After New START Treaty: Is the World Entering a New Nuclear Arms Race?

The last major nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia has ended. What happens next?

In this episode of “At the Boundary,” host Jim Cardoso speaks with nuclear policy expert Heather Williams, director of the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) and a senior fellow in the Defense and Security Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), about the expiration of the New START Treaty, the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between Washington and Moscow.

Drawing from her recent analysis, Williams explains three key truths about the end of New START and what they reveal about the future of nuclear strategy, deterrence, and global security. The conversation explores whether the treaty’s expiration signals a new nuclear arms race, how the United States might adapt its nuclear posture, and why future arms control efforts may need to include China alongside Russia.

Williams also emphasized the importance of new ideas in nuclear policy, encouraging the next generation of strategists to rethink how arms control can manage risks in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment.

From nuclear modernization to deterrence strategy and the future of nonproliferation, this episode provides a clear and accessible look at one of the most consequential shifts in global security.

Subscribe to the channel to stay up to date on the latest in this new nuclear age.

• Tampa Summit 6 Registration

• Rob and Arman’s Article for National Interest

GNSI on X
GNSI on Linkedin
GNSI on YouTube

At the Boundary  from the Global and National Security Institute at the University of South Florida,  features global and national security issues we’ve found to be insightful, intriguing, fascinating, maybe controversial, but overall just worth talking about.

A "boundary" is a place, either literal or figurative, where two forces exist in close proximity to each other. Sometimes that boundary is in a state of harmony. More often than not, that boundary has a bit of chaos baked in. The Global and National Security Institute will live on the boundary of security policy and technology and that's where this podcast will focus.

The mission of GNSI is to provide actionable solutions to 21st-century security challenges for decision-makers at the local, state, national and global levels. We hope you enjoy At the Boundary.

Look for our other publications and products on our website publications page.

Transcript

SPEAKERS

Heather Williams, Jim Cardoso

Jim Cardoso  00:12

hello everyone. Welcome to this week's episode of at the boundary, the podcast from the global and national security Institute at the University of South Florida. I'm Jim Cardoso, Senior Director for genocide, and your host for at the boundary.

Jim Cardoso  00:30

Joining us on today's episode is the author of a recent analysis of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or, more specifically, the end of that treaty, New Start was the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between the US and Russia, and it expired on February 4. We'll be talking about the article with its author, Dr Heather Williams, in just a few moments.

Jim Cardoso  00:55

First though, some final updates about GNSI Tampa summit six, which takes place next week, we've gathered together an outstanding group of speakers, researchers, policymakers and practitioners for the conference entitled cracks in the lamp, freeing the nuclear Genie. It's set from March 24 to the 25th at the Marshall Student Center here at USF.

Jim Cardoso  01:19

Our headline speaker group includes retired Air Force General John Highton, former commander of US Strategic Command and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Franklin Miller, former Special Assistant to the President, as well as Assistant Secretary of Defense and Senior Director for the National Security Council,

Jim Cardoso  01:38

retired Ambassador Christopher Hill, a five time US ambassador and former assistant secretary of state, and, of course, our own GNSI Executive Director and former commander of US Central Command, retired Marine Corps General Frank McKenzie, joining them will be a who's who of top leaders and experts in the nuclear field. Tampa summit six will examine the critical issues and questions for the modern nuclear era, such as nuclear deterrence and golden dome, nuclear weapons on the battlefield, the future of testing and proliferation, military applications of nuclear energy and many more.

Jim Cardoso  02:18

We'll have several breakout sessions during the summit, highlighted by the on the nuclear Brink tabletop exercise run by the project on nuclear issues from CSIS

Jim Cardoso  02:29

at USF. We're proud to host this event, so we'll also showcase USF faculty and student research, including the public debut of the security analysis Innovation Lab at USF College of Arts and Sciences.

Jim Cardoso  02:43

There's no cost to attend, but registration is required. You can find registration the full agenda and list of speakers, along with other information on our website.

Jim Cardoso  02:54

One other quick note, back in 2024

Jim Cardoso  02:57

GNSI research fellows Rob Burrell and Armand mahmudian predicted the US engagements both in Venezuela and Iran. The two of them got back together recently to write a new article for the national interest entitled, What do Trump strikes in Venezuela and Iran mean for China? In this piece, Rob and Armon examine whether the Trump administration's use of military force may shape its approach to China in years to come. We'll post a link to this insightful article in the show notes.

