Fraud for Sale: Inside the Marketplaces Powering Financial Crime

In this episode of Integrity Insights, Filip is joined by Jan Indra, a threat intelligence specialist with a decade of experience in financial crime prevention. Jan began his career as an investigative journalist, later moved into consultancy and long-term due diligence projects, and now focuses on researching the ecosystem that enables fraud to flourish.

The conversation dives deep into how fraudsters operate today and why understanding their infrastructure — not just individual cases — is crucial for prevention.

Key themes discussed:

• The evolution of financial crime tactics
  Fraud doesn’t happen in isolation. Jan explains how fraudulent documents, fake identities, and suspicious transactions are all interlinked, often forming part of wider, industrialised schemes.
• Template farms
  Jan describes how websites and Telegram channels openly sell editable templates of bank statements, IDs, utility bills, pay slips, invoices, and even death certificates. These “farms” are easy to find with a simple Google search, often optimized with SEO to reach the widest audience. He explains the different formats offered (PDFs, PSDs, generators that batch-produce fake documents), and the scale — hundreds of thousands of fraudulent templates in circulation.
• Account farms
  Beyond fake documents, entire verified accounts are now being sold — from bank and fintech logins to crypto exchange profiles and remittance service accounts. This trend shows how quickly fraud enablers adapt, and why institutions need to anticipate emerging threats.
• Success rates and risks
  Not all fake documents succeed in slipping through controls, but even a small percentage poses huge problems at scale. Jan discusses how quality of the fake, institutional risk appetite, and the robustness of KYC processes determine outcomes. Some institutions may see 5% fraudulent submissions; others up to 20%, with major operational and financial consequences.
• Geographies and actors
  While much of the infrastructure is anonymised and globally distributed, Jan outlines investigative clues about where some operators may be based, their backgrounds, and how underground economies of fraud overlap with mainstream online spaces.
• Why institutions should care
  Beyond regulatory compliance, fraud enabled by weak KYC systems carries heavy reputational risk, potential for serious financial losses, and operational disruption when organised groups exploit vulnerabilities at scale.
• The role of threat intelligence
  For Jan, threat intelligence means systematically researching fraud enablers, understanding their modus operandi, and mapping the ecosystem. This knowledge is the first step toward prevention — ensuring organisations aren’t always several steps behind the attackers.

Connect with Us:

• LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/showcase/integrity-insights/?viewAsMember=true
• Berlin Risk Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/company/berlinrisk/?viewAsMember=true
• Website: https://berlinrisk.com/

Transcript

Right. Jan, welcome on the podcast. Hey, Phillip. How you doing? Doing good. Doing good. Uh, so let's, let's start with a brief intro. Why don't you tell us, uh, who, who you are and what, what do you do? Sure. Uh, so my name is Yan, as you know. Uh, and, uh, I have, you know, worked in the financial crime prevention slash detection space for about a decade.

Uh, started off as an investigative journalist, uh, for a couple of years. Uh, transitioned into working as a consultant, doing a lot of both short term and long term investigations and, and due diligence projects, and. Most recently, about a year ago, I've joined Resistant ai, uh, uh, a prog based startup focusing on, uh, document fraud, uh, detection and suspicions, transactions detection.

And now I'm here to, to help develop, uh, the threat intelligence function as we call it. We focus on, uh, not only on frauds themselves, tho, those are the kind of entities that we come in into, come, um, uh, you know, come in. Touch with, uh, analyzing the submitted documents or the, the flow of transactions. But I think for us, it speci specifically means researching, researching, understanding, and investigating the something that I call fraud enablers.

Uh, so not necessarily fraud systems themselves, but the kind of, uh, individuals or groups or entities that make financial crime possible and easier for all the people out there. Hmm. So, so, so we started the threat intelligence unit. We know with the clear goal of, uh, not only do we develop the, the kind of industry leading software to detect this kind of stuff, but we also need to be the ones who have the best understanding of where are these threats coming from.

Who's acting on them? Uh, how do they look like, you know, what's the volume, what's the sort of geography, anything that comes and any sort of data points we can look at. Right? Uh, so, so, and, and hopefully. Uh, a good enough explanation, which is quite short. Obviously we could go much, much deeper into this, but that, that's the kind of stuff that No, that, that helps definitely.

