Rising Proliferation: Nuclear Risks in a Post-Treaty World

Visit us at Network2020.org. 

The recent expiration of the New START treaty between the U.S. and Russia marks a structural shift in the global nuclear order, removing the last legally binding constraints on the world’s two largest arsenals. With no successor framework in place, the bilateral arms control architecture that has underpinned stability for decades is effectively suspended. In its absence, risks of vertical and horizontal proliferation are intensifying. According to the UN assessment, for the first time in decades, the number of nuclear warheads and nuclear testing is rising, and global military spending climbed to $2.7 trillion in 2025, an increase of 2.9% from the previous year. New records show that China is the fastest-growing nuclear power globally and is significantly expanding its nuclear weapons infrastructure, raising concerns about a potential new global arms race as major arms control agreements weaken.

At the same time, emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence, advanced sensors, and precision-strike capabilities, are reshaping the foundations of deterrence, complicating traditional approaches to verification and monitoring. This discussion will examine how the erosion of arms control is accelerating proliferation pressures, how technological change is altering the strategic landscape, and whether a new, credible system of nuclear restraint can still be constructed.

Join us for an insightful virtual discussion on the new risks of global proliferation featuring David Albright, a Physicist and Founder of the non-profit Institute for Science and International Security, Alexandra Bell, President and CEO of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security.

Music by Aleksey Chistilin from Pixabay.

Transcript

SPEAKER_03 0:01

Today, unfortunately, everything is falling apart. For the first time in more than 50 years, there are no legally binding constraints on the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals. We do not have insights into each other's forces. So, how did we get here? Very slowly and then all at once.

SPEAKER_01 0:20

Last February, the New START Treaty expired. The last agreement capping American and Russian nuclear arsenals. Gone. For the first time in more than 50 years, no binding limits on the world's two largest nuclear stockpiles. No inspections. No data exchanges. No window to what the other side is building. And they're not the only ones building.

SPEAKER_00 0:44

If Iran does it, then Saudi Arabia says it will do it. There's new concerns about Turkey. North Korea's driving South Korea crazy enough that if it's a serious discussion of South Korea building nuclear weapons, China is racing to expand its heart.

SPEAKER_01 0:59

South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Poland, all openly debating whether they need weapons of their own. The system that held for decades is coming apart, and no one agrees on what comes next.

SPEAKER_02 1:11

And it might not be in response to the fact that Iran gets a nuclear weapon. It's just that countries believe that they can't rely on the U.S. anymore, that it's not going to come to their defense.

SPEAKER_01 1:24

Can the nuclear powers rebuild a system of restraint when they stop talking to each other? And what does deterrence look like when the guarantor becomes the destructor?

SPEAKER_03 1:34

I think overall, you know, in the idea of can we build new things, of course we can. Uh I get really tired of people saying, oh, like arms control is dead. It's not a living entity, it's a set of tools. We choose to use the tools. We don't choose to use the tools, and I think we choose not to use the tools at our apparel.

SPEAKER_01 1:54

This is Global Insights by Network 2020. Today, the new nuclear age. Joining us today is David Albright, physicist and founder of the Institute for Science and International Security, Alexandra Bell, president of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and Dr. Stacy Pettijohn, Director of the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security. Moderating the conversation is Courtney Doggard, president of Network 2020.

SPEAKER_04 2:30

So there has been, I think, a lot of focus in general on the integration of new technologies into conventional warfare, namely the use of drones. But all of these developments are taking place against a backdrop of shifts in geopolitical norms and global power that is remaking the post-World War II system, including skepticism over international bodies of governance. And so with the lapse of Newstar earlier this year, the world lost the, I think, the only remaining treaty between the two most heavily heavily nuclear armed countries at a time when it seems like China is ramping up. And ironically, the war in Iran is ostensibly over its desire to have nuclear weapons. So as we conclude nearly three months of war today, we are going to explore where the world stands with regards to nuclear proliferation and ensuring that nuclear weapons are not used again. Alex, I'd love to start with you with a scene center. What does the current arms control architecture look like and how does it differ from where we were, say, five, 25 years ago? And how did we get to this point? So an easy short question to start with.