Jim Cardoso  03:28

All right, let's turn to our featured guest, Dr Heather Williams is a director of the project on nuclear issues and a senior fellow in the defense and security department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She recently authored an analysis for CSIS entitled three truths about the end of new start and what it means for strategic competition.

Jim Cardoso  03:52

What are those three truths and what more do they say about the future of arms control? That's where we'll start our conversation today.

Jim Cardoso  04:00

Heather Williams, welcome to at the boundary. Thank you so much for being here.

Heather Williams  04:04

Thanks for having me. I'm excited for the conversation me as well. So to open the conversation just Can you summarize the three truths from your article about the end of new start and maybe provide folks who haven't read your article yet some of your thoughts on these three truths.

Heather Williams  04:23

Yeah. So the main truth that I'll probably want to hammer home the hardest is that this is not necessarily the start of an arms race, if it is an arms race America is losing. But to zoom out just a little bit, I wrote these three truths about arms control, because it was the end of the new strategic arms control treaty, which was concluded in 2010 and then shortly thereafter, entered into force, and it expired. It ended at the beginning of February. And this treaty is kind of like a legacy.

Heather Williams  04:59

It, you know.

Heather Williams  05:00

It comes in. It has like a rich history of other bilateral arms control agreements between the US and the Soviet Union and now the US and Russia that included on site verifications. It was a lot of on site verifications. It included data exchanges. It often took a long time to negotiate these. These were really intrusive treaties, and when New Start expired at the beginning of February, it's the end of an era. And so one of the big questions that I heard going around Washington and in the, you know, the nuclear wonk crowd, so to speak, was, what does this all mean? And there were a lot of doom and gloom assessments saying this is going to be the start of an arms race. The guardrails are gone, the US and Russia can just build freely now. And so the first truth that I wanted to point to was that this isn't necessarily the start of a really big arms race. If it was, well, Russia has really been racing ahead for quite a while now, since new start in 2010 Russia has built up its type of nuclear capable system significantly. It's had a 20% increase. China has also been building up really rapidly in non Strategic Systems. Russia has increased by 25%

Heather Williams  06:17

now these are systems not covered under new start. So I take the point that's not what New Start was for, but it's all to say that New Start isn't necessarily going to be the thing that's going to stop Russia or even China from doing big build ups. So that was the first truth, yeah, on

Jim Cardoso  06:37

that first only thing I did that first truth for. And you know, hopefully people will hear this and then they'll reference the article. Another reason to reference the article is you provide three very basic graphs that show what you just described. But it is still stunning to look at those graphs to see, you know, China and Russia above the line and us negative below the line. It really is striking to see that.

Heather Williams  07:01

Thank you for that. I had to fight for those charts to look as simplistic as they do. Oh, they were fantastic. But we have this amazing graphics team at CSIS. And they were like, Well, no, don't you want this? And don't you want that? And I was like, No, I want to tell the most basic story, which is Russia and China have been building up, sometimes up to 30% increases in their arsenals, and we've been going down sometimes into like 15% if not more. And it is like just seeing it visually like that does tell this really striking story, which is that while we, the US, have been showing a lot of restraint in our nuclear systems, we have been decreasing. The number of systems that we have, the types, the different platforms, Russia and China have just been racing ahead. And so I appreciate you calling out those graphs. Yeah, they're great one, but they were worth it. Well, I'm sure, I'm sure your team is fantastic, and I look forward to future graphs from them. But in this case, the simplicity, because I looked at I was like, wow. Okay, so I would say, if you're listening to this, you haven't read the article. Read the article for the simple grabs. They definitely tell the story. The second onto the second truth. So let's press on the conversation. Yeah, the second truth was that if the US does decide to build up, it doesn't need a massive build up. I don't hear any serious conversations suggesting that the US needs to build up its arsenal to match Russian and Chinese combined numbers of nuclear platforms. But there is a general recognition that the US does need to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal. A couple quick reasons for this. If anyone's interested in this, the best source on it is the 2023 bipartisan strategic posture Commission, which really outlines the case for how much the world has changed in the past 15 years. Our plans for nuclear modernization, those were finalized in 2012 think about how different the world is right. Like Russia hadn't even invaded Ukraine for the first time. China's China's nuclear silos hadn't been discovered yet. And so the arsenal that we are building right now is an arsenal for a very different era. So what might that Arsenal the future look like? As I said, it does not have to be a massive change. It's more thinking about what are some different types of platforms that we can have, preferably things that can be theater range, that will help usher our allies, but it also will help in terms of escalation management, which is one of the few things that we know that this administration is interested in when it comes to a nuclear posture. But also just check out kind of that diversification gives the President a lot more options in terms of nuclear signaling. So you know, if the US does build up, it's not to say we're not talking about orders of magnitude and some huge change. But in the article, I go through four.