But the, the broader context is that the company itself resistant AI sells, as you said, an industrial leading software to, uh, to basically help companies prevent this type, this type of fraud. Yeah, so, so, you know, we just quickly re reiterate, uh, yeah. We focus on two major aspects that's fraudulent documents and, and, uh, suspicious transactions, right?

So we have two flagship products. One is, uh, the document forensics tool and the other one, one is the transaction monitoring tool. And Yeah. Uh, at the end of the day, you know, something I think we're gonna get into with our conversation as well, uh, today, is that they are very much interconnected, right?

Financial crime doesn't happen in isolation. The issue of fraudulent documents and fraudulent transactions is very much, very much, uh, interconnected. And the, uh, threat intelligence unit, uh, that was launched like when you joined, uh, over a year ago, or has it been like, had it been already in existence before?

Uh, so I think that was the main reason for me coming over was to start doing this. I always say systematically, right? So. I think, you know, there were bits and pieces of threat intel done before I joined, but uh, there was a clear understanding that like, we need to do this on a consistent basis. You know, uh, develop a set of processes, understand all the things that we are looking at, uh, and it keeps on developing.

You know, I think if even after a year of doing this, uh, to me it still seems. A little bit like a beginning of, of a long journey. 'cause uh, we're just now getting to understand, you know, how some, how big some of these, you know, underground markets, whether it's a market for fraudulent documents or, or a market for fraudulent, fraudulent accounts.

How big some of these markets are, and you know. How much more research and, and investigations we need to actually do to have an even better understanding and a clearer, clearer picture of, of how serious things are. Mm-hmm. I mean, I don't know if this is the best way to approach this, because this is obviously a huge topic, but, uh, I mean, you can present this, you know, in whatever way you want, but, uh, maybe I can just ask you like over the, the, the, the last year that you have been looking into this, what are some of the, you know, the main findings, uh, that you and your team you have discovered?

Mm-hmm. So, so I think, you know, for, let's say the first nine months or so, the main focus, uh, of the threat intel unit was, um, research and an identification of something we call a template form. Uh, a template form can be a website, it can be a telegram, user or channel. Uh, it can be a, a forum, web forum thread.

There's different forms it can take, but essentially a template form is an entity that specializes in selling, uh, fraudulent document templates, right? So within the, let's say, website context, it's a basic online shop where you can find hundreds to thousands of fake documents that you can purchase and edit to fit whatever needs you might have.

Of course, uh. Usually, probably with the intention of some, some, uh, you know, financial crime purposes. Uh, a quick, a quick fun fact here. Uh, you know, a lot of these sites sometimes would try to mention that their products, uh, are only supposed to be used for novelty purposes, right? So like the use in film or entertainment and that kind of stuff.

It's a kind of a very funny sort of, you know, uh. Uh, uh, legal disclaimer, which is not a legal disclaimer by any means, but it's funny to see sometimes how farmers try to act as they, as they try to prevent their, their, um, uh, templates for, from being used for, for, uh, illegal purposes. But of course, they very well know, uh, who, who most of the cus or where most of customers I think are coming from and with what, what motivations.

And how do you, how do you, like, how do you go about like, uh, finding these? Is it, is it, first of all, is it all kind of easily, you know, fi findable available on the open web? Or do you, do you have to go like deeper or? I think, you know, as in, uh, I dare I say a little bit of a seasoned investigator myself by, uh, by now.

Um. I, before I started doing this research, I thought, you know, this might be a thing of the dark webs or, you know, something that's harder to trace or harder to identify. 'cause, 'cause we know these cases from, you know, drug trade or human trafficking. But, uh, it turned out to be exactly the opposite, right?

Uh, meaning even if you quickly Google for something like fake. Deutsche Bank statement or something like that, you will not only found, find hundreds of thousands of results, but a lot of those results will be the websites of these template farms. Meaning, uh, you know, they try to attract the widest.

Possible, uh, audience or customer base. So in that sense, they even needs to be easily searchable and easily findable. Uh, so these websites are very much out there, not on the dark web, but, but something we call the deep web. Right? Uh, but these sites are being indexed by Google. It seems these, uh, you know, template farmers are using some SEO tactics to optimize as optimize and try to get their websites to rank as high as possible.

Uh, and, and it gets a little trickier, I think with the, with the, let's say, telegram channels or maybe some discord servers where sometimes you. Might not be able to access something straight off the bat. Uh, you need to either, uh, request permission to join or something like that. But at the end of the day, I think even, you know, with the monitoring of these channels, usually we're able to of course, get in and, and see the communication unfold in real time.

