Can a Minister Change his Stripes?

In this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up, Neil Bisson — retired CSIS Intelligence Officer and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network — dissects a packed lineup of national security threats, foreign interference, and a controversy that’s shaking Ottawa.

🇷🇺 Russia rewards an American spy with citizenship — but what does it reveal about Moscow’s HUMINT strategy and use of propaganda?

🇮🇷 Israel launches a bold counterintelligence campaign warning citizens about Iranian espionage — and it’s a playbook Canada may need to follow.

🇨🇳 A Japanese businessman is imprisoned in China under vague espionage laws — raising new concerns about Beijing’s “lawfare” strategy.

💻 Chinese hackers infiltrate a U.S. National Guard network for nearly a year — exposing critical gaps in federated cybersecurity.

🐅 Canada’s Public Safety Minister faces scrutiny for supporting a man tied to the Tamil Tigers — and the implications for immigration, terrorism policy, and public trust are profound.

🎓 Denmark blocks foreign researchers over espionage fears — are Canadian universities doing enough to protect dual-use research?

🧨 And in Ukraine, a U.S.-founded neo-Nazi group claims responsibility for an assassination — and may be operating as a proxy for Russian intelligence.

Each story is analyzed through the lens of intelligence — giving you the strategic context you won’t hear on the evening news.
🎧 This isn’t speculation. It’s intelligence, verified and distilled — to help you stay aware, and be prepared.

🔗 Support the podcast:
Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/NeilBisson
Buzzsprout: https://www.buzzsprout.com/2336717/support

🌐 Learn more:
Website: https://www.globalintelligenceknowledgenetwork.com
Substack: https://substack.com/@neilbisson1
University of Ottawa Course: https://pdinstitute.uottawa.ca/PDI/Courses/National-Security/The-Psychology-Behind-Human-Sources/Course.aspx?CourseCode=S0236

📅 Chapters
00:00 – Introduction
01:45 – Russia Rewards American Spy with Citizenship
06:20 – Israel Warns Citizens About Iranian Recruitment Tactics
10:40 – China Jails Japanese Citizen for Espionage
15:10 – Chinese Hackers Infiltrate U.S. National Guard (Salt Typhoon)
20:10 – Public Safety Minister Faces Tamil Tigers Controversy
25:20 – Danish Universities Block Foreign Researchers Over Espionage Fears
29:15 – Neo-Nazi Group Claims SBU Assassination in Ukraine
31:32 – Outro & How to Support the Podcast

Transcript

2025 07 18 Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up

Intro:

Welcome to this week’s edition of Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up — the podcast where headlines meet hard truths, and national security is never just background noise.

Neil Bisson, retired CSIS Intelligence Officer and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network, brings over 25 years of experience to the mic — decoding espionage, sabotage, cyber warfare, and foreign influence so you can better understand the threats shaping your world.

In this week’s episode, we begin with a chilling story of betrayal and propaganda. Russia has granted citizenship to an American who spied on Ukrainian forces — a move that reveals Moscow’s long-game recruitment tactics and its use of public spectacle to weaponize loyalty.

Then we turn to Israel, where a bold national ad campaign warns citizens about Iranian intelligence recruitment — a rare public move in the shadowy world of counterintelligence.

In East Asia, a Japanese man is sentenced in a closed-door espionage trial in China, sparking concerns over Beijing’s use of “lawfare” to suppress foreign influence and send geopolitical messages.

Meanwhile, a major breach of the U.S. National Guard by elite Chinese hackers underscores just how far advanced persistent threats are willing to go — and why federal-state integration can be both a strength and a vulnerability.

Back home, political controversy erupts as Canada’s Public Safety Minister is found to have supported a man tied to the Tamil Tigers — a case that raises serious questions about national security, immigration, and political responsibility.

From there, we examine Denmark’s move to reject foreign researchers linked to adversarial states — and ask whether Canada is doing enough to protect its own universities from espionage.

And finally, we end with a targeted assassination in Kyiv — where a U.S.-founded neo-Nazi terror group claims it has begun a violent insurgency aligned with Russian interests. The Base isn’t just talking anymore — it’s pulling the trigger.

