CSIS foreign Operations Under Fire

🎙️ Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up — June 6, 2025
Hosted by Neil Bisson, Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network and retired CSIS Intelligence Officer

This week, the Canadian intelligence world is rocked by a stunning revelation: a CSIS operation was halted mid-mission—without proper authority—putting Canadian officers in serious danger. 🇨🇦 Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, MI5 is accused of lying to the courts to protect a violent informant. And that’s just the beginning.

In this episode, Neil Bisson unpacks seven major stories that reveal how intelligence failures, political interference, lone-actor terrorism, and questionable leadership appointments are shaking public trust in national security institutions around the world.

🔎 With over 25 years of experience in intelligence and law enforcement, Neil provides expert insights into each story, giving you the context and tradecraft perspective that mainstream headlines often miss.

👇 Chapters & Questions Answered in this Episode 👇
(00:00) Intro
(01:35) CSIS Operation Halted Abroad
➡️ What really happened when a CSIS mission was suddenly stopped overseas — and why did it put Canadian officers at risk?
(07:05) ISIS-Linked CSIS Source and the Girls Smuggled into Syria
➡️ Should CSIS be held responsible for using a source who reportedly worked with ISIS? What does this mean for human source risk management in intelligence?
(13:30) Chinese Nationals Caught Smuggling Pathogen into U.S.
➡️ Is this agroterrorism, academic negligence, or covert state-sponsored bio-surveillance? And why should Canada be concerned?
(19:45) Terror Attack on Jewish Rally in Colorado
➡️ What does this lone-actor attack reveal about the rise of antisemitic IMVE threats across North America?
(25:15) Bill C-2: Canada’s Sweeping New Border Security Law
➡️ Is this bill a national security upgrade — or a massive overreach into privacy and civil liberties?
(29:30) Inexperienced 22-Year-Old Appointed to Lead U.S. Terrorism Office
➡️ Can political loyalty replace real qualifications in national security roles — and what are the risks if it does?
(32:45) MI5 Accused of Misleading the Courts to Protect a Neo-Nazi Informant
➡️ Has MI5 crossed a red line — and what happens when a domestic spy agency loses the trust of the judiciary?

📌 Don’t miss Neil’s final segment featuring an invitation to a June 11th event at the University of Ottawa featuring former CSIS professionals — details in the show notes!

🎧 Like what you hear?
👉 Subscribe and hit the bell to get notified when new episodes drop.
👉 Share this with your friends and colleagues in the security, intelligence, and academic communities.
👉 Support the podcast on Patreon or through Buzzsprout — every contribution helps sustain this work.

🔗 More from Neil Bisson and the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network
🌐 www.globalintelligencekn.com

#NationalSecurity #CSIS #MI5 #IMVE #China #Agroterrorism #Espionage #BorderSecurity #Canada #IntelligenceAnalysis

Transcript

2025 06 06 Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up

Introduction: 

Welcome to this week’s edition of Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up — your trusted source for insights and analysis from the world of espionage, foreign interference, sabotage, and national security.

Neil Bisson, retired CSIS Intelligence Officer and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network, draws on over 25 years of frontline experience in intelligence and law enforcement to bring you the critical stories shaping our global security environment.

This week, a scathing report reveals that a CSIS overseas operation was abruptly halted without proper authority — placing Canadian officers at risk and exposing serious gaps in ministerial accountability.

Another NSIRA investigation links a CSIS human source to ISIS, raising uncomfortable questions about risk assessment and how far intelligence agencies can — or should — go when penetrating terrorist networks.

In the U.S., two Chinese nationals are charged with smuggling a toxic crop pathogen into Michigan, triggering fears about biosecurity, foreign research infiltration, and China’s growing use of scientific cover.

We also cover the Colorado terror attack targeting Jewish civilians, the controversial appointment of a 22-year-old political aide to lead a U.S. counterterrorism office, and a sweeping Canadian border bill that could fundamentally reshape intelligence, immigration, and surveillance powers.

And in the U.K., MI5 is accused of lying to the courts to protect a violent neo-Nazi informant — a story with profound implications for public trust and judicial oversight of intelligence operations.

Let’s dive in.

