#81 Changing Minds, Metaphysics, and a Life in Analytic Philosophy with Janet Levin of USC

 Janet Levin on Physicalism, Zombies, and Changing Minds

 Andrea hosts philosopher Janet Levin, newly retired after 40 years at USC and the department’s first tenure-track woman hire, to discuss a life in analytic philosophy and debates about mind and consciousness. Levin recounts stumbling into philosophy at the University of Chicago with Ted Cohen and later studying at MIT amid figures like Jerry Fodor, Noam Chomsky, and advisor Ned Block, and writing the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on functionalism. They contrast dualism and physicalism, explain metaphysics as inquiry into what exists and what is possible, and examine thought experiments such as Descartes’ arguments, Jackson’s knowledge argument, and Chalmers’ zombie case. Levin holds that our feelings and experiences are nothing over and above physical processes in the body, primarily the brain and central nervous system. The conversation closes on teaching, women in philosophy, and how openness, identity, and social forces affect willingness to change one’s mind and pursue truth.

The Road Taken APA Talk

Janet Levin

Time Stamps:
00:00 Big Questions on Mind Change
01:47 Consciousness and Zombies
02:11 Welcome and Season Setup
03:22 Meet Janet Levin
07:31 Stumbling Into Philosophy
08:25 Why Minds Change Slowly
11:10 Synthetic Hippocampus and Extended Mind
12:57 Chicago Origins With Ted Cohen
18:02 MIT Era and Cognitive Revolution
22:01 From Behaviorism to Functionalism
26:17 Defining Physicalism and Supervenience
29:23 What Is the Mind Really
34:46 Cognitive Phenomenology Debate
37:31 What Metaphysics Studies
40:02 Classic Metaphysics Puzzles
43:15 Free Will and Determinism
46:34 Descartes and the Self
51:41 Conceivability and Zombie Arguments
58:40 Dualism’s Causation Problem
01:11:40 Type B Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts
01:22:46 Water Lightning Mind
01:24:15 Identity Theory Pushback
01:27:51 Physicalism Explained Broadly
01:30:05 Phenomenal Concepts Introspection
01:32:17 Introspection As Skill
01:34:44 Defending Armchair Philosophy
01:37:22 Armchair Near Window
01:39:10 How Minds Change
01:43:55 Bias Identity And Windows
01:45:35 Women In Philosophy Shifts
01:50:28 Grad Training Mentorship
01:54:43 Teaching Confidence Bloomers
01:57:42 Love Retirement Future Questions
02:02:12 Host Outro Waymaking

Giving Page

Longer Show Notes and PDF of APA talk

Janet Levin is Professor Emerita of Philosophy at the University of Southern California, where she was a longtime faculty member in the School of Philosophy. Her research focuses on epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of psychology. She earned her Ph.D. in philosophy from MIT and her B.A. from the University of Chicago. 

Much of her work engages with one of the hardest problems in philosophy: how to account for the subjective, felt quality of conscious expe

Transcript

Metaphysics of Minds: Janet Levin and a career in philosophy

Janet Levin: [00:00:00] so there are two questions. One is how do you change your mind? And, but a prior one these days it seems is, how can you get yourself into a position where you are willing to change your mind? What goes into that? What do you have to give up and what do you gain?

You need to have all that stuff going on in order for there to be conscious experience. So my view is that if that's true, uh, then whatever is supposed to be going on to have conscious experience can be explained by appeal to what's going on in the brain, in the endocrine system, and maybe what's going on in the world.

all of that stuff, physical needs to be taken into account, but no matter how much information of that sort you have, no matter how much and how, how closely these events may be correlated with these feelings, these feelings of what it's like to be in pain, to be perceiving [00:01:00] red, to be thinking that Paris is beautiful, whatever that is, that is not going to emerge from your knowledge of all the stuff that's going on.

It's still going to seem separate. And this is where the phenomenal concept strategy comes in.

how do you get yourself to change your mind, if it seems like you need to and how identity plays into it and how forces that, that are, there and increasingly, uh, powerful can get in the way of, you know, real knowledge and changing your mind for the better. I mean, getting closer to the truth. And then, you know, people have said that the truth doesn't matter.

I think it does, but then you have to say more clearly why. Couldn't you imagine what Chalmers calls a zombie and that is a creature that is just like a human being, maybe just like you, neurophysiologically, but doesn't have any [00:02:00] conscious experience, that there's nothing that it's like to be that creature.

Can you imagine that? ​

Andrea Hiott: Hello everyone. Welcome to Love and Philosophy. This is Andrea Hiott and I'm so glad you're here. What does it mean to stumble into your life's work? Do you think most of us stumble into our life's work, or do we choose it? And what does that have to do with the connection between the way our bodies are moving through the world?

All our experiences, everything everyone said to us, all the books we've read. Where we are in the world, what does that all have to do with who we meet, who we become, and who we, later maybe after we retire, for example, look back and think about who we were and what we've done. Actually, those are questions I think that are hiding in a lot of philosophy, even though they're rarely examined or put exactly like that because they're questions that are human and that we're all wondering about and [00:03:00] that we're all trying to figure out as we go.

Through this life. So it's something I just wanted to start with because it's kind of something to keep in mind maybe as we listen to this conversation, which will get quite analytical and deep into philosophy, We can remember that a lot of that was towards trying to figure out some of these bigger questions that matter on a very deep level.

Today. My guest is Janet Levin. She's just retired from a 40 year career at the University of Southern California, which is one of the great schools of philosophy in neuroscience too, actually. And Janet was actually the first woman hired into the philosophy department there for a tenure track position.

So. That was just 40 years ago and that was her. there's a lot of work going on there now, uh, relative to, the body like Demasio, who's at USC and working with the endocrine system. Janet is someone with a deep conviction that the world's physical, and I think these words, physical and mental, I don't know about you, but they're starting to not mean the same thing.

Maybe they used to. I think we're all starting to [00:04:00] understand them a bit, a bit differently, And because of that, even though Janet is definitely a physicalist, a materialist, and she's coming out of the analytic tradition of that now, she describes herself more as holding that feelings and experiences are nothing over and above physical processes in the body.

And primarily she means the brain and central nervous system. She's coming from a really great analytic tradition, which, um, we haven't spoken of a whole lot here. We've had a few analytic philosophers on the podcast, but we haven't really talked about the analytic tradition directly. So I wanted to start this season getting a little analytic, but also getting a little personal talking about Janet's life and philosophy because those things actually analytic philosophy in the US at least.

And her life story in a way are, are intertwined. So we're gonna talk about consciousness physicalism, the zombie experiment, nature of, we'll walk through some of those thought experiments. And what's wonderful is that we end up in a really human place, a place of care, [00:05:00] and

relative to kind of what really matters. Also a little bit relative to those questions that I started this with and actually listening back, I found it really touching and I'm really thankful for that, that we somehow got to that place. I also think her life is one worth celebrating. And I wanted to start with a sort of celebration of life and, uh, her persistence and her curiosity, also what I like to think of as her ambiguous precision. And I mean that as a compliment, and I said it to her too, but she's very good at what I think of as holding the paradox and.

holding a lot of things at once and not, sticking herself into a box always, even though of course she's definitely called herself a physicalist and, and all of that. But she's also very open and she's really trying to figure things out that is the best kind of philosopher. So she's open paths and open worlds for people.

And been part of a time in history that I just wanna note, she trained at the University of Chicago and then she was at MIT in the mid [00:06:00] 1970s and that was pretty electric time. There was a guy named Jerry Fodor there who came up with this thing called Language of thought, LOT, which maybe you've heard of.

He was developing a representational theory of mind. Very interesting stuff. And even though I have a different view of representation, he's actually informed my ways of thinking a lot. He's a really wonderful writer and philosopher, or he was, and Janet was there when he was creating all of this. He was watching him.

She was also there when Ned Block was starting his career. He's, an important person in philosophy. If you haven't heard of him yet, most people know him because of this distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness. But I won't go into all that, but. He was actually, um, her PhD supervisor and she was probably, we think maybe I haven't asked Ned Block, but if I get a chance I will.

But she was his first PhD student, so she was probably helping him learn how to teach in a way, as all our students do. And she actually went on to write the Stanford Encyclopedia philosophy's entry on functionalism. Which relates a lot to all these people I've been [00:07:00] talking about. But Ned especially because he came up with this, idea, it's called the China Brain Thought Experiment, and it sort of distinguishes between what I was just talking about, this access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness Functionalism briefly is this theory that mental states are defined by their roles, their functional roles, so their causal relationships to sensory inputs like mental states behavior rather than the physical substrate. And then that might sound confusing, but we're gonna talk about all that here and hopefully it'll under, you'll understand it a little bit better.

 Janet has come through and to her positions over time. She describes it the way Stein does actually. he talks about it like light, dawning gradually over the whole, She stumbled into philosophy through an undergraduate course at the University of Chicago, taught by this very charismatic professor named Ted Cohen. Who was, you know, like smoking his lucky strikes and telling his stories of Harvard grad school and it was that time and she, she really loved it. She took another course and another, and it kept going.

I think [00:08:00] quite a lot of us in philosophy have an experience like that where we stumble upon philosophy and then we just can't. Leave it. And there's this wonderful talk that Janet gave to the American Philosophical Association where she goes through a lot of these stories, which I will, um, try to include as a PDF here for you if you wanna read even more, because it's a really beautiful and honest way of looking at, at philosophy and at her.

Life and part of it. One question I asked her before recorded we recorded was, how do you think minds actually change? And we don't. We, we get to the end. We do talk about that a bit, but it's not really through knockdown arguments, it's really through something slower, something. Seeping in some, you know, getting some different information, starting to really understand things differently.

It's much more like a turn of a kaleidoscope. I think. she doesn't describe it like that, but I sort of see that in the way she describes it. it's this quiet turn that is also really stark dramatic clear. we look at what really [00:09:00] matters and it tends to be. The ideas and the change itself.

Like finding new ways to sense and think and having a community that's partly helping you do that or at least doing that alongside you thinking about your body, your life, the world outside the world that is you, your this extraordinary sort of experience. And I think we get into that feeling by the end of this.

And it's a very human place and I like that a lot. I'll let you get there yourself rather than keep going on and on because my voice is almost gone. relationships matter, I think is, is what I wanna say. After having listened to our conversation just now and the paths we open for one, one another really matter.

Teachers, you really matter a lot, but also students, you really matter. You also open paths for other people around you and for the people that. Are teaching you. You know, the best thing about being a teacher is that you learn. So sometimes it's more than content, uh, that matters. Sometimes all these theories in the end, end up having taught us something that we [00:10:00] didn't actually think we were even talking about when we were making those theories.

it's a bit of a strange thing for a philosopher to say, but I'll just leave it like that because I think there's a. A lot opening up right now in philosophy and we're starting to see the past in a new light. And I think it's really beautiful actually. And I'm really grateful to Janet for being part of that time, especially in American philosophy that, uh, that those years of creating analytic philosophy and teaching us how to think critically and how to.

Notice the world around us, and I'm also very thankful to her for spending some time with me. I hope you enjoy this conversation. Welcome to the next season of Love and Philosophy. We'll be having a conversation post at least on the 17th of every month and some months, you know, there'll be two or three, but definitely at least one every month.

And I'm you know, on all the other outlets riding as much as I can. About these ideas. If you wanna hear more about the philosophy part of it all. But I just wanna say thanks for being here and, uh, good luck out there. I know some of you're working on your PhDs and it's coming time to [00:11:00] turn 'em in for some people, and so I just wanna say good job.

You can do it. You're almost there. All right. Be well everybody.