It’s a heavy lineup this week — and one that cuts across continents, ideologies, and alliances.
Let’s get started.

MUSIC

Hello and welcome back to the Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap Up. 

I’m your host, Neil Bisson, the Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network and a retired Intelligence Officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. 

Each week I provide the insights, and produce the intelligence, from news stories from around the globe. 

If it deals with national security, espionage, sabotage or terrorism, I look passed the headlines and give you the analysis you need, to see how it affects your career, your country, and your livelihood. 

This week we’re covering everything from an assassination of a Ukrainian Intelligence Official to accusations that Canada’s public safety minister wrote support letters for a suspected terrorist. 

Time to shed light on the shadow world of intelligence. Let’s get started. 

In this week’s first story, we turn to something that reads like its straight out of a Cold War thriller. 

According to Russian-installed authorities in Ukraine’s Donetsk region, an American citizen named Daniel Martindale has been granted Russian citizenship by decree of President Vladimir Putin — as a reward for spying on Ukrainian troops during Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. 

The article outlines how Martindale spent over two years behind enemy lines, feeding intelligence to Moscow’s security services before being exfiltrated in a covert operation.

Martindale, an American national, reportedly entered Ukraine in early 2022, shortly before Russia launched its full-scale invasion. 

He allegedly passed along coordinates of Ukrainian military facilities to Russian intelligence — all while posing as a missionary. 

Russian officials now say that his role in supporting their military operations was so critical, he’s being rewarded with Russian citizenship. 

Martindale received his passport during a formal ceremony in Moscow, stating in Russian that “Russia is not only my home, but my family.”

From an intelligence perspective, this is a textbook example of how authoritarian regimes like Russia use public spectacle to bolster their strategic narratives. 

By lionizing a foreign agent in such a high-profile way, the Kremlin isn’t just thanking Martindale — it’s sending a message to Western audiences: Your citizens can be turned, and we will celebrate them for it.

This isn’t the first time Russia has granted asylum or citizenship to Westerners accused of working against their home countries. 

The case is reminiscent of Edward Snowden, who was granted residency — and later citizenship — after leaking classified NSA documents in 2013. 

But Martindale’s case is even more audacious. 

Reports indicate he may have been recruited by Russian intelligence as far back as 2016, when he was studying in Russia, and possibly expelled in 2019 for labor violations. 

If true, this speaks to a long-term cultivation strategy — one where Russia grooms sympathetic Westerners to act as human assets inside hostile territory.

Some listeners may remember that back in March, I discussed the case of Laken Pavan, a former Canadian Armed Forces Reservist who was recently released from Polish custody on espionage charges after he admitted to being a Russian spy. 

Pavan had told Polish investigators he believed he was heading to Donetsk to assist with a humanitarian group. But once on the ground, he was approached by someone believed to be an FSB officer and pressured into cooperating with Russian intelligence. 

He was instructed by his Russian handlers to travel to Warsaw to gather information on the Polish military.

These operations are part of a broader trend of psychological and information warfare. 

By building a public narrative around Martindale’s loyalty, the Kremlin is seeking to demoralize Western publics, encourage others to follow suit, and reinforce its own domestic propaganda machine.

Denis Pushilin, head of the Russian-occupied Donetsk region, called Martindale “one of us” and praised him for “supporting our guys” and risking his life to deliver intelligence to Moscow.

While Western officials have yet to publicly comment on the case, Ukrainian journalists have raised serious concerns about the nature and timing of Martindale’s activities. 

If indeed he was operating in the strategically important city of Vuhledar during major battles, his intelligence could have had significant consequences on the battlefield.

From my own perspective, this case reveals how Russia is capitalizing on sympathetic foreign nationals — whether disaffected, ideologically aligned, or opportunistic — to extend their intelligence reach. 

These individuals are low-cost, high-impact assets. 

And in a warzone, even a single source with real-time information can be a force multiplier.

Daniel Martindale’s story may be unique in its visibility, but it’s far from isolated. 

This case highlights how modern espionage is evolving — blending traditional human intelligence or HUMINT with propaganda, information operations, and public spectacle. 

