Marking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) 75th anniversary, USC Dornsife scholars examine the transatlantic alliance’s evolution from a Cold War bulwark to its current role. Is it time to strengthen, transform, or even retire it?
Our political science and global security scholars convened for a critical dialogue on NATO's relevance and future as the next U.S. presidential election approaches.
With:
Moderated by:
Learn more about the Dornsife Dialogues and sign up for the next live event here.
Marking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) 75th anniversary, USC Dornsife scholars examine the transatlantic alliance’s evolution from a Cold War bulwark to its current role. Is it time to strengthen, transform, or even retire it?
Our political science and global security scholars convened for a critical dialogue on NATO's relevance and future as the next U.S. presidential election approaches.
With:
Moderated by:
Learn more about the Dornsife Dialogues and sign up for the next live event here.
00:00:00:00 - 00:00:25:05
Amber Miller:
Welcome back to Dornsife Dialogs. April 4th marks the 75th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, established largely as a Cold War defense mechanism to prevent Soviet expansionism in Europe. It quickly became the world's strongest military alliance. But NATO's role and relevance have adapted over the years in response to the shifting sands of global politics and security challenges.
00:00:25:07 - 00:00:46:18
While the alliance has grown from 12 to 32 countries, some members are questioning NATO's actions and debating roles, responsibilities and what the main objectives should be in current conflicts throughout Europe, the Middle East, and even along the Pacific Rim. We have a terrific panel of experts today who will help us understand NATO's future in the modern global security landscape.
00:00:46:20 - 00:01:12:03
Our moderator is Gregory Treverton, Professor of the Practice of International Relations and spatial sciences at USC Dornsife. Professor Treverton served as chairman of the National Intelligence Council from 2014 to 2017. He has been the director of the RAND Corporation Center for Global Risk and Security, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and he served as deputy director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.
00:01:12:05 - 00:01:49:21
So I will now hand it over to Professor Treverton, who will introduce our panelists. Thank you, as always, for tuning in and enjoy the panel.
Gregory Treverton:
Welcome, everyone. It's a great pleasure to be in this Dornsife dialog. Let me introduce my distinguished colleagues and then say a few words by way of introduction, and then we'll we'll be off. It's a great pleasure to be doing this with, as I said to my distinguished U.S. colleagues in Westwick, who is a professor of history and thematic option, I think we could spend a long time talking about what the matter option is, but we want our subject here is Naito.
00:01:49:23 - 00:02:13:11
He's also spent time at Yale, but we won't hold that against him either. Great to have you with us, Peter. My other colleague is Rob English, who's a close colleague, mine in the Department of Political Science International Relations. He is a professor of international relations of Slavic languages and literature and environmental studies. It seems like he could do almost anything.
00:02:13:12 - 00:02:38:01
Here's Rob. Welcome, Robin. Great to be with you. I spent the early part of my career working on European security and NATO's issues. When I worked on NAITO in the White House in the 1970s, there were 15 members of Naito. I could get the list right about two thirds of the time. In those days, it was hard to remember that Ireland wasn't a member of NATO and Benelux was three.
00:02:38:03 - 00:03:00:22
Now, as the dean said, we have 32 members. Hard to imagine anyone being able to remember all of them. But what's interesting lately is that those members now include Sweden and Finland. I would have bet a lot of money. I'm a Sweden-phile, but a lot of time As a visiting fellow there, I would have bet that they would always find reasons to get close to NATO but never to join it.
00:03:00:25 - 00:03:26:11
Vladimir Putin and his invasion of Ukraine finally pushed them over the transom and got them into NATO. So something that no one else could accomplish. But Putin has managed that. We had a couple of lines about NATO's when I was working on it, on the National Security Council staff. We used to say that we like NATO's a lot because we ran it.
00:03:26:11 - 00:04:00:02
We Americans ran it. And while the Europeans didn't always like that fact, it did serve to mute the tensions that otherwise might have been there between the European countries themselves. Tensions that had shipwrecked previous efforts to create a European defense entity. So the fact that we ran it did at least those tensions. The other line we had was that NATO's could do in practice what it couldn't do in principle.
00:04:00:04 - 00:04:30:21
In principle, it's a organization requires unanimity. And so you would imagine that it wouldn't be able to do very much at all. But in fact, the smaller members have mostly been deferential to the larger members, and NATO's been able to act, notwithstanding the principle of unanimity. And we recently saw the Turks do a little bit of extortion as a small country to try and get better conditions for themselves as a condition of Sweden joining NATO's.
00:04:30:21 - 00:04:54:18
But they finally relented as well. So in a certain sense, NATO's has been better at doing things in practice that it can do in principle. When the wall fell and communism ended in the early 1990s, I thought, great, I'm never going to have to worry about NATO's again. Boy, was I wrong. Among many predictions I've gotten wrong, that was a pretty big one.
00:04:54:20 - 00:05:16:28
It turned out that Natal in some ways became even more important after the end of the Cold War than had been during the Cold War. It first became a kind of magnet of attraction for those countries freed of communism and eastern Europe who didn't want to be associated with Russia but instead want to join later. We'll come back to that issue later, I think.
00:05:17:00 - 00:05:43:16
But and it also became a kind of model. Its militaries became a kind of model for those same countries as they start to professionalize and depoliticize their militaries. Later on, they became the basis for coalitions of the willing. Not NATO's operations, nor U.N. operations, but operations by groups of willing states in the Balkans, for example. So we've seen NATO's and now with the Ukraine war.
00:05:43:16 - 00:06:09:10
Robert, want to talk more about that. But with the Ukraine war, the kind of cooperation that the NATO countries, not as NATO countries necessarily, but as that as Natal but as natal countries have mounted, is is really quite impressive. We want to then begin to think a bit about the future. Will there be a hundred anniversary of NATO's?
00:06:09:13 - 00:06:30:16
What are the prospects of and we'll have to touch on the question that now Europeans are having to confront for the really the first time ever, and that is, can you imagine a NATO's without the United States? If Mr. Trump is elected and follows through on his interest in getting the United States out of NATO's, though Congress has made that somewhat more difficult.
00:06:30:18 - 00:06:55:27
We'll come back to that question as well. Finally, I just want to mention Article five this is very relevant to Ukraine's status in or out of NATO's Article five is the article that says an attack on any NATO member is an attack on all. Interestingly enough, it's only been invoked once after 911 and on behalf of the United States.
