Episode 4 Season 1 : The Essence of Louisianas Exonerations

This is a call to action for the Juneteenth organizations, Black Ministers, Fraternities, Sororities and all right thinking counterparts that celebrate Dr. King and all the soldiers involved in the Civil Rights Movement that worked so hard for us to have equal justice and be treated fairly in the Courts. 

Ask yourself, can we really continue to ignore the fact that those we pay to represent us in State courts be allowed to withhold exculpatory material evidence from the Defense without us demanding that there be major Accountability under the fullest extent of the law...

Yes, there are Federal and State laws that forbid such behaviors, they just haven't been applied when it comes to black people being wrongfully convicted and later exonerated. 

In addition to pursuing investigations into State Prosecutors that participate in these offensive behaviors, as a lower level of Accountability there are State Bar Rules that govern State Prosecutors but, even those have rarely been utilized when it comes to taking the freedom of a black man or other wrongfully convicted person that was later exonerated. 

This case went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court but, what happened in the lower Louisiana Courts details the steps the Court found State Prosecutors took that resulted in what was later found to be a wrongful conviction that later resulted in an exoneration. 

Be sure to listen to each Episode of the Judge's rulings because it should make you wonder as it does me:  Why All the Disrespect for black men and others? Why all the Disrespect for the law?  Why all the Disrespect for the safety of the public and public trust? Why all the Disrespect for the Rules that govern lawyers? 

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Transcript

SPEAKER_01 0:03

I can't buy my tongue. I gotta put my tongue but take them down with the weakened court. Yeah, we take them back, put them back down. You would throw him in to the push and wall back up. Take them down, dummy we've been a court, take them down, put the wheat in the court, take 'em up, wake 'em up, gotta know the fact.

