Paras Shah: Today, July 12, the leaders of NATO member countries are wrapping up a summit in Vilnius, Lithuania. The meeting opened as Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan ended his opposition to NATO membership for Sweden, and as President Biden said Ukraine still needs to take steps before it can join the Alliance. Biden further said that Ukraine shouldn’t be admitted while Russia’s invasion continues because that would pit the Alliance directly against Russia.
In 2008, Alliance members vaguely promised that Ukraine could join NATO, but left the timing unspecified. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made it clear that he believes his country deserves membership, particularly as it fights for its survival against Russian aggression and defends democratic values.
But the agreement NATO members reached this week only offers Ukraine membership “when allies agree, and conditions are met,” though the Alliance did put together a package of weapons and security assurances in the meantime.
This is the Just Security podcast. I’m your host Paras Shah. Joining me to co-host this episode is Just Security’s Washington Senior Editor, Viola Gienger.
To discuss the summit and unpack its implications, we have Ambassador Daniel Fried.
During his 40 years in the foreign service, Ambassador Fried played a central role in implementing U.S. policy in Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union. In several senior roles, including Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Ambassador Fried helped craft the policy of NATO enlargement to Central European countries and NATO-Russia relations. Earlier, he served as the U.S. Ambassador to Poland. He is currently the Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council, which co-hosted a public forum with other think tanks as part of the NATO summit.
Dan, welcome to the show. Thanks so much for joining us today.
Dan Fried: Thanks for having me.
Paras: I want to start by asking about some news that occurred before this conference even got underway. Turkish President Erdogan had long opposed Sweden's membership in the Alliance, and over the weekend and Monday, he switched that stance towards supporting Sweden's membership. How will that impact the Alliance and what are the reasons for this change?
Dan: That wasn't the only shift of policy Erdogan made. He also came out in favor of Ukraine's membership in NATO. He came out in support of continued shipment of Ukrainian grain across the Black Sea and I think offered Turkish naval escorts for it, whether or not there's a deal with Russia. So this was quite a shift by Erdogan, and a welcome one.
I think bringing Sweden into the Alliance, first of all, removes a negative that is the continuing Turkish and Hungarian blockages seem to be removed — I'll welcome their Parliaments ratifying it, but that seems to be removed. And Sweden in the Alliance is a big deal. Sweden brings capability and geography. The Baltic Sea is much more inhospitable to Russia than it used to be. So much for Putin's strategic genius, he attacks Ukraine for no good reason, and then gets an enlarged NATO for his trouble. But he should have thought of that at the time.
Viola Gienger: So, you think he will stick to this pledge of supporting Sweden's membership, because of course he controls the majority in Parliament, and could still kind of throw a wrench into things between now and ratification in the Turkish Parliament if he wanted to, right?
Dan: Well, yeah, that's right. I don't think — I don't suppose Erdogan would risk his personal credibility by reversing course, absent some rather drastic change of circumstance. I'll pop the champagne corks when it happens, of course.
Viola: If Sweden does clear those hurdles, what does its accession mean for the Alliance and how does that tie into the trajectory of the war in Ukraine?
Dan: Well, as I said, Sweden brings military capability that we need to invest more in its military. It brings technology, it brings political savvy and foreign policy sophistication, and it brings really good geography to the Alliance, by which I mean with Sweden in the Baltic Sea is much less hospitable to the Russians. So that is a big deal.
And it also shows to any Russians with eyes to see that Putin's war in Ukraine is a strategic disaster for Russia. Putin constructs all he wants, but look at what he has achieved. The Alliance is thinking about Ukrainian membership in NATO, which was never even considered in a serious way before, and Sweden and Finland have joined or will join shortly. That's a catastrophe for Putin's foreign policy, and one he brought on himself, and I think discerning Russians are aware of that.
Viola: Interesting, okay. One other thing about Sweden's accession — one of the concessions that Turkey got out of this was a new position at NATO for a “special coordinator” for counterterrorism. Now, we've seen the proliferation of counterterrorism institutions in global institutions like the UN and elsewhere over the last two decades plus. Is there a risk for NATO of buying Erdogan’s argument on “terrorism”, which, while some of that may be — has obviously some firm grounding in reality, counterterrorism can also be used by authoritarian leaders to commit abuses and violations of human rights. Is there a risk there that you see?
Dan: Well, of course, authoritarians have abused counterterrorism, or used it as an excuse to do all manners of bad things. But naming a special counterterrorism envoy doesn't mean we've bought into a bad narrative. Take it at its word. It's not a bad thing. It's a good thing. And if this is part of an understanding reached with Turkey, well, that's fine. The practice of foreign policy is not for purists. Deals are done. You have to make sure that the deals are consistent with your overall values, but within that, why not help the Turks or give them what they're asking for if you can, consistent with your values? Nothing wrong with that.