00:06:55:29 - 00:07:27:06
But it is a very big issue as we think about European security arrangements moving forward. Let me turn first to you, Peter. You've been thinking a lot about nuclear issues and the role of nuclear weapons. And NAITO would be interesting to get your reflections and your lessons you drive as we enter this period when Vladimir Putin has been not particularly shy about raising nuclear possibilities, What does the history tell us about that set of issues as we go forward?
00:07:27:09 - 00:07:51:26
Peter Westwick:
Right. Well, before I jump on the nuclear weapons, one more kind of quip to add to your couple that you started with. And the one that I always heard was that NATO was designed to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down. Yes, that's exactly, exactly right. No, like but right there went three, three, three, four, three or what his batting average was.
00:07:51:26 - 00:08:15:14
Peter Westwick:
But but nuclear weapons, I mean, so what makes NATO's I think exceptionally important is the role of nuclear weapons. And that role has long been an issue of debate. From the outset, nuclear weapons were central to NATO's strategy. The first NATO's strategic doctrine, strategic doctrine in 1949 relied on, quote, strategic bombing, including the prompt delivery of the atomic bomb, unquote.
00:08:15:14 - 00:08:39:08
Peter Westwick:
So the idea was that the threat and that the so that the US would respond to any Soviet attack on Western Europe, even one by conventional forces with nuclear weapons, would deter the Soviets from doing so. This concept was known as extended deterrence, that is, extending the U.S. nuclear umbrella to Western Europe. It was seen as vital to offset the vast Soviet advantage at the time to conventional forces.
00:08:39:08 - 00:09:03:21
Peter Westwick:
The 175 infantry divisions that were seemingly poised to roll through the full the gap into the plains of Western Europe. So there were two components to the U.S. commitment nuclear commitment to the first was its strategic arsenal, high yield weapons into the megaton range. These were stationed in U.S. air bases, missile silos and submarines under direct U.S. control.
00:09:03:23 - 00:09:39:14
Peter Westwick:
The second component was smaller tactical nuclear weapons deployed to bases in Europe and shared with NAITO. So in case of war, these would be delivered by native forces. A Naito aircraft and NAITO eventually created a joint nuclear planning group to oversee these weapons and jointly plan the strategy. So the first U.S. nuclear weapons arrived in Europe in 1954, and by the end of the 1960s, there are around 7000 of them in the form of bombs, short range missiles, artillery shells, landmines and so on.
00:09:39:16 - 00:10:05:08
Peter Westwick:
And this included the nuclear armed Jupiter missiles that were deployed to Italy and Turkey in 1961, which were a major reason the Soviets sent their own medium range missiles to Cuba, thus precipitating the Cuban missile crisis. So all these nuclear weapons were intended to provide something like a bridge from peace to nuclear war. So the U.S. couldn't really justify an all out nuclear attack on Soviet cities in response to a conventional invasion.
00:10:05:09 - 00:10:35:12
Peter Westwick:
So it kind of relied on tactical nuclear weapons as a first step in escalation. In a theory, this would work both tactically to slow an invasion, but more importantly, perhaps strategically, to deter an invasion in the first place. And yes, this strategy would have left NATO's territory, starting with western Germany, a smoking pile of radioactive ashes. But this could be seen as part of the appeal by defeating the whole point of a Soviet invasion that's kind of a nuclear age version of the old scorched earth strategy.
00:10:35:14 - 00:10:58:26
Peter Westwick:
The upshot was that NATO's doctrine ensured that any conflict along a central front would quickly climb Hermann Kahn's famous ladder of escalation from crisis to catastrophe. And that was the basis of deterrence, but also, of course, a profound danger. This is the kind of the looking glass world of nuclear strategy where madness can be rational and rationality can be made us.
00:10:58:28 - 00:11:26:22
Peter Westwick:
The commitment to defend NATO's allies with nuclear weapons meant that the U.S. was willing to suffer a Soviet nuclear counterstrike in order to defend Western Europe. As Charles de Gaulle put it to President Kennedy, the U.S. had to be ready to trade New York for Paris. So if the Soviet attacked Europe with conventional forces and NATO's responded with nuclear weapons, the Soviets could nuke New York and de Gaulle at least was dubious that the U.S. would make the sacrifice.
00:11:26:24 - 00:11:52:29
Peter Westwick:
So fast forward a little bit. By the 1980s, the strategy was coming under increasing strain. By then, both the U.S. and Soviet Union together had about 50,000 nuclear weapons between them. And with the U.S. really commit civilizational suicide to defend a swath of Western Europe was one question. And the criticism came from both left and right. So, for instance, after the Soviets deployed a new intermediate range missile in 1977, the SS 20.
00:11:53:01 - 00:12:23:19
Peter Westwick:
The U.S. responded by sending nuclear armed cruise missiles and Pershing two missiles to NAITO, and these so-called Euro missiles sparked giant anti-nuke protests across Western Europe. Now, meanwhile, from the right, some strategists in the U.S. were pointing out that NATO's strategy to respond to a Soviet invasion by, in essence, nuking its own territory was literally incredible. So the end of the Cold War, the end of the Cold War, it resolved these tensions for a time at the end.
00:12:23:26 - 00:12:53:01
Peter Westwick:
So in early 1991, the U.S. probably had about 4000 nuclear weapons shared with NATO in NATO's territory. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the U.S. withdrew its ground and sea based weapons from Europe and left about 400 gravity bombs, nuclear bombs that were just dropped from aircraft. And as netto and large, the new members came under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and the enlargement explicitly included the nuclear protection.
00:12:53:04 - 00:13:25:15
Peter Westwick:
But the weapons themselves, the US weapons, remained where they had been at the time in six nations Britain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Turkey. They were removed from Britain in 2008, but just several weeks ago they were reported to be returning. The number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe has now dwindled to about 100. Until very recently, these were b61 bombs with a what they called dial a yield capability up to 175 kilotons.
00:13:25:17 - 00:13:54:13
Peter Westwick:
These little these weapons you'll sometimes see described in the literature as some strategic or non-strategic, which is a curious and perhaps misleading ambiguity. Sometimes they're more plainly referred to as tactical nuclear weapons because they will ostensibly be dropped on military targets, but calling them tactical weapons may make them seem less threatening. But these are not small bombs. You know, 170 kilotons is more than ten times the power of the bomb that demolished Hiroshima.
