MI5 Lied in Court! Canada Names Fentanyl Czar.

🚨 MI5’s Courtroom Deception & China’s Digital Influence 🚨

This week on Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up, we break down MI5’s shocking admission that it misled courtsabout a violent neo-Nazi informant. What happens when intelligence agencies go too far in protecting their sources? 🤔

Meanwhile, a Chinese-backed disinformation campaign targeted Chrystia Freeland’s leadership bid in Canada. How are foreign actors using digital influence to manipulate democratic institutions? 🕵️‍♂️

We also cover breaking intelligence developments from around the world:
🔍 Neo-Nazi terror plot foiled—how extremist groups are shifting tactics.
🛑 South Korea’s AI warning—is China’s DeepSeek app a data-harvesting threat?
💊 Canada’s fentanyl crisis—will the newly appointed “fentanyl czar” make a difference?
⚓ Russian sabotage? Reports suggest Moscow may have targeted Germany’s newest warship.

With over 25 years of intelligence and law enforcement experience, Neil Bisson brings you expert analysis and insights you won’t find anywhere else.

🎙 Like, comment, and share to help the channel grow!
💡 Want to support the show? Join us on Patreon or Buzzsprout!

📌 Chapters:
00:00 – Intro: MI5’s Courtroom Deception & China’s Digital Influence
01:22 – MI5 Caught Lying to Courts About a Neo-Nazi Informant
06:32 – Foreign Interference in Canada: Chrystia Freeland’s Leadership Bid Targeted
11:47 – Neo-Nazi Leader Convicted for Plot to Attack Maryland Power Grid
17:08 – South Korea Warns About Chinese AI App DeepSeek
21:32 – Canada Appoints Its First Fentanyl Czar
24:03 – Did Russian Agents Sabotage Germany’s Newest Warship?
26:25 – Outro: Support the Podcast & Stay Informed

🔗 Links & Support:
📌 University of Ottawa Course – The Psychology Behind Human Sources in Intelligence Collection:
https://pdinstitute.uottawa.ca/PDI/Courses/National-Security/The-Psychology-Behind-Human-Sources/Course.aspx?CourseCode=S0236&429f5b2a066e=3

📌 Support the Podcast:
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🟢 Buzzsprout: https://www.buzzsprout.com/2336717/support

🔗 Links to source articles are in the show notes.

🛑 Stay Curious, Stay Informed, Stay Safe. See you next week!

Transcript

Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up 2025 02 14

INTRO:

Welcome to this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up, where we bring you expert analysis on the intelligence and national security stories shaping our world.

With over 25 years of experience in intelligence and law enforcement, Neil Bisson—Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network and a retired Intelligence Officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service—breaks down the critical developments you need to know.

This week, a stunning revelation from the UK—MI5 has admitted to misleading the courts in a case involving a violent neo-Nazi informant. 

The agency’s rare public apology raises serious questions about the balance between operational secrecy and accountability. 

How far can intelligence services go to protect their sources? 

And what happens when those sources become the very threats they were meant to stop?

Meanwhile, foreign interference and espionage remain front and center, with new reports out of Canada, South Korea, and Germany revealing the latest tactics used by hostile states to infiltrate, manipulate, and disrupt Western institutions.

Stay tuned as Neil Bisson unpacks these urgent developments. Now, let’s get started.

MUSIC

Hello everyone and welcome back to Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up. 

I’m your host, Neil Bisson, the Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network.

Each week I break down the biggest intelligence stories so you can better understand the world of espionage, foreign interference, and national security.

As with every week, there’s been some shocking stories from around the world ranging from an alleges lies made by the MI5 regarding a neo nazi agent, to the naming of Canada’s new fentanyl czar.  

There’s a lot to cover so let’s get to it. 
  
For our first story, we start in the UK, where a senior aide to Prince Andrew is at the center of a legal battle involving an alleged Chinese spy. 

The case raises serious concerns about foreign interference, the vulnerability of influential figures, and how adversaries leverage relationships to gain credibility and access.

