Ti Kosmos podcast
Ti Kosmos podcast
US-China relations: strategic competitors or outright enemies? by IDIS China Program
US- China Relations: strategic competitors or outright enemies?
US-China relations are among the most important bilateral relations in the world, as noted by United States secretary of state Anthony Blinken in 2023.
Is China America's rival or enemy? What are the three main issues that the US government is monitoring regarding China? What will happen to Taiwan? How is the European Union positioned in relation to China and the US? How does China interact with authoritarian regimes and the "informal" network being formed globally?
Professor Neysun Mahboubi, Director of the Penn Project on the Future of U.S.-China Relations at the University of Pennsylvania, provides answers to these questions.
This podcast is part of the IDIS-China Program Podcast Series, in cooperation with the “Ti Kosmos Podcast.” The host of the podcast is Marilisa Anastasopoulou.
The China Program at the Institute of International Relations (IIR – IDIS) promotes the systematic study of contemporary China in Greece, aiming to provide an in-depth understanding of China’s historical evolution, contradictions, political, economic, and social processes, as well as its global role.
For more information on the IDIS-China Program please visit:
Links to audio sources used in the introduction of the podcast:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AGggLYszJYY
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQkfFIcYrds
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HIvaIgBgnWk
Aμερική και Κίνα: ανταγωνιστές ή εχθροί;
Οι σχέσεις ΗΠΑ-Κίνας είναι μία από τις σημαντικότερες διμερείς σχέσεις στον κόσμο, όπως είχε δηλώσει ο Αμερικανός Υπουργός Εξωτερικών Άντονι Μπλίνκεν το 2023.
Είναι η Κίνα ανταγωνιστής ή εχθρός της Αμερικής; Ποια είναι τα τρία βασικά θέματα που απασχολούν την αμερικανική κυβέρνηση σε σχέση με την Κίνα; Τι θα συμβεί με την Ταϊβάν; Ποια είναι η θέση της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης απέναντι στην Κίνα και τις ΗΠΑ; Πώς συνδέεται η Κίνα με τα αυταρχικά καθεστώτα και το «άτυπο» δίκτυο που δημιουργείται παγκοσμίως;
Σε αυτά τα ερωτήματα απαντά ο καθηγητής Neysun Mahboubi, διευθυντής του Προγράμματος για το «Μέλλον των Αμερικανο-Κινεζικών Σχέσεων» του Πανεπιστημίου της Πενσυλβάνια.
Αυτή η συζήτηση αποτελεί μέρος της σειράς podcast του Κινεζικού Προγράμματος του Ινστιτούτου Διεθνών Σχέσεων, σε συνεργασία με το "Ti Kosmos podcast". Παρουσιάστρια του podcast είναι η Μαριλίζα Αναστασοπούλου.
Το Κινεζικό Πρόγραμμα του Ινστιτούτου Διεθνών Σχέσεων (Ι.Δ.Ι.Σ.) προωθεί τη συστηματική μελέτη της σύγχρονης Κίνας στην Ελλάδα, επιδιώκοντας να προσφέρει μια σε βάθος κατανόηση της ιστορικής εξέλιξης, των αντιθέσεων, των πολιτικών, οικονομικών και κοινωνικών διεργασιών, καθώς και του παγκόσμιου ρόλου της σύγχρονης Κίνας.
Για περισσότερες πληροφορίες σχετικά με το Πρόγραμμα, επισκεφθείτε τη διεύθυνση:
https://chinaprogram.gr
*https://cscc.sas.upenn.edu/people/Neysun_Mahboubi
[00:00:00.830] - Marilisa Anastasopoulou
Today, we have with us Professor Naisan Mahboubi. Naisan, if I may call you. Please do. Thank you for being here with us today. We are going to discuss US-China-EU relations. That's the broader context of the discussion. Let's start with a very basic question. For many, many years, the US and and our allies have moved towards an idea that we will work with China, and China will become more democratic, and it's a partner, an opportunity. And year by year, this notion has changed. Why it has changed and where are we standing today?