MUSIC

Hello everyone, and welcome back to Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up. I’m your host, Neil Bisson, a retired intelligence officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network. 

Each week, I scour open media news to bring you the world of intelligence, provide insights, analysis and intelligence to help you make sense of the complex threat landscape that shapes national security and intelligence collection issues. 

We’ve seen some major announcements and criticism affecting intelligence collection in Canada this week, as well as MI5 still facing allegations of lying in court and more antisemitic terrorist attacks in the US.

There’s lots to discuss so let’s dive in. 

In our first story, we examine a troubling issue that goes to the very heart of operational accountability and political oversight in Canada’s intelligence community.

The CBC reports on a newly released, heavily redacted review from the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency or NSIRA, which reveals that a sensitive CSIS operation conducted overseas was abruptly suspended by government officials — placing Canadian intelligence officers in harm’s way. 

The halt was ordered without proper documentation or authority, raising major red flags about how we manage high-risk missions abroad.

The NSIRA’s findings paint a disturbing picture. 

The CSIS operation — still classified — was suspended mid-mission without any formal directive from either the CSIS Director or the Public Safety Minister. 

This abrupt halt reportedly created “unnecessary danger” for Canadian intelligence officers on the ground and inflicted reputational damage on Canada.

From an intelligence perspective, this isn’t just a bureaucratic misstep. 

It’s an operational hazard. 

Field operations require certainty, clear command chains, and airtight communication. 

When political actors intervene without coordination, they not only risk operational failure — they risk lives.

The broader implication? 

If Canada’s intelligence community cannot rely on clear ministerial oversight and operational autonomy, future missions — particularly in hostile environments — may falter or even collapse under the weight of political indecision.

To put this in context, all foreign based intelligence operations have a different set of risk factors and a potentially more significant fallout from a political, reputational and governmental perspective.  

Additionally, although CSIS can and does conduct foreign operations, it is not a dedicated foreign HUMINT agency like the CIA or MI6.

This isn’t the first time that political interference or bureaucratic hesitation has hampered intelligence efforts. 

During the 2010s, CSIS was repeatedly flagged for operational opacity and the lack of clear ministerial directives. 

But this case goes a step further — suggesting a vacuum of leadership during a live, overseas operation.

In 2022, then-Public Safety Minister Marco Mendicino called for a review of how his office and CSIS coordinate accountability. 

That review has now yielded these damning conclusions.

While the report is light on specifics, it does quote an urgent message from then-CSIS Director David Vigneault:

“Time is quickly running out and the situation is getting much more tense on the ground. We need a decision tomorrow.”

That statement — likely issued from some frustration over the urgency and lack of response — underscores the operational volatility and the need for decisive leadership within ministries that must deal with intelligence matters.

From my own experience, the absence of clear chain-of-command decisions in covert environments can be catastrophic. 

Officers in the field need to know that someone has their back — not just strategically, but politically.

NSIRA’s recommendation that any non-CSIS directive halting an operation be formally documented and attributed to the Public Safety Minister is long overdue.

This story should alarm every Canadian who believes in the need for effective, professional intelligence operations.

CSIS officers working abroad were exposed to the dangers that are conducive with any foreign intelligence operation. 

The chain of command broke down. 

And the system of ministerial accountability — which is supposed to protect both our national security and democratic principles — failed.

Going forward, the Government of Canada must take NSIRA’s recommendations seriously. 

Canada’s international credibility and the safety of our intelligence officers depend on it.

MUSIC

Sticking with this issue our next story brings us into deeply uncomfortable territory — one that questions the very framework of how Canada handles high-risk human source operations abroad.

The report by NSIRA uncovered major failures in ministerial accountability surrounding a secret CSIS operation — one linked to a controversial human source accused of smuggling three teenage British girls into ISIS-controlled Syria.

The report, as previously mentioned, is heavily redacted, but what has been made public paints picture, that to the uninitiated, demonstrates incomplete briefings, overlooked legal risks, and a human source who likely worked ISIS.

But as you will see in my analysis this isn’t the whole story. 

According to NSIRA’s findings, CSIS failed to adequately inform then-Public Safety Minister Marco Mendicino — and even Prime Minister Trudeau — about a covert overseas operation tied to Mohammed al-Rashed, a Syrian-born man who allegedly smuggled three teenage girls into Syria in 2015.

