Wadcast
Wadcast
#8 Social Justice & Desire | with Cara Addleman
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What does it take for us to be free people? How should we think about our desires when those desires are formed by oppressive social structures? Cara Addleman, a third-year Wadham student studying Philosophy, Politics & Economics won the College's Cheney Prize for her essay addressing these questions.
We discuss the ideas and themes of her essay, explore her own doubts about her conclusions, and have a friendly philosophical back-and-forth.
Do note that the episode contains some references to sexual assault and abuse.
You can contact Cara at cara@wadham.ox.ac.uk or in her capacity as a SU Women's Officer at su.women@wadham.ox.ac.uk
You can provide feedback on Wadcast at https://www.wadham.ox.ac.uk/wadcast
You can listen to past episodes of Wadcast on all major podcast platforms, including Apple and Spotify.
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I think it's right to say that
by having long hair
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I am furthering patriarchal norms.
It seems wrong
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and far too strong to say that
I have a duty not to.
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You're listening to Wadcast,
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a podcast from Wadham College,
University of Oxford,
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bringing you interviews,
seminars and stories from our community.
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Welcome to episode eight.
My name's Martin.
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I work in Communications,
for Wadham College. In this episode,
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I talk to Cara Addleman,
a Wadham student in her third year studying PPE.
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She won the college's
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Cheney prize for her essay
on the philosophy of social justice.
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Our congratulations to Cara.
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We talk through the ideas and themes
of her essay. Questions like “What does it take
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for us to be free people?”
and “how should we think about our desires
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when those desires are formed by oppressive
social structures. We’ll dive in in a moment.
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But before we roll the episode,
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be aware that at various points
in the conversation we do reference
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sexual assault and abuse.
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Thanks Cara for joining me today
to discuss your essay
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and broader issues around
philosophy and justice.
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Maybe you can start by just sharing a bit
about who you are, what you do at Wadham
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and what you study.
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So on.
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I'm Cara.
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I'm in my third year studying PPE,
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although economics was dropped a while ago
now, so it feels
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like a bit of a distant memory.
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And yeah outside of my degree
in the rare hours that are outside of my degree
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I’m a SU women's officer with my friend
Nia. More generally, often
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with Nia and other PPE-ers and some others
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kind of hauled up in Wadham library
or I go to SU yoga quite a lot.
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So we're going to be talking
about your Cheney prizewinning essay
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The essay deals with issues of freedom
and social
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justice, issues like what does it take
for us to be free people?
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And you defend a particular theory
of social justice.
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But before we get into the particulars
of that theory, there might be some people
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listening who wonder why theorize
about social justice at all?
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Why not just go out and tackle it?
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Easy question.
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I mean, I'm not going to try and make out
that my undergrad essay is
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somehow equivalent
to like political protest or actually
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taking a more active stance
on issues of injustice
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and also, I guess at the end of the day,
a large part of the reason
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why I wrote the essay’s just because
I think it's quite interesting,
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but I'd like to think that it's
not completely irrelevant either.
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I guess specifically,
this essay is kind of looking at cases
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where it seems like
there's an injustice involved somewhere,
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but it's not actually obvious what that is
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and what is kind of responsible
for the injustice.
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And so it's not clear
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what kind of just going out there
and tackling it would look like.
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Right.
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If we didn't first think about
why is this unjust
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in what way is it unjust
so maybe it's of some value.
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Yeah, that makes sense to me.
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One thing I was thinking about as I read
your essay is just that
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as you point out,
it's not always clear in a given case
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a) whether there is injustice going on
or if there is.
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What is the source of the injustice
that what makes
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that particular event
or interaction unjust?
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And so you kind of don't
really know what tool
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to apply to something if you don't know
what the problem is exactly.
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And maybe theorising can help us get
a clearer grasp of what the problem is.
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Maybe.
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Hopefully,
But let's assume that we're on board
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for some theorising,
at least for the purposes of the podcast.
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The particular theory of social justice
you defend is called
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the Republican theory of Social Justice.
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Could you explain what that theory is
and maybe clarify
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what “Republican” means in this context?
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Yeah.
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So it's not US Republicanism
if that's the the worry.
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So in this context, it's
basically like a theory of social justice
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as obtaining where people have
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freedom
in their interpersonal relationships.
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But freedom's understood in quite a specific
way as not being dominated.