So. So at the end of the day, I would say most of this stuff is, is is widely accessible if you know where to look, obviously. And you, I mean, it's called Template Template Farm. So the way it works is that if you, you wanna fake, you know, your identity for whatever reason, you would buy a, a template and then, and then do what with the template.

Mm-hmm. Um, so there's different ways of what you can buy and how, uh, uh, but I. Obviously the sort of most standard way is yes, you buy, you buy a template, which you know can be usually A PDF, but it can also be a PSD file. It could probably be an Excel or Microsoft Word file. In some cases it might even be an image, right?

But the idea is that you download or obtain the template and then you edit it. Yourself putting in the personal details you want, whether it's identity, transactions, anything of that nature, and then you use that fake document to, you know, onboard a fraudulent account or, you know, uh, submit a loan application that might be fraudulent because you provide the incorrect, uh, uh, uh, income or earnings details.

Uh, there's definitely a wide variety of uses. Uh, and, and when we go to, when we go back to how you use these templates, well, obviously the first thing that comes to mind as I just said, is you edited yourself, but it's not the only way. Uh, there's definitely farmers that offer editing services as a bonus to the templates themselves, so they will edit the documents for you if you want, or there's even, you know, a specific type of farm we call a generator.

Which is a farm where you would not buy the template first, but you would first provide the details, uh, and then they would generate the document for you straight away. And that one is especially dangerous because, um, these tools can also do something we call batch generation of documents. So let's say if I had like a stolen database of personal information, you know, some Excel sheet.

Something like hundreds to thousands to million, even maybe millions of rows. I could probably feed that tool with that spreadsheet and generate fake documents for thousands of people in a very short span of time. Mm-hmm. And do you have any like understanding what are the most popular type of fake documents?

Definitely, definitely. So we, you know, um, try to track and monitor the offering of all these websites that we have found so far. Uh, we found, you know, around 150 of these template farm websites. Uh, and we are also, you know, monitoring over I think 130 different telegram channels, uh, that, you know, uh, advertise this type of activity.

Uh, so we, so we have a good, I think, a pretty good look into, into which documents are being offered the most. And, and so by far, I think the most popular. Document type is bank documents, you know, whether it's account statements, confirmations of account, uh, you know, basically a document that, uh, is issued by a financial institution.

And again, it can, it can serve numerous purposes. So, so that's by far, you know, the most popular one. I think it's 'cause we have catalog already over 300 thousands of these template offerings. I don't say templates on purpose 'cause there is always some level of duplicity, but at the end of the day, we've seen more than 300,000 different offerings.

Uh, so the bank documents take up around one third of all, all the document offerings we've seen. Uh, then obviously, uh, another highly popular group would be IDs, uh, utility bills, um, uh, you know. Pay stubs or income confirmations, that kind of stuff. But also, you know, uh, I think some, something that we tend to think of as, you know, widely used, sort of u ubiquitous commercial documents like receipts, invoices, uh, you know, booking documents, that kind of stuff.

So really, uh, I always tend to say that the, the account farmers don't really discriminate, uh, based on document types. They try to sort of have an offering for everything. Mm-hmm. You know, I, I could cite, you know. One is kind of, I would say obscure document type, even though it's actually not at obscure at the end of the day, uh, that I've seen being offered is death certificates.

Like, um, I can say that I didn't have much knowledge of how death certificates are you used or how are they even issued, but seeing that there is a death certificates template for virtually any country. Makes you think around, well, how this, how could this kind of a fake document be used? How would an institution from Europe even verify a death certificate that is issued somewhere in, you know, uh, the Pacific or some small African country?

You know, like you get to think about these, like obviously to some degree abstract, but to some degree also, I think. Really happening scenarios. 'cause we have seen, for example, that death certificates are also being faked by some people, you know, whether it's some inheritance cases or maybe some insurance fraud cases.

You know, even a document type like that can be, can be, uh, sort of. Offered by the eco, by the template farmers and demanded by fraudsters. Mm-hmm. I mean, that, it is fascinating, really like to, to, to, to, to learn about this. How many Yeah, like the, that, that there's so much you can, uh, you can kind of easily purchase online.

