Canada Bans Hikvision. Chinese Spies in the US Navy

In this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up, Neil Bisson — retired CSIS Intelligence Officer and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network — delivers timely, top-tier analysis of the week’s most urgent national security threats and intelligence developments from around the world.

🇨🇦 Why did Canada force Hikvision — a Chinese surveillance giant — to shut down its operations entirely?

🇨🇳 Who are the two Chinese nationals charged with trying to recruit U.S. Navy personnel for espionage?

🇩🇪 What does the arrest of a German-Iranian spy reveal about Iran’s escalating repression campaign in Europe?

🇬🇧 Is the UK right to label Palestine Action a terrorist group — or is this a dangerous precedent for protest policing?

🇺🇸 Why are American authorities warning of possible July 4 terror attacks — and what makes lone actors so hard to detect?

⚖️ What’s behind MI5’s credibility crisis after allegedly misleading British courts?

🧳 How did a Canadian teenager end up working for the FSB — and why might he walk free early?

Plus: Neil shares insights from his new Substack article on Chinese surveillance threats in Canada — and why every Western democracy should be paying attention.

🎧 Tune in for critical insights drawn from over 25 years of frontline intelligence and law enforcement experience.

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📚 Explore more at:
www.globalintelligenceknowledgenetwork.com

📅 Chapters
00:00 – Introduction
01:20 – Canada Orders Hikvision to Shut Down Operations
06:10 – Two Chinese Nationals Charged for Recruiting U.S. Navy Spies
10:20 – Iran-Linked Spy Arrested in Germany
15:20 – UK Bans Palestine Action as Terrorist Group
20:35 – FBI, DHS Issue July 4 Terror Alert
24:40 – MI5 Accused of Misleading UK Courts
28:00 – Canadian Teen Jailed for Spying for Russia May Be Released Early
29:10 – Outro & Independence Day Message

Transcript

2025 07 04 Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up



Intro:

Welcome to this week’s edition of Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up — your trusted source for global intelligence, national security, and espionage insights that go beyond the headlines.

Neil Bisson, retired CSIS Intelligence Officer and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network, brings over 25 years of experience to help you understand the threats shaping our world — and what they mean for your safety, your data, and your country.

This week, Canada orders Chinese surveillance giant Hikvision to shut down operations, in a major move to secure its digital infrastructure. 

In the U.S., two Chinese nationals face espionage charges for targeting Navy personnel, while Germany arrests a dual national accused of spying for Iran.

The UK designates Palestine Action as a terrorist group, prompting debate over protest and extremism. American authorities issue a July 4th terror warning as lone actor threats intensify. 

MI5 faces a major credibility crisis after misleading courts. 

And a Canadian teen jailed for spying for Russia may be released early — sparking urgent questions about youth recruitment and state coercion.


Ready for another amazing episode? Let’s go!

MUSIC

Hello and welcome back to the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up. 

I’m your host, Neil Bisson, a retired intelligence Officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network. 

Each week, I provide you with the insights, analysis and intelligence surrounding what’s happening in the world of intelligence, espionage, national security, foreign interference and terrorism. 

So you can see how the shadow world affects your safety, your career and your country. 

We have a lot to cover this week, so let’s get started. 
We start off in Canada for our first story, where the federal government has ordered Hikvision, a partially state-owned Chinese surveillance company, to shut down its Canadian operations. 

This comes after a national security review under the Investment Canada Act, marking the first time Ottawa has used this legislation to force a foreign technology company to close its doors entirely due to intelligence concerns.

Hikvision isn’t just another tech firm—it’s one of the largest manufacturers of surveillance equipment in the world, with links to the Chinese government. 

Its products, including AI-enabled cameras and video management systems, have been installed across Canadian infrastructure, from commercial properties to potentially sensitive locations.

Ottawa’s concern is that this hardware could be used by the Chinese Communist Party to conduct covert surveillance, access sensitive video feeds, or harvest biometric data. 

The risk is heightened by China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which compels all Chinese companies to assist in state intelligence efforts if asked.