Janet Levin: That is interesting. I mean, you know about this guy Berger at USC who has um, uh, kind of made an equivalent of a synthetic, um, hippocampus where, 

Andrea Hiott: oh, 

Janet Levin: Yeah, that is Burger. 

Andrea Hiott: Okay. 

Janet Levin: I think his name is Berg. I mean, I'll check. Wow. 

Andrea Hiott: Cool. 

Janet Levin: And, um, I think he was in the neuroscience department and he found a way to, um, I mean for people who can't, um, lay down long-term memories, you know, that they just vanish, yeah, like Memento or The Lost Mariner 

Andrea Hiott: mm-hmm. 

Janet Levin: That he can find a way to transfer them into some.

This was a while ago. I mean, I mean, I'm probably giving you wrong information. 

Andrea Hiott: Well, it's fine. Even, even, so maybe I do, and I, I, I'm thinking of something different, but yeah, I'll [00:12:00] definitely go visit that again.

That's super, very cool. I love the hippocampus, so I should know everything. I don't know that, but can you 

Janet Levin: remember it all? 

Andrea Hiott: Yeah, exactly. Haha. Remember I use my hippocampus. Yeah, 

Janet Levin: yeah, yeah. 

Andrea Hiott: Um, 

Janet Levin: I suppose an iPhone can be one too. 

Andrea Hiott: Yeah. Yeah. At the end of your book, you talk a bit about extended mind. 

Janet Levin: Yeah. Yeah.

Andrea Hiott: That's, uh, just briefly maybe we'll get to that, but maybe we should start, uh, okay. Where should we, well, okay, I guess I'll start officially. But hi Janet. I'm just thrilled to meet you, as you know, and, uh, welcome to Love and Philosophy. 

Janet Levin: Thank you very much, and I'm very grateful that you've taken so much time with my work and raised some really, really interesting questions that I definitely need to think about more.

Andrea Hiott: Great. I'm so glad to hear that. Um, I wonder where should we start? Should we, should we start in Chicago? Is that the place to start? 

Janet Levin: Um, yeah, I think so. There's [00:13:00] not a whole lot that went on before then. Um, so I was an undergraduate at the University of Chicago and my first, I mean, they had a big, you know, very heavy duty core curriculum requirement in Western civilization.

And, um, you know, some of it was a little bit outdated, but, I happened into, I mean, I was just assigned a three quarter, sequence in, um, in the humanities. And there was one quarter, my first quarter ever in college, which was Ted Cohen's class. On philosophy and you know, modern philosophy. Well, no actually was supposed to what we 

Andrea Hiott: call modern philosophy.

Janet Levin: Yeah, yeah. It was actually supposed to be a history of philosophy starting with Plato, but 

Plato. And we started in on Descartes. We did a little walk Hume and, uh, well we were supposed to do [00:14:00] con too, but we did about five minutes on cot. But, uh, 

Andrea Hiott: now had you wanted to take that class, or it was by 

Janet Levin: accident 

Andrea Hiott: or 

Janet Levin: No, no, it was completely by accident.

I mean, I really didn't know anything about philosophy before I came, which, you know, I mean, I often think that these core curriculum requirements are not so good, but boy, if you didn't have them, nobody would end up majoring in philosophy because very, very few people encounter it. 

Andrea Hiott: Absolutely. I have to tell you, it's exactly what happened to me.

I thought I was gonna go to law school and I took a philosophy class with the core curriculum and it changed everything. So 

Janet Levin: Really? 

Andrea Hiott: Yeah. 

Janet Levin: So your family was okay with that? 

Andrea Hiott: No, of course not. I was gonna be a lawyer and I became a philosopher. It's, uh, no. Eventually they were okay with it. But Was your family okay with it?

Janet Levin: Yeah. Yeah. They, they didn't go as long as you're happy? I mean, I don't think they expected that much, but yeah, they were happy to go with it, actually. 

Andrea Hiott: That's good. So you took this class and what, what happened? 

Janet Levin: Well, I really, uh, I, I, I [00:15:00] loved it, and I wasn't quite sure whether I liked it. I mean, there were, you focused on various passages and you had to write these very short 500 word responses to various questions.

And that was fun because that got me to be more precise and to really look at these passages carefully. But there was, but there was also a lot of camaraderie in that class. In fact, I remember the names of about half of the students in that class. Yeah. Which is shocking because, you know, he 

Andrea Hiott: does that.

Janet Levin: And I, that isn't, that hasn't even happened in most of the classes I've taught. So it was really extraordinary. And, uh, I, Ted Cohen in those days was just some, I don't know if you know him, mean he, died a few years ago, but he w he, uh, focused on aesthetics, but he's probably best known for a book that he wrote about jokes.

Huh. 

Andrea Hiott: Oh. I 

Janet Levin: didn't 

Andrea Hiott: know that. 

Janet Levin: Anyway, he had a good sense of [00:16:00] humor and he would just, I mean, he was very charismatic. He would smoke his lucky strike. He could smoke in class in those days. And um, and sort of go into a reverie and talk about what it was like to, um, be a graduate student at Harvard, which he was, and all of the stuff that was going on there.

And, uh, so I couldn't quite determine whether it was the subject matter philosophy that I liked so much or this experience of being in this class where people really were engaged and the teacher was very charismatic. 

Andrea Hiott: this is one of those classes that sort of, everyone took, is this the one I'm remembering that your husband took too and then maybe even later, your son?

Is that 

Janet Levin: my son? Yes. Yes. Yeah. 

Andrea Hiott: So it was one of those classes that gets a reputation. 

Janet Levin: Well, but it got a mixed reputation. I went on to philosophy. that was the only philosophy class that my husband took, and my son actually double majored in philosophy and history, but he ended up going into history. So [00:17:00] there you have.

Andrea Hiott: Okay, so it did something to you then, so maybe 

Janet Levin: That's right. Yes, yes. So, um, but, you 

Andrea Hiott: know, but I love that mood you create, you know, because people smoking in the class and this kind of, obviously something special happened in that particular one, if, if everyone remembered each other and stuff and, and there are special classes like that that happen, that sort of something happens and that, 

Janet Levin: yeah.

Um, and I mean there was one person who knit all the time, but, um, asked these really good, this if I may pointed questions. Um, and um, and uh, you know, there were people who went on to do various things and um, I've lost touch with most of them, but, uh, but it was very interesting that I remembered it all and people really talked to one another.

They engaged and that was nice. Yeah. And, um, but so I ended up taking other classes with less charismatic professors and, uh, I ended up liking it. And so I, uh, went on to [00:18:00] graduate school, and um. I, uh, went to MIT and it was, uh, I mean, that wasn't my first choice, but I'm glad I was there because a lot of interesting things were going on at the time.

you know. 

Andrea Hiott: Oh my goodness. Yeah. When was this exactly this? 

Janet Levin: Um, I went to, uh, MIT in, I, um, graduated from college in 72, and then I went the next fall. And um, 

Audio Only - All Participants: so 

Andrea Hiott: a lot of people would say philosophy was basically. Being created, around that time at MIT and also Harvard, which we'll get to.

'cause you didn't end up at Harvard a little bit, which I think you'd applied to first. 

Janet Levin: Yes, yes. And 

Andrea Hiott: then you ended up at MIT. 

Janet Levin: Yeah. But, um, I got to know people there, uh, for, for various reasons, which, uh, I mean, basically they needed TAs at Harvard. And, um, MIT didn't have enough spaces. So I was the first pioneer to go down there, and I was a teaching assistant for Equines Logic class, which was 

Andrea Hiott: Quinine at Harvard, in, at MIT you were also in the middle [00:19:00] of, this was like when they were, when the philosophy of mine was sort of joining forces with the linguistics building or something. And 

Janet Levin: yes, 

Andrea Hiott: Jerry Foer was there, I think. And Oh, 

Janet Levin: he was, yes. 

Andrea Hiott: Ned Locke. And I mean, you really, for those who are philosophy nerds, everybody was, you know, building their theories at that time.

Right? 

Janet Levin: Yeah. Yeah. It was really interesting. there, of course, Chomsky was in, uh, oh 

Andrea Hiott: yeah. Chomsky too. Goodness. 

Janet Levin: And, uh, Morris Hawley, uh, and, you know, it was really a group. But, um, at that time, or during the time I was at MIT, um, there was, I mean, philosophy had its own debate. It was, in the humanities, section and, um.

There was the worry, uh, well, actually the threat, that philosophy would just be, kind of absorbed into the humanities. It wouldn't have its autonomy. But at that point, there were some people who had joined appointments in philosophy and [00:20:00] linguistics, and I mean, there were all sorts of twists and turns here, which not only would be boring, but I can't remember them all.

Andrea Hiott: I mean, do you think that merger with linguistics had, um, a, a big influence on actually, like the philosophy that was happening with, for example, Jerry Foer? 

Janet Levin: No. Um, 

Andrea Hiott: okay. 

Janet Levin: I mean, Jerry Foer was interested in linguistics and psychology, um, for a long time.

I mean, I think, I mean, Descartes was a great 17th century example of, of a polymath. I mean, including, you know, his mathematical, you know, uh, 

Andrea Hiott: that whole science, uh, strain, which 

Janet Levin: yeah, science 

Andrea Hiott: also becomes important for your work, but, mm-hmm. 

Janet Levin: Yeah. Um, he, he did no real work in science. He did real work in.

Mathematics, you know, Cartesian Coates, that are probably better known than Cartesian dualism among [00:21:00] some. And, um, so, you know, he really had it all. now you, there are a few people who are, who do know science and I mean very well, and do philosophy of science too. But now it seems that, people, it, it's easier and also very relevant for people who, have, uh, who count as, uh, as poly mass are people who do serious philosophy and serious linguistics and or serious psychology.

Um, altogether they make real contributions in all those fields. And, um, that's pretty good. And Jerry Foer really is an example of that. And he really did serious psychology and, um, serious philosophy. And, his psychology most of the time, not all of the time, did inform his philosophy and vice versa. So, so it was very, it was [00:22:00] very nice to see that.

Andrea Hiott: So you were in his classes and around him, but why did you end up with Ned Block as your supervisor, which is a more general functionalism instead of that sort of. What do you, I guess representationalism more specific Representationalism. What, what happened there? I mean, 

Janet Levin: yeah, that's an interesting question too.

I think at that time that I was, you know, more interested in kind of getting the hang of a, of a, the general hang of an alternative to behaviorism and just, um, physicalism of the type identity sort. And I wanted to see what was going on. And, um, I was probably, I don't know if I was the absolute first, but I was one of Ned's first, uh, dissertation students and 

Andrea Hiott: Oh, you were one of his first 

Janet Levin: PhDs.

Andrea Hiott: Oh, wow. 

Janet Levin: Yeah, so one of his first, maybe the first, I can't quite remember, but it was around there. That's [00:23:00] very interesting. And so we were, he was learning, I guess, how to be a dissertation advisor. And, you know, he has supervised so many. I mean, he really is a superstar of, and, um, but I wasn't quite ready to, um, either be swept up in, uh, the ongoing research program of Jerry Foer or to take a step in opposition to it because I felt that, um, I really wanted to master these more general questions first. And, um, I'm glad I did. and, uh, you know, I've read a lot of Jerry Foer in be in Between and talked to him and, you know, he's wonderful.

But I think I made the right decision.

You know, Andrea? I didn't feel that I was ready either to be swept into a research program or to stand in opposition to it. And I was, uh, gradually, getting much more convinced that, oh, yes, there really is, you know, there really are interesting [00:24:00] processes that go on in the mind, and let's see how you can give a general characterization of them that's not too behaviorist and is not, uh, uh, JJC smart type of identity theory.

