Paras Shah: As fighting in Sudan enters its third week, rival generals have turned the country’s capital, Khartoum, into a warzone. Mohamed Hamdan, better known as Hemedti, and his paramilitary Rapid Support Forces are fighting with Abdel Fatah al-Burhan, who leads the Sudanese Armed Forces.
In just three days, the World Health Organization estimates more than 400 deaths and 3,500 wounded in the conflict. For years, Burhan and Hemedti have wrestled for power and control of Sudan. But until now, they’ve been on the same side. In 2019, they teamed up to remove the country’s long-time President Omar al-Bashir from power. And in 2021, they toppled the civilian government for military rule. The latest fighting is a clash between two men, but it’s also the latest chapter in Sudan’s long fight for freedom.
Those who can have begun fleeing to neighboring countries. The United Nations’ refugee agency expects over 270,000 refugees to cross over into Chad and South Sudan, while others will likely cross into Egypt and Ethiopia. Although a temporary ceasefire allowed many foreign diplomats to be evacuated from Khartoum, thousands of Sudanese remain behind while basic infrastructure, like hospitals, are collapsing from the fighting.
This is the Just Security podcast. I’m your host Paras Shah.
To help us understand the conflict, what it means for the people of Sudan, and how it will impact the region, we have Quscondy Abdulshafi, Suliman Baldo, and Rebecca Hamilton. Quscondy is a Senior Regional Advisor at the nonprofit organization Freedom House. He has over a decade of experience working on human rights and peacebuilding in Sudan and East Africa. Suliman is the Executive Director of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, an organization that develops investigation and analysis of corruption in Sudan, led by Sudanese voices. Rebecca is a law professor at American University. But before that, she covered Sudan as a reporter for the Washington Post. Rebecca is also a member of Just Security’s Editorial Board.
Suliman, Quscondy, Bec. Thank you so much for joining the show, especially in what I know has been such a difficult time for Sudan. I really appreciate you being here and I know our listeners do as well.
Quscondy Abdulshafi: Thank you.
Suliman Baldo: Thank you for putting us together.
Paras: Bec, you've reported from Sudan and you even wrote a book about the conflict in Darfur. I want to start by grounding us in some context and some history to understand this conflict, Because a lot of listeners may recall the genocide in Darfur from the mid 2000s, but they might not have heard about recent developments in Sudan. A lot of the Western media has portrayed this as a conflict between two men – between Burhan and Hemedti – and that it’s a conflict of personalities. But there's another dimension to this conflict, and that's a clash between democracy and dictatorship, between military rule and civilian government. And to understand that story, we need to start with a third man. Not Burhan or Hamadi, but the former president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir. What do we need to know about what's been happening in Sudan for the last 30 years?
Rebeccaca Hamilton: Thanks, Paras. I think you're right, because this is not just about a conflict between two personalities, although it is also that. But it's really hard to understand how you reach a place where Burhan and Hemedti are in the positions that they're in, without understanding the dictatorship of Omar al-Bashir in essentially creating these two players of General Burhan and Hemedti.
So for many listeners, Sudan has just hit the headlines all of a sudden, but what we've seen in the last two weeks has not come out of nowhere and in fact, has a brutally long history in Sudan. If we start only 30 years ago, and we could certainly go back further with Omar al-Bashir coming to power in a military coup and seeking to continue this approach of governing the country through a process of divide and rule, of defining what it means to be Sudanese through a very narrow lens of an Arabic Islamic identity, and creating this category of “other” for anyone who didn't fit within that mold. And then generating these conflicts in all of the regional areas – and listeners will remember, of course, the genocide in Darfur at the start of the century, which played to the same dynamic of othering.
Paras: The conflict in Darfur is complex, but when thinking about the conflict that's happening today, here's what listeners can keep in mind: Almost exactly 20 years ago, a rebellion sprang up in Darfur. To put down that rebellion, Bashir armed a different group, the Janjaweed, a militia that was recruited mostly from Arab herding tribes who were already in conflict with the region's non-Arab farmers. One of the leaders of the Janjaweed’s genocide in Darfur was Hemedti, who later transformed the group into the Rapid Support Forces, out of this militia. Suliman, could you tell us more about these militia groups?
