Inside QE'S $440 Million Win Against Credit Suisse For SoftBank

John is joined by Richard East, Senior Partner of Quinn Emanuel’s London office, and Nikolas Bruce-Smith, Partner in Quinn Emanuel’s London office. They discuss a major London commercial trial arising from the collapse of Greensill Capital and the resulting litigation between Credit Suisse and SoftBank. The plaintiff alleged that SoftBank sought to orchestrate, for its own ends, a complex restructuring involving the Greensill Group in late 2020, through which approximately US$440 million worth of assets were allegedly placed improperly beyond the reach of creditors while Greensill was in severe financial distress.

Following a five-week trial in 2025, and one of the first major trial conclusions arising from the widely publicised Greensill collapse, Credit Suisse’s claim failed. SoftBank’s conduct was vindicated by the English High Court, which found that SoftBank had acted “in good faith” and “did not know or suspect” that Greensill intended to prejudice its creditors.

The trial was especially unique and notable, garnering extensive press attention, because Greensill founder Lex Greensill voluntarily agreed, on the eve of trial, to appear and testify despite not being called by either side and while facing separate legal and regulatory proceedings. A development like this is almost unheard of in complex, high-stakes commercial litigation and required all parties to adapt at the last minute in response to such an extraordinary turn of events as the trial commenced.

Podcast Link: Law-disrupted.fm
Host: John B. Quinn 
Producer: Alexis Hyde
Music and Editing by: Alexander Rossi

Transcript

Note: This transcript is generated from a recorded conversation and may contain errors or omissions. It has been edited for clarity but may not fully capture the original intent or context. For accurate interpretation, please refer to the original audio.

JOHN QUINN: This is John Quinn, and this is Law, disrupted. Today, I'm speaking with two of our partners at Quinn Emanuel in the London office, Richard East and Nikolas Bruce-Smith, about a pretty technical, complicated financial case that they and the team worked with, tried last year, in London. You know, we don't get to talk so much about our London office.

We're very proud of our London office, where we have about 125 lawyers. I think it's the largest litigation team in London. Would that be fair to say, Richard, or close to the largest?

RICHARD EAST: It's probably the largest US litigation team, yes, in terms of numbers. Yeah.

JOHN QUINN: H ow does it compare with the size of the litigation teams at the so-called Magic Circle firms like Linklaters, Freshfields, Clifford Chance?

RICHARD EAST: So we're bigger than some. We're, in terms of numbers, we're probably bigger than Slaughter and May, bigger than, A&O Shearman now as they are, and probably about the same time size as Clifford Chance and smaller than Freshfields.

But in revenue terms last year, we were bigger than all of the Magic Circle practices, including the US firms.

JOHN QUINN: And I think it, we opened that office back in 2007, as I recall, with you and Sue Provost QC, just the two of you. 

Sue's gone on to other things since there, but Richard has continuously been the senior partner, as they say, over in London. We say managing partner in the US, of that office, and it's grown to 125 lawyers.

It's generally regarded, I think, as the leading complex litigation practice in London. It's our largest office outside the US. But enough about bragging about our London office, and let's talk about this kind of interesting case which involves, you know, it involves Greensill. 

Lex Greensill had a company. It's sort of a receivables financing company, it started in Australia, I think. International company. Was in a lot of headlines. Seemed to be doing very successful for a while. It had a financing agreement with Credit Suisse, another major Swiss bank, which, you know, not long after this, these events that we're gonna be talking about, itself went into insolvency, and its assets were taken over by UBS.

It involves interesting claims relating to SoftBank, you know, a major well-known Japanese company. The SoftBank Vision Funds, first Vision Fund was a $100 billion fund. A lot of high-profile characters. It involved a claim about, you know, if a company is in distress, it's considered improper, even fraudulent, to put assets beyond the reach of creditors so creditors can't reach them.

And under English law, as there is in English and U.S. law, there are ways to hold parties accountable. Distress or entities that are in distress or bankruptcy who do that kind of thing to hide assets from creditors, there's ways to reverse that, hold them responsible for that. That's not the theory of the case that was pursued here.

Here, the plaintiff was Credit Suisse, and the theory that they pursued was that the party to whom the assets they claimed were put to be out of reach of creditors, i.e. SoftBank, is that right, Richard? 

RICHARD EAST: Yeah, SoftBank, and the Vision Funds. 