A former adviser to Prince Andrew, is attempting to block the release of his testimony in a legal case involving Yang Tengbo, a businessman accused by UK authorities of being a Chinese intelligence operative.

Yang was denied entry to the UK on national security grounds, and Prince Andrew’s former advisor has submitted a statement supporting his appeal. 

Now, British media organizations are fighting to have that testimony made public, citing concerns about transparency and potential political influence in espionage-related cases.

From the lens of an intelligence operation, this case underscores the long-running tactic of foreign intelligence services targeting influential individuals to gain credibility. 

The Chinese Communist Party or CCP has repeatedly been accused of using business and social connections to infiltrate Western institutions, including politics, academia, and even royal circles.

This case isn’t unique. Western intelligence agencies have long warned about China’s extensive foreign interference operations, particularly in the UK, Canada, and the US.

• In 2022, MI5 took the rare step of publicly naming Christine Lee, a lawyer accused of working as a covert agent for Beijing to influence British politicians.

• Here in Canada, CSIS has continually warned about China’s interference in political campaigns and attempts to cultivate relationships with elected officials.

• And in Australia, legislation was introduced to curb foreign interference after revelations of Chinese influence operations in universities, businesses, and politics.

The concern isn’t just about individuals acting as spies in the traditional sense—it’s about Beijing using influence networks to advance its strategic interests without direct espionage operations.

British security officials have cautioned that Yang’s case represents a broader pattern of China-linked businessmen gaining access to high-level networks and using that influence to shield themselves from scrutiny.

This highlights a major counterintelligence vulnerability. 

While espionage usually brings to mind covert agents stealing classified secrets, modern intelligence threats increasingly involve political and social engineering—covert efforts to cultivate insiders who can advocate for foreign interests, whether knowingly or not.

This raises important questions:

• How many Western officials, business leaders, and aides are unknowingly vouching for individuals tied to foreign intelligence services?

• What safeguards exist to prevent adversaries from using high-level endorsements to bypass national security screenings?

The Prince Andrew aide’s involvement in this case raises serious concerns about foreign interference and the effectiveness of counterintelligence safeguards in the UK.

This won’t be the last time we see a case like this. 

China’s influence operations are growing increasingly sophisticated, and Western nations will need to bolster their defenses—not just against spies in the traditional sense but against subtle infiltration through business and social networks.

What do you think? 

Should intelligence services be doing more to screen political and business connections for foreign influence risks? 

Let me know in the comments.

MUSIC

We head to the United States for our next story which delves into a significant case that underscores the persistent threat of domestic terrorism and the evolving tactics of extremist networks.

Brandon Russell, a 29-year-old neo-Nazi leader from Orlando, Florida, was recently convicted of conspiring to attack Maryland's power grid. 

Russell, co-founder of the Atomwaffen Division, plotted with Sarah Beth Clendaniel to execute "sniper attacks" on electrical substations, aiming to incite chaos in predominantly Black Baltimore. 

This case highlights the strategic shift among extremist groups towards targeting critical infrastructure to maximize societal disruption. 

By attacking power grids, these actors aim to cause widespread outages, sow fear, and undermine public trust in governmental institutions.

The Atomwaffen Division, founded by Russell in 2013, is a neo-Nazi organization that has been linked to multiple murders and bomb plots before being dismantled in 2020. 

Russell's defense of FBI entrapment was rejected by a Maryland jury, leading to a potential 20-year prison sentence. 

The trial revealed the Biden administration's crackdown on violent right-wing extremists and highlighted Russell's deep involvement with the Terrorgram Collective, a group designated as a foreign terrorist organization. 

Russell's prior convictions include possessing explosive materials and neo-Nazi paraphernalia, discovered during an investigation into his roommates' murders. 

Despite serving time, he continued his extremist activities upon release, exemplifying the challenges in deradicalizing committed ideologues. 

Security analysts note that this plot is indicative of a broader trend where domestic extremists focus on critical infrastructure to achieve their ideological goals. 

The choice of Baltimore, a city with a significant African American population, underscores the racial motivations driving such attacks.

This case underscores the importance of robust intelligence operations and community vigilance. 