Viola: Great, thanks.
Paras: Let's turn to the question of Ukraine. So, Ukraine has sought NATO membership since 2008, and at this year's summit, there were some rhetorical gestures from NATO countries to eventually have Ukraine join the Alliance and reaffirming that, but no concrete timeline. So how should we think about the dynamics there, especially President Biden's reluctance to have Ukraine join in the midst of this ongoing war with Russia?
Dan: Well, there was never any serious chance that NATO would propose a timeline for accession of another country. I can understand perfectly well, while the Biden administration didn't want itself locked into a timeline, which was rigid. And we play out against reality. And we don't know what the war is going to bring. So I appreciate the Biden administration's reluctance on a timeline or reluctance to grant Ukrainian accession or an invitation to NATO automaticity.
That said, I think the language in the communique was a bit too reticent, and I think that the US contributed to the sense that it was holding back, including through some of President Biden’s statements like the interview on Fareed Zakaria on Sunday. I felt that that would not have been my preferred approach were I advising the president. However, all that said, NATO did take a step forward. It wasn't just a few countries. It was NATO as an alliance, saying Ukraine's future is in NATO, and talking about an invitation to join the Alliance when all allies agree and when conditions are met.
Now, that is not a commitment. But it does say that NATO has agreed that Ukraine belongs in the transatlantic and European family. It doesn't say that Ukraine belongs to Russia's sphere of influence, its sphere of domination. That's a big deal. And we have seen a groundswell of support in NATO for Ukrainian accession, which didn't exist a year ago. Acouple of years ago, this was not being discussed. Now, it's being debated.
So advocates of faster movement toward Ukraine accession are frustrated. I get it. President Zelenskyy yesterday was frustrated. I think he's more positive today. I get that too. But this is a big deal. Step back — Ukraine joining the NATO alliance? This is a big step, and one that was not contemplated a few years ago. It's easier to write an op-ed than it is to craft a policy and be responsible for it. So I don't want to knock what NATO did. The language could have been stronger. The US projected too much grudging hand wringing, but those are secondary issues. The primary issue is that NATO has said that Ukraine is in our family, and isn't the property of the Kremlin. And given Putin's war and his war aims, that's a big deal.
Viola: Can you clarify just a little bit more, and how this language about Ukraine's ultimate NATO membership is different from the 2008 Bucharest language, which also said Ukraine will become a member of NATO at some point in the future. I mean, it didn't even say at some point if it will become and left it at that, right? So qualitatively, how is this different?
Dan: Well, at a micro level, it's different because NATO has now raised the issue of invitation to join, which Bucharest didn't. The macro and more serious answer to your question is that at Bucharest — and I was there at the summit — allies were divided, the language of the Bucharest communique was crafted on the fly in the room with Angela Merkel, Condi Rice, Polish Foreign Minister at the time Radek Sikorski and I think maybe the defense minister Bogdan Klich, and the Baltic States. It was on the fly, right? It was improvised. And although it said that Ukraine will become a NATO member and Georgia too, it's not clear that the allies meant it. They said it but they didn't mean it.
Now, this language follows a much more serious and methodical debate. And as I said, we could have gone farther. The United States was reluctant to engage in this for some time. But they still made this commitment about Ukraine's place. The strategic question is whether Ukraine is part of the transatlantic and European family, or it belongs to Russia. And there are a lot of people, including some in the United States, who argue that they don't have the courage to say it explicitly, that Ukraine belongs to Russia. It's a disgusting position, given what that means in reality, but they make the argument anyway. That's not where NATO came out. NATO came out with a position that the whether Ukraine joins NATO is decided in the affirmative. The question now is the when and the how.
Viola: And the assurances — we're hearing this term “assurances” that NATO is giving Ukraine in the meantime — but the assurances —
Dan: Well, it may be G7 assurances, it may not be NATO.
Viola: Hmm.
Dan: I don't expect another NATO statement. I do expect the G7 will make a statement, and I wish it were the G7 plus Poland, but that's another issue. And that's the statement which will talk about security support for Ukraine, essentially, in the interim, between now and when Ukraine joins NATO.
Viola: And that's basically going to be weapons packages, right? Weapons, logistics, whatever support that the G7 may be able to provide, short of any kind of guarantees as we traditionally think of them.
Dan: Well, it's not a guarantee in the sense of Article Five. The G7 statement, as far as I know, is not going to say that an attack on Ukraine is an attack on all the G7 members. It's not that, but it is a statement that if Ukraine is attacked again by Russia, if this war ends with some kind of an arrangement and then Putin regroups and attacks, which many people including myself think is possible, absent stronger security guarantees for Ukraine, that the G7 will act. That it will consult with Ukraine. So it's an interim step. It's not as good as Article Five.
