One Year of EU Economic Security Strategy - comparing progress with Elvire Fabry and Nicolas Köhler-Suzuki

In this episode of Geoeconomic Competition, Francesca Ghiretti engages with Elvire Fabry and Nicolas Koehler-Suzuki to discuss how the EU economic security strategy has performed in its first year compared to the economic security approaches of other actors.

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SPEAKER_01 0:10

Welcome to Geoeconomic Competition. I'm Francesca Giretti, your host, and in every episode I dive into the intricacies of geoeconomics with other experts. And today, as we celebrate the anniversary of the publication of the EU Economic Security Strategy, I have two great experts. I have Elvire Febri, who's senior research fellow on the geoeconomy of trade at the Jacques Delor Institute, and Nicolas Küller Suzuki, who we practiced the surname just before recording, who is associate researchers and researcher also at the Jacques de Laurent Institute and trade policy advisor at International Trade Intelligence. Welcome to the both of you and thank you for being here. But let's start immediately with the first question to Nicholas. So recently, a few weeks ago, uh the both of you with other co-authors published a great report on the different approaches to economic securities of a number of actors. But I guess that you know, when we read these reports, the first question that spurs into our mind is what is economic security?

SPEAKER_02 1:21

Yes, Francesca, that's a really great question. So the premise of our report is that there's really not a one size fits all definition. So economic security really lies in the eye of the beholder. And we say that how a country defines its economic security really depends on the distinct set of that country's interest groups, its economic model, and the foreign policy goals that shape how that country engages with the world. And that means also that they have to balance different narratives and internal logics of their different epistemic communities. So the economic security discussions bring together economic policymakers and security policymakers, and those two groups often see the world quite differently. In the early 1990s, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mark Aeskins said that the EU is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm. And 30 years later, this is uh maybe still the case, and that means that there is exclusive competence for the EU's common commercial policy that is centralized in Brussels. But uh, when it comes to national security, the member states hold that portfolio quite close to their chest. So the EU's federal institutional design for policy coherence between economic and security interests is quite different from unitary powers like the US, China, and Japan. And that brings us back a little bit to this question of how these countries define it. So for the US, economic security is very closely tied to the national security agenda. Washington has a toolbox that goes back to the Cold War, includes export controls, investment screening measures, and these kind of tools have been used much more again in recent years. And perhaps even more importantly, the implementation of these tools is backed up by a very large national security apparatus with tens of thousands of people in the beltway. And of course, the stated intention in US national security strategies is for the US to use all these tools at its disposable to maintain global leadership and the technological edge. If we go to China, China's primary objective for economic security is regime security for the Communist Party. Although there's clearly also now a longer-term goal to assert the country on the global stage. For quite some time, China has tried to become less dependent on other countries because the Communist Party of China feels that the West is out for regime change. And over the last years, it has done several things to achieve these objectives, and most notably maybe the dual circulation strategy. But China also very tightly controls what it defines as critical industries and pushes very aggressively and strategically for technological advancements in those sectors. And Japan, like the EU, is reliant on open global markets for economic growth, but it has had some very serious political tensions with China that erupted in 2010. And shortly after that, Japan started to systematically think about supply chain resilience and reducing its dependency on external sources for key inputs. Japan also created a new set of institutions that specifically use this term, economic security, like an economic security minister at the cabinet level, which has helped to make uh Japan's uh economic and national security policies much more coherent. And maybe a last point on this question of how countries define it in the EU. Uh the narrative that has been pushed is uh is that we de-risk and not decouple. Previously, these things were somewhat used interchangeably. A lot of the discussion in the US was about uh decoupling, and um I believe this came actually from the from the top of the European Commission, this this narrative of de-risking, which um which has very different implications. So in in the US, obviously the the definition that has been used which which puts the quantity uh into the narrative is the small yard with a high fence. Um although I think many of us start to wonder if it's uh not a small fence, but a rather sorry, not a small, not a small uh yard, but a rather large park. That's a different question. But um on the European side, the it has been very much what the European Commission does frequently in a very like technocratic way, develop like um a set of relatively objective indicators of what we're talking about. So there um there have been multiple studies by DG GROW identifying where we have critical dependencies, um, and and um yeah, I mean you can get into this question a little bit later, you know, uh how much we are actually like dependent, because I think some of these analyses show that it's much less than we than maybe is sometimes um thought in this discourse. Um, and especially some more recent analyses by um economist Isabelle Mejan, for example, have shown that um this this number is actually even smaller, maybe only up to 49 products out of more than 5,000 products where we have these critical dependencies, where economic security measures must maybe apply on the input side. Um but yeah, maybe that's that's that's for for a later point. Um and I mean maybe you added some of this out. Uh I I I've I think I've I've uh gone a little bit too far on the definition side. But maybe uh if if you want to have something on FDI as well, dear editor. So um for FDI, we we don't have the same level of um of granular data as for for trade, for imports, but at a broad macro level, uh exports and um FDI are actually quite diversified, although this might be sometimes uh different at the firm level, and uh we've obviously seen that, especially when it comes to China.