Heather Williams  10:00

Different options for how the US might might build up

Heather Williams  10:05

loading, yeah, and So option one is to upload, and this would be just put more warheads onto existing platforms, and supposedly this can be done relatively quickly and would increase the size of the arsenal. Option two is to expand procurement of forward deployed in theater systems, and that's kind of what I was saying just now about diversifying more things that are theater range,

Heather Williams  10:32

giving you some more options in terms of the escalation management and signaling. Option three would be to change our plans for nuclear modernization. So our nuclear modernization plan in nuclear wonk terms, is referred to as the program of record, and it is pretty set in stone. It's really hard to imagine changing it, popping it open, and cutting anything at all that is mainly for congressional political reasons. But maybe you can expand on some of the things that are in there. For example, the B 21 the bomber leg of the of the triad that's being modernized will have, supposedly, is going to have a lot of flexibility, and that the modernization and production of that is going relatively well compared to the other sides of things. So that's, that's another option, the fourth option, is to try to solve this strategic problem with non nuclear capabilities. So there is an argument out there. Well, if you want to deter Russia and China simultaneously, if you want to respond to their build ups, you don't have to respond in kind. You don't have to pursue additional nuclear capabilities.

Heather Williams  11:43

This option, I think this is the least strong option. You know, Russia and China clearly value nuclear signaling. They are telling us that pretty explicitly signaling right now, that's for sure. They Yeah. I mean, Russia has been signaling since the start of the war in Ukraine about how it thinks of nuclear weapons. But the other reason, which is getting a lot of attention in the press lately, is because of our allies and for extended nuclear deterrence reasons. So if we say, Well, do you know what we're going to respond to this strategic moment with a conventional answer rather than a nuclear answer, our allies are going to see that and be like, no, no, we want a nuclear. We wanted a nuclear answer. We asked for the ones. Yeah. It's like, we're the ones who are really up against these rising you know, China is a rising power to some extent, and so if we don't, effectively, incredibly assure our allies, we risk our allies developing independent nuclear programs. And, you know, I don't think a more proliferated world is a safer world by any means, but So those are the four options for how the US might respond to this moment. Again, I think that more theater based capabilities is probably the best option. Okay, so that was kind of one thing I was going to ask you is, which one do you think is the best option? Which you just touched on? Where do you have any indications of though, of where you think the US may go with those options? Do they do they agree with Heather Williams? Are they going to they're going to do their own thing in a foolhardy manner. I wish that they agreed with having organs on many things.

Heather Williams  13:22

The answer is, I don't know, this administration has been really quiet on nuclear issues, and people might find that hard to believe, because it seems like nukes have been in the news a lot. You know, the president posted about returning to nuclear testing midnight hammer, big nuclear news, but in terms of how this administration thinks about the role of nuclear weapons, we actually don't know a lot. There was the national defense strategy that came out earlier this year, and normally when that document comes out, it is paired with a nuclear posture review. And the nuclear posture review will tell us things like, what are the objectives of the nuclear arsenal? What type of an arsenal do we want? What's our declaratory policy? What are our negative security assurances? We didn't get any of that. There was very little mention of nuclear weapons in that document. So there's still a lot we just really don't know. Some of the things we do know in recent weeks, in the past month, senior administration officials have come out and said that we will continue to provide an extended nuclear deterrent to our allies. Now that was a really big deal, because up until then, it hadn't been made explicit, and that will have implications for the force posture and which of these options they go with. But no, I don't know what direction of travel they're going in on this or many other nuclear things. Yeah, but that's an interesting indicator. You just said because I hadn't heard that. I mean, there was a lot of discussion about the relative, you know, low amount of reference to the nuclear enterprise in both the NSS and.