SPEAKER_03 3:40

All right. Thanks, Courtney, and thanks so much for having me. Uh, you know, we are now 80 years into the nuclear age. Uh, and I am very sorry to report that virtually every nuclear challenge is trending in the wrong direction. 25 years ago, we had emerged from the Cold War triumphant. Arms control treaties were being negotiated left and right. Uh, and then as we approached the millennium, and certainly post 9-11, things started to shift. Uh, the Bush administration left the anti-ballistic missile treaty, the Russians started to bristle under the restraints of the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty, the conference on disarmament, where the international community came together to formulate arms control agreements, uh, effectively became a parking lot uh where ideas went went to die. Uh, but yet we loped along and agreements and hammered out agreements like the new strategic arms reduction treaty uh that we lost uh just this past February. Uh, even five years ago, uh, there were still a functioning uh if it strained uh relationship between the United States and Russia on arms control early in the Biden administration. I think just a couple days into the Biden administration, we were able to extend new start. Uh they were still legally binding limits on the deployed strategic warheads in the US and Russia. There were inspections uh that had been uh stopped via COVID, but the uh data exchanges were still going on. And those data exchanges, uh, over the course of the treaty's history, you know, something like 20,000 uh exchange notifications, giving each other a real-time view on our strategic nuclear forces. There was regular mill-to-mill contact, even though there was deep mistrust uh that was continuing to grow between Washington and Moscow. Both sides were still adhering uh to an agreement that we saw had mutual interest. Uh today, unfortunately, everything is falling apart, crumbling around us. For the first time in more than 50 years, there are no legally binding constraints on the US and Russian strategic arsenals. We do not have insights into each other's forces. So, how did we get here? Very slowly and then all at once. Uh, US-Russia relationships have been uh relationship has been deteriorating over the past 20 years, aided by the wars in Georgia, Crimea, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, disputes over NATO expansion, disputes over missile defense. Uh, and then, of course, technologies are growing at a rate faster than our ability to understand them, much less control them. Uh, and AI and other disruptive technologies uh threaten to upend how we've understood strategic stability for the past 50 to 60 years. You know, in addition to that, China, which has long relied on a minimum deterrent uh of around 350 weapons, has massively expanded its arsenal in an opaque uh and uh and quite dangerous, provocative way, you know, with some estimates uh, you know, predicting that they would have uh 1, 1,500 in in the coming years. We've also forgotten why it was that we were pursuing arms control in the first place, why we were seeking mutually amenable constraints with countries with whom we had difficult relationships, but saw through uh to manage the worst potential problem. And for the US and Russia, that is the existential threat that those countries' nuclear arsenals present to the other. Uh the treaties that we've lost weren't just pieces of paper. Uh they created transparency, predictability, gave us intelligence insights. We couldn't get any other way. Uh, and the fact that we aren't talking at all anymore means we're also losing the muscle memory that comes with negotiating, with having a rapport with your interlocutor on the on the other side. Um, that's why the Biden administration's nuclear posture review directly tied arms control and deterrence together, saying they're mutually reinforcing and both necessary for US security. So without this system, without paying attention uh to where we're going, uh worst case assumptions are going to grow. Uh, we're going to make uh potential choices about our own nuclear posture based on assumptions that we're making and not actually cold hard data, not actually the things our inspectors, boots on the ground can actually see. Um so that means upload potential increases, miscalculation risks go up, military planners uh begin preparing uh for a potentially unconstrained competition rather than trying to manage that competition. So the bottom line is 80 years into the nuclear age, we are entering a new nuclear age. And I think most experts in the field agree. But what this nuclear age is is entirely dependent on the choices that we make over the coming months, the coming years, and really a decision that we make collectively about whether or not we want to keep loping along and pull those numbers down, keep restraints in place, or just go barreling into a multi-peer nuclear arms race and roll the dice, really with humanity, uh future of humanity on the line.