Unlike software, which can often be patched or removed, physical surveillance infrastructure is persistent and embedded. 

That makes it a long-term espionage risk if the manufacturer—or the data—can be controlled from abroad.

This move is part of a broader trend among Western democracies. 

The U.S. placed Hikvision on a trade blacklist in 2019, citing national security risks and the company's involvement in human rights violations in Xinjiang. 

In 2022, the U.K. banned Chinese surveillance cameras from government buildings. 

Australia has also begun auditing and removing Chinese-made cameras from defense sites.

Canada initially restricted the use of Hikvision cameras in government facilities two years ago, but this full operational ban represents a major policy escalation. 

It sends a clear message: the presence of foreign surveillance tech from authoritarian states is no longer acceptable—even in the private sector.

Security analysts point to Hikvision’s alleged integration of facial recognition software, potential remote access capabilities, and cloud-based storage vulnerabilities as particular concerns.

One senior researcher at Citizen Lab, which has studied Chinese surveillance technology for years, noted that Hikvision devices “are not simply passive cameras. Many are active sensors, connected to networks, collecting data that can be exfiltrated or misused.”

I recently wrote a substack article which goes into more detail about how several Chinese companies have infiltrated Canadian industry, mining and critical infrastructure. The article is entitled, Hikvision: The Tip of the National Security Threat to Canada From China, I’ll leave a link in the show notes. 

From an intelligence perspective, I see this as a delayed but necessary action. 

Allowing a company with close ties to Beijing to embed itself in Canada’s surveillance architecture is equivalent to giving a foreign adversary a window into Canadian military and government, infrastructure and industrial research and development. 

 The Chinese Communist Party has learned to leverage cheap cameras as a way to conduct espionage without using human spies. 

Although they still do that. And we’ll get to that in our next story. 

The PRC heavily subsidizes digital camera manufacturers who in turn can sell their products to western clients at costs much lower than manufacturers in the west. 

This makes the cost savings to Western industries and governments so attractive that they use Chinese camera manufactures like Hikvision, in every conceivable security area to deter theft and other crimes. 

Unfortunately, the theft of intellectual property, government secrets and activities of citizens of western countries is the real price that we are paying for inexpensive digital camera technology. 

Whether you’re a multimillion-dollar business, a government facility or a health care provider, the price of having Chinese manufactured equipment installed in your facility is a lot higher than you think. 

The shutdown of Hikvision's Canadian operations is not just symbolic—it’s a security imperative.

But this move also raises broader questions: 

How many other foreign-controlled technologies are already embedded in Canadian infrastructure? 

And are we prepared to root them out, given the high expense of replacement?

Going forward, Canada needs a comprehensive supply chain and technology security strategy, one that includes continuous vetting of critical vendors, real-time threat assessments, and clear consequences for companies that pose national security risks.

MUSIC

We’ll stay on the topic of Chinese spying but move to the United States for our next story. 

 Where we focus on an Al Jazeera report, entitled “Two Chinese nationals charged for trying to recruit spies in US military.” 

In brief, U.S. prosecutors allege that Yuance Chen, a California-based permanent resident, and Liren “Ryan” Lai, an Ministry of State Security or MSS officer operating from China, tried to groom U.S. Navy personnel for espionage and passed naval intelligence to Beijing.

Let’s break this story down by topic: 

• The operation: Beginning in 2021, Lai cultivated Chen as an asset, encouraging him to deepen contacts inside the Navy. The pair allegedly shared base photographs, personal data on sailors, and left a $10,000 cash dead-drop to pay for future secrets.

• Tradecraft cues: Use of encrypted apps, cover businesses, and offshore meetings mirrors classic MSS HUMINT methodology: identify access, build rapport, then incentivize with cash or career help.

• Why it matters: Beijing’s push for “blue-water” naval dominance demands inside knowledge of U.S. fleet operations. Penetrating personnel networks is cheaper and harder to detect than cyber-intrusions.