00:13:54:15 - 00:14:20:00
Peter Westwick:
As one nuclear analyst has noted. Any nuclear detonation is a strategic event and distinguishing between strategic, strategic and tactical weapons. In this context is academic. In the U.S. has a new version of this bomb, which was cleared just last year for deployment to NAITO. It's not clear that this has occurred yet. As far as I know. This new version has yields only up to one only, quote unquote, up to 50 kilotons.
00:14:20:02 - 00:14:46:26
Peter Westwick:
So it's smaller, but still 50 kilotons. So the upshot is that the United States has about 100 nuclear weapons deployed to Europe under NATO, each with up to three times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. Now, some observers have asked whether this is a wise or immoral policy. For starters, Naito now enjoys an advantage over Russia in conventional forces, which removes the original justification for NATO's nuclear weapons.
00:14:46:28 - 00:15:17:19
Peter Westwick:
It is also widely accepted that the American weapons in Europe really have no military value. Their purpose is purely political as a symbol of continuing American American commitment to defend European allies, especially in the last couple of decades when the U.S. has shifted its security focus first to terrorism after 911 and more recently to China. There have been occasional efforts to change NATO's nuclear posture, for instance, after 911 sparked fears of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons.
00:15:17:22 - 00:15:49:03
Peter Westwick:
Some people questioned the wisdom of having 100 nuclear weapons scattered around Western Europe. Some NATO members have also occasionally called for a no first use pledge, but the U.S. has emphatically refused to consider it. So NATO's policy remains or retains the rights to be the first to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack. But in general, NATO's members have often been reluctant to raise the issue of nuclear weapons for fear of causing divisions within the alliance.
00:15:49:06 - 00:16:17:19
Unknown
One basic fissure is between advocates of arms control and disarmament, who notes the dangers of nuclear escalation and this first U.S. policy. And on the other side, advocates of deterrence and defense who want to keep the U.S. coupled to Europe in the face of Russian revanchism and the newer, newer member states proximity to Russia tend to focus on deterrence and thus are more in favor of keeping the American nuclear presence.
00:16:17:22 - 00:16:52:06
Unknown
So what happens if the U.S. pulls out of them? On the nuclear issue, currently the U.S., the total U.S. nuclear arsenal was about 5000 nuclear weapons. If those strategic and those remaining hundred or so that are stationed in Europe, if the U.S. pulls out, that would leave Europe on its own to deter Russia's 6000 nuclear weapons. Now, Britain and France have their own nuclear arsenals, which together total about 500 nuclear weapons, which may be enough to deter Russia, although some analysts are skeptical.
00:16:52:08 - 00:17:16:26
Unknown
But France has for decades insisted going back to the 1960s that going back to the origin of its nuclear weapons program. France has long insisted on keeping its nuclear weapons independent of nature. And it is highly unlikely that France would agree to pool its weapons with Britain in some kind of joint European nuclear force. And that would leave NATO's only with Britain's 225 nuclear weapons.
00:17:16:28 - 00:17:45:03
Unknown
So even if the U.S. stays in Naito, some observers are questioning the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrence because de Gaulle's question has become basically what the U.S. really tread new York for telling or at least see or give and credibility depends not when weapons but also on delivery. Delivery vehicles are as questions here. NATO's nuclear bombs are currently going to be delivered would be delivered by either F-16 airplanes or tornado aircraft.
00:17:45:05 - 00:18:09:01
Unknown
Both of these airplanes are over 50 years old and are unlikely to survive Russian air defenses. Several European states have not committed to buy the nuclear capable F-35 aircraft from the U.S., but it may be years before those arrive in substantial numbers. So to kind of briefly wrap up here in a historical reckoning, you know, NATO's nuclear deterrence seems to have worked.
00:18:09:04 - 00:18:28:11
Unknown
The Soviets never invaded Western Europe, but this assumes that the Soviets would have otherwise invaded without that nuclear threat. So there's a kind of a basic historical question to my mind, that is and that is, you know, were the Soviets indeed bent on bearing Western Europe? You know, was NATO's really necessary?
00:18:28:14 - 00:18:50:09
Unknown
And of course, the follow on question is, you know, is Russia really a threat to Europe today? It's currently bogged down in eastern Ukraine. It may seem in no shape to send an army all the way across Ukraine or Poland. But, Rob, I think we'll be discussing some of those questions. But Russia does still have those 6000 nuclear weapons, despite his nuclear saber rattling.
00:18:50:16 - 00:19:18:05
Unknown
Putin has not used them. Now, this may be because of strategic calculation that is, nuclear deterrence works or it may be the so-called nuclear taboo. You know, the political and cultural revulsion against nuclear weapons in the implications for Russia if it crossed that implicit red line or it maybe not that deterrence or nuclear taboos really work, but rather simply that Putin hasn't used nuclear weapons yet.
00:19:18:07 - 00:19:49:16
Unknown
And at some point, NATO's luck may run out with profound implications. So it's that old argument about why nuclear weapons haven't been used in the 75 years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Has NATO's nuclear strategy been smart or has just been lucky? And I will stop talking now and headed off to run.
Gregory Treverton:
We got used to in the Cold War to mutual assured destruction, right where both sides knew that whatever they did in the first strike, the other side could retaliate devastatingly.
00:19:49:18 - 00:20:19:02
Gregory Treverton:
And that developed arms control arrangements to even to buttress that number, these awful syllogism of the Cold War era, that offense was defense and defense was offense, that killing people was good, but killing weapons was bad because that might have upset neutrals or destruction. Now, that era has really passed us. We now are in a different era, but we have to worry about the Chinese arsenal now big enough to worry about, and particularly about Russia and and Putin's saber rattling.
00:20:19:02 - 00:20:55:10
Gregory Treverton:
So it does raise the question as we go forward, is deterrence robust? Maybe, Peter, you're right. It was in some ways unnecessary given Soviet intentions, But given Putin's intentions, it does raise, I think, the questions if we go forward of is deterrence still credible and especially, as you say, could it be credible if the United States weren't in NATO's and in some ways that would leave Britain and France in kind of not the bad posture, not mutually assured destruction, but sort of what I think of as mend or mind minimum deterrent posture would that be enough?