Suliman: I think the Islamist factor is very important. Bashir took power in a 1989 coup, in which the military were just the front for the Muslim Brotherhood movement of Sudan. You know, they wanted to re-engineer Sudanese society and population to their image.That movement survived the fall of regime from al-Bashir in 1989. And it has been working from behind the scene to manipulate the officer corps that it controls within the Sudan Armed Forces, so that a transition to democracy never gets a chance. So, Sudan is making a full circle.
Rebecca: Hemedti was brought to Khartoum by Omar al-Bashir, who was hoping that he would provide protection against the risk of a military coup.
Paras: Obviously, Bashir didn’t anticipate that the coup would come from his former lieutenant, Hemedti. So, how does Burhan fit into the picture?
Suliman: So for me, Burhan and Hemedti are partners in crime. They have known each other from the early 2000s in Darfur, where Burhan was the liaison officer between the Sudanese Armed Forces and their proxy, the Janjaweed. Burhan became the head of the border guards. This is the corps which was created by the Sudan government to incorporate the Janjaweed when the international pressure, you know, increased for dissolving this deadly militia, having realized the genocide they committed in Darfur.
Paras: Just to make sure I've got this straight – Burhan and Hemedti, these two generals, are the keys to Bashir's power, and they go on to overthrow him in a coup and take power themselves. Can you explain the power struggle that we're seeing now between the two of them?
Rebecca: There was incredible popular protests by the Sudanese people, peaceful protests that led to the overthrow of Omar al-Bashir with the assistance of Hemedti. So he turned his back on the man who brought him to Khartoum, and instead sought to paint himself as a hero of the revolution. And what we ended up with was a transitional government that had, at that time, a strong civilian component. The military component, however, was combined Hemedti, with the Rapid Support Forces, and General Burhan, the head of the Sudanese Armed Forces. That went through until 2021, when Hemedti and Burhan, together – partners in crime – overthrew that government, that arrangement, and ousted the civilian part of that government. Since then, there has been a scramble to try to keep some kind of transition to democracy on track. But it has been really a futile endeavor, when you have had Burhan and Hemedti at the helm. And I think it is not terribly surprising to anyone that at some point, this arrangement would reach its limit.
Suliman: There is no winner in this fight. And there is only one loser, which is Sudan, which is being destroyed before our eyes, and its population which is being, again, sent in displacement camps, in refugee camps across the region. And Sudan doesn't deserve that. Together, they are partners in crime and they are killing the country and its people.
Paras: Quscondy, anything you’d like to add there?
Quscondy: In the past 64 years of Sudanese independent life, at least 54 of those were abused by the military. all this change has been kind of obliterated by the military institutions. And that rule, throughout those years they have accumulated a lot. Not only power and wealth, but also internal systems of political control. And I think one of the strongest mechanisms of control was war. Now they built an ambition called power. And because of that, now this is the end circle of all the evil circles that turn it into itself. And it is the – I hope it's a final episode of Sudan’s existence or nonexistence. For as we said in the beginning, this is the worst of all possible worst scenarios that could happen.
Rebecca: Talking about the worst of all scenarios here, it is this culmination, in many ways, of so many strands of Sudanese history coming together. And I think one of the things that has been, has taken people a little aback in the last two weeks, is that it is unfolding with the center of it... Actually, the center of the fighting, happening in Khartoum. So for decades and decades and decades, all of those wars that Quscondy has been talking about, have been happening in areas outside of Khartoum. And Khartoum was the place that people fled to.
Paras: Right, and now that even that sense of relative safety is gone.
Suliman: The Sudanese, when they see everyone – foreigners leaving the country, the pace of the evacuations by all nations, almost three dozen of them already have arranged to extract their citizens from Sudan – you know, they get worried, frankly, because, you know, they draw the logical conclusion that friendly nations are abandoning Sudan to its own fate. And as a result, what has happened is a spontaneous exodus out of Khartoum. It's a survival instinct and Khartoum is becoming a ghost city as we speak.
Paras: I know the images I’ve seen on TV really do show a ghost city. Suliman, what steps should the international community take to respond.