This indictment sits in a wider pattern. In August 2023, two U.S. Navy sailors were charged with handing operational details to China, and former Army Sergeant Joseph Schmidt was arrested the same year for similar outreach. 

These cases underscore a long-term, global recruitment drive that also targets Canadian service members, defence contractors, and veterans’ groups.

• Attorney General Pamela Bondi called the affair “a sustained and aggressive effort to infiltrate our military and undermine national security.”

• The FBI affidavit read: MSS networks exploit Chinese-heritage recruits but also anyone with financial or emotional vulnerabilities, stressing that “personal connection, not ethnicity, drives recruitment success.”

I teach a course at the University of Ottawa on the Psychology behind Human Sources in Intelligence and from my perspective I see the MSS is trying to refine its playbook to include short cycle grooming for quick wins, paired with deeper cultivation for strategic access.

China’s intelligence services are accelerating in-country HUMINT against Western militaries. And here’s what we can expect going forward: 

1.   More Foreign Agent Registry Act or FARA prosecutions as U.S. authorities leverage registration laws.
2.   Broader veteran-targeting; retiring personnel remain lucrative marks for foreign states to try and gain access to sensitive military information.
3.   Spill-over to allies — Canada’s own naval and Arctic programs are prime targets. Counter-intelligence briefings for Canadian Forces members and veterans are no longer optional; they’re urgent. Even more so given Canada’s push to augment our Military capacity. 

MUSIC

For our next story, we head to Germany, where federal prosecutors have arrested a dual German Iranian citizen on suspicion of spying for Iran’s intelligence services. 

The man was reportedly collecting information on potential attack targets, including individuals and sites associated with Iranian opposition groups in exile. 

The case raises concerns about Tehran’s escalating use of transnational repression and covert operations across Europe.

The suspect, identified only as Kambiz A., was detained in Frankfurt and accused of gathering intelligence on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence or MOIS. 

German prosecutors allege that the individual had been monitoring Iranian dissidents living in exile, with indications that the information collected may have been used to plan future attacks on German soil.

This case fits into a broader trend of Iranian state actors surveilling, intimidating, and targeting members of the Iranian diaspora who oppose the regime. 

MOIS and the IRGC’s Quds Force are both known for operating covert networks across Europe, recruiting local assets to track or neutralize political opponents.

Germany has long been a hotspot for Iranian transnational repression. 

In 2018, the German government expelled Iranian diplomats after uncovering plots to assassinate dissidents in Berlin. 

In 2020, a German Iranian was convicted of surveilling Jewish synagogues on behalf of the IRGC.

And in 2023, security officials warned that Iranian intelligence was shifting focus from cyber intrusion to more traditional HUMINT methods — including recruiting agents of influence within immigrant communities.

The trend isn’t limited to Germany. 

Across Europe, there has been a steady uptick in Iranian plots:

• In France, MOIS-linked operatives planned a 2018 bombing of an MEK rally.

• In Denmark, an Iranian national was arrested in 2019 for planning an attack against an Arab separatist group.

• Sweden is currently prosecuting IRGC-linked operatives for murder and attempted murder tied to dissident targeting.

European intelligence agencies now regard Iran as one of the most active state actors conducting espionage and hostile activity on the continent, second only to Russia. 

A German domestic intelligence report from 2024 flagged Iranian operations as “persistent, flexible, and increasingly bold.” 

Experts warn that Iran’s focus on human intelligence — often through proxies or unwitting community contacts — makes detection especially difficult.

I view this arrest as a warning shot. 

Tehran’s repression campaign is no longer just about controlling its own population — it’s about projecting fear globally. 

The line between domestic dissent and international threat has been blurred, and democratic nations must adapt accordingly.

This case underscores the need for greater vigilance around foreign influence and espionage, especially within diaspora communities. 

Intelligence services must engage more closely with vulnerable groups, invest in HUMINT countermeasures, and ensure foreign agents are not using open societies as safe havens for covert action.

Canada has a large diaspora community in which Iranian Intelligence could tap into, and not all asylum seekers are fleeing Iran, some are active members of Iran’s authoritative regime looking for an opportunity to infiltrate Canada. 