SPEAKER_01 7:51

Thank you, Nicholas. And uh um just for our listeners, just in case they don't know what FDI is, foreign direct investments. And uh I'm glad you mentioned vulnerabilities and the the fact that the EU is not as vulnerable as we think, because last week we recorded a great episode with Luke Pety on this topic. So if you want to go back and listen to it, please do. I just want to move on to the next question to um Elvira uh directly, which is something that you, Nicolas, have hinted at is the fact that there are some discrepancies between the different views and the different approaches to economic security. And I would like to know what the main discrepancies are and what challenges in practice emerge from these different approaches.

SPEAKER_00 8:38

Well, Nicholas has already well described the different models. I think the main discrepancies starts with the one which relates to the long-term objective of those economic security strategies. Because we see very well that on the US side and the Chinese side, they have a very clear long-term objective, which is to access, I mean, to preserve or to reach technological leadership. And that means that they are ready to pay the cost, uh, a high cost for economic security. And as it was uh mentioned by Nicholas, the small yard on the US side is expanding a lot. And it means that for the Europeans, which uh have a closer approach of economic security to the Japanese one, which is rather based on increasing the resilience of uh of uh value chains, uh they still need to define what they consider as uh what is the scope of uh the risking. Uh this uh rhetorical change has uh had an influence on the international debate over economic security, but at the at the current stage we don't know, we don't know exactly what the risking means, continues to mean. And we we still need to define our scope. Um that's that's one one discrepancy. The other one is obviously the fact that the EU remains very aligned under the WTO rules, the World Trade Organization rules, like Japan, but also we could consider like uh uh South Korea and other other countries in the world, while we have seen that the US has been departing from those rules and that China for long has uh had uh taken some uh extensive leeway in the the way it is implementing those rules. Um this is important, it's a very important pillar of the European approach to uh to de-risking. Um but for how long can it stand really aligned on those rules? And we have to consider uh the rising use of discrimination throughout the world, uh the increasing use of local content requirements, uh not only by the by China, as it has been doing for long, and the US, but also other countries in the world are extensively using local content requirements. Uh, this is an issue which is uh will be probably more at the center of uh discussion uh within the EU, within the member states, and notably because we have uh had the results at the European Parliament with stronger calls from the populist parties uh for more uh let's say protectionism. While the EU intends, I mean the European Commission until now has been really focused on protecting without protectionism. So this is a second uh issue. The third one I would say it's um it relates to the the governance of economic security. As Nicholas uh mentioned, of course, we know we have this uh challenge uh within the EU to coordinate to coordinate the member states and to coordinate the member states and the European Commission. And that means that uh the the speed also of the elaboration of this strategy is a very which is a very key factor, uh, may be a weak point for the Europeans. And and we see that since uh the strategy was presented by the Commission last June, a year ago, um I'm not sure we can say that the member states are doing their homework in risk assessment, uh, which was the call from the Commission requesting that the member states do the own risk assessment to be able to coordinate and to calibrate the different tools for economic security. Uh, we see that some countries, some member states like the Netherlands, uh obviously we know what, uh, have been more uh I mean have been engaging more uh more concretely in those debates, but it's not it's not even an issue that has risen in public debates within the member states, and it was never mentioned during the European Parliament campaign. And uh so we need really to speed uh and the I would say the uh another issue that is related to this one is also the means that are dedicated to this, because uh on the US side, on the Chinese side, there are huge uh human resources, uh budget dedicated to uh uh to the implementation of those tools. Uh just look at the Cephus staff. Uh they are huge compared to the staff available at the European Commission. And uh and we would have a lot to learn even from Japan, the way the way Japan has implemented its uh has developed its governance uh within the administration, uh has created a position for economic security minister, and he's coordinated very closely with its industry, and it is it is benefiting from an old tradition of uh important coordination with the industry, but this is uh uh this is uh also uh a weak point of the European side. And if you allow me, just uh just a last um uh just a last element. Um of course the um the fact that uh uh the EU uh has uh intends to have a country agnostic uh policy, uh this is also something uh that is uh it's important and and it's key in the way it is using its uh already implementing its uh its tools. Uh but I'm not sure that this narrative is uh is perceived uh exactly the way it's uh it's it's it is intended to be to be understood, and uh that it will prevent uh retaliation uh from increasing retaliation from from the Chinese side. Uh however.

