Landmark NMC Restructuring in UAE

John is joined by Richard East and Karabeth Ovenden, partners in Quinn Emanuel’s London Office. They discuss the unprecedented bankruptcy and restructuring of NMC, the largest healthcare provider in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Initially listed on the London Stock Exchange and heavily favored by the market, NMC collapsed precipitated by a report by short-seller Muddy Waters raising significant questions about the audited accounts of the company. Ultimately it was revealed that NMC had approximately $6.5 billion in debt, rather than the $2.5 billion that had been disclosed to the market. Over 100 creditors rushed to seize NMC’s assets across the UAE. The absence of a compreheånsive UAE bankruptcy framework posed an existential threat to the company, especially because the crisis occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic when NMC facilities were treating a significant portion of the country’s COVID hospitalizations.

To address this crisis, a team of QE insolvency litigators initiated administration proceedings first in the UK for NMC’s parent company. However, this did not protect NMC’s UAE-based operating entities. To protect those assets and preserve continuity of care, the QE team adopted the novel strategy of moving 36 NMC operating companies into the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM), a common-law “free zone” jurisdiction within the UAE. This required a sovereign executive order to release existing asset attachments and allow for insolvency proceedings in the ADGM—an unprecedented step in UAE restructuring history.

The move faced significant jurisdictional and legal resistance across the various Emirates. Recognition of the ADGM orders in onshore courts was difficult, requiring extensive legal argumentation and government coordination. Once inside the ADGM, the companies could proceed with a complex reorganization plan, culminating in a successful arrangement which obtained support from over 90% of the creditors. The team also navigated criminal investigations, litigated against dissenting creditors, and pursued claims against parties potentially complicit in the fraud. 

Podcast Link: Law-disrupted.fm
Host: John B. Quinn
Producer: Alexis Hyde
Music and Editing by: Alexander Rossi

Transcript

Note: This transcript is generated from a recorded conversation and may contain errors or omissions. It has been edited for clarity but may not fully capture the original intent or context. For accurate interpretation, please refer to the original audio. 

JOHN QUINN: This is John Quinn. This is Law, disrupted and today we're talking to two of my partners in our London office, Richard East and Karabeth Ovenden. We're gonna be talking about a very interesting bankruptcy proceeding in the ADGM Court, the Abu Dhabi Global Markets Court and how they brought about the restructuring of NMC, a major healthcare provider in the UAE in that court, and what was involved in making that happen.

Imagine that there's a private hospital, a system called NMC that has like 85 facilities in the UAE, 5 million patients per year, 12,000 employees; it's listed on the London Stock Exchange, it's kind of a darling of the stock exchange market.

Its revenues keep going up and up and up, it's extremely successful. And then suddenly, Muddy Waters writes a piece. Muddy Waters, of course, is one of those well-known short sellers that does research and publications. And it turns out that NMC is riddled with fraud and suddenly some 100 banks among other creditors are trying to get there first and seize assets.

And all this is taking place in the UAE, which is kind of a federation of Emirates as the name suggests and doesn't really have the bankruptcy sort of infrastructure, legal infrastructure in place to deal with something like this. And at that point, enter Richard East and Karabeth Ovenden, who we're gonna be talking to from Quinn Emanuel London, who brought about the restructuring of NMC in just a two year period of time in the course of 60 hearings and really kind of put the ADGM court on the map there. So, Richard East and Karabeth Ovenden, I don't know which of you wants to start, tell us how this all began. 

RICHARD EAST: Okay, so I'll talk a little bit about how it started. So you are right John, that a Muddy Waters report precipitated the collapse of the group and it led obviously to a number of banks realizing there were serious issues with the financial position of NMC and as it was ultimately revealed the company had reported about two and a half billion dollars of debt. In fact, the company had nearly six and a half billion dollars of debt, so there was a very large proportion of debt that was completely undisclosed.

And the reason that we got involved initially is that we were hired by the largest credit firm of the group and that was a bank called ADCB and they were obviously very concerned about their position. They were not secured in any way, they were an unsecured lender. And we came on the scene and it seemed to us, and almost immediately, that the best thing to do here was try to put the group into administration.

So first sort of major step and something, which I'm not sure has been done before, but we petitioned a creditor petition for the administration of the plc in London, NMC health plc and petitioned for the administration of that company in circumstances where we didn't know what was inside the company, and we petitioned and obtained the administration order for just that entity in the UK.