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So this idea of like freedom of non-
domination
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and domination occurs,
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so say A would dominate B
if A has the capacity
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to interfere B’s choices
in a way that B doesn't control.
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So the Republican view doesn't require
that we’re never interfered with.
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It just requires
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that when we're interfered with, it's
kind of on our terms.
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Is that right? Yeah.
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So can you explain a bit more about what
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the difference would be, maybe
using an example between being interfered
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with not on your terms
and being interfered with on your terms?
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Yes. I’m gonna say Philip Pettit,
I always want to say petite
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but I might have his name wrong... but Philip Pettit,
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who sort of founded Republicanism
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has this quite famous example
of like an alcohol cupboard case.
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So say you decide
that you don't want to drink
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for the next week and you lock all your
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alcohol in the cupboard
and you give me the key
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and you're like, Cara, no matter what
I say to you, don't give this back to me.
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If in two days time you then come back
and ask for the key and I say, No,
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I'm interfering with your choices
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because I'm preventing you
from choosing to go and drink.
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But I'm doing
so on terms that you laid out.
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Basically,
I'm doing it under your instructions.
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And so that interference
would count as controlled for Pettit.
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And it has quite interesting
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implications
in terms of like on a state level,
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because Pettit basically tries
to argue that democracy counts
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as the citizens controlling the state’s
interference if it's...
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Yeah, right.
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Yeah.
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If it's sufficiently democratic.
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Yeah.
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So yeah, there definitely are cases
in Republicanism where you can interfere
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and that's not seen as like
inhibiting anyone's freedom.
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That's really interesting.
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Why do you prefer the Republican theory
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as any other theory
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On the Republican theory of justice
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you're dominated if you were exposed to
somebody’s capacity to interfere with you.
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But because
even if they don't actually interfere,
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but they just have the power to
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essentially that still counts
as domination on a Republican account.
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So it's quite different from, say,
like liberalism in that sense,
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which focuses
more purely on non-interference.
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And so long as people don't interfere
with your choices, you're fine
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you’re free. Republicanism can capture,
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I think, more successfully in cases
where we feel like
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there's something unjust,
but there isn't any actual interference.
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So I would say if you have a society
where, say, marital rape were legal
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and socially condoned,
and so it's kind of structurally
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supported and it's not really punished,
liberalism
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might see that as bad and it might say,
hey, we should criminalise this.
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And we should kind of socially sanction
this.
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But it's reason for doing
so would just be that in cases
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where a wife were raped by her husband,
she would be therefore interfered with.
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It's kind of a ridiculously academic way
of talking about that,
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and that would be objectionable.
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Republicanism can kind of go
one step further and say
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just the fact that he’d have the power to
is objectionable in and of itself.
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And where he acts on that power,
that's worse
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and that's kind of a greater injustice.
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But we should criminalize
and socially sanction this,
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not just to try and minimize the chances
or the probability
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of interference occurring,
but because even if interference
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never occurred, just living under
that power is objectionable.
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Okay, great. That's really helpful.
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But what your essay deals with
is a problem
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that the Republican theory faces,
like a particular objection.
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And can you explain what the problem is?
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Yeah, so I kind of talk about it as
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the problem from adaptive preferences
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so adaptive preferences
I am roughly defining
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as where the options that are available to
someone are limited by their oppression.
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And so their preference is formed
in response to that repression.
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The sort of running example is where
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women have a sexual preference
for their own subordination,
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but that preference is formed
by patriarchal social conditioning.
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I think there are, yeah, such sort of
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strong patriarchal
conditioning into these roles
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that a lot of women do basically prefer
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subordination in various ways.
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So I mean, probably the stuff
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that comes to mind is like more S&M
type thing, but also
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it's a lot broader than that.
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I might also be kind of preference
for a man to initiate a date
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rather than a woman or a man to be the one
that proposes rather than the woman.
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And so I think it's actually
quite widespread.
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Right. Okay. Yes.
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So we have these adaptive preferences,
the concept of them
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preferences taht are genuine
preferences of the person who has them,
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but nonetheless, they have been shaped
by oppressive social structures.
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So why do these adaptive preferences
cause a problem
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for the Republican theory of justice?
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So because like I spoke about earlier on
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the Republican theory of justice
interference is only problematic
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it only counts as dominating
if it's not controlled by the person.
