Lead-Lag Live

Markets Gone Wild with Seth Cogswell

• Michael A. Gayed, CFA

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Speaker 1:

If you think of your equity portfolio as an ice cream sundae run, or our efficient growth strategy is meant to be the vanilla ice cream of your ice cream sundae. Our universe's companies are five billion dollars, trade on US exchanges, so it's in that mid large space, mid-large space, and then it's growthy because that's a big priority of ours. But our focus on valuations and risk brings it back into core and so it really sits right in the middle of, if you think of the Morningstar style boxes. That's where it sits. It sits in this mid-large kind of core space.

Speaker 2:

We figured we'd title this the World is Freaking Nuts. So we're going to talk about how nuts markets have been. For those that are watching us across X, Instagram, LinkedIn, YouTube, all the various platforms, we can see your comments, Don't hesitate to engage during this roughly 40, 45-minute conversation. This will, of course, be an edited podcast under Lead Black Live. And guess what? Folks?

Speaker 2:

Starting next week, there's going to be a new sheriff in town. Somebody who I am bringing on to the Lead Black Media side is going to be much more of a face than me in terms of these types of podcasts. She's got a lot of great experience. We'll add a whole different level to these conversations going forward. So, with all that said, my name is Michael Guy, a publisher of the Lead Lager Board. This is Mr Seth Cogswell of Running Oak. Running Oak is a client of mine, big fan of Seth's, and I always ask every single guest what should we talk about? And Seth said why don't we talk about how freaking nuts things are? So let's get into it because, let's face it, it's kind of an expensive market.

Speaker 1:

Yeah it's every day. I'm seeing more and more data that is freaking nuts, you know. We're seeing more and more data that is showing that the economy in the average person is struggling or feeling more pessimistic or whatever. I mean almost every indicator that we would generally look at is basically recessionary. Meanwhile the stock market is crazy. I mean, if we're going to stick with a trend, we'd say it's freaking nuts, and meanwhile the stock market is crazy. I mean, if we're going to stick with a trend, we'd say it's freaking nuts.

Speaker 1:

I mean, today Kohl's went from $12 to like $23, I think in moments we had Open Door. Maybe yesterday that was up, I don't know 150% or something like that. So Palantir is obviously up 700% and that's a real company. We're not talking tiny meme stocks. So it's an interesting time. It's very contradictory.

Speaker 1:

Again, the stock market is a derivative of the US economy, right, like the stock market provides access to the US economy, we are buying shares of companies that are operating within the US economy, and so if everything pertaining to the US economy is saying at least flashing a yellow light, and then the stock market has gone, I don't know, I don't know what's beyond a green light, maybe there's just no lights, I don gone. I don't know what's beyond a green light. Maybe there's just no lights, I don't know. But in a lot of ways, according to a whole lot of measures, things have gone beyond the tech bubble. The forward P of the top 10 stocks in the S&P 500 is now roughly 15% beyond the top 10 stocks in the tech bubble. I saw a data point earlier today where the buy the dip, where if market's down, particularly NASDAQ, if NASDAQ's down, and then you buy one day later, it's outperforming every single year, going back to 1985, I think, other than 2020. So it's again outperforming 2000. So it's just it's, it's freaking nuts.

Speaker 2:

It's an interesting time does that mean that we're in a uh in bubble? Because it doesn't really feel like a bubble right, like in a bubble, I think, kind of everything sort of acts, nuts and everything gaps up. This doesn't really quite have that type of a feel to it, does it?

Speaker 1:

It does in ways right. I mean Circle IPO. It went from, I think, a price of $30 and went to $250. There are ways and what makes it really different, and I try to be very careful throwing bubble around, because people use it all the time. I've been wrong.

Speaker 1:

I've been doing this for quite a while now and been wrong a lot, so I try to always hedge my bets. But also I don't want people, if we're doing this to help people, if the things that we say causes them to shut down and not want to hear it, then we're not being effective. And so I want to be very mindful of. To me it seems like we're very much in a bubble, but it's contained in a small number of things. I think it's important to remember that in 2000, which was obviously freaking nuts and we assumed I kind of assumed we'd never see it again, and in 2001, when the S&P and the NASDAQ were down a lot, there were a lot of things that were up. So I want to really focus on the positives, not the negatives and there are. You know, if things are overvalued, certainly that implies that there's negatives, but there's so many great options out there, and so really the main thing is, and I haven't figured out how to really get this through, but I just want people to think more, be a little more thoughtful.