And what does that mean, Richard? What’s an administration order in this context? Well, it's sort of the UK's equivalent to Chapter 11, so it's a formal insolvency proceeding where you put office holders into the company who then effectively become the executive of that company and their duty is to try and rescue the company or to liquidate.

Try and get the best return for creditors, so Alvar and MA were appointed. They went in and that was really the first step of the restructuring because we were just in the Topco in the UK, that didn't really help at that stage. The operational group, which was based in the UAE. And so our next step, having put the administrators into the Topco, was to try and figure out how to protect the group, which at that point was subject to dozens and dozens of claims being pursued in the UAE by other banks, who were obviously also concerned about their own position in three of the Emirates: in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah.

JOHN QUINN: I assume at that point you're facing the prospect of a creditor free-for-all all with multiple proceedings in multiple UAE courts with courts issuing orders, freezing or seizing assets, potentially entering competing judgments, potentially really a chaotic situation. Is that fair to say, Karabeth? 

KARABETH OVENDEN: Yeah.

It was definitely chaotic. I think in England when the Topco went into administration, a moratorium kind of hit where creditors couldn't do anything -  in England at least - but that didn't have extraterritorial effect. So, where the real companies were, who were actually saving lives and providing medical treatment - they were in the UAE - creditors could just go after them and, as you say, seize their assets. So while we were immediately, you know, kind of elated about getting the PLC entity into administration in the UK, we realized that actually wasn't going to save the group.

So at that point we had to pivot and think about what to do to save the group in the UAE because as you say, yes, there were multiple creditors. Many had attachments already over assets, over bank accounts. There was worry whether they could even pay employees - and at that point, we were in the middle of the COVID pandemic.

And one outta every two COVID patients that were in hospital were actually in an NMC hospital bed. 

JOHN QUINN: So this threatened the prospect of a liquidation which would result in the company, not the operating entities, not having concerns in the middle of COVID. Is that fair to say? 

RICHARD EAST: Yeah, for sure.

Yeah, no, it was a very serious fear that the whole group would collapse. It is the largest private hospital operator in the region, responsible for - and on the front line - of the COVID response. So there was very serious concern that the company would not survive. And at that point, as Karabeth says, there was literally no money in any of the bank accounts left.

It had many thousands of employees and couldn't even pay them. So one of the first things that was done - which I still to this day, can't believe what happened - is that we then asked some of the lead banks to lend them the company more money in the face of the known fraud. Some banks stepped up and lent another $50 million just to keep the business going, so that we could then try and devise a way of trying to protect the group and then move to the kind of restructuring phase. But even that was not simple, because at the time the UAE had a very unhelpful restructuring process, which would not have allowed us to keep the group together operating. So we looked at various options: whether chapter 11 would work - it would not be recognized in the UAE - we looked at the UK administration - could we put the group into UK administration? 

Again, that would not have been recognized, it wouldn't have helped us in the UAE. So in the end, the thought turned to looking at two of the regimes in the USA, the DIFC and the ADGM. The ADGM had something very, very close analogous to the UK administration regime, but we had to move the companies from the onshore world into the ADGM.

JOHN QUINN: Now, before we move on, Richard and Karabeth, could you explain what the DIFC and the ADGM are? 

KARABETH OVENDEN: Yeah, sure John. They are effectively free zones in the UAE, so they operate separately from the UAE. They have their own legal system, which is based on common law as opposed to the civil law system that operates onshore in the UAE.

And they have their own courts, their own judges in their own regime. The DIFC is kind of a business free zone. So, if you're in that immigrant, the free zone off of Dubai is the DIFC. I think more people knew about the DIFC at the time; it was more prevalent across the region. Then we have the ADGM, which is the Abu Dhabi Emirates free zone.

And at that time, the court and the region wasn't used as much as the DIFC, but companies registered there and they take their disputes to the courts, where they know they will have English, Australian or other common law judges presiding. They kind of had a sense of what the law will be and how it'll be applied, because it generally takes the form of English law in some way, shape, or form. But the ADGM is slightly different in that it has adopted English common law as evergreen, so as it's actually being made in England, it's being made in the ADGM as well. 

JOHN QUINN:So as that case comes out the DIFC, they've made an effort to actually codify common law at a point in time.