And so it was really good for me to read some of the burgeoning literature on it, and Jerry Foer did a lot of it, and Jerry and Ned wrote some important papers together too, against behaviorism. So. In favor. 

Audio Only - All Participants: Yeah. 

Andrea Hiott: It's funny you said you were kind of a secret behaviorist or something. Do I remember that correctly?

I mean, you, you seem to have do kind of fighting yourself on that one a little bit. 

Janet Levin: Yes, yes. Um, it's something, it's one of these embarrassing things that I remember, although I try to shut down and, um, 

Andrea Hiott: yeah, I mean, I don't think it's embarrassing. 'cause when you talk about, you know, it, it's still, it's the kind of behaviorism that's maybe scientific, right?

But when you're thinking about philosophical behaviorism as you describe it later, or even I'm thinking of like Edward Tolman and 

Janet Levin: Yeah, 

Andrea Hiott: this [00:25:00] kind of, then actually, I don't think it's embarrassing, but tell me why it was embarrassing for you or what was going 

Janet Levin: on. Oh, oh, well, I mean, nobody was behaviorist, and, um, at, at some point I wasn't, but I was attracted to the idea that, yeah, maybe, uh, you can explain a lot by talking about what people are disposed to do under certain environmental circumstances.

And you could get a lot farther with that than, uh, people had thought. but functionalism at least, um, analytic or, um. Or philosophical functionalism, I suppose, is like behaviorism in that the mental states are defined all at once in terms of what people will do if they have, various combinations of those states, given certain environmental stimulation.

So it is a more, realistic, I think, um, less objectionable version of behaviorism [00:26:00] and it is compatible or compatible enough with physicalism, even though it's not strictly speaking, a physicalist view. And, um, it seemed a lot more promising and really worth pursuing. uh, a lot of people are functionalists now.

Andrea Hiott: Indeed. Yes. And it's even, I mean, all of that's changing in a way, but for those who don't really understand what we're talking about with all these words, cause this audience is so broad, but I remember you said you, you just always thought physicalism was sort of normal or something. Is that what you said?

You know, of course everything is physical or something like this was kind of your, your feeling. And then of course when we have to justify it philosophically, this is, this is a whole other thing which we're getting into, but just for those who don't really understand, like what does, what does it really mean to, to think about physicalism, 

Janet Levin: Okay, well, what physicalism is, and again, there are lots of many theories, ways to define it, but what, um, a fairly common way that is sufficiently broad, I think, is to [00:27:00] say that, well, what a physicalist thinks is that what a general Physicalist thinks is that everything in the world, objects, properties, relations, et cetera, are physical or they, they are nothing over and above the physical.

Now. So I've talked about, I've used the word physicalism, I've used the word or the words over and nothing over and above. Now, what is it to be a physical property or object or event or relation? Well, uh, maybe this is begging the question, but, um, many believe that, well, at least for a start, it, includes, I mean, physical being physical includes being, uh, one of these items that are, theorized about, that are mentioned in the physical [00:28:00] sciences, including physics.

Chemistry, biology, maybe psychology or at least certain parts of psychology. and, um, and nothing over and above means that whatever else there is, if you will, ves on the physical, the items mentioned in the physical sciences, what is it to Supervene? Well, basically the idea is that if you have, um, allegedly two different things that if they're really different, they must, be underlayed by a physical difference, no difference without a physical difference.

So that, you know, you may have these things, but um, if there's no physical difference between them, then they're not really two, they're one. So was that understandable? 

Andrea Hiott: Absolutely. It was wonderful. I would just say, uh, before we move on to some more specific [00:29:00] things that this, I guess people will, could fill this in contrast to mental or something like that, or, What, what are we trying to understand when we're trying to understand the mind? Is it this experience that we have that we call thinking? Or how would you sort of define that? Because it sounds like we're trying to figure out something, um, and see if it's physical or not, but maybe we need to talk a little bit about what that, what that is.

Janet Levin: Well, uh, it seems that, uh, people or many people are interested in what it is. I mean, what the nature, if you will, is of mental states. And that includes thinking what goes on when we think, what goes on, when we feel that is we have bodily sensations like pain and, Um, you know, nausea and itching and things like that.

Enjoy ecstasy, if you will. Uh, love, uh, and, um, uh, and what goes on when we have perceptual [00:30:00] experiences, that is when we look out into the world and we see colors and shapes and, everything and other people, the world around us, what goes on when we are in moods. I mean, all these things are supposed to be things that, uh, involve or are located in the mind.

So if you're asking what's interesting about the mind, I think the question is, well, what's going on when all of these things are happening to us or all of these things that we're doing? Because sometimes we do these things, sometimes we, are subject to them. And, um, you all those things I think are interesting to a lot of people.

So what goes on when we're doing all these things? What goes on when we think, how is it that our thoughts can be about items in the [00:31:00] world? I mean, that's the question about representationalism. What on earth? How is it that what goes on in the mind can reach out, can connect up with items in the world, or.

Can it, maybe it can't. So those are the 

Andrea Hiott: Yeah. How do we know that It does, yeah, 

Janet Levin: exactly. That's, 

Andrea Hiott: yeah. These are the sort of questions and then language coming in too. What is that doing? Yeah, 

Janet Levin: yeah, yeah. Uh, and can you represent the world and have thoughts, if you will, without language? I mean, that's a really interesting question too.

well, in any real life situation, I guess you're doing a lot of things at the same time. You're thinking, um, you know, you're wondering, I mean, okay, you're thinking about things.

You are, um, perceiving various things. sometimes your perceptions, uh, get, distracted by your thoughts and you don't notice certain things. How does that work? you are feel, if you're sitting down, you're feeling the [00:32:00] seat, um, beneath you. Um, if you're, um, you know, if, if you have sort of a sore leg or something, then you can notice when you move around.

And so all these things are going on when you are just sort of awake. paying attention, at least to some degree that, you know, you'll notice all these things and you're, oh yeah, well, I'm thinking, but my mind is wandering and, um, look, I, I can't help but sort of look out of the corner of my eye to see if there's something interesting happening over to my right or to my left.

And so is what's going on in all these cases to be, to be characterized in the same way. Are there interesting and important differences between thoughts and sensations and perceptions and, uh, well, it seems that gee, thoughts are mental states that are at least in most cases, [00:33:00] about something either in the world or.

In your own body or, you know about you yourself in general. Whereas sensations and perceptions have this, if you will, this qualitative character. This what it's like as Thomas Nadel says, and has really become the phrase of choice to describe this, what it's like to have those states or to be in those states.

And, um, some people think, oh, well, thoughts are essentially representational. You know, you could have thoughts, without there being any particular, uh, qualitative character to your thoughts. There might not be anything special that, can be characterized as what it's like, you know, to think that Paris is beautiful or that it's sunny outside, you know, that goes beyond sort of picturing being sunny outside, et cetera.

and that, so there's a distinction, a separation between thoughts because they necessarily have [00:34:00] that. Whereas sensations and perceptions, well necessarily, there's something that it's like to perceive or to feel or to have an emotion, et cetera. But these days, um, the separation, the lines of separation have been vanishing.

And many people think that. Perceptions and even bodily sensations are also representational that perceptions, you know, represent, you know, truly or falsely what's out there in the world. And bodily sensations, even pains and experiences of, um, of various other sensations represent what's going on in the body.

Moods can represent certain general states of the world. and um, on the other hand, there are people that are, I mean, an increasing number of people who engage in what they call cognitive phenomenology. That is, that [00:35:00] they, uh, say, uh, that they propose that thoughts not only have sort of this general kind of content that, that this general feeling can be aware of, but that each and every different type of thought has a special what it's like character to it.

So that what it's like to, I don't know what it's like to think that world peace would be good. is, uh, phenomenologically that is the, what it's like to think that is importantly different from what it's like to think that, Universal charity is good. Um, let alone a more mundane thoughts like, oh, I have to go to the grocery store after class.

Or, uh, ooh, I hope my parking meter has it, uh, run out. And so, uh, that there's special, there's a special what it's likeness to have those thoughts. It can't just be reduced to the other kind of pictures that come into your mind when you're thinking [00:36:00] these things. so, um, a lot of people now, propose this, uh, there's a whole book written by Angela Mendel Laci about this, and, um, uh, a lot of people have this view.

And so it's interesting that what seem to be a sharp line between what you can say about thoughts and sensations seems to be, um, ragged at best. 

Andrea Hiott: Yes, absolutely. That's happening in a lot of different fields. I think this kind of, sort of clarifying and blurring at once. 

Janet Levin: Yes. 

Andrea Hiott: Um, but it's, it's kind of interesting because I think a lot of the work that we were talking about that started in the seventies that seemed so oppositional in this way, sort of helped us get to that point where we can handle that weird clarified blurriness or, I don't know, holding the paradox or whatever it is, but you wrote a book called Metaphysics of Mine, a short.

Very well written, sort of understanding of all these things that we're developing, all these different theories that we're developing or that have been developing, what you talk about dualism, you talk about type [00:37:00] identity theory. You talk about functionalism, you talk about ru and monism, TISM, illusionism.

I mean, there's a many that we could talk about here, but maybe we could just pick a few that you think kind of shows us what that oppositional nature was or is, um, that were sort of becoming more clarified about am blur or about at the same time. Also, we should probably talk about the word metaphysics a little bit because you do talk about that in the beginning of the book, and it is metaphysics of mind.

Janet Levin: Mm-hmm. 

Andrea Hiott: Uh, so maybe we start there first. Like, what do you really mean by metaphysics? 

Janet Levin: Well, metaphysics is, uh, I mean, you know, the term metaphysical is used in sort of new age circles to me. Yes, 

Andrea Hiott: absolutely. 

Janet Levin: Something spiritual, which is, you know, maybe that could be one kind of metaphysics. But, um, metaphysical questions are usually taken to be questions about what there is.

and, um, what, That is what, what is there in the world know? Is there basically, I mean, are there basically, just [00:38:00] mental entities? Are there physical entities? what are, properties, um, and what, what is or what are the natures of things? And so to determine their nature, you have to determine not just, or you have to have a theory, not just of what there actually is and what things actually do.

And not just a theory of what, given what we've observed about what there actually is and what those things actually do, that you can use inductive principles, like scientific principles to predict what they will do under different circumstances that could occur. Metaphysical questions at least mostly involve what's possible that is things that might not be scientifically possible, like jumping over the moon, let's say, you know, cows or [00:39:00] people.

Is this metaphysically possible? I mean, is there, some sort of, I mean, is this sort of thing, I mean, it will, I mean, not only may it never happen actually, but it can't happen according to science. But is it possible in some other sense? Oh, and, uh, that is, is it in the nature of human beings not to be able to jump over the moon?

Maybe, maybe not. But that involves thinking about things that go beyond science. now maybe that wasn't a particularly good example. maybe better examples are, uh, whether,

well, I guess we could stick with that one, but it makes metaphysical 

Uh, but it, it may make metaphysical questions, um, seem not so interesting after all. But, um, but I mean, think about what are the basic properties in the world?

and, uh, those things might go beyond [00:40:00] pure scientific, uh, speculation know. what about, and what about time? I mean, is time, something that. Persists. I mean, do present, past and future exist all at once or is there sort of a, a spotlight present so that here, everything that exists ex everything that exists now exists, then you move on to the next time period and only that exists?

Or is it more like a block so that you go and you, um, move from one, uh, temporal period to another, but it all is still here? And what does that mean and how would that work? And once you start thinking about these things, then you, um, think, Hmm, these are interesting questions. Or think about, this, uh, about, um, a, a statue, let's say a statue of [00:41:00] Goliath.