I guess my main question when I hear you talking about this is, what is that? I don't know. Obviously, like this might be quite difficult for you to assess, but, you know, I'm, I'm gonna ask it anyways. You know, what is then the. The, uh, uh, the success rate, let's say, you know, of those documents, uh, when, when whoever buys it online then presents it to the, to the bank or whoever demands this document, like, do you have any way to kind of assess what, how, you know, how likely you are to succeed, uh, with this document?

Mm-hmm. So I think that is a very, very complex question because there is a huge number of factors that come into play, right? Um, we kind of estimate, uh, that, you know, usually around one in four documents might, might have been tampered with, but it's important to know the no, the tempered viff uh, expression here.

'cause it might. You know, when a document has been edited or manipulated digitally, it doesn't always have to mean that it was done with the intent of committing fraud. Uh, so, so that kind of an estimate, you know, considers all the possible motivations or reasons for document modification. And then I think you get into, well, the success rate really depends.

Obviously on the quality of the fake itself and, and how, how diligently that was prepared, but also on the, you know, level of risk appetite, uh, of the institution where it's being submitted or the, or the controls being set up right. Uh, what might, you know, a fake document that might be able to breach one platform might not be able to breach the KYC process of a different platform 'cause it's using better tools or it's set up in a better way.

Uh, you know, we definitely keep seeing, you know. That de-risk appetites, uh, vary and, and for good reasons, 'cause itif to the segment you operate in. And where are your motivations or your reasoning, uh, uh, as well as what's the document journey, what kind of formats of documents you, you sort of allow to people to submit?

Right? Is it just PDFs, is it images? Uh, what's the sort. Whole document journey from uploading a document or submitting a document to, to that document being evaluated. Uh, so I think all of these factors come into play and it's hard to, you know, we, we do try to estimate some sort of. Percentages of fraudulent documents within different segments.

It can be anywhere from, you know, let's say 5% all the way up to something like 20%. Right? Which, you know, at the end of the day, this, this kind of, uh, you know, analysis we do as well on some sub-sample of, of the documents submitted, tells you the actual number of documents that are labeled as being fraudulent.

So, so documents that are being faked with the purpose of committing fraud. So especially when it gets to the, around, you know, 20%. Uh, uh, threshold that is starting to become really serious. I mean, even 5% would be serious if you're, uh, processing millions of documents per week or per month. But, uh, but if you get even a higher, higher up, 50 percentage, uh.

It shows you, I think that the document fraud problem can have really severe operational consequences for the, for the, for the institution involved. Mm-hmm. And another question that is coming to my mind is that because we, we have done this, uh, in-house, like a lot of kind of research into. There's different type of fraud as a service, like this information as a service, or ransomware as a service.

A lot of this, we have been seeing a lot of this stuff coming out of the, like former Soviet Union, uh, states like Ukraine, Russia. It's usually down to the fact that there's usually like lot of, um, kind of, uh, emphasis on this type of, um. Uh, it or this, this type of education. And there's a lot of this skilled workforce that, uh, often works on these state projects sponsored by the government, and then, then they develop these skills and then they go through private sector.

Uh, I don't know if you've like, you know, seen your data set any like, indications of where these, uh, kind of organizations or, or these groups that are, that are behind these operations, uh, they are kind of where they're based geographically. Do you see any of this in your, in your data? Um, um, I think we see, you know, um, bits and pieces and clues here and there, right?

Uh, it's definitely not easy to to, to provide an answer to that question simply because. Uh, the template farmers are, I think, fraud enablers, uh, or financial crime enablers in general. You know, if they know what they're doing, they are leveraging the, the global internet infrastructure, right? So you have servers set up in different regions, you're using VPNs, you're anon, you're anonymizing all the domain registrations.

So, so very rarely I think you can get to real. Names, or I'm not even saying real faces, of course. Uh, at the same time, there are some clues here and there, right? We, uh, obviously the primary goal is to monitor and understand these, these, uh, threats, uh, manifesting. At the same time, we still try to, if there is a good piece of actionable evidence to to, to go.

From, we try to investigate some cases in, in a bit more in depth, right? Something that we've, for example, done in January was, um. We published a piece that is trying to sort of track the history of Only Fake, which is one of the sort of most famous, uh, document template providers, uh, known within the space.

