Wadcast

#8 Social Justice & Desire | with Cara Addleman

Wadham College, University of Oxford Episode 8

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0:00 | 30:54

What does it take for us to be free people? How should we think about our desires when those desires are formed by oppressive social structures? Cara Addleman, a third-year Wadham student studying Philosophy, Politics & Economics won the College's Cheney Prize for her essay addressing these questions.

We discuss the ideas and themes of her essay, explore her own doubts about her conclusions, and have a friendly philosophical back-and-forth. 

 Do note that the episode contains some references to sexual assault and abuse. 

You can contact Cara at cara@wadham.ox.ac.uk or in her capacity as a SU Women's Officer at su.women@wadham.ox.ac.uk

You can provide feedback on Wadcast at https://www.wadham.ox.ac.uk/wadcast

You can listen to past episodes of Wadcast on all major podcast platforms, including Apple and Spotify.


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I think it's right to say that by having long hair

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I am furthering patriarchal norms. It seems wrong

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and far too strong to say that I have a duty not to.

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You're listening to Wadcast,

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a podcast from Wadham College, University of Oxford,

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bringing you interviews, seminars and stories from our community.

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Welcome to episode eight. My name's Martin.

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I work in Communications, for Wadham College. In this episode,

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I talk to Cara Addleman, a Wadham student in her third year studying PPE.

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She won the college's

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Cheney prize for her essay on the philosophy of social justice.

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Our congratulations to Cara.

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We talk through the ideas and themes of her essay. Questions like “What does it take

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for us to be free people?” and “how should we think about our desires

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when those desires are formed by oppressive social structures. We’ll dive in in a moment.

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But before we roll the episode,

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be aware that at various points in the conversation we do reference

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sexual assault and abuse.

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Thanks Cara for joining me today to discuss your essay

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and broader issues around philosophy and justice.

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Maybe you can start by just sharing a bit about who you are, what you do at Wadham

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and what you study.

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So on.

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I'm Cara.

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I'm in my third year studying PPE,

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although economics was dropped a while ago now, so it feels

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like a bit of a distant memory.

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And yeah outside of my degree in the rare hours that are outside of my degree

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I’m a SU women's officer with my friend Nia. More generally, often

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with Nia and other PPE-ers and some others

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kind of hauled up in Wadham library or I go to SU yoga quite a lot.

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So we're going to be talking about your Cheney prizewinning essay

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The essay deals with issues of freedom and social

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justice, issues like what does it take for us to be free people?

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And you defend a particular theory of social justice.

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But before we get into the particulars of that theory, there might be some people

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listening who wonder why theorize about social justice at all?

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Why not just go out and tackle it?

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Easy question.

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I mean, I'm not going to try and make out that my undergrad essay is

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somehow equivalent to like political protest or actually

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taking a more active stance on issues of injustice

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and also, I guess at the end of the day, a large part of the reason

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why I wrote the essay’s just because I think it's quite interesting,

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but I'd like to think that it's not completely irrelevant either.

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I guess specifically, this essay is kind of looking at cases

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where it seems like there's an injustice involved somewhere,

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but it's not actually obvious what that is

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and what is kind of responsible for the injustice.

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And so it's not clear

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what kind of just going out there and tackling it would look like.

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Right.

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If we didn't first think about why is this unjust

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in what way is it unjust so maybe it's of some value.

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Yeah, that makes sense to me.

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One thing I was thinking about as I read your essay is just that

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as you point out, it's not always clear in a given case

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a) whether there is injustice going on or if there is.

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What is the source of the injustice that what makes

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that particular event or interaction unjust?

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And so you kind of don't really know what tool

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to apply to something if you don't know what the problem is exactly.

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And maybe theorising can help us get a clearer grasp of what the problem is.

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Maybe.

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Hopefully, But let's assume that we're on board

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for some theorising, at least for the purposes of the podcast.

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The particular theory of social justice you defend is called

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the Republican theory of Social Justice.

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Could you explain what that theory is and maybe clarify

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what “Republican” means in this context?

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Yeah.

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So it's not US Republicanism if that's the the worry.

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So in this context, it's basically like a theory of social justice

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as obtaining where people have

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freedom in their interpersonal relationships.