Al-Rashed, according to the book The Secret History of the Five Eyes, was a CSIS source reportedly working with ISIS. 

According to the news article, CSIS categorized the operation as low-risk and failed to flag his alleged criminal past or operational concerns to senior officials.

Worse, it was only when al-Rashed was arrested, and the case risked going public that CSIS disclosed Canada’s involvement — suggesting the move was more about damage control than transparency.

From an intelligence perspective, I can tell you this is a gross underestimation of the work that goes into both assessing risk and the need to maintain as high a level of confidentiality as possible concerning the source. 

As with any criminal organization, and ISIS is a criminal organization by the very fact that they are a terrorist organization, the need to acquire access to them occurs through individuals who have access to that group. 

Police organizations don’t gain access to gangs and mobs by speaking to and recruiting individuals who aren’t apart of these groups. 

The same holds true in the world of counter terrorism. 

Risk management is a critical component of every operation that CSIS conducts, and this includes not only the risk to the source, and the handlers, but the operation, the organization’s reputation, and the political and governmental fallout as well. 

The idea that an operation is low risk is dependent on various factors including what can be used to mitigate the risk at the time and going forward. 

If there is a robust gambit of mitigating risk factors, even an operation that appears to be high risk on the surface can be low risk once all contributing factors are considered. 

Let’s go back to 2015. 

The disappearance of Shamima Begum, Amira Abase, and Kadiza Sultana — three British schoolgirls — made headlines across the UK. 

They had boarded a flight to Turkey before crossing into Syria.

Later reporting, including BBC interviews and Kerbaj’s book, suggests al-Rashed facilitated that crossing — during the time he was a human source for CSIS.

The Canadian public only became aware of this connection in 2022, as a result of international investigative journalism. 

That prompted Trudeau to promise an inquiry and led to Mendicino’s request for NSIRA’s review.

While no direct quotes from the intelligence community are cited in this report, Ashley Burke’s CBC reporting included critical insights. 

National Security Intelligence Advisor, Jody Thomas stated that she had to ask questions on behalf of multiple departments because of CSIS’s withholding of information. 

The idea that CSIS was withholding information from the NSIA is a misnomer. 

As in any ongoing intelligence operation, the safety of the operation, including the source and the intelligence team handling and supporting the operation is paramount. 

Information is provided on a “Need to know” basis and the fact that more questions were being asked, does not, in and of itself indicate an attempt to prevent information from being shared. 

It’s just the correct operational procedure for maintaining operational integrity and safety. 

This story is a powerful reminder of the complexities surrounding intelligence operations, especially when they occur outside of your own country. 

The Service is, and has been quite capable of operating complex foreign based intelligence operations. 

The NSIRA report offers six key recommendations to overhaul how the government assesses risks and keeps ministers in the loop. 

As with any process there is always room for improvement, however trying to lay blame at the foot of the Service is not only irresponsible, but also dangerous. 

A national security culture needs to start from within the government and this means that identifying, contacting, recruiting and handling members of terrorist organizations, even outside of Canada is part of that world. 

Canadian politicians and review bodies cannot simply play the blame game when, years after the operation occurred, investigative journalist pull on the threads that demonstrate the activities of these individuals and operations. 

MUSIC

We head to the United States for our next story where we take a closer look at a case that sits at the intersection of science, security, and sovereignty.

Two Chinese nationals — Yunqing Jian and Zunyong Liu — have been charged with attempting to smuggle a biological plant pathogen into the United States. 

While experts downplay the likelihood that this was an act of agroterrorism, the case still raises serious concerns about scientific oversight, biological risk management, and foreign influence in academic institutions.

Let’s unpack what we know — and why it matters to Canada and the broader Western intelligence community.

According to federal prosecutors, Jian and Liu brought Fusarium graminearum — a toxic fungal pathogen — into the U.S. through Detroit Metropolitan Airport. 

Jian had reportedly received Chinese government funding for her research on the fungus and planned to deliver it to a lab at the University of Michigan.

The DOJ emphasized that this type of pathogen is considered a potential agroterrorism agent due to its ability to damage critical food crops like wheat and barley, although it is not currently on the USDA's list of the most dangerous agricultural threats.