SPEAKER_04 8:54

Thank you, Alexandra. That's a very helpful scene setter. So, David, just turning to you, Alex, Alex outlined the unraveling of the treaties and how much depends on the decisions that we make in the coming years. In addition to the unraveling of the agreements that she mentioned, there's also been an unraveling of international norms as we've seen in recent conflicts, in terms of the decisions that the world is making, and by the world I mean different governments. What lessons do you see other countries taking from the wars in Iran and Ukraine? And how do you see this manifesting and what countries are choosing to do on the nuclear front from a technical point of view?

SPEAKER_00 9:38

And let me let me just add some context on the non-proliferation front. I mean, it you know, I think it's important to mention that many countries have sought nuclear weapons. I mean, we my institute have tabulated 34 programs and 10 actually built nuclear weapons and one dismantled. And so and nobody has crossed the nuclear threshold since the early 1990s. So the non-proliferation treaty has been a remarkably successful treaty. I mean and states have decided they look around and say, we'd like to live in a world where our neighbors don't have nuclear weapons. And so it became a you know, of course, the weapon states that or the states that did creates an unfair created unfairness in the treaty, but nonetheless, it was working pretty well. And and and that's all at risk now. I mean, it's the other side of this uh arms control equation, that the non-proliferation treaty is still a very strong treaty, but it's under tremendous stress. And and I think President Macron said it just to emphasize what Alex said, that the coming half century will be an age of nuclear weapons, and that they're we have the war in Ukraine, there I mean, it's very tough struggle to keep Iran from building nuclear weapons. And you mentioned we've been in in this war for I would say been at a war with Iran for over 20 years in one form or another. I mean, it's been a very hot war since June of 25, and we've just had the second phase of that war, and any day now we may enter the third. And that and it's a very um very tough struggle to keep Iran from building nuclear weapons. And we know that if Iran does it, then Saudi Arabia says it will do it. There's new concerns about Turkey. North Korea's been, you know, just butting up against South Korea, driving South Korea crazy enough that it is a serious discussion of South Korea building nuclear weapons. And so these norms to try to keep countries from building nuclear weapons are are really eroding. And I think it's you know, the impact of Iran and and then of course Ukraine on non-proliferation is very hard to judge. I mean, Iran, some countries are going to look and say Iran is because it sought new has sought nuclear weapons, it's gone through intense punishment and they still don't have them. And they still have a struggle to get them. I mean, their program has been set back pretty dramatically in terms of actually building the bomb. And so this this place between not having them and having them is a very vulnerable place to be. And so I think but other countries, as I mentioned, South Korea, they they may try to find a way to do it, and and uh and our norms against non-proliferation are are weakening and uh and we don't have the usual tools. UN Security Council is pretty much useless. Alex mentioned China and Russia. I mean, from where we sit, the work we do on Ukraine and Iran, we see them very as very threatening, very aggressive, and not willing to abide by the norms anymore. So that's a bright spot, but there's many dark spots, and and the collapse of all these norms is has really complicated in the the um the path to a solution.

SPEAKER_04 12:51

Thank you. So it sounds like the NTT is keeping a lid on that things are simmering uh quite quite heavily. Thank you for that. Stacy, I wanted to bring in some elements of new technology into the conversation. So how are technological developments impacting the nuclear arms race? And do you see technology as being helpful in potentially maintaining stability or is there a greater downside risk? Um, and how does the science of verification keep pace with the science of weapons?