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But freedom's understood in quite a specific way as not being dominated.

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So this idea of like freedom of non- domination

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and domination occurs,

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so say A would dominate B if A has the capacity

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to interfere B’s choices in a way that B doesn't control.

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So the Republican view doesn't require that we’re never interfered with.

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It just requires

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that when we're interfered with, it's kind of on our terms.

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Is that right? Yeah.

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So can you explain a bit more about what

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the difference would be, maybe using an example between being interfered

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with not on your terms and being interfered with on your terms?

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Yes. I’m gonna say Philip Pettit, I always want to say petite

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but I might have his name wrong... but Philip Pettit,

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who sort of founded Republicanism

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has this quite famous example of like an alcohol cupboard case.

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So say you decide that you don't want to drink

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for the next week and you lock all your

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alcohol in the cupboard and you give me the key

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and you're like, Cara, no matter what I say to you, don't give this back to me.

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If in two days time you then come back and ask for the key and I say, No,

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I'm interfering with your choices

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because I'm preventing you from choosing to go and drink.

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But I'm doing so on terms that you laid out.

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Basically, I'm doing it under your instructions.

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And so that interference would count as controlled for Pettit.

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And it has quite interesting

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implications in terms of like on a state level,

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because Pettit basically tries to argue that democracy counts

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as the citizens controlling the state’s interference if it's...

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Yeah, right.

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Yeah.

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If it's sufficiently democratic.

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Yeah.

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So yeah, there definitely are cases in Republicanism where you can interfere

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and that's not seen as like inhibiting anyone's freedom.

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That's really interesting.

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Why do you prefer the Republican theory

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as any other theory

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On the Republican theory of justice

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you're dominated if you were exposed to somebody’s capacity to interfere with you.

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But because even if they don't actually interfere,

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but they just have the power to

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essentially that still counts as domination on a Republican account.

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So it's quite different from, say, like liberalism in that sense,

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which focuses more purely on non-interference.

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And so long as people don't interfere with your choices, you're fine

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you’re free. Republicanism can capture,

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I think, more successfully in cases where we feel like

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there's something unjust, but there isn't any actual interference.

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So I would say if you have a society where, say, marital rape were legal

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and socially condoned, and so it's kind of structurally

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supported and it's not really punished, liberalism

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might see that as bad and it might say, hey, we should criminalise this.

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And we should kind of socially sanction this.

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But it's reason for doing so would just be that in cases

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where a wife were raped by her husband, she would be therefore interfered with.

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It's kind of a ridiculously academic way of talking about that,

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and that would be objectionable.

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Republicanism can kind of go one step further and say

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just the fact that he’d have the power to is objectionable in and of itself.

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And where he acts on that power, that's worse

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and that's kind of a greater injustice.

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But we should criminalize and socially sanction this,

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not just to try and minimize the chances or the probability

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of interference occurring, but because even if interference

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never occurred, just living under that power is objectionable.

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Okay, great. That's really helpful.

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But what your essay deals with is a problem

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that the Republican theory faces, like a particular objection.

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And can you explain what the problem is?

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Yeah, so I kind of talk about it as

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the problem from adaptive preferences

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so adaptive preferences I am roughly defining

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as where the options that are available to someone are limited by their oppression.

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And so their preference is formed in response to that repression.

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The sort of running example is where

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women have a sexual preference for their own subordination,

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but that preference is formed by patriarchal social conditioning.

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I think there are, yeah, such sort of

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strong patriarchal conditioning into these roles

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that a lot of women do basically prefer

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subordination in various ways.

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So I mean, probably the stuff

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that comes to mind is like more S&M type thing, but also

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it's a lot broader than that.

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I might also be kind of preference for a man to initiate a date

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rather than a woman or a man to be the one that proposes rather than the woman.

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And so I think it's actually quite widespread.

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Right. Okay. Yes.

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So we have these adaptive preferences, the concept of them

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preferences taht are genuine preferences of the person who has them,

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but nonetheless, they have been shaped by oppressive social structures.

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So why do these adaptive preferences cause a problem

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for the Republican theory of justice?

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So because like I spoke about earlier on

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the Republican theory of justice interference is only problematic

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it only counts as dominating if it's not controlled by the person.

