Episode 1 Season 1: The Essence of Louisianas Exonerations

This is a call to action for the Juneteenth organizations, Black Ministers, Fraternities, Sororities and all right thinking counterparts that celebrate Dr. King and all the soldiers involved in the Civil Rights Movement that worked so hard for us to have equal justice and be treated fairly in the Courts. 

Ask yourself, can we really continue to ignore the fact that those we pay to represent us in State courts be allowed to withhold exculpatory material evidence from the Defense without us demanding that there be major Accountability under the fullest extent of the law...

Yes, there are Federal and State laws that forbid such behaviors, they just haven't been applied when it comes to black people being wrongfully convicted and later exonerated. 

In addition to pursuing investigations into State Prosecutors that participate in these offensive behaviors, as a lower level of Accountability there are State Bar Rules that govern State Prosecutors but, even those have rarely been utilized when it comes to taking the freedom of a black man or other wrongfully convicted person that was later exonerated. 

This case went all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court but, what happened in the lower Louisiana Courts details the steps the Court found State Prosecutors took that resulted in what was later found to be a wrongful conviction that later resulted in an exoneration. 

Be sure to listen to each Episode of the Judge's rulings because it should make you wonder as it does me:  Why All the Disrespect for black men and others? Why all the Disrespect for the law?  Why all the Disrespect for the safety of the public and public trust? Why all the Disrespect for the Rules that govern lawyers? 

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Transcript

SPEAKER_01 0:03

I can't bite my tongue, though. I gotta share my thoughts. About to take 'em down to the Louisiana courts. Yeah, we taking measure. And it's like that. You attuned in to the Twisted Rules podcast, though. Take 'em down to the Louisiana courts. Take them down to the Louisiana courts.

unknown 0:22

Shake 'em up, wake 'em up.

SPEAKER_01 0:23

Gotta know the facts. You were tuned in to the Twisted Rules Podcast. Let's go.

SPEAKER_00 0:36

Hey y'all, come on in. Come with me on this virtual trip to the criminal courts of Louisiana. If you ever wondered how so many wrongful convictions happen, you're about to find out. So get your bowl of gumbo and let's go down this road to the essence of Louisiana's exonerations. JT spent a total of 18 years in prison, 14 of them on death row. He was later exonerated of the crimes he was convicted. Unlike many other wrongfully convicted exonerees, JT decided he wanted to go after the prosecutors and the DA involved in his wrongful conviction. He wanted them held accountable for his wrongful conviction. He filed a civil suit against the prosecutors, the DA, and the DA's office. The prosecutors and the DA, of course, weren't used to exonerees coming after them because they're usually immune from civil suit. But JT's lawyers found a way. And it worked. A win for a brother. At this stage, anyway. Here's the judge's ruling on the prosecutor's motion to dismiss JT's civil suit.