[00:00:52.010] - Neysun Mahboubi
Sure. And it's such a pleasure to be here with you today. Thank you for having me on the podcast. I think there are a lot of things that have changed in the US-China relationship and in China's relationship with the Western world in particular over the past 10, 15 years. And I think there are two main variables that I pay close attention to as helping to explain the shift. One of them is that China, of course, has become much stronger economically and militarily over the last 15, 20 years. I think we all anticipated when China joined the WTO back in the late '90s, early 2000s, that it would have positive effects for China's economic development, even beyond the economic miracle of the early reform and opening period. But I think China's economic development and corresponding sense of itself on the global stage has vastly exceeded what we anticipated back then. At the same time, we, for a long time in the US, and perhaps in Europe as well, anticipated that China was moving in a direction of some greater liberalization, both in terms of its economy, but also in terms of its political system.
[00:02:16.010] - Neysun Mahboubi
And I think there was a lot of measured expectations for how far China would liberalize, but the general direction was one that we felt comfortable with. And especially in the last 10 plus years under President Xi Jinping, it's become clear that China is not only no longer moving in that direction to liberalize its economy and its political system, but is, if anything, perhaps moving backwards by the metrics that matter to us in the US and the West more generally. So as a consequence, we have a picture now of a China that is stronger economically, militarily, wants to project its power on the global stage, and is more a liberal in its economic orientation and its political orientation than at any point, in my view, of the past 40 years. So that combination of factors is one that has given us in the US, and I think also in Europe, a lot of difficulty. And that's, I think, why our policies have had to adjust in some way. Now, to what extent our adjustment is strategically wise and takes into account the possibilities of China moving in other directions in the future, we can talk about in the podcast.
[00:03:37.900] - Neysun Mahboubi
But the fact that there is some level of adjustment, I think, is very natural.
[00:03:42.490] - Marilisa Anastasopoulou
What would you say are the three most important issues from the US side when it looks at China?
[00:03:49.610] - Neysun Mahboubi
That's a great question. In fact, I think in the US, we sometimes have trouble figuring out exactly what those issues are, exactly what it is we want from China. At some level, I think it has to be said that what the US wants from China is to move in a more liberal direction, both economically and politically. Now, whether that's the right thing to want, whether that is something that the Chinese can accommodate, I think is a difficult question. But certainly that's part of our orientation towards China, hoping that China does not continue down this path of greater repression politically at home and moving away from marketization in terms of its economy. Second, I think the US is concerned about China's ambitions in East Asia, in particular. China clearly is interested in becoming a hegemonic power within East Asia. And that includes lots of different sub goals, perhaps includes unification with Taiwan, includes China's claims of sovereignty in South China Sea, includes just general projection of power in East Asia. And I think the US is concerned about all of that. Maybe those are so important, we could put them in different points. But for purposes of this conversation, I'll group that as one general point, displacing the United States as a hegemonic power in East Asia and doing all of those things that are of concern to us and our allies and partners in the region.
[00:05:40.890] - Neysun Mahboubi
The third thing, probably Probably it's fair to say that in the US, there's concern that this China that has grown more liberal at home and more ambitious on the world stage is also seeking to project a liberal value values in other parts of the world, even beyond East Asia, that China is exporting some aspect of its attitudes towards rights, towards political freedoms to other parts of the world. And doing that through its increasingly strong economic leverage, doing that through its increasing engagement in multilateral institutions and at the UN. And so that, I think, If I'm trying to summarize a lot of different concerns into three points, I would say those three. China's greater degree of illiberal movement at home, its ambitions for greater hegemony in East Asia, and then its interest in projecting illiberal values abroad more generally.
[00:06:51.460] - Marilisa Anastasopoulou
You mentioned those three points. I would like to look at the second point and the role of US in Southeast East Asia, and more particularly, I would like to ask your opinion of how serious is the threat of China invading Taiwan. But also, we talk about it, but it's not clear to me, if something happens, what would be the position of the US? I mean, to what extent the US will be willing to get involved in the area and what their strategy is in general. We should also bear in mind that there are US elections in November, and if there is a change in the President, would that change?
[00:07:38.260] - Marilisa Anastasopoulou
Too many questions.