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There'll be lots of cases where adaptive preferences

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might lead someone to prefer and then say consent to

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or initiate interferences

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say a particular sexual act where

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they might not have consented to it if it weren't

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for having adaptive preferences.

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But nonetheless they do consent.

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And intuitively that seems like a case where they control

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that interference, just like in the alcohol cupboard case.

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And so that's not necessarily the wrong

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Well, I'm going to argue it's not the wrong verdict, but

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it does seem to suggest that Republicanism just has nothing to say about

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what's unjust in, for example, women choosing to be sexually subordinate

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or people acting on their adaptive preferences more generally.

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Yes. So if I’m following then

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when we look at a case of an adaptive preference at work,

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like a woman preferring to be sexually submissive

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and consenting to sexual acts that put her in that submissive position,

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there seems to be intuitively there's something unjust

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like around this territory,

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but it seems at least on first glance, that the Republican theory

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cannot capture or say anything about that injustice,

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because it seems like in the details of the case,

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the conditions for a just or free relationship are satisfied

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that the person is acting with a genuine desire.

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And if they're consenting to a sexual act

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that puts them in a submissive position, yeah, they're being interfered with.

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But it's on the basis of their genuine preferences.

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And so we have a situation where

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intuitively we still want to say there's something unjust about this.

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After all the preferences are kind of formed by these oppressive structures,

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but it's not clear what the Republican view can actually say

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about that injustice.

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Yeah. So, okay. You're summarizing this

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far more eloquently than I’m saying it in the first place

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But yeah, that's exactly it. Cool.

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You want to defend the Republican view from this objection.

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You think that there is a good way of critiquing the objection,

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but there's also a way to respond that you don't think is ultimately successful.

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Yeah.

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So what's the the wrong way to defend the Republican view?

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So I think the wrong way is to try and argue

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that acting on adaptive preferences and any interference

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consented to based on them actually is unjust on a Republican account.

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So you could try and kind of push back against this idea

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that consent equals control and sort of say

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actually where consent is based on adaptive preferences, it doesn't.

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And therefore, because it would be uncontrolled

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interference, it would be domination, it would be unjust.

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All right.

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So, sorry, to jump in.

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So you're saying that according to this response,

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if you're consenting to something on the basis of your adaptive preferences,

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it's not really on your terms. Yeah. Yeah.

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So that would be exactly it.

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You would have to try and argue that it's not really the agent's true choice. Yeah,

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so I think that this response is quite problematic

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because on the face of it, there just clearly are cases

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where consent does control the interference.

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So like the cases we were just speaking about where someone

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consents to submissive sexual acts, but say, you know,

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their partner wouldn't do that unless they were to consent.

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It seems pretty clear there that they do control it.

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And so to try and argue that even in such cases, it's actually

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not the agent, but instead kind of the social structures

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which are shaping their preferences that controls the interference, denies

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the agency of the person involved and denies

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the fact that from the inside it still feels just like their preferences

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and their choosing to act on them and also seems to kind of elide

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the distinction between someone consenting

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to an interference where their consent is based on adaptive preferences

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and someone just not consenting, because either way it would be

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the patriarchal social structures which give their sexual partner

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that capacity to interfere rather than their choice or their consent.

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And I think that hopefully it's obvious that those are two very different cases.

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Yeah, no, that that seems right.

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So let's grant that that’s not a very promising

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avenue for defending Republican.

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What IS a more promising route?

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So I think

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and try to argue not so sure if I succeed on this one,

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that Republicanism can still say that there is an injustice involved.

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It's not sort of left with nothing to say by recognizing that when adaptive

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preferences are formed, that formation itself is dominating.

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And so even then if people go on

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to choose X, Y or Z on the basis of those preferences

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that need not constitute domination, there is still domination

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and therefore kind of a Republican idea of injustice involved.

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Yeah, So that sounds like what initially motivated this problem

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was that intuitively there's something unjust in this like territory roughly

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and you're saying, okay,

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what the Republican can do is say we shouldn't locate the injustice

00:15:50:09 - 00:15:54:09
in like a particular act of consent.