SPEAKER_01 14:57

Thank you, Elvira. Um so you mentioned a couple of things. You mentioned the issue of uh speed a lot um related to member states, not only application, but also thinking around economic security policies and the risk assessment more specifically. Um you mentioned a long-standing issue, which is capacity building. Um, of course, some member states are better placed than others, and this is definitely an uneven picture. Um, and if we could refer to something that Nicola said before, the same happened in the past with FDI screening, for example. A very uneven picture in terms of capacity building to screen FDI. And the third point that you also mentioned in the report, by the way, is sort of a call for a figure, maybe a commissioner on um economic security, since we're talking about a potential since we're talking about the follow-up to the elections, European elections, and the construction of the new European Commission leadership and the rest of it. And then the issues of a country agnostic approach, which has a lot of benefits, but perhaps we have not really done a good assessment of what are the what the actual benefits and what just the benefits on paper maybe are. Um, Nicholas, which brings me to the question to you, which is look, we've already quite unpicked the EU economic security strategy. Um, I think to a certain extent it's a bit unavoidable, but I would love to hear your opinion. What is your assessment a year after the introduction of this strategy?

SPEAKER_02 16:33

So before the podcast recording, we we discussed whether we should light a small candle for the one-year anniversary of the EU economic security strategy. But it's probably best that we decide against it because our listeners are not going to be able to benefit so much uh from that. In any case, yes, we do have this uh this economic security strategy in place for a year now. Uh it uh it came into existence on the 20th of June 2023. And just to revisit very quickly what it's about, it's uh structured around three pillars protect, promote, and partner. The protect pillar is about protecting critical infrastructure, the security of supply chains, and protecting against uh economic coercion and unfair trade practices. And the tools for this are strengthened export controls, streamlining of the investment screening mechanism across member states that we just discussed, and the enforcement of the EU's trade defense instruments, of which the EU now has quite a few, but it's a question of how to implement them. The idea for this pillar is that protective measures should really help to shield the EU from external threats and ensure the stability and resilience of the European economy. The promote pillar is about driving economic growth through innovation and competitiveness. So the EU wants to lead in some critical technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and cellular networks. And the idea is to invest in research and development, fostering innovation, supporting startups. The EU generally wants to upgrade its technological capabilities, and that in this context increasingly is about sectors that the Commission and the member states will deem to be strategically indispensable in this economic security space. And very importantly, this promote pillar also includes a deepening of the single market, which um Enrico Letta recently highlighted in this in his report for the European Council. And lastly, in the third pillar partner, the EU recognizes the importance of strong international partnerships to achieve its economic security goals. It wants to build alliances with like-minded countries to promote a rules-based international order, and this includes partnerships on global supply chain resilience, critical raw materials, and setting international standards as well as the traditional agenda on trade and investment agreements. Now, this is of course a very wide portfolio that covers many different directorates of the European Commission. And from my perspective, the substantive work to implement this strategy that has happened over the last year has really mostly been under the protect pillar. For example, we have seen this very strong push again in January to streamline the investment screening mechanisms of member states because there's not a shared risk assessment. And the partner and promote pillars, on the other hand, are basically picking up the political agendas that were previously not under an economic security frame, which leaves it open to what extent this is a genuine economic security agenda. And we could talk a little bit more later about this question of competitiveness, which is clearly going to become a major agenda for the next commission. But in regard to the partnering pillar, the bilateral trade agenda of the Commission in the last several years has been quite disappointing. If we think about Australia, if we think about Mercosur, there is not that much happening in that space, and it's not very difficult to move forward. So I think there needs to be a bit more of a discussion going forward about the trade-offs between how deep you want these agreements to be and also other non-trade objectives like trade and sustainable development. If we want to use trade and investment agreements as meaningful tools to change Europe's trade and investment flows. And uh this hasn't quite happened during the last legislature, but I think it is very likely to start happening with the next Commission and the next European Parliament.