They, they made a, made a, let's say, big bus, uh, within the industry, you know, uh, a year and a half ago when they, when there was a different piece written about them, how they're able to generate very convincing fake IDs and, and sell them for quite cheap. Uh, so we decided to sort of. Uh, really dig into the online footprint of this vendor and, and see what kind of, uh, forums he is been active on and the kind of, you know, communication he has been sharing with, with potential customers.

And so, and so, there are these clues that it might have been, you know. Or it, it might be a group of, you know, scale graphic designers that originated from Russia and at some point maybe realized it's probably better for us to not just provide our fraudulent editing services, but also have our own sort of template shop to go with it.

'cause it's, you know. Uh, probably a faster, more profitable business. And they even, you know, they would even sometimes I think, share information on themselves. You know, they would use these references to a Russian novel or they would, uh, talk about, you know, uh, some level of interaction with, you know, uh, the state potentially.

I don't want to go too much deep into that, 'cause I don't know if that's going on, but I think it might be. And, and, and lastly of course, the sort of. Uh, web forums or languages. This is all happening in. Uh, kind of gives you an understanding of where these people might be coming from simply to how they talk and, and, and, and, uh, how they communicate with each other.

Uh, so I think, you know, again, it's harder to sort of draw any, like, specific conclusions from that, but yeah, if we, if we have a good piece of intel, we definitely. Would like to know as well, who the real, who the real actors are behind some of these farms. And uh, this also leads me to my next question. Uh, I really wonder what your, do you have a, like before you, you know, set out to do a particle investigation, do you kind of limit yourself consciously in a, in the scope of the investigation or how far are you then like able to also the resources, you know, how, how far do the resources allow you to, to go?

You know, uh, if you find some interesting thread. Uh, it's a good question. I think, you know, something that I really like about, uh, this job is that we are really allowed to do in-depth research that takes months. Uh, so, you know, if we had a, if we had a, if. Good story or good pieces of information to maybe base an investigation on.

I don't think there's some sort of a time limit we are given in that sense. Like, you know, it's, it's be because it's not a commercial project, uh, or a commercial investigation that needs to wrap up at a signif at specific point in time. We sort of have the liberty to, to go as deep as we can. Right. But knowing, of course, the ultimate objective, of course, for us is to understand the modus operandi of these, of these fraud enablers.

We're not law enforcement. So, you know, at the end of the day, we, we don't have the ultimate goal of tracking these guys down and catching them as much as you would want them to be caught. Mm-hmm. Uh, but we've had, you know, some conversations. I think, you know, if there ever would be an opportunity to also, uh, share some of our findings with those, with those, uh, you know.

Law enforcement agencies or anybody who might be interested in, in fighting this problem. I think that that would definitely be a possibility. Uh, and, and yeah, I think there's, you know, actually a couple of investigations we're working on right now. And, and, uh, hopefully whenever we get to some conclusions or some, or some stories, uh, I'll, I'll share those with you for sure.

And to play at the, the devil's advocate a little bit. I mean, we, uh, kind of spoke about this before we hit the recording button here, but, uh, what, uh, you know, like from the perspective of the, the banks or whoever's supposed to do this KYC. Uh, you know, when, when, when these people, let's say they, you know, watch your webinar or like read some of your reports, like why, why, why should they actually care?

Mm. You know, like if, if let's say they, they, okay, then they, they they kind of, uh, it, uh, seems to indicate that suddenly, I don't know, 20% percent, 50 or 15, I dunno, 15, 10% of their clients are maybe, maybe, uh, fraudsters, uh, what are their, you know, implications, uh, of this for the. For the, for the, for the banks or for these, uh, for these entities.

Well, I think, you know, uh, there's a number of reasons for why fi, why they should care, simply because things like compliance and, and, and, you know, adhering to the rule of law is relevant. Uh, but also you. I think should worry or be very aware of your potential re reputational, uh, risks here. You know, if you're an institution that's, that's, uh, I'm not saying maybe knowingly, unwillingly, but if, if, if you become known as an, as an institution that is allowing fraudsters to, uh, launch a money for system, you quickly can use a lot of.

A lot of the credibility you might have. We see it, I think even with some of the big banks, uh, over and over again. Uh, and them not sort of, you know, committing enough resources or, uh, do care to, to dealing with some of these, let's say, you know, even a ML issues and identification of potentially dangerous accounts or transactions.