00:20:55:13 - 00:21:32:20
Gregory Treverton:
Let me turn to you, Rob, and it's your take on both the history and the current circumstances, particularly, I suppose, around the war in Ukraine.
Rob English:
Yes. Thank you, my colleagues, for having resolved all these thorny issues and leaving me so little to talk about. I'll, I think, have some remarks on a different tack, more political at the outset, and maybe at the end they return to these questions of how the war might end and if it could escalate and get to where we have to confront those questions of nuclear deterrence or not.
00:21:32:22 - 00:22:00:13
But I'm going to start on the political, even the economic side and ask the question, is NATO's is the NATO alliance now stronger and more united than ever? Most people believe the answer is yes. A resounding yes. And it was just a few years ago, Don't forget that NATO's bickering. It was under siege from Donald Trump. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, even declared NATO brain dead.
00:22:00:16 - 00:22:33:13
Right. Things look very different just a few years ago. But since the Russian attack on Ukraine, NATO's has been rejuvenated as a strongly united, dynamic and even growing alliance. Right. And not a few commentators have noted with irony that if Putin invaded Ukraine to block Natal from expanding, what he got instead is the alliance adding these two new members in Sweden and Finland and also gaining a 1300 kilometer border with NATO alliance in the process.
00:22:33:16 - 00:22:59:05
Rob English
So there's reason for satisfaction. There's reason for confidence. And what I want to talk about is that we should be careful that we're not overly confident and overly self-satisfied. NATO's and its member states also face some really serious problems that could leave the alliance not stronger, but in fact may be even weaker after the war than it was before more divided.
00:22:59:07 - 00:23:13:06
Rob English
And I may be overly pessimistic. And what I'm about to describe, but I think it's better than wearing rose colored glasses and being caught unawares when these problems multiply and converge.
00:23:13:09 - 00:23:39:03
Rob English
So let me start my role as a Cassandra by noting the obvious to say that NATO's members have been drawn together by the threat of Russia is to admit that it's a marriage of convenience or necessity. That's how Natal was formed in the first place. That's how bitter enemies like the U.K., France, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy began cooperating in the face of the new Soviet threat.
00:23:39:06 - 00:24:07:27
Rob English
It doesn't necessarily necessarily resolve those differences or enmities. It suppresses them because they share a larger common concern. That's why international relations theory predicts that alliances usually weaken when the threat is ended. And history offers a lot of examples, beginning with the rivalries and conflict that fatally weakened classical Greece. Once the Persian threat that had previously united them was vanquished.
00:24:08:00 - 00:24:34:04
Rob English
For history buffs, of course, I'm referring to the Peloponnesian Wars with NATO, however, NATO and the Ukraine war. The problem is rather different. It's not that the war has ended. It's that it's dragging on for so long and imposing enormous costs on its Member States. At the same time, some of those members do not or don't any longer see that as a threat to themselves, only to Ukraine.
00:24:34:06 - 00:25:02:13
Rob English
And so with no apparent prospect of a Ukrainian victory in sight, they are now turning to the alternative of a negotiated settlement, something that would probably freeze the conflict along the current lines of division, leaving Russia, of course, with a huge swath of Ukrainian territory under its control. Some European leaders state this openly, such as the leaders of Hungary and Slovakia, write Viktor Orban and Robert Fizzle.
00:25:02:15 - 00:25:31:06
Rob English
Others let it slip privately, like the Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni. More important is that European publics, European public opinion is trending in this direction, with majorities in most NATO's member states now preferring negotiations to end the war over continued pursuit of victory for Ukraine. That is the case not only in Italy, but also the linchpin NATO's member states of Germany and France.
00:25:31:08 - 00:26:07:22
Rob English
In the short term, European leaders can ignore this turn in public opinion, but eventually elections force them to reckon with it. And that dilemma is looming right now for French President Emmanuel Macron. And he's probably been, at least over the last year, Macron has probably been Ukraine's strongest backer in Europe, maybe with the exception of the UK and France, notably recently signed a long term security agreement with Ukraine, one that promised $3 billion in military aid for 2024.
00:26:07:24 - 00:26:35:15
Rob English
Macron also recently called for NAITO to consider introducing its own member troops to help in the fight with Russia. Right. And extremely bold, some would say even provocative idea. But France is facing elections in June, as are all EU member states. And at the moment, Macron's Renaissance party is well behind the far right national rally. This is the party formerly known as the National Front, the LA Pan Party.
00:26:35:18 - 00:27:05:07
Rob English
If presidential elections were held tomorrow, the national rally leader Jordan Bardella, right successor to the La Pon le Le Pen dynasty, Della will defeat Macron. So why this turn in public opinion? Well, it's partly disappointment that the much touted Ukrainian offensive of 2023 failed so dramatically. And with that, there's the continued erosion of faith right in Naito and EU leaders.
00:27:05:10 - 00:27:34:27
Rob English
Right. As we see represented by force Stoltenberg and Ursula von der Leyen. But the apparatus of EU and NATO's advisers and experts more generally, This weakness of support for Ukraine, however, derives mainly from economic woes and the continuing enormous costs of war. Thanks to the war, the disruption of energy supplies and other trade has some EU states really an economic crisis.
00:27:34:27 - 00:28:13:11
Rob English
At a minimum, they're in the doldrums. The biggest problem is the soaring cost of gas and energy bills to households and industry that are several times higher than before the war. Not only households, but industry and agriculture, too. And it's precisely workers and farmers who have staged huge and disruptive protests in France and in other countries. Macron also faces now the recent news that the French deficit is skyrocketing, along with a whole series of other public pushback over cuts to social services, to pensions.
00:28:13:13 - 00:28:39:22
Rob English
And France has failed to fulfill its military commitments to Ukraine. That $3 billion commitment for 2024 has still not even been budgeted. And we're now on the verge of April. And a similar story could be said for other EU countries. For Germany. For the United Kingdom. Both the public protest and impatience and their inability to fulfill even their basic commitments of military support to Ukraine.
00:28:39:28 - 00:29:04:20
Rob English
You probably know the most headline example of all of this is that instead of 1 billion artillery shells for 2023, all the EU could scrounge together was about 300,000. And collectively, the EU and the United States are still producing new artillery shells at a rate far behind Russia's war machine.