SPEAKER_01 20:54

Well, it's it's it's a great answer to the sense of I appreciate that you're focusing on the partnering side, the partner side of the economic security agenda. The reason for that is that we've covered we had several episodes, for example, on industrial policy where we were trying to get a better understanding of the promote, so to say, uh part of the pillar. We constantly talk about protect because it's the part that is best developed. Um, but when it comes to partner, we still were still trying to square the circle. We were used to do this great, you know, all comprehensive FTAs. Now they no longer work in the sense of the the constituencies don't necessarily have an appetite for that anymore. So, what is the next step? And uh, Elvira, I would like to ask you, you know, let's a bit let's look a bit towards the future and considering your analysis, your work, what type of recommendations would you give, especially in terms of you know the partner and coordination aspect to the European Union for the future of the economic security.

SPEAKER_00 22:01

Well, I think I think we have to consider sort of a multi-layer approach of partnering. Of course, we we um we have a first challenge with the the transatlantic coordination. And this is a this is a key one, and this is gonna be a very challenging one in the future. Um if we end with the re-election of uh Donald Trump, uh it it will be if he's if he really implements the measure that he's been announcing, uh 10% on all imports and 60% on the Chinese imports, it's gonna be such a reshuffle shock for supply chains globally, uh, that we need to we would need from now to coordinate much more uh globally with other key partners and not only within the G7, uh the G7 group, uh, but much more beyond, and that will lead me to another command uh to coordinate what we're doing within the G7 and within the G20. But if we end with the re-election of uh Joe Biden, um we will need to anticipate much more um the need for dialogue to not only uh not only be on the receiving end of the pressure of Washington to be aligned on the Washington's initiative, but also to be much more in a relation of allies and uh and undermined and an underline to address to Joe Biden with the limits of that sort of uh alignment strategy. Uh, because all the all the the recent announcements that have been uh that have been that were made by Washington, uh we're not considering the impact on the Europeans and uh and more recently the very high tariffs that have been imposed on on some Chinese imports have a really are going to have a very strong impact uh on the on the single market. So having said that, uh within the G7, there's obviously an important coordination, not only on the protection side of economic security, because for the moment the the the focus has been really rather on the protection side. And uh with the if we go back to the joint statement of last year of the G7, it was rather a sort of menu of what all the members of the G7 should do in terms of economic security, equipping themselves with the same tools. Um but I think it would be interesting to focus much more on the competitive side and how we can coordinate a sort of uh like-minded countries' economic resilience, uh, which would lead also maybe not only to share some good practices and some assessment on uh on the opportunities to develop specific technologies which will impact very deeply our societies and how we can coordinate in the in the production of those technologies, uh but also to develop a common, maybe to share some common economic intelligence in the assessment of innovation, uh, of the level of innovation in China and other countries. And uh and that's that should lead also to coordinate much more some resilience in supply chains for to access some some critical components, critical materials, uh of course strategic minerals. And uh and and this in the end um should also lead the European Union to be much more offensive in its uh partnering strategy with some supply uh resource uh countries. And uh and this this needs to uh uh this requires from the European side to invest as much with partners who today are criticizing its uh increasing what they call the green protectionism of the EU. So anticipate much more the impact on third countries of our own our own green standards, and also work much more within the EU at the domestic level to gain more support from the public opinions to the need to continue negotiating those FTAs, because it's not only about uh market opening, uh economic benefits, but now there's really a sort of a security concern deeply rooted uh in those uh future negotiations.

SPEAKER_02 27:05

Let me maybe add one more point on this question about partnering. Because if we uh want to push ahead with trade agreements to really reconfigure our trade flows, there is a question of what these agreements should look like. And as I mentioned earlier, it has been quite difficult to push some of the recent trade agreements over the line. I mean, Mercosur is an endless saga, but even for example, with Australia. So increasingly I hear people saying we need to just have quick and dirty deals, right? Something that is maybe not even technically falling under the WTO rules to cover substantially all trade. So uh the idea would be you know, you get you give a very nice political signal to your partner country uh embedded within that wider bilateral relationship. Uh, you can sell it also maybe to some domestic constituencies that you have this trade agreement with this new partner country. So it looks great on paper. But does it actually change and reconfigure trade and investment flows? And I would very much have my doubts about this. I think it's lazy thinking and it would actually undermine the kind of strategic impact that a trade agreement can have. So without negotiating these agreements in a way that we really meaningfully change market access, you're not gonna see firms investing in these countries more or trading with these countries much more, and you're just gonna end up with a paper tiger. So I think we need to be very careful going forward that we don't fall on the same trap as, for example, Australia, to um to conclude these very, very shallow deals that might look great on paper at first, but don't actually do anything.

