Canadian Armed Forces Charged with Terrorism

Canadian Armed Forces Charged with Terrorism | China, North Korea, and Russia Escalate Global Espionage

In this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up, Neil Bisson — retired CSIS Intelligence Officer and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network — unpacks the week’s most pressing threats in global intelligence and national security.

🇨🇦 Why were two Canadian Armed Forces members arrested for plotting a domestic terror campaign — and what does this deeper dive reveal about rising extremism within Canada’s military?

💻 How is North Korea weaponizing the gig economy by using fake freelance IT workers to fund Kim Jong Un’s weapons program?

🇨🇳 Who is the suspected Chinese intelligence asset targeting Canadian research — and how are CSIS and Canadian universities responding?

🕵️‍♀️ What’s behind China’s sweeping new warnings about Western “honey trap” spy tactics?

🇺🇦 Why were two Chinese nationals arrested in Ukraine for trying to steal secrets about the Neptune missile system — and what does this suggest about China-Russia intelligence cooperation?

🔥 Are we seeing a covert war unfold as Russia escalates its sabotage operations across Europe — and could Canada be vulnerable?

Plus: Neil shares thoughts on his latest Substack article urging Canada to launch a dedicated foreign HUMINT service — and sounds the alarm on how our education system may be enabling foreign interference.

🎧 Tune in for expert insight built on over 25 years in intelligence and law enforcement — and get the briefing you won’t hear anywhere else.

🔗 Support the podcast:
Patreon | Buzzsprout

📚 Explore more at:
www.globalintelligenceknowledgenetwork.com

📬 Subscribe on Substack:
https://substack.com/@neilbisson1?utm_source=user-menu

🎓 Neil’s University of Ottawa course:
https://pdinstitute.uottawa.ca/PDI/Courses/National-Security/The-Psychology-Behind-Human-Sources/Course.aspx?CourseCode=S0236

📅 Chapters
00:00 – Introduction
01:30 – Canadian Armed Forces Charged in Domestic Terror Plot (CBC Article)
06:55 – Canadian Armed Forces Terror Plot (Deeper Dive via The Guardian)
11:25 – North Korea’s Fake Freelancers Fund Weapons Program
16:40 – CSIS Issues Alert on Suspected Chinese Intelligence Operative
20:40 – China Warns Citizens About Western “Honey Traps”
24:15 – Ukraine Arrests Chinese Nationals for Spying on Neptune Missile
27:35 – Russia’s Sabotage Campaign Across Europe
28:40 – Outro & Substack/Patreon Info

Transcript

2025 07 11 Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up

Intro:

Welcome to this week’s edition of Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up — your trusted source for intelligence insight, national security analysis, and expert commentary that goes beyond the headlines.

Neil Bisson, retired CSIS Intelligence Officer and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network, brings over 25 years of experience to unpack the world’s most pressing security threats — and what they mean for you, your data, and your country.

In this week’s episode, we begin with a case that’s shaking Canada’s national security establishment to its core: a domestic terror plot involving Canadian Armed Forces members, explosives, and a plan to seize land in Quebec.

We then move to cyberspace, where North Korean intelligence is deploying fake freelance workers to finance the regime’s weapons programs — a dangerous evolution of cyber-espionage.

Back at home, CSIS issues a quiet but urgent warning about a suspected Chinese intelligence operative targeting Canadian research — while China’s Ministry of State Security accuses Western agencies of using sex, coercion, and psychological manipulation to recruit Chinese nationals.

We round out the episode with escalating international tension, as two Chinese citizens are arrested for spying on Ukraine’s Neptune missile program — and Russia’s sabotage campaign intensifies across Europe, raising fears of a covert war being fought on NATO soil.

This is the modern battlefield — and Neil’s got the briefing you won’t hear anywhere else.
Let’s get started.

MUSIC

Hello and welcome back to the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up, I’m your host Neil Bisson, a retired Intelligence Officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network. 

During my career as an intelligence officer, I spent years recruiting sources and providing intelligence to the highest levels of the Canadian Government, now I’m taking open-source information and doing the same for you. 

This is your intelligence brief, identifying the threats to your country, your career and potentially your life. 