The implications are serious: countries like Canada and its allies must be more alert to citizens who develop strong ties to adversarial regimes, especially under the guise of education, religious work, or humanitarian missions.

If Western governments don’t take this trend seriously, they risk allowing future Martindales to operate unchecked. 

Surveillance, counter-intelligence strategies, and better screening of foreign academic and travel activity are needed — not just for the sake of security, but to protect the integrity of democratic societies.

MUSIC

For our next segment, we stick with issues of foreign state recruitment, but we turn our attention to a powerful new counterintelligence initiative out of Israel. 

This week, the Israeli government launched a nationwide advertising campaign urging citizens not to fall prey to Iranian recruitment efforts. 

The campaign, spearheaded by Shin Bet — Israel’s internal security agency — aims to raise public awareness of how Iranian intelligence operatives target vulnerable individuals through social media, emotional manipulation, and financial incentives. 

The message is clear: if it sounds suspicious, it probably is.

The campaign includes videos, online content, and media interviews, warning the Israeli public not to engage with unknown contacts online — particularly those who seem too friendly or offer easy money.
 
Shin Bet’s move underscores a growing concern: Iranian intelligence services are stepping up efforts to recruit Israelis to gather information, transport equipment, or conduct surveillance — all under the guise of innocent relationships or business opportunities.

This campaign is a direct attempt to inoculate the public against hostile human intelligence collection. 

Iran’s intelligence agencies — particularly the Ministry of Intelligence and the IRGC-Quds Force — are known for targeting citizens in Israel, Europe, and North America through various cutouts, fake personas, and coercive tactics. 

The Israeli government’s proactive approach represents a shift from quiet interdiction to public deterrence.

This isn’t the first time Israeli officials have warned about Iranian espionage. 

In recent years, multiple incidents have come to light involving Israelis recruited via Telegram, Facebook, and other social platforms to perform low-level tasks such as photographing sensitive sites or delivering items across borders. 

While many of these operations may seem innocuous, they serve as building blocks for more serious intelligence-gathering efforts.

Back in 2022, Shin Bet revealed it had foiled a plot in which an Iranian handler posed as a Jewish man living abroad and attempted to lure women into relationships to recruit them for espionage. 

The public warning now echoes the urgency of those earlier disclosures but brings it to a mass audience in a coordinated, national campaign.

While the article doesn’t cite specific analysts, the implication is clear: Iran is not letting up, and Israeli counterintelligence agencies are adapting by shifting their approach to emphasize public education. 

As a retired CSIS officer, I’ve seen this tactic used effectively in other jurisdictions, including campaigns in the U.S. and UK warning academics and scientists about Chinese and Russian recruitment attempts. 

But what stands out here is how direct and personal the Israeli message is — tailored to reach everyday citizens, not just officials or military personnel.

This is classic counterintelligence in a modern age: you don’t just protect secrets by locking them away — you protect them by making your citizens harder to manipulate.

This campaign reflects the new frontline of counterintelligence — not just governments and institutions, but the public. 

As state-sponsored recruitment efforts grow bolder, particularly from Iran, public awareness becomes a critical defense. 

Israel’s advertising blitz is a smart move, signaling to adversaries that their tactics are exposed and their chances of success are dwindling.

Canada would do well to take note. 

While we face different actors and threats, the principles are the same: hostile intelligence services exploit ignorance, trust, and vulnerability. 

National security begins with public awareness.

MUSIC

In this next segment, we focus on rising geopolitical tensions in East Asia, where a Chinese court has sentenced a Japanese man to three and a half years in prison on charges of espionage. 

The individual, reportedly in his 60s and an employee of the major pharmaceutical company Astellas Pharma, was arrested in March 2023 and charged last August under China's expanding anti-espionage laws. 

This latest case underscores the growing risks faced by foreign nationals conducting business in China — and reveals deeper fault lines in the China-Japan relationship.

According to the Japanese embassy in Beijing, the man was tried behind closed doors, and few details were made public. 

The lack of transparency surrounding the case is a consistent feature of China’s state security prosecutions. 