SPEAKER_02 13:23

Thanks, Courtney. Sadly, I think I'm going to uh continue the pessimistic assessment that Alex and David began with in terms of other technologies further fueling arms races, potentially undermining strategic stability as well as crisis stability, where I think there could be greater concerns of uh first strike because of advancements in non-nuclear technologies that are making counterforce potentially more viable, meaning that a country might decide to attack another nation's nuclear arsenal, its nuclear weapons, and take them out in ways that previously wasn't very feasible. So a lot of the technological developments also that are happening are happening in the commercial uh sector, which is unusual and something that I think is harder to control, um, which further reduces the prospects of using export controls or sometimes arms control to uh limit these capabilities. So on the increasing the ability to potentially conduct counterforce strikes, you're seeing space um is just exploding. There's so many different sensors in low Earth orbit that are making it more possible to nearly continuously observe different parts of the world. Unfortunately, I don't think that necessarily is gonna help verification as much as trying to track mobile weapons. Though one of the big things I think we've seen with this war in against Iran is that finding missile launchers is much more difficult. Uh, it remains incredibly difficult. We weren't good in '91. We've claimed we've gotten better. But this is where potentially, when you include having satellite imagery with um put aircraft that are observing a space, and then you layer in new technologies like artificial intelligence that can process all of that different sensor data and synthesize it in a way to make sense of where mobile targets are and where they're moving, whether they're on the land or potentially undersea. That could be very troubling. Also, in terms of new capabilities, you're seeing that missile defenses have been proven as a theater missile defenses have proven to be very effective in the Ukraine war. Also in the Middle East, they have intercepted the vast majority of ballistic missiles that have been fired. And I think there is an increased emphasis uh in many places on acquiring more missile defenses, most notably with the U.S. and what it is trying to do with the Golden Dome for America, which is an incredibly ambitious, one might say even totally unrealistic uh effort to uh defend the United States from all forms of aerial attack. But the fact that the US is looking to put in place a more extensive uh ballistic missile defense is something that uh those in Beijing and Moscow would certainly look askance at and worry that this is uh going to reduce their uh second strike capability and that it's directed against them and likely to fuel them to be seeking new and new weapons that are able to circumvent those defenses. You can go go down the rabbit hole about space-based interceptors, which is a whole uh piece of this that uh is, I think, potentially some of the most destabilizing part because those could be used as anti-satellite weapons, but also uh to try to intercept ICBMs. Uh finally, I think you're you're seeing that there are new delivery systems. So um you have a lot of cheap drones out there right now. I don't think those are particularly likely to be used to carry nuclear weapons, because if you have a nuclear weapon, it's something's pretty precious. It's still a fairly rare commodity. Why would you put it on a crappy delivery system if you have a better ballistic missile or cruise missile? But you are seeing that there are a lot more conventional strike options. And there's also because these weapons are being used in conventional operations, and one of the ways that they have been effectively countered has been with jamming and cutting off the connection between the drone and the pilot who's flying it. I think you're gonna see this drive towards more and more full, greater amounts of autonomy on these systems. And fully autonomous weapons bring a whole host of different risks where you don't necessarily have a human making a decision about something being a target and deciding to engage it. On the high end, you've seen China invest in things like fractional orbital bombardment systems, and both Russia and China have a number of different hypersonic capabilities that they're developing, at least uh according to them, in part in response to the US having missile defenses. So you're already seeing this destabilization and sort of this reaction action movement that is happening um in terms of arms racing. And I think this could trickle down as more and more AI-enabled systems and weapons are fielded to further weakening sort of crisis stability.

SPEAKER_04 18:42

Okay, thank you. Alex, I want to turn back to you. Um we've talked a little bit about China, and my understanding is that with it with some of the agreements like New Start, one of the big criticisms is that we're I guess sort of just some sort of reasons that we can get into if you think it's relevant. But where what do we know about China's nuclear capability? And under what circumstances do you think China could sign an agreement with the US and Russia? Is that even a possibility on the horizon, or is that just so far gone based on what we've been talking about?