JOHN QUINN: A major international Japanese institution sort of facilitated that.

So the claim was not against the party that allegedly put the assets beyond the reach of creditors. It was against the party who the assets were put to, SoftBank. And in that respect, it was kind of an unusual claim in this case. So can you give us kind of the background? I don't know whether, Richard, you should address this in the beginning or Nikolas.

Kind of give us the background. What was the structure of the transactions and what led up to this case that you ended up trying in the High Court in London?

NIKOLAS BRUCE-SMITH: Absolutely. I'm happy to cover that, John. Thank you very much. So as you mentioned, the claim arose from the collapse of the Greensill Group in 2021, and they were one of the world's largest supply chain finance providers. And it's fair to say prior to its collapse, it was seen by the market as what was often referred to as a financial unicorn.

And Lex Greensill himself was considered one of the CEO rockstars of that era. There were sort of a number of notable CEOs in that era, and he was one of the ones who was often featured in the FT and reported as being the sort of rockstar, really trailblazer in his area.

JOHN QUINN: What was his innovation? What made him so special? I mean, he was somebody who was in the press a lot and he was pointed to as this incredible young Australian entrepreneur who had done wonderful things. I mean, supply chain finance doesn't sound like something that's high tech or any special magic. What was his claim to fame?

NIKOLAS BRUCE-SMITH: It's probably the speed at which he has managed to grow the Greensill business and the supply chain financing. And I suspect there's also an element, myself coming from New Zealand, that coming from Australia sort of seemed to come from, you know, the southern hemisphere to actually break out with his business international.

In terms of the clients they had, the banks they had, that were involved, you know, Credit Suisse had invested nearly 10 billion in the notes prior to its collapse that Greensill was issuing. So we're talking about here, it had SoftBank, you know, and again, you know, this, this massive international bank.

He'd sort of come from Australia, from Bundaberg, which is a very small town in Australia. 

JOHN QUINN: Never heard of that. Makes very good ginger beer.

So we have this young Australian guy, rockstar, he's in supply chain finance. He gets international attention. His business comes out of nowhere. Suddenly, the Greensill group is famous, but they get into trouble.

NIKOLAS BRUCE-SMITH: And in effect, it sort of formed against the backdrop as many of these claims have done of the COVID, of COVID coming into effect. And really, what Greensill was looking to in 2020 was set itself up for a big IPO launch. It was getting geared up for that. The problem that it faced as it went on into the latter half of 2020 was that one of its big, its big sort of key companies in its supply chain operation, Katerra, which itself was a startup, a technology offsite construction startup once valued at 4 billion, it was facing, you know, turning the lights off the next day.

It was in continued downward decline. It was on the verge of bankruptcy. And it just so happened that Credit Suisse held 440 million worth of notes issued by Greensill that were backed by Katerra receivables.

JOHN QUINN: Right, so Katerra is a, Katerra, as I recall, was a SoftBank Vision Fund One company. It was some kind of a construction high-tech company. Not sure exactly what that is, but that's what it was to be, and its operating, it was facing its own distress problems, and it was getting financing from Greensill in some fashion.

NIKOLAS BRUCE-SMITH: Correct. Yeah. So financing from Greensill. And so SoftBank, who we acted for in this, in this case, and the Vision Funds, they were faced in a position where Greensill, who was on the verge of wanting to IPO and go large was facing this hurdle of Katerra potentially toppling over, and the knock-on effect of that, that it would obviously have in terms of confidence in the business model, confidence from the likes of Credit Suisse and other big banks.

And SoftBank is sitting there both as an investor in Greensill, you know, set to really reap rewards if it IPOs, and also on the other side as an investor in Katerra, which is faced with the situation potentially going bankrupt imminently unless it can be restructured and recapitalized. 

JOHN QUINN: So what happened? How does Credit Suisse and Greensill get impacted by these efforts to try to save Katerra leading to this lawsuit?

NIKOLAS BRUCE-SMITH: So in late 2020, Greensill approached SoftBank, which it had actually done on a number of occasions when it was in trouble, to try and solve the Katerra problem. And in order to try and steady the ship, what was agreed, what was understood, particularly from the SoftBank side, was that it would inject $440 million into Greensill on the understanding that Greensill would use those funds to repurchase or repay the notes that were held by Credit Suisse.