Japan’s ambassador to China, Kenji Kanasugi, called the sentence “extremely regrettable,” emphasizing that this and similar detentions are straining diplomatic ties and eroding trust between the two nations.

This case is the latest in a broader pattern. 

Since 2014 — the year China implemented its anti-espionage law — at least 17 Japanese citizens have been detained under suspicion of spying. 

Five of them remain in custody. 

In 2022, a Japanese diplomat was detained for questioning and later released, triggering a diplomatic protest from Tokyo. 

The message from Beijing appears clear: China is increasingly using its anti-espionage legislation to project state power and control foreign influence — especially against countries viewed as strategic rivals.

China's anti-spying law has been steadily expanded and enforced with increasing regularity.

What began as a national security mechanism to counter foreign intelligence activity has morphed into a tool of deterrence — and arguably coercion — against business professionals, researchers, and even tourists. 

For Japan, this trend is particularly concerning given the high volume of economic, academic, and governmental interaction with China.

It’s also worth noting the broader regional tension. 

Japan sees China’s expanding military presence, economic leverage, and technological ambitions as a strategic threat. 

In response, Tokyo has increased defence spending, strengthened its alliance with the U.S., and Canada and has begun discussing more assertive counterintelligence and cyber capabilities.

Beijing’s use of vague and opaque legal proceedings to detain foreign nationals adds to the anxiety. 

From an intelligence standpoint, this can have a chilling effect on international cooperation, commercial ventures, and diplomatic engagement. 

It signals that the risk of arbitrary detention — or what some might view as hostage diplomacy — is very real.

While the article doesn’t cite outside analysts, the implications are evident. 

China’s weaponization of legal frameworks for national security purposes is now an established pattern. 

Similar incidents have occurred with Canadian, American, Australian, and Taiwanese nationals. 

Each case follows a familiar template: secret trials, no access to independent counsel, and sentences handed down with little to no public explanation.

I find this trend concerning. 

It is part of what intelligence professionals would call “lawfare” — the strategic use of legal systems to advance geopolitical objectives. 

It’s not espionage in the classical sense; it’s a form of political messaging. 

And it works — because it injects fear and hesitation into diplomatic and commercial engagement with China.

The sentencing of this Japanese citizen highlights three key dynamics: 

1) The expansion of China’s counterintelligence apparatus, 
2) The deterioration of Japan-China relations, 
3) The growing vulnerability of foreign nationals operating inside authoritarian states. 

This is not an isolated case — it’s part of a wider pattern in which China uses its legal system as an instrument of strategic influence.

For Japan, and indeed for other democracies, the signal is clear: proceed with caution. 

Business, academic, and diplomatic activities now carry a significant personal risk — particularly in a country where “espionage” can be whatever the state deems it to be.

The potential for Canadian officials to face detention and scrutiny abroad — and given our deep economic entanglements with China — it’s essential that we strengthen consular protections, enhance public awareness campaigns for travellers, and continue to monitor how foreign intelligence and security laws are being used as tools of intimidation.

MUSIC

We move from the Chinese courts to Chinese hackers in this segment, where we examine a chilling new revelation from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

An elite Chinese cyberspy group known as Salt Typhoon penetrated at least one U.S. state’s Army National Guard network for over nine months. 

According to a leaked DHS memo obtained through a Freedom of Information request, the breach began in March 2024 and remained active until at least December. 

The group — already behind a series of major cyberespionage campaigns across the U.S. — may have accessed highly sensitive military, law enforcement, and critical infrastructure data.

The breach, described as an “extensive compromise,” raises serious concerns about both national and state-level vulnerabilities. 
National Guard units, while part of the Department of Defense, operate under dual state-federal authority, meaning they are deeply integrated into local emergency response systems, cybersecurity teams, and law enforcement partnerships. 

This makes them a high-value target for hostile intelligence services — not just for military data, but for access into civilian infrastructure and fusion centers.

Salt Typhoon is believed to have extracted:
• Maps of geographic locations tied to National Guard operations
• Internal network diagrams
• Personal data of military service members

From an intelligence perspective, this kind of access creates a launchpad for broader surveillance, exploitation, and follow-on cyberattacks. 