SPEAKER_00 0:24

You would throw them in, put a push-umble, pop, because this case was brought against the DA's office and the district attorneys in their official capacities, JT must prove that the violation of his constitutional rights was the product of a policy or custom of the DA's office. See Minnell v. Department of Social Services 436 U.S. 658-694. Certain actions of a policymaker can also subject a governmental entity to liability under Section 1983. See Woodard v. Andrus 419, Federal Third, 348, 352, Fifth Circuit, 2005. In this case, the District Court determined that Conock, as district attorney, was a policymaker for the DA's office. With respect to claims that a constitutional violation was caused by the government's failure to train its employees, a plaintiff must prove that the government was deliberately indifferent to the need to train. City of Canton v. Harris, 489-U.S. 378-388-289. Quote, only where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city policy or custom that is actionable under section 1983. Here, the jury rejected JT's argument that Connock's Brady policy was unconstitutional, but accepted the argument that Conock was deliberately indifferent to the need to train on Brady issues. On appeal, defendants set forth numerous arguments as to why the jury could not reasonably have concluded that Conock acted with deliberate indifference. 1. No pattern of similar violations. Defendants first argue that there was no evidence of a pattern of similar Brady violations, and that such a pattern is necessary to establish deliberate indifference. JT does not argue that there was evidence of a pattern, but instead contends that evidence of a pattern is not always necessary for a finding of deliberate indifference. In City of Canton, the Supreme Court set the degree of fault for a failure to train case as deliberate indifference. 489 U.S. at 388-109 Supreme Court 1197. In elaborating on that standard, the court stated that it may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees, the need for more or different training is so obvious and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. ID at 390-109 Supreme Court 1197. The court then included an example in a footnote. For example, city policymakers know to a moral certainty that their police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons. The city has armed its officers with firearms, in part to allow them to accomplish this task. Thus, the need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force can be said to be so obvious that failure to do so could properly be characterized as deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. It could also be that the police, in exercising their discretion, so often violate constitutional rights that the need for further training must have been plainly obvious to the city policymakers, who, nevertheless, are deliberately indifferent to the need. ID at 390, number 10, 109, Supreme Court 1197. Thus, the Supreme Court recognized two possible methods of showing deliberate indifference. One, when the need for training is obvious based on the nature of the conduct at issue and the potential for harm, and two, when there is a pattern of violations that makes it obvious to city policymakers that more training is necessary. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the possibility that a plaintiff could prove deliberate indifference without having to show a pattern of constitutional violations in Board of the County Commissioners versus Brown 520 U.S. 397-409 when it observed in leaving open in Canton the possibility that a plaintiff might succeed in carrying a failure to train claim without showing a pattern of constitutional violations, we simply hypothesize that, in a narrow range of circumstances, a violation of federal rights may be a highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle recurring situations. The likelihood that the situation will recur and the predictability that an officer lacking specific tools to handle that situation will violate citizens' rights could justify a finding that policymakers' decision not to train the officer reflected deliberate indifference to the obvious consequence of the policymaker's choice, namely a violation of a specific constitutional or statutory right. Therefore, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a pattern of constitutional violations is not always a prerequisite to a showing of deliberate indifference. However, the court has limited those situations to circumstances in which the need for training is obvious and when the violation of rights is a highly predictable consequence of the failure to train. Fifth Circuit case law is not to the contrary. None of the cases cited by defendants in support of the pattern requirement states that evidence of a pattern is always necessary. Instead, the cases all qualify the requirement by stating that a pattern is generally or usually necessary. See, for example, Rios versus City of Del Rio 444, Federal Third, 417, 427, Fifth Circuit 2006, stating that proof of deliberate indifference generally requires the plaintiff to demonstrate a pattern of violations. This court's precedent is thus consistent with the Supreme Court's limitation of single incident liability to the narrow circumstances in which the need for training is obvious and when the violation of rights is a highly predictable consequence of the failure to train. Indeed, this court has explicitly recognized that a single incident of misconduct can, in the right circumstances, give rise to a claim of deliberate indifference. See Roberts v. City of Shreveport 397, Federal III, 287, 295, Fifth Circuit 2005. Discussing the Supreme Court's description in Board of the County Commissioners vs. Brown of when a single act may be sufficient to prove deliberate indifference. Burge vs. St. Tammany Parish, Burge 2, 336, Federal III, 363, 373, Fifth Circuit, 2003, recognizing potential applicability of single incident liability, where, quote, the facts giving rise to the violation are such that it should have been apparent to the policymaker that a constitutional violation was the highly predictable consequence of a particular policy or failure to train. End quote. Brown versus Bryan County, 219, Federal Third, 450, 463, Fifth Circuit, 2000. Permitting a jury finding of liability for deliberate indifference where no pattern of similar incidences existed in a case involving a failure to train or supervise. Consequently, the fact that JT did not establish a pattern of Brady violations by the DA's office is not dispositive of his claims. Further, the evidence developed at trial clearly demonstrates that this case falls within the Supreme Court's description of the narrow range of situations that do not require a pattern of misconduct before deliberate indifference can be shown. Here, there was evidence that Connick was aware that the attorneys in the DA's office would be required to confront Brady issues on a regular basis and that failure to properly handle those issues would result in constitutional violations for criminal defendants. As Connock testified. Of course. Question. And would you also agree with me that you also knew that if the favorable evidence came into possession of the state and if it wasn't produced to the defense, the result of that would be a violation of the accused's constitutional rights? Answer. Yes. JT's legal expert, Joseph Lawless, further testified, every district attorney knows that at some point in a prosecutor's career, they're going to come into possession of evidence that tends to be exculpatory of a defendant or tends to impeach other witnesses. And they also understand that failure to turn that information over under Brady is going to result in a serious constitutional violation of a criminal defendant's rights. There was also evidence that the need to train about Brady was obvious. Many of the attorney witnesses in this case testified that Brady was a gray area, subject to interpretation. Connack stated that Brady is, quote, an elastic thing, according to some of the justices too, and that makes it a little more difficult to find a standing definition of what Brady