Speaker 1:

We have somewhat all been indoctrinated into the belief that passive investing outperforms everything. But if you really dig into passive investing at its or kind of get down to its most basic construction, you are investing more in overvalued companies at all times and investing less in undervalued companies at all times. I don't know that there's a single person that would say that's how I want to invest. So it's literally the exact opposite of how we would all say that we want to invest. But the data is the data. The data shows that you know passive is outperformed a good percentage of managers and so it's really trying to walk that line between the data and then thought. And right now, I think that there's this tendency to really focus on the data and just assume that our thoughts are contradictory and therefore worthless, and putting more weight on the data itself worthless and putting more weight on the data itself. But the problem is, you can make poor decisions and get good results. You can make good decisions and get poor results, and so it's really that combination of the data and common sense that we really want to focus on. Again.

Speaker 1:

In a lot of ways it's freaking nuts, but there are so many reasons to be positive in that, just like 2000, there are a lot of companies that haven't really participated in this crazy move. There's a lot of companies that people have nothing invested in. When we think of potentially, let's say, a bubble, or certainly overvaluation or the market being overheated, it's largely contained in a small number of companies in the index or the S&P 500. And we have so much money flowing into those tiny number of things that that's just naturally due to supply and demand. That's going to drive prices up, it's going to drive valuations up and the problem is, as people do this, there's a number of. There's some numbers to keep in mind. First of all, the average household now has 20 percent more invested in the stock market than they did in 2000. So they're more levered to the stock market.

Speaker 1:

Again. The top 10 companies in the S&P their forward P is now higher than the forward P during the tech bubble. And the reason why is because so much money is concentrated in the tech bubble. And the issue is, and the reason why is because so much money is concentrated in the top 10. It's a historically high percentage. But that leaves, you know, the whole rest of the market, right? I mean, there's 506 companies. I don't know why there's more than 500 companies in the S&P, but there's 506 companies, I think, in the S&P 500. So at least 400 and, let's say, 96 companies within the S&P that have very little invested in them, and many of them are great, and so it's really just a matter of pumping the brakes a little bit and looking for opportunities elsewhere.

Speaker 1:

It's important to again just be a little buffle, right? We've all had fun evenings where we're hanging out with the fun people, having a great time. You know, the beer is flowing like wine and the salmon and the women are instinctively flocking like the salmon to capistrano. We've had nights like that and then the next day usually we we don't feel too great. I think we would all argue that really, the best way to consistently live is is being measured, eating well, getting exercise, whatever, drinking lots of water.

Speaker 1:

But, you know, being thoughtful, and now is is definitely a time to just pump the brakes a little bit, take a step back and just think one. We don't know what's going to happen. Right, there's plenty of good things, there's plenty of positives in the big tech companies. Plenty of positives. What's going on right now is at least has rational roots, but it's an uncertain time. You know, there's all this data saying, hey, maybe things aren't quite like they seem, especially in the stock market, and there seems to be a bit of a breakdown between the US economy and the stock market, and so it's. It's a time when things are uncertain. The stock market, and so it's. It's a time when things are uncertain. That is a good time to diversify and and really just sort of hedge your bets a little bit, um, and so that's. That's really the message that I hope that I, or you know, we or anyone, is able to get across over today and over the next few weeks or whatever. There's no telling when things top, but it's time to be thoughtful.

Speaker 2:

It's been a very weird bull market right? Because, like even as we're talking, the S&P 500's pretty much at new all-time highs. Mid-caps are not, small caps are not. I've used that line many times the last several years. When a rising tide does not lift all boats, everybody drowns, which you know. Play on this idea of again rising tide lifting all boats. Is there something structurally different about the markets? You think that's causing large caps to act like almost a completely different market than mid and small within the US?

Speaker 1:

Oh, definitely, there's a lot going on. Structurally right, I mean the the market, I would argue, is 17 years into 16, 17 years into the longest bull market in history. Some might say 2022 was a bear market, but having experienced bear markets, I would say it wasn't, it was nothing and so. But the question is, why are we 16 years, in my opinion, into the longest bull market in history? And the answer is not because we are in the strongest economy in history or the most consistent economy in history. It's because it's been fueled by stimulus like nothing seen before. Right, I mean prior to 2008,. If you had mentioned QE, every single economist would have had a heart attack.