Jim Cardoso  15:00

The nds. So it's good to see something at least, but I guess there's more, more to be developed, and we'll see as that goes forward, right? You know, in the

Jim Cardoso  15:11

so the three truths, I mean, the last truth that we're going to talk about, we can use it to kind of hop into another kind of concept here is how the US can lead a new era of arms control. And I think that transitions to a question, which you talk about later in the article, which are the three simultaneous and as you described, potentially very challenging priorities for the US, if it wants to lead in this new era. Can you? Can you describe those priorities again? These are not either or. These are three that you say need to happen kind of at the same time, right? And, and so what are they and what

Heather Williams  15:49

makes them so challenging? Yeah. So the main, the top priority, according to the Trump administration, which they have actually been quite consistent about, is that China has to be part of any future arms control agreements. And I want to, I really want to stress this point, because the little that the President has said about nuclear weapons, he always includes China. So a lot of people get excited. You know, the President said he wants denuclearization. He's, he's talked about denuclearization many times, but he always says he wants it with Russia and China. It isn't just another bilateral agreement that is really what he seems interested in here. So bringing China to the table is the first thing that they are the administration is signaling they really want it is worth noting. China has consistently refused to participate in anything like these types of arms control agreements that we have been doing with Russia. They did. The Chinese did have one dialog with the State Department and the Biden administration about potential arms control. But, you know, not a ton came out of that. So that's the first issue, is, how do you get China to the table? But on that first issue, you talk about, excuse me, you talk about. And

Jim Cardoso  17:04

maybe you're gonna, if I interrupt you, I apologize. But I found it interesting that, you know, maybe Trump himself leading tripart, you know, tripolar talks would then pull China on to the table, because in that case, President Xi may be interested when it's actually the heads of state discussing this.

Heather Williams  17:21

Exactly, that's what I think is the most likely option for trilateral arms control. And the narrative and the process around this would be really important. But if Trump, you know, if Trump puts out an offer to meet with Putin and Xi to talk about the risks of nuclear weapons use. It's kind of hard to say no, like it's if you're the one who says no. It's quite clear who's left holding the bag on this issue. But you know, there are, there is historical precedent for this sort of thing. The one of the recommendations that I made was to go back to the 1973 I think it's called the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war and that accompanied other arms control efforts, but it's exactly what it says on the tin. It's nothing fancy. It's just coming to an understanding of we recognize that the risks of nuclear use are rising. We also recognize that we are in a strategic competition with each other. There's no point in pretending that we're not. But we also want to recognize the following steps that we will take to prevent nuclear use. And you know, Trump seems to really like personalist politics. He likes leading a lot of these initiatives himself. He wants to get a good deal out of it. If that's the case, then, you know, I think this might be a window of opportunity to try to have a trilateral summit on nuclear issues, and I mean, to be clear, like that would be a really big deal. There's never been anything like that before, and so even if the outcome, you know, we're not going to get a new version of new start coming out of something like that. But that's okay, because right now it's just about, how do you get the Chinese to the table. Yeah, okay, no, that's great. And, I mean, we'll see. I mean, it does you write? It does fit into his mindset, you know, being there, making the deal, being personally involved in that, and and doing something that maybe hasn't been done before. I mean, I think these are all things that would strike a chord with with President Trump, so that in that case, we'll see the the US government may take Heather Williams, you know, advice seriously in that case, which would be good. So that was one priority. What are the other two priorities that you talked about in the article? Yeah. So other priorities are getting non strategic nuclear weapons involved. And you know, I kind of gave a preview of this at the beginning, and you referred to the chart that we have in the piece, but this is where Russia and China have just really sprinted ahead of the US. So in terms of active, non strategic nuclear systems, also, some people refer to these as tactical nuclear weapons. Just to avoid confusion, Russia has increased the types that it has by 25

Heather Williams  20:00

Percent, China has gone from having one to three types of these platforms, whereas the US has decreased by 33%

Heather Williams  20:08

so this is somewhere where we have a really big gap. But also, I think this gets forgotten a lot, but when New Start was was negotiated and when it went through the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The Senate mandated that the next agreement has to deal with tactical nuclear weapons, and so there is a legacy to try to incorporate this issue into the follow on. Russia has pretty consistently rejected this. There are some questions about whether or not the Brits or the French, French might have to get involved. And I'm sure we'll talk about Macron speech in a little bit.

Heather Williams  20:45

But then, you know, the other, the other factor in all of this

Heather Williams  20:50

is that we is the NPT, and this is the 1968

Heather Williams  20:56

nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, and the it meets every five years to have a review of where it's at, and its review conference is coming up next month, in April. There is a lot of pressure on this review conference, and so another priority for the Administration has to be we have to do something. We have to bring something to this to the NPT to show that we are trying to make progress on arms control, on risk reduction measures. Whether or not that can happen in the next month, I don't know. But just to kind of finish telling the big story and putting everything into this context, it isn't just about the geostrategic competition. It is also about the concurrent and parallel diplomatic pressure that I don't know. I don't know how much this administration cares about those things. Our allies and partners really care about it. The Brits in particular are really eager to deliver something to the nuclear diplomatic community. So that's kind of the different pressure points, and the big picture story about the end of arms control and what might come next for the US, at least

Jim Cardoso  22:10

that you talk as well in that you say that one thing we need, the US needs is people with new thinking to seize opportunities when they arise, new creativities, still maintaining lessons learned, but looking forward in the future. What? What does this new thinking look like? What mean? You know, here at the University of South Florida, global national security Institute, we do work with a future strategist program and its students looking to create the next generation of national security leaders, some of them will be at the conference we're going to have in a few weeks. And you know what? What should those students hear about, what this new thinking looks like, if they want to be part of the conversation in the future?