As always, there’s no lack of weekly news articles concerning terrorism, espionage, sabotage and national security concerns. 

From Canadian Armed Forces members being charged with terrorism to the Chinese Ministry of State Security warning citizens about western honeypot operations there’s a lot to dive into. 

So, let’s get started! 

I’m going to start this week with doing a deeper dive into a story that is sending shockwaves through the Canadian Military. 

Of course, I’m talking about the disturbing case from Quebec that highlights the growing concern of ideologically motivated violent extremism within Canada’s own institutions. 

Following a two-year investigation, the RCMP has charged four men—two of whom are active members of the Canadian Armed Forces—in connection with an alleged extremist plot to form an anti-government militia and forcibly take possession of land in the Quebec City area. 

This case marks one of the most serious domestic terrorism investigations involving serving military personnel in recent Canadian history.

According to the RCMP, the accused—Marc-Aurèle Chabot, Simon Angers-Audet, Raphaël Lagacé, and Matthew Forbes—were allegedly preparing to create a self-sufficient, anti-government community through paramilitary training and armed force. 

The group is said to have conducted firearms, ambush, survival, and navigation exercises while also recruiting new members via social media. 

Charges laid include facilitating a terrorist activity, weapons possession, and violations of the Explosives and Defence Production Acts.

What makes this case especially alarming is the involvement of two serving corporals from CFB Valcartier, including Chabot and Forbes. 

These are individuals with institutional training, tactical knowledge, and access to military-grade equipment—transforming what might otherwise be seen as fringe extremism into a potential national security threat.
 
The RCMP's investigation began in 2023, though the group’s activities reportedly date back to 2021. 

Police seized a staggering cache of weapons: 83 firearms, 16 explosive devices, roughly 11,000 rounds of ammunition, military equipment, night-vision goggles, and nearly 130 magazines. 

It is one of the largest such seizures in a Canadian terrorism case, suggesting significant operational readiness.

This case fits into a troubling trend of extremism infiltrating the military ranks. 

In recent years, the Canadian Armed Forces have faced repeated scrutiny over links between personnel and extremist or hate-based movements. 

In 2022, the military’s own advisory panel flagged a rise in the number of members drawn to extremist ideologies. 

Previous high-profile cases—like those of Patrik Mathews, a Canadian white supremist and a former armed forces reservist who was involved in a U.S.-based neo-Nazi plot, and Corey Hurren, who stormed Rideau Hall in 2020—have underscored the danger of radicalized soldiers acting independently under extremist motivations.

A former CSIS analyst, called this the largest seizure of weapons and components in any Canadian terrorism case. She emphasized that the volume of weaponry indicated planning for a significant event—either mass recruitment or a large-scale confrontation.

Barbara Perry, director of the Centre on Hate, Bias and Extremism, said she wasn’t surprised by the charges, noting an “unholy trinity” of dangerous elements: access to firearms, targeted recruitment of military personnel, and deep-seated anti-government ideologies. 

She warned this combination significantly amplifies the threat posed by IMVE actors.

This case is a stark reminder that domestic violent extremism isn’t confined to online forums or protest rallies—it can grow quietly within the ranks of our most trusted institutions. 

When ideology meets tactical capability, the consequences can be severe. 

The scale of the weapons seized, the nature of the plot, and the involvement of serving soldiers should prompt immediate reflection across both the military and intelligence communities.

I had an opportunity to speak to Global News about this incident, and I indicated that given Canada’s focus at increasing military capacity and recruitment, this is an issue that needs to be taken very seriously. 

Both within the ranks and by the brass. 

The screening process for recruits, needs more irregular and frequent screening updates to effectively weed out or identify individuals attempting to join or already in the Canadian Armed Forces who are contemplating armed insurrection against their own government. 

Canada must prioritize early detection, robust radicalization awareness programs within the armed forces, and stronger vetting processes. 

This isn’t just a question of law enforcement—it’s a matter of national resilience and public safety.

MUSIC


Given the seriousness of this topic and its coverage in the media, I will continue to discuss in our next segment. 

I’ll return to the major national security story making headlines across Canada and beyond—the arrest of four men in Quebec on terrorism-related charges. 