SPEAKER_03 19:18

Yeah, so as I said uh earlier, China is no longer operating as a minimum deterrent nuclear power where they were for so long, saying they just needed a small arsenal uh to deter and defend China. It is now undergoing the fastest nuclear expansion uh uh since the end of the Cold War. You know, the Department of Defense says uh uh China's around 600 weapons now could exceed 1,000 by 2030. They're clearly on an upward trajectory. Uh of course, uh Beijing denies this buildup. Uh, and I've, you know, had I've had my former Chinese interlocutors, you know, deny it to my face. And what I do is I I push back saying, look, I can see via commercially available satellite imagery, not even US national technical means, but commercially available satellite imagery uh that shows the construction of hundreds of new missile silos in Western China and the and the excuse the Chinese originally gave that, oh no, these are windmills. We know what windmills look like from space. These are nuclear silos. Uh we see, I can see with commercially available satellite imagery, the expansion of their missile production facilities, their fissile material production facilities, uh the the delivery system construction across the board, activities at their test site at Lopnor. Uh I say to them, if you're not building up, please explain to me what you're doing. Because for us, there there really can't be any other determination for this. And if we're if we're operating on a false assumption, that's problematic for you too. So let's actually talk about this. Why does all of this matter? The buildup. So not only can this buildup drive uh potential regional proliferation threats, as David said, uh, our allies in the region are looking uh not only at the threat that North Korea has presented for some time, but what this expansion in Chinese nuclear forces will do to their own uh uh security and deterrence uh at the same time that the US has has unfortunately been undermining our assurances to our allies in the region about our extended nuclear deterrence. Uh, it also, uh, of course, uh, you know, is extremely dangerous because of the arms racing dynamic that this is now reintroducing into a system. Uh and it brings up a three-body problem in terms of the US, Russia, and China managing deterrence. So multi-uh deterrence is a tricky business to begin with on a bilateral scale. But it if you bring in multiple actors, it's extremely difficult to manage because every bilateral move you make in terms of your own posture is going to affect a third or fourth or fifth actor, all of which then has ripple effects back. We're also operating in the dark. We really don't have a clear. Clear, fully clear idea. We've made assumptions about why China has engaged in this buildup, but we don't know about its exact warhead numbers, its alert status, their posture and uh and doctrines are around these issues. We we tend to think that they have a bad estimation on uh escalation control. And I think that was borne out when they seem to be so surprised at our reaction to the spy balloon that came over uh the United States back during the Biden administration. They sort of like, why did why were you so upset? Everyone spies on everyone. And I was like, just look at this reaction to this incursion and then multiply it by X number if ever we were to involve ourselves into some sort of kinetic situation. So what comes next? Uh uh Beijing argues that it doesn't have to actually engage in any sort of trilateral arms control because you know it has such a smaller arsenal. And that is true. So what to do? Can we get them in agreement? Of course we can. Uh there's always a way. Uh, we haven't identified it yet. And I would probably make the case when we haven't put our full diplomatic shoulder uh into this effort yet. We've got to listen to them. We've got to learn. We didn't just manifest new start with the Russians. That was 50 years of work, of lessons, of rinse and repeat uh that went into building a structure like that. The number one thing we got to do is get into a sustained conversation with China about these issues, listen to them, uh, and uh and then we can determine uh what our first steps might be. And if it involves a broader strategic conversation, concerns they have about our conventional forces in the region, we should be open to that. Uh the worst thing that we can do is just assume there's some future date where we can get it into a conversation, it'll be easier then. It will only get worse from here on out.

SPEAKER_04 23:45

Thank you. Thank you. Final question to you, David, David, and Stacy and Alex, if you'd like to chime in, please. I welcome your thoughts too. I know you're working on how to thwart proliferation. So where we're at right now, and given everything that we've heard today, do you think a new arms control architecture can be built? Um, and if so, who's going to build it?

SPEAKER_00 24:10

I think in in in my field, I mean, space in a sense, the the NPT provides a very valuable base. And it and uh you combine that, in fact, you go back to what was done in the 60s, which uh was the time that NPT was dealing with what was thought to be a situation where many countries would proliferate, 10, 15 countries would proliferate over 15 years or so. And and that so getting the NPT, but coupling it with nuclear sharing arrangements. NATO's the best known one, but we have had one with South Korea and or have one with South Korea, and one of the solutions in South Korea is to strengthen that nuclear sharing. That's difficult now with President Trump in office, but I think that we need to calm down the non-nuclear weapon states who are essentially becoming more and more panicked about the situation. And so I think that that can move forward. And I think even, I mean, we may have to wait out the Trump administration to move forward on on some of it, but it can be moved forward. Now, the good thing about nuke proliferation is it's not easy. People often underestimate how hard it is to build a credible nuclear arsenal. And in South Korea, Iran, they don't want a bomb in the basement, they don't want a you know, a cheap bomb that that they can detonate underground and then and then wait for the missile attacks to come from a place like Israel. So they they want to have a and then building that credible nuclear arsenal takes a lot of work and knowledge and know-how. In fact, more important is the know-how to be able to do it. And so I think we have time. I think what we're looking for in the US, we're gonna have trouble with it now, is active efforts, counter-proliferation efforts that if South Korea wants to go down this path, we're gonna be there covertly, overtly, diplomatically, politically to block your way, throw in roadblocks, make it more difficult. They're an ally, so it has to be done carefully, but it can be done. And with Iran, it becomes more muscular because of the of the situation. I mean, we're engaged from a non-proliferation point of view on an enforcement action in Iran, and much more is going on than that. But at the from a non-proliferation point of view, this is an enforcement action. We don't know how it's going to turn out, and we'll have to see. It could turn out very badly. It turned out in Iraq pretty well. I mean, that was also in it inadvertently a very big enforcement action against a nuclear weapons program in 1991, and that turned out very well. And so I think it there's things in our toolbox now that can get us through some of the worst problems that we're facing, at least on nuclear non-proliferation. On on the P5 arrangements, I think it's unfortunately I agree with Alex, I think it's going to be tough. And China is probably the one of the highest priorities to try to start a dialogue with.