That's, uh, an example that people use a lot. Now it's made of some sort of substance. It's made of clay, let's say. Now, is the statute the same thing as the clay? Now what does that mean? Does it mean that if they're the same thing, then they both have to come into existence and go out of existence at the same time?

So if you, um, crush the statue, or if it starts breaking apart, you've still got the clay, but you don't have the statue. Now I. Is that definitive? Does that mean that they're not the same thing? Well, that depends. Uh, and what happens if you have the clay in the statue, come into existence at the same time that is, you somehow manufacture the clay and it, um, and you mold it into the statute at the very same time, and that, um, and that then the universe gets destroyed.[00:42:00] 

Now are we talking about two things or one thing? And what do you have to do to determine you, you presumably have to do well, what would've happened? And uh, and what gives you justification for saying that it's this rather than that? So things about composition, things about time of, and um, and also moral questions.

At least some of them questions about the self. I mean, is the self just a bunch of, of, um, changing states about what's going on in your mind and body at a particular time that gets strung together? Or is there some sort of substantial self that we can access by introspection at different times? And so getting clear about those questions and trying to figure out what could answer them and arguing one way or the other about them are, I think, better examples of [00:43:00] metaphysical questions.

Know, you don't really have to imagine wild fantasies like, humans jumping over the moon, the moon. But what is the nature of, time self, moral acts? How about free will and determinism? Are those compatible or not? Science isn't gonna tell you. science has to, and you have to find a definition that's acceptable of what it is to have free will and determinism is, well, that's a little bit hard too, but that's usually agreed on what determinism is.

And so is free will compatible with determinism. is, um, do we need. I mean, can we have autonomy, you know, whether or not that's the same as free will. I think it's a little bit different, but can we have autonomy in a deterministic world? so that's similar to the question about whether we can have free will in a deterministic world.

Determinism meaning that, if you [00:44:00] start with some initial conditions, maybe the big bang, maybe something else, um, and you fix the laws of nature, that everything from that point on is necessitated or determined. And that just means that as a matter of natural law, things will happen. Now, is it possible to have free will, even though there is no way that you can get out of the sequence of what will happen?

to put it another way, if I'm sitting here and I decide to raise my hand like that, do I do it of my own free will, even though given the initial conditions and the laws, I, um. Well, this is really, uh, uh, you have to think really hard before you put it this way, or, uh, hard about putting it in a way that doesn't beg the [00:45:00] question.

Even though, um, the laws of nature, would have it that, um, in a lawlike way that I raised my hand, is it still possible that I could have done otherwise? And so there are a lot of people now who are working on the question of what it is to be able to do otherwise and is that compatible with determinants?

So there are lots of metaphysical questions like that, which are 

Andrea Hiott: right. Wonderful. It's just everything we're interested in, in a way even. But really thinking about it, you talk about armchair philosophy. I love it that you actually defend armchair philosophy in a way. Yeah. Um, and you defend science, which is again, that, you know, holding, holding the paradox, which I love about your work.

But why? So, so we were talking about mind and you described that really well, and we were talking about the physical. How does that come into play with all these questions? Why do we need to care about that? And why have we had all these theories that say either like dualism, that they're separate things or like, uh, monism that they're one thing.

Why is that mattered? 

Janet Levin: will [00:46:00] matter to what? 

Andrea Hiott: So trying to talk about metaphysics, I guess, or, um, all those questions you raised the free will, the time, Yeah. Pick, pick any of them, I guess, or it doesn't have to have mattered so much as why has it been such an argument? 

Janet Levin: a about, about mind, well, 

Andrea Hiott: about is mind dualistic is mind monistic physical.

You, you can take your pick of how you might wanna, which maybe just two kind of to loosely cartoon it a little bit. Two different ways that have that one that says everything is, one way and one that says everything is another. 

Janet Levin: Yeah. Um, well, I think that, uh, it's natural at least for some people to think, you know, what is it to be me?

and um, I mean this is the way Descartes starts actually in the first meditation. Um, gee, I've, um, been doubting various things and uh, I'm just wondering what it is. If [00:47:00] I kind of pursue my doubts and pursue my wonderment about what I really am, I can get clear, in fact, have a clear and distinct conception of what it is to be me.

And, uh, so, 

Audio Only - All Participants: which 

Andrea Hiott: is something I think we all have at some point in some way. I don't Do you think you had it first with your philosophy class, or do you remember having that before? where you realize you're someone and you start to wonder what that even means. You become aware of your thoughts and so yeah.

Janet Levin: Yes. And um, and also what, um, what could I lack and still be me and what could I lack and still have thoughts? And so Decart goes through it. Well, do I need, various, I mean, he doesn't quite do this, but many people do. If I, uh, lost an arm or a leg or whatever and still was living, would I still be me?

Well, yeah. Or so he thinks so. He says. And, um, what if, um, what if I were dreaming, [00:48:00] and that the world around me, and even the nature of my body is completely different from the way that I think it is in waking life, would I still be me? And he says yes, because why? Well, because I'd still have my thoughts and, um, some, um, my thoughts and, and at least my memories of perceptions, et cetera.

Now. What if he says, and this is really the, um, the big canon. What if there were an evil genius who devoted all its powers to deceiving me, to making me think that there was a world out there, in all aspects, but that I think a world that's different from the world of my waking life in all aspects.

But, um, nope, but nothing really is the way it seems, even mathematics and even geometry because [00:49:00] you have to take a step to get from one premise to another, into the conclusion in a mathematical or a geometrical proof. And, uh, you know, the evil genius could mess with you and still make you think that you got the right answer.

I mean, this evil genius could do a lot evil demon, there's no day card said. And so he comes to the conclusion then that, um, he can exist. Because, you know, it would still be me, that it would still be Descartes that the evil genius was doing his stuff to his, uh, illusory stuff. Uh, and, um, well then, 

Andrea Hiott: and by me he means this, sense that he can be aware of his own body and his own self that we call sort of thinking and this kind of thing we talk about is inner often.

Janet Levin: Yeah. Yeah. Well, his view was that, the only thing that, um, that um, requires us to [00:50:00] have in order to survive, uh, to exist even under the spell of the evil genius is that we can think, we can have thoughts and, um, thoughts include, perceptions and doubts and being certain and having mental states.

So what we need to exist and all we need to exist, Descartes says, is to have. Mind that is to be a substance. He says, an immaterial su substance that has the capacity to think in this broad way. And so he gets to it by trying to, to shave away in thought, um, all these other things that we may have thought were essential, that is, a body, um, let alone an environment.

he doesn't talk about gender or anything like that. We just can continue to exist as [00:51:00] ourselves as, you know, an entity. as long as we have the capacity to think in this broad way. And so, 

Andrea Hiott: and so that's started to feel like something separate from the physical somehow. Absolutely. Um, as if that's, that's what we've called mental.

Yes. Um, and then, but then the question comes, maybe that is just a kind of some kind of bodily physical thing like, uh, sea fibers firing at some certain moment or, or something like this. So could you talk about that a little bit about how it seemed to be sort of bifurcated, but then that tension of that bifurcation felt like it needed to be solved?

Janet Levin: Absolutely, yes. So, um, so why can't. The, um, so this is, this is where, uh, all this stuff that, that gets picked up by Kripke and Chalmers and Jackson and the whole, uh, zombie, what it's like. Uh, and Thomas Nagel, of course. 

Andrea Hiott: Yeah. Nagel Jackson Chalmers. You talk about all of them in the book. [00:52:00] Uh, who else? Key, you already said?

Yeah. Basically all those are arguments against that. It's just physical. 

Janet Levin: Yes. And they, us and they use, uh, Descartes because Descartes says, look, I can have an idea of myself, my mind in this way as something that is capable of thinking and perceiving and all these things. and I also have a conception of my body, this physical thing that takes up space and is capable of moving.

Now I think really hard about what's physical about me, you know, my body, my ability to move, et cetera, and, uh, you know, my shape, size, et cetera. And I then think very, very carefully about my capacity to think. And there's nothing in those thoughts. And, and also I have Descartes says, a clear and distinct.[00:53:00] 

Perception or conception of both these things? That is, I know enough about them. I have a complete enough thought about them that, um, uh, that, that guarantees that they exist on both sides. Uh, so I mean, anything, um, that, uh, can move, take up space, et cetera, counts as physical. Anything that can think counts as mental and there's no connection that I can find between them.

There's no conceptual connection. There's nothing in my complete thought of the mind and my complete thought of the body that shows how they could be connected at all. I have a full and complete thought of both of them. So because I can conceive in that right way of the one existing without the other and vice versa, then Decart goes through various steps about it, [00:54:00] including that God wouldn't mislead a good God, wouldn't mislead us about these things.

And that, yeah, God is good, even though we make mistakes. Um, so he has to go through in a bunch of different meditations to, uh, get those out of the way. Um, but then he says, well, because of all this, and because I can continue to conceive of the one without, um, well conceive of them both and, and find no connection between them, I can conclude that they are distinct.

So he now is laying the foundation for this view that if you can have certain sorts of conceptions of the one without the other, then they're distinct. And that's what comes up in, um, in the zombie arguments, which I mean, you know, but we'll talk about them in a minute. Frank Jackson's argument, um, cryp argument, [00:55:00] um, 

Andrea Hiott: Frank Jackson is the merry one for those who know the knowledge.

Janet Levin: Yeah. By the way, he's changed his view, you know, 

Andrea Hiott: has he. 

Janet Levin: Yeah, in 1994, he now is a representation. He thinks that, oh yeah, if we recognize that these, um, states that these thoughts represent the world, then um, we can be physicalist. But I don't think, 

Andrea Hiott: well, that's really interesting. I, I did, I did know that, but I thought you meant changed it again or something.

But what's that? What's that? Physicalist? Because that's what, you know, that's, that's your work. Your work is really showing that, and we haven't really brought that out yet in comparison to this, more dualistic notion that we've been describing. 

Janet Levin: Yes. Okay. Well, um, so what, so what a physicalist would say about Descartes view, which is called, not surprisingly Cartesian dualism or substance dualism, um, which holds that there are two distinct kinds of things in the world that is their minds and there are [00:56:00] bodies and, um, you know.

Which minds get connected up with which bodies, you know, you don't know there's an extra thing in the world that is, or a bunch of things, this material stuff and this, um, mental, you know, non-material stuff. I mean, what is it? It's just immaterial, you know, it exists through time, but, um, it doesn't take up space.

Whereas, God, if God exists, is supposed to be, um, eternal. That is, um, it, uh, never begins and sort of always there and will never end. at least that's one conception of the difference between God's mind and, um, human minds that, you know, there's a definite, uh, beginning and there's a definite end.

Uh, but, um. Or at least maybe there's a definite end, but, uh, there's a, at least a beginning. And because, you know, if mind and body are separate, then genie, it's possible that minds could continue to exist, um, [00:57:00] even though the body, uh, decays and ceases to exist. I mean, that's the hope I think of a lot of, 

Andrea Hiott: that's probably part of why these are all so attractive to think about.

Yes. 

Janet Levin: Yeah. And then, so another way that you can get this intuition that minds are separate from bodies is to elaborate on this idea that I'm sure we've all had about being able to look down or to be aware of what's going on, around us, including what's going on with your own body. I mean, you people can imagine, I think that, they can, wash themselves, um, uh, get out of bed and get dressed and things like that.

Or, um, they can, um, watch the themselves or their bodies being, you know, falling off a cliff or getting run over by a car or something like that. And they still can sort of be aware of this. And so doesn't that suggest that minds are distinct from bodies? [00:58:00] Because here seems to be a case in which the mind continues to exist and the body doesn't.