According to the RCMP and as reported by The Guardian, the group is accused of plotting to form an armed organization, rejecting the Canadian government’s authority, and planning to seize property in the province by force. 

Two of the accused are serving members of the Canadian Armed Forces. 

The case has raised serious alarm bells about ideologically motivated violent extremism—and insider threats from within the military.

The RCMP’s Integrated National Security Enforcement Team or INSET in Quebec began investigating the group in 2023 after receiving intelligence suggesting the men were engaged in anti-government activity and paramilitary training. 

The accused reportedly conducted reconnaissance of targeted properties and practiced ambush tactics. 

As discussed in the last segment, police seized a staggering cache of weapons, including 83 firearms, thousands of rounds of ammunition, and 16 explosive devices.

To give hit context, a typical platoon is made up of 28 individuals. This amount of armory is more than 2 platoons with firearms to spare. 

From an intelligence standpoint, this isn’t just a case of domestic radicalization. 

This was an operational cell with a clear objective: to capture and assert control over land and territory through the threat—or use—of force. 

It has pre Waco Texas vibes and we all know how that ended. 

The planning, training, and buildup of weapons point to a sustained effort to mobilize ideologically motivated violence within Canada’s borders.

The ideology reportedly driving the group is linked to the so-called “sovereign citizen” movement—an anti-government belief system in which individuals claim they are not subject to laws or authority of the state. 

Some have speculated given the gun mentality of the group, that gun restriction laws passed by the Liberal government was a bone of contention among the members of the group. 

Whether this is the one or only one of the catalysts for their action is up to debate as this is ongoing investigation as the charges been laid recently. 

While most visible in the United States, elements of this type of movement have been seen as gaining traction in Canada, often overlapping with far-right and conspiracy-driven extremism.

This case bears striking resemblance to patterns identified in their recent CSIS Annual public report. 

The 2024 CSIS Annual Report warned of the continued rise of ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE), including anti-authority sentiment. 

It also specifically noted concerns about insider threats and the involvement of individuals with access to weapons, training, or positions of trust—like active military personnel.

The presence of two serving CAF members among the accused is a critical detail. 

It raises urgent questions about screening, oversight, and the potential for radicalization within the ranks.

While this article does not quote outside analysts, RCMP officials made clear that the arrests were pre-emptive—designed to stop the group from executing what police described as “a violent plot” to forcibly occupy land. 

My consensus is that there was likely information that the group planned to act in the immediate future and that the RCMP acted quickly to prevent potential bloodshed. 

The RCMP emphasized that public safety was at risk and that the individuals had already progressed beyond ideology and into operational planning.

I view this case as part of a broader trend where extremist beliefs—often shaped and accelerated online—are now translating into real-world threats, including inside trusted institutions. 

When extremists go from rhetoric to reconnaissance, that’s when public safety is immediately at risk.

The use of social media to communicate and potentially recruit like-minded members to the group is another example of how younger generations of extremists are extending their reach to radicalize others. 

Domestic terrorism doesn’t always wave a flag or broadcast its intent. It can look like a few men in rural Quebec conducting drills and acquiring weapons—until, suddenly, it doesn’t.

The fact that two of the accused are CAF members makes this an inflection point. 

It reinforces the need for enhanced monitoring, stronger inter-agency collaboration, and a whole-of-government approach to countering radicalization—especially within institutions tasked with protecting Canadians.

It should be remembered that individuals in any community can unfortunately choose to engage in activities that are not reflective of either the values or focus of the institution. 

This is definitely the case here. 

The Canadian Armed Forces is a proud and honorable pillar of Canadian safety and sovereignty, and the actions of these men are not representative of the vast majority of serving Canadians.

However, Canada’s national security posture is being tested in the face of this internal ideological threat. 

I will continue to monitor this story and provide updates as they become available. 

MUSIC

Ok, let’s switch gears now and examine how North Korea’s intelligence apparatus continues to adapt in the cyber domain. 

The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned a member of Kim Jong Un’s Reconnaissance General Bureau or RGB—North Korea’s top intelligence agency—for orchestrating a global scheme using North Korean IT workers to funnel revenue back to Pyongyang. 

These workers posed as non-North Korean freelancers to gain access to U.S. and international companies, undermining global sanctions and aiding the regime’s weapons development programs.