The successful infiltration of Russell's network by an FBI informant was pivotal in disrupting the attack, highlighting the efficacy of proactive law enforcement measures.

The conviction of Brandon Russell demonstrates the evolving threats posed by domestic extremist groups. 

As these organizations adapt their tactics, it is imperative for intelligence agencies and the public to remain vigilant.

MUSIC

For the next story, we turn to Canada, where a government task force has detected a Chinese-backed disinformation campaign targeting Chrystia Freeland’s leadership bid. 

This raises serious concerns about the vulnerability of democratic institutions to foreign interference and how state actors use digital influence operations to manipulate political discourse.

According to Global News, Canada’s Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections, or SITE, Task Force identified a network of online activity aimed at discrediting Freeland. 

This operation was reportedly linked to China, with coordinated efforts to spread negative narratives through social media platforms.

From an intelligence perspective, this is a textbook example of how foreign governments leverage digital tools to shape political outcomes. 

Rather than engaging in direct electoral interference, adversaries use social media to push narratives that weaken politicians who are seen as unfriendly to their interests. 

These campaigns often target diaspora communities, where information channels like WeChat can be difficult for Western intelligence agencies to monitor.

This incident is not the first time Canada has faced foreign influence operations. 

As anyone who follows the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up knows. 

Intelligence agencies have repeatedly warned about China’s interference in Western democracies.

• In 2023, a CSIS report confirmed that China had attempted to manipulate multiple Canadian elections through disinformation campaigns and covert funding.

• In Australia, similar concerns led to the passage of strict foreign interference laws after revelations of Chinese influence operations in politics, business, and academia.

• In the United States, intelligence officials have flagged coordinated foreign disinformation efforts in presidential campaigns, particularly through social media.

The tactics remain consistent: exploit online platforms, spread misleading narratives, and create divisions to weaken political opponents.

The Chinese government has denied involvement, dismissing the allegations as groundless. 

However, Canadian intelligence officials and cybersecurity experts have long pointed to China’s use of disinformation and influence operations to shape political outcomes.

This highlights a growing national security challenge. Foreign interference is no longer about spies stealing classified information—it’s about manipulating public opinion through digital influence campaigns. 

These operations are cost-effective, difficult to trace, and highly effective in shaping political narratives.

This raises key questions:

• How prepared is Canada to counter these influence operations?

• Should there be stricter regulations on foreign-controlled platforms that host disinformation?

• What role should intelligence agencies play in monitoring and exposing foreign influence in political campaigns?

The targeting of Chrystia Freeland’s leadership campaign is the latest in a growing pattern of foreign interference in Western politics. 

It underscores the need for stronger cybersecurity measures, better public awareness, and coordinated efforts to counter disinformation.

This won’t be the last time we see foreign actors attempting to manipulate political discourse. The question is whether Canada will take the necessary steps to strengthen its defenses.

What do you think? 

Should governments take a more aggressive approach to countering foreign interference in elections? 

MUSIC

We travel to South Korea for our next story, where the country’s spy agency has raised alarms over the Chinese A.I. app DeepSeek. 

The National Intelligence Service of South Korea, or NIS, has warned that the app “excessively” collects personal data, potentially allowing it to track individual users and send that data to Chinese servers. 

The case underscores growing concerns about A.I.-driven data harvesting, national security vulnerabilities, and how adversaries may use technology to conduct covert intelligence operations.

The NIS has issued an official notice to government agencies, urging them to take security precautions when dealing with DeepSeek. 

The agency highlighted the app’s ability to:

• Transfer chat records and collect keyboard input patterns that could identify users.

• Communicate with Chinese company servers, including volceapplog.com.

• Store South Korean user data on Chinese servers, making it subject to Chinese government access under Chinese law.

From an intelligence perspective, this is a clear-cut national security risk. 

Foreign-controlled AI applications that store user data on overseas servers create an open channel for mass data collection, potential espionage, and influence operations. 

The risk isn’t just about individual privacy—it’s about the possibility of large-scale data harvesting that can be used for intelligence-gathering, blackmail, or AI-driven propaganda efforts.