So, you know, ongoing new precedents in England are not necessarily the law and the DIFC. But, we are in the ADGM because as you say, it's evergreen. So, how did you end up, Richard, how did you end up choosing? We know this went forward in the ADGM, why did you end up choosing the ADGM over the DIFC, which at that point had a significantly higher profile, more experience, more history?

RICHARD EAST: Yeah, well, I think it was a combination of things really. It was partly that some of the authorities we were talking to were encouraging of us looking at the ADGM -  we knew that the administration would stand a good chance of being recognized in the onshore courts in Abu Dhabi. There was a death in possession regime that looked very helpful.

The company needed money, day one of the insolvency, so there was a regime there that looked like it would work; it allowed us to file all of the companies together in the same insolvency filing. So there were, I think the authorities at the ADGM were also very enthusiastic about this happening because, as Karabeth said, the ADGM was quite new - much newer than the DIFC.

And I think there was a feeling from the ADGM that the insolvency of NMC would mean that there would be a lot of work in the ADGM, which would put the ADGM maybe on the map. I think there was some of that thinking behind it, but there were a whole array of reasons why ultimately.

And then, one of the key things was that it was not possible to continue companies into the ADGM who were insolvent, all of our companies were insolvent - cashflow and balance sheet. So there were then some discussions with the ADGM authorities to see if they would allow a rule change to give a discretion to the ADGM registrar to let these companies in when that rule change was achieved and as a consequence, we were able to continue the companies into the ADGM and then immediately file for administration. 

And the other benefit that we had, as I think John, you mentioned, was that all the banks were suing, got attachments, assets were being seized. And the authorities in the UAE to allow us to move the companies, had to pass an executive order to assist NMC in releasing the attachments from various assets and licenses. So, for example, there were banks attaching the medical licenses in the company's registrar, and we couldn't move the companies with those attachments in place. So, the authorities provided an executive order that essentially released all the attachments, allowing the companies to move into the ADGM.

Now, that was extraordinary: a sovereign act to allow us to move those companies into the ADGM, which the structure would not have happened if we were not able to obtain that. 

JOHN QUINN: So, you had various operating companies, which were in different locations and different Emirates in the UAE, and you know, the UAE is kind of a federal system, as I understand it. You have laws and courts for the individual Emirates, and then you have, what I understand is a relative, and you may disagree with this, a kind of wreck, traditionally federal power at the top. Those individual Emirates are very independent, in my experience, yeah.

And then you had this offshore court, the ADGM, and the challenge you faced was how do we get jurisdiction? How do we get all these different entities, which are in essence incorporated or organized elsewhere, how do we get them all within the ADGM, these new-ish offshore courts? So we have jurisdiction over them and can do a reorganization in one location.

Yeah, and I guess as I understand what you're telling us, that required some executive order at the federal level to make that happen. 

RICHARD EAST: Well all I can say is that the UK administration of Topco happened in April, 2020. The filing of the 36 companies in the ADGM was in September, and it took many, many hours of phone calls and meetings.

This was all being done by Zoom at the time, because, obviously we couldn't travel to the UAE with various different officials, various different ministries. I mean, there were many days when I thought this was not gonna happen. Even when we obtained the executive order, there were different speeds at which that order was given effect to.

So for example, Abu Dhabi almost immediately gave effect, and all of the attachments were released. Dubai, several months for that executive order to filter down to the senior judiciary and then ultimately to the judges in the courts. So there was a kind of two-speed process that was going on. And then Sharjah, I can't recall.

I don't think that was particularly problematic, in that particular Emirate, but yes, it took essentially from April to September to achieve this. We had a long checklist of things that we had to do, people we had to speak to, and issues that we had to deal with. There were all the employees, how were the employees gonna be transferred?

There were medical licenses that needed to be transferred. There were people at the various authorities that we had to speak to and explain. Imagine trying to explain this to people in the onshore world, yes, we're going to transfer these companies into the ADGM. What's the ADGM? What's administration? What does that mean? 

These things all had to be explained over and over again to various different people. So it was a huge effort to convince everyone, and we needed to convince everyone that this was something that needed to be done to save the companies. I can remember the feeling when we actually got certificates of incorporation of the 36 companies, when those were delivered to us. It was a momentous moment, is all I'll say. 