00:15:54:14 - 00:15:58:15
So it shouldn't we shouldn't locate the injustice when, for instance, a

00:15:59:16 - 00:16:02:10
woman via her adaptive preferences,

00:16:02:18 - 00:16:06:12
consents to a sexually submissive act

00:16:07:08 - 00:16:09:20
where we should locate the injustice

00:16:09:24 - 00:16:14:21
and so say there's something right about our intuitions is in the fact

00:16:14:21 - 00:16:17:21
that those adaptive preferences were formed in the first place.

00:16:18:01 - 00:16:19:17
Yeah. Okay.

00:16:19:20 - 00:16:22:23
You said you're not 100% sure that your response succeeds.

00:16:23:00 - 00:16:25:02
What are the concerns that you have about it?

00:16:25:23 - 00:16:31:04
So kind of up until now and at the beginning when I was explaining

00:16:31:04 - 00:16:36:07
what domination is, it's sort of this idea that person A dominates person B

00:16:36:21 - 00:16:39:15
when they have this capacity for uncontrolled interference

00:16:40:03 - 00:16:43:23
and where adaptive preferences are formed,

00:16:44:10 - 00:16:48:08
it might not be that there is any person A who dominates.

00:16:48:18 - 00:16:53:01
So it might be that, you know, there's the agent and just through

00:16:53:09 - 00:16:57:24
kind of seemingly or ostensibly innocuous social structures

00:16:58:08 - 00:17:02:07
like the way that we’re brought up the kind of films that we see,

00:17:02:20 - 00:17:07:11
books that we read all present it as such that women

00:17:07:11 - 00:17:11:05
ought to be more passive and men ought to be more active and dominant.

00:17:12:00 - 00:17:15:18
And so thereby this person acquires adaptive

00:17:15:18 - 00:17:18:24
preferences it’s not very obvious here

00:17:19:00 - 00:17:21:02
that there’s anyone in particular who dominates her.

00:17:21:16 - 00:17:26:20
So to explain how it is still domination, I think we need to have this concept

00:17:26:20 - 00:17:31:02
of systemic domination, which is the idea that someone can be dominated

00:17:31:17 - 00:17:36:00
because they are systematically disempowered relative to other agents,

00:17:36:11 - 00:17:40:19
even if there aren't any other agents that are actually doing the dominating.

00:17:40:19 - 00:17:45:11
And I think that this does work as a response

00:17:45:11 - 00:17:50:19
in saying that the formation of adaptive preferences is unjust.

00:17:50:19 - 00:17:53:23
What I'm less sure about is whether it remains unjust

00:17:53:23 - 00:17:55:08
because it involves domination

00:17:55:08 - 00:17:58:11
or whether it kind of collapses into maybe another thing like oppression.

00:17:59:01 - 00:18:01:07
Right, Right. That's interesting.

00:18:01:07 - 00:18:02:01
Yeah.

00:18:02:01 - 00:18:08:02
So, yeah, the concern here is that what started off as an account that

00:18:09:10 - 00:18:10:17
framed injustice as a

00:18:10:17 - 00:18:13:21
relationship between two people, or two persons...

00:18:14:11 - 00:18:19:03
Now, to maintain your response, you kind of have to say that injustice can

00:18:19:03 - 00:18:24:04
occur between a person and this slightly more like diffuse group of people.

00:18:24:04 - 00:18:24:13
Yeah.

00:18:24:13 - 00:18:28:16
When no one agent bears the full brunt of any responsibility,

00:18:28:16 - 00:18:31:22
but they all kind of participate slightly in some diffuse way.

00:18:32:07 - 00:18:33:04
Yeah, exactly.

00:18:33:04 - 00:18:35:02
Which I think is

00:18:35:09 - 00:18:37:07
a good thing insofar as I think that much more

00:18:37:07 - 00:18:41:15
accurately captures how injustice is perpetrated

00:18:41:15 - 00:18:44:22
a lot of the time or how it permeates through society.

00:18:44:22 - 00:18:49:14
But I guess the worry would be that what made domination

00:18:49:14 - 00:18:52:18
this like distinct concept in the first place was this idea of

00:18:53:15 - 00:18:56:03
the kind of paradigm like master slave relationship

00:18:56:03 - 00:18:59:22
where there's someone kind of imposing their will on somebody else.