Jian and Liu are now facing multiple charges, including conspiracy, smuggling goods into the U.S., visa fraud, and making false statements. 

Perhaps most telling: Jian’s electronics reportedly contained data referencing her membership and loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party.

From an intelligence perspective, this incident raises key red flags. 

The use of scientific collaboration as a vector for covert collection, influence, or even sabotage is a growing concern. And one that I have referenced on multiple occasions on this podcast. 

We’ve seen this pattern before — foreign researchers working in sensitive academic labs without proper permits or oversight, often backed by state funding or ideological loyalties.

This pathogen is not new. 

It's a well-known and already present in dozens of U.S. states and has been in North America for more than a century. 

It causes a disease known as "head blight," which has been responsible for billions of dollars in crop losses globally.

So what’s the concern?

Because the smuggled samples could be foreign strains that are more aggressive, more toxic, or resistant to current mitigation tools. 

As one expert noted, it’s not the presence of the fungus that’s alarming — it’s the unknown characteristics of the strain that was brought in.

And then there’s the issue of protocol. 

Any importation of foreign biological agents must be cleared through the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service — with lab inspections and documentation. 

It’s unclear whether Jian and Liu followed any of those steps.

This echoes other known Chinese state efforts to collect genetic, agricultural, or biological data through unreported or covert means — whether through academic collaboration, cyber-espionage, or theft of research material. 

The blending of civilian and state activity, particularly in biotechnology, is a growing tool in China’s foreign influence playbook.

Plant pathology experts like Caitlyn Allen and Gary Bergstrom were quick to note that Fusarium graminearum isn't a “top-tier” threat — but that doesn't mean it’s benign.

Allen suggested the incident may be more a case of “bad judgment” than malice, noting that passionate young researchers sometimes ignore procedure.

Still, the DOJ sees it differently. 

Prosecutors highlighted the fungus’s economic impact, noting that it produces a potent mycotoxin — sometimes called “vomitoxin” — that can harm both livestock and humans.

The risk lies not just in the fungus, but in what it represents: a lapse in border biosecurity, the potential for foreign-state-sponsored scientific misuse, and the legal gray zone where dual-use research can be manipulated for state purposes.

As someone who’s worked on border integrity and national security issues, I can tell you this: even “low risk” bioagents deserve scrutiny when the vector is covert and the sponsor is a geopolitical rival like the CCP.

Recent added strains to the relationship between Washington and Beijing makes this a potential attack on North Americas food supply and ability to produce crops for economic trade. 

This may not necessarily be an act of agroterrorism — but it is a warning shot.

Biological threats don’t always come in the form of pandemics or weaponized viruses. 

Sometimes, they come through a customs line, inside a suitcase, carried by someone with a research visa.

In an era where food security and supply chain stability are becoming increasingly politicized and targeted, Canada and its allies must revisit how they vet foreign research collaborations, protect academic institutions, and enforce biological import protocols.

MUSIC

For our next story we turn to a disturbing case from Boulder, Colorado, where a man armed with Molotov cocktails and a makeshift flamethrower attacked a peaceful group rallying in support of Israeli hostages.

Twelve people were injured, including an 88-year-old Holocaust survivor, and the FBI is now treating the incident as an act of terrorism.

We’ll break down the facts, the ideological motivations, and what this attack says about the growing domestic threat landscape in North America — particularly when it comes to Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism, or IMVE.

The suspect has been identified as 45-year-old Mohamed Sabry Soliman, an Egyptian national who had overstayed his U.S. visa and was living in Colorado Springs.

According to court documents, Soliman planned the attack for over a year, studying how to build incendiary devices online and waiting until after his daughter’s high school graduation to act.

He targeted a group affiliated with Run for Their Lives, an organization advocating for the release of Israeli hostages held in Gaza.

During the attack, Soliman allegedly shouted “Free Palestine” and declared he wanted to “kill all Zionist people.” 

When arrested, he confessed to plotting multiple attacks and expressed regret only because he became frightened during the act.

This isn’t a case of spontaneous violence. 

It was calculated, ideologically driven, and executed with intent. 