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There'll be lots of cases
where adaptive preferences
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might lead someone to prefer
and then say consent to
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or initiate interferences
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say a particular sexual act where
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they might not have consented to it
if it weren't
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for having adaptive preferences.
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But nonetheless they do consent.
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And intuitively
that seems like a case where they control
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that interference,
just like in the alcohol cupboard case.
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And so that's not necessarily the wrong
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Well, I'm going to argue it's
not the wrong verdict, but
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it does seem to suggest that Republicanism
just has nothing to say about
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what's unjust in, for example, women
choosing to be sexually subordinate
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or people acting on their adaptive
preferences more generally.
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Yes. So if I’m following then
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when we look at a case
of an adaptive preference at work,
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like a woman
preferring to be sexually submissive
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and consenting to sexual acts
that put her in that submissive position,
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there seems to be intuitively
there's something unjust
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like around this territory,
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but it seems at least on first glance,
that the Republican theory
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cannot capture
or say anything about that injustice,
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because it seems like
in the details of the case,
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the conditions for a just
or free relationship are satisfied
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that the person
is acting with a genuine desire.
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And if they're consenting to a sexual act
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that puts them in a submissive position,
yeah, they're being interfered with.
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But it's on the basis
of their genuine preferences.
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And so we have a situation where
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intuitively we still want to say
there's something unjust about this.
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After all the preferences are kind
of formed by these oppressive structures,
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but it's not clear
what the Republican view can actually say
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about that injustice.
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Yeah. So, okay. You're summarizing this
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far more eloquently than I’m saying it in the first place
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But yeah, that's exactly it. Cool.
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You want to defend the Republican view
from this objection.
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You think that there is a good way
of critiquing the objection,
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but there's also a way to respond that
you don't think is ultimately successful.
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Yeah.
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So what's the the wrong way
to defend the Republican view?
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So I think the wrong way
is to try and argue
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that acting on adaptive preferences
and any interference
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consented to based on them actually
is unjust on a Republican account.
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So you could try and kind of push back
against this idea
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that consent equals control
and sort of say
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actually where consent is based
on adaptive preferences, it doesn't.
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And therefore,
because it would be uncontrolled
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interference, it would be domination,
it would be unjust.
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All right.
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So, sorry, to jump in.
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So you're saying that
according to this response,
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if you're consenting to something
on the basis of your adaptive preferences,
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it's not really on your terms. Yeah. Yeah.
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So that would be exactly it.
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You would have to try and argue that it's
not really the agent's true choice. Yeah,
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so I think that this response
is quite problematic
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because on the face of it,
there just clearly are cases
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where consent does
control the interference.
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So like the cases
we were just speaking about where someone
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consents to submissive sexual acts,
but say, you know,
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their partner wouldn't do that
unless they were to consent.
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It seems pretty clear there
that they do control it.
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And so to try and argue
that even in such cases, it's actually
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not the agent,
but instead kind of the social structures
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which are shaping their preferences
that controls the interference, denies
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the agency of the person
involved and denies
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the fact that from the inside
it still feels just like their preferences
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and their choosing to act on them
and also seems to kind of elide
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the distinction between someone consenting
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to an interference where their consent
is based on adaptive preferences
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and someone just not consenting,
because either way it would be
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the patriarchal social structures
which give their sexual partner
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that capacity to interfere
rather than their choice or their consent.
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And I think that hopefully it's obvious
that those are two very different cases.
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Yeah, no, that that seems right.
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So let's grant that
that’s not a very promising
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avenue for defending Republican.
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What IS a more promising route?
00:15:00:06 - 00:15:01:14
So I think
00:15:01:14 - 00:15:05:15
and try to argue not so sure
if I succeed on this one,
00:15:05:15 - 00:15:09:15
that Republicanism can still say
that there is an injustice involved.
00:15:09:15 - 00:15:13:14
It's not sort of left with nothing to say
by recognizing that when adaptive
00:15:13:14 - 00:15:17:24
preferences are formed,
that formation itself is dominating.
00:15:18:21 - 00:15:21:08
And so even then if people go on
00:15:21:08 - 00:15:24:10
to choose X, Y
or Z on the basis of those preferences
00:15:24:22 - 00:15:28:20
that need not constitute domination,
there is still domination
00:15:28:20 - 00:15:32:24
and therefore kind of a Republican idea
of injustice involved.