And in effect, it would internalize the risk of Katerra falling over and the exposure that Credit Suisse had to it. I think one of the witnesses from SoftBank referred to it in the trial as, internalizing the bomb, the Katerra bomb, that would otherwise go off as they're sort of leading up to this IPO at the end of 2020.

JOHN QUINN: So Nikolas, I think we need to understand the relationship between Greensill and Credit Suisse. You referred to these notes. I take it Credit Suisse is holding notes issued by Greensill. Is that correct?

NIKOLAS BRUCE-SMITH: Correct. So, Credit Suisse had invested through, I think it was four funds they had in these financing arrangements, the supply chain, supply chain finance arrangements. About $10 million in notes that were issued by Greensill, of which $440 million of those notes were backed by receivables from Katerra.

JOHN QUINN: All right. So, SoftBank says, "Okay, we're gonna advance some $440 million," or whatever the number is, "of money to Katerra to pay off these notes or to take care of Credit Suisse, advance to Greensill to be used for that specific purpose." Was that kind of the idea?

NIKOLAS BRUCE-SMITH: That was SoftBank's understanding, that by transferring the $440 million over, what they'll be doing in sort of both directions is ensuring that Credit Suisse is made whole, that they're not exposed to a Katerra collapse. And then in doing so, it means that Greensill was in a position to deal with Katerra, and to restructure, effectively, Katerra in a way which might allow it to continue as a going concern rather than immediately going bankrupt.

RICHARD EAST: Yeah. And, the quid pro quo and the focus of the claim was that part of that deal was that Katerra was effectively released from its liability to Greensill. So the $440 million traveled from the SoftBank Vision Funds into Greensill, into an entity above the special purpose vehicle that was the issuer of the notes, with the intention that 440 would be there to repay the Credit Suisse notes, so therefore essentially taking those notes off risk. But the quid pro quo and part of the restructuring of Katerra is that it was released from its obligation to Greensill to pay $440 million. So on the one hand, Greensill, after the transactions, no longer has any claim against Katerra, but it has the $440 million. It's released the claim and the security, but it has the $440 million in cash to repay the notes.

That was the SoftBank understanding of the transaction.

JOHN QUINN: What could possibly go wrong? Sounds like, you know, everybody gets whole here. Katerra, you know, gets a release. It's no longer on the hook. It has a path for going forward. Greensill's got money. They can pay off these notes, the money that they owe to Credit Suisse. Sounds like everybody should...

What could possibly go wrong?

RICHARD EAST: Well, the problem is that then Greensill itself became increasingly distressed, and one of the main problems was that it owned a German bank that was also under pressure from the regulator in Germany to improve its capital position. So it was a combination... So Greensill then transferred some of the money, I think two hundred and twenty odd million or something of that nature, to the German bank to improve its capital position, and then Greensill itself became increasingly distressed. And so right at sort of the key moment, the cash was essentially partly diverted and was unable to get that cash back. And also Greensill itself became increasingly distressed, itself and was facing bankruptcy itself. So ultimately, and as the court found unbeknownst to SoftBank, that four forty was never deployed in the way it was intended to be deployed.

So Credit Suisse found itself in the position where it was still... those notes were still live, hadn't been purchased or repaid and... but its security that it thought it had against the Katerra entity had already been compromised and released. So from SoftBank's perspective, it thought it had dealt with this issue, paid the money, understood that the money was expressly for the purpose of the redemption of the notes, but then discovered subsequently that the cash had never been utilized for that purpose and had been used for other, for other things. 

And so, unfortunately for SoftBank, that purpose was never fulfilled, and unfortunately for Credit Suisse, it found itself with a claim and without any security because it had been released. So the motivation for Credit Suisse was to try and find someone to recover that four forty from, now Greensill was bust, and so the obvious target was, and to use the old adage, the party, you know, who'd done the good deed, and as they say, "No good deed goes unpunished." So then, Credit Suisse decided to pursue SoftBank for recovery of that four hundred and forty million, notwithstanding that SoftBank had already written a cheque for precisely that value and had put that at disposal, you know, for the disposal of Greensill. Yeah.

JOHN QUINN: They provided cash, which they understood the purpose of which was ultimately to pay off the notes, then there'd be a release of Katerra, which is the SoftBank Vision Fund. Now, I assume in the documentation there, of course, in a situation like this, you would have a specific use of proceeds provision, which would spell out that this money is being provided by us, SoftBank, in order to take care of these notes that Credit Suisse is holding.