Suliman: The international community could definitely, you know, set the record straight by showing that is not abandoning Sudan. And they should come back first, you know, to impose cessation of hostilities for humanitarian reasons. Second, to extend a rescue to the population that are trapped in crossfire zones. There are millions in Khartoum alone who are in that situation. Third, by creating an effective mechanism for observing a ceasefire, so that it will become known who is violating it. You know, so many ceasefires have already been declared, belligerents have committed to it, and then didn't observe this obligation. So we need a mechanism to verify that. And last, the international community should use its leverage to return Sudan to a political pause, where the hopes of the Sudanese for democracy, rule of law, you know, a modicum of justice for all the injustice that has been meted out over the decades, is guaranteed. And this should involve regional actors and international actors who are already part of the mediation scene in Sudan. Short of that, you know, Sudan would have really been abandoned by everyone.
Quscondy: Yeah, if I may add in here. In all of this conversation now, what is missing – the key – who's supposed to be in the driving seat, it's being moved and marginalized. We see visuals of what is happening: War, people are fleeing. But also there are visuals, sounds of the resistance that exists. Mass civil society organization, political actors, including some of the army actors that are taking part of this ongoing conflict, signing letters to abolish the violence. A market just burned down, by RSF. And in a few hours, the civilians came back, built back the market, and they put all the commodities for poor people who are dependent on that market to come and get things for free. And everyone takes only what they need. Those are signs of, you know, a big question of Sudan’s miracles. Is there a possibility that non-violent peace forces can coexist, even within all of this fighting that is taking place? I think those voices are missed in all of this conversation so far, which I think is one of the negative implications of how media and policy are directing toward what's taking place in Khartoum.
Paras: That's such an important point, really. These neighborhood resistance committees are taking the lead in helping people get through the conflict, and that's a role they've played for a long time, going all the way back to the start of Bashir's reign.They've been a driving force for people's opposition even since then. Beyond organizing civil disobedience, committees have been critical in supporting those who are left behind in Khartoum, as diplomats and humanitarian workers leave so swiftly. They evacuate families as fighting reaches their streets. And they're providing everything from food to water, but also insulin and baby formula, essential lifesaving services, as the health care sector collapses. All the while, they've been vocal about trying to restructure the military and placing the government back in civilian hands
Rebecca: These neighborhood resistance committees have been the backbone – largely youth-led – of all positive developments that we've seen recently in Sudan. And they have stayed the course even as others have come and gone. And this ties in, I think, to this question that Suliman was raising about evacuations. And the need to get people back in there quickly, the foreign actors. Because if you don't, then the only voices that will hear other voices who already have the platform. Which is the generals, right? And it is just much harder to raise up the voices of the people in these neighborhood resistance committees in civil society, if you're outside the country. It's harder to build relationships with them. The access to those voices is harder once you're outside of the country. And so it sort of doubles down on the loss of those voices when we have this situation of evacuation. It also changes the calculation, I think, for those who are involved in pushing for a ceasefire, when they don't have their own nationals in the country.
Paras: Many commentators are calling this scenario the nightmare scenario. Where does the conflict go from here?
Suliman: Worst case scenario for me, in the development of this conflict, into a full blown civil war. And there are factors of this that could easily ignite such a broader and more deadly conflict, even, than the one happening now. Quscondy mentioned the local initiative pushing the generals, or pressing them to agree to a ceasefire. There are local initiatives in Darfur that have worked out in separating the Rapid Support Forces and the army and making them abide by ceasefire that’s held outside the control of their chain of command. In West Darfur, the worst case scenario is already playing out, because the belligerents are aligned with associated ethnic groups. The RSF has the backing of all the pastoralist, smaller tribes in the state of West Darfur. And the locals have been victims of the Rapid Support Forces for many decades now. They are all fleeing to Chad to seek safety, because they are all at risk for nothing except for who they are. And in Junaynah, we have seen a level of chaos that we haven't seen elsewhere. You know, people breaking the armories of their national police, of the general intelligence agency. And taking weapons. Civilians, in the neighborhoods.
Paras: Suliman, these tensions you're describing fall into a long pattern of othering people based on ethnic lines in Sudan, defining one group and pitting that group against others that are seen as different.