SPEAKER_02 1:43

Order and reasons. Before the court is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12B6, filed by defendants Eric Dubalier and James Williams in their official capacities as former assistant district attorneys. The motion is opposed. After considering the motion, opposition, and the applicable law, the court finds that the motion should be denied. On April 11 and 12, 1985, plaintiff was prosecuted in Orleans Parish Criminal District Court and convicted of attempted armed robbery. Then, on May 5 through 8, 1985, plaintiff was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for first-degree murder, again in Orleans Parish Criminal District Court. Plaintiff exhausted his post-conviction relief available in state court, and on February 27, 1997, he filed a habeas corpus action in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana. After conducting an exhaustive review of the state court pleadings and records available at that time, the district court denied plaintiff's application for habeas relief. Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision, which was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. On April 16, 1999, the state trial court set plaintiff's execution date for May 20, 1999. On April 29, 1999, plaintiff's counsel met with Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorneys and were provided with documents regarding blood evidence in the attempted armed robbery case that had not been turned over before trial. On May 2nd, 1999, the trial court stayed plaintiff's execution. Plaintiff's blood was tested and determined to be different than the blood of the assailant in the armed robbery case. Consequently, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and on June 29, 1999, the court vacated the attempted armed robbery conviction. Plaintiff then filed for additional post-conviction relief with respect to his murder conviction. On October 26, 2000, the trial court conducted a hearing and reversed plaintiff's death sentence, but did not award him a new murder trial. Plaintiff appealed, and on July 17, 2002, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed plaintiff's conviction and sentence and remanded the case for a new trial. A new murder trial was conducted in May of 2003, which resulted in plaintiff's acquittal of the murder charges. On July 16, 2003, plaintiff filed the above-captioned lawsuit under 42 USC, SS 1983, 1985, and 1986 against the defendants Harry Connick, Eric Dubalier, James Williams, Eddie Jordan, and the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office. Harry Conock was sued in his personal and his official capacities. The other defendants were sued only in their official capacities. Plaintiff also asserted state law tort claims. Defendants answered the complaint. Following a period for discovery, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that plaintiff was barred by prescription or estoppel, that plaintiff was barred by absolute or qualified immunity for the federal claims against Harry Conock personally, and for the state law claims, and that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact on necessary elements of his federal claims against the district attorney's office and Harry Conock. This court granted defendants' motion with regards to the state law claims and denied it as to the defenses of prescription and estoppel. The court also denied judgment against the federal claims because the claims were legally viable and plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to raise questions of fact to be resolved at trial. The specific defendants, Eric Dubalier and James Williams, in their official capacities as assistant district attorneys, have now filed a motion to have the claims against them dismissed based on a recent unpublished Fifth Circuit opinion that found that an assistant district attorney is not the proper party for an official capacity suit against the district attorney's office because he is not the final policymaker. See Truvia vs. Julian 2006, WL 1675116, Star 3, Fifth Circuit 2006. In its earlier ruling, this court specifically considered the issue of whether assistant district attorneys could potentially subject the District Attorney's Office to liability under 28 USC SS 1983 by acting as official policymakers. The court found that it was not barred as a matter of law and that factual issues exist as to whether Mr. Dubelier or Mr. Williams had been delegated the final policymaking authority in this case. Doc 60, pages 10 and 11. Applicable legal standard. Federal Rule 12B states that a motion making any of the defenses allowed by that subsection must be made before pleading. Clearly, the present motion does not comply. Before this court has already ruled on the exact issue that defendants raise in the present motion, the motion will be treated as one for reconsideration. The federal rules of civil procedure do not expressly allow motions for reconsideration of an interlocutory order, but clearly it is within a district court's inherent discretion to reconsider or modify such orders at any time prior to the final decree. C. E.G. Xerox Corp versus Gen Moore Corp. 888 F2D 345-3569, Bon Air Hotel Inc. v. Time Inc. 426F.2D 858-862 5th Circuit 1970. For the following reason, the court declines to reconsider its prior order. Defendants fail to present any new factual evidence. Defendants, in supplying this court with a copy of a recent Fifth Circuit opinion, argue that the court has made a mistake of law in allowing for the possibility that a jury might find that Mr. Doublier or Mr. Williams were delegated official policy-making authority. Defendants' basic contention is that the recent case forecloses that possibility as a matter of law. Truvia vs. Julian 2006 WL 167-5116, Fifth Circuit 2006, is an unpublished procurium decision. As such, it is not binding precedent under Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.4, though it may be persuasive. Truvia reads the statement in Burgess v. Parish of St. Tammany 187 F.3D 452-469, Fifth Circuit 1999, that a district attorney is the independent and final official policymaker for all administrative and prosecutorial functions of his office, as establishing that an assistant is not a proper defendant for a claim against the district attorney's office. However, the particular issue in Burgess addressed by this quote was whether a suit against the district attorney was more properly viewed as one against the entity he represents, such that any recovery should come from the office's funds and not from the district attorney personally. Burgess offers no analysis that forecloses as a matter of law the possibility of an assistant being delegated official policy-making authority. In fact, as this court noted in its first order, the Fifth Circuit has expressly found an assistant district attorney to be a policy-making official at the District Attorney's Office, whose actions subjected the office to liability under SS 1983. See Marina versus Fode 816F.2D 1061 1065 Fifth Circuit 1987. This court therefore does not find triviate to be so persuasive as to dispose of the issue. At best, the law on this issue is ambiguous. This court's review of the precedential case leads it to conclude that an assistant district attorney may be delegated official policymaking authority, and the evidence adduced in this case prohibits an entry of summary judgment. Accordingly, it is ordered that defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12B6, Doc 69, is denied. New Orleans, Louisiana, this the tenth day of October 2005.