RICHARD EAST: Well, that argument did feature, as you would imagine. So Credit Suisse argued that in a sense, because of the absence of the use of proceeds, that was somehow evidence of SoftBank's, you know, that SoftBank didn't have ultimately that understanding because if they had had that understanding, they would've made sure it was properly documented. But what the judge ultimately found on the evidence, and this was obviously cross, after cross-examination of certain individuals who were responsible for the transaction from the SoftBank perspective, is that firstly, it was clear that Lex expressly asked for this money for this precise purpose.

JOHN QUINN: Lex, Greensill.

RICHARD EAST: Greensill for, who for these purposes, was treated by the court as Greensill, that his motivation, his evidence as essentially could be, attributed to the Greensill entities. And the court found that number one, he asked expressly for this money for this purpose. 

Also the court found that the SoftBank individuals understood that this was precisely the purpose for the money, and it never occurred to them at any point that Lex wouldn't use this money for this purpose because it was precisely to solve the Credit Suisse issue for the purposes of the equity raise. So on the evidence at least, and that obviously that evidence was tested in cross-examination, the court concluded that the SoftBank people believed, that this money was being used for that purpose and was used for that purpose, and it was only, you know, subsequently down the road that they realized that in fact it hadn't been used for that purpose. So that was really the findings of the court, notwithstanding the absence of a use of funds clause.

JOHN QUINN: Credit Suisse here brought the claim against SoftBank, the SoftBank entities, basically on a theory that they were what we would call conspirators or facilitators of hiding assets, you know, from Credit Suisse.

RICHARD EAST: Yeah. So it was a number of strings to the case. Nick, do you wanna... Sorry, you can probably expand on that.

NIKOLAS BRUCE-SMITH: No, no, it was very much against this backdrop that SoftBank was the orchestrator of all of this, was the puppet master. That it had effectively heavy-handed Greensill into entering into these transactions so that it could save Katerra, in return get a debt-free Katerra, increase its shareholding in Katerra, and that this was the motive behind all of this at the expense of Credit Suisse.

And things, for example, like the absence of a use of proceeds clause, which, again, for us was something which was explainable on the facts. The documents were all consistent as to what the money was to be used for. In the absence of that, things like that gave Credit Suisse some room and maneuvers in trial to make, to make trouble and mischief by saying, "Well, you say that this was all very clear, but if it was clear there'd be a use of proceeds clause.

In the absence of that, we should say the court should infer that this was all part of this procurement from you to harm us, because you're looking out for your own benefits at our expense, and you knew that we would suffer here. And in that sort of basis, what they tried to do and without sort of expressly saying it, was effectively pin dishonesty onto SoftBank.

They went so far as to say, "We don't need to prove dishonesty. It's not an element of the claim we need to bring against SoftBank." But they nonetheless asked the court to infer a series of facts about SoftBank's knowledge and involvement, which were akin to saying that they were a dishonest conspirator involved in the process, who had effectively made Lex Greensill undertake these transactions to their detriment and to their prejudice.

JOHN QUINN: We know, I mean, this case went to trial. I don't know how much you can say under rules in London about settlement discussions. I assume there were efforts to settle the case and avoid a trial. Is there-- well, what can you say about that?

RICHARD EAST: Probably all we can say. Yes, there were some settlement discussions, and that's probably all we can say on that.

JOHN QUINN: So, but the case went to trial and, when did it go to trial, and how long was the trial?

NIKOLAS BRUCE-SMITH: Went to trial in June 2025. It was a five-week trial, which is relatively, you know, it's a relatively sizable High Court trial in terms of number of factual witnesses. There were four witnesses of fact gave evidence, five expert witnesses, so a sizable body of sort of factual and expert evidence for a High Court trial, even a large commercial. 

RICHARD EAST: Then I'm trying to remember, the judgment came out then I think in October or November, something like that. 

NIKOLAS BRUCE-SMITH: October of 2025. 

RICHARD EAST: Yeah. 

JOHN QUINN: And, of course it was a judge trial as you have now in the UK. It wasn't a jury trial. What sort of, can you give us some color about the trial? What stands out about the whole trial. What was unique, different, memorable? I mean, you fellas have got some pretty dry financial transactions here.

You know, I'm just listening to you, I'm kinda drawing diagrams to keep track of it.