00:18:59:22 - 00:19:01:07
So I don't think that it's

00:19:02:08 - 00:19:02:16
like a

00:19:02:16 - 00:19:06:06
flaw of a theory of social justice to focus on,

00:19:06:12 - 00:19:10:14
like the diffuse ways that kind of power can be exercised over people.

00:19:10:17 - 00:19:11:16
But it might just be that

00:19:11:16 - 00:19:15:21
I kind of fail to vindicate Republicanism as that theory of social justice.

00:19:15:21 - 00:19:19:20
Like, maybe the theory has transformed into a different theory.

00:19:20:07 - 00:19:22:15
Maybe. I'm still hoping not.

00:19:22:15 - 00:19:23:19
Yeah,

00:19:24:08 - 00:19:27:00
that is that is interesting.

00:19:28:05 - 00:19:30:20
And one of the things that you address in the longer form

00:19:30:20 - 00:19:33:04
of your essay, which I’ve read, is

00:19:34:14 - 00:19:39:06
an objection or a concern that I had upon like second read of your essay.

00:19:39:06 - 00:19:42:18
And then you addressed what I was concerned about so well done on that.

00:19:42:18 - 00:19:44:19
And I was thinking, Yeah, but,

00:19:44:19 - 00:19:49:04
you know, none of our preferences are entirely free from social control.

00:19:49:10 - 00:19:51:12
So it has to be...

00:19:52:05 - 00:19:55:04
What makes the formation of an adaptive preference

00:19:55:04 - 00:19:58:05
unjust has to be more than just that

00:19:58:05 - 00:20:02:06
the person didn't autonomously create them

00:20:02:06 - 00:20:06:22
in some like social void it has to be something distinct from that.

00:20:06:24 - 00:20:11:13
So yeah, I think you appealed to some particular criteria

00:20:11:13 - 00:20:15:13
that make adaptive preferences the formation of them

00:20:15:13 - 00:20:18:14
an injustice, but not some other preferences.

00:20:18:14 - 00:20:20:22
Yeah. So yeah, exactly what you're saying.

00:20:20:22 - 00:20:25:05
I mean, basically all of our preferences are influenced by our social conditions.

00:20:25:05 - 00:20:28:07
I mean, I think I mentioned earlier, let's say someone who votes based on what

00:20:28:07 - 00:20:32:12
their parents vote on or if my music taste is influenced

00:20:32:12 - 00:20:35:19
by the kind of music that my friends listen to, that kind of thing.

00:20:36:15 - 00:20:36:24
Yeah.

00:20:36:24 - 00:20:40:16
So there are case like that where it's very obvious that social conditioning

00:20:40:16 - 00:20:45:03
is involved, but we very much wouldn't want to say that that makes the person

00:20:45:03 - 00:20:49:03
kind of dominated or that constitutes kind of social injustice.

00:20:49:03 - 00:20:53:12
I think we can differentiate cases of adaptive preference formation

00:20:53:12 - 00:20:57:18
from this kind of more innocuous preference formation because where

00:20:57:18 - 00:21:01:17
adaptive preferences are formed, it is the case that the person

00:21:01:17 - 00:21:06:03
who forms their adaptive preferences is kind of systematically disempowered

00:21:06:16 - 00:21:11:17
relative to another group that's empowered by their having that preference.

00:21:11:17 - 00:21:16:02
And so to kind of give an example, if a woman forms a preference

00:21:16:02 - 00:21:18:12
for sexual subordination, kind of indirectly,

00:21:18:12 - 00:21:24:10
we can say that that empowers men because it's feeding into patriarchal

00:21:24:10 - 00:21:29:01
norms where women are submissive and those norms privilege men.

00:21:29:01 - 00:21:34:11
And so there's a sense in which by her forming adaptive preferences,

00:21:34:17 - 00:21:38:10
not only is she not in control of her preference formation,

00:21:38:10 - 00:21:42:07
but also others are kind of given power relative to her.

00:21:42:10 - 00:21:45:16
So yeah, the idea is that adaptive preferences,

00:21:45:16 - 00:21:51:03
unlike some other more innocuous kinds of preferences formed by society, are

00:21:51:04 - 00:21:55:13
that these are ones which end up giving one group power over another.