South Korea isn’t alone in raising concerns about DeepSeek. 

Other nations, including Australia and Taiwan, have also issued warnings or blocked access to the app over security concerns. 

This reflects a broader trend of democracies growing wary of AI-powered applications tied to authoritarian states.

This case also follows a pattern of Chinese tech firms being accused of data privacy violations.

• In the United States, TikTok has faced scrutiny over its ties to China, with lawmakers citing national security risks due to its data collection policies.

• In Europe, similar concerns have been raised about Chinese-made surveillance cameras and smart devices embedded in critical infrastructure.

• In 2023, Taiwan banned the use of Chinese-made AI chatbots in government offices, citing cybersecurity concerns.

The growing concern over China-linked technology is not just about data collection—it’s about how that data can be leveraged for influence operations, social control, and geopolitical advantage.

The NIS also pointed out another troubling aspect of DeepSeek: its inconsistent responses to politically sensitive topics. 

When asked about the origin of kimchi, a fermented Korean dish, the app gave different answers depending on the language. 

In Korean, it stated that kimchi is Korean, but when asked in Chinese, it claimed the dish originated in China.

This type of algorithmic bias is not an accident. 

It aligns with China’s broader strategy of using technology to push state-approved narratives while censoring politically sensitive topics. 

DeepSeek reportedly avoids discussing issues such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, instead prompting users to “talk about something else.”

From my perspective, this highlights a growing risk in A.I.-driven influence operations. 

A.I. chatbots are no longer just neutral tools—they can be programmed to subtly reinforce nationalistic narratives while suppressing dissenting viewpoints. 

This raises critical questions:

• Should democratic nations implement stricter regulations on foreign A.I. applications?

• How can intelligence agencies detect and counter A.I.-driven disinformation campaigns?

• What safeguards should be in place to ensure that A.I. remains a neutral tool rather than a propaganda device?

The South Korean NIS warning about DeepSeek is a wake-up call for governments worldwide. 

The intersection of A.I., data security, and national intelligence is becoming a major battleground. 

As foreign adversaries develop increasingly sophisticated digital tools, democracies will need stronger countermeasures to protect their citizens’ data and safeguard the integrity of A.I. systems.

This won’t be the last time we see a case like this. 

The question now is whether countries will take proactive steps to regulate and monitor foreign AI applications—or wait until the damage is already done.

On my podcast, Intelligence Conversations, I recently had a chance to discuss DEEPSEEK and some of the concerns surrounding this AI with Ryan Zorn. 

Ryan is a former colleague of mine and head of CyberAGroup, a company on the cutting edge of Open-Source Intelligence Collection or OSINT. 

It was a fascinating discussion, and I’ll leave a link to it in the show notes. 

MUSIC

We return to Canada for our next story, where the federal government has appointed Kevin Brosseau as the country’s first-ever fentanyl czar. 

Brosseau, a former RCMP deputy commissioner, will be tasked with coordinating national efforts to curb fentanyl smuggling into the United States. 

This move comes after U.S. officials pressured Canada to take stronger action against the illicit drug trade, particularly as part of broader negotiations around trade and border security.

Brosseau’s appointment is significant, not just as a domestic policy decision but as part of Canada’s broader intelligence and security commitments to the United States. 

The role of the fentanyl czar will focus on:

• Strengthening coordination between law enforcement agencies across Canada and the U.S.

• Targeting fentanyl smuggling routes and identifying key players in the illicit supply chain.

• Enhancing intelligence-sharing agreements with U.S. agencies such as the DEA and Homeland Security.

The fentanyl trade is closely linked to organized crime, transnational smuggling networks, and even foreign actors who exploit drug trafficking as a form of economic and social destabilization. 

Any effort to curb the crisis will require sophisticated intelligence operations, financial tracking, and coordinated law enforcement efforts at an international level.

Fentanyl has been identified as one of the deadliest drugs in North America, fueling an ongoing opioid crisis. 

While much of the illicit fentanyl entering the U.S. is trafficked through Mexico, there have been growing concerns, voiced by the current U.S. administration, about Canadian-based smuggling operations supplying U.S. markets.