RICHARD EAST: I suppose, I mean,first and foremost, the, I mean, the trial had a lot of publicity. Every single day there were multiple members from the press attending. And I think the thing that generated a lot of their interest, and certainly is something I've never experienced before, is Lex Greensill who decided voluntarily to turn up and give evidence. Neither side...

JOHN QUINN: Neither side called him as a witness…

RICHARD EAST: Neither side called him as a witness. 

JOHN QUINN: This is to me, this is extraordinary. I've never, I've never heard of that in a US court. Both sides have their witness list, they call witnesses, and you don't have somebody show up, raise his hand saying, "I wanna testify."

RICHARD EAST: I mean, it's extraordinary in two ways. One is obviously his, his motivation, his purpose, his evidence was absolutely central to the, the Section 423 claim because everyone agreed, and it wasn't controversial, that his, motivation, his subjective motivations were the relevant subjective, motivations for the purposes of testing whether the statutory purpose test was met. So he was absolutely central. And as you say, John, he was no one's witness. He attended essentially, and both sides had an opportunity, again, very unusual, to cross-examine him. So it's very unusual where a witness is cross-examined by both parties. And...

JOHN QUINN: How does this happen? Does he have a lawyer who writes to the judge and says, "By the way, I have a client who's important to this case, and he's willing to…

RICHARD EAST: Yeah. Well, it's true that Credit Suisse were corresponding with him. They were keen to have him turn up, and they were making some legal moves to try and compel him to turn up. Although they didn't actually issue an actual subpoena for him to turn up. But so they were in communications with him and we were skeptical that he would turn up because he was at the same time simultaneously subject to proceedings in different jurisdictions where he's being sued. But in England also, what we call a disqualification proceeding, so in other words, the government prosecutor was, applying to court to have him disqualified as a director, meaning that he couldn't serve as a director of an English company, for…

JOHN QUINN: I assume there is also... I assume there was, and I don't know if there is, the prospect of potentially criminal prosecutions here.

RICHARD EAST: He was subject to criminal proceedings in I believe in Switzerland as well.

JOHN QUINN: But usually people in that circumstance are not looking for opportunities to testify in public and be cross-examined.

RICHARD EAST: Well, absolutely. We did not think he would give-- decide to give evidence for all those reasons, but he decided to turn up. He obviously decided to roll the dice and thought it was a good opportunity for him to try and exculpate himself from…and of course, I suppose if the judge had taken a good view of his evidence, it would have been very helpful to him in other, in other proceedings.

If a judge had said, "I find Mr. Greensill to be an honest witness. He was put in a very difficult situation. He did the best he could, but I still find that ultimately he wasn't dishonest or fraudulent," that might have been very helpful for him to deploy in other, in other cases.

JOHN QUINN: So that was his hope, I guess, to...if he had an opportunity to tell his story at an opportunity of his own choosing, that might be helpful to him in other pending and potentially future. 

RICHARD EAST: That is the only reason I think he kind of decided to do that. And as it turned out, it didn't go that well for him in court, and ultimately the judge concluded that certain aspects of his evidence were not reliable or didn't believe certain aspects of his evidence, and ultimately concluded that he did have the purpose, was maybe one of the purposes, but one of the purpose of his actions was to put assets beyond the reach of Credit Suisse.

So, ironically, in this case, Credit Suisse met all of the requirements of the cause of action, purpose being one of them, and ultimately still failed in the case. But anyway, that's another point. But that was probably the most extraordinary part of this trial was all of us, both sides, claimants and defendants, in trial, listening to the evidence of the person upon which the whole case could turn, and no side really knowing what he was going to say. 

Now, we felt that he would more likely be saying things that were supportive to us because he wasn't going to say, for example, "Oh, yes, I had the purpose of putting assets beyond the reach." He was more likely going to say, "I was doing the best I could. I was trying to save Greensill. I didn't have the intention of prejudicing Credit Suisse because that would have been disastrous for Greensill. I was trying to keep the business going. I was trying to raise funds. I didn't intend to hurt Credit Suisse. It turns out I was wrong and the business collapsed, and it did hurt Credit Suisse, but that wasn't my intention." So we felt he was more likely than not to give evidence that was supportive of us, which in fact he did, albeit the judge didn't believe aspects of his evidence and ultimately concluded that he did have the statutory purpose. So anyway, that's a very...