With 14 National Guard units in the U.S. maintaining direct links to law enforcement fusion centers, the breach could have cascading effects across both state and federal systems.

Salt Typhoon is no newcomer to the global cyber battlefield. 

This group — widely believed to operate on behalf of China’s Ministry of State Security or MSS — is infamous for its ability to pivot laterally across networks, embedding itself in telecommunications firms, critical infrastructure, and now, state military systems.

Last year, Salt Typhoon reportedly compromised eight of the U.S.’s largest telecom and internet providers — including AT&T and Verizon — using that access to monitor communications linked to the Harris and Trump campaigns, and even the office of then-Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer. 

They are persistent, well-resourced, and patient — with Cisco confirming the group remained undetected in one environment for up to three years.

What’s particularly troubling about this breach is its hybrid nature. 

While it began in a military domain, the National Guard’s dual responsibility model means this attack may have compromised law enforcement, emergency services, and even local government networks.

While no specific analysts were quoted in the article, the implications are obvious to anyone with intelligence or cybersecurity experience. 

From a counterintelligence lens, this operation fits China’s growing strategy of targeting edge-network institutions — where oversight is lighter, defenses are weaker, and integration with other sectors creates ripple effects.
A spokesperson for the National Guard Bureau confirmed the attack but declined to provide details. 

The Chinese embassy, for its part, did not deny the campaign — simply stating that cyberattacks are a global problem and that the U.S. has not provided “conclusive evidence.”

Let me be clear: this is standard Chinese deniability doctrine. 

They’ve used this line before. 

From the theft of Office of Personnel Management files, a U.S. federal agency responsible for managing the civil service workforce, in 2015, to repeated attempts against Canada’s federal networks, Beijing’s preferred tactic is to cast doubt, deny involvement, and continue operations in the shadows.

The Salt Typhoon breach highlights a critical weakness in federated security systems — when national security assets operate at the state or provincial level without full-spectrum cyber defence. 

For Canada, this has direct implications. 

Our provincial emergency management systems, municipal police services, and even certain Reserve Force units may similarly lack the robust cyber posture needed to detect and repel advanced persistent threats.

This is no longer about a few stolen files or disrupted systems. 

This is long-term digital infiltration with strategic objectives: mapping infrastructure, identifying key personnel, and establishing backdoors into systems that matter when crisis strikes.

It also reinforces the importance of cross-jurisdictional coordination. 

When state-level agencies are compromised, national intelligence suffers. 

The U.S. — like Canada — must invest in strengthening cyber protocols across all levels of government, especially where civilian and military systems intersect.

This is what modern espionage looks like — not a man in a trench coat handing off documents, but a hacker in a tee shirt halfway across the world, quietly copying network architecture files from a laptop.

MUSIC

In this segment, we turn to a controversy unfolding within Canada’s federal government — one that raises difficult questions about immigration, terrorism designations, and the responsibilities of elected officials. 

Canada’s current Public Safety Minister, Gary Anandasangaree, is under scrutiny after it was revealed that, prior to his cabinet appointment, he wrote letters in support of a man found by the Canada Border Services Agency to have been a member of the Tamil Tigers — a group listed as a terrorist entity in Canada.

According to newly revealed Federal Court documents, Minister Anandasangaree — then a Member of Parliament — submitted letters on his official letterhead in 2016 and again in 2023, urging the CBSA to reconsider its decision to deny permanent residency to a Sri Lankan man named Senthuran Selvakumaran. 

The rationale in the letters emphasized humanitarian grounds, particularly family separation.

However, CBSA determined that Selvakumaran was inadmissible to Canada on national security grounds due to his past membership in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam or the LTTE. 

While his activities reportedly involved the distribution of LTTE propaganda rather than direct acts of violence, Canadian law treats any support for listed terrorist groups — including non-violent activities — as grounds for inadmissibility.

The man’s appeal to the Federal Court was dismissed just days ago, upholding CBSA’s assessment that his involvement with the LTTE constituted support for terrorism.

The LTTE is designated as a terrorist organization in Canada, following decades of insurgent warfare and high-profile attacks, including suicide bombings and political assassinations.