00:15:33:06 - 00:15:37:23
Yeah, So that sounds like what
initially motivated this problem
00:15:37:23 - 00:15:42:03
was that intuitively there's something unjust
in this like territory roughly
00:15:42:16 - 00:15:44:20
and you're saying, okay,
00:15:45:03 - 00:15:50:05
what the Republican can do
is say we shouldn't locate the injustice
00:15:50:09 - 00:15:54:09
in like a particular act of consent.
00:15:54:14 - 00:15:58:15
So it shouldn't we shouldn't
locate the injustice when, for instance, a
00:15:59:16 - 00:16:02:10
woman via her adaptive preferences,
00:16:02:18 - 00:16:06:12
consents to a sexually submissive act
00:16:07:08 - 00:16:09:20
where we should locate the injustice
00:16:09:24 - 00:16:14:21
and so say there's something
right about our intuitions is in the fact
00:16:14:21 - 00:16:17:21
that those adaptive preferences
were formed in the first place.
00:16:18:01 - 00:16:19:17
Yeah. Okay.
00:16:19:20 - 00:16:22:23
You said you're not 100%
sure that your response succeeds.
00:16:23:00 - 00:16:25:02
What are the concerns
that you have about it?
00:16:25:23 - 00:16:31:04
So kind of up until now
and at the beginning when I was explaining
00:16:31:04 - 00:16:36:07
what domination is, it's sort of this idea
that person A dominates person B
00:16:36:21 - 00:16:39:15
when they have this capacity
for uncontrolled interference
00:16:40:03 - 00:16:43:23
and where adaptive preferences are formed,
00:16:44:10 - 00:16:48:08
it might not be
that there is any person A who dominates.
00:16:48:18 - 00:16:53:01
So it might be that, you know,
there's the agent and just through
00:16:53:09 - 00:16:57:24
kind of seemingly or ostensibly
innocuous social structures
00:16:58:08 - 00:17:02:07
like the way that we’re brought up
the kind of films that we see,
00:17:02:20 - 00:17:07:11
books that we read all
present it as such that women
00:17:07:11 - 00:17:11:05
ought to be more passive and men
ought to be more active and dominant.
00:17:12:00 - 00:17:15:18
And so thereby this person acquires
adaptive
00:17:15:18 - 00:17:18:24
preferences it’s not very obvious here
00:17:19:00 - 00:17:21:02
that there’s anyone in particular who dominates her.
00:17:21:16 - 00:17:26:20
So to explain how it is still domination,
I think we need to have this concept
00:17:26:20 - 00:17:31:02
of systemic domination, which is the idea
that someone can be dominated
00:17:31:17 - 00:17:36:00
because they are systematically
disempowered relative to other agents,
00:17:36:11 - 00:17:40:19
even if there aren't any other
agents that are actually doing the dominating.
00:17:40:19 - 00:17:45:11
And I think that this does work
as a response
00:17:45:11 - 00:17:50:19
in saying that the formation of adaptive
preferences is unjust.
00:17:50:19 - 00:17:53:23
What I'm less sure about
is whether it remains unjust
00:17:53:23 - 00:17:55:08
because it involves domination
00:17:55:08 - 00:17:58:11
or whether it kind of collapses into
maybe another thing like oppression.
00:17:59:01 - 00:18:01:07
Right, Right. That's interesting.
00:18:01:07 - 00:18:02:01
Yeah.
00:18:02:01 - 00:18:08:02
So, yeah, the concern here is that
what started off as an account that
00:18:09:10 - 00:18:10:17
framed injustice as a
00:18:10:17 - 00:18:13:21
relationship between two people,
or two persons...
00:18:14:11 - 00:18:19:03
Now, to maintain your response,
you kind of have to say that injustice can
00:18:19:03 - 00:18:24:04
occur between a person and this slightly
more like diffuse group of people.
00:18:24:04 - 00:18:24:13
Yeah.
00:18:24:13 - 00:18:28:16
When no one agent bears
the full brunt of any responsibility,
00:18:28:16 - 00:18:31:22
but they all kind of participate slightly
in some diffuse way.
00:18:32:07 - 00:18:33:04
Yeah, exactly.
00:18:33:04 - 00:18:35:02
Which I think is
00:18:35:09 - 00:18:37:07
a good thing
insofar as I think that much more
00:18:37:07 - 00:18:41:15
accurately captures
how injustice is perpetrated
00:18:41:15 - 00:18:44:22
a lot of the time
or how it permeates through society.