00:21:55:18 - 00:21:58:20
Or am I misconstruing that? That is what I just said.

00:21:58:20 - 00:22:01:23
But I'm just debating whether or not that's what I want to say.

00:22:01:24 - 00:22:03:07
Okay. Right. Sure

00:22:04:10 - 00:22:07:13
So I think what I want to try and argue

00:22:07:13 - 00:22:11:10
is that kind of regardless of the consequences

00:22:12:04 - 00:22:14:13
in the very process of adaptive preference

00:22:14:13 - 00:22:19:17
formation, one group is empowered relative to the person

00:22:19:17 - 00:22:23:00
whose preferences they are and potentially their social group who are disempowered.

00:22:23:04 - 00:22:26:03
So in the essay,

00:22:26:03 - 00:22:29:05
I try to use this this idea of objectification,

00:22:29:15 - 00:22:32:17
which is I mean, it's Sally Haslanger’s definition

00:22:32:17 - 00:22:36:01
and it's quite technical but basically the idea is that

00:22:36:06 - 00:22:41:05
if one group of persons has like social power over another,

00:22:41:19 - 00:22:45:11
then the way that they want someone to be

00:22:45:22 - 00:22:48:24
might force that person to actually become that way.

00:22:49:10 - 00:22:52:18
So I think the quote is something along the lines of like men

00:22:52:18 - 00:22:55:19
wanting women to be subordinate forces them to become subordinate.

00:22:56:10 - 00:22:57:08
And I think that

00:22:58:07 - 00:22:59:16
with a

00:22:59:16 - 00:23:03:01
suitably loose understanding of what we mean by force here,

00:23:03:02 - 00:23:07:10
I think it is actually quite plausible that the fact that it's benefited

00:23:07:10 - 00:23:12:09
men for women to be submissive and for men to have more power relative to them

00:23:13:00 - 00:23:17:01
has meant that we have masses of media

00:23:17:01 - 00:23:20:16
in which that is kind of romanticized or eroticized or promoted,

00:23:21:21 - 00:23:24:17
and therefore people's preferences are kind of

00:23:25:19 - 00:23:27:10
formed according to that.

00:23:27:10 - 00:23:31:02
And it's the case that men's preferences are also formed according to that.

00:23:32:00 - 00:23:35:18
But in such a case, it's like the way that men...

00:23:36:21 - 00:23:40:00
the idea would be men wanting men

00:23:40:00 - 00:23:44:09
to be dominant causes men to become dominant.

00:23:44:09 - 00:23:46:21
whereas if that’s the sort of parallel quote

00:23:47:12 - 00:23:50:24
So there's not the same disempowerment relative to another group

00:23:51:12 - 00:23:54:19
that there would be in the case of men wanting women to be subordinate

00:23:54:19 - 00:23:56:12
forces women to become subordinate.

00:23:56:12 - 00:23:59:04
Yeah, Yeah, that makes sense.

00:23:59:08 - 00:24:03:09
We're definitely going to have to explain like some relevant difference between

00:24:03:09 - 00:24:06:22
the formation of adaptive preferences and just any other preferences. And

00:24:07:24 - 00:24:09:16
what you described

00:24:09:16 - 00:24:13:11
strikes me as as good a way as any to make that distinction.

00:24:13:11 - 00:24:17:10
And I think in my mind it returns a little bit

00:24:17:10 - 00:24:21:14
to the worry that you had that maybe at the end of this

00:24:21:14 - 00:24:24:23
you get a really great theory of justice, but it's just not the Republican one.

00:24:25:09 - 00:24:29:15
But yeah, the reason I say that ... my concern is that

00:24:30:03 - 00:24:33:11
according to the Republican theory of justice,

00:24:33:11 - 00:24:36:10
you know, what can make something unjust is this

00:24:37:04 - 00:24:39:17
interference with another agent not on their terms.

00:24:40:11 - 00:24:41:15
And that might be fine.

00:24:41:15 - 00:24:44:07
Like that might be sufficient to make something unjust.