But that combined with, and in the context of, the NATO communique adds up to something pretty significant for Ukraine, which remember, had not been considered. Even a few years ago, we remember the Obama administration decided not to send any weapons at all to Ukraine.
Viola: Right, right.
Dan: The Obama administration — and I was in it, I was in it — was divided on the question whether or not the US had any serious security interest in Ukraine. We've come a long way. Could have been faster, could have been farther, but don't knock it.
Viola: Okay. Got it. Thank you.
Paras: Regarding providing weapons to Ukraine, on Friday, the Biden administration made the controversial decision to send cluster bombs. Have we seen any political or military reaction from NATO allies regarding that decision?
Dan: Well, I'm not aware of all of the — I don't know all of the reactions. There are a number of NATO allies, I think probably most of them have signed on to the international accords banning their use and export. So they're not going to follow us. There's been some criticism in the US Congress, from Democrats and from others, which I understand, but I take the Biden administration at its word. This was a tough decision. And it was made because the Ukrainians are under attack, these munitions are available, other munitions are running short. And under those circumstances, I would have done the same.
Nobody loves cluster munitions, but the Russians have been using them for years against the Ukrainians. And the alternative was not some kind of good solution for Ukraine. The alternative to cluster munitions was fewer munitions when the Ukrainians needed them. So this is a tough call, but I think the right one.
Viola: And related to that question of the Russians having used cluster bombs already for a time, I heard an interesting perspective on that, because when I first heard that rationale, I thought it was referring to, well, the Russians do it. So you know, maybe we need to do it, too. But my understanding is that the point about the fact that the Russians have been using cluster munitions is that the fields already will require extensive demining because of that. So the demining that will be required after the war, or after fighting ends or after territory is reclaimed by Ukraine, is going to be essentially no more than what would ordinarily need to be done anyway, because the Russians have been using it. Is that part of your understanding?
Dan: That’s a sophisticated — and I think, a better — argument than the argument that the Russians are doing it, so we should do it. And I don't think that the latter was the argument the Biden administration used. I mean, it's a debating point when people get on their high horse and wag their finger. You might ask why they didn't wag their finger at the Russians or even raised the issue of Russian use of cluster munitions. What you said is more important. That is, the impact of Ukraine's use of cluster munitions on its own territory will be mitigated by the fact that they have to demine anyway.
So you're balancing different equities, which is what policymaking is all about. It's not for the pure of heart, okay?Sometimes you have to balance mutually inconsistent, legitimate equities and discover where it is best to come out. And I think the Biden administration wrestled with it and came out in the right place.
Viola: Really appreciate your nuanced take on all of this, Dan. Thank you.
Paras: Dan, is there anything that we haven't touched on that you'd like to discuss?
Dan: The NATO summit yesterday was marked by stories of Ukrainian disappointment. I think today's story will be different. I think the NATO Ukraine council meeting, the bilateral Zelenskyy is having, and President Biden's speech will help put yesterday's decisions into a better context. And I think first reactions are understandable, but not positive. Second point I'd like to make is that Zelenskyy cannot be blamed or faulted for pushing the administration hard. People, including in the Biden administration, need to understand his position. He doesn't stand where they stand. His country's at war. He's going to push as hard as he can. And we should understand his position.
Zelenskyy I think today is far more positive. That's good. But we shouldn't be surprised that Zelenskyy is going to push us hard. What did we expect? 30 years ago was Lech Wałęsa pushing Bill Clinton pretty hard. I remember. I was there, and Poland wasn't even under attack. They were just worried that it might be some day unless we moved on NATO enlargement, a concern that sounds pretty foresightful at the moment. So I think in the heat of negotiations, people's blood is up. And I get it. But step back, I think the summit will look better over time. And I think some of yesterday's sparks and hand wringing will fade and fade rather quickly. I hope so.
Paras: We really appreciate your insight and your expertise. As you said, you've been in the room when many of these types of discussions unfold.
Dan: Yeah.
Paras: Thanks so much for joining the show.
Dan: Thanks for having me. Take care.
Viola: Thank you, Dan.
Paras: This episode is co-hosted by me, Paras Shah, and Viola Gienger with co-production and editing by Tiffany Chang and Michelle Eigenheer. Our music is the song, “The Parade” by Hey Pluto.
Special thanks to Clara Apt and Ambassador Daniel Fried. You can read all of Just Security’s coverage of the NATO summit and Russia’s war on Ukraine, including Ambassador Fried’s analysis, on our website. If you enjoyed this episode, please give us a five star rating on Apple Podcasts or wherever you listen.