Episode 3 Season 1: The Exonerations of Louisianas Exonerations

This is a call to action for the Juneteenth organizations, Black Ministers, Fraternities, Sororities and all right thinking counterparts that celebrate Dr. King and all the soldiers involved in the Civil Rights Movement that worked so hard for us to have equal justice and be treated fairly in the Courts. 

Ask yourself, can we really continue to ignore the fact that those we pay to represent us in State courts be allowed to withhold exculpatory material evidence from the Defense without us demanding that there be major Accountability under the fullest extent of the law.

Yes, there are Federal and State laws that forbid such behaviors, they just haven't been applied when it comes to black people being wrongfully convicted and later exonerated. 

In addition to pursuing investigations into State Prosecutors that participate in these offensive behaviors, as a lower level of Accountability there are State Bar Rules that govern State Prosecutors but, even those have rarely been utilized when it comes to taking the freedom of a black man or other wrongfully convicted person that was later exonerated. 

This case went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court but, what happened in the lower Louisiana Courts details the steps the Court found State Prosecutors took that resulted in what was later found to be a wrongful conviction that later resulted in an exoneration. 

Be sure to listen to each Episode of the Judge's rulings because it should make you wonder as it does me:  Why All the Disrespect for black men and others? Why all the Disrespect for the law?  Why all the Disrespect for the safety of the public and public trust? Why all the Disrespect for the Rules that govern lawyers? 

Fair Use Disclaimer: The copyright laws of the United States recognizes a " fair use" of copyrighted content. Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act States "Not withstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of copyrighted work including such use of reproduction in copies of phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching , scholarship or research, is not an infringement of copyright."

This podcast and or Youtube video channel in general may contain copyrighted works that were not specifically authorized to be used by the copyright holder(s), but which we believe in good faith are protected by federal law and the fair use doctrine for one or more of the reasons noted above. 

If you have any specific concerns about any of the audios/videos or our position on fair use please contact us

Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:03

I can't fight my dog. I gotta fight my dog but we've been a course. Yeah, we fight them back, put the black back, you would throw them in, put a push-mool, back, take them down, don't we in the course, take them down, put the weakened course, take 'em up, break 'em up, gotta fight.