The individual sanctioned, Kim Sang Man, is believed to have facilitated illicit IT contracting work by employing North Korean tech specialists who masked their identities using false documentation and virtual private networks. 

These freelancers earned substantial income while covertly channeling funds to North Korea’s weapons programs.

From an intelligence perspective, this is classic asymmetric warfare—North Korea leveraging cyberspace and non-traditional means to outmaneuver international restrictions. 

What makes this particularly dangerous is the use of legitimate freelance platforms and tech-sector vulnerabilities to blend in with the global workforce. 

It’s not a ransomware campaign or obvious hack—it’s infiltration through the front door, under the guise of business as usual.

The Reconnaissance General Bureau is not new to this game. 

It’s the same agency behind high-profile cyber operations like the Sony Pictures hack in 2014 and suspected involvement in the WannaCry ransomware attacks. 

But this latest scheme is more covert. 

Rather than directly attacking, they’re embedding operatives in the remote workforce to siphon money and potentially gain access to sensitive infrastructure.

The U.S. has warned companies before about North Korean IT workers applying for jobs abroad under aliases. 

According to past advisories, these workers often target roles in cryptocurrency, blockchain development, and financial services—industries where access can mean financial disruption or intelligence collection.

While the article doesn’t quote outside analysts, the U.S. Treasury’s action signals clear concern that these types of schemes are expanding. 

The fact that a named individual tied to Kim’s intelligence network is being sanctioned tells us Washington is trying to put a spotlight on the human infrastructure behind North Korea’s cyber operations—not just the code.

This case reinforces the point that traditional counter-espionage techniques must evolve to catch up to the tactics of western country adversaries and enemies. 

It’s no longer just about intercepting signals or catching agents in the act—it’s about identifying who’s behind the keyboard, even if they’re halfway around the world and working from a coffee shop with a laptop.

This isn’t just about North Korea exploiting loopholes—it’s about a sanctioned state using its intelligence services to exploit the open, globalized nature of the tech economy. 

The implications are vast: cybersecurity, financial compliance, corporate hiring practices, and export control regimes are all affected.

As adversaries grow more sophisticated, especially in cyberspace, governments and companies alike will need to invest more heavily in due diligence and digital verification. 

Because when sanctioned nations like North Korea can pay for missiles with freelance tech gigs, the line between responsible hiring practices and global security is paper-thin.

MUSIC

We’re back in Canada for our next segment, discussing the latest advisory from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. 

CSIS has quietly warned federal departments and universities that an unnamed individual is actively trying to obtain sensitive Canadian information on behalf of China’s intelligence services.

According to CSIS, the suspect is engaging targets across government and academia in search of privileged data—precisely the kind that can shorten Beijing’s R&D timelines or provide strategic insight into Canada’s emerging-tech edge. 

The service has instructed recipients to use extreme caution, limit discussions of confidential material, and report any encounters. 

Operationally, this is a textbook example of what CSIS calls “non-traditional collectors”: individuals who may not hold formal diplomatic cover yet conduct intelligence tasks on behalf of a foreign service.

China remains Canada’s top counter-intelligence threat. 

Ottawa has previously prosecuted Yuesheng Wang for economic espionage at Hydro-Québec and dismissed scientists at the National Microbiology Laboratory over PRC security concerns.

In their 2024 public report, CSIS highlighted Beijing’s appetite for AI, quantum computing, biotech and aerospace—a wish-list that mirrors Canada’s own areas of excellence. 

This latest advisory demonstrates a dangerous pattern: targeted harvesting of niche research rather than broad data grabs.

CSIS spokespeople rarely confirm operational matters, so public acknowledgement of an “espionage advisory” is itself notable. 

By alerting stakeholders, CSIS hopes to blunt collection efforts and push the suspect into the open, where countermeasures might be easier to execute. 

Expect heightened security briefings across federal labs and university research hubs. 

If China’s collector is identified and charged, we may see another precedent-setting economic-espionage case. 

In the meantime, Canadian institutions including post-secondary education, should revisit insider-threat protocols, reinforce “know-your-client” due diligence, and remember that hostile actors often exploit the very openness that fuels Canadian innovation.

I have previously discussed my concerns relating to how Colleges and Universities, which fall under the provincial jurisdiction, and profit from large tuition fees from international students, pose a threat to Canada’s national security. 

This is because foreign adversaries, like China, Russia and Iran use these institutions as gateways to Canadian research, technology and funding. 

It makes no sense for Canada to proclaim sanctions against Iran on their nuclear program, to then turn around and allow Iranian students to access nuclear energy technology courses at established Universities because they are willing to pay 5 times more to study in Canada than a Canadian student is expected to pay. 

The provincial educational system needs to stop focusing on international exchange students as cash cows if there are potential risks to Canada’s national security. 

MUSIC

Staying on the topic of Chinese espionage, one of my favourites as you all know, let’s take a closer look at a new warning from China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), which claims that foreign intelligence services are actively targeting Chinese nationals with classic recruitment tactics — including seduction, psychological coercion, and threats against family members. 

The campaign is part of a growing effort by the Chinese government to raise domestic awareness of foreign espionage threats.

The MSS alleges that foreign agents are using “honey traps” in hotels and coercive tactics such as blackmail and intimidation to recruit Chinese citizens living or traveling abroad. 

One highlighted case involves a Chinese national in Italy who was allegedly lured into an intimate relationship, recorded, and then pressured into gathering intelligence. 

In another, a student was approached online with offers of money and later threatened when they resisted. 

These examples are being used to send a public message: foreign recruitment threats are real, and they start with human vulnerabilities.

From an intelligence perspective, this is textbook human source recruitment. 

The warning itself may be politically convenient for Beijing — especially as it ramps up counterintelligence narratives — but the methods it describes are entirely consistent with how human sources have been recruited for decades. 

Using seduction, ego-stroking, fear, or financial incentives are standard elements in source handling. 

Intelligence officers often target individuals with access, but also with exploitable psychological weaknesses.

What’s especially noteworthy here is China’s open use of public messaging. 

Instead of keeping these incidents quiet, they’re now turning them into propaganda campaigns — not just to warn, but to instill a sense of suspicion and paranoia. 

As an authoritarian one party state, instilling fear in the populace is just another well used tool in the CCP toolbox.

This may also serve to justify increased surveillance and internal controls on students, business travellers, and diaspora communities under the guise of national security.

The broader implication is clear: intelligence services across the world — not just Western agencies — rely heavily on exploiting psychological factors when dealing with human sources.

These campaigns remind us that national security threats don’t always come through technology or weapons. 

Often, they come through people — and the relationships, fears, and motivations that shape them.

For those who are interested in learning more about the psychology behind human sources in intelligence, I teach a one day, an online course at the University of Ottawa on just this topic. 

With my over 25 years of intelligence and law enforcement experience I provide deep insight to the motivational factors surrounding human source recruitment, how it works, and what happens when things go wrong. 

I’ll leave a link in the show notes and transcript if you want to check it out and sign up. 

MUSIC

Chinese spies here. Chinese spies there. I report on Chinese spies everywhere. 

For our next story we’re focusing on growing tensions between China and Ukraine, following the arrest of two Chinese nationals accused of attempting to gather intelligence on Ukraine’s Neptune missile program. 

The Ukrainian Security Service, known as the SBU, claims the individuals were acting on behalf of Chinese intelligence. 

The case has quickly gained international attention, with China responding cautiously and calling for clarification while asserting its intention to protect the rights of its citizens.

According to Ukrainian authorities, the first suspect is a 24-year-old former student who allegedly attempted to acquire sensitive technical documents related to the Neptune missile system. 

He was reportedly caught in the act, and subsequent investigation led to the arrest of his father, who is believed to have been involved in facilitating or overseeing the operation.

Ukraine’s Neptune missile system has been a key strategic asset since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. 

It’s believed that these missiles played a role in striking Russian naval targets, including the much-publicized hit on the Moskva warship. 

That makes the Neptune program an obvious high-value target for hostile intelligence services.

From an intelligence perspective, this case reflects a common and growing trend — the recruitment of students, researchers, or dual nationals to gain access to restricted defense or technology information. 

These individuals often have legitimate reasons for travel and access to academic or technical environments, making them ideal candidates for recruitment or coercion.

This case marks the first known arrest of Chinese nationals for espionage in Ukraine since the war began. 

While China has attempted to maintain a publicly neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the West has increasingly accused Beijing of tacitly supporting Moscow — particularly through the transfer of dual-use technologies and possibly intelligence coordination.

This incident could have ripple effects beyond the immediate diplomatic fallout. 

It highlights the vulnerability of Ukraine’s sensitive military programs and raises questions about broader counterintelligence practices in countries facing ongoing conflict. 

It also underscores the importance of scrutinizing foreign nationals working in or around critical infrastructure and defense programs.

This is a wakeup call for any defence contractors or the Canadian Government who are looking to shore up our military capacity. 

Security officials have raised concerns that China may be increasing its intelligence-gathering efforts in Eastern Europe, not only to monitor the war’s progress but also to exploit new military developments and technologies being tested on the battlefield. 

A concern that I have revolves around how Russia is now outsourcing their intelligence requirements to China, and most likely North Korea. 

This is a true game changer and indicates that a new era of intelligence collaboration on the collection front for Russia and China. 

This means that if China and Russia have brokered a high-level intelligence gathering exchange, they have become a force multiplier in intelligence operations against western countries. 

With current trade tariffs and global economic uncertainty potentially slowing the cooperation between allied western nations, this leaves all them more vulnerable than ever. 

The arrests have sparked debate about the potential for broader espionage operations and the long-term risks posed by foreign access to sensitive programs in Ukraine and other allied nations.

Professionally speaking, this is a textbook example of strategic intelligence targeting. 

It demonstrates how military innovation in active warzones becomes a magnet for adversarial collection efforts — and how intelligence services continue to exploit personal and academic channels to achieve their goals.

The arrest of these two Chinese nationals is more than a bilateral issue — it’s a reflection of the global intelligence contest unfolding in the shadow of the Ukraine war. 

As countries like China and Russia look to gather advantage in real-time conflicts, we can expect more attempts to infiltrate, monitor, and exfiltrate information from frontline nations. 

It also places added pressure on Ukraine, its allies and supporters, like Canada,  to harden their counterintelligence practices and improve international coordination.

MUSIC

For our last story this week, we examine a growing concern in Western capitals — Russia’s escalating sabotage campaign across Europe. 

The Associated Press this week reported that Russia is increasingly relying on covert operations, including arson and sabotage, to target Western military infrastructure and disrupt support for Ukraine. 

These acts are believed to be orchestrated by Russian intelligence services and carried out using proxies — often recruited from migrant communities or organized crime groups. 

This signals a dangerous intensification of grey-zone tactics that many Western governments are now starting to acknowledge more openly.

The article highlights a string of incidents over the past year — fires, vandalism, and attempted attacks on military or logistics hubs — that officials in the UK, Germany, Poland, and other NATO countries suspect are linked to Russian intelligence. 

These actions are subtle but strategic: setting fire to warehouses, damaging rail lines, or attempting to disable supply chains that funnel weapons and support to Ukraine. 

The attackers are often locals or foreign nationals with no formal ties to the Kremlin, making attribution difficult and allowing Russia plausible deniability.

In intelligence parlance they are “proxies” and this is classic hybrid warfare. 

When Moscow can't match NATO militarily, it turns to sabotage, disinformation, and covert action to achieve strategic goals while staying below the threshold of direct conflict. 

What we’re seeing is a calculated effort to stretch Western security services, spread fear, and undercut Ukraine’s war effort by disrupting logistics and sowing internal distrust within Europe.

This shift toward physical sabotage builds on a long-standing Russian playbook. 

From the Soviet era to present day, Moscow has used subversion and covert action to destabilize adversaries.
 
But since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there’s been a marked escalation. 

Just this year, authorities in the UK and Germany arrested several suspects accused of plotting attacks on behalf of Russian intelligence.

It’s important to compare this to other trends in grey-zone warfare — such as the suspected Russian involvement in cutting undersea cables or the widespread disinformation campaigns targeting Western elections. 

What sets this apart is the re-emergence of kinetic sabotage operations on European soil, coordinated not by uniformed soldiers but by these covert proxies.