JOHN QUINN: Okay. Well, Karabeth, once you had all the companies transferred into the ADGM was it basically over then or did you face some additional challenges? 

KARABETH OVENDEN: It wasn't easy sailing because as Richard said, you know, we did some legal work.

I think magic effectively, but these were operating companies that still existed. Nothing changed on shore, right, so they were operating, they were the same hospital, still operating in Dubai, still operating in Sharjah, still operating in Abu Dhabi, but we just changed their legal title or their legal place of incorporation.

They may be there, but they're actually ADGM companies. And so even with that piece, you know, it was difficult for everyone to understand what had happened because to everyone on the ground, it seemed nothing had happened to NMC. It was still the same, but a big thing had happened: we'd switched the law that was governing it, so we had to take the moratorium, which was what comes out of an administration, is a moratorium against creditor action. You know, it's the main thing you want; it stops creditors from kind of going after assets in the court, stops 'em in their tracks. So we had to take that order and then try to bring it on shore where the court cases and these companies actually were.

And as Richard said, again, the ADGM was kind of new to everyone, they didn't understand what we were doing. This was not a simple debt order, it was probably 30 some odd pages long, this administration order explaining what was happening, explaining that no one could enforce any debts against these companies, explaining that two new people were in charge of these companies.

And so, if you wanted to talk to the companies or do anything, you had to talk to the administrators 'cause they were appointed by the court. So that was another kind of difficult, I think, situation we faced. And then of course, we had to get right on to figuring out how to restructure them and how to get them out, because we couldn't leave these operating companies in kind of the administration process.

We needed to get them out as fast as possible so they could continue to save lives in the Middle East. 

JOHN QUINN: I mean, what is the status of orders of this offshore court, which applies English law? This ADGM, which didn't have much of a history, what was the understood status of its orders in the onshore courts?

I mean, you needed the onshore courts to recognize this order. Was it obvious that, you know, the law or the orders of the ADGM court were superior and needed to be followed? Or did that require some persuasion?

RICHARD EAST: It required some persuasion. There were some basic regulations, I suppose you call 'em in place, that did, before the ADGM required for recognition between Emirates. So for example, if you've got a judgment debt in the ADGM, sorry, in the Abu Dhabi courts, you could give effect to that in Dubai. And there were some basic regulations that allowed that kind of recognition. But what had never been done before is the recognition of an insolvency regime and one of these offshore jurisdictions.

And as Karabeth says, we actually had to produce an order that laid out essentially all of the effects of an administration, almost reciting the legislative provisions in the order itself, and then obviously translate that. So recognition in Abu Dhabi wasn't so difficult because the ADGM is technically part of the Abu Dhabi court system.

So, when I say it was easy, it was relatively easy for that order to be recognized, in the Abu Dhabi onshore courts. But Dubai, unfortunately, was another very different prospect. So not only was it being asked to recognize an order from another Emirate, it was an insolvency order, which had all these various requirements, and it was also the ADGM in Abu Dhabi. So that was really the first time, another thing, the first time trying to have an administration order recognized in Dubai. It was the first time that that had ever been attempted, obviously, it wasn't an overnight thing.

It took us many, many weeks to shut down all the various claims that had been started and to state those claims, so that was kind of the first step. But that was again, a very difficult exercise and we were assisted by our lawyers in having face-to-face conversations with the various judges who were responsible for overseeing these cases.

JOHN QUINN: And were there any particular challenges in the reorganization itself, the financial reorganization, or did that go relatively smoothly once you got everyone in the ADGM? 

RICHARD EAST: Well, I suppose this is all relative. Karabeth, do you wanna talk about this? 

KARABETH OVENDEN: I'd say that, you know, I think NMC was a key restructuring where it couldn't have happened without litigators, you know, so at every turn to get everything done, we had to litigate.

We literally had to go into the court and argue against a creditor or, you know, do something; and I think one of the things we had to do in this particular case was get orders from the court that would allow us to transfer assets because this fraud was so big that there were criminal cases on foot as well that then complicated a restructuring full stop because, you know, we're trying to move assets to a new group, we're trying to, you know, do all sorts of things.

But then, you know, the public prosecutor has its eye on everything and has put bans on anything with NMC's name on it. So, you know, we were constantly in the court trying to get an order out of the ADGM that would allow us to transfer onshore assets, that we could then take to the public prosecutor to say, you know, please lift, you know, the ban.