00:29:04:22 - 00:29:32:08
Rob English
And so Macron's proposal to send NATO's troops, starting with French troops to fight in Ukraine, almost seems like an effort to compensate for these other weaknesses and inabilities. But what happened when he did that, he was immediately attacked and contradicted by all of his key natural allies by Germany, first and foremost. And I think this sent the worst possible message of all to Putin.
00:29:32:11 - 00:30:02:14
Rob English
Instead of showing unity and unity in warning of NATO's ability to escalate, he exposed disunity and highlighted that not only can NATO's not agree on any bold escalatory policy, it can't even fulfill its previous commitments. It can't even fulfill or complete those it's already made much less undertake risky new ones. Now, I don't have time to detail similar problems in other key NATO member states, but you probably know they exist.
00:30:02:14 - 00:30:27:01
Rob English
In some cases, they're even more secure, more severe. I would only add to the picture of NATO's looming problems and European public opinion souring on the war in Ukraine. The fact that the war in Gaza and what many see as hypocrisy exacerbates that severely. We have yet to see that play out at the ballot box, but we likely will.
00:30:27:01 - 00:30:56:01
Rob English
We see it in opinion polls. And there's also an even more disturbing trend, perhaps dividing the U.S. from its NATO allies. And I'm not referring to Donald Trump that's on the horizon. I'm referring to the widespread opinion that the U.S. is getting rich off of this war. Many Europeans and yes, mainly on the right side of the spectrum, but on the left and far left as well, believe that this war is a big profit making enterprise for the United States.
Rob English
We're selling our gas to them now at much higher prices than they used to pay to Russia. We are now selling arms and we're getting rich and richer. Of course, this is grossly exaggerated, but it's widely believed and needs to be taken into account. When we look ahead to what electoral impacts there will be, what changes of governments might follow, and what new policies towards the war could be just six or nine months away.
00:31:23:00 - 00:31:55:04
Rob English
And all of this all of this is overlooking or setting aside the question of what if Trump is reelected? And I'll close with a couple of comments here because there's one school of thought that's optimistic that says or Trump to be elected that could finally force the Europeans to really get serious about self-reliance, not just meet that 2% of GDP commitment for defense spending, but to cooperate and coordinate much better than they do with all the bickering I've just described.
Rob English
And so it would actually be salutary. Some believe good for NATO, even if the U.S. takes a back seat. The pessimists see it absolutely differently. They say that absent American leadership, the needle will dissipate, that the likelihood of Shultz in Germany, Macron in France, Maloney in Italy, sooner, or a successor in the U.K. getting along on a wide range of economic and social issues like the shadow of Brexit budget disputes.
00:32:26:03 - 00:32:52:29
Rob English
So much else already inclines them to disunity without America to lead the way on military policy. They suspect that it would all simply crumble and we'd see more division, more weakness in a naito where the U.S. is drastically reducing its role as a leader and drastically reducing its commitment. So I don't know which of these is more likely.
00:32:53:02 - 00:33:27:20
Rob English
I'm only going to conclude by saying there are a wide range of problems on the horizon that have been suppressed or pushed aside for the moment, thanks to the horror at what Russia's doing and the need to take some common action. But patience is growing thin and even wise leaders in Europe can be undermined by public opinion. And all of that, by the way, is heightened by a concerted campaign of Russian disinformation into European societies on the eve of these elections that we have to be mindful of as well.
00:33:27:27 - 00:34:08:00
Rob English
The recent revelations of the extent of Russia's disinformation and meddling in various European elections is really disturbing. So taken altogether, there's a lot we need to be concerned about and prepared for. Thank you.
Gregory Treverton
I want us to continue talking about the future, to be sure. I'd just like to pick up one quick historical footnote. That is, you know, our friend and colleague John Mearsheimer, makes the kind of uber realist argument that basically Ukraine is NATO's fault, that if NAITO hadn't expanded up to Russia's borders of leaving Russia in a kind of security dilemma from which they had to escape, that the Ukraine war wouldn't have happened.
00:34:08:02 - 00:34:30:17
Unknown
I'd be interested in either of your take on that. Why? Don't want to take us down a rabbit hole, but I'd be interested in either. Your take on that. Mearsheimer Argument,
Peter Westwick:
Well, yeah. So this is the. So Mearsheimer had this famous article in Foreign Affairs, I think in 2014, and the title was Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault.
00:34:30:18 - 00:34:55:10
Peter Westwick:
Now, this is the 2014 crisis, but he has since doubled down after the Ukraine war and doesn't stuck to the argument. And he makes this kind of analogy to the United States and the Monroe Doctrine. You know, we would never the United States would never allow a major adversary to station military forces in our backyard. And the United States, of course, intervened plenty during the Cold War in Central and South America.
00:34:55:13 - 00:35:28:27
Peter Westwick:
So there is this this goes back to the argument about the the famous statement by Secretary of State James Baker to Gorbachev in 1990 when the Berlin Wall had fallen. And Baker is trying to persuade Gorbachev to relinquish East Germany to withdraw Soviet troops from East Germany, allow Germany's reunified. Baker says that if the Soviet Union does that, NATO's and I quote, will not shift one inch eastward from its present position, unquote.
00:35:28:28 - 00:35:54:04
Peter Westwick:
So this idea that, you know, NATO's and the United States were engaged, reneged on that commitment, and that therefore this provoked all kinds of resentment on behalf of Russia. And, you know, the United States and NATO did expand greatly right up to Russia's doorstep. And therefore, Russia is justified in its response. So this is a so it's interesting to me that Mearsheimer, even in the current context of Ukraine, has stuck to this argument.
00:35:54:04 - 00:36:22:07
Unknown
But Robert will turn it over to you. Yeah, Thank you.
Robert English:
No, that's an important that's really important background. All I can add is, in some sense this is the question of questions because it's really asking why did Putin do it right? And none of us really know. So. Mearsheimer, You, me and others are speculating at best. All that I can add is and it's not a satisfying answer, but it's the usual political science cop out, it might seem, which is that it's multi causal.
00:36:22:07 - 00:36:49:04
Robert English:
There's no one simple answer. From my work, my research, my frequent visits to and and discussions in Moscow over the eighties, nineties and early 2000s. I don't go there anymore, by the way, for understandable reasons. I saw that resentment at NATO's enlargement, whether it was a broken commitment or not. We don't have to quibble over the legalities of what Baker said and what others promised.