SPEAKER_01 0:24

You would throw them in, put a push-umble, back, Thompson further asserts that other Brady evidence was not turned over as required. Several police reports containing eyewitness descriptions of the murderer that did not match JT's description were not turned over to the defense, despite the defense's request for all police reports containing descriptions inconsistent with JT's general appearance. For example, one police report indicated that Mr. S described the perpetrator as having, quote, close-cut hair, end quote, and made no reference to an quote, Afro style, end quote, haircut. At the time of the murder, JT's hair was decidedly Afro-style, while alias number two's was close-cut. JT also asserts that the DA's office did not disclose the fact that alias number one received a monetary award from Mr. L's family for identifying the murderer. Following this day of execution, Connick moved to vacate the armed robbery conviction and did not retry JT for that crime. Footnote six. Conock also convened a grand jury to investigate the concealment of the blood evidence, but eventually dismissed the grand jury. John Glass, Glass, the assistant district attorney who was prosecuting the concealment charges, resigned in protest of the dismissal and testified in the instant case that the evidence supported the charges. JT filed for post-conviction relief on the murder conviction, and in 2001, the criminal district court changed his death sentence to life in prison, as the attempted armed robbery conviction had been used as evidence against him during the sentencing phase. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed JT's murder conviction in 2002, finding that the attempted armed robbery conviction unconstitutionally deprived JT of his right to testify in his own defense at his murder trial. The DA's office retried JT for Mr. L's murder, and, free of the attempted armed robbery conviction, JT testified in his own defense. In addition, JT was able to use 13 pieces of evidence that the prosecutors did not turn over during the first murder trial. This evidence included the police and incident reports described above, photographs, statements by alias number two and alias number one, an audio tape of alias number one, and information regarding the monetary award given to alias number one. Alias No. Alias No. 4, and alias number five, eyewitnesses who the police had not previously disclosed to JT also testified about the Mr. L murder. Alias No. 2, the DA's office's key witness in the first murder trial, had been killed during the interval between the first and second trial. However, the state court permitted the DA's office to read relevant portions of alias number two's testimony in the first trial, and JT's lawyers were permitted to state the questions they would have propounded on cross-examination. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty in 35 minutes. JT was then released from prison 18 years after he was initially arrested. Section 2, Procedural History. JT filed suit on July 16, 2003, naming as defendants the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, Conock, Williams, Dubelair, and Eddie Jordan, the district attorney in 2003, in their official capacities, and Conock in his individual capacity. Collectively, defendants. JT brought state law claims for malicious prosecution and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, as well as a claim under 42 USC Section 1983 for wrongful suppression of exculpatory evidence and a conspiracy claim under 42 USC Section 1985. The District Court granted summary judgment for defendants on the state law claims on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity, but permitted the federal claims to go forward. The parties presented the case to a jury from February 5th to 9th, 2007. Prior to the trial, JT dismissed the claim against Conock in his individual capacity, and after JT rested, the District Court dismissed the Section 1985 3 conspiracy claim. At the close of evidence, the District Court ruled that Dubalier and Williams were not, quote-unquote, policymakers, and thus their actions could not create liability on behalf of the DAA's office. It also ruled and stated in the jury instructions that the non-disclosure of the blood evidence and the resulting infringement on JT's right to testify in the murder trial violated his constitutional rights. Footnote 7. Therefore, the arguments of the parties focused on whether the DA's office had an unconstitutional policy regarding Brady evidence and whether the DA's office adequately trained, monitored, and supervised its attorneys regarding their Brady obligations. Following three and a half days of testimony, the jury was asked the following two questions concerning liability. Number one, was the Brady violation in the armed robbery case or any infringements of JT's rights in the murder trial substantially caused by an official policy of the district attorney? Number two, was the Brady violation in the armed robbery case or any infringements of JT's rights in the murder trial substantially caused by the district attorney's failure through deliberate indifference to establish policies and procedures to protect one accused of a crime from these constitutional violations. If the jury answered yes to either question, it was instructed to answer a third question regarding damages. Question 3. Please state what sum of money, if any, would reasonably and fairly compensate JT for damages he has actually suffered or is reasonably likely to suffer in the future as a result of the district attorney's policy or deliberate indifference? A little more than three hours after the jury recessed to begin deliberations, it sent out a note which read, What does deliberate indifference mean? Does it mean intentional, or would failure to monitor be considered deliberate? After discussing the issue with the attorneys, the district court sent in the following response. Deliberate indifference does not necessarily mean intentional, but does require more than mere negligence, sick, or even gross negligence. Please refer to pages 26 and 27 of the legal instructions for further guidance. The court had originally instructed the jury that to find liability for deliberate indifference under the second question, it had to conclude that, quote, the district attorney's failure to adequately train, monitor, or supervise amounted to deliberate indifference to the fact that inaction would obviously result in a constitutional violation. End quote. Pages 26 and 27 of the jury instructions clarified. In order to find that the district attorney's failure to adequately train, monitor, or supervise amounted to deliberate indifference, you must find that JT has proved each of the following three things by a preponderance of the evidence. First, the district attorney was certain the prosecutors would confront the situation where they would have to decide which evidence was required by the Constitution to be provided to an accused. Second, the situation involved a difficult choice, or one that prosecutors had a history of mishandling, such that additional training, supervision, or monitoring was clearly needed. Third, the wrong choice by a prosecutor in that situation will frequently cause a deprivation of an accused's constitutional rights. Less than half an hour later, the jury returned its verdict, answering no to the first question regarding whether the harm was caused by an official policy. The jury answered yes to the second question regarding whether the harm was caused by a deliberately indifferent failure to establish policies and procedures. The verdict form reflects that at some point the jury checked no in response to the second question, but it crossed it out and checked yes. The jury then awarded JT $14 million in damages. Footnote 8. The District Court entered a judgment in that amount against Conock, Dubalier, Williams, and Jordan in their official capacities and against the DA's office jointly