00:18:44:22 - 00:18:49:14
But I guess the worry would be
that what made domination
00:18:49:14 - 00:18:52:18
this like distinct concept
in the first place was this idea of
00:18:53:15 - 00:18:56:03
the kind of paradigm
like master slave relationship
00:18:56:03 - 00:18:59:22
where there's someone kind of imposing
their will on somebody else.
00:18:59:22 - 00:19:01:07
So I don't think that it's
00:19:02:08 - 00:19:02:16
like a
00:19:02:16 - 00:19:06:06
flaw of a theory of social justice
to focus on,
00:19:06:12 - 00:19:10:14
like the diffuse ways that kind of power
can be exercised over people.
00:19:10:17 - 00:19:11:16
But it might just be that
00:19:11:16 - 00:19:15:21
I kind of fail to vindicate Republicanism
as that theory of social justice.
00:19:15:21 - 00:19:19:20
Like, maybe the theory
has transformed into a different theory.
00:19:20:07 - 00:19:22:15
Maybe. I'm still hoping not.
00:19:22:15 - 00:19:23:19
Yeah,
00:19:24:08 - 00:19:27:00
that is that is interesting.
00:19:28:05 - 00:19:30:20
And one of the things that you address
in the longer form
00:19:30:20 - 00:19:33:04
of your essay, which I’ve read, is
00:19:34:14 - 00:19:39:06
an objection or a concern that I had upon
like second read of your essay.
00:19:39:06 - 00:19:42:18
And then you addressed
what I was concerned about so well done on that.
00:19:42:18 - 00:19:44:19
And I was thinking, Yeah, but,
00:19:44:19 - 00:19:49:04
you know, none of our preferences
are entirely free from social control.
00:19:49:10 - 00:19:51:12
So it has to be...
00:19:52:05 - 00:19:55:04
What makes the formation
of an adaptive preference
00:19:55:04 - 00:19:58:05
unjust has to be more than just that
00:19:58:05 - 00:20:02:06
the person didn't
autonomously create them
00:20:02:06 - 00:20:06:22
in some like social void
it has to be something distinct from that.
00:20:06:24 - 00:20:11:13
So yeah, I think you appealed
to some particular criteria
00:20:11:13 - 00:20:15:13
that make adaptive preferences
the formation of them
00:20:15:13 - 00:20:18:14
an injustice,
but not some other preferences.
00:20:18:14 - 00:20:20:22
Yeah. So yeah, exactly what you're saying.
00:20:20:22 - 00:20:25:05
I mean, basically all of our preferences
are influenced by our social conditions.
00:20:25:05 - 00:20:28:07
I mean, I think I mentioned earlier,
let's say someone who votes based on what
00:20:28:07 - 00:20:32:12
their parents vote on
or if my music taste is influenced
00:20:32:12 - 00:20:35:19
by the kind of music that my friends
listen to, that kind of thing.
00:20:36:15 - 00:20:36:24
Yeah.
00:20:36:24 - 00:20:40:16
So there are case like that where it's
very obvious that social conditioning
00:20:40:16 - 00:20:45:03
is involved, but we very much wouldn't
want to say that that makes the person
00:20:45:03 - 00:20:49:03
kind of dominated or that constitutes
kind of social injustice.
00:20:49:03 - 00:20:53:12
I think we can differentiate cases
of adaptive preference formation
00:20:53:12 - 00:20:57:18
from this kind of more innocuous
preference formation because where
00:20:57:18 - 00:21:01:17
adaptive preferences are formed,
it is the case that the person
00:21:01:17 - 00:21:06:03
who forms their adaptive preferences
is kind of systematically disempowered
00:21:06:16 - 00:21:11:17
relative to another group that's empowered
by their having that preference.
00:21:11:17 - 00:21:16:02
And so to kind of give an example,
if a woman forms a preference
00:21:16:02 - 00:21:18:12
for sexual subordination,
kind of indirectly,
00:21:18:12 - 00:21:24:10
we can say that that empowers men
because it's feeding into patriarchal
00:21:24:10 - 00:21:29:01
norms where women are submissive
and those norms privilege men.
00:21:29:01 - 00:21:34:11
And so there's a sense in which by her
forming adaptive preferences,
00:21:34:17 - 00:21:38:10
not only is she not in control
of her preference formation,
00:21:38:10 - 00:21:42:07
but also others are kind of given power
relative to her.