00:24:45:01 - 00:24:47:20
But it's not clear now that that's necessary,

00:24:48:00 - 00:24:51:22
just because in the case of adaptive preference formation,

00:24:52:08 - 00:24:55:16
it seems like what we're appealing to now is something a little different,

00:24:55:16 - 00:25:01:00
something like power exertion, where we're no longer talking about terms,

00:25:01:05 - 00:25:04:19
whether it's on anyone's terms, I could be entirely mistaken.

00:25:04:20 - 00:25:06:21
No, I feel like that's a good point.

00:25:06:21 - 00:25:08:01
I will try and

00:25:09:00 - 00:25:11:13
push back. Yeah do!

00:25:12:05 - 00:25:16:15
So for Republicanism it’s sort of always about power insofar

00:25:16:15 - 00:25:20:04
as it's the capacity for uncontrolled interference that’s problematic

00:25:20:19 - 00:25:24:19
and I think that it is relevant in the case of

00:25:24:19 - 00:25:28:01
adaptive preference formation that it's not on the person's terms.

00:25:28:16 - 00:25:32:13
So if it were the case that

00:25:33:17 - 00:25:38:06
I could consent to how my preferences are formed

00:25:38:19 - 00:25:43:08
and thereby determine the conditions on which my preferences were formed,

00:25:43:17 - 00:25:47:06
if I could sort of say, Oh yeah, I'm really happy

00:25:47:13 - 00:25:51:14
to be influenced by patriarchal structures such that

00:25:52:11 - 00:25:54:24
I would prefer to have long hair,

00:25:54:24 - 00:25:57:14
then I could say, Well,

00:25:57:21 - 00:26:00:12
nothing's interfered with me in a way that I haven't controlled.

00:26:00:23 - 00:26:04:11
I think that because our preferences dictate what we choose

00:26:04:20 - 00:26:07:19
in the first place, it's just not intelligible that

00:26:08:09 - 00:26:11:01
we could control the way that our preferences are formed

00:26:11:22 - 00:26:13:14
by, say, patriarchal structures.

00:26:13:14 - 00:26:16:22
So I think that that still is doing some work.

00:26:17:19 - 00:26:18:12
Yeah, that's helpful

00:26:18:12 - 00:26:20:09
actually, I think I follow that.

00:26:20:09 - 00:26:25:11
I think the mistake I was making was in thinking that okay, because

00:26:26:18 - 00:26:29:04
like necessarily

00:26:29:04 - 00:26:31:08
you aren’t sort of consenting

00:26:31:08 - 00:26:34:17
to your preference formation, that the,

00:26:35:19 - 00:26:39:11
that your lack of consent was morally irrelevant in that case.

00:26:39:14 - 00:26:43:01
On the Republican theory, you kind of need like two things.

00:26:43:01 - 00:26:47:19
You need some like interference, so some kind of exercise of power, say,

00:26:48:08 - 00:26:52:05
and you need for that to not be on your terms, for that to be

00:26:52:07 - 00:26:54:21
unjust or...? The only

00:26:54:21 - 00:26:57:21
mistake is that you don't need there to be any actual exercise of the power.

00:26:57:21 - 00:26:58:18
All right.

00:26:58:18 - 00:27:00:00
The capacity. Yes.

00:27:00:00 - 00:27:01:23
Yeah, right. True, true, true.

00:27:01:23 - 00:27:03:24
When it comes to adaptive preferences,

00:27:04:21 - 00:27:07:07
they are necessarily

00:27:07:07 - 00:27:12:12
subject to the “not on your terms” condition in the same way that any desires

00:27:12:12 - 00:27:18:02
which are formed by societal influences satisfy that condition.

00:27:18:03 - 00:27:20:22
So that conditioning is like almost trivially satisfied.

00:27:21:24 - 00:27:23:04
But in the case

00:27:23:04 - 00:27:26:09
of adaptive preferences and not more innocuous preferences,

00:27:26:09 - 00:27:30:13
you also get this capacity or exercise of power over you.

00:27:30:13 - 00:27:34:01
All that to say, I think your response succeeds to my worry.

00:27:35:04 - 00:27:37:02
You sound more confident than I am.

00:27:37:07 - 00:27:38:13
But that's nice.

00:27:38:13 - 00:27:39:03
Yeah. Yeah.