So, I mean, you know, there are lots of things that you could, um. Challenge about this. Um, how exactly are you aware of this? Don't you have to be seeing it? Doesn't that anyway, but um, but there really is this intuition, I think, that yes, you could be observing various things occurring to your body and, um, still continue to exist.

And this hope that, well, if minds can continue without bodies, there's at least a hope for immortality or a longer life, as long as it's the life of the mind. Uh, and so there are these intuitions that really support dualism, but there are problems too that is, you know, how exactly are these, um, minds and bodies connected and, um, and what exactly happens when, you, something happens in your body, which [00:59:00] produces a thought about what's going on in the world, or a pain or some other bodily sensation.

And Descartes is actually really good about neurophysiology, or at least the neurophysiology of the time, until you get to the point where what's going on in the body of thinks something in the mind that is, it produces a thought, it produces a desire, it produces, some sort of, um. Bodily sensation, you know, you stub your toe and um, then you feel pain.

Well, stubbing your toe on Descartes view is a physical state, and it produces something that goes on in this immaterial mind, a mental state. How does that work? How do you get causation between the physical and the mental? And then if you, um, feel pain, then that in turn produces various, [01:00:00] um, movements in the body.

you will say ouch, or you'll hold your, um, toe or you will go to the medicine cabinet and get aspirin or something like that. And so how does that work? So he's very good at the neurophysiology, but then what happens when the mental state or the state of mind is produced is, well, like that famous cartoon where you see, these mathematicians doing this very, very complicated equation on the blackboard.

And then one says, oh, and then a miracle happens. Um, I should have brought that cartoon, but probably many people have seen it. Um, 

Andrea Hiott: yeah, I can show it. 

Janet Levin: Oh, oh, great. Yeah. So you know it obviously. Mm-hmm. Probably everybody else does too. 

Andrea Hiott: Yeah. I think we all have that feeling right, that, that we know our, that physical seems so different From our experience of the physical. Yes. And it's very hard for us to understand how those things could be the same thing, even though of course we see how connected they are all the time. I mean, we go for a run, we're in a different mental state or, or [01:01:00] whatever. It's, it's, it's very hard for us to be experiencing it and, um, not sort of separate it because it's almost as if we're having a kind of conversation with our own self.

And just as when I'm having a conversation with you, I feel like you're different than me. It feels like there's something in me that's different than me, and it wouldn't be reduced to, you know, either side. So this has been such a, you know, hard thing to kind of put into words and figure out, especially when we do get to the science and we're trying to understand, you know, something like the brain and the nervous system and the body, and how, literally how we can study what's really happening when I do have thoughts and feelings.

Janet Levin: yes. So, uh, yeah. So, um, it's interesting because

sometimes when I would start an introductory class in, um, philosophy of mine, I would ask students wh um, whether they thought that, um, that, That all of their, you know, their thoughts [01:02:00] and sensations and things like that were fit well, I think I would ask them, uh, whether they thought that, um,

that neuroscience, that the study of the brain, um, is the only thing that can tell us about the mind. And many people, especially science major, said Yes, of course. and, um, that, that everything that happens in the mind will at least someday in the future, maybe not the near future, but the future will be explained by looking at the brain and maybe even looking at psychology and what psychology says about how certain brain states lead to others.

Andrea Hiott: so they were kind of a iv this, do you think just 

Janet Levin: Well, no, they're physicalist. Okay. They, they think. That is that they think that anything that goes on in the mind can be identified. Well, and maybe they're limited of this, but [01:03:00] of them 

Andrea Hiott: an extreme version, but 

Janet Levin: yeah. Yeah. 

Andrea Hiott: That's really weird because you know, there's all those, I don't know who actually did did those, but I often hear that most people are kind of dualists that they think.

Yeah. So that's interesting that your students set those both sort of go together. There's this intuitive dualism that people assume but don't think about. Mm-hmm. But then when you ask them, will, one day we explain everything by study of the brain and the body. Usually they say yes. 

Janet Levin: Yeah, but these students did the reverse, so, so I would give them just sort of basic descartes.

Yeah. Well, you know, can't you imagine that, things are going on? In the mind, um, without there being, some sort of physical correlate of it. And then, you get these experiments, these thought experiments about, well, couldn't you be, perceiving, uh, couldn't you be perceiving something that doesn't exist?

Or could you be standing above the world? And, um, [01:04:00] and um, and looking down at, you know, I mean, looking down at, of course, as being aware somehow of your body and even more, uh, so that's the idea of being able to think about minds physically without bodies. But it seems that the real clincher of the argument that really grabs students, um, is the version that is put forward by Chalmers in the zombie argument.

And, um. Jackson in the knowledge argument that is, couldn't you imagine that you've got, um, all of this information about the brain states of some individual and, um, all of the effects of what goes on in the world on those brain states and the effects of the, um, interaction of all those brain states on bodily [01:05:00] movement?

Couldn't, you know, or at least have a good, um, justified belief that all that stuff was going on in a creature, and yet they don't have any conscious experience that is the lights are on, or maybe the lights aren't on and nobody's home that is. Couldn't you imagine what Chalmers calls a zombie and that is a creature that is just like a human being, maybe just like you, uh, neurophysiologically, but doesn't have any conscious experience, that there's nothing that it's like to be that creature.

Can you imagine that? Now some people, you know, are recalcitrant and say no, uh, um, others say, and you know, they're, I think, well anyway, we don't have to put a label on them, but a lot of people say, yeah. [01:06:00] I don't have any guarantee, even if I look very, very assiduously at what's going on in their brain and body and even what's going on in their brain and body and the world around them that is having some sort of impact on their perceptual systems and thus in their brain, eventually, I can imagine or conceive of that all being there.

But there's no consciousness, there's nothing that is like in Thomas Nagels words to be that creature. I won't say person, but I will say creature Now that grabs a lot of people, and once you get them into thinking that way, it's really hard to, uh, get them back down the ladder to physicalism. So it's very interesting.

Maybe I should, I 

Andrea Hiott: think it might also be because we have experiences of, you know, like when you're driving and you're, you don't seem [01:07:00] to be sort of aware of what you're doing or, I mean, there's, we, there's contrast to us that I think get a, like that zombie thing speaks to in a really, in a way that's not actually what's meant by the zombie argument, but that makes us so, oh yeah, I could, I could imagine that.

Um, but how do you counter that as a physicalist or as a methodological naturalist, which I think is what you might call yourself. Yeah. Um, how do you, what do you, how do you deal with that? 

Janet Levin: Well, um, um, there are a number of different ways, and they all also come from critics of Descartes back in the 17th century.

That one is, um, something that Gu Sendi said, which is, you know, um, you think that you are conceiving or imagining, um, your mind without. Your body, um, that is, you think you have a clear and distinct idea of each of these [01:08:00] things and that, um, they're not connected and that that's gonna be a guarantee that they're distinct.

But really maybe you don't have such a clear idea of your mind. Um, maybe the mind is just a bunch of very, very ethereal, physical, um, entities that are sort of floating around and you just don't, it seems like there's nothing physical there, but it's just that they're sort of too small to recognize or you don't pay enough attention.

And so you're really wrong that you have a clear and distinct idea of your mind and um, also of your body and that they're not connected. Okay? So that's one thing. That, um, people said, and a lot of people say that now too, you really aren't conceiving of a mind without a body. Uh, and, um, and or in the zombie case, you really don't have the mental capacity to think about all of this [01:09:00] physical stuff at once.

And if you did, then you'd recognize that, oh yeah, of course that thing is conscious. Now that doesn't really seem like a very plausible, uh, argument, but some people try to make it along with Ga sendi now, or no, on the other hand, another critic of Descartes in the 17th century said, well, uh, there are obvious counter examples to your claim that, um, you can, if you can conceive of things as existing apart, then, um, they're not, they can't be the same thing.

And, um, I mean, he gave an example of, um, um, and, uh, a triangle. You know, I, I saw Alis triangle. He says, see, look, you can conceive an of an, I saw Alis triangle without conceiving of the Pythagorean theorem, but um. Uh, but any isly triangle, um, [01:10:00] obeys the Pythagorean Theorem, um, or, uh, any sort of geometrical example like this and Descartes responds, well, you don't have a complete idea of the triangle and the theorem.

If you did, you'd recognize that anything that satisfies the theorem has to be a triangle of that sort. So you really have been deficient in getting a good enough idea what counts as a good enough idea. Well, that's also left a little bit unclear, but that's what, uh, a lot of Descartes critics said, um, back then.

And then a number of also of critics also said, look, uh, this view is kind of a crazy view because it doesn't account for how it could be that the physical stuff has an effect on the mental stuff. How the mental stuff [01:11:00] can cause events going on in the physical world because that kind of causation, especially causation of physical stuff from the mental, just violates things like the conservation of energy, which people were, um, thinking about at the time.

So that it would be very, very difficult to explain how there can be causal connections between the mind and the body. And we all believe that there are, that is if you stub your toe, you're gonna feel pain. And if you feel pain, that's gonna produce effects on your body, just as we said. So causation makes it really hard.

Andrea Hiott: Okay. So, but what about, um, like conceptual or phenomenal concepts I'm thinking about now, or, or how, um, you're usually, I, I'm not sure if you're type B physicalist, um, still or what, but there's this, you know, the theory that's relying on the phenomenal concepts. [01:12:00] Could you talk about that a little bit here and how, you know, maybe we, um.

Try to explain something like red or pain or what you're talking about through a ba, a brain state, um, and maybe how these can't actually be, how, how would you say it? I don't know. known through conceptual analysis or something like that, till sort of after the fact. Even though they're happening as one thing.

Janet Levin: Yes. Okay. Well, um, people say, look, I'm having, um, a feeling, a sensation that is, um, I'm, uh, perceiving red, or I'm having an after image of yellow orange. That was always smart's example. JJC smart, uh, and um, or he was 

Andrea Hiott: one of the sort of founding 

Janet Levin: yes people 

Andrea Hiott: in this, 

Janet Levin: of the, of the type identity theory.

Um, but, um, gee, so, so I'm having these, this feeling and, um, I [01:13:00] also, I mean here, think of it this way. Think that you are sitting somewhere and you've got some sort of brain scan attached, and so you can see on the screen what's going on in your brain. Okay. I mean this is probably relevant, more relevant to Jackson's argument, but it can be used, um, as an illustration of all of them I think.

So you are seeing what's going on in your brain and you are feeling what you're feeling, you are aware of your experience. Okay, so I am, uh, seeing red, so there's various things going on in my, um, visual cortex. There's sort of cone stimulation, et cetera. You know, various things that, um, explain what goes on when you see color.

and yet there doesn't seem to be any connection. Um, if all that stuff up there had produced a sensation of green, you [01:14:00] know, you wouldn't, you wouldn't be able just from feeling this or experience this and looking at that, that, there, that, that, that sensation had to occur given that this stuff going on in the brain had to occur is occurring.

So in that way, very graphically you can explain this intuition that there can be the, um, experience of one thing that seems to be completely cut off from your perceptual experience of, or your knowledge, if you will, of what's going on in you right now. So that's pretty stark. So, that I think is a good argument that there really isn't, um, any way that you can spell out the, what's involved in, per se, in feeling like you're having experience of red or feeling pain or whatever.

And, um, [01:15:00] or adding more information to what's going on in your brain and, um, determining that, oh yeah, there really is a connection after all, a conceptual connection. But, um, you can also say, okay, well I can't do that, but why do I need there to be a conceptual connection, uh, between my ideas of the one and the other in order for those ideas to be picking out the very same thing?