00:21:42:10 - 00:21:45:16
So yeah, the idea
is that adaptive preferences,
00:21:45:16 - 00:21:51:03
unlike some other more innocuous kinds of preferences
formed by society, are
00:21:51:04 - 00:21:55:13
that these are ones which end up
giving one group power over another.
00:21:55:18 - 00:21:58:20
Or am I misconstruing that?
That is what I just said.
00:21:58:20 - 00:22:01:23
But I'm just debating whether or not
that's what I want to say.
00:22:01:24 - 00:22:03:07
Okay. Right. Sure
00:22:04:10 - 00:22:07:13
So I think what I want to try and argue
00:22:07:13 - 00:22:11:10
is that kind of regardless
of the consequences
00:22:12:04 - 00:22:14:13
in the very process of adaptive preference
00:22:14:13 - 00:22:19:17
formation, one group is empowered
relative to the person
00:22:19:17 - 00:22:23:00
whose preferences they are and potentially
their social group who are disempowered.
00:22:23:04 - 00:22:26:03
So in the essay,
00:22:26:03 - 00:22:29:05
I try to use this
this idea of objectification,
00:22:29:15 - 00:22:32:17
which is
I mean, it's Sally Haslanger’s definition
00:22:32:17 - 00:22:36:01
and it's quite technical
but basically the idea is that
00:22:36:06 - 00:22:41:05
if one group of persons
has like social power over another,
00:22:41:19 - 00:22:45:11
then the way that they want someone to be
00:22:45:22 - 00:22:48:24
might force
that person to actually become that way.
00:22:49:10 - 00:22:52:18
So I think the quote is something along
the lines of like men
00:22:52:18 - 00:22:55:19
wanting women to be subordinate
forces them to become subordinate.
00:22:56:10 - 00:22:57:08
And I think that
00:22:58:07 - 00:22:59:16
with a
00:22:59:16 - 00:23:03:01
suitably loose understanding
of what we mean by force here,
00:23:03:02 - 00:23:07:10
I think it is actually quite plausible
that the fact that it's benefited
00:23:07:10 - 00:23:12:09
men for women to be submissive and for men
to have more power relative to them
00:23:13:00 - 00:23:17:01
has meant that we have masses of media
00:23:17:01 - 00:23:20:16
in which that is kind of romanticized
or eroticized or promoted,
00:23:21:21 - 00:23:24:17
and therefore people's
preferences are kind of
00:23:25:19 - 00:23:27:10
formed according to that.
00:23:27:10 - 00:23:31:02
And it's the case that men's preferences
are also formed according to that.
00:23:32:00 - 00:23:35:18
But in such a case,
it's like the way that men...
00:23:36:21 - 00:23:40:00
the idea would be men wanting men
00:23:40:00 - 00:23:44:09
to be dominant causes men
to become dominant.
00:23:44:09 - 00:23:46:21
whereas if that’s the
sort of parallel quote
00:23:47:12 - 00:23:50:24
So there's not the same disempowerment
relative to another group
00:23:51:12 - 00:23:54:19
that there would be in the case of men
wanting women to be subordinate
00:23:54:19 - 00:23:56:12
forces women to become subordinate.
00:23:56:12 - 00:23:59:04
Yeah, Yeah, that makes sense.
00:23:59:08 - 00:24:03:09
We're definitely going to have to explain
like some relevant difference between
00:24:03:09 - 00:24:06:22
the formation of adaptive preferences
and just any other preferences. And
00:24:07:24 - 00:24:09:16
what you described
00:24:09:16 - 00:24:13:11
strikes me as as good a way
as any to make that distinction.
00:24:13:11 - 00:24:17:10
And I think in my mind
it returns a little bit
00:24:17:10 - 00:24:21:14
to the worry that you had
that maybe at the end of this
00:24:21:14 - 00:24:24:23
you get a really great theory of justice,
but it's just not the Republican one.
00:24:25:09 - 00:24:29:15
But yeah, the reason I say that ... my concern
is that
00:24:30:03 - 00:24:33:11
according
to the Republican theory of justice,
00:24:33:11 - 00:24:36:10
you know,
what can make something unjust is this
00:24:37:04 - 00:24:39:17
interference
with another agent not on their terms.
00:24:40:11 - 00:24:41:15
And that might be fine.