And while authorities say he acted alone, the extremist rhetoric and ideology he espoused reflect a broader radicalization trend happening both online and offline.

From a national security perspective, this is a textbook example of IMVE: an individual radicalized by a specific worldview — in this case, anti-Zionist and antisemitic — who moves from grievance to intent to action.

Soliman arrived in the U.S. in 2022 on a temporary visa that expired in early 2023. 

He later filed for asylum and was issued a work permit. 

U.S. officials now say he was in the country illegally at the time of the attack.

His case comes just days after another high-profile incident — a deadly shooting outside a Jewish Museum in Washington, D.C., where the attacker also shouted “Free Palestine.”

The backdrop here is a documented surge in antisemitic incidents across the U.S. and Canada.

According to the Anti-Defamation League, 2023 and 2024 saw record-breaking numbers of antisemitic threats and violence.

Groups like Run for Their Lives, while explicitly peaceful, have become lightning rods for extremist ire — particularly in the wake of the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas.

The weaponization of slogans like “Free Palestine” by extremists is especially troubling because it hijacks legitimate protest language and distorts it into justification for violence.

Special Agent Mark Michalek, head of the FBI’s Denver office, confirmed the FBI is investigating the attack as terrorism, emphasizing the targeted nature of the act.

Court documents also indicate that Soliman left messages for his family in anticipation of his arrest or death — a potential indicator of martyrdom ideology often associated with extremist actors.

From an intelligence perspective, there are several red flags:

• Soliman conducted surveillance by researching his target group online.

• He prepared dozens of incendiary devices in advance.

• He deliberately timed his attack and left ideological statements behind.

This closely mirrors tradecraft used in lone-actor terrorism, where the attacker avoids detection by operating independently while being ideologically connected to a broader movement.

It’s also a case study in the challenges of monitoring radicalization among individuals with no formal ties to terrorist organizations.

The attack in Boulder is a chilling reminder that North America is not immune to ideologically motivated terrorism — even when it’s not directed by foreign actors.

It also underscores how easily antisemitism can evolve from rhetoric to violence, especially when fueled by personal grievance, international conflict, and access to radicalizing material online.

For intelligence and law enforcement communities, the incident raises urgent questions about:

• Visa overstay monitoring

• Radicalization detection among asylum applicants

• And the rise in “low-tech” attacks using everyday items as weapons.

This wasn’t just a hate crime. It was a premeditated act of political violence — one that severely injured a Holocaust survivor and shattered a community.

MUSIC

Back to Canada for our next story where we examine a massive legislative proposal just tabled by the federal Liberal government — Bill C-2, a sweeping 139-page border security bill that may significantly reshape how Canada manages its national security, immigration, data privacy, and intelligence operations.

Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree says the bill is focused on securing the border, fighting organized crime and fentanyl trafficking, and cracking down on money laundering. 

But critics say it goes far beyond border management and introduces expansive new surveillance and enforcement powers that raise tough questions about oversight and civil liberties.

So, what does this bill actually do? 

And how will it affect Canada’s intelligence and security landscape?

Bill C-2 proposes a range of sweeping measures across several domains:

• Border Security: It tightens asylum claim eligibility, expands the CBSA’s powers to inspect containers leaving Canada, and closes loopholes in the Safe Third Country Agreement with the U.S.

• Surveillance and Intelligence: It grants law enforcement and intelligence agencies — including CSIS — new authority to intercept communications and access digital data, even without court warrants in certain cases, and allows mail to be searched as part of criminal investigations.

• Asylum Reform: The bill retroactively deems ineligible any asylum claim made over 365 days after a claimant's arrival in Canada — affecting thousands, including international students. It also allows Ottawa to halt or cancel immigration applications en masse for reasons of national security or public health.

• Coast Guard Expansion: The Canadian Coast Guard is granted a new security role — including patrols near borders and in the Arctic — and permission to share surveillance data with military and intelligence partners.

• Financial Crime Enforcement: Civil and criminal penalties for failing to comply with anti-money laundering and terrorist financing laws are increased. The bill also imposes new requirements on digital service providers to organize user data for law enforcement access.

This isn’t just a “border security” bill. It’s a multi-pronged legislative overhaul that touches immigration, cybersecurity, surveillance, organized crime, and maritime security.