While the civil war in Sri Lanka ended in 2009, members and supporters of the LTTE continue to face scrutiny in countries where the group remains banned.

This case also highlights the political tightrope elected officials often walk when it comes to constituency advocacy. 

It is common for Members of Parliament to submit letters supporting immigration applicants from within their ridings. 

However, when such support involves individuals linked to terrorism — even tangentially — it introduces a level of risk, both in perception and in policy integrity.

Security screening of individuals with ties to criminality, terrorism or foreign governments actively working against Canada’s interest only works if the recommendations by government agencies, like CSIS and CBSA are adhered to. 
Politicians trying to score points with constituents by recommending that these decisions be overturned are risking Canada’s national security. 

Terrorist organizations, foreign governments and criminal organizations are well aware of the loopholes and pressure points they can manipulate in Canada’s immigration and political systems to gain access to Canada, become citizens and then infiltrate our political systems to work contrary to Canadian interests and endanger our national security. 

In this instance, the individual receiving support from Public Safety Minister was ultimately found to have engaged in activities that directly contributed to the LTTE’s operations — a fact that, under Canadian law, overrides humanitarian considerations in many cases involving security assessments.

While no expert quotes were included in the report, from a national security standpoint, the situation reveals two critical vulnerabilities: 

the first, the potential for politicized interference in immigration and inadmissibility processes, 
and the second, reputational risk when elected officials support individuals tied to terrorist groups — even in a personal or non-violent capacity.

This controversy also presents a dilemma for public safety leadership. 

Since taking office, the Public Safety Minister has placed a recusal screen on LTTE-related matters, acknowledging that his past involvement in Tamil advocacy could create conflicts of interest. 

But the fact remains — the individual now overseeing Canada’s counterterrorism portfolio previously advocated for a man found to have supported a terrorist organization.

This case serves as a reminder that national security doesn’t exist in a vacuum. 

It intersects with politics, immigration, public perception, and diplomacy. 

Ministers, MPs, and all public officials must be cautious in the support they lend, particularly when it involves individuals flagged by Canada’s own national security apparatus.

More broadly, the incident underscores the need for strong boundaries between political advocacy and operational security assessments. 

It also reaffirms the importance of robust, independent review mechanisms when cases involve terrorism designations.

As the story continues to unfold, it remains to be seen what impact — if any — this will have on the Public Safety Minister’s credibility or the public’s trust in Canada’s security institutions.

MUSIC

We head to Denmark for our next story where we examine a growing trend that could have serious implications for Canada. 

I’m talking about a recent article discussing several leading Danish institutions that are now turning away applicants from countries like China, Russia, and Iran due to concerns about state-sponsored espionage. 

Aarhus University alone has rejected at least 24 foreign researchers this year — a move driven by national security considerations and increasing awareness of the risks tied to sensitive, dual-use research.

At the core of the article is the assertion by Danish security officials that the espionage threat to universities is both real and high. 

Foreign researchers, particularly from adversarial nations, are seen as potential conduits for illicit technology transfer or influence operations. 

Danish universities are now proactively screening applicants, particularly those who would gain access to research in areas such as quantum technology and the green energy transition — sectors that hold both economic and military value.

From an intelligence perspective, this is a smart and necessary defensive posture. 

Academic institutions are frequent targets of foreign intelligence services. 

Research generated in universities can be of strategic value to adversaries — especially when applied to dual-use technologies that straddle civilian and military domains. 

If such research is accessed, copied, or exfiltrated, it could ultimately undermine a nation’s innovation edge and compromise its national defence posture.

Denmark’s response is not occurring in a vacuum. 

The country has recently assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union and has made defence and cybersecurity key priorities. 

In parallel, the Danish Emergency Management Agency has identified cyber espionage and cybercrime against universities as “very high” threats.

These policy shifts reflect a broader European trend, where academic security is increasingly being seen through the lens of national security. 

In contrast, Canada continues to lag behind. 

Although CSIS has issued public warnings for years about the exploitation of Canadian research by foreign actors — particularly China — there is no formal national protocol for academic security screening. 