00:27:39:03 - 00:27:41:01
No, I think that summed it up

00:27:41:01 - 00:27:42:03
helpfully actually.

00:27:42:03 - 00:27:45:03
Cool. Well, let's tie things together.

00:27:45:15 - 00:27:50:19
What does all this show us about justice more broadly? Scary question.

00:27:50:19 - 00:27:55:01
I think it raises some quite interesting questions

00:27:55:01 - 00:27:59:21
about the extent of our responsibility to combat injustice

00:28:00:06 - 00:28:01:15
that I think on the face of it

00:28:01:15 - 00:28:05:10
we’d want to say that wherever we are responsible for perpetuating injustice,

00:28:05:19 - 00:28:08:12
we ought not to do that and we ought to act differently.

00:28:08:18 - 00:28:12:04
But once we see that... “once we see” - that’s a very confident

00:28:12:04 - 00:28:15:22
way of assuming my argument works, if we see that

00:28:17:01 - 00:28:20:13
the formation of adaptive practices is unjust,

00:28:20:13 - 00:28:26:22
then there are so many kind of small and seemingly harmless ways that

00:28:26:22 - 00:28:30:12
we all contribute to forming one another's adaptive preferences all the time.

00:28:30:24 - 00:28:33:04
Like I mentioned earlier, I have long hair.

00:28:33:13 - 00:28:37:04
Like if I have a daughter and I'm wearing makeup and have my hair long,

00:28:37:14 - 00:28:41:06
then that might reinforce to her that that's how a woman ought to dress

00:28:41:06 - 00:28:43:15
and that then perpetuates patriarchal norms.

00:28:44:22 - 00:28:48:12
And so I think it's right to say that

00:28:49:11 - 00:28:52:16
by having long hair, I am furthering patriarchal norms.

00:28:53:01 - 00:28:54:24
It seems wrong

00:28:54:24 - 00:28:58:14
and far too strong to say that, like I have a duty not to.

00:28:58:20 - 00:29:00:00
How dare you

00:29:00:00 - 00:29:03:14
So yeah, I think there's some interesting questions

00:29:03:14 - 00:29:07:19
there about kind of more broadly,

00:29:07:19 - 00:29:12:21
do our actions have to be harmful in order for us to have a duty not to act

00:29:12:21 - 00:29:17:15
in that way or where we kind of contribute to injustice in like more subtle ways?

00:29:18:13 - 00:29:19:04
Yeah, Yeah.

00:29:19:04 - 00:29:22:20
What's our responsibility for not doing that basically?

00:29:22:20 - 00:29:25:16
Really good, good question.

00:29:25:20 - 00:29:30:03
And to end on a lighter note, what's your favourite thing about Wadham?

00:29:31:10 - 00:29:34:08
the people can I say that? you absolutely can.

00:29:34:16 - 00:29:38:17
And yeah, the lovely people of Wadham. Wonderful answer.

00:29:39:00 - 00:29:41:19
And yeah, if people want to get in touch with you

00:29:41:20 - 00:29:47:18
either to chat about your ideas or to reach out to you in your role

00:29:47:18 - 00:29:52:04
as women's officer in the SU how is best for them to do that?

00:29:53:15 - 00:29:55:19
Probably email me.

00:29:55:19 - 00:29:59:14
I mean, my Wadham email’s just my name, or if it was about

00:30:00:05 - 00:30:02:13
SU women's stuff, there's an su.women email.

00:30:03:05 - 00:30:04:05
Yeah. Sure,

00:30:04:05 - 00:30:08:06
I'll include your email in the show notes.

00:30:08:17 - 00:30:09:06
Great.

00:30:09:06 - 00:30:11:18
And congratulations again on winning the essay prize

00:30:11:18 - 00:30:15:16
and thank you for sharing it with the Wadham community.

00:30:15:16 - 00:30:17:15
Thanks for your time. Thanks for having me.

00:30:17:15 - 00:30:19:05
Thank you for listening.

00:30:19:05 - 00:30:21:13
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00:30:21:16 - 00:30:24:06
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00:30:24:24 - 00:30:27:18
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00:30:28:02 - 00:30:31:18
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00:30:31:24 - 00:30:52:22
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