Canada has long faced criticism for lagging behind allies when it comes to border security and intelligence integration — particularly from American officials, including former and current U.S. administrations.

Public Safety Minister Anandasangaree admitted that some provisions address longstanding American concerns about the northern border, but stressed the bill isn’t a direct response to Donald Trump’s security demands.

The Coast Guard provisions, for instance, represent a significant evolution. 

Until now, the Canadian Coast Guard has been a civilian agency focused on navigation, search-and-rescue, and environmental protection. 

Bill C-2 would give it a hybrid security mandate — potentially allowing for armed patrols in future, though Ottawa hasn’t confirmed whether ships will be militarized.

On the surveillance front, this bill emerges in the shadow of multiple court decisions that have hampered the ability of Canadian law enforcement to obtain digital evidence. 

Bill C-2 appears to be the government’s response: lowering the barriers for warrant access and expanding the intelligence community’s ability to proactively gather data.

National security expert Wesley Wark notes that while the legislation is pitched as a border security bill, it has far broader implications. In his words:

“It’s pitched as another set of measures to strengthen border security but that is not a universal component of many of the proposed changes — e.g. those to combat illicit financing; and transnational organized crime.”

From a tradecraft standpoint, the data-sharing clauses and warrantless access provisions could be a game changer for CSIS and other intelligence partners — enabling faster coordination and real-time intelligence flow across departments.

Bill C-2 is bold, complex, and to some, controversial. 

It could very well become the most significant overhaul to Canada’s border, intelligence, and immigration systems in a generation.

As this bill works its way through Parliament, expect some debate over the line between public safety and personal liberty, between national security and government overreach.

For intelligence professionals, policymakers, and private sector security leaders, this is one to watch closely. 

Because how Canada chooses to manage its borders, its data, and its people in the coming years will define the future of our national security posture. 

MUSIC

For our next story we head to Washington for a controversy that’s sparking deep concern in the intelligence and counterterrorism communities.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has placed a 22-year-old recent college graduate — with no prior experience in security, intelligence, or public leadership — in charge of a key federal terrorism prevention program.

Thomas Fulgate, a self-described “Trumplican” and former Heritage Foundation intern, is now leading the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships — or CP3 — a DHS initiative responsible for combatting hate-motivated violence, terrorism, and school shootings.

And if you think this sounds like political patronage overriding national security, you're not alone.

Fulgate’s appointment follows the abrupt resignation of CP3’s previous head, Army veteran Bill Braniff, a seasoned national security expert who had spent more than 20 years advancing evidence-based, community-led counter-extremism programs.

Since its founding, CP3 has distributed tens of millions in federal grants to help prevent radicalization and violence — especially at the grassroots level. 

Braniff’s approach emphasized de-stigmatization, data, and inclusion — a hard-won evolution away from the post-9/11 era focussed on Sunni Islamic Terrorism.

Enter Fulgate — a 22-year-old University of San Antonio graduate, former campaign volunteer for Donald Trump, and part-time gardener in 2020, according to his own LinkedIn profile. 

Before this appointment, he had worked as a "special assistant" in an immigration office at DHS, with no leadership experience in national security.

Yet DHS insists he was given the CP3 post “due to his success.”

To put this plainly: it’s a stunning case of ideological placement over professional qualification. 

And it comes at a time when violent extremism is escalating — from the Molotov cocktail attack in Boulder, to bombings and shootings tied to ideological hate.

The CP3 program was created to fulfill one of DHS’s original mandates — preventing domestic terrorism. 

It supports law enforcement, community leaders, and NGOs in identifying and mitigating early signs of radicalization before violence erupts.

But CP3's evolution under Braniff was crucial. 

He helped push the U.S. approach beyond outdated post-9/11 methods, which often alienated Muslim communities, and into a more inclusive, fact-based model that could tackle white supremacists, anti-government extremists, and hate-based violence across the spectrum.

Now, that progress may be at risk. 

ProPublica reports that staff under Fulgate describe meetings with him as more like “career counseling” than policy leadership — and note that he lacks fundamental understanding of the agency’s mission.

All of this is happening while the U.S. sees a surge in ideologically motivated violent extremism. 