Why do I need this? And a lot of people say we don't, but, if you wanna say that more generally, then you have to, well, you don't have to, but, um, you can say that, that, um, uh, it seems like you have to say it for all sorts of other things. I mean, again, if we had more time, we could go into more detail about this.

Andrea Hiott: Yeah, there's just so many things we could possibly get into here. We're just glossing over it in a way. But, [01:16:00] 

Janet Levin: but, um, I. My view, and it's the view of many so-called type B materialists, um, let me say a type A materialist says that, okay, well, um, we have an idea or a conception of what's going on in our experiences and then what's going on in our bodies.

Um, but if we thought more carefully about what was going in our bodies or, and, or thought more carefully about what's going on when we're having pain, et cetera, then we would see that there really is a connection. I mean, after all, think about what goes on when we feel pain. Yeah, there's this sort of alci, uh, feeling to it, right?

Uh, it's an aversive state. Uh, we want to be out of it or you know, if we're normal, we wanna be out of it. Uh, and, um, and. [01:17:00] So it gives rise to another state, this desire. And, um, we, um, can compare it to other states that we've had, other experiences that we've had and differences and similarities. So there really is a lot of information in our idea of what it's like to be in pain that we're glossing over.

And even though looking strictly at what's going on in the brain, might not, um, give us more information that will be relevant to the mind. But if you go a little bit more general, uh, about what's going on in the brain and take it up a step and say, oh, well there are these generalizations about what's going on in the brain that have psychological significance about how it is that having certain beliefs and desires produces a behavior of certain sort, then you can say that, well, if you get more specific about the [01:18:00] psychology, then you'll see that there is a connection after all.

And that's what Deni says. and a number of people too. And I used to think that too. That, um, if you could get enough functional information that is information about the, um, way that these brain states causally interact to produce behavior then, and you get more information about what's going on when you're having a feeling of pain, then you'll be able to see that they're connected.

But, um, now I have changed my mind and I think that, well, it's probably, it's unlikely that there will be, um, a conceptual connection between, your, um, experience of, or you know, your thought about your experience of what's going on in the mind and what's going on even, um, when you get these, um, more higher level generalizations about what's going on in the brain.

But, um, but there [01:19:00] is something special about this, um, phenomenon of separation, conceptual separation here, and that it is that mind body connections, mind body identities, even though it seems like there is a lack of connection, conceptual connection are a special case that is in these cases of mind. You get this idea of what is going on.

In your mind what's happening when you have sensations, you get it through introspection. That is, you are, well the term looking in doesn't really get it because looking in sounds awfully, um, no bodily, you know, you're looking 

Andrea Hiott: mm-hmm. 

Janet Levin: You are aware of a certain kind of event that's going on in you that is, you can pick [01:20:00] it out as that, that, and so there's really no information there that you need to have other than that it, your, um, conception that is demonstrates some sort of something going on in you now, why can't that be something physical?

There's no connection between your conception of what's going on in your brain and the, um, conception that picks out in a way that demonstrates it, points to it. Um, that goes on in your mind. But so what? You get that. Pointing through introspection. And that is, um, a, a special subjective, if you will, way of pointing to what's going on in [01:21:00] you.

And given that there really isn't anything to your conception of these mental states beyond picking it out, demonstrating it, and then being able to recognize it, if it occurs again, then there, there's nothing to be that has to be conceptually connected. 'cause it's just a pointer. And introspection is the only way of getting information about something that's substantive that you can do by pointing in this way now somehow.

Andrea Hiott: So, oh, go ahead. 

Janet Levin: Yeah, no, no, go ahead. Because somehow I think that could be clearer. 

Andrea Hiott: Well, I was going to say, is it, is it just the same as when we do a science experiment so that we're, we're then, we're then noticing as much as we can about whatever we've set up. It's not that we're noticing every single thing and you know, there's many different scales we could look at it on, and of course we take that as physical and when we're doing it with our own [01:22:00] bodies, it seems somehow different.

But is it just sort of the same kind of thing? We're, we're also, you know, noticing as much as we can, and of course we could look at different scales or with different technologies and, and notice it in different ways, but that idea that it's somehow of a different substance, um, because we're doing it with our own bodies is not necessary.

Um, or how would you push back on that or, or play with that idea? 

Janet Levin: Um, so you're saying that well, in lots of different. Um, scientific experiments, you find out more by doing the experiment and looking more deeply at what's going on in the relevant, um, domain. Um, and that you have no problem in saying, oh yeah, well, a stream of photons.

Uh, that's what lightning is. You know, even though lightning or, you know, common sense concept of lightning is so different from stream of photons or that Oh yeah. That stuff in that bucket that, um, you [01:23:00] know, that water, uh, we've got this notion of what water is and then we find out that, oh my God, there's what's really, or what's at least mostly in that bucket is a bunch of H2O molecules.

And we have no problem in saying, oh yeah, okay, well there's no conceptual connection, but, we have no problem in thinking that, oh yeah, water, that's stuff that we've got this, uh, this slushy stuff, um, is, uh, H2O, it's nothing but H2O, 

Andrea Hiott: is nothing. But I mean, yeah, and, and we're sort of doing that something similar with our own.

Understanding of what we're calling our thinking and so on. We're, we're trying to understand it better. I don't think it takes away the mystery of, you know, what's in like, that there's something in the bucket. Whether, whatever it is, is still kind of amazing and crazy if you really think about it. I think it's very similar to our own experience.

it's, it's pretty wild and I understand that we wanna think of it as something ccra like different, but if you [01:24:00] think, I'm just saying, if you think about, you know, what we're looking at in the world, you can also think what, you know, you can have that same kind of awe about it. and you can also have that same kind of understanding that I was just trying to express and that you were explaining so well of it's just H2O or what or whatever.

Janet Levin: Yeah. Well, um, but there's been pushback about that too because, uh, many people say, and um, a lot of the early identity theorists also said, look, saying that, having an after image of orange is just, um, having a certain brain process. I mean, scientists do that all the time. They say that well being a streak of lightning is just being on a stream of photons.

Um, being a bucket of water is just a matter of, um, having, of being composed of H2O o molecules. But the pushback from people like. Crip and, um, Chalmers and Jackson is that, well, the reason that we can say these things about [01:25:00] water and H2O or lightning in a stream of photons is that, um, there are, that what we mean, I mean all this is contentious, but there is a distinction that they point to whether or not it makes a difference in, in the end that, um, gee, when we talk about water, we are talking about, you know, the stuff that comes out of the faucets, or, um, fills our lakes and streams.

And so, what makes it seem as though it's possible that, um, there could be stuff that fills our lakes and streams that is not H two that, sorry, what makes it seem possible? That water, you know, that stuff, couldn't be H2O is that we associate water, we mean by the term water, more or less that the stuff that comes out of our faucets, et cetera.

Now, it may be true that [01:26:00] there could be stuff that comes out of our faucets that's not H2O but that doesn't mean that water, that stuff. Isn't H2O you turn on the faucet and there's gin or there's something that's, you know, has the same effects on that population that water does, but it's made of a different kind of chemical compound.

there could be those situations, those possibilities, but no real possibility that that stuff, is at H2O given that we have done experiments and found out that it's H2O I mean, unless we, it turns out that we are wrong about the science. 

Andrea Hiott: Yeah, there would be, I mean, we already talked to an hour and a half, so I won't try and push back on all that because we could get into 5 million threads. But a lot of that could, could be about language in terms of like what a neuroscience is often called, behavior, cognitive problem, where we've named something and then we're trying to find what we've named and, and all of this kind of stuff.

But to try to get it to a really general level just for [01:27:00] people like, so we don't have to go into all the details. We were thinking about mind as something that's not, you know, able to be known as physical things. And you think that everything is physical. So like if we try to just think about this in the most general way, how can we, would, would it just be that you think we can always, if we had enough sensory, uh, skill and technology somehow understand anything through the body, I guess you might say the brain, but, um, maybe you also think the body too, or the whole central nervous system, I don't know.

But, um, that, that those aren't necessarily like some kind of, you know, separate realms that cannot be, that are not in contact, but rather there's something that are, is continuous. Uh, is that fair? Or how would you kind of, you know, what would you, how would you explain that better for people? 

Janet Levin: Okay. Well briefly the idea is that, um, all thoughts and perceptions and bodily [01:28:00] sensations, are nothing but.

physical or, uh, physical states. Now, by physical I might include not just what's going on in the brain, but what is going on, I mean, in the rest of the body. I mean, there are various people now including Antonio Demasio, um, whose, um, has this Neuro Neuroscience Institute at USC now who, who think that it's important for there being conscious experience that there are certain events occurring in the endocrine system of all things.

Who would've known? Uh, I mean, I don't know if it's true, but, uh, but that there are a lot of other things going on in the body that are required and besides, um, the brain being uncertain. Uh, states or processes going on in the brain that are required for consciousness, that there are certain ways that, um, that various parts of the brain that are associated with emotions have to [01:29:00] be involved.

And so, um, you need to have all that stuff going on in order for there to be conscious experience. So my view is that if that's true, uh, then whatever is supposed to be going on to have conscious experience can be explained by appeal to what's going on in the brain, in the endocrine system, and maybe what's going on in the world.

And so all of that stuff, physical needs to be taken into account, but no matter how much information of that sort you have, and, um, and no matter how much and how, how closely these events may be correlated with these feelings, these feelings of what it's like to be in pain, to be perceiving red, to be thinking that Paris is beautiful, whatever that is, that is not going to emerge from your [01:30:00] knowledge of all the stuff that's going on.

It's still going to seem separate. And this is where the phenomenal concept strategy comes in. That is the idea. Of this so-called strategy. I mean, it's called strategy in sort of a disparaging way. Uh, but I think it's on the right track anyway, that, because that there's a special case where you don't have to be able to see that all of this information, that determines what conscious experiences you have cannot, um, be, uh, connected conceptually with your experiences with the, what it's like, your knowledge of what it's like.

But the reason is that you get a special set of concepts, a special way of picking out items in your brain that is in, that is introspection. You know, you are a subject, you have experiences, so do [01:31:00] I. Um, because you can focus your mind on, you know, from the inside, if you will, on these states from the inside.

you can get a panoply of information, if you will, about um, what. Is going on in you, what it feels like to do things. But because you've got this, I mean, I don't wanna say it's a special sense because it's not like there's some, um, area in the brain that underlies introspection, but you know, you can point to various things and once you point to them and you point to a bunch, you can compare them and contrast them in terms of what it's like to have them.

Um, but because you get this from, um, introspection then and interest and your own mental states are the only things that you can be picking out by introspection, then, um, you [01:32:00] have this special way of determining what's going on. You use your phenomenal concepts. That is the concepts or the way of thinking about your self, what's going on inside that comes from introspection.

So every, would 

Andrea Hiott: you be willing to think of that as a skill that we develop or as some something like? Um, 

Janet Levin: well that's really interesting because there's a lot of stuff about skills and, um, I think that you can get better and better at I identifying different, um, things that are going on. but by practice, I mean, think about what goes on when you, um, take a wine tasting class.

That, gee, things that seemed, you know, um. It's these liquids, these wines that tasted, eh, basically the same. Yeah. You know, this one's a little bit sour. This one's sweet. Um, this one kind of gives [01:33:00] me a tingling, but you can learn to, uh, differentiate these things by, um, you know, uh, by. By introspect and you by thinking about, oh yeah, now what are these tastes?

I mean, are there differences, similarities you might learn by paying attention to, um, find differences and similarities that you didn't expect before? And you can get better at that too. I mean, and there are people who are particularly trained in, um, taste and smell distinctions because they can be quality checks for people who, um, manufacture these things.