SPEAKER_04 27:04

Thank you. Um, and just to follow up on that quickly, Alex, given your time at the State Department, do you think, and because David's answer, I think, relies so heavily on diplomacy uh in order to deter the non-nuclear states, do you think we have those capabilities now? Are you tuned in with what the State Department is doing? And do you think that's possible?

SPEAKER_03 27:26

Uh, it's a complex question for me right now. Uh the MPT uh review conference is actually coming uh to an end uh Friday, and they're they're you know working right now to get a consensus agreement in difficult times. And I think what's marked the last couple review conference process and and and certainly this is not really issues related to whether or not the treaty has value, uh, but the broader political issues that are influencing the discussions and people sort of pushing things together, whether it's the continuing invasion uh of Ukraine or the US actions in Iran, it it's sort of it's hard to look at the treaty for its purpose, its very utilitarian purpose in terms of global security. And I'm hoping that that countries can can set that aside. I think overall, you know, in the idea of can we build new things, of course we can. Uh, I get really tired of people saying, oh, like arms control is dead. It's not a living entity, it's a set of tools. We choose to use the tools. We don't choose to use the tools. And I think we we choose not to use the tools uh at our apparel. Uh, you know, so what does it look like to do new things that are fit for purpose, that are informed by the past, but not shackled to it is start with what we want. What do we want to improve our security? And what are the mechanisms that can help us get what we want? Um, get ready to be extremely patient and extremely persistent because it's hard. Uh you know, building things is hard. Wrecking things is really easy, leaving treaties, incredibly easy. Uh, but uh but building them takes time and effort and patience. And those things seem to be a little bit of short supply uh among political leaders these days. And third, you know, we got to be flexible. Um, there is no grand bargain, this neat, elegant solution that will solve all these problems at once. Uh we have to be willing to take wins where we can. Uh, and remember that arms control is never just treaties, uh, it's crisis communication, it's it's launch notification, it's military exchanges, scientific exchanges, uh, behaviors, norms, uh, you know, you know, transparency measures. We can use all of these tools to buy time to change behavior, which is essentially what we've been trying to do this entire 60, so years that we've been really trying arms control and non-proliferation in in earnest. Uh, and we can do it all again. We we have to demand it from our leaders. And I think that's where we're we're sort of disconnected right now. We have leaders who are not taking the steps necessary to reduce nuclear tensions, and we have a uh a public that doesn't necessarily know that it does have agency in this conversation. And that's what needs to change.

SPEAKER_04 30:02

So, Stacey, you talked a little bit about um AI and how that is a concern for you. If you could talk more about how AI can play a role in nuclear technology and specifically, will it be able to help countries get closer to nuclear weapons, or is that just not relevant, yeah?