That includes the recent attack in Boulder by Mohamed Sabry Soliman, as previously mentioned, and other incidents involving anti-Israel, anti-Jewish, and anti-government attackers.

This isn’t just a personnel issue — it’s a threat to the effectiveness of an already strained prevention ecosystem.

Former officials who’ve worked with CP3 describe the appointment as “an insult.” One DHS veteran told ProPublica:

“We’re entering very dangerous territory.”

They warn that Fulgate’s sudden promotion signals a return to politicized, unqualified leadership at the top of critical national security functions.

Even those in the intelligence community who might not align politically are concerned about the loss of institutional knowledge and credibility. 

Programs like CP3 rely on public trust and cooperation — something hard to sustain when the leadership is seen as unqualified and ideologically motivated.

From my perspective, based on years in intelligence and enforcement, appointments like this severely undermine morale, weaken operational readiness, and erode trust — not just internally, but among community partners essential to successful prevention.

This story may seem like political theatre on the surface, but it cuts to the core of what makes a national security system effective: trust, credibility, and competence.

The appointment of a politically connected 22-year-old intern to lead a terrorism prevention office is more than eyebrow-raising — it’s dangerous.

We’ve seen the cost of inexperience and ideology in intelligence leadership before. 

If the U.S. is serious about preventing terrorism — whether from lone actors, hate groups, or radicalized individuals — then CP3 and its leadership must be qualified, accountable, and grounded in professional best practice.

Canada and its allies should take note. 

Weakening prevention models in the U.S. can have ripple effects across the Five Eyes, and it reinforces the urgent need for apolitical, expert-led intelligence programs.

MUSIC

For our last story this week, I am going to discuss a topic that has attracted a lot of attention in a previous episode of Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up. 

It takes us to the heart of the British security establishment, where the United Kingdom’s domestic intelligence agency, MI5, is facing unprecedented allegations — not from a foreign adversary, but from the BBC and its own judicial system.

A High Court panel is now reviewing whether MI5 and three of its officers committed contempt of court by knowingly giving false evidence in an attempt to cover up the identity of a neo-Nazi informant who allegedly abused women.

This case raises fundamental questions about accountability, ethics, and the relationship between intelligence agencies and the courts.

At the centre of the storm is a man known only as Agent X — an MI5 source who reportedly used his protected status as a government informant to intimidate, control, and abuse a woman referred to publicly as “Beth.”

MI5 originally argued it had never confirmed X’s status and invoked the long-standing NCND (neither confirm nor deny) doctrine. 

However, the BBC was able to produce recordings and notes proving that an MI5 officer did, in fact, confirm X’s role during an off-the-record call — seemingly in an effort to dissuade the journalist from pursuing the story.

The High Court is now weighing whether this amounts to deliberate deception. 

MI5’s official barrister, Sir James Eadie KC, has issued an “unreserved apology” but maintains that while serious errors occurred, they were not intentional lies.

The BBC and Beth’s legal team disagree. 

They allege “copious levels of dishonesty,” a failure to acknowledge misconduct, and a lack of candour in MI5’s internal investigations.

They’ve called for contempt of court proceedings— a rare and serious escalation that could carry prison time or significant fines.

The origins of this case go back to 2022, when the BBC attempted to publish an investigation into X — a violent neo-Nazi and misogynist. 

MI5 sought to block the story using secrecy provisions and legal arguments grounded in national security.

Eventually, the BBC prevailed, but the fallout revealed a troubling pattern: MI5 gave false testimony in at least three court cases, all while claiming it had never breached its secrecy protocol.

Compounding matters, much of the evidence has been confined to closed hearings, which neither Beth nor the BBC could attend. 

That secrecy has only deepened concerns about transparency and oversight.

Beth’s legal team now argues that this ruling could finally give her the fair trial she’s been fighting for. 

Her solicitor, Kate Ellis, said the outcome “really undermines MI5’s credibility in the courts.”

The implications are massive: this is one of the most significant credibility crises MI5 has faced in decades — one that touches on source management, gender-based abuse, and institutional integrity.

The BBC’s barrister, Jude Bunting KC, told the court that MI5’s explanations lack candour and that the internal review — led by former government legal chief Sir Jonathan Jones KC — failed to even speak with two critical witnesses.