With continued tensions between Iran, Israel and the United States, Iranian Intelligence organizations could use Canada as an access route to the US to coordinate attacks inside their border or conduct attacks against the Jewish communities and dissident groups in Canada. 

The Canadian Intelligence Community must ensure that security screening is clearly focussed on identifying and stopping these potential threats from happening. 

MUSIC

Off to the United Kingdom for our next story, where we discuss a major escalation of how protest groups are being treated under national security laws. 

The United Kingdom has officially designated Palestine Action a terrorist organization. 

The ban, approved by Parliament this week, criminalizes membership in or support for the group, which has carried out direct actions against British defense contractors and Israeli-linked targets. 

UK authorities allege the group promotes and engages in serious violence under the guise of protest — raising critical questions about the line between activism and terrorism.

Palestine Action, formed in 2020, is known for its high-profile, disruptive campaigns targeting companies like Elbit Systems UK, a subsidiary of Israel's largest arms manufacturer. 

The group has stormed factories, chained members to machinery, destroyed equipment, and used paint bombs and red dye to symbolize bloodshed in Gaza. 

While they call themselves non-violent, their methods have grown increasingly aggressive — and costly. 

Elbit has permanently closed two UK facilities following sustained sabotage and protest.

The UK's Home Office, in introducing the ban, cited “a campaign of criminal damage and violent direct action” that had moved beyond protest into terrorism. 

The new designation makes it a criminal offence to belong to, support, or publicly promote Palestine Action — placing it in the same legal category as banned extremist groups like Hamas or Hezbollah.

This move comes against the backdrop of intensifying political pressure in the UK around the Israel-Hamas war and mounting pro-Palestinian activism on university campuses, in public squares, and outside arms facilities. 

Palestine Action’s campaign has won support among some activists and celebrities, but the tactics have sparked backlash — not just from government, but from law enforcement and members of the public concerned about escalating violence.

The use of anti-terror legislation to address protest activity isn’t unprecedented in the UK, but it remains controversial. 

Critics argue that designating a protest group as a terrorist organization risks criminalizing dissent and could have a chilling effect on civil society. 

Supporters of the ban argue that the line was crossed when violence, coercion, and property destruction became central to the group’s strategy.

From an intelligence standpoint, the designation reflects a growing concern about ideologically motivated violent extremism or IMVE — particularly forms of activism that become operationalized in ways that resemble sabotage or terrorism. 

The UK, like Canada and other Western nations, is now confronting how to deal with actors who operate outside traditional political or religious extremist categories but still pose a threat to public safety and national infrastructure.

The UK’s Home Secretary described Palestine Action’s tactics as “designed to intimidate and cause harm.” 

British intelligence analysts have quietly warned for years that the group’s activities risk inspiring lone actors or splinter cells with more radical intent. 

Civil liberties advocates, meanwhile, are calling for an independent review of the decision and demanding clearer legal definitions around protest-related terrorism.

From my perspective, this designation marks a pivotal moment in how Western democracies frame violent protest movements that blur into sabotage or domestic extremism. 

When ideology is used to justify sustained, deliberate damage to national defense or commercial infrastructure, the response must be appropriate to that threat.  

The ban on Palestine Action signals a tougher, stance by the UK government — one that could ripple across Europe and North America. 

As climate, pro-Palestinian, and anti-capitalist movements increasingly adopt direct-action tactics, intelligence and law enforcement agencies must be aware of how these actions and groups can cross the line into ideologically motivated violence. 

MUSIC

I am recording this episode on July 4th, and our next story is focussed on Americans preparing for Independence Day celebrations. 

The FBI and Department of Homeland Security or DHS have issued a heightened threat advisory warning of possible terror attacks targeting mass gatherings across the U.S. 

The concern stems from both foreign and domestic actors, with intelligence indicating increased chatter and potential lone-actor mobilization. 

With July 4th typically marked by large public events, law enforcement is on high alert.