Heather Williams  22:53

I would, I appreciate, I really appreciate you calling this out, because I will issue a call to all of those students, all of you, future leaders, this is your moment.

Heather Williams  23:05

Because when we think about what is the future of arms control, this is probably a controversial statement, but I'll go with it. To some extent, you have a blank slate. You it can look like whatever the world needs it to look like now, I want to stress, let's not just come up with arms control agreements for the sake of doing something. I don't think anyone is advocating for that, but I think the starting point has to be, what is the new geo strategic reality? And a lot of us are still coming to terms with that. I mean, in DC, you know, old thinking dies slowly, often, and the world is very, very different. So taking a step back and saying, Okay, what is, what is the world look like? Where are the biggest risks? And arms control was never about reductions. Arms control is not, does not equate to, oh, you cut this many, and we cut that many. Arms Control is about management. It's about how do you manage competition so that the worst things don't happen? And when it comes to nuclear weapons, they're pretty horrible things that we're talking about could happen. And so, you know, if you look at the history, don't get me wrong. There are incredible lessons learned to draw from start, salt, Moscow treaty, new new start. Even if you look to things like the Biological Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons Convention, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, there's this really rich history of arms control, and we do need to harvest from that to realize, okay, how do you tie this agreement and this management tool to the moment, to what is needed, but in terms of what that looks like in the current moment, I really think that I would love to, I would love to learn from early career folks in the field who do take a blank slate approach to this and think about it a bit differently. Just Just one last point on this.

Heather Williams  25:00

A lot of us who work on arms control issues, we are still relying on a book that was written in 1960 right? So shelling and Halperin, strategy and arms control. I'm looking at it on my bookshelf right now. Every one of us has a copy, and all of us keep going back to it, and I'm as guilty of this as anybody and say, well, shelling and Halperin said, A, B, C, it's a great book, but maybe this moment calls for something other than a book written by two guys based on a Harvard seminar in 1960

Heather Williams  25:32

and I don't, you know, I feel blasphemous saying anything bad. And so this is not a criticism of the book. Rather, it is saying we needed, we need additional thinking on top of that book, that

Jim Cardoso  25:46

that's a really great answer. And it's one of those sometimes, every sometimes I ask questions and I'm like, Ah, hopefully it's a good question. I'm really glad I asked that question, because, and just the way you started out saying, This is your moment, we may use that as a quote in the future, because I think that's fantastic to tell our students. We have about 7070, of them here looking at different areas of being involved in national security, enterprise. And you know, a lot of them probably,

Jim Cardoso  26:11

it's like nuclear is, oh, that's what, that's what my dad or my grand, my grand, that's my grandparents worried about. I don't I? That's not what the modern world is. Well, no, not necessarily. And in fact, it needs new thinking, again, appreciative, you know, absorbing the lessons of the past. But still it is. It's a different era right now. And I think that combination is really what, what provides some, some innovative solutions to some, some age old problems which are changing now. I really appreciate your thoughts on that.

Heather Williams  26:44

Yeah, no, it's it genuinely is a moment for and I'm also glad you raised this is something that we deal with a lot at pony, the project that I, that I run, is it's almost like people forget that nuclear weapons are still around. You guys still talk about that really?

Heather Williams  27:02

Yeah, there's still a thing. But yeah, there are 1000s and 1000s of nuclear weapons still in the world. We are very lucky that only nine countries have nuclear weapons, and not more than that, but managing the risks associated with those weapons, that is a lifelong quest like that is a mission that will exist as long as nuclear weapons exist, and we need the best and the brightest working on the issue to help us figure out how to reduce the risks associated with them. General McKenzie, our Executive Director, he'll get asked, I've seen him get asked this sometimes talking about the threat, you know, not recently, but in the past, threat of Iran to the interest of the United States, the threats of, you know countries, you know Venezuela, or countries in the Western Hemisphere, to the interest in China to the interest United States. And he'll say, look at this point in history, right now, there is only one nation that is an existential threat to the United States, and that's Russia. Because right now, Russia can pretty much destroy the United States with within about an hour. There's no other nation that has that capability. So basically saying, Don't forget about that threat that still exists. Don't forget about nuclear weapons. And we still have to have some solid policy and think that it goes with that. That's why he was real big on doing this type of conference and have this conversation we're going to have in March, because it is still such a relevant conversation.