Universities remain largely autonomous and are under no legal obligation to heed intelligence briefings.

Brian Vinter, vice-dean at Aarhus University’s Faculty of Engineering, stated that several applicants were denied because they would have had access to research material that could be shared with third parties. 

Meanwhile, André Ken Jakobsen, associate professor at Denmark’s Centre for War Studies, warned that the increasing global demand for advanced technology is making the espionage threat more intense.

These assessments align with my own professional perspective on the issue. 

The intelligence community has long known that states like China, Iran, and Russia deploy covert strategies to gain access to foreign research. 

That includes placing students or researchers in targeted programs — a soft but effective method of acquiring valuable intellectual property without firing a shot.

Denmark is demonstrating that vigilance in academia is not paranoia — it’s strategy. 

Their pre-emptive screening of researchers may come at the cost of rejecting some legitimate applicants, but the greater cost would be losing control of sensitive research to foreign adversaries. 

Canada must start asking itself some hard questions: 

1) Are we doing enough to safeguard our academic institutions? 
2) Are Canadian universities aware of the espionage threat they face? 
3) And do we need national-level screening protocols to keep pace with our allies?

If we fail to act, the very research that drives our future could be used against us.

MUSIC

For our last segment this week, we focus on a chilling development in Ukraine that blurs the line between ideological extremism and state-sponsored violence. 

A Telegram post attributed to the Ukrainian wing of The Base — a far-right terrorist group originally founded in the United States — has claimed responsibility for the recent assassination of Colonel Ivan Voronych, a senior officer with Ukraine’s Security Service or SBU. 

The killing took place in broad daylight in a Kyiv parking lot, and video of the assassination quickly spread through Ukrainian media, shocking the public and raising new questions about the nature of hybrid warfare in Eastern Europe.

The assassination marks a dangerous escalation in The Base’s activities. 

For months, the group has publicly called for sabotage and assassinations within Ukraine, offering monetary rewards for attacks on critical infrastructure and political targets. 

With this killing, The Base appears to have moved beyond propaganda into direct action — either by coordinating the attack, endorsing it after the fact, or both.

A statement posted by the group claimed the murder was “only the beginning” and declared its members would continue their campaign until “justice prevails.” 

The same message lauded the attackers as heroes and dismissed critics who labeled them terrorists or extremists. 

A follow-up post threatened further attacks on Ukrainian public figures, declaring, “The hunt continues!”

This isn’t just violent rhetoric — it's part of a broader campaign. 

Since at least March, the group has claimed responsibility for arson attacks targeting military vehicles, electrical infrastructure, and police stations across Ukraine. 

These attacks, geolocated and documented in online videos, suggest a coordinated insurgency campaign aimed at destabilizing Ukraine from within.

The Base was formed in 2018 by Rinaldo Nazzaro, a former Pentagon contractor who has since relocated to St. Petersburg, Russia. 

The group quickly attracted attention from the FBI and other Western intelligence services for its extremist ideology and attempts to build an all-white ethnostate through terrorism. 

It has been designated a terrorist organization by several governments.

Originally focused on the U.S. and North America, The Base has increasingly shifted its operations abroad, especially in Europe. 

In April, the group declared the start of an insurgency in western Ukraine, claiming it sought to establish a white ethnostate in the Zakarpattia region. 

The group’s ideological messaging has become intertwined with broader geopolitical aims — and increasingly aligned with Russian interests.

According to Ukrainian security services, the two suspects behind Voronych’s assassination were killed shortly after the attack. 

Ukrainian officials believe they were recruited and supplied by Russian intelligence. 

Reports suggest the attackers were foreign nationals linked to criminal groups, supported remotely by Russian handlers. 

If true, this suggests that The Base — or at least elements of it — may now be operating as a proxy or tool of Russian statecraft.

Although Nazzaro has denied direct involvement in the Ukraine cell or the assassination, he has publicly praised the group’s actions in Ukraine and claimed to have relinquished control to local members. 

He has also repeatedly denied any relationship with Russian intelligence, despite evidence suggesting the group’s digital infrastructure relies heavily on Russian platforms, including email services linked to Kremlin allies.