Or you can have people who are very, very attuned to differences in color to recommend to interior decorators. You know, what exactly, what exactly the shade of off-white you should use in this room. And, you know, I would never be able to tell. And so, yes, there are ways in which you can get better and better [01:34:00] at identifying various ways things seem to you, ways things appear, sensations, et cetera.

Andrea Hiott: Yeah. That's, that's wonderful. 'cause that's the kind of noticing, and actually I was thinking of this in connection to some of the arguments you make, which we don't have to go into it a lot, but like, why don't we just do only experimental philosophy, forget all this, um, thought experiment stuff. And I was thinking about that, those, and if we really take you seriously, that being a kind of skill or physical, um, that critical thinking is actually doing something.

Much more powerful than we've given it credit for in a way. And I, I seem to hear that a bit in your kind of defense of the armchair philosopher, but I'm, I don't know if I'm going too far with that, but what does that bring up for you? Uh, 

Janet Levin: well, um, what I think that the armchair philosopher can do is to take certain counter examples seriously.

Uh, that is, gee, well, Well, there's, you know, the old case of, you know, knowledge. I mean, [01:35:00] can knowledge be something other than justified true belief and, you know, that's been chewed over for such a long time, or the trolley problem. I mean, it, we can get 

Andrea Hiott: Yeah.

And get are cases and all this. I really mean it in a more general sense, just that philosophy of that nature of, of thought experiments and, and you know, some people would just say it's all pointless and, you know, we just do experiments and think about the science. And I know you're, you're coming from Hawaiian and naturalism and you yes, you do.

You know, you hold that as that's, that's important. But on the other hand, there's something about critical thinking, which if we really take seriously that this is a physical. Process or even a skill, which I know I'm pushing a bit here, but an embodied sort of, you know, brain activity. Then it does seem that it gets even more important that we do continue doing things like that because it's doing something experimental within itself that is physical.

Does that make sense at all? 

Janet Levin: Yeah, I think that does, I think that's a good way to put it. That, um, my [01:36:00] problem and, you know, you, you, um, mentioned my, um, critical review of Edward Cherie book. I mean, he's great, actually mean he does Oh 

Andrea Hiott: yeah, yeah, he's great. 

Janet Levin: But, um, but he just, uh, it's just such an impoverished view of what philosophers can do.

I mean, he, yeah, the cover of his book is really interesting because he shows somebody in an armchair, um, you can see their, their back and they're up against a wall. And, uh, you know, that there are just things that are beyond the limits of philosophy, which is the name of his book. Uh, but, um, I think that he stops too soon that there are things that, um, philosophers can actually work out that are things about possibility that are interesting.

And sometimes the things about possibility that, um, these thought experiments give rise to not only can quell the tickle that are wondering [01:37:00] about the world and what things could be and what's possible and what things must be, um, not only does it do that, but it can also. Um, get people to reexamine some of the empirical evidence.

Say, you know, it seems like there might be a distinction here that you've missed. And so it can affect, uh, empirical research too. Now, um, the, the book that I've been sort of trying to write and been working on for a long time, it's gone through very, very, uh, very, very various, um, uh, incarnations. I've called tentatively the armchair near the window now.

Andrea Hiott: Oh, beautiful. That's beautiful. 

Janet Levin: Yes. So 

Andrea Hiott: I love that title. 

Janet Levin: So I could have a matchy picture of the armchair, but rather than 

Andrea Hiott: by the window instead of the wall. 

Janet Levin: Yeah. Yeah. And 

Andrea Hiott: so I think there's something to that. I mean, you know, and it's even actually in that spirit, if, I'm not sure if we were on camera yet where I [01:38:00] was talking to you about the rigorous ambiguity that I like in your work.

I think, you know, you could even look at those views in that way and Yeah. But I mean, that would be a lot to go into, go into his book. But I guess I wanna try to bring it like to, to a bit of a close. Would you be willing to do the Molly? No. Uh, question another time, because now we already had almost, 

Janet Levin: yeah, 

Andrea Hiott: like if we start it now, we're gonna need an hour.

So maybe we could just do a short one just on that together. What do you think? 

Janet Levin: Sure. Um, do it another, but, okay. And also India. I mean, I know that there were these deeper questions that you didn't get into and I spent too much time, so if you wanna do the whole thing over again, I can do that. 

Andrea Hiott: I love this.

I don't wanna do it over again. I think this is actually exactly the right thing for the audience, but for me personally, I really have more things I wanna talk to you about. And I know for like, um, some part of the audience, they, they'll be really interested in those things too. So I say I still have a few more questions just, you know, to tie it up, but then I think [01:39:00] what if we do kind of special one where we just talk about those really specific things for me and for the kind of nerds of the podcast?

What do you think? And we can do it later in the, in the spring, but 

Janet Levin: Okay. That sounds good. Yeah. But just one thing about the window, I mean, the idea being that, um, well if you pay attention to what's going on and what's going on in the sciences, then you, what you take to be possibilities you might reconsider.

And, um, and then, and you see. But how does that work? Well, and this gets into an issue that you began to ask about in the questions that you gave me, but we really didn't talk about how do you change your mind and what does it take to effect either a slight change in the way that you think about things or even a wholesale change.

But the idea here is that a lot of what's going on in these. Thought experiments is that you are [01:40:00] willing to include or, um, not willing to include certain cases as part of the category that you're thinking about. Knowledge free will, moral action, autonomy, um, and, um, and so, so information about what's going on in the world and what's going on in the sciences and even, um, information about how other people are thinking about things can either have a direct impact or just somehow seep in and, um, change your, um, inclination to categorize things in certain ways.

I mean, I think that's what happened with same-sex marriage. I mean, you know, people were against it and then they were realized that oh yeah, a lot of people that they know and love, uh, who are um, uh, are in a same [01:41:00] sex relationship would like to get married, you know, the way we heterosexuals or whatever do and wanna have families and, you know, why think that there's something wrong with that.

And so all of a sudden, um, people don't, um, limit their category of, um, legitimate marriages too. Um, different sex of, so, uh, um, 

Andrea Hiott: wonderful. That's exactly what I was thinking of when I was asking those questions. Um, yeah, exactly. And I was even thinking about you being the first, I think you were the first tenure track, uh, woman philosopher at, um, at USC and these kinds of things.

Is that related to, or that kind of

shift in? I mean, the more we sort of notice and experiment and consider and look out the window and so on, if it's done in a rigorous way, which is that kind of precise ambiguity that I'm talking [01:42:00] about, um, then there are other possibilities we, we can notice and, and, and be able to handle, which is is part of it too.

Janet Levin: Yeah. Well, um, I just remember that once, um, uh, somehow, um, an uncle of mine, actually an uncle of my husband's, um, met, um, a friend of mine, you know, a very who, a woman who looked really glamorous and he said to her, um, you don't look like a philosopher. And she said, well, you know, this is what philosophers look like.

Wonderful. I love it. It reminded me of, of Gloria Steinem, um, who when said, when she turned 50, said, well, you know, you don't look 50. And she said, well, this is what 50 looks like. And, uh, I think that once you start getting used to this, then, I mean, uh, remember there was a joke that I, well, not a joke that, uh, a riddle that I heard as a kid [01:43:00] where, um, oh, this, um, uh, this, uh, a father and a son were, um, in a car accident.

And, um, the father, uh, was, uh, or I don't know, the father died and the kid was taken to, um, the hospital to a surgeon, and the surgeon looked and said, my God, that's my son. And so people were saying, how could that be, you know, the father? But then, you know, women are surgeons. I mean, nobody thinks, uh, I don't think anybody could think that there was a, a puzzle or a paradox or something to think about more than once there.

Uh, and you know, that comes from, uh, noticing things about the world and, um, accommodating and, you know, changing your, um, credences accordingly. Now, some people won't, some people won't look. So you could [01:44:00] be staring out the window, but just purposely focusing your attention straight ahead and people are doing that more these days.

And one question, so there are two questions. One is how do you change your mind? And, but a prior one these days it seems is, um, how can you get yourself into a position where you are willing to change your mind? What goes into that? What do you have to give up and what do you gain? So 

Andrea Hiott: yeah, I think you have to be very strong.

I think that's one reason I would argue for critical thinking and for philosophy of the nature of the so-called armchair, as long as you're by a window, because it does teach you how to hold tensions and how to understand how to hold things that might not be resolvable. Um, which is hard, but does open up the world.

I mean, if anything it, it gives you more windows and it lets you go outside those windows, which I think can be very hard for people. Right? We, we [01:45:00] sometimes we'd rather not know there's a whole other way of being in the world or other worlds to experience because we don't know how to handle it. 

Janet Levin: Yeah. And it might, uh, um, and identity group identity.

Really plays a big role here too. I think that um, if you even look elsewhere, then you're betraying your group and that seems to be more and more the case. 

Andrea Hiott: That's a good point too. And we get a lot of more peer pressure of don't dare look out the window, you know, because, you know, and there's a lot of that, which is very, never ends well.

But just before we go, can you tell me just a little bit, have things changed? I mean, because you were in this exciting moment in philosophy for us. You were philosophy nerds and you were one of the first women you were, you know, for me that's a really amazing thing. And I just wonder, um, like if you have anything you wanna share about that before we go, if things have changed or, um, if it was, you know, not the way [01:46:00] I'm, I'm imagining it, uh, I just, I was thinking about your friend Tara, Tamara Horowitz, I think too, for some reason.

I just wanna mention her because I know she was at MIT with you, I think. And she became the first 

Janet Levin: at Chicago too. 

Andrea Hiott: Hmm? 

Janet Levin: She was at Chicago too. We were, she 

Andrea Hiott: was at Chicago too. Oh wow. You knew her that long. Oh wow. 

Janet Levin: Yes. And I continued to know her because she, um, got a job at University of Pittsburgh and became chair of the department.

And my mother lived in Pittsburgh, so every time my mother, I'd visit her too. And um, 

Andrea Hiott: yeah, that's what I wanted to mention because she was the first, I mean, Pittsburgh is a big, you know, school for US philosophers too. And she was the first. Female chair there. So I just, I just wanna mention that 'cause I want people to know that you were there and she was there and these things feel important to me.

But, um, I guess from your perspective, it, maybe it was just life, but if there's anything you would like to share about that or, uh, just anything at all about any of that that you might wanna share with people that, that you feel Yeah. Should be [01:47:00] part of the record somehow. 

Janet Levin: Yeah. Um, well, I, I would like, you know, people, uh, well, I, I just, she, uh, you know, she was, she was a very close friend and, um, she died, you know, of a brain tumor, um, much too young before she was 50.

So, uh, that was because I just thought that, you know, she was doing some interesting things and would go on and do a lot of interesting things philosophically, but, you know, I didn't care about philosophy. I just, um, um, 

Andrea Hiott: yeah, 

Janet Levin: I just, uh, you know, she was a friend and you lost a friend became part of, of our family.

'cause my mother would visit her a lot in the hospital and things like that. So, um, um, but, um, I, you know, I was just feeling, uh, that, um, I mean when I gave that lecture that, you know, I wanted to acknowledge her because, you know, she could have given one too if she'd lived. So, um, so I just wanted to mention her, but, um, I'm 

Andrea Hiott: really glad you did.

Janet Levin: [01:48:00] Yeah. But in terms of, um. Of changes. There are more women in philosophy they had been assigned to, um, well, not assigned to, but they were, I guess, encouraged to pick so-called softer subjects such as, uh, you know, ethics and, um, you know, moral philosophy, value philosophy. But, um, now there have been a number of different changes.