Heather Williams  28:29

It is. And I also something that I think that GNSI And the next generation thinkers on this with where they can particularly help us is forgive the pun, but getting out of the nuclear silo, and I mean that in a few ways, it's hard to avoid the pun, though it sort of writes itself right. It does. It's also genuinely is the best word. But the nuclear community, we're pretty siloed. We all know each other. We all know what each other are going to say,

Heather Williams  29:02

and occasionally we have new ideas and debate them. It's really prime community for new thinking and new ideas and new blood. But also because I don't think that we can keep treating nuclear weapons as a discrete issue, whereas this, like, you know, for example, what's going on in Iran right now? It's like, well, there's this war going on Iran. Oh, there's also this nuclear angle to it. It's like, no, no, the nuclear component is really central to the cause of the war. To what is the outcome of the war going to be? As long as Iran's stockpile is still unaccounted for, you've got a really big risk on your hands, but also that incorporating new technologies, things like space AI, into our thinking about nuclear issues, it's going to take a new generation to really bring us forward in our thinking on that. You know, in a new wrinkle that is within the nuclear the nuclear world is on March 2, and we you referenced this already French president.

Jim Cardoso  30:00

Macron, he made this landmark speech spelling out a new doctrine of forward deterrence for France to he would increase warheads greater cooperation with European allies, and even cease disclosures of France's nuclear arsenal. So how does how does this pronouncement fit into the overall trends in nuclear arms control, and what can you envision going forward as this new policy is executed.

Heather Williams  30:24

Yeah, for anyone interested in this, I highly recommend an article by my colleague Astrid chevry at i hope i It's a French last name. I'm sure I butchered it with my Boston accent. But I highly recommend her piece at CSIS, and she kind of outlines the impact of the speech, what was significant? What might be getting overblown a little bit, but I mean main takeaways from the speech, Macron announced that they're going to increase the size of the French arsenal. They talk about the possibility of deploying nuclear capable systems to partner European countries, not permanent basing, but as a possibility, and then also some joint planning and exercising with some European partners. So I think there's a few key implications for this, including for arms control, the biggest question that I have, and I'm looking forward to discussing with our European, European friends and partners, what does this mean for NATO? Because there already is a nuclear planning group within NATO that France isn't part of. So the risk that I worry about with this announcement is, are we just creating two competing, potentially parallel forums for discussion of nuclear issues within the NATO alliance? And you know, the French have have offered assurances, that's not what this is. But I think as this issue develops, that's probably the number one thing that I'm going to be watching for.

Heather Williams  31:47

But in terms of arms control, this, you know, I don't think the French want to hear this, but

Heather Williams  31:53

the French announcement, along with the,

Heather Williams  31:57

you know, the the UK's nuclear modernization program and some changes in their posture, it could make them a really big player in arms control, because Russia and China have often said that they won't do further arms control unless France and the UK are involved, and particularly now, if they are both expanding their arsenals, then they might have A role to play in some future agreements, thus far that you know, that is anathema to both London and Paris, and I'm sure that they will give me grief for saying this. But if they wanted to, they really could, could play either a spoiler role or a bit of a savior role in bringing in some sort of risk reduction or arms control efforts. I mean, with that said, I think that the Brits have been, historically, one of the world leaders in risk reduction, in dialog transparency. You know, historically, they have really popped the hood on a lot of their decision making and how they think about the role of their nuclear arsenal. And so there is a bit of a legacy there for that with them. But I mean, overall, the a lot of the reporting on the cron speech seems to be, oh, this is in response to the Trump administration and concerns about us credibility. Yeah, sure, but let's not forget, the bigger driver here, which is Russia, which is repeatedly invaded a neighbor, has relied on nuclear threats throughout, has expanded its regional and dual capable nuclear platforms. So it isn't this isn't all coming from the Trump administration or even from the US. This. A lot of this is being driven by Moscow.