SPEAKER_01 28:53

I guess that is one of the never-ending debates within the European Union, at least you know, at least contemporarily speaking. Um it's very difficult to conclude these wide FTAs for a number of reasons, not just within the European Union, you see this trend in the US and et cetera, right? But you also see that these more flexible frameworks don't always bring home the objectives that you create them for. Uh I think IPEF is a great example of that. So I don't want to I don't want to discuss this now and here, but where do we go next is definitely um a big question that we'll address perhaps in a future episode. But just let me pick up on a couple of things. And I guess the first one is could we say maybe that offense is the best defense when it comes to um when it comes to economic security agenda and the coordination and partnership with different actors, especially when we think about the United States. And the way that I'm framing, you know, offense is uh the best defense is a very poor way of framing it. What I mean is we need, I think, to understand what we want and how we adopt policies accordingly before somebody else does a move and then you're forced to you're rushed into a decision or you're rushed into a process that doesn't necessarily get you where you want to go. Um and I'm also wondering, and this is sort of internal voice rather than probably an external one, um, what are the consequences of the UE, sorry, the US tariffs adopted just a little while before the EU tariffs, despite them being extremely different between themselves. I find it quite difficult not to see partners or even, you know, in this case, China, not seeing them as something that has been somewhat coordinated or that, you know, is equal. And this has consequences, right? On the way that the the two um, sorry, the different actors coordinate and respond to the different policies. Sorry, very vague, but you know, um, I just wanted to put this thought um out there. Um, Nicholas, let's continue with you for a second. Because you mentioned something before, you mentioned competitiveness, which is almost a dirty word. Not anymore, but you know, it's still a bit, you know, complicated, especially if coupled with the other term that I want to ask you about, which is prosperity. Again, we're saying all these you know terrible, terrible things. Um, what do you think? What is your assessment? What is the role of uh competitiveness and prosperity within the economic security approach of the European Union?

SPEAKER_02 31:35

Yeah, so I already mentioned the different ideas that are in this strategy and what the European Union is trying to achieve through it. So to use military language here, the problem is that no plan survives first contact with the enemy, right? So we really have to uh think about how this strategy is going to affect European business. And that I think is actually a point that security-centered discussions in the security policy community on economic security often really falls short on. So if you want to talk about it in security terms, the long-term national capabilities of a country, including for intelligence and the military, will depend on the underlying strength and competitiveness of the economy. So let me talk a bit more about the impact that I think this strategy could have on European firms. If we do actually see this more concerted push for technological leadership and some core technologies, where the EU wants to develop strategic indispensability, we can expect there will be significantly more state investment in RD for these sectors. It is a big if. We only need to look at the German constraints after the German Supreme Court struck down the government's budget proposal. Maybe most importantly, I think that the economic security agenda is giving this political impetus to move forward with integrating the single market. I mentioned this before. And a more integrated single market would obviously be a better environment for many businesses to grow. And on top of that, the EU's efforts to diversify supply chains, sign new trade agreements, and deepen existing economic partnerships could, in theory, open up new markets for European firms. And lastly, there are some studies that indicate this is maybe already the case. European firms could benefit if there was trade diversion because of economic decoupling between China and the United States. But, and now we come to the challenges that arise also for the competitiveness. There are first these immediate challenges from the economic security agenda for firms. And these challenges could have a very negative impact on their competitiveness. They are, first and foremost, the compliance costs that firms have with all these new measures. So economic security regulations tend to increase operational costs, or in extreme cases, obviously, even cut off market access altogether. And this comes from export controls, it comes from investment screamings, it comes from sanctions, or cybersecurity measures. It's nice to think about securitizing everything, but it will have an impact on the way that firms operate. And closely related to that is the cost of adjusting supply chains and finding new consumer markets that correspond to these new political realities. Changing your supply chains requires finding new suppliers. And that might no longer be according to the best price. So this can be costly for firms and then eventually also for consumers. And last but certainly not least, this focus on reducing dependence on non-EU technologies might limit the access for European companies to some cutting-edge innovations that were developed outside of the EU. And without access to these technologies, there's obviously a risk that competitiveness could suffer in the medium to long term, which then again, you know, affects the capabilities and the long-term economic security, if you want to think about it in those terms.