Speaker 1:

Now, in 2008, it made sense to do QE because the entire financial system seemed like it was about to crumble. But coming out of 2008, the economy has grown a little slower than people liked. Right, it wasn't cooking, and which was to be expected, because we were coming out of a debt bubble. Debt bubbles are inherently deflationary. You need to take your medicine, pay down the debt and then you're ready to go. But the problem is we didn't do that. All we did was kick the can. Because growth was not what people wanted, we did QE2. Then, a little while later, we did QE3. And keep in mind, prior to 2008, anytime anybody had printed money, I'm pretty sure it resulted in hyperinflation, and so we had this one moment where QE1 worked and people just sort of assumed we could keep doing it.

Speaker 1:

Then, in 2017, we did a massive tax cut when we were at 50 year lows in the unemployment rate. In 2018, powell was actually going to potentially behave with discipline and roll off balance sheet and instead, because of some angry tweets, he changed his mind and instead, because of some angry tweets, he changed his mind. And then we had COVID, and that was obviously. There was wild stimulus during that as well. Qe4. And then trillions of dollars in stimulus. Some of it was warranted, probably, but it ended up just going all over the place and to a lot of people who definitely did not need it. And now we are apparently going to be running a $3 trillion deficit at when we are at least according to markets and according to some not in a recession. That is the exact opposite of what we have always done in the past and what Keynes and other economists would say you want to do. You want to run a massive deficit and be stimulative when we're in a recession, not when inflation is still very much a concern, and so things are different.

Speaker 1:

And also, historically, is antitrust activity. But back in the day, back in the day, the company got too big. If it was anti-competitive, the government would hopefully step in and and break it up and make sure the economy is in the quality of life or the standard of living over the last 100, 150 years is due to capitalism, and at the source of capitalism is competition, which implies creative destruction, right, people? We get winners and losers if you're competing, and that's been killed, and so that's really. The main issue is Apple. I got some friends at Apple who are awesome, but Apple's kind of known for being a little cutthroat at times. Amazon has been able to basically bundle across a wide spectrum of businesses and products and destroy anything they want, right, like they can. They can be the cost leader on anything, you know. Then you had Google, microsoft, whatever it's.

Speaker 1:

Things have changed structurally, which have led to where we are today, and and maybe those things don't change, although, again, that which can't last forever doesn't, and the stimulus that we're running, the deficit that we are now running up, it's getting to a point where many are beginning to question whether that's sustainable or not. So the last 15, 16 years again was due to artificial stimulus like nothing seen before, and you know people were willing to say, well, the US can print money and we'll be fine. There is a tipping point where that's no longer the case and as many as more and more people become concerned about that tipping point, that tipping point becomes more of a reality. That tipping point can be pushed off if people aren't thinking about it. It's when that tipping point is top of mind for a lot of people that it becomes an issue, and so, again, it's just a good time to be thoughtful.

Speaker 2:

Thoughtful is a good word because the way you constructed your RUNN run ETF is thoughtful. Thoughtful is a good word because the way you constructed your RUNN run ETF is thoughtful.

Speaker 1:

Let's talk about that fund strategy and what makes it thoughtful. It's really just based on common sense. You know, I mentioned the S&P and how it's. Just the way that's designed is going to always be overweight, overvalued companies and underweight, undervalued companies. That's just how it's constructed and that's the opposite of how pretty I think everyone would say they ever want to invest. We, on the other hand, have built our portfolio in a way that I'd say is obvious. That's the opposite of the S&P, where it's based on three very simple, self-evident principles that no one will be able to convince me won't provide value, whether it's higher return or lower risk over the long run. I'm not guaranteeing it will, I'm just saying nobody will ever be able to convince me that it won't. Those principles are maximize earnings growth, because nothing drives price performance like earnings growth. You know, you, you buy a share of a company you've now got, um, you you own a part of that company and if that company is growing in wealth and value, the share of that company is going to go up. There's no arguing that earnings growth doesn't drive performance.