Jim Cardoso  33:42

We'll, we'll go ahead and find that article, and we'll put a link to it in our show notes for this podcast, so that way Astrid can can get properly recognizes recognized. Sorry, you talk about Russia, and actually, in a separate piece by one of your CSIS colleagues, said, in 2022 in the fall, 2022 when they were really threatening hard the use of nuclear weapons, that was possibly one of the most dangerous nuclear crises in decades for the United States. You know, the nuclear rhetoric has subsided a little bit, but Russia's war aims in Ukraine certainly haven't subsided. What Where do you think that's going? What lingering concerns do you have regarding Russia's nuclear capability and their continuing quest to emerge victorious in Ukraine?

Heather Williams  34:31

My biggest concern is, what are Russia's lessons learned about the role and the value of nuclear threats,

Heather Williams  34:43

I am assuming that Russia's geopolitical ambitions will not stop with Ukraine, and whatever peace agreement happens, and whatever the terms that Russia will remain ambitious in my.

Heather Williams  35:00

Cause mischief for some of its neighbors, particularly non NATO members

Heather Williams  35:05

and or non native, yeah, non NATO neighbors. And so what I really worry about, and, you know, it's a real shame that we can't have more transparent and regular dialog with Russian colleagues. You know, a lot of my my Russian colleagues and friends used to be able to just hop on a call and get answers to these types of questions, and we can't really do that anymore. But if Russia's takeaway is, you know, nuclear threats slowed Western intervention significantly, if it is that the nuclear threats

Heather Williams  35:38

bullied the US out of directly getting involved at certain stages, then that means not only is this not the end of Russia's nuclear threats, but they might ramp those up. They might make those threats more aggressively and even sooner in a nuclear conflict. So but it is interesting that the nuclear rhetoric has died down a little bit. I think I would. I would probably argue that the rhetoric hasn't. The rhetoric has died down, but the nuclear saber rattling hasn't died down. It's just changed, because now we see Russia not just talking about nuclear, but using dual capable, so nuclear capable systems like the arashnik,

Heather Williams  36:23

you know, they have done testing of, believe it's the Bureau of ethnic in recent months as well. And so it's gotten to a point maybe Russia doesn't need to talk about it quite so much. They can just show it. Yeah, and that that worries me as well, because that has escalation implications. Yeah, good, not good. But, I mean, that's very now, it's very clarifying, you know, because I think a lot of people, they haven't heard much, but, I mean, and so they think maybe there's just not as much of a threat. But, you know, that's, that's good to hear that and understand. Now it may have just evolved a little bit. So we need to be cognizant, so from the

Jim Cardoso  37:05

fairly current to the hyper current, kind of as we start to wind down the interview. So we're about at the time we're recording this. We're a little over a week into the combined us and Israeli operations in Iran.

Jim Cardoso  37:19

You know, Iran's nuclear capabilities were, According to various sources, anywhere from substantially degraded to obliterated in the previous operation, Midnight hammer in June of 2025

Jim Cardoso  37:30

and you know, us and Israeli Aircraft have subsequently targeted nuclear related facilities and missile sites as well, although the results are at this point fairly unclear. As someone who spends a lot of time thinking about nuclear geopolitics and national deterrence strategies, how will Iran figure into your thinking going forward?

Heather Williams  38:00

That's not the question I expected. It's a really good one.

Heather Williams  38:05

I think it's too soon to tell what lessons we take away from Iran.

Heather Williams  38:14

I thought midnight hammer, we had satellite imagery analysis showing that midnight hammer did inflict significant damage to the nuclear program. I don't think it obliterated it quite to the degree that some of the administration might have claimed, but there are a whole lot of degrees between status quo ante and Obliteration, and it was somewhere in that space we always knew that the there

Heather Williams  38:44

was a stockpile of somewhere around 400 kilograms of 60% highly enriched uranium that is still unaccounted for. We also knew that there's a third enrichment site, and then there's also this additional site that one of my colleagues, Joseph Rogers, has been tracking called pickax mountain.

Heather Williams  39:04

There's also Iran civilian nuclear facility at Bushehr. And so those are the those are the four key things that I am still watching in the ongoing war in Iran. It's just a few quick highlights from it. Thus far, there have not been any direct strikes. It sounds like on the Bushehr reactor, which is a good thing because you don't really want to hit a nuclear reactor. It's also a good thing because that reactor is run jointly with the Russian state owned energy company Rosatom. And so there are a lot of Russians there. So one of the things that I'm watching most closely has been if and how Russia gets involved. But the other piece that I am really were, I am genuinely concerned about it is the stockpile. You know, 60% enriched. It's not quite, you know, weapons grade is usually said to be around 90% you can do a lot with 60%

Heather Williams  40:00

Enriched uranium. How secure is that? Is it vulnerable to non state actor threats? What are the Iranians going to do with it as the war evolves and so to your question, how does Iran factor into my thinking about these issues? I It makes me think that the nonproliferation order and the rules that we had, they failed in when it comes to Iran.