Suliman: So, this is really a play out, an advanced play out of what could happen across the world if people don't pay attention. You know, there will be a polarization because of all these years of oppression by the Rapid Support Forces against groups of African origin, educated leaders of those groups are saying, let's join this fight and take our revenge on the Rapid Support Forces and so on, little knowing that this could really ignite destructive war that is even more deadly than the conflict of 2003, that is still ongoing, actually – it never ended. So this this is a nightmare scenario for me
Rebecca: I mean, not to make a very bleak picture that you've painted even worse, Suliman. But just to say, of course you know, we're not just talking about Darfur, either. Because these very same dynamics are playing out in other areas that have been the victims of the consistent strategy of a sort of divide and rule to maintain control. And the pitting of one population against another. And the question of who is, quote unquote, truly Sudanese. And what does that Arab Islamic identity look like? And who gets defined as “other” from that? And that division that has been created and stoked over successive generations, at this point…. All it takes is just another match to set it alight. So I think, yeah, the worst case scenario looks even worse. And then adding on to that, if instead of the one sort of unified message coming from external actors, that the violence just has to stop, we instead get these different actors backing one side or the other. And there’s just more and more weaponry sent into Sudan. It's just, it's just horrific.
Paras: I'm also curious as we look forward, what are the key things that we should have on our radars? What should we be looking out for?
Suliman: There is intense diplomatic preparation for a coordinated mediation. But there is a diplomatic jam of initiatives. You know, the US is depending on the quad, the mechanism it has developed is in partnership with United Arab Emirates, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and UK. You know, to play a lead role in mediating for a political outcome of this conflict rather than, you know, the fight to the end that the generals are seeking. At the same time, Sudan definitely – you know, the current government of today, which is the coup d'etat regime of General Burhan, has clearly and in no uncertain terms – and even in the Council session about the situation in Sudan – expressed preference for initiatives by the African Union on the principle of, African solutions for African problems. And I expect that the regime, the military in Khartoum, prefer this route because they would think that African institutions would be less harsh on them because they're really not prioritizing the democratic aspirations of the Sudanese people. They will search for a solution that they would say would add stability, but not necessarily one that would lead them back to a democratic transition.
Quscondy: Adding on to what Suliman says, any potential of change of cutting, strict political position of each military party that, “I have to finish this one,” “I have to arrest this one.” How that rhetoric is being played out into softer language, depending on trends of the conflict in Khartoum and elsewhere in Sudan. So I think any change in those positions, either through international pressure, but also through exhaustion of the war options, can open a new window for potential [of] any permanent ceasefire. And how those processes being transparent are very key in the coming days, to watch. Both of the warring parties, you know, particularly now the release of some of the former regime leaders from the Prison. And now they are free, open in air, can be a new trend to watch. All of this new release, prisoners released, can be tools for new violence and something to really need to be watched as things go through.
Rebecca: I think I'm at least finding it hard right now, to focus much beyond the really urgent need for a permanent ceasefire, just because of what we're seeing, what the risks are. But that is just your baby step one, for what is in fact, needed. In the medium term, assuming the sort of traffic jam that Solomon has laid out on the diplomatic front is worked through, I think I might be concerned that the strong preference of all external actors, for just stability, is going to drive what any conversation looks like. And that is going to, once again, not serve the democratic aspirations of the Sudanese people. But I understand why that desire is there. And certainly, figuring out how to make the shift from military control, to choose civilian control, is an enormous challenge. I just wish over the course of recent history, we would have had more patience for the work involved in supporting the navigation of that challenge. Instead of this sort of idea that you have the moment of overthrow, and celebration, and wonderful talking points emanating from around the world. And then you focus your attention elsewhere, which of course leaves space for all of the actors that never went away, that would spoil the transition to democracy to come back and take control. And I think that is exactly what we're seeing emerging today.
Paras: As Western media outlets have withdrawn from Khartoum and diplomats have also left, how do we get credible information? What sources can we look to to understand what's happening on the ground?
Quscondy: there's a very heavy, intentional, very well-organized campaign of misinformation and disinformation from conflicting parties. That's taking place currently, as part of the warfare. And I think, lack of information… Now, the exodus of, you know, diplomats, but also people who are doing monitoring of human rights and critical information, in the coming days, can set up a new trend of using the existing, limited-access media, to really promote the agenda of war and deep division. So, I think strong attention on those trends could be very important in the coming days.
