent shareholders actually. 

JOHN QUINN: And where does that stand?

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Okay. That was approved. That is, I think,  precise. 

JOHN QUINN: Mm-hmm. Yeah. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Just they, they sell off. Toyota didn't like it. Mm-hmm. If they sell off that kind of huge amount of Toyota shares, their share price would go down. 

JOHN QUINN: All right, so does activist shareholder activist activity in Japan result in litigation?

Of course, in the US active activist shareholders commonly resort to the courts to press their case. Is it similar in Japan? 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Not too much. Litigation may happen in case of taking a bit, completing it and then squeezing out. Squeeze out process is a part, I think, maybe litigated. 

JOHN QUINN: Mm-hmm. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: But the court says, take it over a bit.

You know, price is the fair price that squeeze out is,  I think completed. So,  almost no chance to have litigation of activists, but activists would like to have a shorter period, to make a better profit. Hmm. And higher prices then go out and make another, you know,  target company. 

JOHN QUINN: Right. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: If the litigation commences one year, two year, they're, they have litigated, but the shares are kept in, in that company.

JOHN QUINN: Yeah. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: They don't like it, 

JOHN QUINN: Right. They want to move on to the next one. Yes. Get liquidity and move on to the next one. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Yeah. They, they negotiated, asked them to buy back. Right. 

JOHN QUINN: You know, our firm was involved in a,  a, a competing,  takeover situation involving a company called FujiSoft, where we were behind the scenes advising KKR.

KKR was competing with another global private equity firm,  FujiSoft or private equity firm. Bain for Bain. Bain for FujiSoft, and there wasn't any, there never was any litigation. It was a situation where in the US there easily could have been. Litigation, but it was mostly,  you know, something that was,  sort of fought out in the press and in communications rather than, you know, the equivalent of the SEC or going to court, which never happened.

HIDETAKA MIHARA: If there's a big, you know, problem in the market such as. Fuji Television Company, then big shareholders came in and made a proposal of changing the management. Then I think,  the company made another strategy to take better management personnel. This year  's annual meeting of Fuji, the management,  was actually elected as they wanted. Then the [00:35:00] scandal itself has now started in Japan, but not a big, big matter, but it's against the individual, former president or former CEOs or something.

Big litigation of activities and the company? No. 

JOHN QUINN: Yeah, there was no litigation relating to the takeover itself. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Not, not many. 

JOHN QUINN: Yeah. Okay. Well let's go to the third subject,  that we're gonna talk about. Something that has been in the general news here in the US and may now finally be resolved.

And that's about, um, nip on Steel's efforts to acquire and seemingly now has acquired the rights to US Steel. I mean, what is the Japanese perspective on, on what happened there? 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: Many Japanese,  I think,  people think this is very good for us and good for Japan as well. And for I think,  the industry as a whole is still acquired already.

In an Indian company with a startup, very many huge investments are made in India. The next step is,  this, I think,  basis that they would like to retain in the US about steel. The still found US Steel is a very good partner to have business together, not a kind of. Because,  US Steel is a very good company and they're based in the us They keep their management business and,  I think factories as they're, but they want to have more money, make a facility better, more updated and advanced technology needed so that the US Japan, you know, allies.

Compete with,  China or other, you know, still in other companies, in, in the market, in the market in the world. That's a way they explained repeatedly to many shareholders who still, I think,  supported that idea. The question really was asked, the president,  Mr. President Trump was against, and Mr. Former president Mr. Biden was against it. But the Japanese industry says that we support Nippon Steel, that kind of thing. Not from the Japanese perspective, but us Japanese, you know,  I think relationships. That's very good. 

JOHN QUINN: Yeah. I mean, the US steel industry has been dying for a long time. You have US Steel, which is sort of iconic,  in a sense, an American company, which was struggling and was in need of cash.

You had Nippon Steel, which was competing globally with Chinese steel companies and Indian companies. Nippon Steel had the cash, I mean, it seemed like in business terms, like a perfect marriage. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: I think so.

JOHN QUINN: And then it became a political issue, seemingly, 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: And we thought about US most advanced companies, I think Age of Us is a high tech company such as Google or Amazon,  or something.

But, this kind of but fundamental of the industry is still, we, we support that kind of idea. Basically. 

JOHN QUINN: Mm-hmm. As the deal was finally approved,  the US government under President Trump negotiated for a so-called golden share.  and, and, and what rights does that give the US government.  

HIDETAKA MIHARA: the golden share?

We have a President of Golden Share in Japan's law.  impacts is a Japanese company which is listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Their impact is the petroleum company. They have some interest in the Saudi or some other Middle East oil producing companies there. There's no oil producing process in Japan, but we have to import a lot of oil from overseas, such as the US, Middle East, or some others.

This National Security Company is listed on Turkish Exchange, but they issued one golden share to the METI, Minister of  Economy, Trade and Industry, just a Japanese government minister. They have one golden share. Golden Share can be [00:40:00] exercised based on news set by the METI Rule that is published. If they are acquired by foreigners, for example, or if they suck the CEO or if they change the article incorporation, the government has the right to make this kind of proposal with no pressure.

That's one golden share. Interestingly, that is this company. 

JOHN QUINN: Hmm. I mean, I'm not sure whether there probably are, and I'm just not thinking of them. But I'm, offhand, I can't think of an example of a golden share issued to us, the US government before. I know when General Motors went through a bankruptcy, there was a bailout.

There have been other bailouts of US companies. Um, but I,  and the terms may have been similar to what these Golden Share terms were. As I understand it, the golden share that President Trump negotiated for permits the US government to block certain management changes. And how, how has that been perceived in Japan, on the Japan side?

Do  the Japanese expect that this will have any significance? It'll be exercised. Was this controversial in Japan, or how, what was the view on that? In Japan, 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: We're not against that kind of golden share scheme of steel,  because of this, currently,  interest in and are, I think,  combined in the same way we're in the same boat. 

JOHN QUINN: Yeah. 

HIDETAKA MIHARA: They're this side and side going the same way. There is no conflict at the time and in the ordinary management of John Steel. They are very much traditional and the core of Japanese industry.

They don't take any unfair conduct against US Steel or any other company. We're always very honest towards our friends on a long term basis, not a betrayal of other companies. After just the equation immediately, no. Mm-hmm. Now we hope. That, not the kind of,  happening, that's it. 

JOHN QUINN: Yeah. Well, this has been a fascinating discussion.

Thank you very much for joining us.

HIDETAKA MIHARA: I'm very pleased to have a conversation, quite enjoyable. We enjoyed it very much, very much knowledgeable, you know, a lot of knowledge in industry, litigation, Japanese company, Japanese culture as well. I'm very pleased to have the opportunity to talk to you.

JOHN QUINN: You're very, you're very kind. The pleasure was all mine. We have been speaking with Hidetaka Mihara, who's senior counsel at the law firm of Tokyo International. This is John Quinn, and this has been Law, disrupted.

Thank you for listening to Law, disrupted with me, John Quinn. If you enjoyed the show, please subscribe and leave a rating and review on your chosen podcast app. To stay up to date with the latest episodes. You can sign up for email alerts at our website, law-Disrupted fm, or follow me on X at JB Q Law, or at Quin Emanuel.

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