00:24:41:15 - 00:24:44:07
Like that might be sufficient
to make something unjust.
00:24:45:01 - 00:24:47:20
But it's not clear
now that that's necessary,
00:24:48:00 - 00:24:51:22
just because in the case
of adaptive preference formation,
00:24:52:08 - 00:24:55:16
it seems like what we're appealing to
now is something a little different,
00:24:55:16 - 00:25:01:00
something like power exertion,
where we're no longer talking about terms,
00:25:01:05 - 00:25:04:19
whether it's on anyone's terms,
I could be entirely mistaken.
00:25:04:20 - 00:25:06:21
No, I feel like that's a good point.
00:25:06:21 - 00:25:08:01
I will try and
00:25:09:00 - 00:25:11:13
push back. Yeah do!
00:25:12:05 - 00:25:16:15
So for Republicanism
it’s sort of always about power insofar
00:25:16:15 - 00:25:20:04
as it's the capacity
for uncontrolled interference that’s problematic
00:25:20:19 - 00:25:24:19
and I think that it is relevant
in the case of
00:25:24:19 - 00:25:28:01
adaptive preference formation that
it's not on the person's terms.
00:25:28:16 - 00:25:32:13
So if it were the case that
00:25:33:17 - 00:25:38:06
I could consent
to how my preferences are formed
00:25:38:19 - 00:25:43:08
and thereby determine the conditions
on which my preferences were formed,
00:25:43:17 - 00:25:47:06
if I could sort of say,
Oh yeah, I'm really happy
00:25:47:13 - 00:25:51:14
to be influenced by patriarchal structures
such that
00:25:52:11 - 00:25:54:24
I would prefer to have long hair,
00:25:54:24 - 00:25:57:14
then I could say, Well,
00:25:57:21 - 00:26:00:12
nothing's interfered with me
in a way that I haven't controlled.
00:26:00:23 - 00:26:04:11
I think that because our preferences
dictate what we choose
00:26:04:20 - 00:26:07:19
in the first place, it's
just not intelligible that
00:26:08:09 - 00:26:11:01
we could control
the way that our preferences are formed
00:26:11:22 - 00:26:13:14
by, say, patriarchal structures.
00:26:13:14 - 00:26:16:22
So I think that that still is doing
some work.
00:26:17:19 - 00:26:18:12
Yeah, that's helpful
00:26:18:12 - 00:26:20:09
actually, I think I follow that.
00:26:20:09 - 00:26:25:11
I think the mistake I was making
was in thinking that okay, because
00:26:26:18 - 00:26:29:04
like necessarily
00:26:29:04 - 00:26:31:08
you aren’t sort of consenting
00:26:31:08 - 00:26:34:17
to your preference formation, that the,
00:26:35:19 - 00:26:39:11
that your lack of consent
was morally irrelevant in that case.
00:26:39:14 - 00:26:43:01
On the Republican theory,
you kind of need like two things.
00:26:43:01 - 00:26:47:19
You need some like interference,
so some kind of exercise of power, say,
00:26:48:08 - 00:26:52:05
and you need for that
to not be on your terms, for that to be
00:26:52:07 - 00:26:54:21
unjust or...? The only
00:26:54:21 - 00:26:57:21
mistake is that you don't need there to be
any actual exercise of the power.
00:26:57:21 - 00:26:58:18
All right.
00:26:58:18 - 00:27:00:00
The capacity. Yes.
00:27:00:00 - 00:27:01:23
Yeah, right. True, true, true.
00:27:01:23 - 00:27:03:24
When it comes to adaptive preferences,
00:27:04:21 - 00:27:07:07
they are necessarily
00:27:07:07 - 00:27:12:12
subject to the “not on your terms” condition
in the same way that any desires
00:27:12:12 - 00:27:18:02
which are formed by societal influences
satisfy that condition.
00:27:18:03 - 00:27:20:22
So that conditioning
is like almost trivially satisfied.
00:27:21:24 - 00:27:23:04
But in the case
00:27:23:04 - 00:27:26:09
of adaptive preferences
and not more innocuous preferences,
00:27:26:09 - 00:27:30:13
you also get this capacity
or exercise of power over you.
00:27:30:13 - 00:27:34:01
All that to say, I think
your response succeeds to my worry.
00:27:35:04 - 00:27:37:02
You sound more confident than I am.