The FBI and DHS warned state and local officials in a recent call that fireworks shows, parades, and public celebrations could be attractive soft targets. 

According to officials, the threat environment is being driven by a convergence of risk factors including:

ongoing conflict in the Middle East.

homegrown violent extremism. 

and the approach of the 2025 U.S. election cycle.

This alert is not tied to a specific or credible plot but reflects what DHS calls a “persistent and dynamic threat landscape.” Officials are particularly concerned about lone actors, inspired by groups like ISIS or al-Qaeda, or by ideologically motivated violent extremist narratives circulating online — including anti-government, religious, and racial supremacy ideologies.

The bulletin follows a steady drumbeat of recent warnings:

• In June, DHS released a National Terrorism Advisory warning of a “heightened threat” from both foreign terrorist organizations and domestic extremists.

• In May, the FBI Director testified before Congress about the unprecedented volume of investigations into suspected extremist actors across all 50 states.



This year’s July 4th comes in the shadow of ongoing conflicts abroad, especially the Israeli conflict in Gaza and against Iran, which continues to radicalize individuals across the ideological spectrum. 

Authorities have noted increased online propaganda urging attacks in Western countries as retaliation. 

Additionally, 2025’s political climate — with polarized rhetoric, conspiracy theories, and renewed militia activity — is creating fertile ground for violent mobilization at home.

The U.S. has already seen several recent disruptions of planned attacks. 

In one case, a man in Michigan was arrested with weapons and tactical gear after threatening to shoot up a parade. 

Another case in California involved a suspect with homemade explosives targeting federal buildings. 

These foiled plots underscore the seriousness of the warnings — and the thin margin for error.

Security experts warn that independence-themed events present high symbolic and operational value to would-be attackers: soft security, large crowds, and massive media attention. 

Former DHS officials point out that the threat matrix is no longer top-down — it’s networked, digital, and often invisible until it's too late.

This moment illustrates the challenge of modern counterterrorism: we’re no longer just watching for foreign-directed plots, but for individuals radicalized in basements, chat rooms, or Telegram channels — some with no prior criminal history, yet fully mobilized for violence.

The July 4th advisory is not a reason to panic — but it is a reason to be vigilant. 

Folks should be aware of their surroundings, report suspicious behaviour, and understand that law enforcement presence at events is based on credible concern. 

The decentralized nature of today’s threats requires the public to play a more active role in early detection and prevention of potential terrorist activity.

MUSIC

Back to the United Kingdom for this next story, where, in a stunning rebuke of the United Kingdom’s Security Service, the High Court has ordered a new, independent investigation into how MI5 gave false evidence to multiple British courts. 

Regular listeners to the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up may be aware of this story as I have been covering it from its inception. 

The judgment comes after revelations by the BBC exposed serious misconduct involving a neo-Nazi state agent, known only as "X", and internal attempts by MI5 to conceal the agent’s status — even after serious allegations of abuse emerged. 

This case cuts to the core of democratic accountability, candour before the courts, and how the actions of sources or assets can have a detrimental effect on an intelligence organization.  

Three of the UK’s most senior judges — Lady Chief Justice Baroness Sue Carr, Dame Victoria Sharp, and Mr. Justice Chamberlain — concluded that previous internal and external reviews into the matter were “seriously deficient” and lacked procedural rigour. 

The court has now tasked Sir Brian Leveson, head of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office or IPCO, with conducting a full and robust investigation. 

The IPCO itself had been misled by MI5 during the initial legal proceedings.

At the heart of this case is the question of whether MI5 knowingly misled courts — and the degree to which it allowed a dangerous individual, agent “X,” to continue operating under state protection despite serious allegations of violence, coercion, and abuse against women. 

Agent X, a known neo-Nazi, reportedly used his MI5 affiliation to intimidate and control a former girlfriend, referred to publicly as “Beth.”

MI5 initially told the courts it had never breached its NCND policy — the long-standing rule to “neither confirm nor deny” the identity of intelligence assets. 

But the BBC presented clear evidence, including recordings and notes, that this was false. 