Quscondy: There is very much in the beginning of the conflict, particularly the first three days, intentional targeting of everyone who used the phone or camera to take photos. Because of that, it was really, you know – several people, civilians who were shot, [were] shot during a time when they tried to take photos and emails. But it's still currently – because the violence actually takes place in a short military confrontation, confrontation in an area and then they move to another area – there is always people there. Civilians that go on collecting data to make videos, image. I think also there is, you know, the technology advantages I think we have. Also some of the local institutions, but also some of the international institutions that vet some of those information, particularly propaganda, basic video, audio that have been kind of very widely distributed, WhatsApp or Facebook or other social media outlets. So I think it's just, you know, to be very careful of any piece of data that comes in to consume and before you just take it, [as] this is true, I think it really, really needed to be cross checked, because really very much intentional misinformation happening.
Suliman: This is very important, Quscondy. And this should remind us of the role of the Wagner Group in Sudan. The group came to Sudan by invitation from Omar al-Bashir to provide security services: Training and facilitating equipment, supplies from Russia. And the second intervention that they excelled at is political influence operations. They were very effective in setting up disinformation platforms favoring a positive image of the military as more capable of ruling Sudan than those civilians who were then, you know, civilian-led transition. And the military, therefore, should be in control and so on.
I want to point out there are credible news websites such as Sudan Tribune, Radio Dabanga, in particular Madameek, which is one news website in Arabic, or Rakoba, the Sudan Nile news websites. The Sudanese go to these websites to find some credible information that has little chance of manipulation, because all of these groups, alternate media websites – such as electronic Al Taghyeer, or the Change newspaper, also. You know, they do have people on the ground who are proper journalists and, you know, are vetting the information seriously. There is a website of the Democrat and of Al-Jareeda and Al-Tayar. All the local news services that are known to the Sudanese are, you know, are providing that service. Internationally, it is probably Sudan Tribune and Radio Dabanga doing most of the flow of credible information out of the country. Particularly what's happening beyond Khartoum, because there is a lot that is happening for instance in Darfur and Kordofan, and these news websites that are bilingual, in fact, are doing a great job covering these difficult circumstances.
Rebecca: One of the many things I’m concerned about is that, for the first time, we've seen the reaction of all of the diplomats from external countries in the past week, rushing to evacuate. There's a panic and a focus about the fact that Khartoum is under attack. And I'm worried that in that focus, we are going to lose sight of what is happening around the rest of the country, as well. So building on all of that, I think it's important to remember that there are incredible Sudanese journalists who have against all the odds, across the course of decades, managed to get good information out of Sudan. They know how to work under really difficult and dangerous conditions, and are continuing to do so.
But the other thing to say is that, as relates to misinformation and political influence campaigns that are being spread through social media – unfortunately, Sudan is not unique in having to deal with this now that it's in this conflict. And we've seen the tragedy that unfolded in Myanmar, with the role that Facebook and misinformation played in that situation. The only positive thing to say out of that is that there have been lessons learned by both tech companies and by civil society, itself. And then one of the things that might be worth thinking through is how some of those lessons can be brought to citizens in Sudan, or watching the conflict in Sudan. About how to avoid some of the pitfalls of the online spread of misinformation, in the context of conflict.
Paras: Thank you so much to all three of you. Quscondy, Suliman, Rebecca. I know this is such a difficult time and that all of you are incredibly busy. Thank you so much.
Suliman: Thank you.
Quscondy: Thank you.
Rebecca: Thank you. And with my Just Security hat on, a particular heartfelt gratitude to Suliman and Quscondy for taking the time to speak with us, even though I know your phones are exploding and there's a million things that you're dealing with around the clock, to handle what is happening on the ground. So I'm just, I'm always learning from you. I'm always grateful to you, and I really appreciate the time today.
Suliman: Thank you.
Quscondy: Thank you.
Paras: The Just Security podcast is produced in partnership with NYU's American Journalism Online program. AJO trains students to become world class journalists, no matter where they live or work. Find out more about how and how you can apply in our show notes. This episode was hosted by me, Paras Shah, with co-production and editing by Tiffany Chang and Michelle Eigenheer. Our music is the song, “The Parade,” by Hey Pluto.
Special thanks to us Quscondy Abdulshafi, Clara Apt, Suliman Baldo, Rebecca Hamilton, Alex Kapelman, and Ben Montoya. We'll link to Suliman's piece, which analyzes how the international community can respond to the conflict, in the show notes.
If you enjoyed this episode, please give us a five-star rating on Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen.