Bibi’s Gaza Reversal

David Makovsky joins the Jewish People’s Podcast to discuss Netanyahu’s reversal on the Trump plan to disarm Hamas, what drove the decision, what it means for Gaza and whether it risks a new rupture with Washington.

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:00

David, it's great to have you on the podcast. Thank you so much for taking the time to speak to me today. Delighted to be with you, Yacov. So, I mean, it's it's this whole Gaza thing is kind of a lot to unpack. A week ago, it seemed that Israel was fully on board. It was brought to the security cabinet, the 15-point plan, the 20-point plan, whatever many points there are to these plans. But the 15-point plan was brought to the security cabinet. There was a vote that was held on it. Ben Gvir, of course, opposed. Uh Smutrich seemed to support it at some point, but either way, it got across, it got the majority, it seemed to be moving ahead. And then things started to happen inside Israel. Smuttrich said, I was maybe misled. Let's do a new vote. And then suddenly on Sunday, Netanyahu announces at the beginning of the larger government meeting that Israel actually rejects the 15-point plan. It does not accept the 15-point plan and it will only begin to even consider something of withdrawal from Gaza. If and when Hamas doesn't just hand over arms to some technocratic US monitored or verified entity, but when it uh actually completely disarms. So I'm I'm curious for your take, David, as someone who's really in the weeds on these issues, has been working on them for a long time. What is going on? And and are we looking at just politics by Israel, or do you see something maybe deeper here?

SPEAKER_01 1:30

Again, first of all, it's great to be on with you. Thank you for having me. And um it's a delight. I look, I'm myself trying to um to to understand this. I think what is fascinating is there are things that Netanyahu says and things he doesn't say. For example, when he publicly said Israel will not withdraw until they are completely disarmed, he said on Sunday. Um he didn't say uh that I basically it also meant not doing new attacks beyond the yellow line. And um I saw already on Channel 12 on the Monday night news that um soldiers are already filtering back to journalists. You know, we're there's new orders not to engage in new attacks. Apparently, uh an attack that is not imminent self-defense has to be authorized by the chief of staff himself, Ayal Zamir. So I found it interesting that things that the Prime Minister wanted to comply with, he doesn't announce, and the things that he doesn't want to comply with, he does announce.

SPEAKER_00 2:36

Well, that's his politicians for you, right?

SPEAKER_01 2:39

That's that that's like it's a classic political season here that he's worried most of all that everything is refra refracted through the lens of his base. So, I mean, that's how I see that for the right now, and you have to say for now, um, he is doing what the Board of Peace and uh the U.S. has asked of him, which is not to engage in new attacks. So the issue about where to withdraw from is is odd because the yellow line moves. And the truth is, as far as I know, you might know differently, I don't think Israel has ever published where the new yellow line is. Bibi said it's 70% of Gaza, I think it's a little over 60. It doesn't really matter, but the fact is, is that it's more for effect, I think, than anything else, which is the principle is the onus is on Hamas. And I think that part is something that I think is is, you know, many Israelis would agree. I didn't see a lot of criticism of the Prime Minister uh with his statement, uh, because there is a skepticism that's uh richly earned by Hamas that uh, you know, that the weapons are are part of their DNA. And are they really going to disarm? I think no one has ever gone broke being a pessimist on Hamas's intentions. And I think, you know, there's a real question. And then you add to that, Yaqov, something you alluded to is the question of who is exactly storing these weapons. Uh, it is this uh NCAG, this National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, uh, a group of technocrats who have been, as far as we know, vetted by Israel. But the police force, I don't think they were supposed to do training in Egypt. When I was in Cairo, they said we're ready to have them, but they haven't exactly uh Israel hasn't let them in. Now, part of it is I think Egypt wants to be sure, it's not a question of letting them out, but it's like, will Israel commit to letting them back in after they've they've been trained? And I don't think they got full authorization. So I think there's a fair question to be asked beyond liquid politics is you know, can you really count on this new entity uh to really keep these weapons out of Hamas's reach? Because best is to keep them out of Gaza completely. Of course, I'm sure Hamas objects to that. I personally think if Egypt would take on that rule, it would it would add a little confidence because Egypt is a real country, uh, and this this group of Palestinian technocrats are not yet known. So I think there's to answer your question, there's part politics connected, but there's part a real fear is Hamas truly willing to disarm? And people are skeptical. What Nikolai Miladnov, the the um you know, the commissioner of the Board of Peace, or however you want to call it, the CEO, is saying is basically the onus for the most part is on Hamas. Although in a Channel 12 interview he did with Amit Sega, he did say, well, we should do this by sector. So where where we finish a sector, then Israel could pull back a little bit. He doesn't get into what are the quids for the quos. You know, how much does Hamas, how big is their sector, how much does Israel pull back? But um, you know, I think there's what I'm saying is it's a mix between the political season that makes everything harder and some real legitimate questions that the Board of Peace hasn't yet answered.

SPEAKER_00 6:26

Why do you think it is, David, that on Lebanon, if we look at the Lebanese model and the negotiations that continue to be ongoing between Israel and the government of Lebanon, but you also have the uh the the basic system in place that Israel's withdrawn so far, withdrew so far from what, two villages or so, and given them maybe three, and given it over to the LEFs, to the Lebanese armed forces, if they can prove a capacity and a capability to prevent Hezbollah from returning to those areas, then the idea is that Israel will then do the same in other parts of southern Lebanon. So there it is, a piecemeal kind of system and model. Let's see if it works. If it works, great, we move on to the next place. Lebanon is okay, Gaza we won't accept. Now, my my feeling is, I'm curious what you think. My feeling to some extent is Gaza's more emotional for Israelis, right? Obviously, because of October 7th, but just in general, even without October 7th, the whole Palestinian issue is much more emotional than Lebanon, let's say. I mean, why do you think in Lebanon that model can work, but not in Gaza?

SPEAKER_01 7:34

Hey, I don't say it can't work, but I think you're perfectly spot on to look at these two fronts and say what's analogous and what isn't. I think that's really good. And look, I think in Lebanon we know what the government is. We know this is the most hopeful government in Lebanon in 40 years because they see Hamas is destroying their country. They want to take their country back. So there is at least something defined. Right now in Gaza, it's not yet defined. Not a single NCAG person has come in. Um, A. B, there's a Lebanese armed forces is defined. So you could kind of hold them to a certain standard. Right now, there's no Palestinian forces. Now, whether they should have let the PA get in is a whole question, and it's you say very political, and maybe they should have, but it was felt not. And so people are trying something new there. But all I'm saying is you've got really defined building blocks in Lebanon that in theory should make for um, you know, you know, there's structures. I would also say in Lebanon, I think Israel has learned the hard way with the MOU that Vice President Vance uh signed with the Iranians. Like, if we don't move on this other model, there are consequences that Lebanon, that Iran is gonna say we should be the arbiters of Lebanon's future as per the MOU, which is kind of there. And I think to be to give credit to Secretary of State Um Marco Rubio, you know, he understood that immediately, and that was certainly an incentive to get this like kind of alternative track going of um Lebanese-Israeli negotiations. And so I think having these structures and the clear consequences of what if it fails, I think we're all things that we don't yet have in Gaza yet. And but I I I I accept your premise completely that in theory that that might be ultimately the model. If NCAG or my you know, whoever it is, proves themselves in in in one or two villages and then expands. I mean, that should be what should happen. There should be this incremental, as you stand up, Israel stands down model. But uh Israel is right um to say, you know, show me, you know, first, uh, because it doesn't want to get burned like it's been burned in the past.

SPEAKER_00 10:09

What do you think? I mean, like, you know, I look at Netanyahu's kind of flip-flop here. It seemed that at one one hand, he was under some pressure from the Americans. He wanted to, he went to Washington, he had that meeting with Trump, he had to bring something to the table to be able to get that meeting, and that was gonna start with the uh Intel Sultan, start with some sort of humanitarian effort to allow in what those like caravans or something for for the displaced Palestinians. And then, of course, the cap the original cabinet decision on on the on the international stabilization or security force, the ISF, and then what was supposed to lead to the 15-point plan. Now he's take backtracked. But what I try to think about is let's say there's another Israeli prime minister who takes over in October, and you know some of these individuals. You I know that Gaudi Isencott, for example, spent some time at the Washington Institute with you, so you you probably know him quite well, but you've spent time with Naftali Bennett and Lapid and others. Do you think do you sense a substantial policy difference between let's take Eisencott Bennett and and BB on on these issues, or is it just gonna be a different face and a different rhetoric, but it's gonna be the same policy?

SPEAKER_01 11:27

I do think there's a difference between all of them, and and you're right, Gotti spent um uh six months at the institute. I think I spent an hour a day with him for six months, uh, except for maybe one of us was traveling or something. We we I really got to know him, and Naftali and Bennett and and Lapete are also people who, you know, I I you know I I I've gotten to know over the years, uh as you know, you also uh dealing with politicians all the time. Um I I would just say this. I think what what complicates things is in the United States when they they they feel there's a difference between Netanyahu, the individual, and Netanyahu, the political leader of the Likud, and the leader of the government. I think they feel if it was just BB personally, they could reach a lot of sets of understandings. But I think they're very concerned that as the leader of this bloc and of the leader of the of the Likud government, that you know, we don't know exactly. Is Smutrich, is Benkvir, what are the agendas? Do they want to create settlements in Gaza? Is um the goal of Smutrich basically to use, you know, the um the Hamas area where most of the population is living, and many intents, to as the as a as a way station to push them out of Gaza altogether. Being in Egypt, I I felt that that that they they felt that's the grand plan of Smutrich is to push all of them out. I think with any of these other guys, they don't feel that there is a hidden agenda. And that means if there's challenges, there are challenges to work through as opposed to be challenges of an excuse not to act. And uh I think I think in general in the US, they feel someone who's who really wants to be a problem solver, okay, there's security issues. You gotta take those things seriously. That's a big deal. But if there's an ideological agenda outside of the security questions, then it's the trust is not there. And I feel it's it's a different ball game. And so I do feel that whoever comes in um, you know, as like, hey, I've got legitimate security problems, people say, okay, cool, let's work through it. But if they feel that it doesn't matter what you work through, your real goal is to build settlements or to push the Gazans out of Gaza, it's a very different conversation.

SPEAKER_00 14:00

What do you think? What's your opinion? I mean, you you know, you've worked a long time and you were part of the Kerry uh team back in you know in the late Obama years in the second term when there was really an effort to try to move something with negotiation. So you I mean, you know, you know the maps, and maps has long been been your thing, David. But but on Gaza at least, what do you see as a viable solution here? I mean, you know, what what can be done that can give Israel the security assurances? Or is it just look, this is gonna take a long time, nothing is going to change for years. And maybe that's the reality that we have to accept.

SPEAKER_01 14:39

All right, so here I think, you know, door number one or door number two. I mean, door number one, if Hamas really is engaged in this Board of Peace idea for decommissioning, it's a new it's a new day. You know, it gives you some hope. Uh I I saw one of our colleagues wrote something somewhere, even if they don't get all the weapons and all the tunnels, if they get a good chunk of it, it's a diminished Hamas. But if there's a real effort here uh to create a new Gaza, it might be what you and I have been saying here until now, it's it's gonna be incremental, but there is a trajectory. I'm concerned, what if it's not serious and it's just a way for Hamas to buy time, in which case we're talking about two Gazas basically. And inside the yellow line, I I think a plan B should be okay, whoever is in a tent and wants to move uh to the uh the non-Hamas side, I didn't say the word Israeli side, but the non-Hamas side of the yellow line, you're gonna have to go through a certain vetting of the Shin bet because you don't want you know Hamas people to uh infiltrate. But if you go through that vetting, you know, you could come out of your tent and there'll be some housing for you. And at least give some people some hope that they are not doomed to live in these tents, and there's you know, winter is not that far off. And so I think that's where it'll go. It's like, is there gonna be one Gaza or two Gazas? And the people who will decide that are Hamas. If they if they are genuine, again, I hold withhold my skepticism given, you know, uh, you know, my experience with these people. Uh, you know, I'm from Missouri, literally, so it's like, show me, you know, show me that it's that it's real. And if Nikolai Miladnov, God bless him, is successful and it's real, then we're in a new game. It's a new world. It might be incremental, the reg reconstructional start sector by sector, great. But I I think in the Mideast, you have to always assume what if it isn't real? Then I think you have to think about it, and no one wants to use the word two Gazas, but for the foreseeable future, you know, that it's the question of what could be built within the yellow line. Again, that's still at least 60% of Gaza. We're not talking about people moving into the Sinai or into Israel or anything like that. We're talking about within Gaza, of course, there's gonna have to be some sort of a buffer area near the the actual border, I think, at least for a while. So I think it depends. Door number one, the border peace is successful, Hamas is more serious, and we have an incremental decommissioning process. Door number two, they're not serious, they're just playing for time, that's the same old Hamas, in which case I think it's two Gazas. I think in either of and and and this effect, this is a huge consequence because, you know, first of all, this this international stabilization force, ISF, whether it's Moroccans, whether it's Zeris, I don't know who these, you know, the people are coming, Moroccan, whoever it is, none of them are gonna go and fight Hamas.

SPEAKER_00 17:57

No, of course not.

SPEAKER_01 17:58

So so therefore, under door number one, where Hamas is genuine, then maybe they could actually go in at a certain point and liberate areas that Hamas is evacuating. Door number two, they'll be basically beyond the behind the yellow line in the non-Hamas zone. And I I think it would be good for Israel and whoever the new government is to say, look, we don't want Gazans to suffer, but we cannot be at risk because of Hamas. So it's all on Hamas. They decide. And if they're not serious, plan B is that uh Israel will just keep the, you know, will keep the pressure on them with from within the yellow line. And if it has to go in, it'll go in. I think there'll be some sensitivities in the US in Israel and the U, especially in the U.S., to doing that before the midterms in America. But if Hamas doesn't want to play ball, I think we're probably in a countdown to the next Israeli incursion. My hope is just that the Gazan people are not caught in the middle. And I think this Plan B idea um of building within the yellow line. I mean, you mentioned Tel Sultan, Yaakov. I mean, that's where the Emirati project of 25,000 homes is supposed to be built. I there have been reports it's back on again. But because we had heard it was frozen because Netanyahu didn't like the vibe that says, you know, that there'll be any reconstruction uh until after disarmament. Right. But it was really until after the elections. But I think it would have happened. But the whole idea is to say divide, what is the Hamas zone and what is the non-Hamas zone? And uh it's up to Hamas if if uh there's gonna be one Gaza or not. It's not a nefarious Israeli plotting, as some of Israel's critics I think would like to allege.

SPEAKER_00 19:50

My sense, and I'm curious what your sense is, there's still some sympathy in the United States for this predicament or this dilemma that Israel finds itself in. Right. Uh people still do remember October 7th. They recognize the Hamas is a terrorist organization, they recognize that genocidal groups don't just, you know, convert overnight and become suddenly good guys. Right, right. But I'm curious if that can last, right? In other words, if something doesn't move and we stay in the status quo, David, where we're kind of like, we're neither here nor there, we're in the yellow line, they're doing what they're doing, nothing's really moving, there's no progress. And then I don't know, a year from now, people look at Israel and like, wait, you guys are now occupying, I don't know, still 60, 70% of Gaza. It's time to get out. And then there will start to be this pressure on Israel that Israel will have to then start to do things under pressure that it wouldn't have wanted to do otherwise.

SPEAKER_01 20:44

Yeah, no, I think it's a very good question. And it gets to the heart of the matter, your question, Yaakov, in my view, which is is this a war against Hamas or against the Gaza people? Israelis are convinced it's a war against Hamas. Many of Israel's growing chorus of critics are convinced it's against the people of Gaza. And therefore, what Israel does will determine which school of thought uh prevails, I think, in many ways. And Israel is behind because there's many more critics right now. Um, and so uh, you know, that's why I come back to plan B. If the border peace plan A doesn't work, where Hamas disarms, etc., etc., then you're right, if we're stuck in this limbo, there's gonna be growing, growing anger, I would say. But if Israel could demonstrate it is not against the people of Gaza, it actually wants to get them out of these tents, it wants to give them a a future that's at least, you know, something. It's not living like in hovels. I I tend to think people will give Israel the benefit of the doubt over time if they see that Israel is making the distinction where Israel is not seeing. Is making the distinction, it'll create a default to the scenario that I think you are driving at. That's how I see it.

SPEAKER_00 22:08

So your recommendation if the Israeli policymakers came and said, David, what can we do? We know Hamas is not going to disarm, but to retain some level of sympathy and support in the United States, both sides of the aisle for that matter, if that is even possible, what should we do?

SPEAKER_01 22:22

I think it's clear. This plan B idea, which I want to, you know, write about, is um is uh is really um is that is saying here, here's plan B. It's not against the people of Gaza, we want to give them a better life. You know, it's I think people don't believe that in many parts of the world that that's really Israel's intention. You know, if if you told people, you know, like this is France 1944 and and Vichy and the Nazis are about to go, and it's just about you know, France for the French, I think you would have one figure, but you Israel has left it a bit amorphous because the Smotrich Benvir people might really want to push them out. So I, you know, you gotta decide what is it? Is it are you really trying to make Gaza for Gazans or not? And I think the plan B is to say, you know, we're gonna fight, like I don't know, the white paper, we're gonna fight Hamas as if there's no, you know, yellow line. You're gonna fight, you know, help the yellow line as if there's no Hamas. I think if Israel would draw that distinction, uh, it would, it would really, it would be very important. And therefore, I think a new government in a certain way comes in with some, I don't know the word is honeymoon. Maybe it's too nice of a word. But some pause. Yeah, the people will say, look, let's stop the bleeding here. There's a new government. They're coming in, they're saying we're not building settlements, we're not going to deposit dispossess the Palestinians. We let's give them a chance. I think reasonable people, I'm not I'm not talking about SJP on the campuses I visited, the Students for Justice in Palestine are like that at all. But I think many Americans would want to give Israel a chance that it's trying something new. And uh I don't think we should be so fatalistic about it.

SPEAKER_00 24:14

How much does Trump actually care about this? Right? I mean, we've seen Milodinov kind of at the forefront. Uh he's doing what he can. He's been meeting with Bibi, he's pushing this plan. He he responded after Israel uh decided after BB announced that he's not going to uh adhere to the 15-point plan. But we're not seeing really the Americans, the big guns, whether it's Vance, Rubio, or the president himself uh express much of an opinion on these issues. Do they just not care? Are they too busy with Iran, which is the major issue that's unresolved? And now I read the uh just earlier today that Trump has decided we're actually gonna tone things down with Iran. We don't really care anymore. Let's see if the economic sanctions can have an impact, and we'll let that thing just kind of ride itself out. So maybe he's just kind of saying, you know what? I did what I had to do, and now I'm just gonna sit back. I got other things I got to deal with.

SPEAKER_01 25:08

Oh, it's a great question because it gets to the question of the level of American political investment in the whole Gaza process. Unless you get the big guns, as you correctly put it, you know, Trump, uh the Secretary of State, the vice president, unless they are seen as that this is something they care about, people will assume over time it's just mid-level. The way I see it, and I hope this doesn't sound too cynical, what I'm about to say, but I tend to think the president's attention span is sometimes a function of the wealthy Arabs that he is uh close to. So if MBS, the Muhammad bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, is whispering into one ear, and MBZ is whispering, Mohammed bin Zayed of the UAE is whispering to a second ear, I would put in this, if there was a third ear, it would be uh the Emir of Qatar. And he also likes, for whatever reason, and some people write books about this, he likes he likes Erdogan. Um, if those four say, hey, Mr. President, you know, you've really dropped the ball on this, this is creating domestic pressure for us in the you know, in the Arab world, Muslim world, I do think he takes that part seriously. But he doesn't really care about, I'm sorry, about a lot of the other Arab states that don't have that kind of wealth. And I think, but those he does listen to them. And if he thinks they're telling him it's all going south, and by the way, I think the Turks, although I don't see this reflected in the Israeli media that I read, and uh, you could correct me, but Yaakov, but I tend to think the Turks, who I think, you know, they're pro-brotherhood in many ways, and I not a lot of sympathy, I think, for Erdogan and and his really horrific statements about Israel and the Holocaust, and just terrible. But from what I hear, the Turks are saying to Hamas, it's enough already, that you're with your armed forces, you gotta be a political party. Now, Israelis would say, what? Them as a political party, you know, they will ensure that there's never coexistence. But the Turks will say that that it's a loser. And even the Egyptians, when I was there, I don't say even the Egyptians, I mean, they remember the Jamai Slamiyyah, you know, in the 90s, who who ran around Egypt with guns, and and Egypt just wiped them out. I mean, they they were really, you know, and and they told me, David, we wouldn't live with this, okay? We would not live with this. And I was trying to say, well, you've got to make your voices heard more, because people don't hear that. Like, you know, you see the b the Hamas as the Brotherhood and against you. But um, but they we need to hear their voices more, and I think but Trump will respond to the wealthy Arabs. If the wealthy Arabs say, hey, you know, this is getting too hot to handle for us, and you promised us, and that's why we signed on to the ceasefire. I wouldn't count Trump out. I also think for Trump that he does see the ceasefire as a diplomatic achievement. And for it to just like, you know, fizzle out or, you know, I think he will not he will not be a happy camper, but that doesn't mean he keeps up with every nuance uh uh, you know, in this uh soap opera.

SPEAKER_00 28:26

And I think also, you know, and I've heard this from people on the Board of Peace, they do understand that with Israel's elections uh coming up around the corner on October 27th, nothing really is going to happen until then. And and it will be a decision, you know. I mean, famously we probably you probably remember this, David, 2015 before the election, Netanyahu, who says, and this was Barack Obama years, and there will never be a Palestinian state. He says that right before the elections, he wins the election, and then he says, Yeah, still committed to the two-state solution, right? I mean, so you know, whatever you I always tell people, whatever you hear a politician in Israel say in the term in the in this in these three months now until the elections, it means nothing. It really doesn't mean anything.

SPEAKER_01 29:07

I agree. No, they they're now in all base mode, you know, just trying in America, you used to be elections were one in the middle. So it was the general election when people kind of moved to the middle. But uh certainly in Israel, it's uh you could argue the United States is moving in that way too, because of a long thing I could talk about, this you know, safe seats and how seats are being carved up by legislatures on the state level. You know, there's more appealing to the base in America too in an election cycle. But you were right, and I've been saying this like I I feel in some way we're just treading water here on this issue until after the the elections are over. Um but um I mean I do think it's important to get certain ideas out there, but I don't expect the politicians to be the ones to convey any creative thinking between now and the elections.

SPEAKER_00 30:01

In America, there's a term called an October surprise, right? Ahead of elections that are held there in November. We have our elections October 27th, and the the October surprises that I hear people talk about is either, you know, anything that could help Netanyahu potentially. And what could that be? So either you said you alluded to this before, uh, a new Gaza offensive if Hamas refuses to disarm, although that might be a little too early based on whatever the timeline is from the Board of Peace. But that's option one. Option two is a renewal of uh hostilities with Iran that might lead to the fall or the collapse of the regime. Highly unlikely. I don't I don't see how that happens, but you know what? Never say never in the Middle East. And maybe another option is some normalization agreement, maybe with the Saudis, maybe somebody else. Is there any option for any of this? I mean, do you see any of these options as realistic, David?

SPEAKER_01 30:58

Look, I let's start with the last one. And uh, you know, Yaakov, I love sports analogies. So, I mean, if there was a Saudi-Israeli normalization, it would be the Super Bowl of all peace agreements. Uh, it would basically end the Arab Sunni state struggle since 1948. It would bring in Muslim countries, I think like Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world. The Saudis would want to show they're not the Emiratis that, you know, that they bring a lot of people to the table with them. The reality though is toothfold, and they're the same issue in a certain way, which is the Saudis have conveyed, I won't say, you know, to who, but I think at an authoritative level, they, you know, there's just no way anything's gonna happen before the elections because they don't want to give that prize to BB. They understand that whoever does that is a Nobel Peace Prize winner. Trump wants that, maybe he'll thinks he can get two Nobel Prizes. I don't know, but I tend to think they do not want to, they will see that move as crowning Netanyahu as the next prime minister for the next four years. And also it relates to a related point, so it's kind of a similar point, that we need something, something on the Palestinian issue. We know there's no two states tomorrow. We know that, we know the trauma of October 7th, and we're we we get that, but something that we could tell our people in Saudi Arabia and in the Muslim world that we didn't sell out the Palestinians. And they just don't see that as happening between now and the election. So it's it might be personal with Netanyahu, but it's also policy. They don't believe it's possible to get anything. So I'm I'm a uh, you know, I'm a big uh you know, not believer uh in that, um, that that is possible. The fighting options, I think, is gonna depend a lot on Trump. Uh, because on that one, BB wants to be able to tell the Israeli people that he and Trump are Trump might not endorse him like he we thought earlier in the year, but that Trump and him are basically in sync, even though we've seen so many cases now with Lebanon and Iran where that is not the case. But I don't think a fight, you know, going back to the fight without U.S. authorization, I think would be um too big. I um Yaqov, I'm I'm using this as a brainstorm without without realizing someone is gonna take this loop and hold it against me for the rest of my life. So I'm I'm taking a risk by saying what I'm about to say. I'm not saying I I agree with this anyway, okay, but I'm just trying to play out a scenario you and I haven't mentioned because I want to think out of the box. What if, what if Hamas has always felt the Likud is is like, you know, the face they want to portray of Israel to the world. And certainly in the last few years, you know, it's been very difficult. What if Hamas does something neither you nor I expect and starts decommissioning weapons on October 15th? And BB could say, You see these photos? These are the photos of something where we're our war, we changed the Middle East, and Hamas is disarming. Now, people will be skeptical, they will say it's only for a show, it's only for a few weeks. It can't be like it's just a yeah, but it's a victory image, and that in a strange way, Hamas uh will see having Netanyahu as their foil, you know, helps them with many different constituencies, and who knows, a different leader in Israel could really hurt them a lot. So better the liquid would be.

SPEAKER_00 34:53

What is it called? Four four-dimensional chess or something? Is that yeah, I know.

SPEAKER_01 34:57

Yeah, I'm not I I by the way, I'm sure you're not thinking this, and but none of your listeners are thinking it. But just in case, I'll say it. I am not assuming any collusion, God forbid, between Hamas and the Likud. Okay, I'm not. I'm not.

SPEAKER_00 35:10

But I'm saying but I'll I'll strengthen, I'll reinforce what you're saying, David. I mean, listen, they BB was a known commodity, Hamas was a known commodity. That all exploded on October 7th, but there were there were understandings not written, never discussed, but they kind of each understood the other one and what each side would do. Having the Likud and having that right-wing government in in power does mean a continuation to some extent of the conflict from the Hamas's perspective, which does serve their interests, as opposed to now, let's take the extreme side. You got Irgolan, Meretz, Labor, Democrats. Somebody says two-state solution, peace with the Palestinians. Hamas doesn't want that. So I think what you're saying has some validity.

SPEAKER_01 35:51

Yeah. Yeah, yeah. I'm just thinking when we think October scenarios, October surprises, we're thinking about Saudi normalization, which I think is is is highly unlikely. But like I'm trying to think, what am I not thinking? I'm always trying to like torture myself that way. And I think a decommissioning uh before the elections could give Netanyahu uh a boost that that that he he definitely would like.

SPEAKER_00 36:19

It's an interesting perspective, which I did not think of. And that's why. I know, that's why we're there to challenge each other.

SPEAKER_01 36:26

Always happy to help.

SPEAKER_00 36:27

Yeah, well, thank you so much, David. Thank you so much for joining us. Really enlightening um and trying to make make some order of this whole Balagan, this whole mess that we have when it comes to Gaza. So thank you very much.

SPEAKER_01 36:39

Thank you very much, and uh and keep up your good work, Yaakov. And uh it's a delight to be with you. I want to be clear that I'm understood on Hamas. I have no inside source that this is going to happen. Uh uh, but I'm just thinking we just got to think out of the box and think of different scenarios. That's all.

unknown 36:55

Thank you.

SPEAKER_01 36:56

Thank you for having me.