is. It depends on the evidence, I guess, but primarily the interpretation of Brady by judges. End quote. Williams, who prosecuted JT for both the armed robbery and the murder, testified as follows. Question. Even though you went to law school and you read case reports and you read opinions as they came out, there were still gray areas regarding Brady to an educated lawyer such as yourself? Williams. Yes. Whitaker agreed with that same sentiment. Question. You would agree with me that under Brady there can be some gray areas. Whitaker. Correct. Question. Sometimes it's not crystal clear whether a document or piece of information has to be turned over to the defense or not. Answer. That's true. Besides the difficulty in interpreting Brady, there was evidence that many of the attorneys in the DA's office were only a few years out of law school and thus lacking the legal experience that could have helped them clarify Brady issues without additional training. Question. Would you agree with me that in 1985 many of the assistants, the assistant district attorneys in your office were coming fresh out of law school? Conick. Yes. Question. And in 1985 you had section chiefs that were less than four years out of law school, like mister DuBellier, for example? Answer. Yes. Whitaker further testified. Question. And decisions on whether to produce Brady material, whether material was Brady material and had to be produced. Those kinds of decisions would sometimes get made by inexperienced lawyers just a few weeks out of law school with no training? Whitaker. I imagine that's certainly possible, yes. Finally, Whitaker also testified that training in Brady would have been helpful. Question It would have been helpful to have a little training, wouldn't it? To kind of show you when you started what the Brady rule was so you could deal especially with those gray areas? Whitaker. I think it would be a good thing, yes. Thus, the jury heard evidence that attorneys, often fresh out of law school, would undoubtedly be required to confront Brady issues while at the DA's office, that erroneous decisions regarding Brady evidence would result in serious constitutional violations, that resolution of Brady issues was often unclear, and that training in Brady would have been helpful. Consequently, JT has met his burden of demonstrating that it was obvious that training about Brady was necessary, and that a highly predictable consequence of failing to train attorneys about Brady was the infringement of the constitutional rights of those accused of crimes such as JT. Footnote 12. No pattern of similar violations was necessary to put Connick on notice that training on Brady's requirements was needed. Footnote 13. Therefore, under the tests set out in the city of Canton and Board of the County Commissioners versus Brown, JT did not need to prove a pattern of Brady violations to demonstrate that the failure to train was deliberately indifferent. And the district court did not err in denying JT's motion for judgment as a matter of law on that ground. See Walker versus City of New York 974, Federal 2nd, 293, 300, 2nd Circuit, 1992, finding that a plaintiff sufficiently alleged deliver indifference in failing to train on Brady even though no pattern of violations was mentioned. Defendants next contend that Deegan's unanticipated action in intentionally hiding the blood evidence in violation of Connick's policy requires the conclusion that Connick was not deliberately indifferent and breaks any causal link between the alleged failure to train and JT's injury. JT responds that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Deegan was not solely responsible for the constitutional violations in this case. Defendants first argue that there must be evidence that Conock knew of and failed to control Deegan's known propensity for violating the constitutional rights of others to demonstrate deliberate indifference. See Roberts 397, Federal III at 292. This assertion is incorrect. Failing to control an employee's known propensity for violating the law is only one of several ways to demonstrate deliberate indifference. See Sims versus Adams 537 Federal 2nd 82931 through 32, Fifth Circuit, 1976, listing multiple ways to establish a supervisory defendant's Section 1983 liability, including failure to act despite knowledge of an employee's propensity for misconduct. In Roberts, the court confronted a situation in which the training was adequate. 397, Federal III, at 294, referencing the overwhelming evidence that the officer was adequately trained. In light of this, the plaintiff in that case had to prove that the police chief knew that, despite his training, the officer was still committing improper acts. The plaintiff failed to show inadequate training generally. Thus, failing to demonstrate that Deegan had a known propensity for hiding Brady material is not dispositive of JT's claim. He did not pursue that theory of liability, but rather alleged a failure to adequately train, supervise, and monitor. Defendants next cite the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Shaw v. Stroud, 13 Federal 3rd, 791, 799, Fourth Circuit, 1994, for the proposition that a supervisor cannot reasonably be expected to guard against the deliberate criminal acts of his properly trained employees when he has no basis upon which to anticipate the misconduct. Although we have no grounds to disagree with that statement, the Fourth Circuit's reasoning is not entirely applicable in this case. Shaw refers to anticipating misconduct from, quote, properly trained employees, end quote. ID. As discussed later in this opinion, there was evidence that the attorneys in this case were not trained on Brady's requirements. Therefore, Shaw does not mandate a verdict for defendants. Defendants also generally allege that Deegan's confession to Realman exculpates them from any failure to train because Deegan intentionally acted against his training in suppressing the evidence. However, defendants read more into Deegan's statement to Realman than is actually there. According to Realman's affidavit, quote, the late Jerry Deegan said to me that he had intentionally suppressed blood evidence in the armed robbery trial of JT. That in some way exculpated the defendant, end quote. At trial, Realman recalled that Deegan made this statement in April 1994, shortly after Deegan had been diagnosed with terminal cancer. To begin with, Realman's statement that Deegan's act was, quote unquote, intentional does not necessarily mean that Deegan acted with criminal intent. It could be interpreted by the jury to mean that Deegan's actions were deliberate and that he did not accidentally lose the evidence. Further, Deegan never explained why he suppressed the evidence. It could be that Deegan did not understand his Brady obligations at that time, but in the period between 1985 and his confession in 1994, he came to understand that his actions were wrong. As described earlier, several of the former assistant district attorneys testified that their Brady obligations were not always clear. It is not unreasonable to conclude that Deegan suffered from a similar lack of understanding. Footnote 14. The evidence defendants presented was also ambiguous as to whether Deegan was the only person who was aware of the blood evidence. Realman's testimony at trial confirmed the uncertainty of his recollection of Deegan's statement. Did he say that anyone else was involved with the suppression or did he just simply say, I did it? Realman. He may have said that someone else was involved, but I don't recall. Realman also explained that he could not say whether Deegan told him that Dubalier or Williams were involved. Further, Realman admitted that he did not know to what piece of evidence Deegan was referring. The bloody pants leg, the blood report, or both. Question. Mr. Deegan didn't tell you specifically about a blood report as opposed to blood evidence, did he? Realman, I don't remember exactly what he said. Thus, Realman's recollection of Deegan's confession does not rule out the possibility that somebody else could have been involved in the suppression of either the bloody pants leg or the blood report.