and in soled. Defendants filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a motion to amend or alter the judgment, and a motion for a new trial. The district court denied all three motions. The district court granted JT's motion for attorney's fees and awarded him $1,031,841.79, entering a separate judgment to that effect. Defendants appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC Section 1291 as a final judgment has been entered. Section 3. Statute of limitations. On appeal, defendants first argue that the District Court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the statute of limitations barred JT's claim of a Brady violation in the armed robbery trial for the non-disclosure of blood evidence. The district court held that JT could not have brought suit prior to July 17, 2002, when the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned JT's murder conviction. Therefore, JT's suit was timely brought within one year of that day, July 16, 2003. Defendants argue that JT's claims accrued prior to July 17, 2002, and thus that his suit was untimely. We review a district court's ruling on summary judgment de novo. To determine the statute of limitations for an action brought pursuant to section 1983, we look to the Forum State's personal injury limitations period. In this instance, Louisiana's personal injury limitations period is one year. The parties do not dispute that a one-year statute of limitations applies to this case. Instead, their dispute centers on when the one-year period began to run. Defendants propose two dates when JT's claims accrued. One, June 29, 1999, when JT's armed robbery conviction was vacated, insofar as the claim arises from the Brady violation during the armed robbery trial. And second, May 26, 2001, when JT's death sentence was changed to life in prison, insofar as the claim asserts damages he suffered while incarcerated on death row. Use of either date would result in all or part of JT's suit being barred by limitations. JT counters that under Heck v. Humphrey 512 U.S. 477, he could not have filed suit until July 17, 2002, the day the Court of Appeals reversed his murder conviction. Because his action was filed within one year of that day, JT contends it was timely. The District Court agreed with JT, basing its decision on Heck and the Louisiana Court of Appeals decision that the withheld blood evidence caused JT not to testify in his murder trial. We thus turn to Heck's application in these circumstances. Pursuant to HEC, a plaintiff must prove that a conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before the plaintiff may proceed with a civil suit for damages for wrongful conviction or imprisonment. See also Wallace, 127, Supreme Court at 1098, holding that the HEC rule delays what would otherwise be the accrual date of a tort action until the setting aside of an extant conviction which success in that tort action would impugn. The HECT court elaborated on the standard as follows. If it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit. 512 U.S. at 487, 114, Supreme Court 2364. Footnote omitted. Thus, for example, if JT had attempted to bring suit for a Brady violation related to his attempted armed robbery conviction prior to when that conviction was vacated, his claim would have been barred by Heck because a finding that the government withheld exculpatory evidence would necessarily imply the invalidity of JT's armed robbery conviction. See ID at 479-490-114 Supreme Court 2364. Dismissing claim that government had destroyed exculpatory evidence because conviction had not been vacated. In the instant case, the rationale underlying the decision by the District Court is that a suit regarding the withheld blood evidence in the armed robbery case would have called the murder conviction into doubt. Therefore, until the murder conviction was overturned, Heck would have barred any civil suit. The key on appeal, then, is whether a finding that the DA's office withheld the blood evidence in the armed robbery case in violation of Brady would, quote, necessarily imply, end quote, that the murder conviction was invalid. If not, then JT's suit regarding the armed robbery could have been brought as soon as the attempted armed robbery conviction was vacated in 1999, and that portion of JT's suit would be untimely. When reversing JT's murder conviction, the Louisiana Appeals Court concluded that JT, quote, would have testified at his murder trial, but for the improper attempted armed robbery conviction, end quote. Defendants have offered no argument in opposition to this conclusion. Moreover, defendants' actions inextricably linked the two trials. Defendants stipulated that they sought to reverse the order of the armed robbery and murder trials because, quote, a conviction of JT on the armed robbery charge would effectively preclude JT from taking the witness stand in his own defense at the murder trial, and that the armed robbery conviction could be used in the penalty phase of the murder trial to obtain a death sentence. Footnote 10. Therefore, JT's failure to testify at his murder trial may be directly attributed to the district attorney's conduct that resulted in the Brady violation in the armed robbery case. A criminal defendant's opportunity to testify in his own defense is a constitutionally protected right. ROC v. Arkansas 483 U.S. 4451. In this case, the Louisiana Court determined that JT was wrongfully denied his right to testify by the DA's office's conduct. The court further held that the violation of JT's right to testify was structural error, not reviewable for harmlessness, and that, as a consequence, JT was entitled to an automatic reversal of his murder conviction. Because it is undisputed that the Brady violation and the armed robbery case prevented JT from testifying in his murder trial, and because the Louisiana court found That reversal of the murder trial was an automatic result of the violation in the armed robbery trial. JT's lawsuit regarding the Brady violation in the armed robbery case necessarily implied that JT's murder conviction was invalid. Confer Edwards v. Balasok 520 U.S. 641 647 through 48, holding that success on a claim alleging structural error and bias on the part of the decision maker, which was not reviewable for harmlessness, quote, necessarily implies the invalidity of the punishment imposed, end quote. Therefore, as the district court correctly held, pursuant to HEC, JT could not have brought suit regarding the Brady violation in the armed robbery case until his murder conviction was overturned. Footnote 11. As a result, JT's claims in this case did not accrue until July 17, 2002, when the Court of Appeals vacated his murder conviction. JT filed suit within one year of that date, and thus his lawsuit is not barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Consequently, we affirm the District Court's denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment on this point. B. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Defendants next contend that the evidence admitted at trial does not support a finding of deliberate indifference. Defendants raised this issue in their motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, which the district court denied. This court reviews the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. However, our standard of review with respect to a jury verdict is especially deferential. We can reverse the jury's verdict only if, quote, the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in the movement's favor that reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion. End quote. Navigant Consulting Inc. vs. Wilkinson, 508, Federal 3rd, 277, 282, Fifth Circuit, 2007. We must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movent and quote, disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Evans vs. Ford Motor Company 484, Federal Third, 329, 334, Fifth Circuit, 2007. We may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.