[00:07:39.310] - Neysun Mahboubi
Sure. No, the question of Taiwan is perhaps the most difficult question in US-China relations. I don't know if it has the same resonance within Europe at the moment, but there might be increasing movement in that direction in Europe. I I think a starting point to thinking about the Taiwan issue in particular is that any war over Taiwan would be enormously destabilizing. It would be destabilizing for China. It would be destabilizing for the global economy, the global order. So I think there's a huge amount of incentive on all sides to avoid outright conflict. So I think mostly what we're talking about is how to make sure that there isn't conflict, how to have adequate deterrence on the one hand vis-a-vis China, but also to maintain adequate commitments to China that Taiwan will not declare independence to avoid putting Chinese leadership in a position where they don't have any other choice. There are some in the US who think that China has its own plan on some timetable. And you'll hear sometimes even military figures have said two years, four years. You know, different kinds of timetables for China to actually actively make the decision to upend the long-time consensus that has kept us from war.
[00:09:31.780] - Neysun Mahboubi
I tend to be with those in the US who are skeptical that China is eminently planning an invasion or even in the near future, as long as we can maintain the commitments that we agreed to when we first normalized relations with China back in the late 1970s. So that's a very complicated picture. If there is outright conflict, I think the US has been relatively clear, even within the doctrine of strategic ambiguity, that we would intervene on behalf of Taiwan. But I think the big question is just not, would we do that? But can we maintain the right combination of deterrence and commitment? And a little bit of ambiguity in there so that China does not upend this peaceful, stable coexistence that we've managed to maintain for the last 50 years and counting. So I know that's not a very clear answer, and I think that's just baked into this issue. And again, it goes to the US attitude of both saying enough about its potential defense of Taiwan and not Not only saying it, but demonstrating its capacity, including through new alliances like the AUKUS Alliance with the UK and Australia. It's closer ties with Japan, other allies in the region, but also maintaining the commitment into China that does not put the Chinese leadership in a position where for their own political legitimacy, they have no choice, no matter what the instability to invade Taiwan.
[00:11:24.330] - Neysun Mahboubi
I wouldn't build a house on that foundation, but it's worked It's worked so far, and hopefully it can continue to work, at least for the foreseeable future. You never know what politics will take us to down the road. Now, I think that's the best we can do. And I think from the US standpoint, the hope is that European allies and partners understand all of that or clear about all of that, share the same values, share the same commitment to peace in the Taiwan Straits, and share the same interest in both conveying the right amount of deterrence and commitment to maintain this very fragile edifice.
[00:12:10.920] - Marilisa Anastasopoulou
I would like a quick comment. Where does the EU stand when it comes to US-China relations? Not on Taiwan, but in general.
[00:12:21.590] - Neysun Mahboubi
In broadly. And this is something that I've been... The reason I'm here is in part because of a project that I've been working on for the last few years that basically is looking at connecting better scholars throughout Europe and scholars in the US, thinking about the policy implications of China's rise. So I think I have a much deeper sense of the European landscape because of this project for the last few years than I would have had otherwise. And I think the first point to mention is that we can analyze the EU and we can also think about the member states. We we can think about what is the degree of convergence among different European states? What's the degree of convergence between the member states and the EU? So all of these are part of your question, and we could have a very long conversation. Of course, I'll try to say a few points, a few points, which is that in broad terms, I think most European countries and the EU find themselves in the middle of this increasingly toxic US-China relationship. On the whole, most European countries and the EU are ultimately most closely aligned with the US in terms of values, in terms of overall commitments of liberal world order, but do not necessarily think everything the US is doing in this competition with China is exactly correct.
[00:13:51.700] - Neysun Mahboubi
And so I think for the EU, it offers, and again, when I say EU, all of those complexities are embedded in that. There's this, I think, opportunity to play a useful mediating role to help to stabilize relations to the US and China, because it's very clear that both US and China are lobbying the EU and European countries in particular to get to their side. And so I think that gives an opportunity for European governments and the EU to play a really productive role. And in my mind, it would help if there was convergence within the European context so that the European, whether we think of it in the member states or the EU as an entity, can play the most productive role if there's a greater degree of convergence. But of course, we see that there are different opinions within this context as well, and that complicates how much the European context can contribute to stabilization of US-China relations.
[00:14:57.490] - Marilisa Anastasopoulou
I've been listening a lot lately from analysts making this argument that there is this network of autocratic states. I'm not talking about an axis of resistance. I'm just talking about network that autocratic states cooperate in several areas and support. Do you see China in that network? Do you see China trying to be more neutral? How do you see China in that?