Analysts monitoring extremist movements believe the group’s recent actions in Ukraine represent a significant evolution. 

According to one counter-terrorism expert, The Base has conducted at least 10 attacks inside Ukraine and has issued repeated threats to carry out assassinations and acts of sabotage. 

While it’s difficult to confirm the group’s direct responsibility for the Voronych killing, the operation is consistent with their stated goals and operational tactics.

This kind of activity presents a double threat: ideologically driven terrorism merged with state-sponsored objectives. 

The group is no longer acting independently — it’s becoming part of the new gray zone conflict, where traditional intelligence services enable and exploit non-state actors to wage war without attribution.

The assassination of Colonel Ivan Voronych is yet another reminder that the modern threat environment is rapidly evolving. 

Groups like The Base are no longer fringe movements operating in isolation. 

They are becoming hybrid threats — ideologically radical, operationally violent, and strategically useful to hostile state actors like Russia.

Ukraine is facing these threats head-on. 

But for countries like Canada, the implications are just as serious. 

Are we prepared for a world where foreign intelligence services co-opt domestic or foreign extremist groups to conduct targeted assassinations, sabotage, and influence operations? 

Are we tracking the online spaces where these groups coordinate and radicalize? 

And most importantly, are we prepared to respond when these threats cross our borders?

As always, these are the questions we need to ask — because in intelligence, what we fail to see is often one of our biggest threats and what we ignore hurts us most.

That will do it for this week in the look into the shadowy world of intelligence. 

As always, the links to the open-source stories are in the transcript for you to read and make your own assessments. 

This podcast is not about hype, or spin, or political leanings. 

It’s about taking information and through a process of collaboration, verification and analysis, providing you with actionable, relatable intelligence. 

The intelligence to: Stay curious, stay informed and stay safe. 

See you next week. 

MUSIC

OUTRO:

That wraps up this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up.

From foreign agents rewarded with Russian passports, to cyber intrusions targeting military infrastructure, to extremist groups turning ideology into assassination — this week’s stories show just how broad, complex, and interconnected today’s intelligence threats have become.

Each episode takes hours of research, analysis, writing, and editing — not to mention decades of real-world experience. 

This isn’t breaking news or clickbait. 

It’s curated intelligence — designed to give you the insight needed to see the bigger picture and prepare for what’s coming.

If this episode helped you think differently about the threats we face, please like, share, and leave a review. 

Your engagement helps us grow and reach others who care about national security, foreign interference, and protecting democratic institutions.

And if you believe in the value of what we’re doing — if you want to help keep this podcast sharp, focused, and fully independent — you can support the mission directly through Patreon. 

Every contribution helps ensure we can continue delivering intelligence that matters.
Thanks for listening. Stay curious, stay informed, and stay safe.

LINKS

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Story 1: Putin rewards American Daniel Martindale with a Russian passport for spying in Ukraine
Link: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/american-daniel-martindale-russia-passport-spying-ukraine-war-putin/

Story 2: Israel Launches National Campaign to Warn Against Iranian Espionage
Link: https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/national-advertising-blitz-urges-israelis-not-spy-iran-2025-07-16/

Story 3: Chinese Court Sentences Japanese National to Prison for Espionage
Link: https://japantoday.com/category/crime/chinese-court-sentences-japanese-man-to-3-1-2-years-in-prison-for-spying

Story 4: Chinese Hackers Infiltrate U.S. National Guard for Nearly a Year
Link: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/national-guard-hacked-by-chinese-salt-typhoon-campaign-2025-07-15

Story 5: Public Safety Minister Wrote Support Letters for Suspected Tamil Tigers Member
Link: https://globalnews.ca/news/11287613/public-safety-minister-support-letters-immigration-applicant-terror-group/

Story 6: Danish universities reject foreign researchers amid espionage fears
Link: https://www.euronews.com/2025/07/17/danish-universities-increasingly-rejecting-foreign-researchers-in-fear-of-espionage

Story 7: Ukraine wing of US-founded terrorist group says it was involved in killing of intelligence officer in Kyiv
Link: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jul/16/the-base-terrorist-group-ukraine-assassination