00:36:49:07 - 00:37:13:10
Robert English:
Lots of Russians, including the Liberal, the pro-Western elites, people like the previous foreign minister, causative, people like President Boris Yeltsin, Right. Who was a friend of the West, were furious at NATO expansion. And it wasn't because we had broken our word or violated a contract, it was because it humiliated them. It made them feel like we were taking advantage of their weakness.
00:37:13:15 - 00:37:45:11
Robert English:
A sign of distrust. It there were so many reasons why, Of course, you have the pure military people who saw a direct threat, and certainly they have exaggerated the threat, the military threat from nado that NATO's might attack greatly. But there was a broad among the political elite, including pro-Western elites, anger and resentment at NATO expansion. Some of it might have stemmed from their frustration over their own economic problems, over the failures of transition in many ways.
00:37:45:13 - 00:38:08:13
Robert English:
I'm just emphasizing that it was a broad sentiment in Russia that they disliked this expansion greatly. And that was in 99, 2000, right. The first round of expansion to the Czech Republic and Poland and Hungary. And the expansion, of course, has continued and continued, as you say. Right up to Russia's borders in the north center and south of there, the Russian Federation.
00:38:08:16 - 00:38:32:26
Robert English:
So there is something to that side of it. But we also know, to be fair, here's the other part of that multi cores that Putin is really wrapped up in some nationalist ideology and some some really distorted history. You know, the famous essays he's written in the comments that kind of deny Ukrainian nationhood and assert a kind of Russia and Ukraine belong together.
00:38:32:26 - 00:38:56:03
Robert English:
And the corollary of that is if they won't do it, we'll do it for them. We know that's important, too. And that suggests that maybe he would have inclined to push to invade to try to dominate Ukraine anyway. And therefore that sort of partly absolves the West of any responsibility. It's some combination of those two factors and others as well.
00:38:56:05 - 00:39:18:25
Peter Westwick:
Well, I would just add as a coda, just I mean, people have argued that I mean, the rise Putin himself to power is a reflection of this resentment. Right. You know, because 1999, 2000, this is just when Putin is it gives kind of Putin a a lever or an entry point into political power over that period. I of the practical problem.
00:39:18:27 - 00:39:43:07
Robert English:
It was certainly there's some talk about some loose federation of states around Russia. But the practical problem was that none of those states wanted to be associated with Russia in that way. They wanted to be members of NATO and joined as soon as they had the opportunity that we had to play over again. I think we might play that and a bit differently to try and create some European security operation that included Russia but didn't stymie decision making.
00:39:43:10 - 00:40:06:03
Robert English:
But that would have been difficult. But the problem was that those states didn't want the states that Russia relied on as buffers had been allies, didn't want to join Russia. They wanted to join NATO's are hard to say. No, I was a strong proponent of the first expansions of NATO's, but later ones I think we're more questionable and maybe we could have done something different.
00:40:06:03 - 00:40:33:27
Unknown
But it's a that was hard because of the preferences of those states themselves. It got a lot of interesting questions coming up. One is, should NATO's be in the future more inclusive? Should it reach out to Korea, Japan, Australia? Already there's been some increased cooperation. Those heads of state of those countries have been at the last couple of NATO's summits.
00:40:33:29 - 00:41:09:13
Gregory Treverton:
So is NATO's future. Should NATO's future be more inclusive, not less inclusive? Rob, do you want to jump in first?
I'll say this briefly. I'm dubious about that. And it's not because of any animus to any particular country. It's not because NATO's means North Atlantic. And we're going well beyond that. It's simply because in line with what I've said before, the bigger NAITO gets, the more members, the more internal issues, the more economic and political differences it is importing, the more difficult it is to act with unity.
00:41:09:15 - 00:41:37:01
Unknown
And it could actually weaken itself by becoming too diverse and too large. That's just sort of organizational theory saying at some point it becomes counterproductive. Right.
Peter Westwick:
Let me just point out that there was an Asian version of NATO's the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Quito, which was explicitly modeled on Naito from the 1950s. And it had similar principles of, you know, it had a mutual defense article.
00:41:37:02 - 00:42:06:20
Peter Westwick:
This is in Article four, not Article five. It had, you know, nuclear deterrence was explicitly part of the package with nuclear weapons forward deployed in the Asian theater. But, you know, Cedo ended up kind of fizzling and then disbanding in the 1970s, in part because it was there was different geographic situation where the U.S. allies were kind of on the periphery, from South Korea, Japan down to the Philippines, Taiwan.
00:42:06:23 - 00:42:33:16
Unknown
And also there was, you know, zero seemed to be aimed less at like a major military conflict, like an invasion and more, you know, addressing kind of rooting out communist insurgents in some of these countries sort of pseudo ended up in most most important. It also lacked this mechanism of kind of nuclear sharing. It was more of kind of like a hub and spoke type thing with the U.S., almost like bilateral relations in this organization.
00:42:33:16 - 00:43:08:07
Unknown
Then the actual sharing of NAITO. So for a bunch of reasons, Tito kind of fizzled. You could conceivably, you know, revive it. But I think that would be, you know, as Rob points out, trying to kind of meld this entire entirely different geography, strategic situation context, political context onto nature would be challenging. Obviously, the the possibility of Trump being elected is a very big shadow on the horizon, or at least looming about on the horizon.
00:43:08:09 - 00:43:32:17
Unknown
But I want to ask one more question about the Biden administration and one of the questioners, as has mentioned this as well. Biden has been very careful not to want to escalate in ways that might turn this conflict in Ukraine nuclear or into a conflict directly with Russia. He said something like, I don't want to risk a war with a nuclear power.
00:43:32:20 - 00:44:00:11
Unknown
Do you think we have some ways self deterred ourselves? Could we have done more? Does Macron's comments about sending may make you either you think that we we've been too careful. Now, as you say, we've had difficulty meeting our commitments to supply weapons to Ukraine, but have we been too careful in our actions or that conflict? Should I take a stab at that?
00:44:00:11 - 00:44:26:13
Unknown
Again, I'll try to be very you know, I guess you could analogize it this way. We crossed one of Putin's red lines gingerly and nothing happened. So very carefully we escalated a bit more and sent even more capable weapons. And the pessimists warned that that could provoke We're crossing a red line and nothing happened. And again and again, so many are arguing that was foolish.