Beth’s counsel, Charlotte Kilroy KC, argued that MI5’s insistence that the false evidence wasn’t deliberate simply isn’t credible given the weight of documentation and recordings.

Sir James Eadie, in defence of MI5, countered that the mistakes were serious but not intentional, and added that MI5 Director General Ken McCallum alerted the Home Secretary as soon as the situation came to light.

But the damage may already be done. 

For an agency that depends on judicial trust, political oversight, and public legitimacy, even the appearance of dishonesty can be corrosive.

From my own professional experience, intelligence agencies walk a fine line — balancing secrecy with accountability. 

But if that line is crossed, especially in a court of law, the entire foundation of democratic intelligence work can be shaken. 

Courts must be able to trust the agencies appearing before them — full stop.

This case is about more than one agent or one policy failure. It’s about whether intelligence agencies are above the justice system — or accountable to it.

If MI5 knowingly gave false evidence to shield an agent accused of domestic abuse, then we are witnessing not just an operational failure, but a moral failure.

Whether the High Court proceeds with contempt charges or not, one thing is clear: MI5’s credibility has taken a significant hit, and future operations may suffer as a result.

The case also raises broader questions for all Western intelligence agencies: 

how do we balance secrecy with justice? 

How do we ensure sources aren't abusing their positions of power? 

And how do we rebuild trust when it's broken?

Well, that puts a wrap on another week of intelligence. 

As always, links to the open-source media stories are in the transcript. 

I’d like to inform my audience of a truly special opportunity.  

The Professional Development Institute at the University of Ottawa will by hosting a panel discussion featuring former RCMP and CSIS intelligence professionals at the Alex Trebek, Alumni Hall in Ottawa on June 11th from 1pm until 245. 

The list of distinguished speakers from the Pillar Society includes two individuals that I have previously had the opportunity to interview on my podcast “Intelligence Conversations” they include Dan Stanton, a former CSIS intelligence officer and executive and Iwona Mooney, a former CSIS analyst. 

Registration starts at 1245 and there should be plenty of time for questions and networking. 

If you are a national security practitioner, enthusiast or academic, you won’t want to miss this one. 

And who knows, maybe I’ll see you there. 

I’ll leave a link to the presentation in the show notes. 

So, until next week. Stay curious, stay informed and stay safe. 

MUSIC

OUTRO

That’s a wrap for this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up.

From a halted CSIS operation that endangered officers abroad, to allegations of MI5 misleading the courts, to the troubling rise of lone-actor terrorism in North America — this week’s stories underscore the critical importance of trust, oversight, and strategy in the intelligence world.

Bringing you this level of detail and expert insight each week takes time, effort, and more than two decades of frontline experience — all dedicated to cutting through noise and delivering what matters.

If this episode gave you something to think about, please share it with someone in your network, leave a review, or hit subscribe so you never miss a briefing.

You can also support the podcast directly on Buzzsprout or through Patreon — every contribution helps keep this work independent and focused.

For more intelligence-driven content, including training, analysis, and resources, visit the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network.

Until next time — stay curious, stay informed, and stay safe.

Links:

Story 1: Halting spy operation placed CSIS team in unnecessary danger, watchdog report says
Link: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csis-operation-nsira-1.7547940

Story 2: Minister lacked details about CSIS operation linked to asset who reportedly smuggled teens
Link: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/nsira-report-overseas-operation-1.7550986

Story 3: What we know about the attack in Colorado
Link: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c74n3122pgpo

Story 4: What to know about Fusarium graminearum, the biological pathogen allegedly smuggled into the US
Link: https://abcnews.go.com/US/fusarium-graminearum-biological-pathogen-allegedly-smuggled-us/story?id=122487812

Story 5: Liberal government tables border security bill with sweeping reforms and asylum claim clampdown
Link: https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/liberal-government-tables-border-security-bill-with-sweeping-new-data-collection-powers

Story 6: A 22-year-old college grad with no security experience is now leading a government terror prevention team: ‘Putting the intern in charge’
Link: https://ca.news.yahoo.com/22-old-college-grad-no-155207221.html

Story 7: MI5 lied deliberately, BBC tells court
Link: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4ge87g2lngo