Heather Williams  40:30

And we need to consider other tools for how to handle nonproliferation going forward, but this can still go sideways a whole lot of ways, and so I am not going to make any more predictions and be proven right or wrong. Well, I mean, I think we can probably guess that there's going to be continued chaos inside Iran. And anytime you combine, at least to me or my foxhole, combining chaos and availability of nuclear material and a latent desire for nuclear capability is probably not a good combination that we should be happy about going forward.

Heather Williams  41:09

Probably not. I we do have, it does seem like we did a lot of damage to their ability to enrich so they probably aren't going to be trying to enrich that to 90% especially during an ongoing war, because the centrifuges are really sensitive, especially to bombs.

Heather Williams  41:28

But

Heather Williams  41:31

nonetheless, as long as that stockpile is there, you know, in the short term, it's a question of how vulnerable is it to theft or to or to leaking like you don't want radioactive material being released into the atmosphere, really. But also the question of coming out of this, what will Iran's ambitions be whenever this war ends, and under what conditions it ends? If it is some version of the existing regime, I could imagine them wanting to get a nuclear weapon pretty fast to deter something like this from happening again, if it's a different regime, I would hope that any sort of settlement would include turning over that stockpile to the IAEA. Yeah, we're, we're about out of time. But I do want to ask one. I'm going to add one more question. Here's the thing. I don't know what the question is because you had an envision in your head, and you were about to provide some fantastic insights, and now I'm going to ask the UN asked question, which is just a blank silence for me, so that you can answer that question that you had in your head, that you thought I was going to ask, and you had some insight to provide.

Heather Williams  42:39

I mean, I thought you were going to ask, How worried should we be about nuclear issues in Iran? Okay, yeah, today. But, I mean, please, yeah, no, that was the main, that was the main thing, I think. But I you know, I mean, as a closing out point, I actually want to circle back to what you flagged on, opportunities for students, new leaders and early career folks in this field, Iran is actually a perfect example. We've never been here. I was talking to a colleague today, because we're doing some analysis on the Iran, on the he on the HEU stockpile in Iran. And I was like, what historical examples can we draw on? Like, you know, literally, where is the playbook that tells us how to analyze the situation? And there really isn't anything like the closest that we could come up with was the August 91 coup against Gorbachev, when there was a time when it wasn't quite clear who had control of nuclear weapons, there was concern about loose nukes in the post Soviet era. This is totally different. Like, what do you do with at you in a war zone? And so to just really encourage young people, like, not just young people, I mean, early, mid career professionals. Anybody interested in foreign policy right now, don't be intimidated by the nuclear topic, go get smart on it. It's if you're looking for resources, check out project on nuclear issues. We have a video series on deterrence, 101, and arms control, 101, and a ton of other resources.

Heather Williams  44:13

But we just really need you, and we really need creative thinking, because as the war in Iran is showing this issue and the nuclear weapons are not going away anytime soon. We need those young minds. I couldn't agree with you more. 

Jim Cardoso  44:27

Heather Williams, thank you so much for your time today. Really appreciate your insights. 

Jim Cardoso  44:30

Thank you. Special thanks to our guest today, Heather Williams, a highly acclaimed researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the author of a recent analysis on the expiration of the New START Treaty.

Jim Cardoso  44:47

Next week, on the podcast, we'll open up the history books. Our guest will be author Matthew Miller, a senior historian and veteran. We'll talk to him about his latest book, Assault Brigade, the 18th Austria.

Jim Cardoso  44:59

Trillion Infantry Brigade in World War Two. You'll want to join us for that episode

Jim Cardoso  45:06

while you're listening right now, next week or whenever, be sure to subscribe to ATB on your favorite podcast platform. Rate and review. We genuinely appreciate you sharing some time with us today. You can find GNSI on YouTube, LinkedIn and X. Be sure to follow like and subscribe. Tell your friends and colleagues as well, and check our monthly newsletter, All this and much more on our website, usf.edu/gnsi,

Jim Cardoso  45:32

that's

Jim Cardoso  45:34

going to wrap up this episode of at the boundary. Each new episode will feature global and national security issues we found to be insightful, intriguing, maybe controversial, but overall, just we're talking about, I'm Jim Cardoso, and we'll see you at the boundary.

Jim Cardoso  46:00

you.