The article quotes European intelligence officials who warn that this is no longer a fringe tactic — it’s becoming a central pillar of Russia’s war strategy. 

They point to a growing pattern of Russian spy services outsourcing sabotage to criminals, ideologically motivated actors, or those easily manipulated with financial incentives.

This totally fits the Russian Intelligence Community’s MO. 

They understand that in open democracies, there are more opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities — whether through disinformation, corruption, or recruitment of assets. 

And while Western governments are getting better at tracking cyber threats, physical acts of sabotage are harder to predict, and even harder to prevent.

As I have previously referenced, Canada’s continues support and provision of funds and arms to Ukraine make us viable target for Russian sabotage tactics.

As wildfire season continues to rage and Canadians lose homes, businesses and potentially their lives, I can’t help but think that some of the started fires could be the result of a Russian proxy firebug agents. 

Russia’s sabotage campaign in Europe is more than a series of isolated incidents — it’s part of a broader hybrid strategy aimed at weakening NATO resolve and support for Ukraine. 

These operations challenge the capacity of law enforcement and intelligence services, blur the lines between crime and espionage, and remind us that the battlefield now includes civilian infrastructure, logistics networks, and public morale.

Western nations must respond with better counterintelligence, greater resilience, and coordinated public awareness campaigns. 

As we’ve seen before, the failure to connect these dots early can have dangerous and deadly consequences.


So another week, another glimpse into the shadowy world of intelligence. 

As always, the links to open-source media articles are in the transcript. 

I want to inform the listeners that I have started providing weekly commentary on substack. 

My most recent article entitled “Canada is Playing Defence with No Offence – And We’re Losing the Game” goes into why Canada needs a Stand-Alone Foreign HUMINT Service and is available for free, please consider subscribing to my substack for more articles and access to this podcast. 

And remember, stay curious, stay informed and stay safe. 

MUSIC

That wraps up this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up.
From armed extremists inside Canada’s own military, to North Korean cyber operations, Chinese espionage, and Russian sabotage in Europe — this week’s stories show that the threats we face are real, growing, and increasingly complex.

This podcast takes time, effort, and hard-won experience to produce — and it exists for one reason: to help you stay aware and be prepared.

If today’s episode gave you valuable insight, please take a moment to like, share, and leave a review. It helps others find the show and strengthens our growing community of informed listeners.

And if you’d like to support this critical mission, you can do so through Patreon. Your support helps keep the podcast going strong — sharp, independent, and focused on the intelligence that matters most.

The world isn’t getting safer — but understanding the threats is the first step toward facing them.

Until next time — stay curious, stay informed, and stay safe.

Links: 

Substack: https://substack.com/@neilbisson1?utm_source=user-menu

University of Ottawa: https://pdinstitute.uottawa.ca/PDI/Courses/National-Security/The-Psychology-Behind-Human-Sources/Course.aspx?CourseCode=S0236


Story 1: RCMP Charges Military Members Allegedly Plotting to Form Militia and Seize Land
Link: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/rcmp-caf-charges-terrorism-1.7579487

Story 2: Canada: Four men arrested in Quebec on terrorism charges, accused of plotting to form armed group
Link: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/08/canada-quebec-rcmp-terrorism-arrests

Story 3: U.S. sanctions North Korean member of Kim Jong Un’s spy agency over IT worker scheme
Link: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-sanctions-north-korean-member-of-kim-jong-uns-spy-agency-over-it-worker-scheme/

Story 4: CSIS issues espionage alert about suspect seeking sensitive information for Chinese intelligence
Link: https://globalnews.ca/news/11274203/csis-espionage-advisory-china/

Story 5: China warns of foreign spy ‘honey traps’ in sweeping new public campaign
Link: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-spy-plots-honey-trap-espionage-arrests/

Story 6: China reacts after Ukraine arrests alleged spies
Link: https://www.newsweek.com/china-reacts-after-ukraine-arrests-alleged-spies-2097058

Story 7:  Russia’s sabotage campaign in Europe raises fears of a covert war
Link: https://apnews.com/article/russia-sabotage-europe-ukraine-13ee37cf869139839f0d4a3ebe7bd80d