An MI5 officer had in fact confirmed X’s role to a BBC journalist in an attempt to stop the story from being published.
 
The original effort to suppress the BBC’s reporting began in 2022. 

MI5 argued that confirming X’s identity as an agent would endanger national security. 

But in February 2024, the BBC’s evidence — including a phone call from the MI5 officer — revealed MI5 had broken its own policy and then lied about it to the courts, to IPCO, and government lawyers.

Two official reviews followed: one was internal, and the second was led by Sir Jonathan Jones KC, the former chief government lawyer. 

Both cleared MI5 of deliberate wrongdoing. 

But the High Court found these reviews flawed — citing failures to speak with the officer at the centre of the scandal, and a tendency to draw conclusions before fully reviewing critical evidence provided by the BBC.

In one particularly damning passage, the court stated that MI5’s explanations to judges had been “piecemeal and unsatisfactory,” adding:

“The impression has been created that the true circumstances in which false evidence came to be given have had to be extracted from, not volunteered by, MI5.”

This isn’t just a legal embarrassment — it strikes at the legitimacy of intelligence testimony in British courts.

Beth’s lawyer, Kate Ellis from the Centre for Women’s Justice, called the ruling a “serious warning” to the Security Service, stressing that accountability mechanisms cannot function without high standards of candour from MI5. 

The judges echoed that sentiment, warning that MI5 had “hid behind” NCND far too easily, and in doing so, jeopardized public confidence in judicial oversight.

MI5 Director General Sir Ken McCallum issued an unreserved apology, calling the matter “a top priority.” 

But apologies may not be enough. 

The court stopped short of launching contempt proceedings against individuals — for now. 

But they made it clear: that decision is being deferred until the full independent inquiry is completed.

From an intelligence accountability standpoint, this is about as serious as it can get. 

The UK’s highest court has cast doubt not just on a specific case, but on whether MI5 can be trusted to tell the truth in court — a foundational expectation in any democratic state.

This case is a rare public window into the UK’s intelligence architecture — and a disturbing reminder of the risks when secrecy becomes an excuse for impunity. 

As someone who has worked in this space, I can tell you: trust between intelligence agencies and the judiciary is not optional — it is essential. 

When that trust is broken, it isn’t just a legal failure — it’s a national security crisis happening in slow motion. 

The upcoming decision of the investigation into MI5 will have lasting repercussions on their reputation, not only with the courts but with the public. 

Protection of confidentiality surrounding sources is at the core of any responsible intelligence organization. 

But actions that may bring the intelligence organization into disrepute must be dealt with in a manner that does not compromise the sometimes fragile reputation of that organization before the judicial system. 

MUSIC

We’ll end this episode on a story about a Canadian teenager who admitted to working for Russia’s Federal Security Service or the FSB and may be released early from prison in Poland. 

The case of Laken Pavan, arrested just days after turning 18, highlights the evolving tactics used by Russian intelligence services—and how even young Westerners are being drawn into the shadows of espionage.

According to Polish court records, Pavan flew from Vancouver to Moscow in April 2024, eventually making his way into Russian-occupied Donetsk. 

There, he was allegedly detained and interrogated by individuals claiming to be from the FSB. 

He later told Polish investigators that he was ordered to return to Europe, discard his passport to erase his trip to Russia, and begin espionage work on behalf of the FSB.

Pavan then travelled to Denmark, before settling in Poland. 

Days after checking into a budget hotel in Warsaw, he reportedly contacted local police and confessed to working for Russian intelligence, including a plan to collect information about Polish military activities.

Sentenced to 20 months in December 2024, Pavan is currently due for release in January 2026. 

However, a Polish court has now stated he may be conditionally released before completing his full sentence.

The case comes amid growing concern across Europe about Russia’s ongoing “hybrid war” campaign—marked by sabotage, disinformation, and espionage activities. 

While the Kremlin has consistently denied such operations, security agencies throughout NATO have been vocal about the increase in Russian intelligence activity since the invasion of Ukraine.