This isn’t the first time Canada has faced external pressure to crack down on cross-border trafficking. 

Similar tensions arose in past decades over weapons smuggling and organized crime ties between the two countries. 

However, this case is unique in that Canada is now establishing a single point of coordination for fentanyl enforcement, signaling a shift toward a more intelligence-driven approach.

Public Safety Minister Dominic LeBlanc emphasized that Brosseau’s role will be key in addressing Canada’s international obligations, stating:

"This is a clear demonstration that Canada takes its role in countering the fentanyl crisis seriously. We’re committed to working with our U.S. partners to disrupt these criminal networks."

This is an important step in improving Canada’s response, but the effectiveness of this new role will depend on some key factors like:

• How much authority Brosseau has to coordinate federal and provincial enforcement agencies.

• Whether intelligence-sharing between Canada and the U.S. improves in real time.


• And, if law enforcement can successfully dismantle major trafficking networks instead of just targeting low-level distributors.

Canada’s move to appoint a fentanyl czar is part of a growing trend of nations centralizing their response to major security threats. 

The question now is whether this will translate into real disruption of fentanyl networks—or if the drug trade will simply adapt, as it has time and time again.

Looking ahead, we’ll be watching how this new role plays out and whether it leads to meaningful policy changes. 

MUSIC

Our next story dives head long into shocking news out of the UK: MI5 has admitted to misleading three separate courts while defending its handling of a violent neo-Nazi informant known only as "Agent X." 

The BBC uncovered evidence that MI5 falsely claimed it had adhered to its policy of neither confirming nor denying informants' identities—when, in fact, the agency had disclosed X’s status in calls with a journalist. 

Now, MI5 has issued an unprecedented apology, and both internal and external investigations are underway. 

Let’s unpack what happened, why it matters, and the potential fallout for the intelligence community.

The case centers around "Agent X," an MI5 informant with neo-Nazi ties who was involved in a violent domestic attack, terrorizing his partner with a machete. 

The BBC originally reported on this case in 2022, but MI5 fought hard to suppress details, even taking the matter to court to prevent the agent from being publicly identified.

The most concerning revelation? 

MI5 provided false testimony in three different legal proceedings—first to prevent the BBC from reporting on the case, then in a court case brought by the victim, and again in a judicial review. 

It was only when the BBC presented hard evidence—recordings of MI5 officers admitting Agent X’s status—that the agency was forced to acknowledge its deception.

The immediate concern is clear: if MI5 was willing to mislead courts in this case, how reliable is its testimony in other classified proceedings? 

MI5 is frequently involved in closed-door hearings that affect national security decisions, including cases involving terrorism, foreign espionage, and even the revocation of UK citizenship. 

If their credibility is called into question, it could have serious ramifications for how intelligence evidence is weighed in legal settings.

Intelligence agencies like MI5 operate under strict secrecy policies, including the principle of "Neither Confirm Nor Deny" or NCND. 

This policy is meant to protect active sources and ongoing operations, but this case highlights a major flaw—what happens when an agency uses secrecy to cover its own missteps?

We’ve seen similar issues arise in other intelligence scandals. 

In the U.S., the FBI has faced scrutiny over its handling of confidential informants involved in criminal activity, including cases tied to organized crime and domestic terrorism. 

In Canada, CSIS has been criticized in the past for how it manages human sources, particularly in cases involving extremism. 

The challenge for intelligence agencies is balancing operational secrecy with legal and ethical responsibility—something MI5 is now under pressure to address.

MI5 Director General Sir Ken McCallum has now issued an "unreserved apology," calling this a "serious error." 

However, he also defended MI5’s use of informants, stating that "to keep protecting us, we must protect them and their identities from all those who would do them harm."

But legal experts, including Beth’s lawyer, argue this case raises fundamental concerns about transparency. 

Kate Ellis from the Centre for Women's Justice told the BBC: "I think this raises real concerns about MI5's transparency, about whether we can trust MI5's evidence to courts."

The UK Home Secretary has now ordered an external review, led by former government legal chief Sir Jonathan Jones KC, to investigate how MI5 ended up providing false evidence in court. 