NIKOLAS BRUCE-SMITH: And then, and just to sort of add to that, in finding that he had this subjective purpose, what was sort of interesting in the court's finding was it did find that he positively... he did not positively wish to prejudice Credit Suisse. You know, he had sort of, he had good intent in one sense that he was trying to save his business.

But the court did go on to nonetheless infer that his subjective intention in entering into these transactions, the inference was that it was still going to have that effect. So it sort of found sort of this dual finding that he positively wished to try and protect creditors, but at the same time took steps that the only inference could be drawn.

JOHN QUINN: Look, if he got money from SoftBank, which was intended to pay off the Credit Suisse notes, but instead he used the money to save this affiliated German bank, that would seem like a problem.

RICHARD EAST: Well, there was a problem ultimately to the judge because the judge took the view that by the time of entering into the specific transaction that released the security, the judge effectively found that objectively he had no reason to be optimistic about the outcome for Greensill because it was clear by, I think it was the day or thirtieth or thirty-first of December, that there was very little prospect of him raising any more money, and the insolvency of Greensill became, at that point, very unlikely...sorry, very likely, and therefore the prospect of him being able to pay the notes off had reduced substantially and materially. 

So ultimately the judge found that the objective facts around Lex at that point, sort of supported the inference that he clearly had the purpose to prejudice the creditors of Greensill Limited. 

So, you're right, John, but I mean, it's interesting actually in my view, if there had been an appeal of the decision from Credit Suisse, which there wasn't ultimately, the purpose finding was actually one of the things where I thought the judge was slightly wrong on the law because there were previous cases dealing with Section 423 that essentially said that even if an individual has a dishonest purpose, so you may even be a fraudster, but if your precise purpose is not to put assets beyond the reach of creditors, then you still can't be found liable under Section 423. 

So Nick's point that the judge actually made a finding that Lex didn't have the purpose of hurting Credit Suisse. In fact, that was the complete antithesis of what he was trying to do. The fact that the judge found that and then still found there was the statutory purpose was...there was a slight, I thought, flaw in that reasoning. But ultimately, Credit Suisse didn't appeal, and it wasn't necessary for us to cross-appeal that particular point.

JOHN QUINN: Suisse made out the, all the elements of the… 

RICHARD EAST: Apart from the relief. Yeah. So and ultimately, the judge found there was a transaction at undervalue. There was the statutory purpose of putting assets beyond the reach of creditors. They were entitled to bring the claim because they were victims. So all of the statutory tests that go into a Section 423 claim, they were- effectively won on, apart from the relief section where the judge has a very, very broad discretion to assess, based on a whole different array of factors.

What the remedy should be as a consequence of the transaction undervalue, and ultimately, because really, in essence, because he found that SoftBank were kind of, in a sense, also victims because they paid over the four forty, they thought it had been deployed in the way that they were told by Lex it would be deployed. 

Ultimately, the benefits from the transaction amounted to nothing, to nothing more than a bean because everything they got out of the Katerra transaction on the bankruptcy of Katerra essentially was reduced to zero. So there was no…, they didn't walk away with a massive pot of cash. They got zero. They lost money on the Katerra bankruptcy, hundreds of millions on the Katerra, actually, and lost the four hundred and forty million they paid to Greensill and their investment in Greensill. So they lost on every front so I think, you know, just in standing back intuitively is the way I saw it day one of getting involved with this, is that it would be enormously unjust in all those circumstances then to impose liability on SoftBank on top of all of those losses across that group.

So really we were just a deep pocket that I think, Credit Suisse thought they could get some money out of you know, obviously they were victims as well, but in a...you know, SoftBank was in many respects a bigger victim of the Greensill situation than Credit Suisse.

JOHN QUINN: I mean, there were a lot of losers here. SoftBank lost, Katerra goes into bankruptcy, Greensill goes into bankruptcy, Credit Suisse disappears. 

RICHARD EAST: Yeah, no one survives. 

JOHN QUINN: No one survives all right. 

RICHARD EAST: Yeah.

JOHN QUINN: Okay, well, this is fascinating stuff. My hat's off to you for successfully litigating. Thank you, my partners, Richard East and Nikolas Bruce-Smith, partners in our London office. This is John Quinn, and this has been Law, disrupted. 

RICHARD EAST: Contact us for any Section 423 claims going forward. 

Yeah. 

JOHN QUINN: Okay.