One is that there are lots more women in all these fields. Um, and in the Soviet, you know, hard core, you know, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, logic, um, philosophy of science, and two, that, um, a lot of the so-called soft, uh, subjects like ethics, moral philosophy, have become very technical, um, maybe, uh, to their detriment in some cases.

Uh, [01:49:00] I mean, all across the board, sometimes people are substituting, have technical results for things that really have philosophical interest. I think it might be going in the other direction now, but also, um, so-called, um, uh, fringe, uh. Studies like, uh, like, um, work about, um, women and gender and, um, and, um, race, which were, oh yeah, these are just very specific.

They don't have general important philosophical consequences. People are taking 'em a lot more seriously because first of all, it opens up. Different, um, questions, uh, not just about these particular issues. I mean, are there intrinsic differences between women and men? Um, are genders binary? Um, are there any physical.

Properties or [01:50:00] psychological properties that, um, are different for different races, you know, all those things. Not only does it open those questions, but it makes you reconsider certain other more general questions about, um, you know, the way things could be and even ways of characterizing the way they are.

And so all that is important, and something that you asked me about, um, with respect to changes, I think is really important too. Good for women and good for men, which is that now, I mean, when I came to MIT, uh, there, I, I knew nothing really, and, um, there weren't any, uh, courses except for, um, a pro seminar run by Richard Cartwright that you had to take.

But, um, uh, and you know, he did, uh, every class that he did, uh, was, uh, formalized in certain ways. And for example, um, I [01:51:00] had to prove Plato's third man argument using Zulo Frankl set theory. I think I did it. I can't remember how. 

Andrea Hiott: Wow. 

Janet Levin: It probably wasn't very elegant. Uh, but, um, but so, 

Andrea Hiott: but you did it so. 

Janet Levin: Hmm. Um, and so, you know, what you were required to do was pretty minimal, and then you got no instruction in teaching and I was thrown into teaching an undergraduate class by myself.

Um, and there really wasn't very much guidance. Um, you had to, to take general examinations, but you could choose the topics very narrowly. I think I did one on Hume's epistemology, which, you know, that doesn't really, um, provide, uh, a survey of knowledge of epistemology. But in any case, now. I believe, I mean, at USC and I think at other places too, when students come [01:52:00] in, they have, um, a fairly set number of requirements that they have to do at every stage.

You've got people looking at your work and making suggestions. Um, I mean, some people think that this is terrifying, but we've managed to soften it in ways that they think mostly are just gonna be helpful. Um, and so, um, you learn how to do these things early on. Um, you get guidance, you know, real guidance from faculty members.

Um, each student gets assigned a mentor for the first couple years. Then you get, um, advisors for your preliminary exam and then your thesis. There are dissertation seminars, there are practice job talks. And, um, you also, um, not only are assigned as TAs to classes where, you know, you sit in the class and you learn the stuff and then you discuss it [01:53:00] with the students.

But there's special teaching seminars where you learn how to teach. Uh, so, uh, 

Andrea Hiott: that's a big difference. That's a very good difference. It's actually great you point that out. 'cause I think it's something we take for granted in a way. 

Janet Levin: Yes. And it really wasn't that way. And it's so much better than it is that way.

And there are also, you know, independent, you know, philosopher, I mean, I, I just mean. I don't mean they're independent, they're, they're teaching somewhere, but they get together, um, get a certain amount of funding to give, um, sort of mentoring seminars for, uh, women at certain stages. Louise an does a lot of this work and Jen Dowling and Sally Hassinger and, um, that they get these, um, women in early positions, you know, they've just gotten hired, their assistant professors and they get people to share their work [01:54:00] and to help each other.

And the hope is that the relationships will go on after the couple months that they work on these things. And, um, they get feedback from more experienced people, not just about their work, but about what to expect, um, at each stage of their progression, what the pitfalls are, what some of the, um, um, mansplaining if you will, that they're going to encounter at various physicians.

And so that's really good. And, um, there are also, uh. Seminars for, uh, younger for graduate students, and these are ones that are usually done in the university. USC has an informal thing where, you know, people can learn how to ask questions. A lot of women, I think, used to be, um, afraid to ask questions because usually somebody would, um, ask a sort [01:55:00] of bombastic question that would, I mean, after a, a colloquium speaker that would kind of veer the conversation in one way, which might not be the most interesting way.

And so we at USC, um, always allow graduate students to ask questions first before faculty come. And, um, people at least are taught informally. Look, um, you might be afraid to ask a question, but you know. A lot of people do, and maybe they, um, don't seem so great after the fact, but just ask a lot of questions and so you'll have some good ones and those will be the ones that are remembered and that here's a way to go about it.

And so, um, being able to express yourself takes a lot of different forms. You don't have to be so aggressive. You don't have to be the first person to put up your hand. You can still formulate something and be confident that it will be interesting enough to be answered. And so people are given [01:56:00] explicit instructions about this.

So the idea that you're innately good at this, um, or are a complete failure just isn't right. You know, you have to wait sometimes for people's, um, uh, confidence to build and that, um, what they're, um, good at can come out and the best way to think about this thing. And I think we are starting to do that.

SC is to, you know, we spend a lot of time, um, choosing an entering class. You know, it takes days and days of, of, um, meetings and uh, um, and deliberation. And so you have to be confident that you picked a good class, that these are good students. And so what you have to do is to figure out how to get them to, um, uh, uh, to fulfill the potential that you, yourself noticed and chose them for.

You [01:57:00] did a good job. That is we, you did a good job. And you have to think of things that way, and then you'll be more patient and, um, you will allow late bloomers to bloom. And they often do. I mean, sometimes 

Andrea Hiott: That is wonderful. Thank you so much for saying that, that, because, you know, that makes all the difference.

I can't tell you how many people I've talked to who you know, are maybe famous now or whatever. It doesn't matter if you're famous or not. Just, just people who have, are happy in what they do, let's say, or have made a difference who say it was some teacher who noticed them and, and did exactly what you just said.

It makes such a big difference. 

Janet Levin: Yeah. And if it's policy, then that's great. Yeah. 

Andrea Hiott: Yeah. Well just before we go last kind of thing is, um, you know, I always ask about love and care and if there's anything that you wanna say about those words relative to all this we've been talking about, or just your general career.

Um, maybe it's about teaching or [01:58:00] maybe it's about philosophy or I don't know, but just does anything come to mind there relative to, to that word and that Yeah. Love. 

Janet Levin: Well, one thing, Andrea, that um, I wanna thank you for is, I mean, I'm retired now. I don't know if you know that. 

Andrea Hiott: I wasn't sure I, yeah, 

Janet Levin: for the last couple years and, you know, I've had, um, it's sort of hard to adjust to, and, you know, I've had various other issues, some health issues.

I mean, nothing, um, life threatening, but, um, but, and it's, it's sort of easy to let the days go by and, um, not really be thinking about things. But when you asked me to do this, I found myself really, really engaged and very, very interested. And, um, wanting to go back and think more about the questions you asked me, especially the ones at the end about, um, how people [01:59:00] change their minds and how people can, um, wall themselves off from even giving themselves a chance to think about things.

And I had had these ideas about how to at least do some research. I mean, I don't even know if I can, uh, I was gonna say to attack these questions, but I don't even know if I'm in the position to attack. But this made me feel much more energized about getting back to this and also made me realize that yeah, the questions that I was interested in throughout my career are still interesting and I'd like to absolutely think about them more.

And so, um, I suppose it made me feel, um, very good about. Um, what, um, I've been working on that is, I mean, maybe not so good about the products, but good about, um, the fact that to me these were very interesting. And when I was [02:00:00] thinking more about questions like, how do you get people to change their minds?

How do you get yourself to change your mind, um, if it seems like you need to and how identity plays into it and how forces that, uh, that are, um, there and increasingly, uh, powerful can get in the way of, you know, real knowledge and changing your mind for the better. I mean, getting closer to the truth. And then, you know, people have said that the truth doesn't matter.

I think it does, but then you have to say more clearly why. And so those are things that I'd like to think about more. and there's of course AI too, which, uh, we haven't got chance to to, but 

Andrea Hiott: yeah. 

Janet Levin: Lot of 

Andrea Hiott: stuff. We'll leave that aside for now, but does that 

Janet Levin: identity,

Andrea Hiott: but I'm so glad you, you said that and I, I actually love that question and the way that you've been discussing it about, um, [02:01:00] how do you get people to change their minds or how do you create a kind of environment where it's possible or the different ways we've been phrasing it.

Janet Levin: Well, thank you. And, um, and as I said sort of just in passing, but I think this is true too. Um, I've been thinking more about what would it would take to get me to change my mind and, uh, I think that's a good first step.

Andrea Hiott: That's a really good first step and very interesting to think about. But, um, yeah, 

Janet Levin: I think 

Andrea Hiott: that, yeah, we, I really appreciate you and I just love this conversation and thank you so much for, for spending this time with me and also for your career and the work you've done. And, uh, yeah. Thanks. 

Janet Levin: Thank you. It was a pleasure.

Andrea Hiott: It was. Is there anything else that you wanna say before we go, or are we all, are we good for now? 

Janet Levin: I think we're good, but I'd be happy to come back and talk about Molly now. 

Andrea Hiott: Okay, great. And, uh, maybe, who knows, maybe how we, how you change your mind. Let's see. 

Janet Levin: Yeah. Okay. Mind about that. [02:02:00] 

Andrea Hiott: I'll try to get you to change your mind, to wanna talk about changing your mind.

Janet Levin: Okay. Oh, alright. That'd be fun too. 

Andrea Hiott: All right. Thank you so much, Janet. 

Janet Levin: Okay. Thank you. 

Andrea Hiott: Bye 

Janet Levin: bye-Bye.

Hey everyone. Thanks for listening all the way to the end. Since you listened all the way to the end, I will just give you a brief little note about how this relates to way making or navigability. And I guess just the short notes are, I sort of brought it up here a little bit, but I actually think what we understand as thinking as a.

Form of communication with ourselves. And when we think of it as communicative, like coming out of Haber Moss and other traditions in phenomenology, not that Haber, Haber Moss is not in phenomenology, but in addition to phenomenology, then I think this makes a lot more sense. And this is what I write about in my thesis.

Also, I talk about how we are confusing self with, with that communication because we can be social and we can. [02:03:00] Learn how the world is from other perspectives through communication with ourself, but with others too. We often confuse this, so self and mine are definitely. Communications in the way that I'm presenting it.

Communicative. So that's why it feels so mystical or like mental, right? That's why we think it's another kind of thing. But in the same way that smell smelling is also pretty remarkable and, and crazy and sight and metabolism and conversation. The fact that we're communicating right now, who knows where you are in the world through.

Voice, but also through all these technologies, it's all miraculous really, and therefore all just not miraculous at the same time. So there's the paradox. So it is, it is bigger than a body, right? The this communication. So I think it makes sense that we've thought of it in mystical ways. Because it is mystical.

Again, it's, it's both and either or. [02:04:00] Uh, so I just wanted to say that at the end and, uh, there's more writings about that coming on the Substack. If you're interested, it would be great if you join or if you want to support us in any way, you can just go to the giving page and give whatever you want. The link is in the show notes or come to the Substack, whatever you wish.

But I'm just glad you're here. Thanks for listening to this conversation. I'd love to know what you thought about it. If you want to write a note on the Substack or somewhere and let me know. I'm unfortunately way behind in all emails and my inbox is a little crazy, but you can also send me an email and I'll hopefully get to it 'cause I really love hearing from you.

Hope you have a good day, wherever you are. Bye everyone.