Meanwhile, MI5 is conducting its own internal disciplinary process.

From my perspective as a former intelligence officer, on the surface there appears to be significant damage here—not just to MI5’s credibility but to public trust in intelligence oversight. 

As a human source recruitment officer and manager, I know that dealing with sources who have access to organizations that are violent is always a concern. 

Similar to Police informants, some intelligence sources can come from a sorted past and may be involved in unsavory activity. 

However, the issue will always be, what is the fallout from the Service’s contact and collection of information from this individual. 

Confidentiality between the intelligence organization and the source is a two-way street. 

In the MI5 case of Agent X, he allegedly used his status as an agent to intimidate his partner who he also verbally and physically abused. 

The issue of the break in confidentiality stems from the MI5 officer confirming the status of Agent X with the BBC journalist. 

The mantra of “Neither confirm, nor deny” goes out the window the moment that officer suggested to the journalist to sit in on a meeting with Agent X. 

Intelligence agencies must walk a fine line between secrecy and accountability. 

If they lose the trust of the courts, it makes it much harder to do their jobs effectively.

When a human source is involved in activities that will place the intelligence agency, they are providing information to, into jeopardy, the relationship needs to be reconsidered and most likely terminated. 

This may seem counter intuitive, but much like this case, the fallout to the reputation of the organization can be devasting. 

The court systems and the public loss in confidence of a domestic intelligence service, who is mandated to protect the country and its citizens, is too important to bet on a source who will jeopardize it. 

This case is a rare look behind the curtain at how intelligence agencies manage their sources and handle legal scrutiny. 

MI5’s false testimony has serious implications—not just for the case of "Agent X" but for any future legal proceedings involving intelligence evidence. 

With external investigations now underway, the big question is: how will MI5 restore confidence in its operations while maintaining the secrecy necessary for national security?

This is a story that will continue to unfold, and we’ll be keeping a close eye on the developments.

MUSIC

For our final story this week, we're diving into reports that Russian agents may have sabotaged Germany’s newest warship, the F126 frigate. 

Is this a sign of a broader campaign against Western military assets? Let's break it down.

The German media recently revealed that suspected Russian agents may have infiltrated a shipyard in Hamburg and tampered with critical components of the F126 frigate, a next-generation warship designed for the German Navy. 

The sabotage was reportedly discovered during routine inspections, raising alarm bells about the vulnerability of Western military infrastructure.

From an intelligence standpoint, this incident follows a familiar pattern: Russia has a long history of using sabotage as a tool of hybrid warfare. 

Targeting critical military assets like warships sends a strong signal—both to Germany and to NATO.

But the key questions are:

• If confirmed, how did Russian agents gain access to the shipyard?

• Were insiders involved, or did Moscow leverage cyber operations to facilitate physical sabotage?

• What does this mean for the security of Western defense industries?

This isn't just an isolated case—it fits into Russia’s broader strategy of undermining NATO readiness, using asymmetric tactics to weaken European defense capabilities without direct military confrontation.

Russia has a long history of sabotage operations against NATO countries. 

During the Cold War, Soviet intelligence targeted Western infrastructure through a mix of human espionage and technical interference. 

More recently, Moscow has been linked to acts of sabotage in Czechia, Bulgaria, and Germany, targeting weapons depots, industrial plants, and other strategic assets.

This particular case also echoes past concerns about Russia’s use of cyber-enabled physical sabotage. 

Western security agencies have previously warned that Moscow could use cyber intrusions to manipulate industrial control systems, damaging critical equipment without setting foot inside facilities.

So what’s the bigger picture here? 

Europe’s defense sector is now a prime target. 

With Germany increasing its military spending and supporting Ukraine, Russian intelligence likely sees these warships as a symbol of Western military strength—and a threat to its own strategic ambitions.

The article cites German security sources who emphasize the sophistication of the sabotage attempt. 

While the full extent of the damage remains unclear, defense analysts warn that this may be part of a larger Russian effort to disrupt NATO’s defense supply chain.