SPEAKER_01 35:20

Okay, wow. So I guess, you know, the so many questions in this episode, by the way, but you know, the question of balancing between uh security and efficiency, security and prosperity to a certain extent. Um, right? Yeah, okay. Okay, let's come to the very last question. Uh this, you know, there's never enough time to answer to all these questions. And as I said last time, there are not enough weeks in a year to have episodes on each of these questions. But anyhow, we'll get there. Ilvia, the last question that I asked to you is the Phil Vosge of uh the podcast, which is trying to understand if all these things, and in this case, the EU economic security strategy, has made the EU more competitive globally.

SPEAKER_00 36:10

I think it's too early to assess that. I mean, we we are still in the, I was going to say early years of economic security for the EU is uh one year, really. And but of course, uh what we see is that uh uh uh China has been engaging in economic security for decades and more intensively uh during the last decade. And and we could consider that the leash the leadership that it has accessed in in the um electric vehicle sector, it's a result of a strategy, of a uh forward-looking strategy, and uh and trying to identify the sectors where it could uh it could gain that technological leadership. Um what it means for the Europeans is that they really need to develop that sort of long-term view and and know what it clarify what is their interest, not only preserve the international liberal order, which is one thing, and uh, but for how long can we preserve that? Uh how they're gonna adapt really to that new ecosystem. Um at least, at least for the moment, um we can consider that uh the Europeans have uh waken up, uh, uh are really speeding in the uh in the adjust the adjustment of the strategy. Um as it was as it was mentioned previously, the focus is rather for the moment on the protection side. Uh to gain more competitiveness, they really need to engage much more on the promotion side and notably on the investing in innovation. And while we are quite um interested by the Japanese concept of strategic indispensability, uh it requires really to identify where are really our assets and how we can protect them, but also where we could we should uh invest much more, and that requires much more granularity in uh in the data, in the uh in uh assessing uh the level of innovation and compare it with uh with other partners, and notably China and the US. And we see that uh the the work that is um that is done and that will soon be published, notably by Bruegel on those issues, will be very useful to have that more accurate view of uh how we need to calibrate the European instruments and where we need to invest. But I think that in terms of competitiveness, it's all about precisely about uh adjusting the strategies of the member states, of the EU, and uh and this is something notably that uh Germany needs to uh to do uh to clarify its the adjustment of its economic strategy, but much more broadly, other Europeans.

SPEAKER_01 39:21

We could say that, you know, I think we have to say that a lot of progress has been made in the European Union regarding the economic security debate. It's always very easy to sit here and criticize that we haven't, you know, we haven't gotten far enough. It's true. And then if you compare it the EU with what is happening perhaps in the US or what has happened in China, um, it's always very easy to say, well, look, we're not, we haven't done enough. I've even seen posts on LinkedIn of you know people comparing US tariffs to EU tariffs and saying, oh, well, you know, sort of you haven't quite reached our level. It's not that, right? I always try to impress the point that the US and China are not good overall blueprints on how to approach economic security for the European Union. They're actually quite bad blueprints. So we need to construct our own thing. And I think we've come quite uh far away. We could even say we are in um data collection phase. Uh I don't know. I, you know, from my PhD there, is thinking you need to collect data before you actually start writing up. But just to sum up a little bit, there are also some weaknesses that are a little bit more immediate to be addressed. And one is member states' capacity in terms of addressing economic security issues, um, in terms of personal specifically, and focus, so that processes are also put in place. And I'm just repeating stuff you've mentioned, both of you mentioned in this episode. Um, in terms of external coordination, sorry, of internal coordination within the European Union, we mentioned the role of uh a point of contact, which could be a commissioner. Um, and in external coordination, be a little bit more assertive in defending your own interests once you've identified them. Um, deeper agreements is what in part Nicholas suggested, even though he also highlighted where the issues with that would be, um, but also better sharing of information practices and objectives as well. And then, you know, ultimately trying to do all of these while we have a reshuffling of the European Parliament and of the European Commission and trying to understand what the political direction of the bloc will be in the years to come. Is this is this enough to close uh this this episode? I think I think we touched upon quite a few things. Uh, but I'm very grateful for this conversation. It's been extremely interesting. If you haven't yet, go and read the report that uh Elvia and Nicolas published. But also, of course, if you if you haven't yet, also read the um Ericoletta report. I want to thank you both of you at this point for your time and your thoughts, and I hope to talk to you again soon. Thank you.