Speaker 1:

The second, though, the second part, is being very disciplined around valuations. Everybody says they invest in undervalued companies, and certainly I'd say that we seek to do the same. They invest in undervalued companies. And certainly I'd say that we seek to do the same. Certainly our goal, but really the big differentiator for us relative to our peers is our sell this one. It doesn't pay to hold assets that should go down, it's just long-term. Yes, it's worked in the last 16 years. Anybody that's sold anything in the last 16 years probably regretted it. But again, that's not common sense. 16 years anybody that's sold anything in the last 16 years probably regretted it. But again, that's not common sense. You don't want to hold things at prices that are above what they're worth Over the long run. That's not going to work.

Speaker 1:

And then the last is an overarching discipline on just downside risk, for the very obvious reason that if you drop 50%, you have to double your money to get it back flat. You drop 30%, which is not fun. You only need a 40% return to make new highs, and so that difference between 30 and 50% decline results in a difference between 40 and 100 percent. That's required to make new highs, which just goes to show how significant drawdowns are. And and why that really matters, especially where we are today, is something that's called the sequence of returns risk that has been again sort of glossed over conveniently by the passive purveyors. You know the way that passive the passive narrative has largely dealt with risk is to say that you just hold because the market will be up eventually, which is fine. Historically that's been true and I think that will be true. Right, it's just a matter of what your time horizon is. But particularly for people who are at a point where they're going to want to access whatever they have invested, nothing kills returns again like large drawdowns. And so if you're going to, if you're thinking of retiring, or if you have clients for advisors, if you have clients that are going to be retiring in the next 10 years, then invaluations are where they are and we've seen lost decades before, and the odds of a lost decade are much higher right now for certain reasons. Not saying it's going to happen, just saying the odds are higher. That lower downside risk will really benefit your clients. You want to make sure that money is there when they need it, but also you don't want to pull money out after a big drawdown, because nothing destroys cumulative growth like big drawdowns, let alone having to withdraw money at those times, and that's one of the things that our strategy really helps with is our focus on risk. So, again, avoiding overvalued companies, which hasn't mattered for the last 16 years, but again, the last thing you want to do is hold companies that should go down.

Speaker 1:

I haven't looked at Apple's P very recently, but I think it's in the 30s. I believe Apple could decline 50% and it wouldn't be cheap. It would not. Relative to its historical valuations, apple could drop 50% and not be cheap. Nobody would be like, oh, that's a buy. And so the problem is the way that human emotion works is we swing from one extreme to another. So if Apple is expensive, it's likely, it's most likely, it's likely to go to cheap because we swing from one extreme to another. So, thinking that it would go from 30 to like a multiple of 15, which isn't necessarily cheap, it's probably optimistic, and so I don't know what will happen. Maybe because we're running, you know, a $3 trillion deficit, and maybe that's what we're going to do from now on. Then maybe what's happening right now continues, but what if it doesn't Right? And that's where diversification really matters.

Speaker 1:

One of my, one of the friends that I think most highly of, said that he has changed his perspective on investing and I actually had an advisor mentioned this earlier too there's so many things kind of driving big tech at the moment, including just an utter lack of any kind of antitrust activity. Many of them do have that sort of network effect going for them, and so now they're taking sort of a barbell approach of investing in a small subset of the big tech companies and then investing with us. Because we don't have that exposure, those companies don't meet our rules, and so you get two very different approaches, two very different portfolios. Both have performed well over the last decade, but ours is much more risk focused. So it's a great way to really hedge your bets. If the market keeps going up, great If the market declines. At least you have insurance.

Speaker 2:

How active is the strategy and what results in a selling of a position?

Speaker 1:

It's intentionally not very active. What makes us active is the way in which the portfolio is constructed and the thought that has gone into it. Passive is synonymous with thoughtless. I mean it just means not acting right. Passive is synonymous with thoughtless, or just not acting, whereas our strategy is thoughtful. You know, it's based upon common sense and that's what makes it active. The way in which we actually run it is a little more like passive, in that it's rules-based, so we do the same thing over and over, kind of like an index, and so and that's by design the purpose of the rules is to remove our emotions and our opinions from the process. You know, I'm a person I got. I don't lack for opinions. You know, much to my wife's annoyance on a regular basis. Opinions, you know much to my wife's annoyance on a regular basis, and and I can be emotional I mean right now I'm worked up, my hands are moving all over the place. So you just don't want to be making objective decisions, particularly on the behalf of others when their financial well-being is at stake, emotionally. And again, that's the purpose of our process is to remove us from it. And so it's very intentionally not active. It's. It's very disciplined, repeatable.