Pavan’s journey—from Canada to a Russian-backed militia zone, to recruitment by the FSB, and ultimately to a confession in Poland—raises several red flags. 

It also reveals how Western nationals, including teenagers, can become entangled in geopolitical conflicts far from home.

Polish officials have not commented publicly on why Pavan turned himself in, but his account suggests that the pressure and complexity of his assignment may have overwhelmed him. 

From an intelligence standpoint, his confession—and cooperation—may have offered value to Polish counterintelligence. 

But it also raises questions:
 
was this a genuine recruitment or a coerced operation? 

And if released early, what precedent does this set for others caught in similar circumstances?

Drawing from my own background in counterespionage, it’s rare to see someone so young entangled in such a sophisticated set of movements and instructions—travel across multiple countries, operational security steps like discarding documents, and a clear espionage tasking.

This may have been a simple recruitment to see if Pavan had any operational chops and if not the recruitment sends a message to western democracies that their citizens can be recruited by the FBS, making them, and their governments vulnerable. 

Whether coerced or voluntary, it fits a concerning trend: state intelligence services targeting vulnerable individuals who may lack a full understanding of what they’re being asked to do.

The case of Laken Pavan underscores just how globalized the threat landscape has become. 

No longer limited to seasoned operatives or foreign nationals, state intelligence services are now actively leveraging young people—sometimes willingly, sometimes not—as tools in broader campaigns of disruption.

As this story develops, the intelligence and national security community must grapple with new questions: How do we detect and disrupt this kind of recruitment? 

And how do we prevent young, disaffected citizens from becoming pawns in foreign espionage operations?

Well, another week, another intelligence wrap up. 

I want to wish my American listeners a happy and safe 4th of July. The ideals of independence, freedom, justice and equality are values worth celebrating and fighting for no matter what country you live in. 

Until next week. Stay curious, stay informed and stay safe. 

Stay curious. Stay informed. And stay safe.

Outro: 
That wraps up this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up.

In today’s digital environment, mis- and disinformation spread faster than ever — distorting facts, manipulating opinions, and clouding real threats. 

This show is here to cut through that noise, offering intelligence-based analysis to help you understand the risks around you — and what you can do to stay ahead of them.

Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up runs on insight, experience — and the support of listeners like you. 

If you found today’s episode valuable, please like, comment, and share it with others. Every download and review helps extend our reach and impact.

And if you’d like to support the show directly, you can do so through Buzzsprout or Patreon — both platforms help us keep the podcast going strong and ad-free.

Everyone can benefit from knowing the threats they face — and how to reduce the risk. That’s what we do here, every week.

To our American listeners, Happy 4th of July, and as Neil always reminds us — stay curious, stay informed, and stay safe.

MUSIC

LINKS: 

Story 1: Ottawa orders Chinese tech firm Hikvision close Canadian operations over national security concerns
Link: https://globalnews.ca/news/11266032/ottawa-orders-chinese-tech-firm-hikvision-close-canadian-operations-national-security/

Story 2: Two Chinese nationals charged for trying to recruit spies in US military
Link: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/2/two-chinese-nationals-charged-for-trying-to-recruit-spies-in-us-military

Story 3: Man arrested for spying for Iran before possible attacks in Germany
Link: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/1/man-arrested-for-spying-for-iran-before-possible-attacks-in-germany

Story 4: UK lawmakers approve ban of Palestine Action as terrorist group
Link: https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/israel-hamas-war/article/uk-lawmakers-approve-ban-of-palestine-action-as-terrorist-group/

Story 5: FBI, DHS warn of possible July 4 terror attacks targeting mass gatherings
Link: https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/02/us/fbi-dhs-warning-july-4-attacks

Story 6: Judge orders “robust” inquiry into MI5 false evidence
Link: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8d6e4d8v8mo
Story 7: Canadian Teen Jailed in Poland as Russia Spy May Be Freed Early, Court Says
Link: https://www.reuters.com/world/canadian-teen-jailed-poland-russia-spy-may-be-freed-early-court-says-2025-07-01/