00:27:37:07 - 00:27:38:13
But that's nice.
00:27:38:13 - 00:27:39:03
Yeah. Yeah.
00:27:39:03 - 00:27:41:01
No, I think that summed it up
00:27:41:01 - 00:27:42:03
helpfully actually.
00:27:42:03 - 00:27:45:03
Cool. Well, let's tie things together.
00:27:45:15 - 00:27:50:19
What does all this show us about justice more broadly?
Scary question.
00:27:50:19 - 00:27:55:01
I think it raises
some quite interesting questions
00:27:55:01 - 00:27:59:21
about the extent of our responsibility
to combat injustice
00:28:00:06 - 00:28:01:15
that I think on the face of it
00:28:01:15 - 00:28:05:10
we’d want to say that wherever we are
responsible for perpetuating injustice,
00:28:05:19 - 00:28:08:12
we ought not to do that
and we ought to act differently.
00:28:08:18 - 00:28:12:04
But once we see that...
“once we see” - that’s a very confident
00:28:12:04 - 00:28:15:22
way of assuming
my argument works, if we see that
00:28:17:01 - 00:28:20:13
the formation of adaptive practices
is unjust,
00:28:20:13 - 00:28:26:22
then there are so many kind of small
and seemingly harmless ways that
00:28:26:22 - 00:28:30:12
we all contribute to forming one another's
adaptive preferences all the time.
00:28:30:24 - 00:28:33:04
Like I mentioned earlier,
I have long hair.
00:28:33:13 - 00:28:37:04
Like if I have a daughter and I'm
wearing makeup and have my hair long,
00:28:37:14 - 00:28:41:06
then that might reinforce to her
that that's how a woman ought to dress
00:28:41:06 - 00:28:43:15
and that then perpetuates
patriarchal norms.
00:28:44:22 - 00:28:48:12
And so I think it's right to say that
00:28:49:11 - 00:28:52:16
by having long hair,
I am furthering patriarchal norms.
00:28:53:01 - 00:28:54:24
It seems wrong
00:28:54:24 - 00:28:58:14
and far too strong to say that,
like I have a duty not to.
00:28:58:20 - 00:29:00:00
How dare you
00:29:00:00 - 00:29:03:14
So yeah, I think there's
some interesting questions
00:29:03:14 - 00:29:07:19
there about kind of more broadly,
00:29:07:19 - 00:29:12:21
do our actions have to be harmful in order
for us to have a duty not to act
00:29:12:21 - 00:29:17:15
in that way or where we kind of contribute
to injustice in like more subtle ways?
00:29:18:13 - 00:29:19:04
Yeah, Yeah.
00:29:19:04 - 00:29:22:20
What's our responsibility
for not doing that basically?
00:29:22:20 - 00:29:25:16
Really good, good question.
00:29:25:20 - 00:29:30:03
And to end on a lighter note,
what's your favourite thing about Wadham?
00:29:31:10 - 00:29:34:08
the people
can I say that? you absolutely can.
00:29:34:16 - 00:29:38:17
And yeah, the lovely people of Wadham.
Wonderful answer.
00:29:39:00 - 00:29:41:19
And yeah,
if people want to get in touch with you
00:29:41:20 - 00:29:47:18
either to chat about your ideas
or to reach out to you in your role
00:29:47:18 - 00:29:52:04
as women's officer in the SU
how is best for them to do that?
00:29:53:15 - 00:29:55:19
Probably email me.
00:29:55:19 - 00:29:59:14
I mean, my Wadham email’s
just my name, or if it was about
00:30:00:05 - 00:30:02:13
SU women's stuff,
there's an su.women email.
00:30:03:05 - 00:30:04:05
Yeah. Sure,
00:30:04:05 - 00:30:08:06
I'll include your email in the show notes.
00:30:08:17 - 00:30:09:06
Great.
00:30:09:06 - 00:30:11:18
And congratulations again
on winning the essay prize
00:30:11:18 - 00:30:15:16
and thank you for sharing it
with the Wadham community.
00:30:15:16 - 00:30:17:15
Thanks for your time.
Thanks for having me.
00:30:17:15 - 00:30:19:05
Thank you for listening.
00:30:19:05 - 00:30:21:13
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00:30:21:16 - 00:30:24:06
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00:30:24:24 - 00:30:27:18
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00:30:28:02 - 00:30:31:18
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