So, we can do that. We also had to apply to the ADGM import, for what's called a Section 81 application, to transfer the shares that were held by one of the previous shareholders, who was caught up in the fraud. He was also then himself in bankruptcy, so we had to lift the moratorium onshore for that bankruptcy first before we could apply in the ADGM to force this, you know, the transfer of his shares as well. 

So, I think it's a good example of where this couldn't have happened without a big team of litigators behind it. 

RICHARD EAST: We have to recognize that the deed of company arrangement which was the formal process that we use, was essentially a debt for securities type of restructuring.

So essentially the restructuring involved a compromise of all of the pre-existing debt in exchange for interest insecurities that had an interest in the new reorganized group. And, I have to mention that we work very closely with Kirkland and Ellis, who were primarily responsible for the implementation, the design and implementation of that deed of company arrangements.

So in a sense, Karabeth and I were responsible for holding the group together, defending the group from litigation, trying to give effect to the moratorium, and shutting down all the historical claims to give space and room for the deed of company arrangement to be formulated, agreed upon, and implemented. So unfortunate for us, you know, ultimately the deed as proposed got a very, very substantial amount of support.

I think over 90% of the banks voted in favor of the restructuring. And so you know, so obviously, we have to recognize the efforts of Kirkland and Ellis and, we work very effectively together in sort of protecting the group and then ultimately implementing the restructuring. 

JOHN QUINN: And who were the local UAE lawyers that you worked with?

RICHARD EAST: So we worked most closely with a firm called GLO Global Advocates, who are a local firm. As you will appreciate, given the hundreds of parties that were involved in this, pretty much every law firm locally was utilized in some way and probably several times over, acting for different parties.

But global advocates were our main source of advice locally and they did an excellent job in terms of communicating with the local judiciary about what we were doing. 

KARABETH OVENDEN: And Richard, I think we took advantage also of the fact that we had to restructure quickly. So we put in a call for creditor claims quickly into bankruptcy or into the administration, which then gave the ADGM kind of jurisdiction over these creditors, which was happening very quickly. And so we then used that, together with the local council about, you know, kind of the rowdy creditors onshore to anti-suit them in the ADGM. So they didn't realize they had come into the jurisdiction of the ADGM when they filed that proof.

But that's kind of how we then all, you know, got at these creditors and kind of were able to shut them down. We were also able to sue the secured creditors who were trying to disrupt the group and stay outside of the process in the ADGM. 

JOHN QUINN: Yeah. Well, how many total hearings did you have in the ADGM?

I've never counted them. 

RICHARD EAST: It would not surprise me at all if it was probably over 50 odd hearings in the insolvency. And of course we've also, last year, been involved in a major trial against one bank, DIB, that also, you know, it was a dispute that evolved out of the bankruptcy and the fraud.

And also next year, in March, we'll be involved in another trial in the ADGM, which also has evolved out of the NMC bankruptcy. That's a claim against another bank, where we say that the bank was sufficiently on notice of the fraud, that it should ultimately contribute to the assets of the group.

So that claim will be pursued next year. And of course, I have to be a little bit careful here, but we were also involved in a claim against EY in London on behalf of essentially the TopCo NMC PLC in relation to what we say was a breach of duty by the auditor not having picked up the fraud - EY - with the auditor to the company for seven years.

And at no point did they pick up the fact that there was a huge fraud ongoing in the company. So, if one adds up all of those interlocutory hearings, anti-suit injunctions, section one applications, the administration, all the various things that we had to deal with through that process, it would not surprise me if we were involved in 50 plus hearings in front of the ADGM. And as I say, I think the NMC case was very much the issue in the matter that breathed life into that jurisdiction and gave it credibility. And I have to say, you know, the administrators, the judges in that, jurisdictions have done a fantastic job in giving that jurisdiction huge credibility. And no doubt going forward, people will see it as a credible forum in which they can, you know, restructure companies and bring serious claims. 

JOHN QUINN: So yeah, I've heard you say that the case you tried last year was actually the first trial that was done, actually completed in the ADGM.

Yeah. I have visited that courtroom. I think there's only one courtroom in the ADGM, is that right? That's right. Yeah. I visited that with you and I have to say, it's a beautiful high tech courtroom, like I'm not sure I've ever seen one that has such sophisticated technical equipment.