00:44:26:21 - 00:44:50:03
Unknown
We should have been bolder right off the bat. Putin will never. He's saber rattling. He's not serious. But the alternative could be true as well. You know, you cross a red line, a red line or red line, and you're emboldened to think he'll never do it. He's just bluffing. But then at some point he actually does. You know, these are games of logic and hindsight, and we don't know the answer.
00:44:50:03 - 00:45:16:20
Unknown
I'll plead ignorance again and just say that we need to proceed with caution. In my personal opinion, the caution is justified because as long as we admit that Putin is unpredictable and could be verging on irrational, some of the things he has said suggest that even if his preceding pattern was very methodical and conservative, we don't know. We cannot always project into the future.
00:45:16:20 - 00:45:39:12
Unknown
Right. You know, past performance is no guarantee of future results as the financial financial brokers warn us when we invest our money. And the same is true here. It's too easy to extrapolate that, nothing happened. Let's go for it. That may be true, but let's do it very carefully. And the hawks and doves need to keep talking on this.
00:45:39:15 - 00:46:02:22
Unknown
And not, in my opinion, again, because I'm always cautious. I'm always worried it might be that Crimea is really that red line. If we try to look more closely at what really matters to Putin. If he was pushed back from some of the territory seized in the Donbas, a lot that might not provoke this lashing out with weapons of mass destruction.
00:46:02:24 - 00:46:27:23
Unknown
It could be that Crimea is special for the reasons we all understand. Yeah, I mean, so this is just seems like another version of the argument, you know, that, you know, NATO's had to expand because Russia became belligerent again or flip it around. Russia became belligerent because NATO's expanded so it's the kind of old Cold War argument about, you know, carrots versus sticks when dealing with the Soviets or, you know, the hawks versus doves.
00:46:27:26 - 00:46:58:26
Unknown
I mean, I think Mearsheimer would respond to this argument about Putin's irrationality. You know, nuclear weapons make everybody rational and cautious. But then there are non realists who say like, but yes, sometimes people are just they do dumb things, they make mistakes, or you get to a place of tension or crisis and mistakes happen. And when you have nuclear weapons on the table, those mistakes can be catastrophic, which which urges caution.
00:46:58:27 - 00:47:26:25
Unknown
So this is just it's an old debate, the hawks versus the doves, the carrots versus the sticks. And which is better? Do either you think that NATO's should offer Ukraine at least the prospect of membership? I think NATO's has done that, at least back at the Bucharest summit in I guess it was 2008, the summer of 2008, Georgia and Ukraine were told that they will one day be members.
00:47:27:01 - 00:47:55:02
Unknown
If you're asking about something a little more updated or with a time horizon here, again, I'm going to be the Cassandra and say, that would be nice to consider if we could do it. But I don't think there's a great likelihood of NATO's unity on that. And if Natal begins proposing actions and then falls to bickering internally, Russia just watches that and all we've done is weaken ourselves.
00:47:55:05 - 00:48:32:10
Unknown
Macron did that with his proposal to send troops, which his allies immediately said, No, no, no, no, no. And that was worse than just staying quiet. So if Natal were to start debating and even proposing concrete plans for some kind of partial membership for Ukraine or some kind of timeline after the war, when they could join again, I would expect to see Turkey are we expect to see Slovakia, even Greece, maybe a new Spanish government all disputing that dissenting and all the Russians have to do is watch and laugh as we deter ourselves again.
00:48:32:12 - 00:48:54:04
Unknown
Yeah. And, you know, don't write checks that you can't cash. So we would have to be we that is narrow and the United States would have to be prepared to defend anywhere along that border from the Baltics, Poland, Georgia, Ukraine, all the way down. And any Russian incursion would have to be met with Article five. Peter, to you a question.
00:48:54:07 - 00:49:19:29
Unknown
If we're allowed to go directly because what you said about nuclear weapons and you've spoken in a sense, in essence, historically about the nuclear the tripwire. Right. By having American troops in Europe. It was a trip wire. It guaranteed that if the Soviets attacked and Americans were dying, we couldn't shirk our responsibilities, we would stay involved. We would support the European because we had to.
00:49:20:01 - 00:49:42:00
Unknown
What do you think about that kind of situation, that kind of model? When we think about maybe the Poles, maybe the Baltic collectively, who have both spoken about this, and now the French sending a brigade, sending contingents? And were they to encounter were they to be massacred, whether to be heavy casualties, what would other NATO countries feel compelled to do?
00:49:42:03 - 00:50:05:15
Unknown
Would strengthen their commitment because their comrades are dying? Or would they say, darn those bolts, they're dragging us into something we didn't want to be dragged into, which is the more likely response among Natal member states today. Right. I mean, so this is the trip wire, the kind of plate glass theory, right? You know, we have American troops in western Germany right across the before the gaps.
00:50:05:15 - 00:50:25:22
Unknown
When the Soviets do invade, they break that glass. And the Soviets at the time, they knew that. So they knew that an invasion would be breaking a plate glass window. And that gets everybody's attention. And then everything is on the table. I think that is so this is the kind of peace through strength approach, right? Okay. So we.
00:50:25:25 - 00:50:55:01
Unknown
But would the U.S. really be willing to station troops in, you know, across that whole western border of Russia to act as plate glass? Would you be willing even to, you know, make that commitment, not even the plate glass, but just the stationing of the troops? That's a very expensive and also, you know, the deployment of the soldiers, very major commitment, a substantial commitment of just US resources.
00:50:55:04 - 00:51:17:20
Unknown
Given the current political climate in the United States, I doubt that there is public support for that just in the United States. And Europe is another can of worms. Another one of these Cold War quotes we used to this is very gallows. We used to say, if the question is how many how many American troops need to be stationed in Germany during the Cold War?
00:51:17:23 - 00:51:40:07
Unknown
The answer was only one provided he's killed in any Russian attack. Gallows humor. What about are there? We've talked some, maybe not enough about the prospect of Trump. Rob, you've been pretty pessimistic about the possibility of Europeans getting together with or without the United States and NATO. Are there other big things out there that we should think about?