So, so there definitely is the reputational aspect, but something that we try to emphasize, you know, is. Even the sort of fraud losses, operational aspect, right? If you would have an organized group that would, uh, be able to crack your KYC process and, uh, commit, you know, mass attacks on your institution in potentially a very short span of time.

'cause we usually see that some of these serial attacks happen, happen in over 24 hours. That could actually, you know, I think, um. Cause quite serious operational, uh, problems to your institution if, if the system is flooded with some of these attacks. Uh, um, so you have, you have obviously that aspect to worry about as well, and, and you know, for somebody like a lender, uh, if, you know, we live now in a world where I think even loan applications, sometimes these institutions, uh.

Are trying to, uh, uh, raise between each other, uh, at who can provide a loan the fastest, right? So it's the whole online, no physical meeting required. You just submit your documents and we're, we're gonna approve your loan. Or if you're gonna have somebody who's gonna use FIG documentation, uh, to, to get that loan, however big it might be.

It's pretty much guaranteed that they're not going to re, like, they're gonna default on that. They're never gonna return the money. They've been, they've been, you know, awarded or approved. So, so, you know, the financial damage aspect comes into play of course, very much as well. So there's a plenty of reasons.

And just to, just to clarify this, I, I obviously realize that this is a huge problem and, uh, everyone should take it seriously. I just wanted to ask provocative question. Uh, but, uh. Let me just ask you this one last thing, uh, because you already alluded to this as well, that you are currently looking into, into something beyond the template farms.

Can you, can you maybe give us a little teaser on, uh, what you've been up to? Yeah. So I think, you know, it's sort of a, a, a logical progression, uh, of our research, right? 'cause we started with the template farms and the sellers of these document templates. But, uh, something that we have been observing recently and, and focusing on in the last few months.

Is is something we found a new term form, uh, something we call account farms, right? Uh, and these, as opposed to template farms are vendors that specialize not in the selling of document templates, but specialize in selling onboarded. Uh, verified account accounts right off the bat. Uh, and there is a logical connection.

'cause I think if you are able to create, you know, fake documents that are gonna pass some of these checks, uh, why maybe not try to also start a fraudulent account and, and sell that for probably much, much higher, uh, prices and, and much bigger profits. So, so these account farms are definitely a thing. Uh, and we have been trying to obviously gather as much data and, and, and insights on those as well.

And, and, uh, you know, there's a lot, a lot of activity going on, uh, that is targeting, I think, numerous sectors. You know, whether it's traditional banks, digital banks, crypto exchanges, remittances, marketplaces, different types of platforms. We've seen accounts being sold for all of these, uh. And obviously there's, we can confirm that a hundred percent of these offerings is legit.

There might be some, some level of scam operations being involved as well. But definitely I think most of these might be legit. Uh, and it shows you, you know, how vulnerable some of these k, some of these KYC processes might be. Uh, and why you need to actually, I think, uh, needs to, you know. Commit some level of, of attention to the f threatt intelligence part and understand what is happening and where the frets are coming from.

So, so to wrap, wrap this up for you, we are going to have a, a webinar on this specific issue in about, I think, three weeks. So, so very much, uh, inviting everybody to listen to this. 'cause I think we're gonna share a lot of interesting insight insights based on our, on our research from the last few months.

I mean, it is really, I find this really fascinating because I, I especially because I, I don't think there's many kind of operators in the field who do this kinda original research. So it's, it's, it's really valuable I think for everyone in, in, in this, in, in this, in this, in, in our space to learn what the threats are.

Because I feel like a lot of us, we are always kind of like one step or even more steps behind. Uh, so it's, it's, it's always really great to. Just like to kind of hone your skills to understand where the threats are coming from. And so I really appreciate, uh, the time that you took to come on the podcast.

It's been, it's been a really interesting conversation and, uh, I'm looking forward to that, uh, webinar. Thanks again, Phillip, for having us. Uh, thanks for, uh, the discussion, uh, and, and, uh, understanding, uh, of the importance of these topics. Of course. I think, you know, one last note, 'cause you made me think of that just now is.

Uh, exactly what you've just said. I think different intelligence more than anything, also helps us to understand the sort of, uh, behaviors and tactics these guys use. And, and knowing that is, I think, the first step to, to not only detecting, but preventing financial crime, which I think is the ultimate, ultimate mission, uh, of all of us.

So, so once again, thanks and, and looking forward to talking again soon.