RICHARD EAST: Yeah, I mean, it really is top of the line in terms of the technology, the screens, the comfort, the number of seats. I mean, it's got everything really, in terms of a courtroom, so we headed over there. We were acting against, law firm, Eversheds and we both had very large UK council teams, many lawyers, Andrew Smith, who is an ex-commercial court judge in England, presided over the trial. So I think it was four weeks, wasn't it, Karabeth, of the trial in total? 

KARABETH OVENDEN: Yeah, I think we ended up finishing early, but yeah, I think in the end it ended up being four weeks.

Yeah. 

JOHN QUINN: Well, Karabeth, what will you remember most about this whole NMC proceeding? I mean, it was such an accelerated proceeding: 2020, the filing started in London and it's over by the time you get your order out, reorganization order in 2022. It's very accelerated. What will you remember most about it? 

KARABETH OVENDEN: I think I'll remember, the most about this is that, you know, cross-border insolvency.

It's gonna happen more and more and it takes a lot of brain power to figure out how to work out those complicated things. I think restructurings have to cross different jurisdictions, different cultures even and I think for us being on the side of the company and the administrators here, it was interesting as well as we faced a lot of creditor challenges and creditors who sometimes are clients as well.

So I think for me, I will take this forward in all kinds of cross-border insolvencies we do. And just remember that you have to think out of the box. You sometimes have to also lean on government officials, especially if it's an  important strategic asset within the country. Yeah, so I think that's what I'll take away from this.

JOHN QUINN: I mean, Richard people are always interested in knowing the smarmy details of the fraud. What was the fraud here? What was the mechanism? What was done?

RICHARD EAST: I probably shouldn't speak too much about that 'cause they're still potentially subject to litigation. But I mean, at its heart it was a very simple fraud, like say, lend money, hide the fact that you've lent the money, dissipate the money, lend more money, dissipate that money, hide the fact that you've lost that money.

It was essentially, I suppose in some respects, a sophisticated Ponzi scheme. As I say at the end, the company ended up with something in the region of a hundred banks that lent to it and it disclosed a really, very small fraction of its actual borrowings. So at that level, it was quite simple and required, you know, some innovative, you know, accountancy approaches to hide that fraud from all the various stakeholders, banks and auditors.

JOHN QUINN: How did Muddy Waters twig to this? 

RICHARD EAST: Well, I mean, interesting point. So they looked at the various transactions of purchases of medical facilities and it took the view that the transactions were probably instigated at an overvalue; so the asset value was overrepresented in the balance sheet.

And you know, the fact that the company continues to produce incredible results every year, you know, is very large. Percentage increases in their revenue and their property, in their profit, without exception and so I think ultimately those are the things that suggested to Muddy Waters that they're very strong indicators of fraud or something wasn't right.

And when they issued the report, there was at first a period in which the company tried to defend and present information that supported its position, but very rapidly. Of course, if what you are trying to do is lending money, dissipating the money, the banks suddenly decide to hold on, I don't like the look of this, I'm not gonna lend any more money to this company. Once that stops the money go round stops and essentially it becomes the end of the party, so that's what then rapidly led to the company having to admit its position. 

JOHN QUINN: This is when it sounds like Muddy Waters got it right. I know we've been in cases where Muddy Waters has written things about our clients, which our clients thought were untrue and there's actually been litigation challenging some Muddy Waters reports. Yeah, and the mouth factors, as I understand it, they're on the lamb.

RICHARD EAST: Well, they're in the country. He was the most well-known shareholder and founder of the business back in the UAE, I believe; but he is the subject of ongoing proceedings. So I can't really, I shouldn't really talk very much more about that. 

JOHN QUINN: Alright, well, super interesting. Thanks very much for joining us.

We've been talking to my partners Richard East and Karabeth Ovenden from our London office about the NMC restructuring bankruptcy proceeding in the ADGM in the UAE. This is John Quinn, and this has been Law, disrupted.

Thank you for listening to Law, disrupted with me, John Quinn. If you enjoyed the show, please subscribe and leave a rating and review on your chosen podcast app. To stay up to date with the latest episodes, you can sign up for email alerts at our website, Law-disrupted fm, or follow me on X at JB Q Law, or at Quinn Emanuel.

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