SPEAKER_02 30:20

The large language models that exist today and all of the major companies that are producing them in the United States put guardrails on them to try to limit what sort of information and advice that they can provide to people practically. Though I think we've seen that if you bully the models a little bit and have a conversation with them, you can often get them to do things that they're not supposed to do, which is a problem. I don't think to uh I think David's point earlier, nuclear weapons are really hard to make. This is not a simple thing, this is not an explosive, improvised explosive device or a drone that you're assembling some commercial pieces. So I don't I don't see them being necessarily a fast track to nuclear proliferation. I think it is more of how AI is incorporated into senior decision making, into military operations at various levels and autonomy and different weapon systems. And especially one of the big benefits that uh the US military at least is looking for from involving AI is making decisions and being able to undertake operations faster than their adversaries. So speeding things up. And when you begin to compress timelines like that, that reduces the amount of time that individuals have to make decisions, increases the likelihood of misperception, and could contribute to things like escalation happening inadvertently if the pace of attacks is just so great.

SPEAKER_04 31:54

So what is the one thing that you would most like to see happen right now in order to indicate that we're sort of on a path to taking some of the threats that we've talked about seriously? And I know that in your work you you work on a range of issues, particularly on new technology. So what is it that would give you confidence that we're headed in a good direction?

SPEAKER_02 32:22

I'm actually not going to talk about a technology, but uh something that is related and I think uh potentially existential threat to the NPT, which is the US's reliability as a security guarantor or the lack thereof, and what we've seen where the Trump administration has threatened to attack NATO allies and has been demanding more of treaty allies as well as partners in terms of providing for their own defense, which is of course good. More burden sharing isn't a bad thing. But if these countries start um thinking that the United States might not actually fulfill its extended deterrent guarantees, especially on the nuclear side, I think that is going to potentially set off a round of proliferation among countries that are close allies and friends of the US, not just what we would call rogue states and potential adversaries. And that is a far more troubling, well, equally troubling issue, and one where you could see things really getting out of control very quickly. You've already seen Poland talking about it, obviously South Korea. There's been a lot of talk. And it might not be in response to the fact that Iran gets a nuclear weapon. It's just that countries believe that they can't rely on the US anymore, that it's not going to come to their defense. And a change, uh, a different US grand strategy where it does not maintain all of those extended deterrent commitments, I think would result in a very different and more dangerous world.

SPEAKER_04 33:59

Thank you. Alex, anything that you would add from your line of work that we think would be relevant?

SPEAKER_03 34:06

Uh yeah, I mean, I would I would like to see uh nuclear armed states, uh in the five recognized states under the MPT, US, UK, Russia, France, China, in a sustained conversation uh about nuclear impostors and doctrines and risk reduction, uh, but at a far uh deeper scale than we've been doing in the past, uh, and uh and some bilateral conversations going on between the US and China and the US and Russia, uh, where we're not necessarily, you know, thinking that there's a deal right around the corner, but that this is just something that we need to do regularly to sustain strategic stability and and and risk management amongst us, and and then go from there. Um is is sort of it's it the process itself is valuable. Uh end goals as far as agreements. That is obviously what we'd like to see. Uh, but start talking, keep talking.

SPEAKER_04 35:00

Right. David, any final thoughts because we're just about out of time?

SPEAKER_00 35:05

I think it it just I think kind of agree with what Stacy said. I mean, it's it's the destabilization caused by the Trump administration actions has has been profound. And and and but we fortunately we have to deal with it in the short term, and and I think states are starting to take action to to do that. And and I think that's why France is stepping up to try to calm down the nuclear state, uh the the non-nuclear states in Europe and make sure that it's about sharing, not about getting on their own. And and I think that's that I think we have to accelerate those efforts and get fully behind them. I mean, it's not what it certainly isn't. Somebody committed to arms control, nuclear disarm, it's not what I signed up to do. But I do think we'd have to take some steps that are purely defensive and to try to keep the situation from getting worse.

SPEAKER_04 35:57

Thank you. Uh thank you all, and thank you for the work you do to try to keep the world a safe place from nuclear weapons. Um truly appreciate it. David, Stacy, Alex, for uh your incredible work and words and insight. Thank you.

SPEAKER_00 36:14

Thank you.

SPEAKER_04 36:15

Bye-bye. Thanks.

SPEAKER_01 36:19

Thank you for joining us on this episode of Global Insights. You can subscribe to Global Insights on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your audio. For more analysis, events, and ways to connect with our community, click on the link in the description. See you next time.