Speaker 1:

Now where we might step in is sometimes, you know, events might not be reflected in the data. For instance, you know, several years ago Equifax had a data breach and at that time, everybody had a data breach. So if you weren't investing in companies that had data breaches, you just weren't investing. But Equifax. It came out that Equifax knew, two weeks before it was, that information was released and insiders were trading on it. That was not good, and so that's one of those instances where we stepped in in an active manner and sold just because we didn't want to have anything to do with that.

Speaker 1:

Usually, though, we're going to sell for two main reasons, and basically you could sum it up as we sell when our rules are no longer met. Now, when we value a company, that valuation moves kind of day to day because it's a relative valuation versus the S&P, but it moves slowly, and we give it a 15% premium over that fair valuation where we sell. So there is some value to momentum. We give it a little room to run. Once it's 15% beyond that fair value, we would much rather invest in something that should go up than should go down Again. That's one of the main premises of our strategy is don't own assets that should go down, let alone a lot, and so when a position works out, we give it room to run. We sell. We never sell the top, which is annoying. I would love to tweak it and be able to sell the top every time, but we sell once it's overvalued.

Speaker 1:

The other reason we sell is, again, if it violates our rules, and that's usually on the earnings growth and with regard to earnings growth. So if a company comes out and warns and it's no longer going to meet our required earnings growth because, again, another goal of the strategy is to maintain a portfolio with significantly higher earnings growth than the S&P, because nothing drives performance like earnings growth If that is not going, if a company is not going to deliver that, then we're going to sell. This is the two main reasons that we sell. Some other exceptions might be other rules. So one of our another rule that really helps with debt or the downside, is a focus on debt. As individuals, we know if we take on too much debt, it's not going to work out well, and that's the same for corporations as well, and for that reason we stay away from companies of over leveraged themselves, and not too long ago and this is kind of was the trend.

Speaker 1:

We had Home Depot and Starbucks, which were within our portfolio. They sold so much debt, not to build better companies, but just simply to buy back stock, that their book value went negative, which was a Benjamin Graham. I don't even know how he'd react to that. He probably never imagined that as even a possibility. Regardless, the amount of debt that they took on was so excessive that we had no choice but to sell. So really, that sums it up. Again, it's very disciplined. We have predetermined sell rules. Again, those are going to be if companies are valued, we sell. We don't want to owe anything that should go down. If a company is not going to deliver the earnings growth that we want, we sell. And then we have some other criteria.

Speaker 2:

How should individuals advisors think about run as a core holding, as satellite? I mean it sounds like it very much could be core.

Speaker 1:

Yeah, I like to use metaphors whenever possible. If you think of your equity portfolio as an ice cream sundae run, or our efficient growth strategy is meant to be the vanilla ice cream of your ice cream sundae, Our universe's companies over $5 billion treat on US exchanges, so it's in that mid-large space and then it's growthy because that's a big priority of ours. But our focus on valuations and risk brings it back into core and so it really sits right in the middle of, if you think of, the Morningstar style boxes. That's where it sits. It sits in this mid-large kind of core space and there's a number of different ways. Well, really two main ways to build a portfolio. You can either use the Morningstar style boxes and again, in that instance we're sitting right in the middle and you can easily complement it with more aggressive growth. More innovative growth mean complement value small. Otherwise, you can take the Yale endowment model, where you have sort of a core satellite approach, and then again we are an excellent core because it's really meant to be the foundation of your portfolio.

Speaker 1:

Because of that rules-based nature, our clients know exactly what we're doing at all times. We've been basically doing the same thing for four decades, which makes it very reliable. You know what we're doing but also that extra focus on risk. So when we analyze a company, we're very focused on risk. We're avoiding companies that should go down, focus on valuations, focus on debt.

Speaker 1:

But then also, when we construct a portfolio, we address risk proactively by one diversifying the portfolio across 50 to 75 names by equally weighting, diversifying the portfolio across 50 to 75 names by equally weighting, so we're not taking any crazy risk on one company, as well as diversifying across industries, so that we, you know, the goal is to really control for that which we can't control, for right, to mitigate idiosyncratic risk in every way that we can. And so that gives you this again, this very risk focused diversified portfolio that sits right in the middle of your equity allocation. That ideally and I wouldn't say you forget about it, but ideally it can be sort of that rock, that's kind of set it and forget it a piece of your portfolio and then you can focus on other aspects, I'm going to assume you're pretty excited for the future going forward, um, just because we're due for a cycle that is not all about large caps but, um, this large cap move still seems to have some legs to it.