[00:15:27.170] - Neysun Mahboubi
I think...
[00:15:27.650] - Marilisa Anastasopoulou
Since we also have the war in Gaza.
[00:15:30.410] - Neysun Mahboubi
Sure, of course. I think China has been very consistent in its foreign policy since 1949 in that above all, what matters to China are China's own interests.
[00:15:47.430] - Neysun Mahboubi
Now, that's probably true of every country. But I think China has an exceptional degree of pragmatism when it comes to its positioning vis-a-vis other countries. It has avoided allies in the way that we often think in the West, and of course, that the Soviet Union had at its height. China's relations with other countries is always very situational and context dependent. And so even though I do think in the US, there is this notion of China spreading liberal values abroad, and there may be some concern there. I don't think it's so much that China is trying to create a new block. I don't think that's the way they view the world, but they're looking for whatever in any given context will work best for Chinese interests. And so I think we can see that dynamic play out with the current two crises, with the war in Ukraine and the war in Gaza. China is not entirely on one side or the other. Now, I think with the war in Ukraine, I think we do have some concerns that China leans a little bit more towards the Russian side. But even in the war in Ukraine, I think you can see China trying to position itself somewhere in the middle and just looking for whatever will make the most sense for China.
[00:17:07.080] - Neysun Mahboubi
That's what it ultimately is the driving logic.
[00:17:11.190] - Marilisa Anastasopoulou
Okay. And one last question. It has to do with human rights. We hear a lot, we criticize a lot China on what's going on in Xinjiang and in other areas. However, how sincere is the criticism, especially from the part of the US, when it comes to the human rights abuses in China? Is it a real criticism or it's simply use this issue to criticize China?
[00:17:39.840] - Marilisa Anastasopoulou
So it's a tool.
[00:17:40.500] - Neysun Mahboubi
I'm a legal scholar. I particularly look at the development of Chinese law over the last 40 years, in particular, since the reform and opening period. I personally am very committed to these issues. My perspective is that, first of all, human rights has always been a part of the US-China relationship, I'm going back well before our time, has never been the top priority, but has always been in the conversation for the US. I think there is certainly a lot to criticize in China, and it is in keeping with American values to do that, to call out human rights abuses, restrictions on speech, on different kinds of political freedoms. And I hope we continue to do that. There are two challenges, I think, from a US perspective. First, that there are some actors in the US context who are not typically thinking about human rights, both in terms of other countries and even at home, but are thinking of geopolitical competition with China, and will sometimes take the human rights agenda and try to use it in their landscape of geopolitical competition. And I think for those of us who have been working on human rights in China for a long time, we have to be very cautious about those kinds of people because you can't take this concern, which is a very valid and legitimate concern, but only think of it in terms of China and not think of any other context where we might care about human rights.
[00:19:23.350] - Neysun Mahboubi
And so I think for credibility, we have to be careful about that. The second point is that if China's human rights situation is going to improve, as I hope it will, it will not be because we invade China. It will not be because we have forced China. Those are not the dynamics at play here. It will be because of dynamics from within China. And I think, especially those in Washington who think through the lens of geopolitical competition, they do not understand that there are people within China who still, to this day, are working to make China a more just, a more fair society. And we have to be wise in our relations with China that does not make it impossible for those people to make some progress. Again, I don't think it's because we will change China, they will change China. But what we can do is make their landscape much more difficult if we think that it's right to block to block off all contact with China or to make China a pariah state. I think it makes that dynamic much harder. Now, of course, embedded in what I just said is a faith that I have that China's internal development is not static, that it is dynamic, that Xi Jinping is not the end of Chinese history, that there will be a post Xi Jinping, and there's lots of things that can happen.
[00:20:52.980] - Neysun Mahboubi
My preference would be for our foreign policy in the US to have that long view more than it does right now. Okay.
[00:21:01.590] - Marilisa Anastasopoulou
It has been very interesting. I mean, we could talk for hours. Let's wrap it up here. Thank you so much and hope to speak to you in the future.
[00:21:09.680] - Neysun Mahboubi
Thank you. This was a real pleasure. I really appreciate it.