00:51:40:08 - 00:52:06:18
Unknown
Obviously, if the U.S. does leave NATO's or effectively leave NATO's, that takes us into a very different world and one in which all the challenges you mentioned, Rob, the Europeans confront will be imperative. They've done better, as we know. More of them have met the 2% goal, not a commitment, a goal that they haven't gotten a lot of additional combat capability for their increased spending.
00:52:06:20 - 00:52:30:18
Unknown
But if the U.S. weren't there, they'd have to redouble their defense spending, maybe take it to four or 5% of GDP. Actually, Germany spent 4% of GDP during the Cold War. So it's not out of the question. But what are for you? The since we're coming near to the end of our time, what are the the big things we should be thinking about as we think about the future of NATO's?
00:52:30:18 - 00:52:55:21
Unknown
Is it we've talked a lot about Ukraine, We've talked some about presidential elections in the United States. We've also talked a lot about European elections, tensions there. Are there other things we should be thinking about as we look to the future of NATO's? It's just two quick things, one technical and one political. The technical is that even if the Europeans band together increase their defense spending, make that commitment.
00:52:55:24 - 00:53:14:16
Unknown
There are things the U.S. does that can't be replaced easily. The airlift, the surveillance and reconnaissance. They just don't have those assets. And you can't get them just by upping your defense spending. So it's not just our our our own military power, but some particular types of military power that would leave Natal much weaker. That's the technical side.
00:53:14:21 - 00:53:39:12
Unknown
As for the political, it comes back to leadership. And Greg, when you were talking about, you know, the first round of NATO expansion, and I thought to myself, you know, more creative leadership might have found that formula, that compromise that you were talking about that might have satisfied placated Russia while still allowing Naito to take in new members and and and sort of have the best of both worlds.
00:53:39:15 - 00:54:02:07
Unknown
And we didn't have that leadership. We had hasty, shortsighted leadership. If we have it now, if we could imagine a macron that wasn't quite so keen to be the boss of Europe just to replace Angela merkel and a Schulz who didn't have to deal with so many petty feuding parties in his coalition, we can imagine giants of European leadership who could do this.
00:54:02:10 - 00:54:26:18
Unknown
We just don't see them right now. And maybe they're capable of rising to that occasion. Maybe Trump and his ultimatums will force them to. It'll be a real test, and I don't know if they'll pass it. Yeah, I would just add. Well, maybe two quick points and one is that, you know, there's been discussions about how about just, you know, if the U.S. pulls out and there's kind of like an EU for military purposes, so like a Europe based, narrow.
00:54:26:21 - 00:54:52:26
Unknown
One problem is that 80% I think correct me if I'm wrong, 80% of NATO's funding comes from non EU countries. That is U.S., Britain, Canada at the moment. So there's just a funding. I mean, the funding question would hugely compound. And the other one is the leadership thing, not only political but also military leadership, because the commanding general of NATO forces has always been an American and you take that out.
00:54:52:27 - 00:55:19:18
Unknown
And again, the European unity question is, how are they going to agree on the commanding leader of these military forces? It's just it's a I mean, you can't see European countries agreeing on that. I can't. Well, I think that's right. If you look at the current tension between Germany and France, between Charles and Macron, it's hard to imagine Germans, let alone Brits, of serving under a French supreme allied commander.
00:55:19:20 - 00:55:45:13
Unknown
That said, probably if the Europeans did create something, they would want to keep the NATO's structure quite, quite create, quite recreate the wheel. But there are those huge political issues. And in addition to the ones you mentioned, the tactical and you mentioned, Rob, that it's just it's hard. It's it's a generation of work to build the kind of defense industrial base in Europe that would be required without the United States.
00:55:45:15 - 00:56:14:13
Unknown
And there are also the questions that lots of European countries are members of NATO, but not members of the EU and vice versa. So the figuring out the geometry would be, I think, really quite daunting. We may have that opportunity depending on what happens in our own elections. But what's your what's your quick conclusion? Will there be a hundredth anniversary of NATO's?
00:56:14:15 - 00:56:38:23
Unknown
I I'm cautiously optimistic. And that's even in the event of a Trump presidency. I guess I'll close with oft after all my negativity and pessimism all say there's a good chance that a second President Trump administration might surprise us and some of the bluff and bluster will be replaced on these climactic issues by a little bit of statesmanship.
00:56:38:26 - 00:57:05:29
Unknown
Trump can say, Hey, they're meeting the 2% goal. I was right to threaten them. I was right to shake things up. But I never meant to abdicate leadership. After all, he can be made to understand if he doesn't already, how advantageous Naito is to the U.S. And that's the point I'd end with. How much weaker, How much less influential we'd be over European Atlanta and global affairs generally if we pulled out of the very alliance that we lead.
00:57:06:07 - 00:57:40:19
Unknown
It would be historically unprecedented. It would be politically. I don't want to say suicidal, but self-harming. And I think ultimately Trump will understand that and he'll do things in a Trumpian way if reelected. But but maybe not the apocalyptic things we fear. And therefore, there will be a 100th anniversary of Naito. Yeah, I would just you know, I would just add, as kind of historian of the Cold War, I'd kind of zoom out a bit and, you know, so Naito, is this Cold War institution that from one perspective has really far outlived the original reasons for its creation?
00:57:40:19 - 00:57:58:19
Unknown
You know, the Soviet Union is 30 years gone, but we're surrounded by such Cold War institutions. This is part of the thing. Like all of these legacies of institutions, nuclear strategies, things like deterrence, math and all these things, they have far outlived the context of their creation. But of course, they have kind of like like a quantum particle.
00:57:58:19 - 00:58:26:07
Unknown
They've tunneled through this energy barrier to reemerge on the other side 30 years later, when they're once again muted again. But, you know, the context has changed. So, you know, is Naito adapting to this new reality or all these old legacies and the history and the and crustacean of all these practices over the years? Can they will they allow it to adapt?
00:58:26:09 - 00:58:44:05
Unknown
Well, unfortunately, we have to leave it there. I think this has been a wonderful conversation. Thanks for all the good questions. I didn't get to too many of them, but thanks to for all the good questions and particularly thanks to Peter and to Rob and to Dornsife for staging this dialog. Thank you all very much. Thank you, Greg.
00:58:44:06 - 00:58:56:00
Unknown
And well done, everyone. Yeah, Thanks.