Speaker 2:

Do we need a? Um, some kind of catalyst like do we need some kind of real prolonged volatility or something akin to that that to cause a you think, a broader rotation out of large caps?

Speaker 1:

yeah, yeah, I mean valuations don't matter until they do, um, and at some point they will right. There will be a catalyst. Where I feel like investor behavior is so ingrained right now because, again, we're 16 years or so into the longest bull market in history it is paid to invest in a tiny number of highly correlated companies. It is paid to invest in a portfolio like the S&P that is massively concentrated in a tiny number of highly correlated companies. Part of that has been a self-fulfilling prophecy, where you've got money just consistently going in it. You know, if you cap weighted portfolios because you're overweight, overvalued companies is a. It's a play on momentum. So as long as money keeps flowing in that same way, keeps pushing those companies up, then the current dynamic will continue, and so it's really. Yes, a catalyst is needed for that to change One of the. It only strikes me as funny when I have these what I think are great ideas, but they're really simple and probably dumb. But last year, momentum hit the 99.8th percentile in history. Nobody's talking about that and people are still behaving as though that's normal, which is understandable because as people, we have recency bias and, as long as most of us can almost remember, the market's gone straight up, and it's been led by a small number of usual suspects, but again, 99.8th percentile means one in 500. And so that's not the norm. That is a very rare exception, but yet we are all behaving as though that's perfectly normal. We're still behaving in the same way we were behaving last year when it hit the 99.8th percentile. We've all been basically indoctrinated into thinking that, in order to make a ton of money in the stock market, all you have to do is pile in indiscriminately every time it goes down a little bit. Again, I mentioned the how well by the dips performed. The only time going back to 85 that's performed better as far as buying the dip was 2020. And in 2020, the mark was up every single day, basically, um and so you know we've got.

Speaker 1:

We are at this very extreme moment as far as sentiment goes, where people think now think that something that is very hard to do, which is investing in the stock market. It is really hard. Many people with very little experience doing it think it's incredibly easy, the easiest thing they've ever done. Right, they're just min money. It's like going to the casino and you find a slot machine that spits out money 99% of the time. That's right now. That is how many feel and that's not reality. It is at the but it is again 99.8 percentiles, a one in 500 moment.

Speaker 1:

It's inevitable that we go the other direction, even if it's just, you know, reverting a little bit. I don't know what's going to cause that. Maybe it just hits an extreme or has no other option but to go the other direction. Or maybe there's a catalyst and there are a lot of potential catalysts out there. Right Like we discussed all the different economic indicators that are reason to worry a little bit, right Like the, the LEI indexes, I think at the lowest point it's been since 08. Delinquencies housing delinquencies are as high as they've been since 2010. Keep in mind, that was the housing bubble. So there's many, there are a lot of catalysts to keep your eye on, and it's inevitable that things reverse. A one in 500 moment is not going to last into perpetuity I mean, yeah, I mean that's.

Speaker 2:

That's the thing about um living in the small sample. It feels normal, right, and in any statistical data set you're always going to have an anomaly, you're always going to have an outlier and yeah, I think by all metrics we are in one of those anomalies, but it feels like it's the way it should be.

Speaker 1:

I'm going to mess this up a little bit, but there's a. I don't know if it's a parable, but either way. Two fish are swimming along and one of them says man, the water feels nice today, and the other one looks at the other one and says what's water?

Speaker 2:

That's a good place to wrap up this conversation, Seth. For those who want to learn more about RUN, where would you point them to?

Speaker 1:

Definitely check out runningoakcom runningoaketfscom. I have very begrudgingly been more active on LinkedIn and X, partially thanks to your efforts, so you can definitely find a little more kind of targeted, more informative videos on LinkedIn. If you just check out Seth Cogswell and then also feel free to email me Seth at RunningOakcom, I'm happy to, I'm always happy to talk shop and help in any way that I can.

Speaker 2:

One of the nicest and most genuine guys in the industry. Please make sure you learn more about run and check it out, obviously, and connect to Seth on social media. Thank you, seth, appreciate it. Thanks, cheers, buddy.

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Michael A. Gayed, CFA

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