From my own perspective as an intelligence professional, this case raises two critical issues:

1. Industrial espionage meets sabotage – Russia isn’t just stealing military technology; it’s actively undermining Western military production.

2. Hybrid warfare escalation – This could be a test run for future, more destructive sabotage operations against NATO countries.

Western governments must tighten security around defense production sites, increase counterintelligence efforts, and reassess vulnerabilities in their supply chains—especially when dealing with hostile state actors.

To sum up:

• Reports suggest that Russian agents may have sabotaged Germany’s F126 warship.

• If true, this fits into Russia’s long-standing use of hybrid warfare and sabotage against NATO.


• The case highlights vulnerabilities in Western military production and the growing threat of state-sponsored interference.

Moving forward, expect heightened counterintelligence efforts across Europe and more scrutiny on Russian activities targeting NATO infrastructure.

Well, that’s going to wrap up this week’s podcast. 

As always, the links to all media stories are in the show notes. 

I want to remind everyone, that there are limited spaces available for my upcoming, on line course, “The Psychology Behind Human Sources in Intelligence Collection” offered by the University of Ottawa. 

The course will provide major insight into some of the motivational factors intelligence agencies identify and use in source recruitment and handling. 

If you appreciate the time, effort and expertise that go into the global intelligence weekly wrap up, please consider becoming a supporter of the show. 

Links to my patreon and buzzsprout support pages are in the show notes. 

Until next week, stay curious, stay informed and stay safe. 

MUSIC

OUTRO: 

That’s a wrap for this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up.

From MI5’s shocking courtroom deception and the risks of handling violent intelligence sources to foreign interference, AI-driven espionage, and suspected Russian sabotage, today’s stories reveal just how complex and high-stakes the intelligence world truly is.

Bringing you these in-depth analyses takes time, experience, and a commitment to uncovering the intelligence stories that matter most.

If you found today’s breakdown insightful, consider liking, sharing, or leaving a comment—it helps expand the conversation and grow the podcast’s reach.

And if you’d like to support the show and keep these intelligence insights coming, you can do so through Patreon or Buzzsprout. 

Whether it’s ongoing support or a one-time contribution, every bit helps. You’ll find the links in the show notes.

Thank you for listening.

And as Neil always says: stay curious, stay informed, and stay safe. See you next week.

LINKS: 

University of Ottawa: Psychology Behind Human Sources in Intelligence Collection
https://pdinstitute.uottawa.ca/PDI/Courses/National-Security/The-Psychology-Behind-Human-Sources/Course.aspx?CourseCode=S0236

PATREON https://www.patreon.com/posts/become-member-of-120422249?utm_medium=clipboard_copy&utm_source=copyLink&utm_campaign=postshare_creator&utm_content=join_link


BUZZSPROUT: 
https://www.buzzsprout.com/2336717/support


Intelligence Conversations with Ryan Zorn, Head of CyberAGroup on OSINT and DEEPSEEK:
https://youtu.be/qXeJgZczKkY

Story 1: Andrew aide asks court to withhold testimony on alleged spy
Link: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c0rq2d9qjzlo

Story 2: Bomb-plot trial of neo-Nazi leader pulls back veil on US extremist networks
Link: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/feb/10/brandon-russell-neo-nazi-bomb-plot-trial

Story 3: Freeland leadership campaign targeted by foreign interference: task force
Link: https://globalnews.ca/news/11009798/chrystia-freeland-liberal-leadership-campaign-foreign-interference/

Story 4: South Korea spy agency says DeepSeek 'excessively' collects personal data
Link: https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/south-korea-spy-agency-says-deepseek-excessively-collects-personal-data-2025-02-10/

Story 5:  Canada’s new fentanyl czar has been named 
Link: https://globalnews.ca/news/11014600/canada-fentanyl-czar-kevin-brosseau/

Story 6: MI5 lied to courts to protect violent neo-Nazi spy
Link: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cew5rwpw579o

Story 7: Did Russian Agents Sabotage Germany’s Newest Warship? What We Know
Link: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/did-russian-agents-sabotage-germanys-newest-warship-what-we-know